



**Local Peace Committees in Communities Affected by Transboundary
Violence: The Case of RENAMO Incursions in Chipinge, Zimbabwe**

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Public Management-Peace Studies
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ABSTRACT

The violence perpetrated by the RENAMO rebels has not only brought suffering to the Mozambican community. It has transcended the Mozambican boundary and affected the Zimbabwean communities adjacent to the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. The outbreak of the violence has occurred twice due to the structural flaws of the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992. Despite this, the Zimbabwean government and the affected border communities have not taken measures to ensure the protection of the communities from further violence. In light of this background, my research intended to analyze how Local Peace Committees can be utilized to secure the border communities from the violence of the RENAMO forces. The research's location was Chipinge-East Constituency in Chipinge District of Manicaland Province in Zimbabwe. The research was guided by the conflict transformation theoretical framework and carried out using the action research methodology with a qualitative approach. From the data collected, the research-participants revealed that the RENAMO rebels have indeed caused a lot of suffering within their community. The data also revealed that the government responses thus far have been ineffective in curbing the violence and the community members, on the other hand, did not take any initiatives to protect themselves from the violence. I then designed an intervention based on the findings of the research. The intervention was in the form of training on Basic Concepts of peace and conflict, Local Peace Committees and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER). Following the training, the research-participants established the Chipinge-East Constituency Local Peace Committee and designed the Chipinge-East Constituency early warning system. The LPC raised awareness of the EWER strategy among their fellow community members and presented their EWER strategy to the local authorities and government officials at the district and provincial levels respectively. The research reached the conclusion that LPC's are in a position to secure the Zimbabwean communities affected by transboundary violence.

Key Words: Early Warning, Chipinge, Zimbabwe, RENAMO, Violence.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis herewith submitted for the Ph.D.: Public Management-Peace Studies at the Durban University of Technology has not been previously submitted to any other university worldwide.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my loving grandmother Mrs. Rose Sipiwe "Chef Dorca" Muchanyuka. Through your unwavering support, encouragement, prayers, and guidance, thus far I have come.....

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The completion of this study rests on the shoulders of individuals who sacrificed and contributed in various ways towards the achievement of this goal. Chief among them was my supervisor, Professor Geoff Thomas Harris. He was my guiding light throughout the study. In many ways, he encouraged me to soldier on through the darkest days of the research when all seemed impossible. Through him, I have come to learn that Peace Studies is more than a mere qualification, but rather a lifestyle. I have been truly inspired to take an active role in bringing about peace in my life, community, country, and Africa as a whole.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to ICON center staff for their support and the Durban University of Technology for the opportunity and resources granted to me to pursue this doctoral program.

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Lastly to my sons, Austin Munesu and Adrian Munesimba, may this body of work be an inspiration to you later in life of what is possible. May it serve as a reminder to you to always aim to reach your full potential in whatever you do. The sky is the limit!

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
DA	District Administrator
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
LPC	Local Peace Committee
NPRC	National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONHRI	Organ National Healing Reconciliation and Integration
PA	Provincial Administrator
PF ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
SADC	Southern African Development Committee
SNASP	National Service for Public Security
UNOCHA	United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WPDC	Wajir Peace and Development Committee
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defense Forces
ZIM-MOZA	Zimbabwe-Mozambique
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the research study through narrating the background, rationale, and problem that triggered it. The chapter further explains the direction of the research study that is the overall aim, objectives, research methodology and theoretical framework that were used. In addition, the chapter further outlines the ethical and validity steps that were used to ensure the credibility of the research project.

1.2 An Overview

The study examined the ability of local peace committees in Chipinge, Zimbabwe to come up with community based initiatives to mitigate the violence that is experienced by Zimbabwean communities located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. The study emanated from the violence, which many communities located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border periodically face from the RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) rebels. The study was based upon the case study of the Chipinge-East constituency in Chipinge District along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. The community fell victim to several incidents perpetrated by RENAMO rebels especially during episodes of the recurrent conflict between the rebels and the Mozambican government. Furthermore, due to the porous nature of the border, the community has become a soft target of the violence perpetrated by the rebels.

Despite the Zimbabwean and Mozambican governments' efforts to rectify the situation, the Chipinge-East community has suffered loss of lives, kidnappings, sexual violence, forced recruitment, robberies, and landmines at the hands of the rebels. The overall aim of the study was to assess how best local peace committees can help the community to better protect itself against the violence. The study was done using action research method to diagnose the problem, design, implement and evaluate the intervention. The data was collected via participatory observation, key informant interviews and focus group

discussions. The participants of the study were local and traditional authorities as well as members of the Chipinge-East community. Thereafter, a series of trainings were conducted with the research participants to enhance their peace building capacity within their respective context.

1.3 Background, Context and Research Problem

The 1977-1992 Mozambican civil war not only affected the Mozambican nationals. It also affected the Zimbabwean communities located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Zimbabwean communities from Nyamapanda in the far north to Chiredzi in the south underwent a series of attacks, robberies, and murders from the RENAMO rebels.

RENAMO was initially created by the intelligence arm of the Rhodesian government under Ian Douglas Smith (1964-1979). It was used as an instrument to destabilize the newly independent state of Mozambique in 1975 (Wiegink 2015:02, Osvaldo *et al* 2013:66, Hultman 2009:825). However, following the fall of the Smith regime and the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, the patronage of RENAMO was undertaken by the South African Apartheid regime under the B.J. Vorster regime (Wiegink 2015:03). South Africa used RENAMO as an instrument for its destabilization policy of newly independent African states such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho among others. This was because these newly independent African states were allegedly harboring South African nationalists, supporting and inspiring the struggle against Apartheid (Rupiya 1998:13). It was during this period in time that RENAMO was at its most brutal and carried out numerous incursions into Zimbabwe (more discussed under section 4.7).

During the Mozambican civil war 1977-1992, the Zimbabwean communities along the border faced multiple incursions from the Mozambican RENAMO rebels. These incursions led to loss of property and lives on both sides of the border. In Zimbabwe, for instance, RENAMO attacked the Mutare-Beira oil pipeline, Mutare-Beira-Maputo railway line, and road networks (Fearon and Laitin 2005:09). In 1981 the bridge over the Pungwe river was bombed. Chicualacuala in Mozambique was also attacked, thereby blocking

Zimbabwe's gateway to the sea. In November 1987, RENAMO rebels crossed the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary and attacked a workers' compound at Nyambuya Forestry Estate located along the border (Chimanikire 1999:10). They destroyed property and the workers were attacked with pangas, knives, and bayonets. Radios, watches, and food were stolen. Twenty people mostly women, were kidnapped and were used as porters. Similar atrocities were committed in Chiredzi's Musumeki village of the Sengwe communal lands. According to Jennifer (1983:04) four people were murdered and four caterpillars belonging to the Ministry of Transport set ablaze. In Ndali town, 71 km east of the Chiredzi town, six people were also murdered, a clinic was burnt down, two grinding mills and five stores were looted (ibid). The oil depot at Beira was blown up with US\$12 million worth of oil which could meet Zimbabwe's needs for 21 months (ibid). As a result, Zimbabweans had a bleak Christmas that year as they could not travel, cars were abandoned, factories were closed and power cuts became the order of the day (ibid).

Following the Rome peace agreement of 1992, the incursions recurred between 2013 and 2017 and history repeated itself. Zimbabwe communities along the border once again suffered. Cattle rustling and skirmishes were happening on the Zimbabwean-Mozambican boundary. Chiketo (2017) states that on 10 December 2016, a report from the Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) confirmed that 15 RENAMO soldiers armed with AK47 rifles carried out a raid of 50 cattle to feed the RENAMO fighters. According to Jakwa (2017), the Mozambican soldiers had also been partaking in the raids. In Nyanga, Nyamutenha village, ward 11 also located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary, RENAMO soldiers armed with bows and arrows invaded, kidnapped four Zimbabweans and stole an unspecified number of cattle. In the Nyamapanda area, residents were reported to be living in fear and a police officer was even shot dead.

Part of the reason why Zimbabwean communities along the border continue to suffer from violence can be attributed to ineffective peacebuilding mechanisms pursued by both the Zimbabwean and Mozambican governments.

The Mozambican government took its first attempt at peacebuilding by signing the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984. The Accord was signed between the Mozambican and South African governments on the banks of the Nkomati River in South Africa (Goncalves 1998: 20). The major promises of the agreement were that the South African government would cease to support the RENAMO rebels (ibid). In return, the Mozambican government also promised to stop accommodating ANC operatives from South Africa. The Mozambican government even went as far as raiding the homes of ANC members residing in Mozambique and four arrests were made (Jorre 1984:02).

However, by 1985 the peace agreement had failed as both parties of the agreement had violated it. This was revealed by the documents, which were found by the Zimbabwean security forces during their raid of the RENAMO HQ at Gorongossa Mountains in 1985 (Osvaldo *et al* 2013:68). The South African government had supplied huge quantities of arms to the RENAMO HQ in Gorongossa prior to the agreement (ibid). As a result, RENAMO forces continued attacking civilians in Mozambique and Zimbabwe such that by 1986 RENAMO operations had spread to north and western-central Mozambique (Rupiya 1998:14). Goncalves (1998:20) attributes the failure of the agreement to the lack of sincerity on the part of the Mozambican government. He states that Samora Machel had signed the agreement to get access to humanitarian aid from the USA (ibid).

As a mitigating measure to these attacks, the Zimbabwe government deployed 5000-8000 troops in 1985 to attack Casa Banana (Mlambo: 1999). This is the location of the headquarters of RENAMO in the Gorongossa Mountains in central Sofala province of Mozambique (Goncalves 1998:21). In addition, the troops protected the Beira corridor in Mozambique, which is the source of fuel to Zimbabwe. However, this approach proved to be ineffective; it only made the violence escalate. The deployment of the troops in Mozambique left the Zimbabwean communities along the border exposed to further attacks. Mlambo (1999) alludes to the fact that the RENAMO continued its covert operations. He further states (ibid) that RENAMO rebels punished the Zimbabwean communities along the border for the interference of the Zimbabwean troops in Mozambican affairs. As a result, 500 Zimbabwean

civilians were brutally murdered and 200 000 Mozambican refugees ended up on Zimbabwean soil (Mlambo 1997:45). Duri (2010:137) however, reduces the figure to 100 000 and states that 52 000 of the refugees resided at the Tongogara refugee camp located in Zimbabwe. The other refugee camps that were opened in Zimbabwe to accommodate Mozambican refugees were Inyangombe, Chambuta, and Mazoe Bridge. Hughes (1999:533) concurs and adds that by 1991 Mozambicans from the Mossurize and Sussundega districts flowed into Zimbabwe's Chimanimani district and were later settled into the Tongogara refugee camp.

In 1992, a liberal peacebuilding model was employed to cease hostilities in Mozambique. The Rome peace accord was signed between the Mozambican FRELIMO government and RENAMO rebels. Zimbabwe government represented by former president Robert Gabriel Mugabe was one of the mediators in the peace process (Mufuka 2016:58). Thereafter, Mozambique went on to have its first multi-party elections in October 1994 and 21 years of relative peace. However, this peacebuilding approach proved ineffective yet again. The peace agreement was not adhered to in letter and spirit. In my view, the Rome peace agreement suffered the same fate as the Nkomati Accord of 1985.

Unsurprisingly, in December 2013 the hostilities resumed albeit at a lower intensity than in the 1980s (BBC 2013). The RENAMO party and its military wing withdrew from the 1992 peace process altogether (Ibid). This followed allegations against the FRELIMO government by RENAMO for rigging municipal elections (Jakwa 2017). By 2016, the RENAMO soldiers had conducted 107 attacks in which 40 civilians were killed and 79 injured. The attacks happened in the areas of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia, Inhambane, Nampula and Gaza (Hanlon 2016).

Nevertheless, once again the attacks affected the Zimbabwean communities along the border. Lives were lost and property was damaged. The response of the Zimbabwean government was similar to its response during the 1977-1992 civil war. Zimbabwean army simply asked the communities dwelling along the boundary to move away from the boundary and deeper into Zimbabwean

territory to avoid conflict (Musiyu 2017). He further specifies that 5000 Zimbabweans dwelling along the boundary were given a three-day ultimatum by the Zimbabwean army to move (ibid). He also informs that this was meant to create a buffer zone between the communities and the RENAMO soldiers (ibid). When I analyzed this modus operandi using peacebuilding lenses, it became apparent that this was not an effective way to deal with the conflict, as it did not address the core issues of the conflict.

Since 2016, the conflict has since subsided when the late former RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama declared a truce and engaged the Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi on the peace process. The peace process took almost three years and was eventually signed in August 2019 (Jentzsch 2019). Sadly, the agreement was signed 13 months after the untimely death of RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama due to a heart attack (Cowell 2018). Nevertheless, his successor Ossufo Momade stood in for him for the negotiations and eventual signing of the agreement. However, as elaborated further in section 9.4, not much has changed from the current peace deal with the former one (Rome Peace Process). The past mistakes of the deal are being repeated. This led to a split in the RENAMO party with one faction led by Ossufo Momade and Mariano Nhongo leads the other faction (Klenfeld 2019).

From my analysis, this is a worrisome development especially for the Zimbabwean communities dwelling along the border considering their past experiences with RENAMO rebels. Furthermore, the recurrence of the conflict and failure of peacebuilding models is indicative of three issues: that the liberal peacebuilding approach utilized to settle the conflict (Rome peace process) is flawed in the context of Mozambique. Secondly, the recurrence of the conflict highlights the need to revisit this approach to bring about a more sustainable and positive peace amongst the parties. Lastly, the recurrence of the conflict brings to the fore the fact that the current stakeholders and guarantors of the Rome peace accords have failed the people of both Zimbabwe and Mozambique especially those residing along the Mozambique-Zimbabwean border. The stakeholders of the peace process i.e. RENAMO, FRELIMO, and even the Zimbabwe government can thus not be relied upon to deal with the Mozambican issue and safety of the people living along the border. Both the

Mozambican and Zimbabwean governments have a documented history of failing in terms of implementing effective peacebuilding mechanisms to conflicts (more explained in sections 4.7.2 and 7.4). The onus is thus on the affected communities to search for sustainable and positive peacebuilding mechanisms. This study explored alternative and more inclusive peacebuilding mechanisms which the Zimbabwean communities affected by the conflict can implement to rescue them from the transboundary incursions. This is an area, which appears to have been neglected by Zimbabwean academics, and thus this study sought to fill that gap and come up with a model, which can be implemented in the affected communities.




Figure 1. Chipinge East Parliamentary Constituency 2018

1.4 Overall Aim

The aim of the research was to assess how Local Peace Committees can be utilized to assist Zimbabwean communities affected by transboundary violence. These communities are located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border and they face the risk of transboundary violence from the Mozambican RENAMO rebels.

1.5 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives were to:

- a) Examine the nature, extent, and consequences of the transboundary violence affecting Chipinge-East in Zimbabwe
- b) Critically examine the initiatives undertaken by the Chipinge-East community and the Zimbabwean government to address the transboundary violence.
- c) Design and conduct interventions that enhance the Chipinge-East peacebuilding capacity against transboundary violence.
- d) Evaluate the short-term outcome of the intervention.

1.5 Research Methods

The research was guided by the interpretivism research philosophy, which advocates the researcher to engage the research participants and understand their way of life. The research also used the action research approach, which moves beyond the traditional social science approach of simply exploring a problem. McNiff and Whitehead (2006:7) define action research as a form of inquiry that enables researchers to explore the dimensions of a problem, to develop and implement activities designed to deal with the problem and to investigate and evaluate their work. They do this `with` people rather than `for` people. Kennis and Wilkinson (1998:21) state that action research attempts to help people investigate and change their social and educational realities by changing the practices of their lived realities. Borda (1979:33) adds that, action research aims to help people to investigate reality in order to change it. Somekh (2006:2) posits that this research approach emanates from the concepts of Lewin's social psychology, which states that action research is as a result of group exploration of social interactions rather than rational deduction. She also states that action research is grounded in John Dewey's theory of learning by doing (ibid). Zeichner (2001:273) traces the origins of this approach to the work of Kurt Lewin in 1946. Koshy (2005:20) informs that action research is about learning through action meaning that it is participatory in nature. In other words, the researcher should make him or herself part of the research.

So ideally, action research is participatory in nature. The researcher includes his or her subjects in the whole process of the research. This means that the researcher cannot be very clear on how the research will play out.

Research design refers to the type of data, which was collected. This may be quantitative (e.g. when surveying samples of 100+) or qualitative (e.g. when carrying out in-depth interviews with 15-20 individuals) or a mixture of the two. The research design for this study was qualitative. This is because the study intended to collect in-depth information concerning how local peace committees in Chipinge can help to protect their community from the conflict with RENAMO incursions. This was done through in-depth, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), structured observations and a collection of secondary data. The interviews and discussions were done with local authorities, traditional leaders and community members of Chipinge.

The study had three components i.e. exploration, intervention, and evaluation. The exploratory aspect gathered background information concerning the nature of the transboundary conflict facing the Chipinge-East community. This was done through consulting primary and secondary sources such as archival material, published articles, books and interviews with key informants on the topic. The purpose behind this was to fully comprehend the context in which the transboundary conflicts are happening and the attempts that have been made to resolve the violence.

The intervention component covered the design and implementation of measures to mitigate the conflict and move towards transforming it. During this phase, the community members underwent training to equip them to better protect their community from violence.

The evaluative aspect reflected on how the research participants devised and implemented the intervention plans

The approximate population size of the target population involved in Chipinge (Zimbabwe) is 20 000 and that of Chief Chipinge-East is 7000. The exploratory component of the research focused on 38 participants as it was qualitative research. Eight of them were key informants i.e.

- Provincial Administrator Manicaland
- Chipinge-East Member of Parliament
- Chipinge Central Member of Parliament
- Chipinge District Administrator
- Chief Executive Officer of the Chipinge Rural District Council
- Chief of Gwenzi chieftaincy
- Chief of Mapungwana chieftaincy
- Commander of the army in Chipinge

30 of them were ordinary community members of the Chipinge-East community. These were divided into two-focus discussion groups; one for women and one for men purposively selected based on their knowledge and experiences with the RENAMO incursions.

The FGDs and the KIs formed the nucleus of the planning group with experience of the research problem. I met with these once a month for 18 months and together we planned and implemented appropriate interventions. This is in accordance with the participatory action research method.

Participatory observation of what was said and what was done – both inside and after the group meetings – was another source of data on the design and implementation component. The group underwent training of early warning systems as well as peacebuilding mechanisms, which I facilitated. The trainings were intended to have a cascading effect whereby the participants trained in turn trained other community members on methods of effectively building peace against the RENAMO violence and secure the community. The groups evolved into a local peace committee. The intention behind the formation of the committees was for the local community to have skills of how to fully participate directly in the peacebuilding process unlike before whereby the governments were in full control and excluded the communities that were directly affected by the conflict.

In order to evaluate the outcomes from the training, it was necessary to go back to the members of the local peace committee and examine the progress they had made in terms of establishing themselves, formulating their own early

warning strategy, establishing contact with their local authorities and fellow community members.

Validity: An attempt to assess the trustworthiness of my data and its interpretation was done by the following means; comparing the information given by respondents with documentary evidence e.g. police reports, newspaper articles and archival data, comparing the FGD and interview responses (triangulation). Member checking i.e. continually taking my findings and interpretations back to the participants to see if they agreed with them. Anonymity was ensured by not publicly using or recording the actual names of the participants during and after the research. Pseudonyms were used instead of the titles of their jobs when this does not allow identification of the individual. The researcher emphasized that all participation will be voluntary and that the DUT ethical requirements were carefully followed.

1.6 Summary

The chapter introduced the whole thesis by outlining the background of the research as well as the theoretical and methodological frameworks. These frameworks and methodologies guided the whole thesis from the beginning to the end. The chapters that follow are an expansion and extension of what was laid out in this introductory chapter.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF PEACEBUILDING

2.1 Introduction

This chapter dwells upon the fundamental theoretical foundations, which informed this study. Academic contributions made by leading scholars in the field of peace studies were examined, for instance, the works of Johan Galtung, Jean-Paul Lederach, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse among others. The chapter also highlighted some gaps, contradictions and even limitations of the theories and contributions made by these scholars. In particular, the chapter reflects and analyze the concepts and theories of peacebuilding, conflict, conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. The analysis of the chapter will lean more towards the latter theory i.e. conflict transformation as it is the main theoretical pillar of this study. The chapter will zoom in on elements of the theory of conflict transformation such as Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) and local peace committees (LPCs). Furthermore, the chapter will also examine case studies of formal and informal local peace committees from various parts of the world. This assists to comprehend the practical realities that face conflict transformation on the ground.

2.2 Peace and Peacebuilding

2.2.1 Definition

The definitions of peace are simple and direct. However, there are two schools of thought regarding the definition of peace. There are scholars who simply define peace as the absence of war or conflict. Schilling (2012:18) defines, "peace as the freedom from war". Lund (1996:09) defines, "peace as the replacement of self-defense measures among parties with high levels of reciprocity and cooperation". However, following the arguments of Galtung (1990) on the three stages of violence, it is found that the absence of physical violence does not automatically equate to peace. He argued that, even in the absence of physical violence, peace can continue to be elusive due to structural and cultural violence. These other forms of violence even have more damaging consequences (Harris 2011:127).

This then leads to the other definition of peace that encapsulates this dimension of the different types of violence. Galtung (1967:12) defines peace as a synonym of all good things in the world i.e. cooperation and integration between human groups. He, however, adds that this type of peace is not concerned with the total absence of violence it actually tolerates occasional violence. Hansen (1988:01) states that peace is a condition in which the majority of people on the planet enjoy physical security, a modicum of material prosperity, the satisfaction of the basic needs of human existence, efficacy and psychic harmony. Irene (2014:138) defines peace as an ideal state of being and depends on the fulfillment of various peace needs such as freedom from violence and social harmony among others.

From these definitions I deduced that, peace is the eradication of all harmful practices that can directly or indirectly affect a person's well-being. Peace is relatively not difficult to define, it is, however, difficult to achieve. The road map towards peace is not straight and narrow, but rather it is convoluted, it is one with several bends, curves, twists, and turns. The process of establishing peace is not as simple as the definition itself. It is a process and not an event. There is no one way of achieving peace, it is rather a context-based or on a case-by-case basis. This process is the one referred to as peacebuilding.

Paffenholz (2014:11) traces the origins of the term Peacebuilding to 1975 but then adds that it became popular in the 1990s. Galtung (1976) also used the term in his publication *Three Approaches to Peace*. Former UN-Secretary General (1992-1996) Boutros Ghali then popularized the term in the 1990s (Accord 2015:10).

Smoljan (2003) on the other hand argues that there is no definite definition of peacebuilding. However, when one looks closely at the literature of peacebuilding, there are scholars and practitioners of peace who have attempted to define peacebuilding. Though they might not agree on a single definition, one can extrapolate the basic meaning and tenets of peacebuilding from these various definitions.

Peacebuilding entails those actions undertaken by national and international actors to institutionalize peace (Call and Causens 2007:02). It also includes a

wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow peace accords (Lederach 2004:20). Peacebuilding involves actions focused on conflict prevention, management, and transformation that are necessary to address tensions in post-conflict societies. It aims to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict in the future (Accord 2015:10).

From these few definitions, one can get the idea that peacebuilding covers all the stages of the conflict from beginning to end. This is unlike peacemaking and peacekeeping, which focus on certain stages of the conflict. Before or after these stages these methods of peace are rendered obsolete. Peacebuilding, however, covers the stages before, during and after the conflict. It can thus be perceived to be a broader framework of bringing about peace. Peacebuilding is the gateway to peace.

Porter (2007) states that peacebuilding aims to establish positive relationships, heal wounds, reconcile antagonistic differences, restore esteem, respect rights, meet basic needs, and enhance equality and security. Former United Nations Secretary-General (1992-1996) Boutros-Boutros Ghali, attempted to define peacebuilding during his Agenda for Peace address. He defined it as a process, which prevents conflict from recurring through addressing underlying issues responsible for the conflict (Ghali 1992:57). Issifu (2016:145) agrees with him when he posits that peacebuilding is concerned with the transformation of post-conflict societies.

When one analyzes these definitions and compares it to contemporary literature in the discourse of peacebuilding they are found to be simplified and outdated. The definitions are narrow in that they focus more on the post-conflict part of peacebuilding. One can classify them as classical or traditional definitions of peacebuilding belonging to the formative years of the theory. The definition of peacebuilding has since evolved to become broader and more pro-active. Contemporary scholars of peace studies now define peacebuilding as the actions that are done to address conflict even before, during and after it occurs.

Lederach (2012:09) affirms that peacebuilding can actually be instrumental in preventing violence and not just post-conflict. Accord (2015:11) maintains that

peacebuilding has evolved from simply the post-peacekeeping or avoiding a relapse into war. It adds that peacebuilding is now doing more than reacting to conflict dynamics and is now strengthening the development of local social institutions. Schilling (2012:28) adds that peacebuilding is an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts but also peacemaking and peacekeeping. It encompasses early warning early response, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreement and the establishment of peace zones. This entails that peacebuilding now covers episodes before and after the conflict. Gruener & Hald (2015:03) state that peacebuilding is a broader policy framework that strengthens the synergy among the related efforts of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, recovery, and development as a collective and sustained effort to build lasting peace.

In addition to the definition of peacebuilding, there are three different approaches regarding the implementation of peacebuilding. These are namely the western, traditional and cosmopolitan approaches.

2.2.2 Evolution of Approaches to Peacebuilding

The western approach makes use of external bodies and systems to transform post-conflict or disaster societies (Issifu, 2016:145). It is known as the liberal peacebuilding or liberal internationalism (Newman *et al.* 2009:03). The affected communities are turned to market democratic states. They are also fixed with formal court systems and the rule of law (*ibid*). This approach has been tested following conflicts such as the First World War (1914-1918), Second World War (1939-1945), Cold War (1945-1991) and various African civil wars. However, it is evident that the conflicts recur especially when one considers African cases such as the Rwandan genocide (1994), DRC (1996-2003), Burundi civil war (1993-2006), Sudan Civil War (1956-1972, 1983-2005), South-Sudan civil war (2013-present), Central African Republic (2012-present), Libya (2011-present) can be seen as a testament to this assertion.

Conflicts have recurred in these communities despite attempts of resolving them through the liberal peacebuilding approach. These cases suggest that

the western approach of peacebuilding seems to have difficulties in resolving African conflicts or conflicts in developing countries. This can be attributed to the prevalence of issues such as illiteracy, poverty, and marginalization in Africa.

Furthermore, in the African contexts, there have been other indigenous knowledge systems that have been in place prior to the implementation of the international liberalism. These issues thus become obstacles to the effectiveness of the liberal approach to peacebuilding. Thus, the introduction of these liberal systems does not address the root causes of conflict and hence the chances of the conflict to recur are high. The argument is similar to that of Moyo (2009: 43) when she stated that the liberalization of African economies through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) did not work due to the absence of Eurocentric institutions to make the aid effective. She argued that this was in contrast to the Marshal Plan in Europe following the Second World War (1939-1945) (ibid: 45). It was a success due to the presence of strong institutions in European nations despite the damage done by war (ibid). The western approach seems to work better in contexts that have pre-existing foundations of liberal economies and political systems i.e. a high Human Development Index (HDI).

Furthermore, the western approach seems to be suitable for horizontal inter-state conflicts. This means that the conflict should be between or among nations with equal standing in the international system. These states should be equal in terms of political, economic and even military capacity. This is similar to Galtung's (1976:285) argument that peacekeeping is more effective when it is done between nations with similar military capabilities. When the conflict is horizontal, it is easier to use mediators from within the international system i.e. from other countries. This is enabled by the equality among states within the international system in accordance with International Law (Shaw 2008:214). So theoretically legally, there is a power balance among nations thus, mediations can be conducted on that basis.

However, the legal basis is an idealistic way of looking at international relations. In reality, there are other secondary issues of economic and political

power that come into play. It is through these soft forms of power that mediators can influence or control the belligerents thereby disrupting the peacebuilding process. However, in the post-cold war era, inter-state conflicts are becoming less whilst intra-state conflicts are becoming more. Conflicts of this nature are vertical in that they are between belligerents with a vast difference in terms of power i.e. the state against civilians. In addition, there are now non-state actors such that the peacebuilding efforts need to be local and context-based as opposed to international (Muchemwa 2015:14).

Scholars such as Chiweshe (2016), Pouligny (2005) and Paris (1997, 2002) have also critiqued the western approach of peacebuilding. Chiweshe (2016) criticizes the western approach for being top-down in nature and institutionally driven at the expense of local cultures and communities. Pouligny (2005: 495 & 507) adds that the western approach is highly formal and elitist in nature. She says that it favors aid programs, civil society and ignores changes within the societies involved in the conflict. Paris (1997:56) argues that the western approach wrongly assumes that peace can be achieved through political and economic liberalization. In his 2002 publication on the same topic of the western approach of peacebuilding, he further argued that it focused more on the political and economic factors as opposed to the social factors. He also argues that the western approach is a re-incarnation of the supremacist mentality that prevailed in the period leading to colonialism. The mentality assumed that Africa was a dark continent and thus needed to be civilized by Europeans (Paris 2002:637). It appears that the western approach assumed that the indigenous system that existed prior to the conflict was faulty and thus had to be replaced. However, one can argue that the old indigenous system does not have to be replaced but rather modified to accommodate the conflicting interests of the antagonists. The new system only serves to bring about further confusion as it is foreign to the antagonists.

The traditional approach is a reaction to the elitist and institutional nature of the western approach to peacebuilding (Mtyoko n.d.:06). He states that this approach is also known as peacebuilding from below which relies more on local actors and non-governmental organizations and citizen-based peacebuilding. Issifu (2016:145) traces the origin of the approach to Africa. He

states that it strives to identify the structural causes of the conflict through mediation, joint problem solving, rituals and negotiations. It utilizes culture and internal social control mechanisms. It promotes a win-win or non-zero sum game in which the antagonists both walk away from the conflict with something or nothing at all. The traditional approach also seeks to re-establish contact between the antagonists to re-establish social harmony. Ajayi and Buhari (2014:142) elaborate it further and state that in traditional African societies traditional police and courts ensured compliance with the law of the land. Elders and neighbors were relied upon as the mediators to resolve the conflicts. Both scholars also state that besides the elders and traditional authorities, community members could also be relied upon to resolve smaller conflicts within the community. This shows that the Traditional approach to peacebuilding had a multi-level structure and was inclusive.

When one analyzes this approach it is seen that parallels can be drawn with the African philosophy of Ubuntu. Nussbaum (2003:02), Mandela (2006: xxv) and Tutu (1999: 34-35) define Ubuntu as an African way of living based on compassion, reciprocity, dignity, and humanity. It builds and maintains communities based on justice and mutual caring. Through this philosophy, peace is achieved, maintained or restored through cordial relations within the community. The peacebuilding is done for the good of the community, the social harmony. It is more inward-looking as it uses mediators from within unlike the western approach.

In the contemporary discourse of peace studies, this approach is being presented as new with the term conflict transformation; however, elements of it were already in existence in Africa. It had always been practiced prior to the emergence of the western approach of peacebuilding.

However, the traditional peacebuilding approach has also come under criticism from scholars. Ramsbotham *et al* (2011:226) argue that the traditional approach can also marginalize people through power asymmetry, patriarchy, and privilege. They argue that local actors are also capable of replicating what external actors are accused of. Furthermore, as argued by Mutisi (2011: 01) the government can take over the process from the local communities. This

has led to the emergence of the cosmopolitan approach to peacebuilding. Metz (2011:533-534) argues that traditional approaches such as Ubuntu are vague and collectivist in nature. They do not fit well into the modern world of human rights and individualism. He argues that the approach is more suited to pastoralist communities.

The cosmopolitan approach is a hybrid model, which combines elements of both the western and traditional approaches. It comes from the understanding that both approaches cannot do without the other. The local communities cannot act alone without the assistance of the government and the reverse is true. Both approaches, though they have their inherent weaknesses if used together, are complementary. Kristoffer (2009:621) defines the cosmopolitan approach as one that combines human rights and the participation of marginalized people in the community. He states that the cosmopolitan approach has social movements and social actors on the one side and social justice on the other.

Given the analysis above, it is safe to conclude that peacebuilding is more of a process than an event. It is more evolutionary than revolutionary. It requires a lot of flexibility and long-term investment. It is also a process that is multi-layered and involves many stakeholders. Judging from the experiences of the three approaches of peacebuilding, it seems that the process requires a combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches. The nature of peacebuilding will also depend on the context of the conflict.

2.3 Conflict

2.3.1 Definition

Woodhouse and Duffey (2008: 21) put forward a simplistic definition of conflict as the opposite of co-operation, harmony, and peace. They elaborate further and state that conflict normally occurs when the goals pursued by another group are incompatible to those of another. Ramsbotham *et al.* (2011:13) take it a step further and define conflict as an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. They view conflict as an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values, and beliefs that arise. He also states that Galtung identified three

aspects of conflict, which are namely contradictions, behavior and attitudes. They point out that Galtung espouses that contradictions encompass the incompatibility of goals whilst attitude includes perceptions, misperceptions, feelings, and beliefs (ibid). Behavior, on the other hand, includes the way people treat each other. This treatment is mostly negative and includes even gestures, threats and hostility (ibid).

Furthermore, Cooper (2003:85) concurs with Ramsbotham *et al* and opines that conflict is an eradicable part of human life and it arises when the interests of one party come into engagement with those of another. Issifu (2016:144) states that conflict takes place where there is a disagreement or difference in values, attitudes, needs or expectations. Wallenstein (2002:16) follows this line of argument and defines conflict as a disagreement between a minimum of two parties where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time. To him, incompatibility is the key to the conflict. Issifu (2016:144) contributes that conflict occurs when there is a clash of interests in the relationship between parties, groups or states.

However, one can argue that a clash of interests can appear with or without a relationship between antagonists. Jal (2014:45) states that conflict is a visible sign of human energy, it is evidence of human urgency, and it is the result of competitive striving for the same goals, rights, and resources. Jal (2014:45) adds that conflict occurs when there are scarce resources, different levels of power, divided functions in society, competition for a limited supply of goods. Harris (2011:124) attributes conflict to the different ways through which humans perceive issues.

From these definitions, it can be summarized that conflict is a situation, which entails an obstruction in the course of the achievement and fulfillment of one's goals and interests. The obstruction is normally precipitated by the goals of another party, which are ultra-vires to those of the other party. Conflict happens at all levels of society, from the individual to the global level between nations or even within nations.

It is important to note that these goals and interests differ in a way. Some of the goals, which the antagonists have, are objective whilst others are

subjective. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:23) define the objective dimension to be composed of goals, which are related to resources such as land, food, water, and weapons. The subjective dimension, on the other hand, is made up of goals, which are based on emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, jealousy, mistrust, and hostility among others.

When one looks at these two dimensions of conflict it is understood that the objective dimension is mainly made up of basic human needs which are not only universally acceptable but form the foundation of the first generation of human rights. These goals, therefore, are legitimate. The subjective dimension when analyzed is understood to be made up of goals, which are secondary to the interests of humanity. However, it is also possible to have a conflict with both dimensions i.e. objective and subjective (ibid). For instance, the denial of land, which is an objective goal, can lead to the antagonist having emotions of anger, jealousy, and hatred, which are subjective goals within a conflict (ibid). Thus, in some cases, conflicts with a subjective dimension might also have an underlying origin of an objective dimension. This is evident in conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestine and South-Sudanese civil war.

What also comes out of these various definitions of conflict is that it is an integral part of human existence, which cannot and must not be avoided. However, the norm is that when conflict occurs people try to stop it or avoid it. Lederach (2009:07) confirms this when he states that when a conflict arises, people tend to feel uncomfortable and seek for a quick solution. However, as much as conflict is usually frowned upon in society and at times avoided at all costs, it should not be so. This is because conflict is a process through which positive outcomes can be realized especially if it is managed in a constructive manner. Ramsbotham *et al* (2011:13) affirms that conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. Muchemwa (2015:16) adds that conflict is an unavoidable part of human life.

However, Kendie (2010) is of a different view and states that much as conflict is unavoidable, it should be contained. When one assesses the argument it becomes evident that containing conflict is similar to freezing it or avoiding it. Thus, Kendie is viewing conflict with a negative lens. On the contrary, conflict

should be confronted head-on and not avoided; it should be interrogated because beyond conflict there is personal and social development. In other words, conflict offers an opportunity, a window towards a better level of understanding in the relationship of the antagonists. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:21) state that conflict can be a catalyst for personal, social and political change and transformation if managed constructively. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:07), sum up the argument and states that conflict is not irrational nor is it dysfunctional. He states that it is an intrinsic part of human relationships. Marshall (2006:02) concurs with him when he states that conflict is neither good nor bad.

All this is a testament to the fact that conflict is not always bad and should thus not be suppressed or avoided. It is a social process, which is a gateway to a better relationship between individuals and societies at large. Violence, on the other hand, is what is destructive and should be avoided. Whilst conflict is unavoidable, violence is a choice (Harris 2011:126). Therefore, it is important to then identify and explain the options that are available for the constructive remedial of the conflict to beget positive gains out of it other than violence.

2.4 Mechanisms of Resolving Conflicts

2.4.1 Conflict Management

It is also known as conflict regulation or the dissociative approach. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:33) define it as the limitation, mitigation, and containment of conflict. It is not concerned with the total elimination of the conflict. Galtung (1976:282) states that conflict management involves separating antagonists under the threat of violence if they engage in any further violence. The separation can even be done through geographical features such as mountains, oceans or deserts. The separation is done using peacekeeping forces. Muchemwa (2015:20) maintains that as a method of dispute resolution, conflict management only includes top leadership and totally ignores the grassroots communities.

It is more suitable for emergency responses when the conflict has degenerated into violence, which has to be stopped, as it is destructive. It is thus utilized in

situations of physical violence, not structural or cultural violence as propounded by Galtung (1990). Muchemwa (2015:19) argues that the nature of conflict management is based on the assumption that social conflicts cannot be resolved. However, when one looks at this assertion it is found to be untrue. Yes, conflicts are part and parcel of human interaction, but this does not imply that they cannot be resolved. Conflicts have to be resolved because as stated earlier they are a gateway to positive social change. Galtung (1976:291) states that unresolved conflict blocks creative thinking in other directions. Furthermore, stopping violence is not a solution as violence is merely a symptom of a much bigger problem. Through conflict management, negative peace is achieved. Negative peace is the cessation of direct violence without addressing the underlying root and structural causes. Schilling (2012:22) defines Negative Peace as an absence of war, fear and direct violence. The negative perception of a former enemy is also discouraged. However, the parties of the conflict do not engage in positive interactions such as starting to build trust and friendship.

Compared to the other mechanisms of resolving conflicts, conflict management is the least effective. It is narrow in its scope and it is a short-term method of resolving conflict. Harris (2011:122) labels conflict management as the most basic level of dealing with conflict, as it does not deal with the conflict, but just avoids the further continuation of violence. From past experiences, it is evident that conflicts that are settled without the involvement and participation of the grassroots communities are likely to recur. Settlements arrived at without inclusivity of all the stakeholders are rarely sustainable. Galtung (1976: 296) warns that when antagonists are denied of conflict participation it might lead to a new conflict. The South Sudanese conflict is an example of this argument. Despite the peace agreements that were signed in 2005, 2015 and 2017 the conflict has continued to relapse. Case in point is the December 2013 and July 2016 outbreak of violence in which 50 000 people (both civilian and humanitarian staff) have perished (Smith 2017:06). It could be argued that the problem in the settlement of the conflict was that the conflict was settled by separating the main antagonists i.e. the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk with the aid of peacekeeping forces. The conflict management involved the top

leaders of both parties namely Riech Machaar and President Salva Kiir. The grassroots, on the other hand, were not involved in the process hence the outbreak of violence afterward.

This then brings us to the statement that I made earlier that in as far as methods of resolving conflicts are concerned, conflict management is found lacking in many ways. The fact that it uses the threat of violence to terminate hostilities makes it problematic as a way of bringing peace amongst antagonists. By not addressing, the root causes of the conflict, it means that conflict management perpetuates the status quo or structural violence, which contributed to the direct violence in the first place. It does not recognize the grievances of either of the antagonists and this raises the chances of the conflict to recur after the peacekeeping operations have left the premises of the antagonists. This is because the marginalization and inequality between the antagonists remained unresolved.

The use of peacekeeping forces is also problematic and not possible in a number of situations. For peacekeeping forces to be fully functional in separating antagonists the conflict should be horizontal meaning that, the antagonists should be more or less of equal military capacity. Galtung (1976:285) informs that the conflict should also involve peripheral or developing nations upon whom military threats can have an effect. He states that conflict management cannot thus be used in a conflict involving center powers such as America, China, and Russia among others. This is because no other nation possesses the military capacity to keep them apart.

2.4.2 Conflict Resolution

Whilst conflict management predominantly focuses on terminating direct violence, conflict resolution focuses on addressing structural violence. This is important considering that structural violence is far more deadly than physical violence in that it kills silently (Harris 2011:127). Conflict resolution tries to address the shortcomings of conflict management by going beyond the cessation of direct violence and going further to confront the root causes of the conflict. This emanates from the notion that violence is a symptom of a bigger problem. Whereas conflict is precipitated by the incompatibility of the goals of

two or more parties, conflict resolution attempts to make these clashing goals to be compatible between or amongst antagonists.

Wallesteen (2002:08) defines it as an agreement between conflicting parties to solve their incompatibilities, accept each other's existence and cease all violent action against each other. Muchemwa (2015:20) states that conflict resolution solves conflict through addressing root causes and finding a mutually satisfying solution, a win-win outcome for the antagonists. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:33) zero in and affirm that conflict resolution involves mutual problem sharing between antagonists whilst also making steps towards redefining their relationship. Miller (2003:08) defines conflict resolution as a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive objectives of problems.

The incompatibility of goals can be resolved through the following methods as espoused by Galtung (1976:292):

- **Trading:** the antagonists are made to expand the conflict and include other conflicts with the aim of trading one clash against the other. For instance, if antagonists A and B in a previous conflict clashed over a piece of land and now both antagonists are now clashing over a building. A would have to settle for the land whilst B would settle for the building.
- **Multi-lateralization:** more actors are brought into the conflict; cycles of conflict are established so as to cancel them off each other.
- **Fusion/Disintegration:** the antagonists are brought together so as to harmonize their goals. This might involve shared ownership of the goal so that both antagonists can thus benefit from the same goal if possible. This method can also work in reverse whereby the antagonists are de-coupled so that their goals do not clash.
- **Conflict protraction:** the conflict can also be prolonged. This is done with the hope that the antagonists will get tired of the conflict and forget about it or even turn to other conflicts.

The definitions show that there are two parts of the conflict resolution process. The first part is that of resolving the issue of incompatible goals whilst the other

part is working on the way the antagonists relate to one another. In normal conflict settlement, there is a clear winner and a loser. In the parlance of peace studies, this is known as a win-lose situation or a negative-sum situation. However, with conflict resolution, all the antagonists walk away with something after the conflict. This is called a positive-sum game or win-win situation.

When I juxtaposed the definition of conflict resolution against Galtung's (1976) definition of conflict, I found that conflict resolution addresses the issues of contradiction, behaviors, and attitudes. Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:33) support this argument when they state that behaviors are changed from being violent, attitudes are turned away from being hostile whilst structures are made non-exploitative. It thus suffices to state that conflict resolution attempts to drive a conflict from being subjective based to being objective based because that way the conflict becomes much easier to resolve.

Burton (1998) informs that conflict resolution is rooted in the human needs theory, which states that conflict results from the failure to satisfy basic human needs. Warnecke and Franke (2010:71) echo this argument when they state that for conflict to be reduced levels of under-development need to be reduced as well. Collier *et al* (2003:1) warns that under-developed countries are more at risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap. However, Tongeren (2012) cautions that even if development is achieved and human needs fulfilled conflict can still take place. This is because the economic and power relations would have changed as well thus leading to conflict. However, Berdal and Malone (2000) suggest that not all conflicts are caused by human needs sometimes it is about greed.

Furthermore, it is also evident that conflict resolution involves the process of making peace agreements between antagonists. These peace agreements are done with the assistance of a mediator at times. Paffenholz (2009:04) states that conflict resolution involves external-actors such as local and international Non-Governmental Organizations. Nevertheless, conflict resolution is said to be operational at both macro and micro levels by involving leaders of nation-states and communal as well as family levels respectively.

Scholars such as Pitrim Sorokin, Lewis Fry Richardson, Quing Wright, John Burton, Christopher Mitchell, Michael Banks, and Johan Galtung pioneered conflict resolution as a discipline. It is informed by numerous academic disciplines such as history, political science, international relations, strategic studies, law, and psychology. Scholars such as Woodhouse and Duffey (2008:03-06), Ramsbotham *et al* (2011:03-07), Wallensteen (2002:01-04) trace the origins of conflict resolution to the First World War (1914-1918) however; it became fully-fledged around the 1950s-1960s when the Cold War was at its height. At that moment in time humanity was under the threat of being wiped out by nuclear weapons, thus the interest in conflict resolution increased as well.

However, the fact that it was formulated at a perilous time in the history of mankind is both a blessing and a curse. This is because it was structured with the conflict of the Cold War in mind and thus after the Cold War it became difficult to adapt conflict resolution to the post-Cold War conflicts. This difficulty emanated from the fact that post-Cold War conflicts were conceptually different from the ideologically based Cold War conflicts. The Cold War conflicts had been between nations such as the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). In the post-Cold War era conflicts were no longer international rather they were now intra-national for instance the civil wars in post-independent African countries (Rwanda, DRC, Sudan, Somalia). Conflicts now even involved non-state actors such as mercenaries, rebel movements and terrorist groups (M-23, Tamil Tigers, Taliban, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram).

Following the failure of conflict resolution to address the post-Cold War conflicts scholars began to heavily criticize it as its limitations became apparent. Berdal and Malone (2000: 04) pointed out that conflict resolution was not suitable for addressing conflicts that were generated by greed and not objective grievances. Examples of such conflicts are the blood diamond wars in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), warlord insurgencies in Uganda (1986-present) and clan-based mafias who are conflict entrepreneurs and thus benefitted from conflict.

Harris (2011:124) asserts that conflict resolution does very little to build a cordial relationship between the antagonists. Muchemwa (2015:22) weighs in and points out the fact that the involvement of external actors/mediators i.e. local and international NGOs disrupts the process as they dominate the process at the expense of the antagonists. The resulting resolution is barely sustainable. Furthermore, it is important to add that when dealing with conflict it is wise to look for endogenous methods within the conflict setting before resorting to exogenous methods. In some cases, NGOs can be elitist and fail to connect with the marginalized grassroots population who are affected by the conflict. Galtung (1976:293) criticizes the fact that conflict resolution makes antagonists fail to pursue the goals that they chose to pursue. It freezes the conflict in a way and makes antagonists cooperate in other activities. Wallesteen (2002:10) warns that the fact that conflict resolution is defined by the antagonists, it focuses on the antagonists and thus lives out vital components of sustainable peace such as cooperation, justice, and integration. Regardless of the fact that conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the root causes of the conflict, it has some weaknesses that are inherent. This has necessitated the evolution of the idea of resolving conflict to formulate a new mechanism that is capable of addressing conflicts in the post-Cold war era.

2.4.3 Conflict Transformation

It is the latest in the line of peacebuilding mechanisms. It encapsulates the strengths of the mechanisms mentioned above and tries to address the weaknesses of the same mechanisms as well. It is thus vital to note from the beginning that as a concept, it is not entirely new, but it is a build-up from what has already been discovered by peace researchers and scholars. Ramsbotham *et al* (2011:09) stated that conflict transformation is the deepest level of the conflict resolution method rather than as a separate venture. Lederach (2004:16) the founder of the conflict transformation idea also stated that conflict transformation's purpose is to add a voice to the on-going discussion, search for greater understanding and not to minimize or degrade

other interventions. Muchemwa (2015:31-32) concurs with this line of thinking when he states that conflict transformation is not there to denigrate other existing conflict handling mechanisms. It is rather a synthesis, it does not compete but compliments them.

Lederach (2014:16) defines conflict transformation as a conflict handling mechanism that views social conflict as a life-giving opportunity for creating a constructive change process that reduces violence, increases justice in direct interaction and social structures. Paffenholz (2014:13-14) adds that conflict transformation is the understanding that conflict is a normal social occurrence. It transforms violent conduct into a peaceful one through a combination of a multi-actor and multi-track approach with short, medium and long-term perspectives. Francis (2002:08) defines it as a method of peacebuilding that involves ensuring that subjects of domination discover and develop the power to participate in what affects them. Galtung (2007:14) informs that conflict transformation is about going beyond the goals of the antagonists and creating a new reality.

Based on this, it can be seen that conflict transformation as a concept is based on a number of things. It aims to establish or restore a relationship between antagonists. The relationships can be established between individuals, within a culture, or between nations. This is based on the belief that the quality of relationships also influences the quality of peace (Lederach 2003:30). Friendliness and neighborliness between households, communities, and countries are essential for peace to reign (Harris 2011:126). It fosters forgiveness, healing, reconciliation and even has a spiritual agenda (Muchemwa 2015:13; 25). It is also based on the assumption that human beings are capable of love that can overcome feelings of hatred (Harris and Morrison 2003:17). This is because such cordial relationships lead to tolerance, solidarity, and understanding, which reduce the likelihood of violence.

It focuses on the third level of violence which is cultural violence whilst conflict resolution and conflict management focus on structural violence and direct violence respectively. It is also more of a long-term approach compared to

conflict resolution. This is because conflict transformation aims to change cultures and structural systems, which take time to transform. Conflict transformation seeks to alter underlying structural conditions over the long-term (Ryan 2007:23). Ryan explains further that conflict transformation is never-ending and equates it to the ideas of permanent revolution by Mao Tse Tung and Trotsky. Conflict transformation does not view conflict in a negative way, but rather as an opportunity to establish a new peaceful relationship between antagonists. It does not seek to end conflict as espoused by the conflict resolution method. Rather it seeks to positively channel the conflict (Woodhouse and Duffey 2008:36). Thus, it perceives conflict as a gateway to a better relationship between antagonists. This is because conflict is part and parcel of human interaction.

Conflict transformation does not favor quick fixes to conflicts. It differs from both conflict management and resolution in that it goes beyond the separation of antagonists to terminate violence. It also goes beyond making goals compatible. It is inclusive and holistic in its approach. Dube (2012:300) informs that conflict transformation is multi-layered and includes multi-level participation and empowerment of the grassroots. It deals with past conflicts (hurts, injustices, traumas) so as to prevent future ones. Through these processes, the expectation is to bring antagonists to a point where they can understand each other's actions and empathize or put themselves in the position of each other.

One key element of the conflict transformation method is that it prioritizes the inclusion of the grassroots in the peace process. It seeks to empower the grassroots because imposed solutions to conflict have a poor track record. The subjects of domination have to participate in the process (Francis 2002:08). It has to be clarified that conflict transformation does not include the grassroots at the expense of other stakeholders e.g international and national authorities. It operates at multiple levels; it is inclusive of the grassroots as well as the political decision-makers and even development agencies. Lederach (1997:39) depicts it as a pyramid with three levels as represented below in Fig 1. The top part consists of the top leadership that is political, military and religious leaders. The middle part consists of local leaders i.e. religious,

academic and ethnic leaders. The third and broader base contains the grassroots leadership i.e. local NGOs, community and health officials. To Lederach, the middle part of the local leaders is more important as they are the go-between the top and the grassroots leadership. This inclusivity is important in that there will be a buy-in factor, ownership of the peace process by all those who were included in the peace process.



Figure 2. Lederach's Peacebuilding Pyramid. Source Lederach (1997:39)

Jean-Paul Lederach as mentioned earlier is one of the pioneers of conflict transformation. He is a leading American scholar on peace studies. The idea came to him from the peacebuilding experiences he had in Colombia and Somalia. The theory is contained in his 1997 publication called *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Lederach (2014:8-10) elaborates and states that conflict transformation emerged at the end of the Cold War. He adds that the theory was also influenced by the Anabaptist-Mennonite religious approach, which promotes peace through reconciliation, truth, mercy, justice, respect for human rights and non-violence. Paffenholz (2014:14) reveals that the theory was also informed by the works of Galtung, Curle, Azar, Frier, Kelman, and Fisher. She vaguely attributes the popularization of the idea to the recurrence of the civil wars in Africa and the failure of the method of conflict management to resolve these conflicts.

Thus, one can safely conclude that conflict transformation emerged to fill the void that had been created in the post-Cold war era. The period was expected by world leaders to usher in a global peaceful co-existence now that the major Cold War antagonists (America and the former Soviet Union) had ended their hostilities. However, this optimistic view of international affairs was shattered by the outbreak of intra-state conflicts in Europe and Africa such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the Bosnia crisis of 1992-95, the DRC war of 1996-2003, the 2001 September 9/11 attacks in America.

Scholars have also criticized conflict transformation like its predecessors. Ryan (2007:01) states that as a theory there is very little research on it. Mitchell (2002:19) dismisses the whole concept and states that there are very few differences between conflict transformation and conflict resolution. He adds that (ibid) literature of conflict transformation is hardly extensive. Thus, norms and principles are yet to be established. There is also very little empirical data to back it up. Botes (2003:11) argues that the link between the conflict transformation theory and its practical application still appears weak. Mitchell (2002:16) labels it as an under-developed concept, which is too vague and lacks clarity on which part of the relationship needs to be transformed and how to move from unbalanced to balanced exchanges.

However, one might beg to differ and point out that the concept might be vague as the greater part of the specific details are left to the stakeholders of the conflict as they know better the contextual composition of their conflict. It can also be argued that conflict transformation can be found in indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms of societies such as Africa and Asia. As argued earlier, peacebuilding and conflict transformation contain elements of the Ubuntu philosophy of Africa. Thus, one can argue that conflict transformation is a mirror of the traditional approaches to peacebuilding used in Africa prior to colonialism.

Political scientists also state that conflict transformation is too idealistic or utopian and not in touch with reality. Ryan (2007:26) calls it Utopian engineering which is reminiscent of leaders such as Stalin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pol Pot of Cambodia, Mao Tse Tung of the

Republic of China and Adolf Hitler of Nazi Germany. It does not acknowledge human nature or the reality of evil and is thus superficial. However, its utopian or idealistic nature can be defended on the basis that the realist approach is no better to the resolution of conflicts as was the case that happened in the post-Cold War era. Muchemwa (2015:31) defends the lack of empirical data on conflict transformation and points out that conflict transformation is in its formative years and going through structural metamorphosis.

On the element of inclusivity of the grassroots, conflict transformation wrongly assumes that everyone is cooperative in peacebuilding mechanisms. Some groups will support the status quo. Harmony of interests does not exist and not everyone is interested in peace (Ryan 2007:26).

Much as it aims to confront cultural violence conflict transformation appears not to comprehend some of the intricacies associated with cultures. Some cultures tend to be exclusionary and repressive to their own people. For instance some cultures in Africa are patriarchal in nature to the point of marginalizing and abusing women, minorities and other groups of special needs.

Having gone through the conflict resolving mechanisms it is important to note that none of them is better than the other. Rather they complement one another. They have their own strengths and weaknesses and are suitable for different stages of the conflict. They are more effective when used together as opposed to being used in isolation. However, for the purpose of this study, the theory of conflict transformation will be the main focus. This is because out of the other three approaches, conflict transformation tends to emphasize the role of the grassroots communities in peacebuilding which is the primary aim of this study.

2.5 Infrastructure for Peace

Infrastructure for Peace (I4P hereafter) is the framework for implementing conflict transformation. Hopp-Nishanka (2012:01) state that I4P gives peace an address. It is yet another initiative from Jean-Paul Lederach in addition to

the idea of conflict transformation. He developed it in the 1980s during his mediation work in Nicaragua (Lederach 2012:08). Former UN Secretary-General (1997-2006) Kofi Annan cited it several times in his speeches between 2001 and 2009. It gained popularity in the international discourse of peacebuilding after it was implemented in the electoral violence of Kenya (2007) and Ghana (2008). It is also central to this study essentially because it is community-based.

Tongeren (2013:18) defines I4P as a cooperative problem-solving approach to conflict through dialogue, non-violence, and inclusion of stakeholders. It is the development of institutional mechanisms in-touch with each country's culture. Kofi Annan (quoted in Tongeren 2013:18) adds that I4P is a sustainable national infrastructure for peace, which allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally with their own skills, institutions, and resources. Lederach (1997: xvi) defines I4P as an infrastructure that empowers the resources of reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside. Kumar (2011:14) Senior Conflict Prevention Advisor at UNDP defines I4P as a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by the government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation to prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in society. Surmond and Sharma (2013:03) offer a minimalist definition and define I4P as the structures, resources, and processes through which peace services are delivered to any level of society.

From these definitions, it is safe to deduce that I4P is predominantly concerned with the inclusivity of all stakeholders within a peace process. In addition to its grassroots orientation, it relies on the top leadership to transform structures so as to dilute asymmetric power. This originates from the assertion that the various levels of society are interdependent and that wider social and public participation enhances the sustainability of peace agreements (Lederach 2012:08, 09). If all the sectors of a nation or community are involved in the peace process, it improves the quality and sustainability of peace. It will also legitimize the infrastructure and bring about cordial social harmony.

These stakeholders, however, should be internal and not foreign. This is based on the notion that outside intervention is a challenge as the external actors will not be in touch with the contextual issues of the community involved (Tongeren 2013:03). Chivasa (2015:04) expands this point and states that the internal actors are to be equipped with social networks, social skills, knowledge systems, neighborhoods, and structures. It frowns upon top-down, formal and externally driven approaches as they rarely work.

I4P also relies on functioning institutions and constructive social relationships. I4P is also very useful in violence prevention and also manages those that erupt. This approach is expected to build trust and confidence amongst antagonists (Irene 2014:141).

It can also be deduced that I4P is a long-term process and not an event. It thus is a shift from erstwhile peacebuilding processes that were either short term or once-off. Ayodele and Felix (2017:26) concur and posit that I4P has been necessitated by a shift from small scale to large-scale peacebuilding. Lederach (2012:09) notes that a peace agreement or an intervention is not the end, but rather the beginning of a process that needs to be supported by both grassroots and national infrastructure.

The framework itself is made up of (ibid:03):

Peace Committees: these link national and local institutions. They focus on violence reduction, promoting dialogue, problem-solving, community building and reconciliation. They depend on the skills of respected individuals.

Peace Secretariats: these assist conflicting parties in peace negotiations and advance the peace process or implementation of agreements.

National Peacebuilding Platforms: these facilitate multi-stakeholder mechanisms for consultation and cooperation. They differ from institutions in that they are inclusive and interactive. They create spaces for collective action and foster concern for systematic agreement.

Conflict Analysis, Early Warning and Response Systems: these systems attempt to prevent violence through alerts, which enable interventions before the escalation of violence.

Inside Mediators: these are now being widely used although they were previously part of the traditional peacebuilding mechanism. Nevertheless, mediators are considered essential to establishing trust and strengthening communities.

The major criticism that has come across for I4P is that it is still an emerging framework and very little is known about it. Surmond and Sharma (2013:81) posit that discussions about I4P are still ongoing amongst academics, practitioners, and policymakers. This is similar even to the theory of conflict transformation as stated earlier that empirical research is also found lacking.

Furthermore, I4P has been criticized for its inclusion of government structures. This is seen as a drawback as the government can take over the process from the local communities (Mutisi 2012:09). Balancing the two sides of the process is very delicate and almost impossible. Lederach himself (2012:09) admits that collaborating with government institutions is a noble idea however; they tend to be rigid and focus mainly on rules and regulations.

In addition, the framework assumes that all government structures will be in a position to cooperate in the peace process. However, this is a misleading assumption considering that some governments especially in post-conflict under-developed societies face a chronic lack of capacity and political will. This is true in the cases of Somalia, Mozambique, DRC, and South-Sudan. Thomson (2010:275) argues that in post-colonial society the state normally dominates the civil society. In Zimbabwe, during the Robert Mugabe era (1980-2017) the state even went as far as enacting laws which made it difficult for the communities and the civil society to have a say in the governance of the country (Mapuva 2011:10). The conflict transformation framework in such situations might find itself in a situation where external actors might have to be heavily relied upon due to the lack of political will.

2.6 Local Peace Committees (LPCs)

Tongeren (2013:39) defines them as committees or structures formed at the level of a town or village with the aim to encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding processes within their own context. He calls them the cornerstone for I4P, which reduces violence, solve community

problems and empower local communities to become peacebuilders. Irene (2014:151) concurs with Tongeren and adds that LPCs are part of the conflict transformation process and use basic local peacebuilding methods. Jenner and Ibrahim (2000:20) states that LPCs are peacebuilding structures that often focus on long-term prevention and management of conflicts. Ayodele and Felix (2017:28) affirm that LPCs are tools for conflict transformation through the use of local peacebuilding methods. They address destructive rumors, fears, mistrust, and facilitate reconciliation and social cohesion. Adan and Pkalya (2006: vii) add that LPCs are a conflict intervention structure that integrates both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent and manage or transform intra-ethnic conflicts.

These definitions portray the picture that LPCs are formed at the local level. This is what differentiates conflict transformation from other peacebuilding mechanisms. This is because through LPCs peacebuilding is moved from the international and national spheres to the local communities (Muchemwa 2015: 14). The reasons for the paradigm shift from the international and national to the local sphere are two. The first being that the nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era had changed and thus reducing the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. Second, it has been proven (more discussed in section 2.7) that these new conflicts are better resolved by local communities, which have a better contextual understanding of the conflict.

Tongeren (2012:106) advises that the membership of LPCs is very important and has to be comprised of highly respected persons. These people should have the capacity of bridging political divides. These people need to be knowledgeable, competent and experienced in matters of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The members need to reduce violence, promote dialogue, solve problems, community building and reconciliation. Adam and Pkalya (2006:47) also echo the same sentiments and state that the qualities to be considered for the members of LPCs are honesty, integrity, impartiality and neutrality, fluency in the local language, local resident and a non-political office holder. Dube and Makwerere (2012:301) however caution that in addition to context-based resources, successful LPCs require the input of national actors and other external support. Their support is in the form of

facilitation, orientation, and national peacebuilding resources. This support is important in that it helps the local actors with the knowledge of how to use their experience with their respective conflict towards a successful transformation.

The issue of membership of LPCs raised by scholars is important. The success of the LPC depends on its composition. However, it might appear that these requirements make the LPC somewhat elitist and even political. The skills required for its membership i.e. knowledge in peacebuilding matters might seem to be mostly found with the elites or politicians. However, even in marginalized grassroots communities with low literacy rates, the indigenous knowledge system can be relied upon.

Nevertheless, Tongeren (2012:108.) posits that in 57% of the communities that have established LPCs, their violence has been reduced. 80% eradicated repeat violence and 94% were partially resolved (ibid). Chivasa (2015:88) affirms that LPCs are an effective mechanism of building peace in conflict-ravaged communities. However, one might wonder whether most of the impact has been achieved by formal or informal LPCs.

There are two types of Local Peace Committees (LPCs) namely informal and formal LPCs (Tongeren 2013:39-41):

Informal LPCs: they are also known as Local Peace Zones/Zones of Peace. They are rooted in traditional structures such as the council of elders. They can either be part of a nation's I4P, be formal and driven by government mandate or can be independent and driven by the local community. However, in many cases, they are immune to political and government actors. Their members are volunteers with a high level of trust and commitment within the community. They, however, lack influence and often times fail to make an impact. Ayodele and Felix (2017:28) maintain that informal LPCs are normally established by civil society and are rarely recognized by the government. They nevertheless open dialogue in a divided community, solving conflicts and protect their communities from violence. They can compensate for the weakness of local governance. They can be hybrid in that they can include both traditional and modern conflict resolution processes.

Formal LPCs: Dube and Makwerere (2012:301) call them nationally mandated LPCs. They have more influence than the latter informal LPCs. They are an important link between local and national peacebuilding. However, they are prone to manipulation by government structures. Irene (2014:157) states that these obtain their mandate from a central processor national structure. They are formed following a government decision. They are nationally recognized and most of their members are from political parties, security forces government bodies, and civil society. Ayodele and Felix (2017:28) cite the examples of South Africa and Sierra Leone as countries that implemented formal LPCs that were created through peace accords.

2.6.1 Challenges Facing LPCs

Irene (2014:155) states that LPCs are bedevilled by the following challenges:

- Financial challenges to advance their work
 - Lack of legal and policy framework
 - Lack of volunteers
 - Gender and age sensitivity
 - Lack of enforcement capacity
- Availability of short-term donor funds meant for emergencies and not long-term projects.

2.7 Case Studies of Local Peace Committees

2.7.1 Africa

2.7.1.1 Kenya: The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC)

Ayodele and Felix (2017:31) maintain that the WPDC is one of the most successful examples of I4P and LPCs. It is a model of conflict intervention and transformation at the communal level. Issifu (2016:149) informs that Wajir is located in North-East Kenya and faces a lot of poverty, marginalization and discrimination. There is not much social infrastructure such as education and health facilities. Unemployment is also very high in the area, especially among

the youth. The community also has different groups of nomadic pastoralists, which results in conflict over pastures and water.

Tongerren (2013:14) traces the origin of these LPCs to the outbreak of violence in the early 1990s between Kenyan Somalis. 1200 people died within a space of 4 years and US\$900 000 worth of livestock was lost. Many others were robbed, raped and wounded (Issifu 2016: 149). The raiding of cattle from pastoralist groups triggered the violence. The tensions were heightened by the influx of Somalian and Ethiopian refugees.

Women who worked in the market formed the LPC. They then engaged elders of different clans to start a mediation process. This resulted in a code of conduct to end violence. The LPC worked with government officials such as the District Commissioner and Members of Parliament (Ayodele and Felix 2017: 31). The LPC was later formalized and integrated with other citizen groups, NGOs and government. The model was used in other districts. It helped the government to become more responsive to the people's needs and even led to the enactment of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008, which then formalized the formation of peace committees everywhere. WPDC also led to the signing of the Garissa Declaration between the government and northern pastoralist clans to tackle cattle rustling in the area (Ayodele and Felix 2017:31). Issifu (2016:150) adds that government support was also in the form of a rapid response team, which was composed of government and civic leaders to avert the conflicts from spiralling out of control. The conflicts were resolved in the Somali customary way such as blood compensation for cases involving murders. Collective punishment was meted out for cases of stolen animals or goods. The clan's cattle would be confiscated until the stolen animals or goods were returned. During the electoral violence of December 2007-March 2008, the northern and eastern parts of Kenya were peaceful due to the formation of these LPCs (Ayodele and Felix 2017:32).

2.7.1.2 Sudan: The Collaborative in South Kordofan

The Sudanese civil war began in 1956-72 and 1983-2005. Two million people perished whilst four million were displaced (Tongerren 2013: 42). Borders, which have not been demarcated properly, and scarcity of resources such as water, land, and oil (Peace Direct 2016:01) are the main triggers of the conflict in the area.

The LPCs aim to prevent conflict in areas of South and West Kordofan. Gillespy (2011) adds that the LPC operates in the communities of Dajou, Misseryah and Nuba tribes. It also operates across the border to facilitate peace between South Kordofan in Sudan and the Unity state in South Sudan (Peace Direct 2016:01). It was formed in 2006 and has 12 peace committees in both Sudan and South Sudan (Kordofan and Unity State) (Ayodele and Felix 2017:32). The LPCs analyze conflict and find local solutions with the support of a rapid response fund (RRF). Costs are covered by community contributions at times.

The LPC has become a partner of Peace Direct, a UK based NGO. The LPCs are voluntary and thus the members are committed to the cause. The LPC comprises of traditional administration and educated youth. It contains representatives from each of the tribes so as to make decision making inclusive and balanced. The LPC responds to conflicts, prevents smaller conflicts from escalating and prevent conflicts from happening. Ayodele and Felix (ibid) add that the members of the LPCs were trained in conflict analysis and finding local solutions to conflict issues. The LPC has 70 members and is supported by the administration, traditional leaders and security forces.

2.7.1.3 DRC: Center Resolution Conflicts in North Kivu

The conflict in DRC is known as Africa's First World War (1996-2003). It involved seven other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda. It led to 5.4 million deaths. Against

this background, the Centre for Resolution of Conflicts (CRC) works in the eastern province of North Kivu. Tongeren (2013:44) states that it was established in 1993. It trains internally displaced persons (IDPs) to work with local communities. Local government officials and NGOs in North Kivu depend on its mediation skills. CRC is partnered with UNOCHA and UK's Peace Direct NGO since 2004. Its efforts have led to community disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration. So far 20 000 were educated from two provinces, 14 400 IDPs were returned safely home, 650 child soldiers were rescued as well. Its success dwells upon its engagement with armed actors, which protected communities from violence. This reduced armed groups in North Kivu from nine to four. The LPCs organize hearings, dispel rumours and mount a rapid collective response to incipient violence, integrate IDPs and ex-combatants, establish links between communities and armed groups.

2.7.1.4 DRC: Baraza-Communautaire in North Kivu

It was formed by the Commission de Pacification et de Concorde (CPC). It was an initiative of Laurent Desire Kabila in 1997. It was a national body with provincial branches and regional peace cells (Ayodele and Felix 2017:32). These cells contained prominent local people at the grassroots level. They organized meetings, disarmament, and reintegration into the community. It also gathered leaders of the nine major ethnic groups in North Kivu. It dealt with community life and resolution of low-level conflicts before escalation. Baraza is a Swahili word for meeting place. Local inhabitants brought their problems to the elders for resolution. 1998-2004 Baraza resolved ethnic disputes in Eastern DRC especially the ones involving land ownership. European Mission in DRC (2001) reported that the Baraza had found peaceful and sustainable solutions to the conflicts in the area since 1997. The settlement of IDPs had moved to multi-ethnic villages from mono-ethnic villages. The Baraza managed to do all this without any external financial support. However, it collapsed in 2005. Political connections appear to have led to its demise. The people in South Kivu protested against its establishment through the provincial governor. The population began to see it as an extension of the rule from Kinshasa. Demonstrators had placards written

Baraza=Conflict. Clark (2008) advised that the Baraza needed to be independent of national and political elites.

2.7.1.5 DRC: The Haki na Amani Network & LP Initiatives in Ituri

Ituri is in North East DRC and is divided into five territories. It also has a number of militias in its area such as the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) fighting for the Lendu and Hema respectively (The New Humanitarian 2005). The conflict in the area has been ongoing for decades and is based on two dynamics. Firstly, during the colonial era's divide and rule policy, the Hema were favoured by the Belgian colonial administrators. This preferential treatment gave them access to better jobs and education opportunities (Grignon 2003). The Lendu on the other hand were marginalized and this created tensions between the groups (ibid). Secondly, the conflict was based on land disputes between the Hema and the Lendu tribes (Reuters 2019). The land disputes were triggered by the enacted land policy in 1973 (Bakajika) which the Hema took advantage of as well as their relatively affluent economic position to buy the land upon which the Lendu pastoralists were residing (Pottier 2003:01). The Lendu perceived this to be an attempt to drive them out of the area and thereby escalating tensions that had already been in existence (ibid). Thirdly, the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 led to an influx of Rwandan refugees and armed groups into the area and led to political consciousness between the Lendu and Hema. This brought the tensions that had been simmering for decades to a boiling point leading to the outbreak of hostilities (Pfefferle 2013).

The resulting violence led to several massacres in the area. Turse (2018) states that the violence included burning of crops and villages as well as kidnappings. Allen (2006) from the BBC reported that 60 000 people had been murdered in the massacres. Ahoua *et al* (2006) add that the violence led to the displacement of 500 000 people from the area.

Understandably, the resultant conflict damaged inter-community relations and the Barazas were formed to reconcile the relations (Tongerren 2013: 47). The

Barazas were named the *Haki na Amani* in 2004 and were composed of Episcopal Justice and Peace Commissions, human rights groups and women's network (Ayodele and Felix 2017:31). Tongeren (2013: 47-48) adds that the *Barazas* promotes peace, human rights, encourages citizen participation and opposes identity violence. The *Barzas* were also working with international partners such as Cordaid, Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and Pax Christi International Alert among others (ibid). They brought together leaders of the conflicting communities, local militia, administration authorities, and civil society groups.

Communities elected members of the Local Peace Initiatives (LPI) with 12 members each who were engaged in mediation and conflict resolution (ibid). Five hundred of these LPIs were established; they went beyond mediation and organized sporting events between the communities such as football matches. They also re-opened schools, markets and helped with the return of IDPs. They trained people about elections and responsible citizenship before the 2007 elections. This lessened tensions between communities (ibid). The *Barazas* strengthened the capacity of LPI leaders in mediation and solving conflicts. Nyumba Kuni was another peace network, which was a rapid alert system. There were 800 of them nationwide and as a result of 57 Local Initiatives for Community Security (ILSCs) (ibid). They received lots of support in the form of bicycles both the local and state actors have received them well. Thus, they have social legitimacy. Cash rewards are not given as a way to avoid intra-group competitions. LPIs and ILSCs have increased security even against state-level abuse and corruption. Most of the members are women and 300 of these ILPs are still active.

2.7.1.6 DRC: Village Peace Committees (VPCs) in North Kivu:

Tongeren (2013: 47) states that VPCs were established by an NGO known as World Relief Congo and are composed of Baraza leaders, traditional leaders, and church leaders. The members undergo a conflict transformation workshop, 10 members are elected to the VPC i.e. Baraza Youth, women, church, school and civil society leaders. They meet on a weekly basis. Its

objectives and activities are similar to the other Barazas, which are fighting towards the same goal of peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.7.1.7 Burundi: Kibimba Peace Committee (KPC)

Issifu (2016:153) states that 300 000 Burundians have perished since independence in 1962. This is due to the pre-existing hostilities between the Hutsi and Tutsi tribes in the country. The hostilities were fostered by the divide and rule policies enforced by Belgium during the country's colonial period (ibid). Furthermore, the country underwent a brutal civil war from 1993-2005 which was fuelled by this enmity between Hutus and Tutsis (ibid). The United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force and African heads of states held peace talks (ibid). A peace treaty was even signed by the president together with the other ethnic groups, however the conflict continued regardless.

Tongeren (2013:49) then adds that LPC such as the the Kibimba Peace Committee (KPC) stepped in to try and restore normalcy in Burundi. The KPC was operational for 7 years without external funding. It brought about stability and conflict resolution. It was launched in 1994 when rebels burnt 70 secondary school children alive in 1993. KPC received training from Mennonites and established communication between different groups (Ayodele and Felix 2017:33). Schools and hospitals were re-opened. Issifu (2016:153) attributes its success to the use of the village approach to peacebuilding and the launch of community development projects such as building hospitals and schools.

2.7.1.8 Uganda: Peace Committees in Karamoja Region

Uganda as a country underwent several episodes of conflict since it attained independence in 1962. Raffaele (2005) states that some of these episodes of violence include the Idi Amin years (1971-79) as well as the Ugandan Bush War era (1981-1986) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion led by Joseph Kony (1987-present). However, the latter conflict has been the most brutal and protracted as it has outlasted any other Ugandan conflict prior to it (Global security.org: n.d.).

The LRA rebels are affiliated to the Acholi tribe who accuse the Yoweri Museveni regime of marginalizing their northern region from development (Raffaele 2005). The aim was to thus remove President Yoweri Museveni from power, but the plan thereafter remains vague to many. Nevertheless, the conflict has led to the killing of 500 000 Ugandans and the displacement of a further 1.4 million people (Tongeren 2013:49). Government efforts such as the Juba Peace Talks (JPT) of 2006 held in South Sudan failed to resolve the conflict. The government and the rebels failed to reach a consensus at the last minute when LRA leader Joseph Kony failed to turn up to sign the peace deal (Reuters 2009). Instead, the talks triggered the LRA's attacks on South Sudan's Western Equatoria region. These attacks were very brutal and led to the displacement of an estimated 25 000 civilians (BBC 2010). The attacks were fuelled by LRA's suspicion that the South Sudanese government was supporting the Ugandan government (VOA 2008). This perception was based on the support rendered by the Ugandan government to the South Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLMA) during its armed struggle against the Sudan government (Ibid). Unsurprisingly, the Khartoum government in Sudan was suspected of rendering support to the LRA rebels to destabilize both Uganda and South Sudan (Ibid). Nevertheless, these attacks led to the withdrawal of the South Sudanese government from the process in 2008 due to the LRA attacks on the western equatorial region (Isiffu 2016:151).

District Peace Committees exist in Karamoja located in north east Uganda. They prevent and solve conflicts as well as respond to the outbreak of hostilities (ibid). They even recover stolen livestock. The District Peace Committee (DPC) is co-chaired by the District Commissioner and chair of the local council. Its membership is comprised of police, security forces, religious communities, Civil Society Organisations, women and youth (ibid).

Karamoja also has VPCs (Village Peace Committees) which discourage youth from cattle raiding through warnings and cautions. VPCs preach about peace during village meetings and are an early warning system against impending raids (ibid). VPC membership is based on being a respectable person with a following in the village. The DPCs and VPCs face challenges of inadequacy to

handle security and conflict matters as well as a lack of funding (ibid). Funding is required for transportation and provision of food, tobacco and local brew for elders during meetings. Nevertheless, cattle raids have since reduced as a result, though cattle theft continues. Issifu (2016:151) adds that Uganda has high levels of poverty, malnutrition and geographical disparity. There is a lack of social amenities such as health, educational and recreational facilities. This is what led to the armed rebellions of groups such as the LRA.

Whilst the government efforts worsened the LRA attacks, the LPCs managed to ameliorate the situation despite limited resources at their disposal. These LPCs included the Karamoja and the Katido LPCs. Tongeren (2013b) points out that these LPCs managed to restore social order and security through pragmatic peace activities such as conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, early warning signals, reporting of potential violence and retrieval of stolen goods in the rural communities of Uganda. Isiffu (2016:152) adds that these Ugandan LPCs helped to ensure sustainable peace and development in Karamoja as well as neighbouring communities.

2.7.1.9 South Africa

Tongeren (n.d.) states that LPCs helped with the transition from Apartheid to democratic government (1991-1994). The LPCs were formed after the National Peace Accord (NPA) that was signed on 14 September 1991 due to violence in the country. The NPA was signed by 27 stakeholders which included the government, main political parties, liberation movements, etc. 6 000 people were killed in political incidents between 1985 and 1990. A further 2000 perished between 1990 and 1991. Violence continued even though political prisoners were released and bans lifted. The National Peace Committee was inefficient and met only twice. The LPCs, on the other hand, managed to slightly reduce the violence, but were powerless and lacked political will. Ayodele and Felix (2017:30) state that prior to 1994 many deaths occurred e.g. 2 649 in 1992 and 3 567 in 1994.

Odendaal (2010) stated that LPCs needed to stand on two legs i.e. government mandate and the local buy-in. He urged local actors to take responsibility for their own peace. In South Africa, the LPCs were shunned by the people due to the existence of police officers in them. The police officers were considered enemies in the townships due to the way the violence they had perpetrated amongst the civilians. In addition to the government efforts, Issifu (2016:148-149) adds that in KwaZulu Natal in South Africa there was **Harambe Women's Forum**: formed by Zandile Nhlengetwa with the help of some local women. Nhlengetwa's efforts were spurred by her loss of a home, husband and a 15-year-old son to the violence that occurred during the Apartheid era. The forum nevertheless aimed to promote sustainable peace after Apartheid by also re-integrating ex-convicts especially youth charged with Apartheid crimes.

Issifu (2016:149) adds that to date the LPC has managed to empower many women, organize literacy classes for youths imprisoned under the Apartheid regime. The LPC has also equipped rural folk with peacebuilding and trauma healing skills.

2.7.1.10 Ghana

Though Ghana has had a stable government since 1992, it has a long history of military coups and dictatorships. No less than 23 conflicts occurred between 1980 and 2002 in the northern region of the country (Bombade 2007). In addition to these macro-conflicts, Ghana is also prone to intra-ethnic conflicts (ibid). Some of these conflicts include the Konkomba-Namumba war (1994-1995) claimed 5000 lives whilst the 2002 violence in the Dagomba Kingdom led to the loss of 40 lives including that of the King (Ayodele and Felix 2017:30). Issifu (2016:152) attributes the violence to the political and economic marginalization of the northern regions. Furthermore, there were also succession disputes amongst the chieftaincies in Ghana (Ibid). These included the:

- Buipe chieftaincy, which faced a conflict between the Jinapo and Lebu gates.

- The Dagbon chieftaincy between the Abudu and Andani royal gates.
- The Bolgatanga chieftaincy between the Nadouli and Wallembele.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the Center for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies (CECOTAPS) moved in and aimed to uncover sources of conflict, encourage dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, joint problem solving and reconciliation (Ibid:153). This prevented conflict from spreading to other communities.

The CSOs were very active on the issue in the 1990s, however the Ghanaian government intervened in an attempt to resolve the conflict especially from 2003 onwards (Hopp-Nishanka 2012:06). The government established a national peace infrastructure, which built upon the pre-existing local peace structures established by the CSOs (Ibid). The national peace infrastructure was led by the Ministry of Interior with the help of the UNDP (United Nation's Development Programme) (Ojielo 2007). The infrastructure has peace advisory councils at district, regional and national levels (Hopp-Nishanka: *Op cit.*) Scholars such as Kumar (2011) and Issifu (2016: 153) concur that the Ghanaian national peace infrastructure helped to ease tensions and facilitate a smooth transition of power during the 2008, 2012, 2016 general elections. The peace infrastructure has also helped to resolve long standing inter-ethnic conflicts such as the Taflo and the Bawku chieftaincy conflicts (Beakal 2018).

The Ghanaian example is one of the few examples whereby the government's intervention did not lead to a compromise of the peace councils (Hopp-Nishanka 2012:01). The governments' involvement in the peace process actually worked in favor of the peace councils. In other cases, such as DRC and Uganda, the government's intervention led to the collapse of the peace process altogether. However, despite the success of the government efforts, it is important to know that its success rested on the hard work of the LPCs in the 1990s.

2.7.1.11 The Gomuti Council in Northern Somaliland

Ahmed and Green (1999:116) state that the conflict in Somalia began in the 1960s after independence from Britain. Siad Barre came to power through a

coup in 1969. The conflict worsened in the 1970s, the famine of 1974-1975 killed 2000 people and forced 15% of victims into relief camps (ibid). In 1978, there was another coup attempt. This led 1.3 million refugees to flee northern Somaliland (ibid). In addition,, the civil war of the 1980s killed 100 000 people most of whom were cattle herders and farmers. Wells were poisoned; livestock was seized leading to banditry. 1991-1992 famine killed 300 000-500 000 people and 3 million were left in poverty (ibid). After the fall of Siad Barre in the early 1990s, Somalia split into two territories i.e. the north and the south. The north became known as the Republic of Somaliland whilst the southern part became the Federal Republic of Somalia. The traditional elders (aka skills) in Somaliland, composed of chiefs and religious leaders established a traditional peace institution in 1991 (ibid). A peace conference with inter-clan warring parties was arranged. Poetry and oratory speeches were used. The clans were urged by the chiefs to take responsibility for their own peace in their respective areas. Written agreements were made at the conference and a joint committee of 30 members was formed.

- It was to preside over all conflicts in the area.
- Properties stolen were to be restored and injured victims were to be compensated through payment.

Aggrieved parties were to refer their cases to the joint committee and not take matters into their own hands.

The peace conferences became national. Farah (2001:143) informs that this reduced banditry and violence due to the fact that the system of governance being used by the Peace Conference was familiar to the Somalis.

2.7.2 Middle East

2.7.2.1 Peace Shuras in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been at war since 1978 and 3 million have perished. However, there is a strong peace structure, which comprises traditional tribal mechanisms for dispute resolution i.e. council of elders (*Jirga or Shura*). *Jirgas* convene when the need arises. Irene (2014:168) adds that the *Shuras* are made up of community elders, teachers, youths, businesspersons and village

mullahs. *Shuras* convene regularly and make decisions on behalf of their community. This peace structure fills a gap left by the Afghan formal justice system, operational only in urban areas. Courts and police are weak, corrupt and inefficient. This appears to be a result of the many years of war in Afghanistan. Peace *Shuras* have elders who are respectable and who understand the intricacies of their local communities. *Shuras* focus more on restorative justice, maintenance of local community relations than punishment.

Irene (2014:168) maintains that besides *Shuras*, Afghanistan has NGOs, which are also promoting peacebuilding i.e. Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) and Sanayee Development Organisation (SDO). CPAU has established 500 *Shuras* since 1996 and builds the capacity of local leaders. SDO was established in 1990 and strengthens social structures that enable the constructive transformation of conflicts. SDO addresses the root causes of conflict, promotes stability, justice, goodwill, etc. Members of Peace *Shuras* are normally 25 in number.

2.7.3 South-America

2.7.3.1 Nicaragua

Nicaragua underwent numerous Cold War proxy wars in the 1980s together with other parts of Central America (Llana 2012). However, the governments of the affected countries made an attempt to resolve the conflicts through the Central American Peace Accord of 1987 also known as the Esquipulas Peace Agreement (ibid). The agreement was the brainchild of Oscar Arias Sanchez, former President of Costa Rica (1986-1990 and 2006-2010) (ibid). The agreement was signed in Guatemala by five countries in the region namely El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica.

Irene (2014:165) states the agreement aimed to deal with internal conflicts of each country. Nicaragua government for instance, set up a National Peace Commission, region-specific commissions and a network of local commissions (ibid). In South Nicaragua, religious leaders joined forces to negotiate conflict-free zones. Their small commissions included local residents (ibid). They

encouraged dialogue between the Sandinista government and the contra rebels at the community level (Ibid). The commissions documented and investigated human rights violations as well as all intra-community disputes, land conflicts, and crime. By 1990, 60 commissions were in existence. 22 000 combatants were demobilized in the west and northern regions of the country (Ibid). Mediators were those involved in the conflict but respected by the communities. The International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was another peace commission of OAS (Organisation of American States) since 1990. It created 96 peace commissions by 1995. This allowed dialogue amongst citizens.

However, despite the inter-governmental efforts and the praises that accompanied the 1987 peace accord, the conflict in the area continues to this day. Llana (2012) maintained that violence continued in the region even after the peace accord was signed. She further mentions that the root causes of the initial conflict were not addressed and the region has now become a hub of youth gangs, organized crime and drug trafficking (ibid). Her sentiments were echoed by the World Bank report on Central America (2011) and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (2011). Roig-Franzia (2012) posited that 25 years after the signing of the peace deal, Oscar Arias Sanchez, the major architect of the peace accord, was still waiting for the peace to come and the fighting to stop.

2.7.3.2 The Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Columbia

For Peace Presence (n.d.) reports that the peace community is located in Columbia's northern region of Uraba. The community is a gateway for the flow of arms and drug trafficking between the Central and the United States of America (ibid) hence the prevalence of armed conflict in the area. Regarding the triggers of the conflict there is no universal explanation among scholars. Currently there are two schools of thought namely the 1940s and the 1960s schools of thought.

Scholars such as Chivasa (2015:83) informs that the violent conflict broke out in 1960s when the first Marxist guerrilla movements were formed during the

proxy wars of the Cold War. Some of these Marxist groups included the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) (Irene 2014: 167). On the other hand, Lawyers without Borders (2016:01) maintain that the roots of the violent conflict, can be traced as far back as 1948 when the traditional and liberal political parties clashed over the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaiten, a liberal presidential candidate during the 1948 presidential campaign. Minster (2019) adds that Gaiten's assassination led to the outbreak of violence known as *El Bogotazo*. This particular incident alone, lasted only 10hours, but destroyed the greater part of the Columbian capital Bogota, killed 3000 people and led to the beginning of a period referred to in Colombian history as *La Violencia* (ibid).

Nevertheless, Svahn (2011:11) details that the violence that has affected the conflict has been in the form of massacres, displacement, murders, rapes, burning down houses and disruption of agricultural activities. Irene (2014:167) adds that there were 560 attacks and 165 murders. 250 000 casualties took place and millions more were displaced.

Government efforts were not successful in quelling the widespread violence. As a result, the LPCs were established in 1997 to address the violence (For Peace Presence: n.d.). Svahn (2011: *op.cit*) states that these LPCs aimed to:

- Forbid community members from carrying arms, ammunition, and explosives.
- Community members to not participate in the on-going conflict.
- Forbid Colombian military and paramilitary groups to be members of the LPC.

Community members declared their communities as zones of peace or violence-free zones. The LPCs reached up to 50 in number thus making it a good example of a bottom-up approach from the grassroots. Chivasa (2015:85) argues that what contributed to the success of the LPCs in Colombia was that San Jose was made up of 1 300 farmers who cherished peace and unity. These values were derived from their traditional practice called *convite* (family working group). These values were based on the principle that working

together leads to higher yields (ibid). The independence of the LPCs also contributed to the success of these LPCs. The LPCs even rejected donations from the government and remained inward looking. Their optimism also carried them forward (ibid). In 2015, the peace committees celebrated their 18th anniversary of peace in their territory.

However, it is important to note that despite the significant achievements of the LPCs in San Jose, they continue to face grave dangers in their quest for peace and tranquility in their community. Palmer (2018) states that since the formation of the LPCs in 1997, 261 members have been murdered. He also states that the LPC members continue to be seen as enemies by the para-military groups (ibid).

2.7.3.3 Peru

Irene (2014:167) reveals that the country was affected by civil war in the 1980s. This was part of the Cold War armed violence that was widespread in the Central American region. The armed conflict involves the government forces, the Communist Party of Peru (Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Stan 2019). The conflict has been on-going for almost 40 years and to date, the death toll of the conflict stands at 70 000 (Truth and Reconciliation report 2008:17). The conflict has been one of the longest conflicts in the Latin American history.

Nevertheless, through the government efforts, the office of the ombudsperson was established in 1993 with the task of defending human rights, facilitate mediation and conciliation initiatives (Irene 2014:167)). In 2003, the government under the Valentina Paniagua administration established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The commission investigated the conflict and published a report. However, the report was disputed as it apportioned 45% of the killings to the Shining Path organisation and only 33% to the government (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 2008:17). In 2008, the government further established a decentralized national system for preventive and constructive conflict management (Irene:op cit). The program was funded by the International Cooperation and administered by the UNDP

(United Nations Development Program) (ibid). The National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS) together with the civil society have worked towards peace (ibid).

However, government inconsistencies decreased the impact of these initiatives (ibid). What the government managed to do was reduce the number of clashes among the armed groups. These efforts proved to be a mere state of negative peace as the root causes of the conflict were yet to be fully addressed. In addition, despite the government efforts, the hostilities have continued although at a lower intensity. The Peruvian media is awash with various incidents that have occurred and caused injuries among the Peruvian populace. Some of the notable incidents, which, have since occurred, include the:

- June 2018 killing of four police officers by terrorist groups in the Anco district of Churcampa in the Huancavelica province (El Comercio 2018).
- March 2017, three police officers were killed in the Ayacucho region (El Pais 2017).
- August 2013, three Shining Path members were killed by the police force in the Echarate region (BBC news: 2013).

2.7.3.4 Asia

Zones of Peace in Philippines

The People Power Revolution of 1986 led to the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. Government-led the peace process with all rebel forces through the office of the Peace Commissioner (Tongeren 2012: 410). The president even had an advisor on the peace process with cabinet rank (ibid). The Peace process was based on the following principles (Tongeren 2012: 411):

- The peace process should be community-based reflecting sentiments, values, and principles dear to all the Philippines.
- The peace process aimed to create a society based on equity, humanity, and pluralism.
- The peace process was neither to apportion blame nor surrender, but dignity for all concerned.

In 2001, the government came up with a peace plan / Policy Framework for Peace, which had two components (ibid):

- a) Peacemaking and peacekeeping through negotiations and local and civil society-led peace initiatives.
- b) Peacebuilding and conflict prevention through addressing major causes of insurgency, eliminating grievances, rehabilitate and develop conflict-affected areas as well as heal wounds of the conflict.

Irene (2014:166) states that by 2008 47 000 rebels had handed over their weapons. Avruch and Jose (2007:52) state that in addition to government efforts, a group known as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality established the Zone of Peace (ZOP) in September 1988. The zones spread to places such as Sagada, Tabuk, Bitumen, and Cantamayog (Ibid). The ZOPs also focused on social justice, human rights and corruption (ibid). Armed protesters were forbidden from entering these zones. In Sagada, even alcohol was banned and members were to respect cultural norms and values. The government rewarded these efforts with a special development fund (Chivasa 2015:87).

The zones succeeded due to leadership training, conflict resolution workshops and the encouragement for the use of dialogue to address conflict (ibid). Livelihood development trainings were also held (Chivasa 2015:88). Militant groups became stakeholders in the zone of peace for instance in Nalapan and violence decreased (ibid). The challenges that they faced were due to dependence on the voluntary participation of local people, they did not have official recognition from the government (ibid). They thus did not have influence at the national level. The zones also did not have legal protection

2.7.3.5 Nepal

Suurmond and Sharma (2013:81) state that Nepal went through 10 years of violence since 1996 between the Communist Party of Nepal, which pursued a Maoist ideology, and the government. The Nepalese conflict was also triggered by feudalism, exclusion of minorities, weak governance and

government neglect (ibid). The conflict was rural-based. 13 000 people lost their lives whilst thousands more were displaced (ibid).

A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006 (ibid). Through the agreement, the monarchy was abolished and replaced by a constitution. In 2007, the government created a Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, which was the second in the world after the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace in the Solomon Islands (Tongerren 2012:411). LPCs were established, but they faced difficulties due to their closeness to the government's Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (ibid). Sixty LPCs were formed, but they were problems of effectiveness (ibid).

2.8 Reflection on LPCs Case Studies

From the case studies above, it can be inferred that LPCs with a lack of resources fail to make an impact. It can also be noted that LPCs with close relations with the government flourish at times. This is in contrast to the arguments of scholars on LPCs such as Van Tongeren (2013:40) who argue that LPCs that are close to governments are prone to the dictatorial and autocratic whims of these governments. This was true in the cases of the Barza LPC in DRC, Peru and South Africa. However, in the cases of the Philippines, Ghana, Nicaragua and Kenya, government assistance was helpful.

This brings to the fore the idea that not all government assistance to LPCs is bad. It depends on the type of government the LPC is dealing with. Some governments are accommodative to initiatives of peacebuilding within their nations. Harris (2011:132) suggested this when he stated that despite the cynicism towards governments and government officials there are some government officials who are principled. Such people, according to Harris, are open to peacebuilding efforts.

Furthermore, the case studies proved that the government assistance is at its most effective when it plays a supportive role rather than a leading role. The peace initiative should remain community driven at all times and the government assistance should be from a distance.

LPCs, which work in partnership with NGOs, also make an impact as they are capacitated to carry out peacebuilding work. This is found to be true in the cases of LPCs in North Kivu whose relationship with the Centre for the Resolution of Conflicts was very fruitful. The case of the Collaborative in Sudan and South-Sudan working with Peace Direct proves this point as well.

The case studies also brought out the fact that despite their notable achievements, LPCs are not a guarantee for peace. It has been seen that there are some conflicts, which are beyond the capabilities of even the most sincere LPCs. This is true in the cases of the peace Shuras in Afghanistan, the LPCs in South-Sudan's Unity state, DRC and in San Jose Columbia. Despite their efforts, the conflicts continue to rage on. Nevertheless, the case studies have also proven that despite the challenges associated with LPCs, they are the gateway to sustainable peacebuilding. They are helpful in mitigating violence through early warning systems.

2.9 Summary

The chapter focused on the theoretical foundations, which underpinned the study. From the theories that were analyzed, conflict transformation stands out as the theory that is most suitable for the study. This is due to its emphasis on the use of local communities in the resolution of their local conflicts, which is the argument this study is proposing for the Chipinge-East community. Case studies of LPCs, which have attempted to resolve the conflicts in their respective areas, have also been analyzed in the chapter. After analysis, it became clear that LPCs the world over have immensely contributed to the resolution of conflicts, though they face many challenges.

CHAPTER 3: TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

Africa is a continent that is replete with violent conflicts. Some of the notable examples are Algeria-Morocco (1963), Somalia-Ethiopia (1961, 1964, 1977-78), Mali-Burkina Faso (1975, 1985-86), Nigeria-Cameroon (1975-1993), Nigeria-Chad (1983), Senegal-Mauritania (1989-1990) and Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2018). These conflicts commenced during the post-independence period of Africa and are attributable to a plethora of issues. One of these issues is that of the nature of the boundaries that demarcate the modern African states. These boundaries have been a source of both intra and inter-state conflicts. This chapter analyzes the nature of transboundary conflicts in Africa. It also traces the origins of these conflicts and analyze the concept of boundaries in pre-colonial Africa. Lastly, the case studies of transboundary conflicts in Northern, West, East, Central and Southern Africa will be examined.

3.2 Definition

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.) defines a boundary as a line, which determines the limits of an area. Therefore, in the context of this study, a boundary is the line, which demarcates the limits of a territory. It is important to highlight that, despite the simplicity of the definition of a boundary being just a mere line, the line itself is of crucial importance in the existence of states. Without a clear definition of these lines, the existence of a state in the international system is compromised. This is why many nations in Africa and beyond have gone to wars in defense of their boundaries.

For a state to be recognized as a legal entity within the international system it has to have boundaries that are clearly defined. Shaw (2008:487) argues that without territory there cannot be a state. He further states that without territory a state has no power over jurisdiction and or sovereignty (Ibid).

Thus, a transboundary conflict is a clash that occurs on both sides of the boundary demarcating the territorial limits of a state. The clashes can be

between governments of the neighboring states or just among the communities residing along the boundary. Transboundary disputes, however, can take many forms such as territorial disputes, irredentist movements or illegal activities such as smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorist activities.

A territorial dispute is defined as a conflict between two states arising from the claim of at least one of these states to a part of the territory or in extreme cases to the entire territory that is administered by the other state (Kornprobst 2002:369). Thomson (2010:15) defines irredentism as the desire to unite under one flag the people of a community that is divided into another nation. Thomson (2015:47) adds that irredentism is a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders.

Jal (2014:44) opines that transboundary conflicts are caused by a variety of factors such as resource scarcity, widespread poverty, and weak government structures, especially in rural areas. Ngalim (2016:01) opines that boundaries remain triggers of conflict in Africa for they are ambiguous.

3.3 The Pre-Colonial African Concept of International Boundaries

The conflicts of international boundaries in Africa seem to be emanating from an error that was done in the pre-colonial era by the European researchers, explorers, and politicians at the time. Pre-colonial academic research on Africa reached the flawed conclusion that the concept of international boundaries was non-existent in Africa. Widstrand (1969:66) claims that the colonial boundaries had the advantage of creating states in Africa that did not exist before. Funteh (2015:223) states that the boundaries of pre-colonial Africa were not rational and did not have exclusive frontiers.

However, recent studies have seen that it is not a fact. The concept of national boundaries in Africa was different from that of Europe, but that does not mean it was non-existent. Asiwaju (1981:01) states that the difference in the European and African concepts of boundary was due to the fact that in Europe the concept was designed for centralized states in the post-Westphalian

Europe whilst in Africa, it was designed for decentralized states such as Kikuyu, Maasai, Nuer, Talensi, and Igbo. He adds that the African concept of international boundaries was not as precise as that of the Europeans (ibid). Instead of using “width less” lines as in Europe, the African international boundaries used a variety of features some of them even topographical such as the sea, lagoon, lakes, rivers, boulders, hills and mountains (ibid). In some cases, even vegetation was used to demarcate boundaries i.e. plants, forests, etc. He adds that European travelers in the 19th century such as David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley were escorted by emissaries of chiefs or kings through their territory after which they would stop (ibid).

Furthermore, Dobler (2008:03) concurs with this argument and states that pre-colonial African kingdoms were separated by vast stretches of land, which were no-mans’ land. These stretches of land could be at least 60km wide in some cases. In these buffer zones, that is where grazing and dwellings of social outcasts took place. This shows that the concept of boundaries was there in Africa prior to colonialism. However, the boundaries were not static as in the case of Europe, they were rather fluid, flexible, mobile and changed by dynamics of history such as migrations, nomadism, trade, wars and revolutions (Asiwaju 1981:03). The Khoisan of South Africa were known to have viciously defended their territory prior to the arrival of the Europeans. Asiwaju (1981:02) affirms that the pastoral Maasai were divided into 16 autonomous sub-ethnic units with clearly defined territory with its own pasture and territory. Asiwaju (1981:02) reveals that in Somalia the Somali would cut marks on the bark of a tree to mark their territorial limits. Funtah (2015:227) stated that boundaries in Africa were not lines, but zones between neighboring states. Asiwaju (1981:03) states that the boundaries in Africa at the time could be grouped into three:

1. **Frontiers of contact:** political groups operated as neighbours e.g. the Yoruba, Hausa, Jolof of West-Africa and Maasai of East-Africa and Baganda.
2. **Frontier of separation:** these are states that were divided by buffer zones consisting of mountain ranges, deserts, forests, deep ravines. This was common in Sudan’s Borno, Darfur, Wadai, Funj and Sokoto Caliphate.

These buffer zones were a no man's land and non-of the states exercised political authority in it.

3. **Frontier of transition:** this is when cultures overlapped without a clear boundary. These types of boundaries were found all over Africa in the peripheries of major culture areas. The Yoruba shared such boundaries with the Aja in the West, the Edo in the East, the Igala and the Nupe in the North-East and Bariba in the North-West.

Dobler (2008:02) explains this lack of precision in African boundaries. He attributes this to the fact that land was in abundance. Dobler (ibid) adds that land was not such an issue in Africa such that even land taxes were not imposed. This was not the case with Europe however, European nations are densely populated to this day and thus territory remains a big issue as land is very scarce. This predicament led to the establishment of institutions and heavy investment in territorial infrastructure to protect the scarce commodity of land.




Figure 3. Map Showing Pre-Colonial African States. Source: Collins et al. 1994.

3.4 The European Concept of International Boundaries

Sotirovic (2017) posits that the Westphalian Peace Treaty signed on October 24, 1648, brought European boundaries, as we know them today into existence. The treaty brought to a conclusion the 30 years war (1618-1648) which killed 8 million people according to Clodfelter (2017:40). This treaty dissolved the Holy Roman Empire and led to the emergence of the modern European states. Hassan (2006:64) states that this treaty is the first modern treaty of modern international law and it was the original territorial basis of the modern interstate system. This was the concept of the territorial sovereign state and sovereign equality. The boundaries are also linear in nature. Hassan (2006: 64-67) continues to say that prior to this treaty in 1648 Europe was under feudalism with a hierarchical system of power and authority. Borders in this era were not respected, as weaker states were vulnerable to stronger states.

Hassan (2006:62) defines state territory as a portion of the surface of the globe which is subject to the sovereignty of the state. Asiwaju (1981:01) defines an international boundary as a border region, zone or tract, which forms a belt of separation, contact or transition between political units. He adds that a boundary or frontier is a width less line of demarcation. The knowledge of purposes and functions of international boundaries is essential in settling disputes (Okunu 2010:02). Funteh (2015:225) states that in international law a state is qualified by occupying territory or boundaries within which it exercises jurisdiction over persons, things and excludes others from other states. This concurs with the 1910 verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which ruled that one of the elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits (ibid).

This shows that the possession of a territory with defined boundaries is crucial for the recognition of a country by the international community. Okunu (2010:02) informs that international boundaries are crucial in that they determine peace, integration, and development of a nation-state or sub-region. Furthermore, boundaries are important for they are the geographical base upon which power can be manifested and accepted by the authorities of the

state in question. He adds that these boundaries are a form of identity for territory and enable a state to administer laws, collect taxes and provide a defense. It is through boundaries that states become recognizable under international law and make them equal with other states. Okunu (2010:15) states that boundaries determine all facets of life in a country i.e. food, money, and education. They provide physical security and resources. This shows how crucial the issue of national boundaries is to the very survival of a nation among other nations.

From the assertions above, it can be deduced that territory is vital for the mere survival of a state in the international system. If there are issues with the definition of a state's territory then the political and economic well-being of that state is automatically affected.

Okunu (2010:11) identifies four types of modern-day international boundaries:

- **Physical or natural:** he states that these types of boundaries follow a particular natural feature such as a river, watershed or mountain range. He adds that 45% of Africa's boundaries are of this nature.
- **Geometric:** these follow straight lines, arcs of a circle such as longitude and latitude. 44% of African boundaries are straight lines. 30% follow rectilinear or curved lines.
- **Anthropo-geographical:** these are related to human settlements, culture, and language.
- **Compounded:** these contain a combination of all the elements mentioned above.

This was the same concept, which was imposed by the Europeans upon African societies at the beginning of colonization. However as noted earlier, prior to the arrival of Europeans, Africa had its own concept of international boundaries.

3.5 Transboundary Conflicts in Africa: BWA Conference (1884-1885)

Kornprobst (2002:369) states that transboundary conflicts are common in African politics. Okunu (2010:02) states that the issue behind many boundary clashes is that the interests of those who drew them clash with those who are

living on the ground in Africa and what they want to use them for. Colonial administrators with European interests in mind, set up the boundaries in Africa and the framework of these boundaries, which are problematic in Africa today, was laid down at the Berlin West Africa Conference, which took place from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885.

Scholars are not in agreement regarding the genesis of the conference. Uzoigwe (1985:28) states that the idea of the conference was initiated by Portugal. Pakenham (1991) identifies Prince Otto von Bismarck as the main instigator of the conference. However, scholars concur on the fact that the conference was as a result of the strong expansionist intentions of Belgian leader Leopold the 2nd (1835-1909). In 1876, he had hosted a Brussels Geographical Conference and set up the African International Association. In 1879, he had sent Henry Morton Stanley (1841-1904) to Congo leading to the creation of the Congo Free State (1885-1908). This alarmed Portugal along with other European nations (such as Britain, Germany, and France), which had expansionist interests in Africa in the case of Portugal these interests were backdated to the 15th century.

Craven (2015:32) adds that the conference was thus held to avoid the outbreak of conflict amongst the rival colonial powers. In the end, it set out conditions of acquiring territory on the coast of Africa. France and Germany wanted to form an alliance so as to undermine the British Empire. These sentiments were based upon the British actions in Africa being an impediment to both France and Germany's interests in Egypt and West Africa respectively. Britain, on the other hand, had also signed an alliance in 1883 (Anglo-Portuguese entente) in which Britain recognized Portuguese sovereignty over the mouth of the Congo. This would effectively block out other European companies and traders from the vast central Africa. However, the Belgian activities in the area were threatening these interests. Thus, the agenda of the conference was to do the following (Craven 2015:37):

- Ensure freedom of commerce in the basin and the mouths of the Congo.
- The application to the Congo and Niger rivers of the principles adopted by the congress of Vienna with a view to preserving freedom of navigation on

certain international rivers, principles applied at a later date to the river Danube.

- A definition of formalities necessary to be observed so that new occupations on the African coasts shall be deemed effective.

The important issues that were contained in the General Act of the Berlin Conference, which was subsequently agreed at the conference, was that (Uzoigwe 1985:29):

- **Article 34:** Any power that intended to occupy a coastal territory should notify all the powers present at Berlin (Germany, France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium). This was known as the doctrine of the sphere of influence.
- **Article 35:** the occupier of coastal possessions had to demonstrate that it had sufficient authority there to protect existing rights, freedom of trade and transit. This was the doctrine of effective occupation.

There are scholars who argue that the Berlin West Africa conference was ineffective and thus the African claim that it generated conflicts in the post-colonial period is an exaggeration. Pakenham (1991:254) argues that the Berlin Conference did not precipitate the scramble for Africa. Ewan (2002:97-98) also argues along the same lines and affirms that the conference was of less practical significance than has generally been supposed. Craven (2015:34) concurs and states that the importance of the Berlin Conference has been misrepresented and exaggerated. He further argues that the conference was a failure and that the conference did not partition Africa, it was only active until 1919, it was ended by the 1919 ratification of Saint Germain-en-Laye and was replaced by the Brussels General Act of 1890 (Craven 2015:33). He adds that the conference did not partition Africa as the partition had already commenced prior to the conference (Craven 2015:39). He bases his argument on the fact that Congo had already been occupied by Belgium under the disguise of philanthropic work. Portugal had already annexed Mozambique (Uzoigwe 1985:28). Germany had proclaimed protectorates over Togoland and Cameroon in July 1884. During the conference, the British explorer Joseph Thomson was in the process of concluding treaties in Northern Nigeria. Carl Peters was doing the same for Germany in East Africa (Craven 2015:42).

However, when one considers the conflicts that the boundaries drawn from this conference have caused, it is safe to conclude that the conference formalized a process that was already in motion. It gave encouragement and legitimacy to this process. It sanitized an abnormal practice. The actual physical demarcation of the current territorial boundaries in Africa might not have happened at the conference; however, it provided the grounds for it especially through Article 34 of the General Act i.e. the Doctrine of Sphere of Influence. When one analyses this article/doctrine it becomes clear that the sphere of influence is another way of imploring European nations to define or specify the territory they are occupying. Through this article, the era of informal empire, which the British had enjoyed during the mid-19th century was brought to an end. It is undeniable that the conference sped up the process of colonization. Most African territories and kingdoms, with the exception of those that are highlighted, were colonized post-Berlin Conference i.e. 1884 as illustrated in the table below:

Table 1. African Territories and Kingdom: Colonization

Country/Territory	Year of Colonization	Colonizer
Angola	1575	Portugal
Benin	1894	France
Botswana	1885	Britain
Burundi	1899	Germany
Cameroon	1884	Germany
Chad	1900	France
Gabon	1885	France
Ghana	1867	Britain
Kenya	1895	Britain
Lesotho	1868	Britain
Libya	1910	France
Malawi	1891	Britain
Mali	1892	France
Morocco	1912	France
Mozambique	1505	Portugal

Namibia	1884	Germany
Nigeria	1861	Britain
Rwanda	1894	France
Sierra Leone	1787	France
Somalia	1887	Britain
Swaziland	1902	Britain
Tanzania	1885	Germany
Togo	1884	Germany
Uganda	1888	Britain
Zambia	1888	Britain
Zimbabwe	1890	Britain

Much as the General Act of the Berlin Conference is said to have been short-lived until 1919 as Craven (2015:40) argues, its consequences are still very active and leading to transboundary-conflicts in Africa. The damage had already been done by 1919 when it is claimed to have been eradicated, thus its dissolution was only on paper and yet on the ground, its resulting colonial territorial boundaries are intact and not changed even when colonialism ended. This argument has also been put forward by Dr. Arikana Chihombori-Quao, the former African Union ambassador to the United States of America. During an interview (October 2018) on *This is America and The World (TIA and TA)* she stated that the Berlin Conference is alive 130 years after it was signed. The countries and boundaries it created are still existing and thus by virtue of this, the effects of this conference continue to haunt Africa to this day and beyond.

3.6 Berlin West Africa Conference: African Transboundary Conflicts

Despite the argument that the Berlin Conference did not cause any harm to Africa, there are scholars who argue on the contrary. Craven (2015:43)

laments that Berlin Conference was nothing other than a monstrous blunder erasing the pre-colonial reality of African sovereignty. He adds that Berlin contrived the unnatural division of Africa, ignoring in the process all ethnic, tribal or natural interests. Craven (ibid), despite his earlier argument also points out that the Berlin Conference determined the future of Africa in which no African was involved. It assumed that Africa was a terra nullius, ownerless and empty and therefore had to be occupied. Brambilla (n.d.) argues that this narrative was fabricated to present Africa as a *tabula-rasa* (blank slate), which desperately needed the introduction of European economic and political structures. This led to the imposition of the European concept of international boundaries upon African nationalities. Michalopolous and Papaizannou (2011:03) also add that African leaders were not invited to the conference and even European explorers, geographers and missionaries who had some knowledge of Africa. Thus, people who did not have knowledge concerning Africa determined the fate of African boundaries.

Uzoigwe (1985:42) adds that the Berlin Conference imposed a new map of Africa consisting of 40 political units. Maps in fig 3 illustrate this point. The new boundaries were arbitrary, artificial and haphazard. The new map distorted African pre-colonial political order. Thirty percent of the borders were drawn in straight lines, which cut across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. Alesina *et.al* (2011) add that 80% of African boundaries follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines, more than any other part of the world. They add that artificial states with straight boundaries have more economic problems than countries with organic borders. This is partly true when one considers the examples of countries such as China, India and Russia. Their borders are organic, they were not altered much by foreign powers as in the case of Africa thus their economies are currently performing well. However, the issue is not about the shape of the boundary, even the United States of America has longitudinal and latitudinal lines dividing its states, but regardless of this issue it is a super power. The deciding factor rather is not the shape of the boundary, but rather the interests of those who demarcated the boundaries.

Okunu (2010:09) stated that Africa has 109 international boundaries, which divide 177 cultural/ethnic groups. Patricio (2008:103) adds that some of the

African communities are separated by more than one boundary. Brambilla (n.d.) calls the current African boundary a falsehood that is misleading in that that the linear structure suggests that the internal political structures are homogenous and unified. She further states that the colonial map is not able to communicate the distinctive aspects of African territory, but it communicates completely artificial values that propose an Africa to be used by the Europeans (ibid). Rodney (1972:212) sums it up when he says European robber statesmen sat down in Berlin...to decide who should steal which parts in Africa.

Michalopolous and Papaizannou (2011:01) maintain that Europeans who had never settled in Africa and therefore had little knowledge of the African context designed the boundaries established at the Berlin Conference. They add that these boundaries are what have influenced Africa's under-development. Wildstrand (1969:66) concurs with them when he states that boundaries have turned out to be stumbling blocks to African relations and development. The borders have also led to ethnic struggles, patronage politics and conflict. Jal (2014:44) also concurs and states that transboundary conflicts in the African context have proved devastating to the socio-economic and development trajectories of entire regions.

Thomson (2010: 14-15) echoes this argument and states that the boundaries have resulted in nations that are too small and others too big to administer a sustainable economy. He gives the examples of Gambia which is only 11 000 square kilometers whilst the Democratic Republic of Congo is over 2 3 million square kilometers making it several times bigger. He also bemoans the existence of 14 landlocked countries in Africa because of these boundaries as illustrated in fig 3 below. This means that these countries have to depend on the mercy of their neighbors to get access to the sea. This is true in the cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe, which have lost billions of dollars' worth of trade in trying to get access to the sea during the colonial and civil wars of their coastal neighbors.

In the case of Zambia, due to its landlocked nature, it has always been at the mercy of its coastal neighbors e.g. South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola (Martin and Johnson 1981:125). During the time when these coastal neighbors

went through colonial and post-colonial struggles (Mozambique and Angola). Zambia was virtually bereft of access to the sea. Some of these struggles included the Mozambique civil war (1977-1992), the Angola civil war (1975-2002) and the destabilization policy of the Apartheid regime (1977-1990). In 1976 at the outbreak of the Angolan civil war, the Benguela railway running from DRC to Angola via Zambia ceased to function. This left Zambia with no option but to send its copper through Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) to Beira in Mozambique. Ball (2015) explains that this was not only a longer route but also more expensive for Zambia.

For Zimbabwe, the outbreak of the Mozambican civil war (1977-1992) between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO rebels robbed it of its access to the sea through Mozambique. It thus had to rely on the port of Durban in South Africa. Chimanikire (1990:10) states that this arrangement made the Zimbabwe government lose US\$7 million per week.



Figure 4. Map of Post-Independent African Boundaries (Moen 2018)

A contributing factor towards the issues associated with colonial boundaries in Africa was the lack of knowledge regarding the African context by the architects of these boundaries. Michalopoulos and Papaizannou (2011:03) admitted that the Europeans had drawn boundaries on places that no European had ever set foot and giving away mountains, rivers, and lakes, which they did not know where they existed. Wildstrand (1969:65) posits that African boundaries were drawn with little regard to geography, ethnic groups and the convenience of the economic activity or lines of communication Michalopolous and Papaizannou: *op cit*) argues that the Berlin Conference

was predominantly a European affair in which the African concerns were marginalized in favor of the interests of the European powers. This is true in the case of East African countries such as Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania for example. The British government, in the process of colonizing it, was not concerned about the fate of the people in the process. Gjeso (2015:831) reveals that the British government was more concerned about defensive issues due to the existence of the river Nile and the Suez Canal, which was crucial for the defense of India. In West Africa, during the demarcation of Nigeria and Cameroon between the British and the Germans, the Germans were more interested in the shrimp along the Bakassi peninsular than its people. The British on the other hand were interested in the key trading post of Calabar thus they exchanged the two territories (Ngalim 2016:04). The interests of the local people were clearly not part of the equation.

Upon further analysis of the historical sources surrounding the issue, it becomes apparent that these actions were informed by the notion that Africa was uncivilized or Africa was a dark continent. These sentiments are shown by the statements made by some of the pioneering Europeans who were on a quest to “discover” Africa. Thomas Pakenham (1991) states that David Livingstone during a speech at Cambridge University in Britain urged other Europeans to join him on his quest to introduce civilization, commerce, and Christianity in Africa. The last entry into his diary prior to his death also described Africa as an open wound of the world. In addition to this, Kipling (1899) wrote a poem titled the White man’s burden. In the poem, Kipling espoused that it was the duty of the Europeans to introduce Africans to civilization. Brambilla (n.d.) adds that the Berlin Conference considered Africa to be a wide empty space to be civilized, devoid of any social meaning. This shows the level of thinking at that point in time, which informed the imposition of these boundaries.

However, it is important to note that Africa had its own form of civilization and concepts of boundaries. This then explains the reason why the boundaries that were imposed upon Africa have become problematic.




Figure 5. Maps of Africa before and after Colonization (Wikipedia.org)

Michalopolous and Papaizannou (2011:04) argue that the boundaries imposed upon Africa have contributed to under-development and conflict through:

1. Irredentist movements of split ethnicities which want to re-unite with their peers across the border. This is true in the case of the Somali tribes who were split into three different countries i.e. Northern Kenya, Southern Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. These irredentist demands have led to three post-independence wars in an attempt to reunite with their fellow citizens across the borders.
2. Secessionist conflicts in which partitioned ethnicities fight for independence. Two hundred and five of the wars in Africa are secessionist wars e.g. Saharawi, South Sudan, Senegal.
3. African borders are poorly demarcated due to imprecise colonial treaties. This has contributed to border disputes, which further hinder development e.g. Eritrea and Ethiopia.
4. The borders have contributed towards patronage politics in which dominant ethnic groups discriminate against minority groups. This triggers intervention from the other partitioned ethnic groups in neighbouring countries. The Ewe of Togo helped Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in his 1979 and 1981 coups in Ghana. The Alur of Uganda were split into Uganda

and DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). During the era of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), the Alur relocated to Uganda to seek refuge due to ill-treatment from Mobutu. However, the Baganda opposed this leading to conflict.

5. Partitioned ethnicities engage in smuggling and other criminal activities. This is due to poor institutional infrastructure and the presence of ethnic contacts across the border.
6. It leads to armed conflict due to interference with natural resources. The Cabinda conflict in Angola is driven by the presence of an artificial border, vast oil fields and the partitioning of the Bakongo
7. The artificial border design leads to conflict especially in large African countries because it makes it harder for the African state to broadcast their political power.

Carik (2009) concurs and argues that when national borders divide ethnic groups it raises the risk of internal/civil conflict. Much as the conflicts might be localized, they threaten regional security. The Yoruba are divided into Dahomey and Nigeria. The Ewes are divided into Ghana and Togo. The Somalis are divided into Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

The conflicts that result from boundary issues in Africa and the world over are very costly on the economic well-being of a country. Okunu (2010:14) gives the following examples:

Table 2. Costs of Transboundary Conflicts

Belligerents	Years of conflict	Cost (US\$ million)
Kenya-Ethiopia	1963-1970	44
Chad-Libya	1960-1994	32
Argentina-Uruguay	1950-1973	981
Egypt-Israel	1950-1988	108

Okunu (2010:05) attributes these conflicts to the fact that there were so many errors in demarcating, managing and administering the boundaries. In some cases, such as Kenya-Ethiopia the process of delimitation and demarcation took 30 years.

However, there are scholars who argue that all boundaries are artificial and are therefore naturally problematic. Okunu (2010:12) argues that all boundaries are artificial in nature because states are not natural creations. They further argue that there is nothing natural or authentic about the political boundaries of any state (ibid).

This line of argument then implies that the source of the transboundary conflicts that Africa has experienced is not due to the boundaries imposed at the Berlin Conference, but elsewhere. However, one can argue that yes, boundaries are artificial and created by humanity, but as in the case of Europe, the boundaries were created by Europeans themselves. They had a say in the demarcations of their territories at Westphalia in 1648. These boundaries were created with their interests in mind for they were present at the Westphalian conference. In the case of Africa, the boundaries were superimposed not by Africans, but by Europeans who had not set foot on the African continent. Their knowledge of the communities on the continent was scanty at best. This then means that the African boundaries are not in line with African interests, but rather with European interests, which then leads to the rampant conflicts that have been experienced in the post-independent era.

3.7 Colonial Mal-administration: African Transboundary Conflicts

The transboundary conflicts in Africa are not just caused by the arbitrary delimitation and demarcation of boundaries done at the Berlin Conference. Part of the reason behind them also lies in the manner in which African nations were administered in the colonial era. Thomson (2010:16) affirms that many African states suffer from a condition, which he labels 'non-hegemonic state' in which the post-independent government fails to project its power to all the borders of its territory. Thomson attributes this condition to the fact that at independence the African nationalists inherited states with institutions that were designed to cater only for the needs of the elite who were the European settlers at the time. The institutions were also designed to administer those areas that were deemed to be of economic interest for instance mines, commercial farms, port harbors, etc.

When one weighs his argument, it is found to be true in the cases of African states such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). The road and rail networks were constructed to link these areas of special economic interest to the nearest port such as Dares Salaam in Tanzania, Beira in Mozambique, Lobito in Angola and Durban or Cape-town in South Africa. This appears to be done so as to drain African resources out of Africa to the colonial metropole case in point is TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority) railway. Ford (2017) states that it was built by the Chinese government beginning 1970 and completed in 1975 at a cost of US\$570 million and it connects Zambia and to the port of Dar es Salam in Tanzania. Scholars such as Monson (2009:05) argue that the TAZARA railway has been a source of livelihood for the people staying along the railway. However, this benefit is not commensurate to the resources being siphoned out of Zambia. The railway has become an artery of looting copper out of Zambia by Multi-national companies as exposed by the Foil Vedanta report of January 2014 (Das and Rose 2014).

Therefore, this inherited system led to the marginalization of citizens dwelling in the borderlands. These areas are characterized by a lack of socio-economic infrastructure to sustain the communities. They are virtually left to fend for themselves leading to the prevalence of criminality in the borderlands. This criminality comprises of smuggling and even human trafficking. Okunu (2010:280) laments over the illegal transboundary activities in the East African borderlands of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti and Tanzania. These illegal activities include cattle rustling; drug trafficking, gun smuggling, and auto-theft.

3.8 Post-Independent Mal-governance: Transboundary Conflicts

However, it is also important to note that this condition inherited from the colonial era was further compounded by maladministration that went on in African post-independent governments. Aitteyi (1998) labels these states as Mafia states that were characterized by chronic kleptomania perpetrated by the government officials themselves. He cites the examples of the following administrations:

- Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in which US\$5 billion was embezzled
- Kamuzu Banda of Malawi in which US\$3.4 million was embezzled
- Emperor Bokassa of Central African Republic in which US\$20 million was embezzled in one day during an inauguration.

Twiss (2002) also cites the example of the government of General Idi Amin of Uganda in which £17 million pounds were embezzled in less than a year and inflation reached 150%. This situation leads to a government system that is unable to cater for its citizens including those at the borderlands which then promotes a culture of corruption and criminality. The Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response Program for East and Southern Africa (CPMR/ESA) (n.d.) points out that in the case of Kenya, the government administration of its borderlands ranges from weak to non-existent.

Okunu (2010:279) however argues from a different angle. He states that the discovery of minerals and other natural resources in African countries has heightened transboundary conflicts in Africa. He bases his argument on the example of the East African region, which has discovered minerals such as hydrocarbons, iron ore, copper, manganese, uranium, zinc and platinum group of metals. He cites the following examples of transboundary disputes as to have been caused by the discovery of minerals:

Table 3. Transboundary Conflicts Triggered by the Discovery of Minerals

Countries	Year of Dispute	Cause of dispute
Burkina Faso vs Mali	1974	Agacher strip oil reserves

Western Sahara vs Morocco	1975-present	Phosphate deposits
Nigeria vs Cameroon	1985	Oil deposits in Bakassi
Sudan vs South-Sudan	2011-present	Oil in the Abyei area

He also attributes the conflicts over the newly found resources to boundaries that were not clearly defined during the colonial era. By 1914 he says only 200 000 square miles of borders had been defined whilst 3.8 million square miles remained unexplored. More attention was put in demarcating the areas in the western region of East Africa due to the belief that there were minerals there and due to the desire to control the River Nile.

3.9 African Case Studies of Transboundary Conflicts

Introduction

The following section will focus on case studies from various regions in Africa (north, west, south, and east) which experienced transboundary conflicts. In particular, the case studies will be focusing on the reasons behind these transboundary conflicts and how they were resolved. The latter part is meant to draw a comparison between transboundary conflicts resolved with and without the participation of local communities.

3.9.1 Morocco-Western Sahara (Secessionist Movement)

Nature of Conflict

Mundy (2008:01) states that Spain colonized Western Sahara (1885-1975). It was ceded to Morocco and Mauritania upon the withdrawal of Spain in 1975. In 1974, ICJ (International Court of Justice) ruled that the Saharawi people were the rightful owners of the Western Sahara and recommended a referendum (ibid). The ICJ further ruled that Western Sahara belonged to neither Morocco nor Mauritania (ibid). This was based on the records that Western Sahara had nomadic tribes whom the Spanish made agreements with. The Moroccan case was thrown out as being weak and invalid. Morocco

traced its ownership of Western Sahara to the era of Islamic conquest 1300 years ago (ibid). Mauritania relinquished its hold in 1979 (ibid). Boukhars (2013:01) informs that Western Sahara has been campaigning for independence from Morocco. However, Morocco together with the international community (France and America) are both reluctant for Western Sahara to get its independence (ibid). The reason behind this position is that the western countries are fearful that Western Sahara might become another failed state like in the case of South-Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, etc (ibid). In addition, the western capitals are concerned about the conflict as it is happening near the boundaries of European countries. Algeria is also supporting and accommodating Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al Hamra and the Rio de Oro) the organization, which is championing the cause of Western Sahara, people since 1973 (ibid). Algeria's support is emanating from the enmity it has with Morocco. The enmity of the two nations is also based on a border dispute (Chtatou 2018). Furthermore, Morocco is accused by Algeria of supporting the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (Xinhua 2012).

Consequences of the Conflict

Nevertheless, the standoff between Western Sahara and Morocco has led to human, economic and political ramifications. From 1975-1991 the conflict led to 100 000-150 000 refugees fleeing to Tindouf in southwest Algeria (Boukhars 2012:03). The conflict has now led to the spread of transboundary terrorism and criminal networks. Boukhars (2012:01) states that the areas are under-governed and vulnerable to drug trafficking, weapon circulation, and contraband smuggling. Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were making in-roads into the area. On 05, January 2011 Moroccan security forces dismantled a 27-member AQIM cell in Amgala Western Sahara with a cache of weapons (ibid). This criminality is affecting areas in Mauritania, Mali, Morocco and the refugee camps in southwest Algeria (ibid). The drug traffickers are even kidnaping both civilians and humanitarian workers to make sure that drug shipments go through (ibid). This can also be attributed to the isolation and frustration, which the area is going through.

Furthermore, the youths are now supporting radical courses of action such as resuming hostilities against Morocco. The UN mission on the ground tried to organize a referendum on independence (Mundy 2008: 02). Morocco is, however, blocking the vote and went on to build a fortified zone inside 85% of the territory being contested for by Polisario (ibid). The fortification is manned by 150 000 soldiers. The remaining area left to Polisario is of no economic or strategic value (ibid). This has led to the disillusionment of the Saharawi refugees in Algeria.

The continued enmity is affecting the whole region. Boukhar (2012:04) states that the Chadian General Adoum Ngare Hassan lamented that the conflict is now making the whole region slide into hell. He further stated that, if Algeria and Morocco came to an agreement it could turn over the fortunes of the conflict (ibid). Boukhar (2012:04) states that Jean Francois Daguzan from France's Foundation for Strategic Research said that the conflict is threatening the security of the Sahel region.

Analysis of Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

From reading the various literature on this case study, I reached the conclusion that this is an example of a transboundary conflict that is caused by the arbitrary boundary delimitations done at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. I realized that, Spain did not put into consideration the political dynamics of the communities that were dwelling in the areas it colonized in 1885. This inconsideration even continued when Spain handed over the Western Saharawi territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. This was done regardless of the fact that the Western Saharawi had their own polity prior to colonialism. The resulting conflict from this inconsideration is now affecting a whole region and not just the countries affected by the errors of Spanish colonialism.

In addition to Morocco and Saharawi, I realized that the conflict is also affecting countries such as Algeria, Chad and even Mali. The conflict is also an example of the failure associated with settling conflicts between political leaders without the involvement of the grassroots communities. Whilst Polisario and Morocco are fighting over the territory, it is the 100 000-150 000 refugees (Boukhars

2012:03) in Mauritania and South-West Algeria who are suffering from poverty, lack of employment and accommodation. Meanwhile, the ex-Polisario officials are being lured by the Moroccan government and being rewarded with senior government positions. A case in point is that of Ovid Soulem who was given an ambassadorial post to Spain (Boukhar 2012:10). Thus, the efforts to resolve the conflicts should be coming from the people (bottom-up) and not political leaders for they have other interests that do not include the people. This case study is also a classic example of how international organizations are not always effective in resolving conflicts. In this case study the ICJ passed a resolution regarding the matter in 1974 and the UN proposed a referendum in 1991. However, both interventions failed and western countries such as the USA and France are said to have had their own interests regarding the outcome of the conflict at the time (ibid).

3.9.2 South-Sudan –Ethiopia Boundary

Nature and Consequences of the Conflict

Jal (2014:44) informs that the conflict is between the Jikany-Nuer against Lou-Nuer. The Jikany Nuer reside on both sides of the Ethiopian and South Sudanese boundary whilst the Lou-Nuer dwell in South Sudan only. The main trigger of the conflict are cattle raids. This is due to the need to satisfy a cultural need i.e. paying dowry for a bride (Arnold and Alden 2007:06). Haro *et.al* (2005:288) add that the use and management of water and grazing areas are also a contributing factor to the conflict. The conflicts are very rampant during the dry season when the Lou Nuer run out of water and thus depend on the Jikany Nuer's areas which have plenty of rivers and swamps with fish all year round.

The raiders in these regions are well-armed like the other fellow militias in East Africa. The proliferation of arms is worsened by the various conflicts in surrounding areas e.g. Sudanese, South Sudan and Somalia. The youths get their arms through trading their cattle. It was through these conditions that the South Sudanese White Army was formed (Jal 2014: 48). The White army is a militant organization formed by the Nuer ethnic group of South Sudan as far back as 1991 (Maasho and Odera 2013).

Furthermore, Borchgrevink and Sande (2009:47) state the pastoralists do not respect boundaries and thus this fuels the conflict. The pastoralists in South Omo of Ethiopia brutally revenge any attack on their families (ibid). They kill and loot in response (ibid). The Murle tribe in Pibor, Jonglei State in South Sudan even goes to the extent of abducting children (ibid). The conflict is worsened by the fact that both sides of the border are not effectively controlled due to weak governance. Jal (2014:45) confirms this when he states that the government officials on both sides actually participate in the raids thus the victims do not have anyone to report to. The road networks in the border region are poor such that even a security response to the attacks would not be possible (ibid). Furthermore, the Ethiopian and South Sudanese governments do not have land policies, which put the pastoralist societies into consideration (ibid). In the end, they are marginalized and this worsens the conflict. The governments in the Horn of Africa deny traditional governance systems.

Analysis of Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

This conflict also shows how the international boundaries imposed by the Europeans have caused clashes. The fact that the Nuer are found on both sides of the Ethiopian and South Sudanese border shows that they were separated by the international boundary that was imposed in the colonial era. Prior to these boundaries, the Nuer on both sides of the borders were aware of the need to move with their cattle and graze.

This example bears testimony to the argument of Michalopolous and Papazannou (2011:04) which stated that the colonial boundaries lead to conflicts over resources. Furthermore, the conflict shows the limitations of African governments to respond to transboundary conflicts. Jal (2014:44) accuses Ethiopian and the South-Sudanese governments of turning a blind eye, but that is not the case. The governments do not have the resources to respond to such conflicts as argued earlier by Thomson (2011:16). The South Sudanese government, for instance, has been undergoing a brutal civil war which, according to Megan Specia's (2018) New York Times article has claimed the lives of an estimated 383 000 civilians and displaced millions more. Prior to its session from Sudan and subsequent independence in 2011, South

Sudan was involved in a 39-year civil war, which again claimed the lives of an estimated 2 million people (ibid). Thus, this diminished the South Sudanese capacity to respond to transboundary conflicts.

Ethiopia as well, much, as it was never colonized, it still faced political and economic instability over the years. As recent as March 2018, the Washington Post published an article that warned of impending political instability in Ethiopia. In November 2019, 78 people were killed in ethnically motivated violence. Kamat (2019) states that 2.9 million Ethiopians are displaced due to the ethnic violence in the country whilst 8 million people in the country are in need of emergency food assistance. This is in addition to a civil war the country faced in 1974-1991 whose death toll was an estimated 1.4 million (Akomolafe 2016:144).

3.9.3 Chad-Sudan Boundary

Nature and Consequences of the Conflict

The transboundary conflict between the two countries was tied to the outbreak of the civil war in Darfur, Sudan in 2003 between the Omar al Bashir led government and the Justice and Equity Movement rebels (VOA:2009). The rebels were demanding a share of the oil revenues and more political representation (ibid). Despite the conflict and the existing border, it is also important to note that these two communities share deep cultural and tribal ties, which date back to the earliest of times (ibid). The people of the Zaghawa tribe reside on both sides of the border and hence the relations (ibid). The ties were even present at political level. The Sudanese government assisted Chadian leaders such as Hissain Habre and Idriss Deby to come to power because of this connection (ibid).

Furthermore, at the onset of the Darfur conflict, the Chadian government under the leadership of Idriss Deby supported the Sudanese government against the rebels. However, the turning point came in 2005 when the Chadian rebels took the advantage of the preoccupation of the Sudanese government to attack Idris Deby (ibid). This was the turning point of the relations between the two nations as each of the two governments accused the other of supporting their

respective rebel groups. Diplomatic relations turned so sour that diplomatic ties between the two countries were cut off in August 2008 (ibid).

The conflict has led to cross-border raids by the Janjaweed and the Chadian rebel groups on the villages in Eastern Chad (Human Rights Watch: 2006). The report goes on to state that the rebels are killing innocent civilians and burning villages and looting cattle (ibid).

Carik (2009) adds that from 2004-2008 the boundary region experienced an increase in crime from 3.87% to 33.33%. Crimes at the border include rape cases, child abductions, skirmishes between government forces and rebels (ibid). In 2004, 240 000 people were displaced, in 2006, 370 000 were displaced and in 2008 500 000 were also displaced (ibid). Carik further states that both nations (Sudan and Chad) are not able to secure their boundaries such that the UN has to do it for them. The UN, however, does not have enough forces and a clear strategy to achieve this. It is operating at 50% capacity and the UN is unable to carry out its mandate (ibid). This case shows the limitations of governments and international organizations on resolving transboundary conflicts.

Analysis of the Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

The case study of Chad reveals the limited nature of the UN peacekeeping forces in resolving such disputes. In this case, we see that the UN peacekeeping forces do not have enough forces to patrol the border. This situation is not only unique to the case study of Chad and Sudan rather it is a common thread in many African cases of transboundary conflicts. Both the respective governments of the affected nations together with the international communities have limited power in resolving these types of conflict. This is true in the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan. Part of the reason of the inability of the UN peacekeeping forces to patrol the border can be attributed to the nature of the border itself as demarcated following the Berlin Conference. Furthermore, the tensions between the two communities can be attributed to the border that split the people of the Zaghawa community into two and thus robbing them of their livelihoods and roots.

Despite the incapacity of the United Nations, the conflict was also worsened by the lack of political will on the part of the respective governments. The civilians of both nations, despite their tribal and cultural ties, are caught up in the middle and suffer dearly for the tensions between their governments.

3.9.4 Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary: (The Bakassi Peninsular Conflict)

Nature and consequences of the conflict

The peninsular is part of the Rio del Rey estuary complex (Funteh 2015:221). The complex is made up of small islands with a total of 8 562 inhabitants residing in 30 villages (ibid). The peninsula's livelihood is oil, fish, and trade. Prior to colonialism, it was known as the Kingdom of Bakassi, founded in 1450 by the Efik people who controlled the Efik, Ibibio and Oron groups as well as the fishing grounds and camps along Bakassi (ibid). Their origins, however, were traceable to Nigeria. They have ties with the chiefs of modern-day Nigeria (ibid).

The Anglo-German treaty of 1913 established the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (ibid). The Germans were more interested in the shrimp along the Bakassi peninsular than its people. The British on the other hand were interested in the key trading post of Calabar thus they exchanged the two territories (Ngalim 2016:04).

In this partition, the colonial powers of both Nigeria and Cameroon i.e. Britain and Germany did not have any knowledge about the geography of the areas they were dividing. This lack of knowledge is behind the resultant conflict over the area (Ibid). Furthermore, following the defeat of Germany in the First World War (1914-1918) Britain took over Cameroon and made it part of its Nigerian protectorate (ibid). After the Second World War (1939-1945), the U.N. accepted Bakassi as part of Cameroon and not Nigeria (ibid). After independence in 1960, Nigeria even acknowledged that Bakassi was not part of its territory through the Maroua Declaration signed between General Yakub Gowon of Nigeria and President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon in June 1975. However, when General Gowon was overthrown in a coup a month later (July 1975) the agreement was reneged (ibid). Ngalim (2016:06) states that the

issue of the Bakassi peninsular also contributed to the coup that overthrew General Gowon. The conflict over the ownership of Bakassi became pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s. The conflict almost became violent in 1981. On 21 December 1993, the Nigerian forces took over Bakassi. The Cameroonians then turned to the ICJ in March 1994. In 2002, the ICJ ruled in favor of Cameroon. However, Nigeria did not comply with the ruling and the Nigerians dwelling in Bakassi protested against the ruling (ibid). Kofi Annan even invited the leaders of the two nations (Olusegun Obasanjo and Paul Biya) to Geneva in November 2002. These talks led to the Gum Tree Agreement, which was concluded in New York 2006. The two parties agreed on the modifications of the transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon in accordance with the ICJ ruling of 2002. Representatives of Britain, America, and France attended the ceremony (ibid).

However, despite the agreement and international intervention the tensions did not subside. The Bakassi were simply told either to relocate to Nigeria or to be integrated into Cameroon (ibid). The tensions have even led to clashes and refugee outflows from Cameroon to Nigeria. Southern Cameroonians were also bitter as they were excluded from the mediation process of the UN and the ICJ (ibid). This has had the effect whereby the Southern Cameroonians were now intensifying their demands for secession. They considered Bakassi to be part of their territory and thus belonging to neither Nigeria nor Cameroon (Ngalim 2016:10).

This led to the agreement of 2006. This was done with the assistance of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) established in 2002 and chaired by the U.N.'s special envoy to West Africa Ahemdou Ould Abdallah (ibid). Following the agreement, the Nigerian troops withdrew in August 2008 and the final handover was in 2013 (ibid). CNMC oversaw the promotion of cross-border cooperation and joint economic ventures.

However, Nigerians still fiercely opposed the agreement. They rejected the ICJ verdict and even still count Bakassi as one of their local government councils. Sporadic armed conflicts still take place between the two nations over the peninsular for instance in 2007 the Liberators of the Southern Cameroons

People (LSCP) attacked Cameroon soldiers and killed 21 of them (ibid). In 2008, three Cameroon soldiers were attacked and killed by unknown gunmen (Ngalim 2016:10). The Nigerians accused their government of selling their land to Cameroon. The Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) under Ebbe Dari seized a vessel and kidnapped 10 crewmembers including six French nationals, two Cameroonians, one Senegalese and one Tunisian. The rebel group even has a radio station and a flag for Bakassi. In 2009, a police officer was killed. In 2011, 2 Cameroon soldiers were killed and 11 declared missing. In March 2013, there was violence in Efut Obot Ikot village, which led to the death of five people, 17 missing and 1700 displaced (ibid).

The Nigerian civilian society, opposition parties, and even the Bakassi indigenes called for an appeal on the case of Bakassi. Ngalim (2016:12) stated that the ICJ ruling was a denial of the wishes of the Bakassi people who wanted to remain in Nigeria. The bulk of the population in Bakassi is largely Nigerian and therefore preferred to remain Nigerian citizens as opposed to becoming Cameroonians (Funteh 2015:224). The ruling ignored the pre-existing ethnic ties of the Bakassi people with both Nigeria and Cameroon. Funteh (2015:228) states that ethnic affiliations are stronger than boundaries. As a result, the new border has become permeable and smuggling activities of 30 million liters of fuel valued at N1.056 billion (equivalent to USD 2 877 223.01) from Cameroon to Nigeria. The paramount ruler of Bakassi Dr Etim Okon Edel also added his voice and stated that Bakassi was independent of Cameroon and he felt Bakassi had been treated like a war trophy in the whole process (ibid).

Analysis of the Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

The case of Bakassi shows us the extent to which the consequences of the boundaries delimited at the Berlin Conference have on the African communities. In this particular case, as argued and shown in the previous section, the conflict has led to the death of both the Cameroonians and Nigerians (21 in 2007, 3 in 2008, 1 in 2009, 2 in 2011 and 5 in 2013). The conflict has led to the emergence of a secessionist movement (South Cameroonians) as well as an armed group (Bakassi Freedom Fighters, BFF and the Liberators of the South Cameroons People LSCP). The conflict even

led to the deposition of a head of state (General Yakub Gowon on 29 July 1975). The conflict has also led to an economic hemorrhage between the two economies in which 30 million liters of oil valued at N1.056 billion was smuggled. The conflict also shows us that the inclusivity and participation of the local people affected by the conflict is very critical towards the effective resolution of the transboundary conflict itself. This will aid in the ownership of the process by the local community and thus less resistance to the agreements, which their respective governments might undertake. Failure to do so leads the whole process of resolving the conflict into disarray. The inclusion of international organizations such as the UN to resolve such conflicts is a noble idea, however, such organizations are found wanting in terms of the interests of the people. They tend to be more state-centric than people-centric in their approach thus leading to failure. This means that the interventions of institutions such as the UN are more inclined towards interacting with the governments in question rather than the people on the ground. The UN Security Council 4933 report (2004:404) was even suggesting the resolution of transboundary conflicts in West Africa to be shifted from the state to the regional levels, which further alienates the participation of the affected populations. It recommended organizations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to be capacitated so as to tackle the problem of transboundary conflicts. However, this approach will not work if the grassroots communities are not involved and take lead in the process. This is what has been shown from previous case studies that were explored in section 2.7.

3.9.5 Kenya-Somalia Boundary

Nature and Consequences of the Conflict

Burbridge (2015), states that the conflict commenced when both nations attained independence (Somalia 1960 and Kenya 1963). The main instigator of the conflict was Somalia under the pretext that some of its territory known as the North Frontier District had been taken over by Kenya when it attained independence (ibid). Furthermore, Somalia claimed that the inhabitants of that district were Somalis (ibid). Somalia had presented these claims to the British

who were the colonial authorities of both territories (ibid). Thomson (2015:94) states that these claims were presented to the British prior to the independence of Kenya. In response, the British government set up two commissions namely the Northern Frontier District Commission and the Regional Boundaries Commission to investigate the matter further (ibid). However, nothing materialized due to the fact that the British feared that it would commence a flood of similar claims across its former colonies (ibid).

Burbridge (2015) further states that after the failure of the talks, the Somali nationals then resorted to irredentist war with the assistance of Kenyan-Somalis residing in Kenya. During the years 1964-1967, both parties conducted various acts of violence in what is known as the Shifta war (ibid). The Kenyan government on the other hand also committed similar atrocities. The British colonial authorities had suggested a federal system with regional autonomy so as not to disadvantage any group, the post-independent Kenyan leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (1979-2002) centralized the system of governance thereby further inflaming the situation (ibid). In November 1980, 3000 Kenyan-Somalis were killed in Bulla Kartasi in retaliation to an ambush carried out by Abdi Madobe a Somali national. In 1984, 5000 Somalis were also killed at Wagalla airstrip (ibid). The late 90s saw the Somali attacks on Kenya becoming radicalized by Islam and taking the form of terrorist attacks (ibid). In 1998, the American embassy in Nairobi was attacked (ibid).

In addition, the Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Response Program for East and Southern Africa (CPMR/ESA) (n.d.) states that in July 2005 the Garre and Marehan of Somalia clashed over the town of El Wak. During the same period, the Kenyan side of the Gabra and Borana in Marsabit near the Kenyan-Ethiopian border clashed. 90 people from the Gabra clan perished and 30 000 were displaced (ibid). Three more conflicts followed over a period of 6 months living 30 people dead and 17 000 refugees fled to Kenya (ibid). Gathara (2019) stated that in response to these clashes the Kenyan government is said to have dispatched troops to the border in 2012. However, this only made things worse. Mutisya (2017:03) reveals that in 2013, there was an attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi killing 71. This was followed by the November 2014

attack of a bus in Mandera County, which killed 28 non-Somali Christian commuters. The following month of December 2014, there was another attack at the quarry site in Mandera, which killed 36 non-Somali Christian workers (ibid). On 15 January 2019, there was an attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi in which 21 deaths occurred (Gathara: 2019).

Analysis of Attempts to Resolve the Conflict

This conflict clearly illustrates the consequences of the boundaries imposed upon African countries. As argued earlier there are some scholars who argue that the negative impact of the European imposed boundaries is negligible. However, in this case, when one studies the precolonial history of both communities prior to colonialism it is noted that clashes between the two communities were minimized due to the buffer zone method of boundaries used in African communities prior to colonialism. Mutisya (2017: 24) informs that these buffer zones gave both communities the flexibility to move around with their livestock in search of pasture and water.

The conflict also shows how external parties do not always have the interests of the clashing parties at heart. Both the British government and even the African Union (Organization of African Unity at the time) were approached by the Somalian government but chose to ignore the issues. This was primarily due to the fact that the British government and the African Union had other interests to pursue.

The conflict is yet another classic example of the limitations of African governments in dealing with transboundary conflicts. Both the Kenyan and Somalian authorities lack the capacity to effectively secure law and order in their respective borderlands regions. According to Mutisya (2017:02), Somalia, for example, spent the greater part of the 1990s without a recognized government. Kenya, on the other hand, alongside the greater part of Africa, experienced political and economic turbulence during the same period because of the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Furthermore, this inability can be partially attributed to colonial effects such as the ineffective demarcation and delimitation of their boundaries. As argued earlier by scholars such as Thomson (2010), Michalopolous and Papazannou

(2011) there are African communities that were divided by the colonial boundaries into more than one state and thus leading to irredentist conflicts. The Somali nation is one such community, which found its people divided into 4 other states besides itself namely Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.

However, it is also important to note that some of the failure of African governments to deal with these boundary issues is self-inflicted. CPMR/ESA report also blames conflict entrepreneurs as some of the catalysts to the conflict. They are not pursuing a victory, but rather a perpetuation of the disorder from which they prosper. They even block reconciliation efforts so as to keep the humanitarian organizations on the ground for they benefit from the contracts and tenders they get from them (ibid). The area is semi-arid and is a pastoralist zone. The state capacity to exercise its authority in this area is weak and non-existent (ibid). The communities on both sides of the border tend to rely on tribal or clan militias for protection instead of their own government (ibid). The police and military units are present in the area, but they refuse to patrol after dark as they are often out-gunned by local militias (ibid). Back-up for the police and army takes hours to respond to attacks. The area faces various socio-economic deficiencies such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, and general under-development (ibid). This contributes to the prevalence of crime in the area and conflict over access to key trade routes. The situation is made worse by the proliferation of small arms in the area. The state collapse in Somalia has also led to the flow of refugees into Kenya. Given this scenario, the onus then lies on the communities to take the initiative to try and resolve the clashes from a grassroots level through local peace committees.

3.9.6 Kenya-Uganda Boundary

Nature and Consequences of Conflict

The conflict involves the pastoralist Pokot and Turkana tribes, which dwell in the northwestern region of Kenya near the Kenya-Uganda boundary. The Ugandan Daily monitor (2015) reported that due to clashes over their respective boundaries they end up crossing the border into the Karamoja

community of Uganda to seek refuge. This is also causing instability in the area as it is leading to the inflow of military weapons in Karamoja. In 2014 and 2015, the Ugandan People's Defense Forces confiscated 60 and 31 guns respectively (ibid). The conflict is caused by competition over pasture and water for their livestock i.e. cattle, sheep, goats, and camels (ibid). Muntet (2016) reports that the Turkana and Pokot are predominantly pastoralist communities, which dwell in arid to semi-arid areas, that are harsh, inhospitable and hostile. Pkalya *et al* (2003:11) affirm that so far the conflict has displaced 164 457 civilians, 70 % of these are said to be women and children. The conflict has not only displaced the Turkana and Pokot but also civilians residing in areas such as Kakuma, Lokidiongo, and Wajir (ibid). The clashes of 1992, 1997 and 2007 led to the death of 2 500 people, the Turkana lost 80% of their livestock and 50% of the Turkana population were in refugee camps (ibid). Jal (2014:44) also reveals that in 2005, 60 Turkana were killed as a result of the conflict and in 2008, the Polots in Kenya raided the Turkana, killed 70 people and stole 2500 herds of cattle.

Ngeiywa (2008:02) classifies the conflict as ethno-terrorism caused by poor governance, poverty, drought, famine, competition for scarce resources and identity-based rivalries. He adds that the roots of the conflict are found in the history of economic and social marginalization (ibid). The conflict is also driven by reduced access to grazing land and water. Markakis (1993:147-48) adds that regular employment is rare among the Pokots, Turkana and the Karamojang. This also fuels the conflict. Prior to colonialism, these pastoralists were wealthy; however, colonial policies suppressed peasant production in favor of a plantation economy. The colonial officials regarded pastoralism to be backward and drove the Africans into reserves (Ngeiywa 2008:23).

The introduction of guns by the Arab traders to the Karamajong has also worsened the situation. The Turkana are also accessing guns from Shifta bandits in northern Kenya. The conflicts in Ethiopia at the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1991) and the Sudanese civil wars (1955-1972, 1983-2005) led to the injection of more sophisticated weaponry in the area (Ngeiywa 2008:20). The conflict has affected the morale of the area. The structure of social relations has collapsed due to the low-intensity conflicts, which has now occurred for

over 3 decades (ibid). Conflict worsened following the independence of both governments, but both governments have not done much regarding the situation. The governments lacked the resources to deploy their respective armies (ibid). This compromised the security of the border, which became porous (ibid). In the 1970s, hardly a week passed without a case of clashes being reported. The pastoralists even became destitute due to the conflict and loss of livestock, which was the mainstay of their livelihood (ibid). Muntet (2016) quoted one of the community members lamenting that they suffered from the “bullet syndrome” as most of the deaths in the community were caused by cattle raids and not common diseases such as TB, HIV/AIDS or malaria.

Ngeiywa (2008: 25) states that the conflict was generated by the imposition of international boundaries by the colonial authorities. Prior to colonialism, these clashes were rare, as the land was communally owned thus, there was an understanding that the pastoralists needed to roam the area in search of pasture for the survival of their cattle (ibid). However, the introduction of the European boundaries complicated matters leading to conflicts. The land was confiscated by the colonial government and utilized for other recreational purposes such as game parks, forest reserves (ibid). This left the Karamojang without land and worse still they were pushed into semi-arid reserves. This was worsened when General Idi Amin further took part of the Karamojang land and used it for his barracks as well as buffer zones in Eastern Uganda (ibid). The Turkana and Pokot were restricted from entering Uganda at that time (ibid).

Ngeiywa (2008:38) informs that when security forces failed against the bandits/militias they would vent their anger on the innocent civilians accusing them of harboring and collaborating with the bandits. The security forces even confiscated livestock, bandits would also attack the innocent civilians and accuse them of being informers for the government forces (ibid). The militias have become more powerful than the government’s army. In 1996, the militias gunned down a government helicopter carrying the Samburu District Commissioner Mr. Henry Nyandoro (ibid). The militias have bazookas, rocket-

propelled grenade launchers, land mines, machine guns, etc. Some of the militias are former members of security forces who are revenging against unfair dismissal (ibid). Muntet (2016) attributes this to the fact that Karamoja is located near the most dangerous and unstable countries in Africa e.g. Somalia, South-Sudan and Ethiopia which have gone through various episodes of political instability such as civil wars, genocides, terrorism thus the flow of arms into the region is inevitable.

Attempts and Effectiveness of Conflict Resolution Methods

The Kenyan and Ugandan armies tried to launch a joint military operation between 2004 and 2006 but it yielded very minimum results. This comes as no surprise considering the immense military capability, which the militias have amassed over time as, mentioned earlier.

This conflict shows how the borders introduced at the inception of colonialism have become a source of conflict among African countries. Not only did the boundaries separate communities that were dwelling together, but they also disrupted peoples' livelihoods and impoverished them in the case of the Turkana, Karamojong and the Pokot. It also shows how the solutions of the governments are limited in such situations. Despite the lack of capacity, the response of both governments to the conflict is the use of force i.e. joint military operation. From the previous chapter, it was made evident that the use of force to resolve conflicts does not address the root causes. The use of force is not a sustainable way of resolving conflict as it increases the likelihood of the conflict to emerge again. Therefore, the next alternative is for locals to come up with the initiatives to resolve the conflict based on their relations as communities. It has worked in other conflicts in Kenya e.g. the work of the Wajir Peace Committee in northeast Kenya and the world over and it thus deserves a chance.

3.9.7 DRC-Burundi-Rwanda Boundary

Nature and Consequences of Conflict

Mbugua (2013:02) stated that the seeds of this particular conflict were sown with the relocation of 300 000 Rwandan (both Hutu and Tutsi) to eastern

Congo between 1928 and 1956. These Rwandese were resettled by Belgian colonial authorities in Masisi, Rutsharu and Walikale areas so that they could provide labor in the mines and farms of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With time, the Rwandan began competing for land with the indigenous people of Eastern Congo. This no doubt caused tensions between the Congolese nationals and the relocated Rwandese. The Congolese leadership did not do anything to resolve this colonial legacy. For instance, the Joseph Desire Mobutu Sesse Sekko's administration (1964-1997) only served to widen the cracks between the two communities through his corruption and dictatorship (ibid). Laurent Kabila's administration (1997-2001) did not make the situation any better as he reneged on his promises to the nations that helped him to overthrow Mobutu Sese Sekko i.e. Uganda and Rwanda (ibid). These nations, in turn, supported rebel movements against Kabila's regime e.g. the Movement de Liberation Congolais (MLC) and the Resemblent Congolais Pour la Democratie (RCD) (ibid). The situation did not get better with the coming of Joseph Kabila who has been perceived as a continuation of the military rule that has been there since 1965 (ibid).

The conflict has also been driven by the manner in which the borders of DRC have been demarcated (Mbugua 2013:09). It is too vast for the government to control effectively. This is the condition that Thomson (2011:10) refers to as the non-hegemonic state (as explained in greater detail in section 3.7). Eastern DRC is larger than Rwanda and Burundi combined. The people residing in the eastern part of DRC feel marginalized as they are very far away from Kinshasa (the distance between Goma and Kinshasa is 2 437.3 km, 44 hours by road). Health and education services are barely accessible. The security forces are unable to drive out organized armed groups. Access to justice is slow, expensive and out of reach for most people.

Mbugua (2013:10) explains that the eastern region is characterized by a power vacuum, as the state is unable to stamp its authority. People thus take desperate measures to protect themselves and their livelihoods. Burundi's rebel movements such as FNL (National Liberation Front) and FRONABU (National Front for Revolution in Burundi) are based in eastern DRC and commit crimes such as robbery, killing, and highway banditry. He goes on

(Mbugua 2013:15) to explain that besides these acts of criminality, there are other 40-armed groups residing in eastern DRC. The armed groups are motivated by the presence of minerals in that region of DRC, which they need to get access to arms so as to finance their activities. Some of the minerals available in DRC are diamonds, gold, niobium, cadmium and cassiterite. Stearns (*et.al*) (2013:15) trace the emergence of the armed groups to the onset of colonialism when local communities had to arm themselves against the invaders.

Burundi has also been affected by the weakness of DRC governance because small arms and light weapons find their way into Burundi from DRC. In 1994, the Rwandan genocide led to an influx of Rwandan refugees into DRC who brought in small arms and light weaponry (SALW) (Mbugua 2013:17). As a result of this conflict, 1.65 million refugees were in DRC by 2011. 2/5 children die in infancy. Forty percent of children have no access to education and furthermore, children are involved in armed conflict. Eighty percent of the population lives on US\$1 per day. In 2010, 1 000 civilians were killed and 7 000 women were raped (Mbugua 2013:18).

Attempts to Resolve the Conflict and their Effectiveness

Many peace agreements have been signed to resolve the conflict, but they have not been fruitful:

- Lusaka 1999
- Sun City (South Africa) 2002
- Ituri 2006
- Goma 2008

In addition to these attempts, Mbugua (2013:18) states that there was the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) established in 2008. It attempted to spearhead peace and security in the region through round table discussions of the main actors in the conflict. It tried to discourage the illegal selling of minerals by advocating the certification of minerals. With the assistance of UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), refugees were being re-settled or even returned to their respective countries

(Mbugua 2013:25). However, the divergent interests of member states some of whom are even supporting M-23 rebels hampered the efforts of the ICGLR. The efforts of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1999 and the African Union (AU) thereafter suffered a similar fate. It experienced divergent interests of nations and global powers such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the UN (United Nations) (ibid).

The UN missions in both DRC and Rwanda have been deemed a failure. UN has thus been regarded as a peacemaker of the last resort in the region (Mbugua 2013:26). Stearns, J *et al.* (2013: 60) confirm this when they state that the credibility of the MONUSCO was affected by the fall of Goma in November 2012. This is because it has the interests of the superpowers of the world at heart and not necessarily the people of the Great Lakes region. Its peacekeeping forces were being over-powered by the M-23 rebels.

America also came with its initiatives to resolve the conflict. It provided military support for Rwanda and Uganda. However, these efforts came to nothing as it is suspected that America is more concerned about Coltrane and cobalt reserves in DRC, which it needs for its military and technological hardware and dominance in the world. France on the other hand, is also interested in the uranium deposits of DRC. Furthermore, 42% of DRC's imports come from France (Mbugua 2013:28).

The conflict in eastern DRC is also indicative of the complications associated with the arbitrary delimitation and demarcation of boundaries. In the case of DRC, its vastness is proving to be more of a curse than a blessing. The state is not in a position to sufficiently broadcast its power to all the parts of its territory. The resulting power vacuum has led to the permeability of the borders of DRC and the infiltration of armed actors. The conflict also shows how peace agreements done without the involvement of the local communities can become bankrupt no matter how many times they are done. The conflict also shows how global powers can be injurious to the success of conflict resolution efforts, as they will be pursuing their own interests.

3.9.8 Reflection on Case Studies of Transboundary Conflicts

The seven African case studies analyzed above bring to the fore some interesting issues which are inherent in most transboundary conflicts in Africa. The first issue is that most of the boundary conflicts trace their origins to the delimitation of African boundaries at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). This is due to the errors that were made by the European powers in the designing of African boundaries. The boundaries they came up with at Berlin divided communities that were dwelling together and grouped communities that had not lived together before. These errors were premised on the scanty knowledge that the Europeans had of Africa at the time of the conference. They were simply drawing boundaries on areas they knew very little of and did not even involve Africans or European missionaries and explorers in the process.

Resultantly, this contributed to transboundary conflicts in the African post-independent era, for instance, the Somalians found some of their people dwelling in other nations such as Kenya. This gave rise to the Kenya-Somalia transboundary dispute and irredentist movements as mentioned earlier in this section.

From the case studies, it also became apparent that the boundaries created at the Berlin Conference also established states that are too vast to administer as in the case of DRC. As a result, its boundaries are very porous and vulnerable to illegal activities such as infiltration of weapons, armed groups, smuggling, and human trafficking. The case studies also revealed that in addition to errors of the Berlin Conference, post-independence governance in Africa worsens the transboundary conflicts in Africa. Most of the governments are not in a position to effectively administer their boundaries. The boundaries are virtually neglected in terms of development and security as seen in the case studies of Kenya, Somalia, DRC, and Uganda. Thus, the people dwelling in these borderlands resort to violence and crime so as to scavenge for alternative livelihoods and secure themselves from the ongoing criminality surrounding them. This scenario is almost ubiquitous in all the case studies analyzed.

However, it should be stated that the failure of African governments to administer their boundaries effectively is due to two factors. The first issue is that these governments have undergone episodes of institutional weakness, corruption and dictatorial leadership as in the cases of DRC, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The other issue, however, is that the failure to administer boundaries effectively is due to the government systems, which the African governments inherited. Thomson (2010:16) stated that these governments were designed in the colonial era to administer only areas of special economic interests. Thus, most boundaries were not in that category during the colonial era.

The case studies pointed to the fact that national governments, national armies and international organizations such as the UN and ICJ are not in a position to resolve these transboundary conflicts if the grassroots communities are not involved in the process. This is what transpired in the transboundary conflicts of Nigeria-Cameroon, Chad-Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, DRC-Burundi-Rwanda and South-Sudan-Ethiopia. The case studies revealed that the involvement of western powers in transboundary conflicts could be counter-productive at times. This is especially if they have geostrategic interests in the dispute. Their interests can actually derail the peace process and prolong the conflict as in the cases of the Morocco-Western Saharawi and the DRC-Burundi-Rwanda conflicts. The Kenya-Somalia transboundary conflict was successfully resolved because it included the local communities in the process. Thus from these case studies in African transboundary conflicts, the involvement of local communities seems to be the key to the sustainable resolution of the conflicts.

The case studies also demonstrated the varied nature of transboundary conflicts in Africa. Some are in the form of territorial disputes and irredentist movements.

3.10 The African Union and Transboundary Conflicts in Africa

Following the African case studies on transboundary conflicts, it is imperative to also analyze the position and efforts of the African Union (AU) regarding conflicts of this nature. This is also important as the transboundary conflicts

are rampant in Africa and the African Union is the supra-national governing body in Africa.

The organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 by African nations with the mandate to liberate the remaining colonized African states. SAHO (2020) reports that its creation followed the 1945 agreement of the Manchester Conference (Declaration of the Colonized People of the World). The conference called for the colonized people to control their own destiny from foreign imperialist control. This agreement and declaration were based on the Atlantic Charter drafted by the Allied Powers in August 1941, however, it also called for the use of force if all else fails (ibid). The Charter of 1941 among other issues also championed issues of self-determination and self-governance for all peoples, which Africans found very appealing considering that they were colonized (OAU 1963:03).

It is interesting to note that at the dawn of African independence the OAU did not take the opportunity to address the issue of arbitrary boundaries in Africa. Rather it maintained or reinforced the boundaries that were created at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). This is known as the principle of *uti possedetis* or the territorial integrity norm, which opted to maintain the status quo of boundaries at independence (Kornprobst 2002:373). Article 03 paragraph 03 of the OAU charter calls for the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states (OAU 1963: 04). In July 1964 at the OAU Summit in Cairo, the organization adopted OAU resolution AHG/res. 16 (01) which called for the respect of boundaries that were existing at the achievement of independence. This decision was also supported by the UN's 15th and 16th General Assembly sessions (1960-61) (Patricio 2008:03). In 1963 at the Summit Conference President Tsirana of Madagascar stated that it was not possible to modify boundaries of African nations, as it would totally erase some other African nations (OAU 2013:62). In 1967, Madibo Keita President of Mali added a voice to this argument and urged fellow African heads of states to take Africa as it was and renounce any calls for territorial adjustments (Kohli 2014:273).

Wildstrand (1969:67) points out that this was a contradiction to what the African nationalists had campaigned for prior to the independence of African nations

and the creation of the OAU itself. Clarke (2002) cites the example of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who tirelessly campaigned for the creation of an independent Africa without borders. He viewed the boundaries of Africa as a hindrance to both unity and development. However, at independence, some African nations were reluctant for a borderless Africa or even a re-adjustment of the boundaries of Africa (ibid). This resulted in two camps amongst the African independent states i.e. the Brazzaville and the Casa-Blanca groups. The Casablanca group supported a borderless Africa whilst the Brazaville group supported the idea of maintaining the status quo of African boundaries (ibid). The Brazzaville group managed to prevail over the Casablanca group. Delegates even went as far as suppressing the cases of other African nations, which had issues with their boundaries (ibid). A case in point is Somalia, which demanded the adjustment of its boundary with Ethiopia, which it accused of taking a large territory of Somalia. Somalia raised this case at both the 1963 and 1964 OAU Summits, but delegates from other African states refused to settle the matter (Wildstrand 1969:69-70). This only worsened the matter as the Somalians began acts of aggression against the Ethiopians and Kenyans.

Kornprobst (2002:370) affirms that elites who wanted to minimize external threats to their rule made this decision. Patricio (2008:03) informs that the new African leaders supported this resolution because they feared to lose their power. They feared the costs of territorial revisionism. Michalopoulos and Papaizannou (2011:04) add that the African leaders assumed that nation-building and industrialization could overcome the complications of arbitrary boundaries. Furthermore, they state that there was external interference with regard to the decision to maintain the status quo. The external influence was in the form of Europeans who were interested in maintaining their special rights and corporate deals with former colonies (ibid). Thomson (2010:17) also echoes this argument when he talks of African state elites who benefitted from the colonial era through various opportunities in education, employment, and entrepreneurship. It is from this class that most African leaders and government officials emerged from, thus maintenance of the status quo would be in their best interest.

However, the position taken by the OUA regarding the issue of boundaries in Africa seems to have backfired. This can be seen through the numerous cases of transboundary conflicts that have been happening in the post-independence period of Africa. Moreover, this comes as no surprise because the OAU was trying to maintain the status quo of boundaries, which do not exist in some cases. It was later found out that only 25% of Africa's boundaries had not yet been demarcated hence the conflicts continued (AUBP 2007:03). The German Federal Foreign Office (2017) concurred and stated that 35% of 80 000km African boundaries are clearly demarcated and delimited.

However, to their credit, the AU member states came up with institutions to try and deal with the issue of transboundary conflicts. These efforts were in the form of the African Union Border Programme (AUBP). It is the brainchild of African heads of states and their ministers in-charge of boundary issues. The decision for its creation was reached at the 8th Ordinary session of Heads of state and government of the AU in January 2007. It was then established in June 2007 to achieve greater unity among Africans (AUBP 2007: 02). It was also meant to turn African boundaries into bridges. It also helps to realize one of the aspirations of agenda 2063 i.e. to create a continent of seamless borders (Xinhua: 2017). The formation of the AUBP was influenced by previous research institutions in Africa e.g. the Border Defense and Security Research Project of Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (1985-1987), the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa's Ford Foundation-funded project on the Role of Border Problems in African Peace and Security (1987-1992), the UN Center for Regional Development Africa Office, Nairobi , Kenya's Research project on the Development of Border Regions in Eastern and Southern Africa (1994-1996) and the Paris based OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Sahel and West-Africa Club (SWAC) funded the ECOWAS Cross-Border Initiatives Programme CIP in January 2006 (Institute of Peace and Security(IPSS) Studies 2012:11).

Its objectives include (AUBP 2007:04):

- The delimitation and demarcation of African boundaries where such an exercise has not yet taken place.
- Reinforcement of the integration process within the framework of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other large-scale cooperation initiatives.
- Development within the framework of RECs and other regional integration initiatives of local initiatives of cross border cooperation.
- Capacity building in the area of border management, including the development of education and research programs.

Its principles include (AU 2010:02-03):

- Respect of borders existing at the achievement of independence (OAU res AHG/res. 16(01) of July 1964.
- Negotiated settlement of border disputes (CM/Res 1069 XLIV) on Peace and Security in Africa of July 1986 Addis Ababa.
- Shared commitment to pursue the work of border delimitation and demarcation (CM/Res. 1069 XLIV).
- The will to accelerate and strengthen the political and socio-economic integration of the continent.

To date, the AUBP has held regional sensitization workshops on the management of land, river and lake boundaries in all regions from 2008-2009. It has also established the Pan African Survey of Borders and sent a questionnaire to all member states on the delimitation and demarcation of borders. It has also tried to initiate cross border cooperation among member states since 2009. This cooperation comprises turning the boundaries into bridges and not barriers (AUBP: 2017). This is based on the belief that the resolution of boundary conflicts is also a structural prevention of conflicts. This is expected to lead to peace, security and socio-economic development (AUBP 2007:02). It has also created a special unit in charge of the implementation of AUBP in the Department of Peace and Security of the AU Commission. It has also published two books on the resolution of boundary conflicts: "From Barriers to Bridges-the AUBP" and "Boundary Delimitation and Demarcation-An AUBP Practical Handbook". It has also established

partnerships and resource mobilization through German financial and technical support (AU 2010:4-7) (GIZ 2016:08). This partnership has seen an NGO known as GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) being delegated to do the work on behalf of both the AU and the German Foreign Office. Since 2008-2016, €37.2 million have been injected into the program. From 2016 to date, €10.4 million has been funded. By 2016 GIZ had demarcated 2 500km of borders in Burkina Faso, Mali, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Zambia. It had also concluded maritime agreements for countries such as Comoros, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania between the periods 2011-2012. It has even established an AU border day on 07 June 2011 to sensitize member states, RECs, border communities, civil societies and academics on border issues (German Foreign Office 2017).

Despite these achievements, the AUBP has also experienced challenges in the form of inadequate technical and financial support for the exercise. The GPS equipment, satellite imagery and lidar survey required for the exercise are beyond the reach of many member states (German Foreign Office 2017). The team itself is too small to respond to all requests. (ibid). Lack of cooperation of member states in submission of the questionnaire sent to them on the needs of border demarcation and delimitation. This, in turn, hampers its efforts of resource mobilization. There is also a lack of a legal framework for the development of cross-border cooperation and the lack of funds for it (AU 2010:6-7). AU member states are not committing themselves to the financing of the program (GIZ 2016:08). IPSS (2012:11) also adds that there is a lack of political will from member states and that there is insecurity in post-conflict areas due to remnants of war such as land-mines in the border areas of countries like Mozambique. Most maps and treaties are locked up in the archives of former colonial capitals.

The position taken by the OAU regarding African boundaries (AHG/Res. 16 (1)) at independence was unfortunate and devoid of foresight. It seemed to be a conscious effort to suppress the concerns of the grassroots African people. This choice to maintain the status quo only led to the escalation of the conflicts leading to boundary disputes, secessionist and irredentist movements as in

the cases of Somalia against Kenya and Ethiopia, Western Saharawi against Morocco.

The formation of the AUBP in 2007 was a step in the right direction considering the multiplicity of the transboundary conflicts in Africa. It was of paramount importance for an institution of this nature to be established, as it is important to resolve transboundary conflicts as they have the potential to be havens of organized crime, cross-border crime and terrorist groups (Xinhua 2017). The objective to transform the boundaries from barriers to bridges appears to be a roundabout turn from the 1964 resolution (AHG/Res. 16 (1)) to maintain the status quo of the boundaries in Africa at independence. When one analyzes the objectives and principles of the AUBP it is realized that they are in some aspects similar to the sentiments of the African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca faction of the OAU. Together they were advocating for an African society, which was borderless and accessible to all Africans. AUBP on the other hand, though still advocating for the demarcation and delimitation of African boundaries it is now advocating for the integration of African societies and cross-border cooperation.

Nevertheless, the institution is failing to realize its potential due to a lethal blend of framework deficiencies and commitment issues from AU member states. Regarding its framework, the AUBP tends to be more state-centric than people-centric. Its modus operandi appears to be heavily reliant on the cooperation of the governments in question. The delimitation process depends on the willingness of the sovereign state and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (AUBP 2007:04). The responsibility of participation and engagement of the local communities is left to the states themselves. This is based on the principle of subsidiarity of the OAU/AU charter, which clearly states that the organization is not to interfere with the matters of sovereign states. However, the track record of some African countries in terms of engaging their citizens shows that it is either weak or non-existent (Thomson 2010:276). Furthermore, as stated earlier, political will is lacking amongst African politicians to deal with the issue of African boundaries. The fact that very few African governments have the capacity to fully administer their boundaries is well documented (Diamon 2016:465). Diamon (2016:467) drives

the point home further when he states that African boundaries are sites of absent state control and neglect.

Therefore, for the AUBP to depend on African sovereign states for the execution of the program is counter-active. The AUBP is also heavily dependent on foreign aid from the international community and former colonial powers (ibid). This is problematic on so many levels, which have been analyzed in detail by Dambisa Moyo's 2009 publication titled *Dead AID*. In summary, the dependency on foreign aid is a perpetuation of the dependency syndrome. Furthermore, depending on foreign aid makes the program vulnerable to the interests of the funders.

3.11 Summary

The chapter traced the origins and case studies of transboundary violence. The origins were traced back to the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885. The case studies of transboundary violence showed that there are different types of transboundary violence. Some of the cases are caused by disputes over border demarcations whilst some are caused by the state of lawlessness and insecurity which characterizes border communities. However, despite the multiplicity of the causes of this violence, it can all be traced back to the Berlin Conference. Nevertheless, the case studies also revealed that this violence has been successfully resolved only when the context-based resources were included in the process of resolving the conflict leading to the violence. The case studies also showed that the use of external actors in resolving these conflicts tends to escalate or perpetuate the violence.

CHAPTER 4: THE ZIM-MOZA TRANSBOUNDARY VIOLENCE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to trace the historical origins of the transboundary violence along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. This will be done by unpacking the relations between these two nations from the earliest times to present. Pursuant of this goal, the chapter will analyze sources from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras of both Zimbabwean and Mozambican history. This historical escapade is done with the hope that one gets a holistic understanding of the nature of the relations of these countries. It will also help to comprehend how tensions or strains in these relations were handled in the past. This understanding will then form the basis of the solution to the transboundary violence that keeps affecting the two countries in present day.

4.2 Background

The transboundary violence between Zimbabwe and Mozambique is unique in many ways. Firstly, the boundary, which the two communities share, has not been disputed since its demarcation as in other case studies. Secondly, the relations between the two nations have been generally cordial from the pre-colonial era to the present. The relations have been characterized by an element of mutual reciprocity particularly during times of political strife. Either of the two nations rushes to the aid of the other in the event of a socioeconomic or political crisis. Mozambique under the leadership of Samora Moses Machel (1975-1986) was very instrumental and supportive especially in the middle stages (1972-79) of the Zimbabwean *Second Chimurenga* liberation struggle against colonial settlers. The support was in the form of accommodating the Zimbabwean guerillas and refugees in Mozambique during the liberation war. Zimbabwean refugees resided in Mozambican bases such as Tembue, Chimoio, and Nyadzonya during the time of the war.

Zimbabwe under the leadership of the late former president Robert Gabriel Mugabe (1980-2017) was also very helpful during the Mozambican Civil war

(1977-1992) and its subsequent Rome peace process (1992). Mozambican refugees fled to Zimbabwe and were accommodated in the Tongogara refugee camp in Manicaland. Some were even integrated into the Zimbabwean community.

The two leaders themselves (Machel and Mugabe) shared a very special bond that was forged in their shared passion for the liberation of Africa from colonialism. Furthermore, the populations of both countries share close social ties with some having relatives on both sides of the border. However, this cordial socio-political and economic relationship has been put to test on many occasions by both external and internal forces. These tribulations were at their height during the Mozambican Civil War in which RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique) forces committed transboundary criminal activities on the Zimbabwean borderland community. The attacks by RENAMO also ended when the civil war ended. However, in 2013 they resumed. This section will thus analyze the nature of this conflict and the nature of the relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique even prior to colonialism.

4.3 Pre-colonial Relations amid Zimbabwe-Mozambique Communities

Regardless of the transboundary conflict, which continues to affect modern-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the communities of both nations shared a common history prior to colonialism. It can be safely stated that the communities lived together as one. However, it should be noted that the period prior to the colonization of both communities is characterized by a scarcity of records (Bhila 1992:640, Mudenge 1988:01). Most of the information is from the Portuguese traders who roamed the areas from the 16th century onwards such as J.J da Silva, Joao dos Santos and S.X. Botelho (Dhliwayo 2014:9-10). However, from the little evidence available it can be deduced that the Shona communities in present-day Zimbabwe stretched beyond its modern-day borders. Furthermore, there are similarities between the Shona and Sena people. Allen and Barbara Isaacman noted these in their 1976 study of the Sena and Shona.

Bhila (1992:640) informs that during the period 1200-1450 A.D. that both Zimbabwe and Mozambique were referred to as the Sofala hinterland. The principal polity in the area was the Great Zimbabwe kingdom. The kingdom was located in the present-day Zimbabwean city of Masvingo (297.9km south of the Zimbabwean capital Harare) (Fagan 1988:532). From it came the offshoots of the Mutapa (1430-1902) and Rozvi kingdoms (1660-1866). The prosperity of Great Zimbabwe was based on extensive trading contacts, which went as far as the east African coast. Its main export was gold and copper whilst it imported glass beads and porcelain among other things from China, Persia, and Syria. The Sena tribes located in modern-day Mozambique were intermediaries in this trade. The Arab travelers such as al Masudi and Ibn Battuta stated that the Great Zimbabwe kingdom depended on coastal trade (Dhliwayo 2014:10).

The Mutapa Empire (1450-1902) emerged in the 15th century and by the 16th century, it was at its peak, controlled the plateau region i.e. Zimbabwe and even commanded ports of the trade routes. Fearon and Laitin (2005:02) posit that the Mutapa Empire dominated both areas of present-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It monopolized gold trade with the Swahili traders. The Empire was composed of the Karanga speaking people. In addition to Mutapa, there were other smaller kingdoms such as Uteve, Manyika, Barwe, and Madanda. These kingdoms were located on both sides of the present-day Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. They stretched all the way from the Zambezi River to the Indian Ocean as shown in the map below (Mudenge 1988: xxv). These kingdoms were also provinces of the Mutapa state. It, however, lost its dominance in the 18th century due to the interference of the Portuguese (1550-1630) and the emergence of the Rozvi Empire in the 17th century (Mudenge 1988:285). The Portuguese also conducted aggressive wars during the period 1569-75 leading to the collapse of the Mutapa state (ibid).



Figure 6. Main Shona Kingdoms of the Sixteenth Century (Mudenge 1988: xxv)

Dhliwayo (2014:10) informs that during the 19th century (1810-1889) three kingdoms occupied the area now occupied by these two nations (Mozambique and Zimbabwe). These kingdoms were namely Kissanga (Quissanga), Kiteve and Madanda as illustrated in the map below (Dhliwayo 2014:118). In addition to these kingdoms, there were people of the Sena tribe dwelling on the coast of present-day Mozambique. The relationship between these kingdoms and the Sena people was predominantly a commercial relationship. The Sena were

the middle men and porters of the goods from both the east African port of Kilwa and the kingdoms in the Sofala hinterland. These kingdoms had minerals such as gold and ivory, which were heavily in demand especially among the Arab traders (Guvamatanga 2017). Fagan (1988:533) adds that Kilwa experienced rapid growth due to increased gold and ivory trading from the Sofala hinterland. Elfasi (1988:89) states that the Mozambican traders were at the peak of their trading activities when the Mutapa Empire emerged. Devisse and Vansina (1988:784) trace the trading relations back to the 12th-century era of the Mapungubwe state. This was the first recorded kingdom in present day South Africa. It was in existence between 1075 and 1220 and was located at the confluence of the Shashe and Limpopo rivers.




Figure 7. 12th Century Era Trading Relations of Mapungubwe State (Dhliwayo 2016:4)

Dhliwayo (2014:10) states that the two sons of Munhumutapa who left their father's kingdom after being dissatisfied with the successor established Kiteve and Madanda kingdoms. He further states that Kissanga kingdom originated from the Rozvi kingdom, which was located in present-day Southern Zimbabwe. The kingdoms had a cumulative population of 166 000 people.

They cultivated crops such as sorghum, millet, maize as well as cotton and domesticated animals such as goats, sheep, cattle, and chickens (ibid). Gold was found especially in Kiteve kingdom. It was mined seasonally through panning and shallow mines (ibid). In addition to the gold, there was cloth, beads, false coral and fine Indian tin that were sold by the *Vashambadzi*. This was the colloquial name used to call traders (ibid).

Thus, from Dhliwayo's research one can deduce that the Sena at the coast were the intermediaries in the trade of this gold and other wares with the traders from Kilwa in East Africa. Furthermore, one can see that there was an interdependent relationship between the communities that occupied the present-day areas of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. According to the maps of Dhliwayo (2014) and Mudenge (1988), the communities were one and the same. Furthermore, from the reports of the Portuguese traders it is clear that conflicts were less common in this community due to this interdependent relationship on trade. Peace and tranquility was essential for trade to thrive. Conflicts began to emerge when external actors interfered and altered the dynamics in the relationship within this community. The external actors were in the form of the Nguni groups fleeing the wrath of the Zulu warriors from the South and the Portuguese from Europe.

The Portuguese were the first to alter the balance in 1506 when they constructed a fort at Sofala. By the 18th century, they began putting the kings of the hinterland kingdoms under pressure (ibid). Kings had to parcel land to them to keep them at bay. The Portuguese began interfering in succession disputes at the Teve court in 1830 upon the death of King Tica (ibid). The Portuguese preferred to install Queen Nengomanye, Princes Bothei and Maveneka (ibid). It is important to note that these leaders were not chosen on the basis of merit, but rather their amenability to the Portuguese cause of controlling the interior trade.

Ngwenya (2014:15) narrates how in the 19th century (1830-39) during the period of Mfecane, the Nguni groups led by Musane, Ngwana Maselo, Zwangendaba, Jere and Soshangane Nxumayo invaded the area. The Mfecane period was when various tribal groups dwelling in present day South

Africa fled North into the African interior. They were fleeing the incursions of Shaka, the Zulu king (1816-1828) located in present-day Kwa Zulu Natal, South Africa (ibid). They also interfered in the same succession disputes, which the Portuguese were involved in (ibid). Due to superior military tactics, the Nguni groups began to dominate the area through constant raids of the kingdoms dwelling in the area of present day Zimbabwe (ibid).

Nxaba was the Chief of the Msene chiefdom in present day South Africa. He was one of the chiefs reporting to King Shaka and also fled his wrath. He fled north like the rest of the other chiefs and proceeded to raid kingdoms of Kissanga and Teve (present day Mozambique) in 1830 (ibid). These raids were a method of survival for the Zulu kingdom. They were meant to obtain food supplies and tribute from the targeted communities. In 1836, he attacked the Sofala fort and defeated the Portuguese in 3 days. Nxaba's army raided all the cloth and cattle that were stored at the fort (ibid). His army was powerful and for the first time incorporated the Ndaus against their fellow Shona and Sena communities (ibid). These conflicts affected trade between the coast and the interior. During the period 1863-1889, the kingdoms, which were in the Sofala hinterland, were absorbed into the Gaza state under Muzila (Rennie 1973:136).

It can thus be safely concluded that prior to the colonization of modern day Mozambique and Zimbabwe both communities lived together as one. The boundary imposed at the beginning of the colonial era thus cut through Shona ethnic communities (Diamon 2016:464). My assertion is based on the realization that the kingdoms, which they dwelt (Uteve, Danda and Manyika), were located on both sides of what is today the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. Furthermore, the introduction of the Portuguese and Nguni factors in the Sofala hinterland ushered in a culture of political interference and violence as a method to obtain wealth and resources. Prior to the introduction of these factors, the relations between the two communities were harmonious and interdependent. This was due to the trade that both communities depended on for survival. It is also important to note that this introduction of violence as a method of gaining political power was to have far-reaching

consequences in the relations between the two communities and last for centuries to come.

4.4 Zimbabwe-Mozambique Relations During Colonial Era

It is sad to note the lack of a respite in the fortunes of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique pre-colonial communities. Following the Portuguese and Nguni incursions, colonialism also came in to further worsen their situation. The culture of violence introduced by the Nguni and Portuguese incursions became the norm during colonialism, which lasted close to a century for both communities.

Following the Berlin Conference (1884-85), Zimbabwe was officially colonized by Britain through the efforts of the British entrepreneur Cecil John Rhodes in 1890 (Mhanda 2005:01). Meanwhile, Mozambique was formally colonized by Portugal in 1902 (Fearon 2005:02). This colonization among other issues entailed the establishment of geo-political boundaries between these two communities along with other African communities. This was done regardless of the fact that the communities in the Zimbabwe-Mozambique area had dwelt as one community with their own concepts of boundaries as stated earlier.

Warhurst (1962:71-72) states that the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary was begun in July 1891 and was only completed in 1937 after additional treaties were signed between the two colonial authorities (*ibid*). Diamon (2016:466) categorizes the new Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary as a natural border defined by physical landscapes such as the Nyangani and Udizi mountains. Patricio (2008:06) adds that the boundary also consists of 4 main rivers namely Zambezi, Honde, Save and Limpopo. It is 765 miles/ 1 231km in length making it one of the longest boundaries in Southern Africa (Diamon 2016: 465; (Patricio 2008:06). Diamon (2016:463) bemoans the fact that the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary has not been adequately academically researched. He states that the little research that has been done on it concentrates on the criminology of smuggling.

The boundary thus separated these communities that had dwelt as one since time immemorial. The demarcators of the border did not consider the pre-

existing ethnic relations among the communities through which it passed. As a result, the boundary ended up separating five Shona communities i.e. the Manyika, Barwe, Tewe, Zezuru, and Ndau (Beach 1992:94). Hughes (1999:536) states that the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary cut across an ethnolinguistic area and across numerous bi-national kindred. He further pinpoints that the families in Vhimba village Chimanimani district of Zimbabwe are bi-national as a result of this boundary. The border split African political systems. Seventy families of Chief Tangwena's chieftaincy found themselves under the Mozambican government whilst their chief was on the Zimbabwean side of the border (Duri 2010:134). The chiefs of the Nyangani, Mutasa, Gwenzi, Mapungwana, Ndima, and Mutsvangwa chieftancies in Nyanga, Mutasa and Chipinge districts, to mention a few, also experienced a similar fate (Beach 1992:1994). Diamond (2016:463) also adds that the boundary cut through homogenous Shona ethnic communities.

Regardless of the divisive boundary, it is important to note that the separated populations found ways of continuing the interaction, which had defined their relationship centuries before. Diamond (2016: 470) informs that the people dwelling in the borderland area do not recognize the border. Rather they have continued their interactions, ethnic ties, and even the cattle still move on the other side of the border. Hughes (1999:535) concurs and states that the African communities dwelling near the Zimbabwe-Mozambique national boundaries just pretend as if the boundaries do not exist. He likens this situation to the Senegalese who simply treat the Guinea refugees as fellow tribesmen. The communities have thus continued to be one despite the boundaries separating them. Furthermore, they have a common interest and identity. This is probably due to the shared marginalization, which the communities suffer under their respective governments. He adds that Mozambican students cross the boundary daily to attend the Vhimba primary school, which is just 50 meters from the border (Hughes 1999:537).

The colonial era was characterized by formal and informal transboundary labor migration. The Mozambicans were mostly the ones who ran away from the abuses and neglect they suffered from the Portuguese colonial authorities (Duri 2010:134). In some cases, the Mozambican farm laborers were

remunerated by over-priced maize instead of wages (Hughes 1999:537). Duri (2010:135) informs that wages were much higher (200-300%) in the Southern Rhodesian farms and mines. He further reveals that in February 1950, a bus had to be arranged by the Southern Rhodesian colonial authorities to ferry Mozambican immigrant workers in Honde Valley, Penhalonga to Mutare (ibid). By 1951, in these same areas, the Mozambican workers were outnumbering the African Southern Rhodesians in places of work. There were 558 Mozambicans compared to 255 locals, 92 Malawians and 2 Zambians (ibid).

It is important to note that the border was also used as an avenue for illegal activities. Duri (2010:135) posits that alcohol and hard drugs were being peddled across the boundary between Southern Rhodesia-Mozambique at this time. Dagga trade was also rampant and by 1971, 145 traders had been arrested in the border town Umtali (present day Mutare) (ibid). Marijuana also found its way across the border and transboundary theft was rampant especially in the low-density suburbs in the north and east of Mutare in Zimbabwe (ibid). This was worsened by the banning of light industrial goods to be manufactured in any of the Portuguese colonies (1936-61). This banning was meant for the Portuguese authorities to monopolize the production of light industrial goods. Moreover, the Portuguese colonial authorities would then sell these at high prices, which were unreachable to many (ibid). This scenario provided the thieves with a ready market for cheap stolen industrial goods to those who were deprived of them.

During this period, Mozambique embarked on its armed struggle against colonial domination (1962-1974). The armed struggle was spearheaded by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane until his assassination in Tanzania 1969 (Martin and Johnson 1981:175). Thereafter, Samora Moses Machel took over until his premature death in October 1986. Under Machel's leadership, FRELIMO managed to expand its military operations from Tanzania to North Tete province (Martin and Johnson 1981:16). The Portuguese authorities responded by launching operation Gordian knot in 1970 (Rupiya 1998:11). The operation was Portugal's biggest offensive in Mozambique (ibid). The rural areas suffered much especially in Wiriamu in Tete, which was attacked in December 1972

leading to the deaths of hundreds of civilians (ibid). However, in April 1974 the war was brought to an abrupt end by the Portuguese revolution led by Marcello Caetano (Martin and Johnson 1981:115).

The Mozambican armed struggle against colonialism coincided with Zimbabwe's armed struggle (1966-1980) as well which will be analyzed in detail later (section 4.6).

4.5 The Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992)

The period 1977-1992 was dominated by the Mozambican civil war that affected both the Mozambican and Rhodesian communities. The war broke-out barely two years after Mozambique attained independence in October 1975. The main protagonists of the war were the FRELIMO government against the RENAMO rebels. The war proved to be a test on the relations between the two African nations (Zimbabwe and Mozambique). The conflict killed 100 000 people, another 1 million died due to the war-induced famine whilst five million were displaced (Robinson 2006:70). Vital socio-economic infrastructure was also destroyed such as schools, hospitals, clinics, community stadiums, and other recreational facilities. Seventy-eight percent of children and youth during that era failed to get access to education and are illiterate to this day due to that experience. Some of the children were recruited as child soldiers (Osvaldo 2013:68-71).

Rupiya (1998:12) states that the civil war was caused by the rocky transition to independence of Mozambique in 1975. He states that the independence of Mozambique caught the FRELIMO movement off-guard (ibid). They had expected the struggle to continue for another decade. Thus at independence, Mozambique had very little infrastructure and expertise to facilitate the administration of its country (ibid). The Portuguese settlers damaged the little infrastructure available as they were fleeing Mozambique. Furthermore, 90% of the Mozambicans were illiterate partly due to exclusionary colonial policies and the resulting war. Thus they were inexperienced and incapacitated to run government affairs (ibid). This was worsened by the fact that the Portuguese settlers in Mozambique left overnight thereby creating a political crisis. Fearon

and Laitin (2005:03) add that the Mozambican civil war was caused by a lack of commitment from the Portuguese colonial authority to guide the new state.

Rupiya (1998:12) on the other hand, brings in another dimension and attributes the outbreak of the civil war to the FRELIMO government's oppressive policies. These policies included a one-party state in which political opponents and "unproductive urban residents" were captured and sent to re-education camps in the far north (ibid). Torture and mistreatment are said to have been the norm at these re-education camps. Traditional authorities were undermined. The National Service for Public Security (SNASP) secret police was set up to detain those suspected of anti-state activities (Ibid). Religious groups like the Catholics and Jehovah's Witnesses suffered persecutions due to their connections to the erstwhile Portuguese colonial regime (ibid). Farms, schools, and hospitals were nationalized. All these factors led to resentment spreading amongst the citizens of the new post independent nation (ibid).

Fearon and Laitin (2005:01) add an economic dimension to the argument and point out that the civil war was a result of a very low GDP, which was at US\$1 182 in 1975. The CIA report on RENAMO (2003: 2357) added to this argument and stated that the civil war was caused by the alienation of the rural population through mismanaged economic and agrarian policies, which included collectivized farms. The FRELIMO government also alienated the Mozambican business community through the nationalization of private businesses (ibid).

Based on these arguments one can safely state that the Mozambican civil war was a consequence of a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. However, one might wonder why during that period the Mozambican nationals did not cross the border into Zimbabwe where the conditions were relatively better. To this question, there are two responses. The first one is that Zimbabwe itself was still under colonialism until 1980. Secondly, Zimbabwe was also waging its liberation struggle and thus the flow of refugees was actually in reverse. Zimbabweans were crossing the boundary to go to Mozambique to seek refuge so as to prepare for the struggle. However, thereafter, when Zimbabwe gained independence, the flow of refugees has

reversed once again, this time from Mozambique into Zimbabwe until the end of the Mozambican civil war.

4.6 The Zimbabwean Second Chimurenga Struggle (1966-1979)

Despite its colonial struggle and civil war, the FRELIMO movement found time to assist its fellow African freedom fighters from the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). This assistance was rendered specifically for these parties' respective military wings (Umkhonto we Sizwe-MK and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army-ZANLA) to wage their own liberation struggles. In the case of Zimbabwe, much as its liberation struggle began in 1966 until 1979, the Mozambican assistance commenced from 1972 onwards. Regardless of the fact that the Mozambican assistance came in when the Zimbabwean second Chimurenga was "mid-way", the assistance made a great difference in the struggle (as will be explained further in section 4.6). It enabled ZANLA to gain easy access through the Mozambique-Rhodesia boundary (upon the declaration of UDI in November 1965 by the Ian Smith led government, Southern Rhodesia became Rhodesia).

Prior to the assistance by FRELIMO, the Zimbabwean liberation struggle had been going through teething problems. Martin and Johnson (1981:10-18) elaborate that the struggle can be divided into 3 phases.

- a. **The First Phase (1964-67)** was made up of 150 ZANLA guerrillas crossing the Zambezi River to infiltrate Rhodesia, 75% of them were killed. It was during this phase in which the famous Battle of Chinhoyi/Sinoia took place (28 April 1966). Much as the battle took place in 1966, the planning and the movement of the guerrillas into Southern Rhodesia began in 1964. All the seven ZANLA guerrillas who participated in it were killed. In July 1967, 70 ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) the military wing of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) also crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia together with ANC guerrillas and infiltrated Rhodesia. However, 31 of them perished and 31 were captured. They were active in the Wankie-Sipolilo area.

However, freedom fighters and scholars alike state that the Chinhoyi battle marked the beginning of the second Chimurenga and praise the seven guerrillas for their heroic efforts. Martin and Johnson (1981:10) state that the battle had profound psychological and political significance. They even praise the guerrillas for carrying out the first deep penetration into Rhodesian territory.

However, the major reason behind the failure of the battle was that the politicians were ill-prepared for it (Mazarire 2011:574). They had thought that the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence would be short and easy as in other African countries (Martin and Johnson 1981:11) such as Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi, and Ghana among others. Chingono (1999:02) calls it a short war illusion. The belief was that the guerrillas would simply scare the European settlers and ignite civil disobedience, which would lead to independence. Martin and Johnson (1981:12) informed that the guerrillas used conventional tactics of war to engage a far superior Rhodesian force. There was no groundwork done prior to the attack and the politicians had been aiming for a short-term political gain. Mhanda (1978:25) states that during this period guerrillas were ill-disciplined and equipped with very little experience in combat security. The nationalists were also counting on the intervention of the British government on the matter (Chingono 1999:03). However, Britain continued secretly supporting the Smith regime. Mhanda (ibid) calls the African nationalists at the time as immature and inexperienced. Hove (2016:102) points out that the lack of mobilization and politicization led to the failure of the Chinhoyi Battle. Therefore, the first phase of the war ended in disarray due to the lack of experience and preparation for the struggle.

- b. **The Second Phase (1968-1972):** following the defeats of their initial war efforts the military wings of both ZANU and ZAPU underwent a thorough period of re-assessment of their war strategy. This was known as the "lull period". No fighting took place, but a lot of re-education, re-assessment and training took place (Mazarire 2011:573). Dhliwayo (2016:109) states that the late Robert Mugabe (Secretary General at the time) of ZANU wrote to Herbert Chitepo (Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee) urging him to suspend military operations until the strategic and political review had been

conducted. Thereafter, ZANLA guerrillas were trained in Tanzania on how to mobilize the masses before the struggle (ibid). It was also during this phase that contact was established between ZANU and FRELIMO (November 1969 and May 1970). This followed FRELIMO's opening of a new front in Mozambique's western Tete province on 08 March 1968. ZANLA preferred to wage the war from the Mozambican side as crossing the Zambezi River was proving to be difficult. This was due to fewer people in the area to offer shelter, food, and information to the guerrillas (ibid).

However, Martin and Johnson (1981:15-16) mention that both ZANU and FRELIMO were initially unholy bedfellows. This is because they were ideologically opposed. FRELIMO was part of the 'authentic' group of nations supported by USSR (Union Soviet Socialist Republics) together with:

- SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) of Namibia
- ANC of South Africa
- MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
- MOLINACO (National Liberation Movement of the Comoros)
- ZIPRA

ZANU, on the other hand, belonged to the 'non-authentic' group of nations supported by China. It was in this camp together with:

- PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) South Africa
- SWANU (South West African National Union) Namibia
- FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
- UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
- FLING (Front for the Liberation and Independence of Portuguese Guinea)
- COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)

In addition to this, FRELIMO initially recognized ZAPU and not ZANU (Martin and Johnson: ibid). It even saw ZANU as a breakaway faction of ZAPU. The situation was worsened by the fact that most of the members of the Chinese supported/non-authentic groups of nations were mostly breakaway factions or secondary nationalist parties. Of the group of parties supported by China very few of them with the exception of ZANU PF managed to successfully form

governments after independence (ibid). FRELIMO was very much against breakaway factions as it was going through the same challenge when UDENAMO (National Democratic Union of Mozambique) was threatening to break away. The turning point came when FRELIMO offered ZAPU the Tete base to launch its liberation struggle. ZAPU turned down this offer, a move that greatly disappointed FRELIMO (ibid). ZAPU at the time greatly believed in gaining independence through the channel of diplomacy. FRELIMO was a strong advocate for the liberation struggle just as ZANU. Therefore, they found favor with FRELIMO. The need to launch the liberation struggle was one of the main reasons, which brought about the split of ZANU from ZAPU in 1963 (ibid).

- c. **The Third Phase 1972-1979:** this was the decisive phase of the war in which ZANLA and ZIPRA were making use of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary to launch their attacks. The phase was kick-started by the ZANLA guerrilla attack on Mr. Borchgrave's Altena farm on 21 December 1972 (Martin and Johnson 1981:01). The farm was located 65km from the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. By 1974 ZANLA had 2500 guerrillas in Rhodesia and by 1975 the figure had quadrupled to 20 000 recruits had crossed into Mozambique.

The fortunes of the liberation struggle were also turned around by the Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1974 (Dhliwayo 2016: 115, Martin and Johnson 1981:115). The revolution strategically changed the course of the Zimbabwean war of liberation (Chingono 1999:10). The revolution overthrew Dr. Caetano's government and ushered in General Antonio de Spínola's administration in Portugal. Portuguese nationals and army who were weary after 13 years of colonial wars in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique staged the revolution. At that point in time, 50% of the meagre Portuguese national budget was going towards the war effort and 7 674 Portuguese soldiers lost their lives. Inflation was at a staggering 30% (Martin and Johnson 1981:116). Mhanda (2011:53) attributes the revolution to the military successes of Samora Machel. Following the revolution, the

new Portuguese government agreed to grant independence to its former colonies i.e. Mozambique, Guinea, and Angola.

This clearly shows that the assistance granted by the FRELIMO government to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle had a considerable effect. The independence of Mozambique increased the entry points of the guerrillas from one to three i.e. the Tete, Gaza and Manica fronts. The Ian Smith regime found itself with a 1 231km frontier to defend. This overstretched the Rhodesian security forces (Chingono 1999:10). In response, the Smith regime invested \$10 million in land mines (from Kanyemba to Nyamapanda) and a cordon sanitaire along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary (Dhliwayo 2016: 139). The government also increased its counter-insurgency attacks against the infiltrating guerrillas. Chingono (1999:13) posited that the Rhodesian forces were now ruthlessly attacking ZANLA training bases from the air and on the ground. He states that it was now safer to be at the battlefield than to be at any of the training bases.

The most notable attacks on the bases were the Chimoio and Nyadzonya attacks. The Chimoio (29 November 1977) attack saw the killing of 2 000 guerrillas and incapacitation of a further 4 000 (Dhliwayo 2016: 233). The Nyadzonya attack (09 August 1976) on the other hand, led to the deaths of 900 refugees mostly women some of whom were burnt alive or drowned whilst trying to cross the Nyadzonya river to safety (Mhanda 2011:131). By the end of the war in 1979 there were 150 000 Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique and UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) together with the Government of Norway were paying US\$3 million for the upkeep of refugees but still, it was inadequate (Martin and Johnson 1981:276)

This shows that the independence of Mozambique was a blow to the Ian Smith government and thus desperate measures were taken to contain the ramifications of this independence. It also shows the strength of the bond between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Despite the persecution that Mozambique got from Rhodesia for supporting Zimbabwean guerrillas it continued its support unabated. The bond seems to be the continuous thread backdating to the pre-colonial era during the eras of the Mapungubwe, Great

Zimbabwe, and Mutapa Empire among others. The bond had survived the Portuguese and Nguni invasions in the 16th and 19th centuries respectively and now it survived the bitter colonial struggles and civil wars. The boundary that had been established by the British and Portuguese colonial authorities proved to be ineffective in dividing the relations between the Zimbabwean and Mozambican communities. However, although Zimbabwe's second Chimurenga ended in 1979, it left a legacy along the boundary. The legacy is in the form of minefields and landmines (Diamon 2016:466) (Rupiya 1998). Hove (2012:200) further elaborates on the issue and states that the mines have specifically affected the South Eastern region of Zimbabwe bordering Mozambique. He notes that the area has several anti-personnel mines planted. The mines were planted to deter the influx of guerrillas from Mozambique. However, after the war (1980-2003) 260 people have been maimed whilst 53 have lost their lives due to these mines.

4.7 The Zimbabwe-Mozambique Post-Independent Era Relations

4.7.1 Introduction

When the third and decisive phase of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle commenced in 1972, Ian Smith was complacent and underestimated the guerillas at his peril. This was based on the earlier successes, which the Rhodesian forces had enjoyed against the initial amateurish attacks of the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas such as the battle of Sinoia and the Wankie-Sipolilo campaign. However, the war got worse as the guerillas became better experienced and equipped, the sanctions imposed by the UN began to take effect and the Rhodesian economy began to crumble just like the morale of its European settlers. This contributed to the peace talks between the belligerents at Lancaster in London in 1979. The result of the negotiations was the Lancaster House Agreement signed on 21 December 1979, which ended the *Second Chimurenga* liberation struggle.

Zimbabwe attained its independence on 18 April 1980; however, the jubilation was short-lived, as once again the boundary dividing it with Mozambique became an avenue for conflict affecting both neighboring nations. The Mozambican civil war was reaching fever pitch, Zimbabwe inevitably became

embroiled in the conflict and was affected in two ways. Firstly, there was a steady influx of Mozambican refugees into Zimbabwe, just as the Zimbabweans had fled across the boundary into Mozambique for safety and training during the *Second Chimurenga* struggle. Secondly and most importantly, the Mozambican rebel movement RENAMO also began attacking Zimbabwe with the assistance of the Apartheid South African government.

4.7.2 Brief History of RENAMO

From the literature available on the history of RENAMO (1976-present), I managed to divide it into 5 inter-linked phases from its establishment to present.

a) **The First Phase: Rhodesian Era (1976-1980)** – During this phase, the rebel movement was established. It was the brainchild of the Rhodesian government under the Ian Douglas Smith regime (Wiegink 2015:02, Osvaldo *et al* 2013:66, Hultman 2009:825). The *raison detre* behind the creation of the movement was three fold i.e. to gather intelligence information, attack the ZANLA guerrillas training bases in Mozambique and also attack the Mozambican government for providing support to the ZANLA guerrillas (Hultman 2009:825).

During this phase in the history of RENAMO, its operations were rather limited in form and scope (Robinson 2006: 57). Its bases of operations were mainly concentrated on the central Mozambique area and the number of its forces did not go beyond 2000 (CIA 2013: 2358). Hultman (2009: 826) however, reduces the number of guerrillas to 900 whilst Tavunayanago (2011:44) states that the rebels were 1000 in number.

However, regardless of the variation in statistics, the idea is that the forces of RENAMO were at their smallest during the Rhodesian phase of their history. Besides bases in central Mozambique, RENAMO also had bases in Zimbabwe's Manicaland province i.e. Odzi, Nyanga, and Chisumbanje (Tavuyanago 2011: 44, CIA 2003:2358). The Rhodesian government set up a propaganda radio station for it known as Voice of Free Africa to incite

Mozambicans to rise up against the FRELIMO government (Tavuyanago 2011:44)

During this phase, RENAMO was under the leadership of Andrea Matsangaissa (1976-79) and Afonso Dhlakama (1979-2018). Its membership consisted of former Portuguese colonial authorities and former members of FRELIMO (Fearon and Laitin 2005:04) (Robinson 2006:56). It appears the time that RENAMO was formed was the same time that there seemed to be a general sense of disillusionment among the Mozambicans with the FRELIMO government. This disillusionment appears to have stemmed from the “oppressive policies” that were referred to earlier by Rupiya (1998:12). Robson (2006:62) adds that the members of RENAMO were also mostly from the Ndaou tribe which resides on both sides of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. He adds that speaking the Ndaou language seemed to be a pre-requisite for joining the RENAMO party. For those who were not Ndaou, they had to undergo a special initiation ceremony. Andre Matsangaissa was a Ndaou himself (Fearon and Laitin 2005:07).

At this stage, the political agenda of the movement was largely vague (Hultman 2009:825). The CIA (Central Intelligence of Agency) report on RENAMO (2003:2351) confirmed this and stated that Afonso Dhlakama failed to articulate RENAMO's vision for the post-war government. The report (CIA 2013:2352) concluded that the RENAMO members were more interested in enriching themselves from the South African government support as well as revenging against the FRELIMO government instead of specific political aims. Robinson (2006:60) concurs with this argument and posits that RENAMO lacked a clear strategy and agenda. Afonso Dhlakama exposed this lack of agenda when he stated in a 1979 *Voz da Africa* radio interview that his movement was not interested in policymaking (Robinson 2006:17). Minter (1998) also reveals that the movement rarely held political meetings to champion its agenda.

Due to this lack of a clear vision and objective, the RENAMO movement has been accused of masquerading as an anti-Communist party that was fighting

against FRELIMO's Communist policies such as collectivized villages (Robinson 2006:55). In a 1979 radio interview, Andre Matsangaissa clearly stated that his party was concerned with the total eradication of Communism from Mozambique (ibid). Its 1981 four point-plan called for the extinction of the Communist system, review nationalization policies of the FRELIMO government and establish a vibrant private sector (ibid: 54). Its 1982 Manifesto was more detailed, but still along the same lines of eradicating Communism and establishing, a society based on free enterprise and human rights. However, judging from the actions of RENAMO, it appears that the movement was simply against FRELIMO and was advancing the imperialist, segregationist and oppressive interests of colonial regimes i.e. Rhodesia and South Africa.

b) **The Second Phase: 'Golden Age' (1980-1984)** - During this period the RENAMO movement was at its pinnacle. This phase could be referred to as the golden age of RENAMO. Its military operations, international support, and impact were all at their climax. This all began with the switching of the patronage of RENAMO from Rhodesia to the South African government. This happened following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the fall of the Ian Smith regime (Wiegink 2015:03). The independence of Zimbabwe left the Apartheid regime in South Africa marooned by independent African states i.e. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, etc. This situation was undesirable to the South African Apartheid regime as it had the effect of inspiring the nationalist parties in its country such as the ANC (African National Congress) and the PAC (Pan African Congress) among others. This is a similar problem, which the Ian Smith regime had faced when Mozambique had gained independence and led them to the formation of RENAMO. The interests of the Apartheid regime now lay in tracking down ANC members hiding in Mozambique and destabilizing post-independent Zimbabwe state. When South Africa took over, RENAMO was now under the leadership of Afonso Dhlakama following the death of Andre Matsangaissa in October 1979. He died during a FRELIMO raid on the RENAMO base in the Gorongosa mountains (CIA 2003: 2358). The South African patronage saw the RENAMO scope of

operations expanding compared to the Rhodesian era. According to Rupiya (1998:13) RENAMO now had to:

- Destabilize the Mozambican government
- Track down and assassinate ANC officials residing in Mozambique
- Conduct acts of sabotage in Zimbabwe

The number of RENAMO rebels increased as well. The training was done in Transvaal South Africa and fighters swelled from 2 000 in 1978 to 8000 in 1982, 10 000 in 1983 and 20 000 in 1990 (Tavuyanago 2011:44). They opened more fronts in central and southern Mozambique. Operations even expanded to the South African, Swaziland and Malawian boundaries (Robinson 2006:57-58). The movement was now active in nine of the 10 provinces of Mozambique (CIA 2003:2358). This could have been enabled by the fact that RENAMO's new benefactor i.e. the South African government was more resourceful than the Rhodesian government. It is public knowledge that South Africa has always had a bigger economy than that of Zimbabwe. According to the World Bank (n.d.) both Rhodesia and South Africa had GDPs of US\$5.177 billion and US\$ 57.65 billion respectively during the period 1970s-1980s. This explains why the operations of RENAMO expanded under the patronage of The South African apartheid regime.

The political wing of RENAMO was also developing at this stage as its military wing. By 1982 the movement had a detailed manifesto which called for a multi-party democratic state which respected the rights of citizens and a free economy (Robinson 2006:55;Tavuyanago 2011:43). This was an improvement from the 1979 radio interview of Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, which exposed the lack of agenda on the part of RENAMO. However, Hultman (2009: 826) states that this was done with the assistance of South Africa. Robinson (2006:55) dismissed the organizational reform of RENAMO as tactics to gain international support. RENAMO was playing to a gallery, which was pre-occupied with the concerns of the Cold war at the time.

Furthermore, RENAMO rebels were now crossing the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary to attack Zimbabwean civilians (CIA 2013:2369). This was in

accordance with the new agreement between RENAMO and the South African government. RENAMO attacked civilians dwelling along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary and Mozambican government installations. This was done through the use of brutal tactics such as shooting executions, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, cutting open pregnant women and forcing mothers to kill their own children. (Osvaldo 2013:67). It also used civilians as human shields against the counter-attacks from the FRELIMO government. It looted shops, bombed bridges, and electrical sub-stations.

RENAMO was also using similar tactics within Mozambique. The CIA report (2003: 2361) affirms that the RENAMO rebels appeared fascinated by the visual impacts of violence. They used axes, machetes, and knives rather than guns. This was followed up by a public display of the bodies and body parts. Its attacks became more sophisticated and brutal. Hall and Young (1997) reveal that RENAMO began to destroy the state's infrastructure i.e. roads and buildings.

Hultman (2009:821) adds that the violence was no longer rational and went beyond military logic. However, she adds that (Hultman 2009: 823) the violence was however targeted to those areas that supported the FRELIMO government i.e. southern Mozambique especially Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane. These areas were called areas of destabilization. In areas where RENAMO was supported i.e. central and northern Mozambique, these areas were deemed areas of potential support (Tax or Control areas) and were not subjected to as much indiscriminate violence (Hultman 2009: 833). However, it is important to note that the violence was happening from both sides of the conflict. Tavuyanago (2011:44) revealed that FRELIMO youth militias were also engaging in similar atrocities against RENAMO supporters. ACCORD (n.d.: 90) states that the rationale behind the RENAMO attacks and brutality was to underscore the incapability of the FRELIMO government to protect and support its people.

Despite these atrocities, Robinson (2006:66-70) argues that the RENAMO movement forged a cordial relationship with the rural communities, which the FRELIMO government could not get access to. He also states that relations with the community were also strengthened by the material support, which

RENAMO was receiving in abundance from the South African government. Robinson (2006:62) details that this aid was in the form of weapons, food, medical supplies and finances, which in turn the RENAMO movement shared with the rural Mozambican communities. Robinson (2006:66) also further asserts that the Mozambican youths voluntarily joined the RENAMO movement to get access to manufactured consumer goods and captive wives.

However, when I analysed Robinson's argument it reminded me of the Stockholm syndrome. The Merriam-Webster dictionary (n.d.) defines it as feeling of trust or affection, which a victim develops towards their captor. BBC reporter, Kathryn Westcott in her 2013 news article states that the term was coined in 1974 following a six day hostage in Sweden in which one of the captives became loyal to the captors to the extent of actually joining them in the robbery.

This is very similar to the case of the RENAMO rebels and the Mozambican rural communities. Despite the suffering, they were enduring at the hands of the RENAMO rebels they supported them even to the extent of enlisting to join the rebels.

Furthermore, I came to the conclusion that there is a possibility that the ties between the RENAMO movement and the Mozambican rural communities were forged out of a fear factor. This is based on the notion that it is very unlikely that the Mozambican communities would have whole-heartedly supported RENAMO forces considering the reign of terror, which the rebels had brought upon them. Based on this notion, I thus subscribe to the assertion that the communities could have been coerced or arm-twisted into supporting the RENAMO movement. To refuse supporting RENAMO could mean a death sentence in light of the atrocities, which were being committed by the RENAMO rebels in rural Mozambican communities at the time.

A parallel can also be drawn here with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle in which scholars such as Krieger (1988:305), Hove (2012:194) Chingono (1999:12) argue that the ZANLA guerrillas intimidated the peasant populations into supporting the liberation struggle. The effectiveness of RENAMO together

with its South-African benefactor during this period led the FRELIMO government to the negotiating table with South Africa for peace talks. This initiative, however, as shall be explained in the next phase of RENAMO history, did not work in favour of RENAMO as it altered the dynamics of its relationship with the South-African government for good.

Jorre (1984:03) states that the RENAMO attacks (1982-83) cost the Mozambican government US\$333 million in damages and by 1990, the cost had gone up to US\$4 billion, which was 3 times the amount, which Mozambique owed to the western governments. The attacks of RENAMO thereafter began to not only affect Mozambique as during the 'Rhodesian phase'. The repercussions of RENAMO operations began to destabilize the Southern African region i.e. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. This was because its attacks made the transport networks (i.e. railways and roads) which linked the landlocked countries in Southern Africa to the Indian Ocean highly insecure. Zimbabwe greatly depended on the Beira and Limpopo corridors for exports and imports such as fuel. Malawi and Zambia also greatly depended on the Nacala corridor for their access to the Indian Ocean.

c) **The Third Phase: Decline (1984-1992)** – On 16 March 1984 the Nkomati Accord was signed between the Mozambican and South African governments on the banks of the Nkomati River in South Africa. The major terms of the agreement were that the South African government would cease its support to the RENAMO rebels. In return, the Mozambican government also agreed to stop accommodating ANC operatives from South Africa. The Mozambican government even went as far as raiding the homes of ANC members residing in Mozambique and four arrests were made as well (Jorre 1984:02).

However, by 1985 the peace agreement had failed as both parties of the agreement had violated it. This was revealed by the documents, which were found by the Zimbabwean security forces during their raid of the RENAMO HQ at Gorongossa Mountains in October 1985 (Osvaldo *et al* 2013:68). Furthermore, prior to the agreement, the South African government had supplied huge quantities of arms to the RENAMO HQ in Gorongossa. As a

result, RENAMO forces continued attacking civilians in Mozambique and Zimbabwe such that by 1986 RENAMO operations had spread to north and western-central Mozambique (Rupiya 1998:14). This shows that the South African government had signed the agreement in bad faith. On the Mozambican part, the support for the ANC operatives continued. The 04 arrests made soon after the signing of the agreement turned out to be a mere perfunctory gesture.

Goncalves (1998:20) attributes the failure of the agreement to the lack of sincerity on the part of both governments. On the Mozambican part, he states that Samora Machel had signed the agreement in order to get access to humanitarian aid from the USA. At that moment in time, the Mozambican nation was under-going a harsh drought and signing the peace agreement had been made a conditionality for obtaining the aid by the USA. In addition to the humanitarian crisis, Mozambique was also facing an economic meltdown. Within a decade of its independence, the Mozambican government owed US1.4 billion to the western governments (Jorre 1984:03). There was also a high level of unemployment caused by the return of Mozambican miners working in South Africa when Mozambique gained its independence. The figure of Mozambican miners working in South Africa dropped from 120 000 to 45 000 when Mozambique attained its independence in July 1975 (ibid). The returns seemed to have been done in the hope that these Mozambican nationals would find better fortunes within their newly independent country. These economic woes were further worsened by South Africa's reduced use of the Mozambican port of Maputo from 6.8 million tons in 1973 to 1.1 million tons in 1983 (ibid). This seems to have been a direct consequence of the trade and financial sanctions that had been imposed on South Africa by states such as the European Community and Japan in 1986 (Hefti and Wit 2008:01). There was reduced trade hence the reduced use of the Port of Maputo by South Africa.

The Mozambican government thus entered into this agreement as a last resort to solve its economic and social problems. Prior to the agreement, Mozambique had turned to USSR, USA and even Portugal. None of them was in a position to help except for the USA, which attached a conditionality of the

peace agreement and lessening of ties with the USSR in exchange for the aid (ibid). Fellow African countries were not in a position to help as they were facing their own crises and were thus undergoing the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) (Ayittey 1999:248). This program saw the worsening of the generality of African economies.

Furthermore, despite their inability to assist in the Mozambican economic crisis, fellow African countries, in particular, the Front-Line States (e.g. Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, and Angola) had not been supportive of the Nkomati agreement. According to them, South Africa was negotiating in bad faith (Goncalves: ibid). The support of these nations would have been vital in making Mozambique uphold the agreement. Jorre (1984:02) adds that in the agreement, Mozambique was more interested in its economic benefits. These benefits included the revival of trade with South Africa, the sale of hydro-electricity from Mozambique's Cahora Bassa dam to South Africa and the revival of South African tourism in Mozambique.

However, it is interesting to note that much as the South-African government wanted RENAMO rebels to attack the FRELIMO government it did not want RENAMO to take over the government. This became evident when the RENAMO Secretary-General Orlando Cristina supported the initiative to launch the Limpopo offensive in 1982 and take over the FRELIMO government. The South-African government was not supportive of this initiative. Cristina considered it a betrayal and not long after this disagreement South African agents assassinated him in April 1983 (Robinson 2006: 59).

In a way, it shows that the South African government just wanted to use RENAMO to execute its own interests and not help RENAMO take over power. This decision seems to have been premised on two fears. The first is that the South African government feared that RENAMO rebels were inexperienced to run the government should they succeed in taking over the reins of power from FRELIMO. This was a possibility considering that Mozambicans had been denied opportunities to acquire education under the Portuguese colonial government. Illiteracy was thus very high among Mozambicans. Rupiya (1998:12) posit that illiteracy affected 90% of the population in Mozambique.

This further means that even the experience to run a government was also lacking among the RENAMO rebels and the Mozambicans at large. The burden of restoring normalcy would then fall upon the South African government again which was also going through turbulent times with the fight against Apartheid. Moreover, it appears that the South African government wanted the RENAMO rebels on a leash so as to control its movements and actions. By letting the RENAMO rebels take over power in Mozambique, the South African government ran the risk of the RENAMO forces becoming too powerful to control them and even with the possibility of RENAMO turning against the South African government.

Rupiya (1998:13, 20) argues that the Nkomati agreement was a failure. This argument is based on the fact that both parties of the agreement did not honor their pledges as explained earlier. However, from another angle, one can argue that the agreement did succeed in cooling down the South African support of RENAMO. After signing the agreement, the South-African government informed RENAMO to diversify its sources of funding and not only depend on South Africa (Robinson 2006:65). Although prior to the agreement South Africa had airlifted a huge supply of arms for RENAMO it does show that relations were waning. It shows that South Africa no longer wanted to be involved at the same level, as it had been involved with RENAMO prior to the agreement. By 1988 RENAMO was now depending on capturing military equipment from FRELIMO soldiers and basic supplies from civilians in Mozambique (CIA 2003: 2352).

However, when one considers the circumstances which South Africa was in at the time, the request by South Africa for RENAMO to diversify its sources of funding comes as no surprise. This was the same period that the South African government was now under immense domestic and international pressure to reform Apartheid. It was also the beginning of the end for the Apartheid government in South Africa. The sanctions that had been imposed against it were also beginning to take their toll (Roekel 2016:13). On 12 June 1986, the South African government had imposed a State of Emergency due to domestic political violence (Mandela 1995:319). By 1988, the country was in turmoil, companies were relocating from South Africa and America had passed

sanctions against South Africa (Mandela 1995: 328). Thus given the plight of the South-African government from the mid-1980s onwards, it was no longer in a position to finance RENAMO as much as it did in the early 1980s. Moreover, the South African government was now inclining towards a policy of fostering cordial relations with FRELIMO and other Southern African governments (CIA 2003: 2352).

Despite the reduction of material and financial support from South Africa, RENAMO still enjoyed support from other countries. Western countries such as Germany and the USA also supported RENAMO (Fearon and Laitin 2005:05). In addition, RENAMO had representatives in charge of fund-raising and propaganda in western countries such as Portugal, the USA and West Germany (Robinson 2006: 65). Even other African governments such as Malawi and Kenya were supporting RENAMO (CIA 2003:2352). However, not all these sources combined were equivalent to the support, which South Africa was pouring in.

The fortunes of the movement suffered yet another blow when the FRELIMO government began reforming its Marxist orientation and adopting a Democratic political ideology in 1988. At that time, the FRELIMO government was now under the leadership of Joaquim Chissano. This change in leadership came about following the death of President Samora Moses Machel in a plane crash on 19 October 1986. Chissano is said to have been a political moderate in comparison to Machel hence these changes. In November 1990 the FRELIMO party voted for a constitution that would lead to its first multi-party legislative and presidential elections in 1991 (CIA 2003: 2357). This move by FRELIMO did not affect RENAMO's popularity among the Mozambican rural folk judging from its popularity in the 1994 elections onwards. Rather it had a devastating impact on its international appeal as a bastion against FRELIMO communism. This was a very valuable currency during the Cold war era. This stance had won RENAMO sympathizers in and out of Africa of individuals, organizations, and governments that were opposed to communism.

Moreover, RENAMO's operations were still widespread and destructive as they were during the second phase. This can partly be attributed to the

massive airlift it obtained from the South African government on the eve of the Nkomati Accord in 1984 as argued earlier. Robinson (2006:58) states that during the period 1980-1988 RENAMO had attacked and destroyed:

- 1800 schools
- 720 health units
- 900 shops
- 1300 trucks and highways

Kalley (1999:739) adds that during the period December 1987-January 1988 RENAMO had conducted 101 attacks along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. Wiegink (2015:04) adds that during this phase RENAMO became sedentary and state-like. It was establishing zones of control, camps, and administration as well as public services in parts of rural Mozambique. In Maringue, a district in the Sofala province in Central Mozambique, RENAMO even provided basic health care and education. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, RENAMO was increasingly finding it difficult to carry out its operations due to international pressure. The end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the end of the Cold War between the USA and Russia forced both FRELIMO and RENAMO onto the negotiating table.

d) The Fourth Phase: Formalization (1992-2013) -This phase saw the signing of the Rome peace process and the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992 after 16 years of conflict. Zimbabwe was also very central to the Roman peace process, which concluded the Mozambican civil war in October 1992. The negotiations began in July 1990 and by December of that year, a partial cease-fire had been agreed upon along the Beira and Limpopo corridors. The deployment of 6 800 United Nations peacekeeping forces and the demobilization of 90 000-110 000 soldiers from both the FRELIMO and RENAMO forces allowed Zimbabwe to withdraw its forces from Mozambique (Goncalves 1998:15-16, Wiegink 2015: 04).

The phase also marked the formalization of RENAMO from being a rebel movement or terrorist group to being a formal political party in Mozambique. In 1994 RENAMO also participated in the general elections of Mozambique and

garnered 33.7% of the votes whilst FRELIMO won 53.3% (Robinson 2006:72). ACCORD (n.d.:90) adds that RENAMO won the majority of parliamentary seats in 5 provinces in north and central Mozambique. Tavuyanago (2011: 45) adds that RENAMO participated in the presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections that occurred from 1999 onwards. In 2013, RENAMO had 51 out of 250 seats in the Mozambican parliament (BBC: 2013). Tavuyanago (2011:49-50) maintains that during this phase RENAMO was very instrumental towards the development of the Mozambican Democracy. It did this by restoring relations between the government and the traditional chiefs. This was one of the major rifts that had fuelled the Mozambican civil war. However, he also states that RENAMO faced internal problems such as excessive interference by Afonso Dhlakama into the work of the RENAMO members in parliament as well as general inexperience with parliamentary affairs.

e) **The Fifth Phase: The Resurgence (2013-Present)** - during this phase, RENAMO withdrew from the ROME peace process of 1992 and returned to the bush to wage guerrilla warfare against the FRELIMO government. Wiegink (2015:01) states that the RENAMO resurgence happened after 22 years of stability and thereby challenging the country's celebrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process (1992-1994). He attributes the resurgence to the maintenance of an informal command and control structure among leaders, commanders, and combatants of RENAMO. This followed rigging allegations against the FRELIMO government in the municipal elections of 2013.

Numerous clashes occurred between RENAMO combatants and Mozambican police, civilians traveling on the highway between 2013 and 2014. (Vines 2013: 386-388). A ceasefire was signed thereafter in September 2014 and RENAMO successfully participated in the October 2014 elections. During this phase, the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama declared a truce and engaged the Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi on the peace process. The peace process took almost three years and was eventually signed in August 2019 (Jentzsch 2019). Sadly, the agreement was signed 13 months after the untimely death of RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama due to a heart attack (Cowell 2018).

Nevertheless, his successor Ossufo Momade stood in for him for the negotiations and eventual signing of the agreement. However, despite the achievement of this milestone, the agreement led to a split in the RENAMO party with one faction led by Ossufo Momade and Mariano Nhongo leading the other faction (Klenfeld 2019).

However, the RENAMO attacks in this phase have been less sophisticated than during their golden age phase (1980-1984). This is primarily due to the lack of external support from countries such as South Africa during the Apartheid government.

4.7.3 Analysis of RENAMO

Regardless of the periodization of the history of RENAMO, it is important to note that the greater part of its notoriety was achieved through South Africa's Destabilization policy. The policy targeted newly independent African governments in Southern Africa (more discussed in the next section). The end of the Cold War globally and Apartheid in South Africa contributed to the demise of RENAMO as a rebel movement. It, however, got a new lease of life as a formal political party through its inclusion into the Mozambican government following the 1994 general elections.

From the way I see it, RENAMO appears to have been an instrument used to advance the machinations of imperialist nations under the guise of anti-communism. RENAMO used this as an opportunity to not only attack the FRELIMO government but also neighboring states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. This had a devastating effect on the economies of Southern African governments and social fabric. Furthermore, countries such as Malawi that were not directly attacked by RENAMO also suffered because of the ripple effects of the destabilization of the road and rail networks in Mozambique.

Tavuyanago (2011:42) argues that despite these atrocities that were committed by RENAMO and its alliance with imperialist forces it was just a way of achieving its agenda for establishing a democratic Mozambique. He bases his argument on RENAMO's participation in the Mozambican government and election since 1994.

However, this assertion seems to clash with facts. The democratic agenda of RENAMO came much later after the establishment of the movement. The movement was founded in 1976 and the first manifesto articulating the political agenda only came out in 1981 and improved in 1982. The organization had already been in existence for 5 years. Robinson (2006:55) however, argued earlier that this was just a charade to get international funding and these manifestos were an initiative of the South African government and not RENAMO itself. Furthermore, one would wonder why, if RENAMO was fighting for democracy, did it directly attack the very same Mozambican nationals it sought to attain democracy for? One would have also thought that a movement campaigning for democracy would have spared the lives of its own nationals even those who oppose its movement since democracy is a government of the people. However, with RENAMO it even used Mozambican nationals as human shields against FRELIMO attacks as argued earlier.

If RENAMO had been fighting for democracy, it would have joined forces with independent African governments or liberation movements, which were also on the quest for democracy, majority rule etc. For instance, ZANU PF was assisted in its liberation movement by fellow African governments such as the frontline states (Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia). However, RENAMO joined forces with European and American governments, colonial authorities, companies and individuals some of whom were hindering the development of democracy in Africa. This is true in the cases of Portugal, South Africa's Apartheid regime and Ian Smith's Rhodesian government, which were all causing suffering at different levels within African countries.

Even in the post-war period, RENAMO still showed these signs of being a militaristic rather than a democratic movement. It chose the militaristic, violent option to resolve its problems. Mr. Afonso Dhlakama is said to have interfered with the work of RENAMO parliamentarians, which affected their performance in parliament. He was also very quick to dismiss members who were suspected of communicating with RENAMO (Regalia 2017:12). Moreover, one might want to point out the fact that Afonso Dhlakama himself had been at the helm of RENAMO's political power for close to 40 years. This suggests that his movement is based more on dictatorship, patronage, personalized rule and

clientelism. The resumption of hostilities in 2013 is also a testament to its true nature as a militaristic movement rather than a democratic one. No matter the circumstances, violence is not an option. One would have thought that had RENAMO been pursuing a democratic agenda it would have engaged local and international stakeholders to facilitate dialogue with the FRELIMO government. RENAMO would have at least attempted peaceful methods of resolving the conflict. However, RENAMO did not pursue these avenues but rushed to the Gorongosa Mountains to resume its hostilities against FRELIMO and other Southern African nations. Earlier on, Wiegink (2015:01) argued that even after the Mozambican peace process RENAMO maintained its command and control structure with its combatants. This revelation seems to support this militaristic narrative of RENAMO. It appears that as much as RENAMO had buried the hatchet publicly, it secretly still entertained thoughts of a violent confrontation with FRELIMO someday.

It is also interesting to note that RENAMO returned to its old ways and once again attacked innocent civilians in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and those using the highway road from Malawi. Despite the fact that the attacks were of a much lower intensity than during the civil war it contradicts the argument of Tavuyanago of RENAMO being a political movement strongly entrenched in democratic principles.

Thus, one can safely reach the conclusion that RENAMO is still the same organization described by the late Afonso Dhlakama during a 1979 radio interview as one that was not concerned with policy issues. The manifestos of 1981 and 1982 were just facades trying to conceal its real intentions.

4.7.4 South-Africa's Destabilization Policy

The policy was South Africa's response to the Portuguese revolution of April 1974 and the subsequent independence of Mozambique and Angola in June and November 1975 respectively. South Africa (still under the Apartheid regime) felt threatened and cornered by the newly independent African governments. This development would have the effect of not only inspiring South African nationalist parties such as the ANC, PAC (Pan African Congress) and the BCM (Black Conscious Movement) among others to step

up their revolts against the Apartheid government. It also presented an opportunity where these very nationalist parties could use the newly independent African states as bases to launch their anti-apartheid struggle. This fear was not unfounded, however, as other independent African countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt had harbored African freedom fighters at one point or another. Furthermore, other independent African nations were bitterly opposing the Apartheid regime in South Africa (Chimanikire 1990:05) hence it felt cornered.

South Africa's response to these developments was to thus come up with this policy of destabilization. The aim of the policy was to sabotage the independent Southern African governments and bring about an atmosphere of general discordance. The objective of the policy was to increase the dependency of these governments in South Africa. This was assumed to have the effect of discouraging the new African governments from harboring South African freedom fighters. Ultimately, the destabilization policy was South Africa's way of ensuring that Apartheid survived (Chimanikire 1990: 03).

The Portuguese revolution of April 1974 was a big blow to the western community specifically those governments, which had imperialist interests in Southern Africa i.e. USA, Britain, and Portugal among others. To these governments, a perpetuation of the colonial status quo in Southern Africa was in their best of interests. Prior to the Portuguese revolution of April 1974, the colonial settlers in Southern Africa together with these western governments were of the opinion that the status quo would remain the same for the near future. Chipasula and Miti (n.d.:159) posit that before the Portuguese revolution, European settlers thought that their control of the region was invincible. They further state that the Americans were of the same opinion and believed that Africans had no hope for change and that any change would come through the European settlers only. Martin and Johnson (1981:116) reveal that in 1969 Henry Kissinger had circulated a memo titled 'National Security Study Memorandum 39'. In summary, the memo perpetuated the idea that the colonial situation in Southern Africa was highly unlikely to change. It was also during this period that Ian Smith contributed to this pre-1974 Southern African discourse by proclaiming that the majority rule of Africans would not

happen in a thousand years (Chingono 1999: 08). To him, the Africans of his colonial domain (Rhodesia) were unaggressive and pacific in nature (Martin and Johnson 1981:01).

When one assesses this assertion from the point of view of the colonial settlers and western governments certain things become clear. One cannot help but empathize with their point of view. It becomes clear that their point of view was based on the state of African nationalism and the liberation movements in Southern Africa at that particular point in time (1965-1974). The liberation movements at that time appeared defeated by the colonial forces and hence made the situation appear bleak (Chipassula and Miti n.d.:160). No change was foreseeable on the horizon, in the near or distant future.

In Rhodesia for instance, the Rhodesian forces easily crushed the first attempts of the armed struggle by the freedom fighters. Examples of such ill-fated attempts include the Chinhoyi battle (April 1966) and the Wankie-Sipolilo campaign (1967). The armed struggle itself had undergone a period of strategical review in which there was no fighting at all during the period 1968-1972 (Mazarire 2011:573). Furthermore, most of the key African nationalists in Rhodesia such as Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, and many others had been imprisoned in 1964 (Mazarire 2011:572).

In South Africa, the situation was no better, key figures of the struggle such as Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, and others had been imprisoned following the Rivonia trial of April 1964 (Mandela 1995:258). In Mozambique, FRELIMO seemed to be under-going an internal leadership crisis leading to the assassination of its leader Eduardo Mondlane in Tanzania 1969 (Vines and Dylan 1998:11). The political vacuum that followed also led to a leadership wrangle, which resulted in Samora Machel rising to power. In Angola, Meijer and Birmingham (2004:01) also state that the liberation forces (MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA) were fragmented and fighting against each other instead of the common enemy i.e. Portuguese colonial administration. Namibia was also firmly under the thumb of the South African Defense Forces. Botswana, on the other hand, was not very accommodating to liberation movements, especially after independence. Ranilala *et al* (2004: 484) states

that Botswana was under pressure from South Africa not to harbor freedom fighters. He states that Botswana even went to the extent of arresting Umkhonto we Sizwe freedom fighters who were passing through Botswana on their way to South Africa. Therefore, to the European settlers and western countries, it seemed as if the African nationalists had failed to achieve their objective of liberating their respective African countries.

However, the sudden occurrence of the Portuguese Revolution in April 1974 turned the tables. It ended the alliance of the colonial authorities in Southern Africa i.e. South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique (Chipassula and Miti n.d.: 162). This spurred South Africa to come up with the Destabilization policy also known as the Total Strategy in 1977. The policy marked a departure from the reconciliatory policy of Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. The objective of Vorster's policy was to re-establish cordial relations with African nations following the South-African Sharpeville massacre of 1960 (Jore 1984:01).

The new destabilization policy under the Piet Botha regime called for the mobilization of all resources imaginable to advance the 'interests' of the South-African government. Chimanikire (1990:04) states that the policy involved military incursions, assassinations, economic destabilization and offers of economic co-operation. The policy saw the transformation of the South African government. There was a centralization of power into the office of the president (ibid). The State Security Council as the supreme-decision making body replaced the cabinet (ibid). according to Chipassula and Miti (n.d.:163) the council was made up of the president as the Chairman, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Law and Order, Head of National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Chief of South African Defense Forces, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs and the Commissioner of Police.

For the successful implementation of the policy, South Africa was relying on the dependency of the Southern African nations on its economic and technological superiority (ibid). Countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were virtually integrated into the South African economy (ibid). It possessed 75% of the region's railway network and port facilities (ibid). Therefore, most of the imports and exports of the Southern African nations

were transported through South African railways. The dependency was increased by the closure of the Benguela railway in Angola and the unreliability of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique railway due to RENAMO guerilla attacks (ibid). In addition, most of the Southern African nations depended on South Africa for their imports e.g. Botswana 78%, Lesotho 74%, Swaziland 90%, Malawi 40%, Zambia 21% and Zimbabwe 19% of all their imports came from South Africa (ibid). Furthermore, South Africa had 287 930 migrant workers from its neighboring Southern African nations. Therefore, South Africa was a source of foreign currency for these countries (ibid: 164). If the South African government was to send them, all back to their respective countries it could have a paralyzing effect for the governments due to the resulting high rate of unemployment.

The resulting implementation of the policy ended in an economic catastrophe for the entire region. The incursions cost the Southern African countries US\$18.7 billion (ibid: 173). Chimanikire (1990: 10) also posits that during the period 1980-1984 the cost of the destabilization policy on SADC was US\$11.36 billion. For countries like Lesotho, the policy resulted in the overthrow of the government by the army in 1986. Mozambique lost its transport network. Zimbabwe incurred a US\$7 million cost from the withdrawal of the railway wagons which had been loaned to it by South Africa.

This is the scenario, which led South Africa to take over the patronage of RENAMO with the specific aim of attacking Zimbabwe as well as Mozambique for supporting ANC nationalists. Zimbabwe became a target even though it did not give much support to the ANC freedom fighters. This was primarily because it served as an alternative transport route for other landlocked Southern African countries in the region such as Zambia, Zaire, and Malawi (Chimanikire 1990:07). Chimanikire (ibid) adds that the socialist and reconciliation policies of Zimbabwe at independence also made it a target as its political and economic orientation was the opposite of South Africa. Jorre (1984:04) also cites the silent treatment, which Zimbabwe gave to the South African Apartheid government as a factor in it being targeted by the same regime. He notes that Zimbabwe refused to deal with South Africa even at

ministerial level, which South Africa did not take kindly to and hence made Zimbabwe a target.

4.7.5 RENAMO Incursions in Zimbabwe (1980-1990)

The subversive actions of RENAMO negatively affected Zimbabwe especially during the first decade of its independence (1980-1990). RENAMO attacked the Zimbabwe-Beira oil pipeline, Zimbabwe-Beira-Maputo railway line and road networks (Fearon and Laitin 2005:09). In 1981 the bridge over the Pungwe river was bombed. Chicualacuala in Mozambique was also attacked and thereby blocking Zimbabwe's gateway to the sea. Chimanikire (1999:10) points out that in November 1987 the RENAMO rebels crossed the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary and attacked a workers' compound at Nyambuya Forestry Estate. They destroyed property and the workers were attacked with pangas, knives, and bayonets. Radios, watches, and food were stolen. Twenty people were kidnapped mostly women and were used as porters (ibid). Similar atrocities were committed in Chiredzi's Musumeki village of the Sengwe communal lands. Four people were murdered and four caterpillars belonging to the Ministry of Transport were set ablaze (ibid). Ndali town, 71 km east of the Chiredzi town, six people were also murdered. A clinic was burnt down, two grinding mills and five stores were looted. The oil depot at Beira was blown up with US\$12 million worth of oil which could last for 21 months (ibid). As a result, Zimbabweans had a bleak Christmas as they could not travel, cars were abandoned, factories were closed and power cuts became the order of the day (Jennifer 1983:04).

On 18 August 1985, the Zimbabwean army attacked Casa Banana the headquarters of RENAMO in the Gorongossa Mountains in central Sofala province of Mozambique. Afonso Dhlakama was almost captured during this raid. President Samora Machel was flown to the base to see RENAMO's military organization and command structures. The communication systems, which Dhlakama had, were even more superior to those of the government (Goncalves 1998:21). However, RENAMO continued its covert operations. These were aided by the amount of support, which the RENAMO forces enjoyed among the masses especially in the rural areas. Therefore, it had

access to food, shelter, recruits, etc. The dynamics of this support as explained earlier were based on a combination of intimidation and genuine cordial relations between RENAMO and the rural communities of Mozambique.

As a result of the RENAMO insurgency, 500 Zimbabwean civilians were brutally murdered and 200 000 Mozambican refugees ended up on Zimbabwean soil (Mlambo 1997:45). Duri (2010:137) however, reduces the figure to 100 000 and states that 52 000 of the refugees resided at the Tongogara refugee camp. The other refugee camps that were opened in Zimbabwe to accommodate Mozambican refugees were Inyangombe, Tongogara, Chambuta, and Mazoe Bridge. Hughes (1999:533) concurs and adds that by 1991 Mozambicans from the Mossurize and Sussundega districts flowed into Zimbabwe's Chimanimani district and were later settled into the Tongogara refugee camp.

Goncalves (1998:20) posits that by 1985 the RENAMO activities were bringing the Zimbabwean economy to a grinding halt. In response to this, Robert Mugabe demanded 30 000 additional troops from the parliament to protect the Beira corridor. This was after an initial deployment of 10 000 troops had already happened. Mlambo (1997:45) points out that this deployment was done at the expense of the Zimbabwean taxpayer.

Goncalves (ibid) takes this as a sign that Zimbabwe had become a central player in the Mozambican civil war. This comes as no surprise considering that Mozambique had also done the same during the Zimbabwean second Chimurenga. It seemed Zimbabwe was now returning the favor to Mozambique. This shows that despite the boundary that now separated the two nations, their ties were still very strong and they considered themselves to be one.

4.7.6 Zimbabwe's Economic Meltdown (2000-2010)

The 21st century saw the tables turning in the Zimbabwe-Mozambique relations. The boundary that separates them once again became a lifeline. This time it was Zimbabwe, which was in need of assistance due to a

tumultuous economic tailspin. Its citizens went to seek economic refuge in Mozambique in the form of employment and even basic commodities. The crossing of the boundary by Zimbabweans was similar to how the Mozambicans had done the same during the colonial era. The difference now was that the push factor was not the oppressive policies of a colonial government, but rather the misguided policies of an African government.

Duri (2010:125) attributes Zimbabwe's economic crisis to the governments' unbudgeted expenditure on gratuities and pensions for war veterans and its participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) war (1997-2003). He further states that the economic woes were heightened by the drought, which the country experienced in 2001. Meredith (2002:167-168) however attributes the economic crisis to the land invasions which began on 26 February 2000. Chatiza (2010) concurs with him as he traces the economic decline again to the Fast Track Land Reform program of 2000. He argues that it transformed vertical and horizontal industrial linkages, land tenure, ownership and development, food production and agricultural productivity. Furthermore, Chatiza states that the land reform displaced socio-economic actors, disempowered local development institutions. However, Mlambo (1997:40-49) backdated the economic decline to 1982 and points to the drought (1982-83), the Gukurahundi massacres (1982-87) and the Mozambican civil war (1977-1992) as the instigators of the gradual decline of the Zimbabwean economy. This then implies that the economic decline that was experienced in 2000 and beyond was a manifestation of a process that had commenced shortly after independence in 1980.

Regardless of the discourse of the inception of the Zimbabwean economic crisis, the situation of the Zimbabwean citizens had become desperate in the first decade of the 21st century. This was because the harsh economic conditions led to the loss of investor confidence and ultimately the closure of several key industries in Zimbabwe. Duri (2010:130) puts the figure at 700 companies that had shut down by 2001. Unemployment became astronomically high. Langa (2016) reveals that unemployment reached a staggering 80% in Zimbabwe. The unemployment was temporarily ameliorated by the fact 80% of the population was employed in the informal sector (ibid).

However, this was brought to an end by the Operation Murambatsvina of May 2005. It comprised of demolitions done by the state for the apparent reason of eradicating vice and squalor (Duri: *ibid*). Regardless of this justification, the demolition exercise resulted not only in the displacement of 700 000 people but the loss of livelihoods in the informal sector.

This dire economic situation in Zimbabwe led to the indirect escalation of illegal transboundary trading activities. These activities included the smuggling of basic necessities, food, clothing items, and liquor, which were all scarce in Zimbabwe at the time. The Zimbabwean Republic Police (ZRP) was arresting as many as 40 illegal traders per day from the year 2000 onwards. Many more were said to be in the Mozambican jails of Chimoio and Manica (Duri 2010:142). In September 2002, ZRP Mutare had arrested 153 illegal traders by 2005 the number had skyrocketed to 1 353 (*ibid*). ZRP seized 12 bales of clothing in August 2005, but by 2008, the figure had doubled to 22.

Besides the illegal trading activities, other Zimbabweans were crossing the boundary to seek for legal informal employment opportunities. These opportunities comprised of being porters for shoppers, seasonal agricultural work (October-April) and money changing (Duri 2010:150-153).

The illegal activities were enabled by the porous nature of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. Diamon (2016:466) informs that the boundary has many illegal crossings. He attributes the anomaly to the limited number of official border posts along the boundary itself. Despite the border being 1231 km, it only has three official border posts namely Nyamapanda, Mukumbura, and Machipanda. This then leads to illegal crossing routes such as Muchakata, Chambuta, Mugavhe, nzira yeku chi King. Duri (2010:138-139) adds other routes such as the Cecil Kopje Game Park, Marymount Teacher's College, and Rimai farm all located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. He adds that the Rimai farm had become an informal border post. Other routes were located near the Forbes border post in Mutare, for instance, the Mutare Truck Inn located 200m from the border post. Imbeza farm in Penhalonga, Mutare was also another route used by the illegal traders.

The illegal trading activities became dangerous for the traders themselves especially women being robbed and raped by pirates during the course of illegally crossing the boundary. Some of the pirates masqueraded as police or military officials. Furthermore, the police and military officials supposedly patrolling the boundary were also demanding bribes from the traders (Duri 2010:138).

Diamond (2016:464) offers an interesting argument on this state of affairs. He posits that illegal transboundary activities are caused by the communities' perception of the boundary. To them the boundary is imaginary, arbitrary and artificial hence they ignore it and replace it with their own version of ethno-nationalism. They do this so as to exploit the socio-economic and cultural benefits on either side. Moreover, these illegal activities occur due to the fact that the boundary itself does not respond to the needs of the local people. In the minds of the local people, the historical knowledge of their pre-colonial ethnic ties is still present. These ties are a safety net for their survival considering the neglect they often suffer from their respective governments. Donman and Wilson (1999:01) also note that there is a clash between the state security and interests of the borderland populations.

Diamond (2016:473) notes that the movement across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border was not one-way, but rather two way. Much as Zimbabweans were seeking economic refuge in Mozambique, the Mozambicans themselves were also doing the same in Zimbabwe. He posits that the Mozambicans normally cross the boundary to seek for better socio-economic infrastructure such as education, health facilities, and employment opportunities. Schools such as Rusitu Mission, Mutsvangwa and Hlabiso had many Mozambican day scholars. Hospitals such as Rusitu, Mapangwe, Mt Selinda and Muziti were attractive to Mozambicans. Zimbabwean estates and plantations in New Jersey, Zona, Tami, Good Hope, Southdown, and Stirling were full of Mozambican workers.

This shows that the nature of transboundary conflicts had changed after the independence of both countries. They were no longer military in nature but criminal in nature as well. We also see that the people residing in both

communities turned to their pre-existing ethnic relations to salvage them from the various crises they were going through.

4.8 Re-Emergence of RENAMO Incursions in Zimbabwe (2013-16)

Despite the Rome Peace Process of 1992, the RENAMO incursions along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary recurred in 2013. The party and its military wing withdrew from the 1992 peace process altogether (BBC: 2013). This followed allegations against FRELIMO of rigging municipal elections (Jakwa: 2017). By 2016, the RENAMO soldiers had conducted 107 attacks in which 40 civilians were killed and 79 injured. The attacks happened in the Mozambican areas of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia, Inhambane, Nampula, and Gaza (Parliament report June 2016). In the Nyamapanda area (also located along the border) residents were reported to be living in fear and a police officer was even shot dead (Herald: 2016).

Cattle rustling and skirmishes were happening on the Zimbabwean-Mozambican boundary when hostilities broke out in 2013 (Chiteko: 2017). Chiteko adds that a 10 December 2016 report from the Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) confirmed that 15 RENAMO soldiers armed with A.K. 47 rifles carried out the cattle raid. Fifty cattle were stolen during this raid. The cattle were meant to feed the RENAMO fighters. However, it has also been reported that besides RENAMO fighters, Mozambican (FRELIMO) soldiers have also been partaking in the raids (Jakwa: 2017). In Nyanga, Nyamutenha village, ward 11 also located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary, RENAMO soldiers armed with bows and arrows invaded. They kidnapped two Zimbabweans stole an unspecified number of cattle.

In an unprecedented move, the Nyanga community retaliated against the RENAMO soldiers and the neighboring Mozambican community. They crossed the boundary and raided Mozambican cattle pens. This shocked the government and prompted the former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe to chastise the retaliating communities to return the Mozambican cattle (Chiketo 2017). Furthermore, the former Zimbabwean Vice President

Emmerson Mhangagwa even dispatched the Zimbabwean army to deal with the matter (ibid). This was also to safeguard the Beira corridor from which Zimbabwe obtains its fuel. The soldiers were later stationed at Gwaivhi and Dandani villages 20km from the boundary (Mambo 2013). However, in retrospect, this seems to have begun even before the RENAMO soldiers resumed their hostilities. The Herald of 13 July 2013 reported that Zimbabweans dwelling along the boundary were barring the Mozambican children from attending schools on the Zimbabwean side of the boundary. This followed four Zimbabweans being assaulted by Mozambicans for hunting in their territory. Furthermore, the Zimbabweans were made to pay taxes such as cart, human, bicycle, and motorbike taxes to Mozambican nationals.

The skirmishes between the Zimbabwean and Mozambican border communities are rather worrying. Incidents such as these had been very minimum in the history of relations between the two nations. Prior to this, if one of the two nations were facing a problem, the other would assist.

Furthermore, there has been an influx of Mozambican refugees fleeing from the conflict and once again rushing into Zimbabwe as what happened during the civil war. Chief Mapungwana claimed that Mozambican refugees were seeking for protection in his area (News 24: 2016). As has been the norm, they were integrated into the communities along the boundary. However, this time the integration is causing destabilization in the Zimbabwean communities (Jakwa 2017). The timing of the hostilities themselves might have triggered this reaction by the Zimbabwean communities. Zimbabwe (2013-present) still is in the midst of internal political and socio-economic dire straits. Politically, there was a leadership crisis in which the former President Robert Mugabe was faced with factionalism in his political party, which eventually led to his ouster in November 2017. Economically there was still a high rate of unemployment and many companies were folding their operations. Such that the revival of RENAMO hostilities was putting more strain on an already strained community.

The renewal of the conflict displaced communities dwelling along the boundary once again. The Zimbabwean army had to ask the communities dwelling along

the boundary to move away from the boundary and deeper into Zimbabwean territory to avoid conflict (Mhlanga 2017). He further specifies that 5000 Zimbabweans dwelling along the boundary were given a three-day ultimatum by the Zimbabwean army to move (ibid). He also informs that this was meant to create a buffer zone between the communities and the RENAMO soldiers (ibid). The ultimatum was given in January 2017 in the middle of the rainy season and there was no assistance given by the government to relocate the affected citizens. The utilization of a military force by the Zimbabwean government is commendable; however, it needed to be complemented by more conflict resolution methods to address the roots of the conflict. The RENAMO fighters needed to be engaged, the members of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary needed to have dialogue about the conflict. The military solution on its own will not resolve the conflict. Asking Zimbabwean communities to move further away from the boundary is more of a coping mechanism and not the solution to the problem. The intended buffer zone will end up giving space for the fleeing refugees to settle. Moreover, the lack of government support for the relocation of the citizens further hampers the effectiveness of the 'military solution'.

On the Mozambican side, the government was being accused of being casual about the conflict at the expense of the communities dwelling along the boundary. Whilst the Zimbabwean side was manned by the Zimbabwean army, there were only a few police officers on the Mozambican side of the boundary. This prompted Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi to call for the European Union, South-African government and Catholic Church to intervene once again in negotiating with RENAMO. The talks resulted in a ceasefire agreement on 27 December 2017. However, the agreement was extended twice and despite the agreement, the conflict continued (Jakwa: 2017). The response of the Mozambican government is also testament to the issue raised earlier that African governments do not pay much attention to communities dwelling in their border regions. This response to the conflict does not seem to include the grassroots communities that are being affected by the conflict.

SADC's (Southern African Development Committee) response to the conflict was that there was nothing to worry about since the conflict was of a domestic

nature. It had faith in the capabilities of the FRELIMO government to handle the RENAMO soldiers (Guilenge 2016). This response from SADC was premised on the prognosis that the conflict was unlikely to escalate as it was post-cold war era and RENAMO did not have financial backing from South Africa and Rhodesia as before (ibid). When I considered this response from SADC I found it to be wanting. It is more of a reactionary approach rather than a pro-active approach. This is seen from its response, which states that the likelihood of the conflict escalating is very slim. However, one might want to point out that as much as the conflict has not escalated it is still harming communities in Southern Africa i.e. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, and Malawi. As pointed out earlier, regardless of the limited nature of the conflict, communities are being affected in so many ways. The children on the Mozambican side are failing to access educational facilities on the Zimbabwean side. Mozambican refugees have begun to flee across the boundary into Zimbabwe. Transport networks have also been affected. The RENAMO fighters also attacked haulage trucks traveling from Zambia to South Africa and from Malawi. Thus, SADC might want to adopt a pro-active approach to the conflict and not wait for it to escalate considering the geo-strategic importance of Mozambique to SADC member states.

4.9 Reflections on Zimbabwe-Mozambique Relations

The analysis of relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambican communities from the pre-colonial era to the present was imperative. It allows one to comprehend the history of relations between the two communities. In particular, it allows one to comprehend what triggered the conflicts, how they affected the communities and how they were resolved. It also allows one to weigh the relations between the communities. This is important in that relationship building is a possible avenue through which conflicts can be resolved.

From this analysis, it becomes evident that prior to colonialism the two communities of Zimbabwe and Mozambique relied on their ethnic relations to address conflicts. The communities were one and there was no boundary that separated them. Both commercial and ethnic ties tied them. This relationship

saw the communities prospering economically and politically from the brisk trade with the Arab traders and Portuguese in the early days of their arrival. However, this relationship also enabled the communities to overcome the violent political onslaughts brought about by the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Nguni invasions (1815-1840) and colonial exploitations in the early 19th century, civil wars and economic decadence in the post-independent period.

During the colonial era, the Zimbabwean and Mozambican communities continued their cordial relations despite the imposed colonial boundary. These relations cushioned both communities from the ravages associated with their respective colonial administrations. The Mozambicans went to Zimbabwe to seek better employment opportunities. The Zimbabweans also went to Mozambique to train and launch their liberation struggle. From the analysis, it became clear the huge difference which the assistance given by Mozambique to the Zimbabwean guerillas made to the quality of their war effort.

From the literature, it became evident that the colonial governments in South Africa and Rhodesia were dismayed by this relationship and tried to destroy it through employing RENAMO rebels. The relationship between the two communities was now becoming an obstacle to the survival of colonial regimes. Mozambique's accommodation and training of Zimbabwean guerillas and refugees clashed with the interests of the Rhodesian government. The support that Zimbabwe gave to Mozambique from 1980 onwards was also problematic to the interests of South Africa. Thus, acts of sabotage were conducted in both countries through RENAMO with a devastating effect on the economies and societies of the two communities.

However, relations again did not falter under the attacks of the RENAMO rebels. If at all, anything the relations became stronger. Despite the attacks that Mozambique was enduring from both RENAMO rebels, South African and Rhodesian governments it continued to support ANC, ZANLA, and ZIPRA freedom fighters. This was the same attitude adopted by Zimbabwe upon attaining independence in 1980. Despite the RENAMO and South African government attacks, it kept accommodating Mozambican refugees within its refugee camps and it continued increasing its military support to Mozambique.

Zimbabwe was also very instrumental in ushering peace into Mozambique through its participation in the Rome peace process of 1992.

The relations between the two communities continued to be cordial following the Rome peace process of 1992. From 2000-2010 it was Mozambique's turn once again to assist Zimbabwe due to its economic meltdown and hyperinflation. Many Zimbabweans went to Mozambique to seek economic refuge during this period. Mozambique was virtually Zimbabwe's lifeline at this moment in time.

However, from 2013 onwards the two nations witnessed the resurgence of the RENAMO rebels. Local and international stakeholders dismissed the conflict due to its low intensity. However, civilian life was disturbed and even lost due to the resumption of hostilities. The resurgence, though it was short-lived (2013-17), it was indicative of several issues. First, it became a classic example of the fact that settling conflicts using the western approach of peacebuilding does not resolve a conflict. The resurgence of RENAMO attacks also pointed to the fact that the Rome peace process was riddled with flaws. With the benefit of hindsight, external mediators settled the conflict. It was resolved through the liberal peace theory approach of introducing free markets and democracy in the affected nation. Elections were introduced in Mozambique and successfully conducted freely and fairly after every 5 years since 1994. However, this did not address the root causes of the conflict. The peace negotiators appear to have assumed that the communist/ Marxist policies of FRELIMO were the ones that led to the conflict. However, it appears it was more than that. These issues were secondary to RENAMO's hatred of FRELIMO. Furthermore, much as the international community celebrated the DDR program of Mozambique (1992-1994) which saw the demobilization of 90 000-110 000 soldiers there was no transitional or restorative justice that was done following the war. Social movements and traditional authorities appear to have been excluded from the peace process. The peace process was elitist and more of a top-down approach. Thus, this robbed the peace process of local ownership, which was crucial to its sustainability. This then suggests a cosmopolitan approach to peacebuilding, which combines both elements of traditional and western approaches to peacebuilding. It appears that

Laderach's conflict transformation is the one that is required to find the underlying cause of the issue. Much as a cease-fire was signed in 2014, the possibility of the resurgence of RENAMO is still high as the mistakes of the Rome peace process are yet to be corrected. Furthermore, with the death of the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama in April 2018 scholars such as Muchemwa and Harris (2018) noted that the FRELIMO government showed signs of backsliding on the resolution of the conflict with RENAMO and the signing of the peace agreement. One of the sticking issues was the integration of the RENAMO forces into the Mozambican army. The issue is yet to be dealt with even though the peace agreement was eventually signed in 2019. However, the RENAMO movement has now split and the new faction is threatening war. This scenario thus leaves the possibility of the conflict very high and even worse is that the communities along the border will be at risk once again.

4.10 Summary

The chapter analyzed the relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique from the earliest times to the present. The analysis revealed that during the earliest times the two communities dwelt together as one. Nevertheless, even as they dwelt as one there were episodes of violence from within the community. However, mostly the violence was externally induced. They were then separated through the demarcations that followed the Berlin Conference of 1884. This demarcation was on paper as the communities continued to relate to one another as they had before colonialism. This relationship continued even during liberation and civil wars which both countries experiences experienced at one time or another. The current violence was a consequence of colonialism. It is a legacy of the colonial experience, which both countries went through. However, despite it all, it appears that the solution to the violence which the both communities are facing is relying once again on the ties that bind them.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter expands on the research methodology employed to execute this study. In particular, the chapter explains in detail the research philosophy, approach, strategy, time horizons as well as the sampling techniques used in this study. The research methodology of the study was based on the research onion model espoused by *Saunders et al* (2009:107). In addition to these concepts, the chapter also delves into the ethical considerations and procedures that were pursued in this research.

5.2 Research Methodology

Research methodology simply put, is the foundation of the research study. It contains a detailed plan of how the research is going to be carried out. This will ultimately assist with directing the manner in which the study will successfully resolve the research problem identified earlier. *Saunders et al* (2009:03) succinctly puts it across when he states that research methodology is the theoretical foundation upon which the research is conducted. *Kothari* (2004:08) defines research methodology as a systematic way to resolve a research problem. Thus the research methodology of this study was based on the "Research Onion model" (illustrated below) espoused by *Saunders et al* (2009:108). The steps followed in this chapter are a reflection of this model.

The Research Onion Model




Figure 8. Research Onion Model: Source: Saunders et al 2009:108

5.3 Research Philosophy

Research philosophy is also known as research paradigm or design, which refers to the center of the research. However, in this research, I felt it was crucial to specify the philosophical basis of this study in order to help the reader contextualize the study and comprehend its basis and direction. Research philosophy is the first layer of the research onion model referred to earlier. Saunders *et al* (2009:107-8) defines research philosophy as the nature and development of the knowledge of the study. It is the foundation, which guides the research methods of the study. He goes on to posit that, it is important to identify a research philosophy because every researcher has his or her own way of viewing the world. These personal views also tend to influence the nature and development of the research. This will also explain how the

researcher arrives at the findings and conclusions of the research. Sekaran (2016:28) concurs with this argument and adds that research is influenced by the researcher's understanding of the world around him or herself.

This study pursued an Interpretivist research philosophy. This type of philosophy advocates for the researcher to engage the research participants to comprehend their way of life, their worldviews as opposed to treating them like objects. This approach, it is assumed, will help to resolve the research problem in a holistic manner. Saunders *et al* (2009:116) states that the Interpretivist school of thought is based on the assumption that the world around us is very complex and cannot be understood through a positivist approach to research or a quantitative approach to research. Sekeran (2016:28) defines Positivism as a scientific approach to research. It is heavily reliant on the experimental type of study, facts, statistical analysis and results, which are quantifiable. It treats the research participants as objects and does not interact with them to understand the bigger picture of their surroundings. This is done to avoid bias and ensure that the research findings adhere to the goal of finding the objective truth.

Interpretivism is similar to the Constructivist school of thought. Sekeran (2016: 29) posits that the Constructivist school of thought aims to comprehend the manner in which research participants view the world around them and how they construct their knowledge. The Constructivist types of studies like the Interpretivist studies are qualitative in nature. They both focus on phenomena, which are not quantifiable or tangible such as feelings, attitudes, and behaviors. They rely on narratives as opposed to numerical data and statistical analysis.

5.4 Research Approach

In accordance with the second outer layer of *Saunders et al's* research onion model, there are two methods to research approach. It is either the study will be based on inductive or deductive approach. According to Saunders *et al* (2009:124-125), the deductive approach involves using the data gathered to test a hypothesis and a theory. The inductive approach, on the other hand, involves building theory from the data collected, which has been accrued

during the process of a study. *Saunders et al's* (2016:489) simplifies it further and states that the deductive approach is used when a theory is readily available whereas the inductive approach is used when the researcher has to create a theory based on data collected. In other words, it is more akin to the grounded theory type of research. My study was based on the deductive approach to research. This is because a conflict transformation theoretical framework guided it.

5.5 Methodological Choice

My study was based on a mono method or qualitative method of research this is a data collection technique, which generates non-numerical data. De Vos (2002:360) adds that in qualitative research, the researcher immerses him or herself in the contextual settings of the research participants in order to understand the research problem more. He also points out that it does not only generate words but pictures and even video clips as well. Burns and Grove (2003:356) state that qualitative research is holistic and illustrative. Holloway (2005:4-6) adds that qualitative research generates descriptive data to discover the uniqueness and importance of human experience. In this research, the researcher is supposed to be a good listener who is truthful and flexible. Davies (2007:136) points out that qualitative research explores the dynamics, which play a role in influencing the manner in which humans behave. Al Busaid (2008:12) specifies that qualitative research aims to find out people's perceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions as well as the meanings, which they attach to events, processes, structures. Merriam (2009:13) points out that qualitative research aims to explore how people make sense of their world. The study is unstructured, flexible and open. Denzin and Lincoln (2000:3) add that qualitative research is normally done in the field, in the natural settings of the research problem in order to understand it better.

This is the total opposite of quantitative research methodology, which focuses more on statistical data analysis and experimental types of studies. Berg (2009:03) posits that quantitative research methodology focuses on numerical data to understand phenomenon. *Saunders et als* (2009:150) informs that

quantitative data focuses on numerical data with data collection tools such as questionnaires. It is highly structured and rigid.

My study was based on the qualitative method of data collection. This was because the study aimed to understand the experiences and perceptions of the community members of Chipinge-East regarding the RENAMO rebels and how it has affected their community. In particular, the study wanted to get the whole story beginning in the late 1980s when the violence escalated and between 2013—2016 when the violence re-emerged. This was done to be able to forge a way ahead to protect the community from future attacks. In addition to that, the study is an interpretivist/social constructionism study using a deductive approach, thus it only made sense to use the qualitative method of collecting data.

5.6 Action Research

This is one of the several categories of research. The selection of a research strategy to utilize in a study is influenced by the objectives of the research and the general nature of the study. There are quite a number of categories of research such as experimental, survey, ethnography, case studies, grounded theory, and Action research. For the purpose of this study, the action research approach was employed. This is because the study intended to effect a change in the issue identified by the community. The research did not want to simply conduct a study and come up with a set of recommendations rather it wanted to go the extra mile. It sought to implement these recommendations to resolve the problem (s) identified by the community and even evaluate if the prescribed solutions are working to alleviate the community from its current predicament.

5.7 Categories of Action Research

From the literature that I have read on action research, I got the impression that there are two categories of action research strategy namely the academic and the political categories. The academic side involves the researcher conducting his/her research with the aid of the research participants. As opposed to other research strategies that separate the researcher from the research participants, action research makes them one. They are both

important stakeholders in the research process. The research participants have an equal voice or stake in the research as the researcher him/herself. Action research is a research strategy that equates the balance of power between the researcher and the participants. In other cases, it tips the balance of power in favor of the research participants; the role of the researcher is reduced to that of a facilitator as noted by Muchemwa (2015:121). Greenwood and Levin (2007:03) add that action research brings together the research experts and the local stakeholders to work out a practical solution to a problem. They add that action research does research with, instead of research for participants.

The political side of action research involves action research using the partnership forged between the researcher and research participants to initiate change to resolve a problem within a given community. This distinct quality differentiates action research from other research strategies. It is at this point that action research transcends the academic realm of research methods and encroaches into the socio-political realm of life. It is more than a research and more of a transformative tool. This transformation can take place from the most basic/ grassroots level of society or business and take place even at the national level. Miller *et al.* (2003:11) add that action research brings together theory and practice, researchers and participants. They add that action research challenges unjust and undemocratic economic, social and political systems and practices. Greenwood and Levin (2007:03) label action research as a collaborative and democratic strategy of generating knowledge and designing action through the researcher and the local stakeholder. Kemmis *et al.* (2010:424) weighs in and equate action research to a democratic dialogue between the researcher and participants. They state that action research is an alternative relationship between the researcher and the participants. Huang (2010:99) states that action research aims to empower those research participants in oppressive contexts that marginalize them from the system. The contexts could be communal, provincial, national or even organizational.

A parallel can be drawn here between the concepts of action research and citizen participation. Sharon Arnstein has put this concept forward in her 1969 article titled *A Ladder of Citizen Participation*. The concept advocates for the

redistribution of political power to the citizens of any given community so that they participate in the decision-making on matters concerning their respective communities (Arnstein 1969:216). This is related to action research in that it also advocates for the community members of a given locality to partake in the search of a solution to the problems in their community. Both concepts give power and voice to the community members; they become key players in the resolution of issues that face their communities.

5.8 Characteristics of Action Research

The key characteristics of action research include a partnership between the researcher and the research participants. Thereafter, there are four stages, which are then taken to conduct action research. These stages are namely:

- Diagnostic stage
- Action plan
- Intervention
- Evaluating

Saunders *et al* (2009:147) state that once the problem is diagnosed, a plan of action is devised, the plan is implemented and then the outcomes are evaluated as to whether they resolve the problem identified earlier. It is important to note that unlike other research methods, action research is cyclical. This means that the research process can end and resume in the event that the action taken did not bring about the desired change.

5.9 Limitations

Scholars such as Miller *et al* (2003:18) have criticized action research because it is often done on a small scale. Furthermore, its findings cannot be replicated in another context, as is the case with positivist or experimental types of research. She adds that action research is most suitable for local issues and not bigger national issues. From the various scholars of action research that I have read the one criticism against action, research is that it assumes that the authorities of all communities embrace democracy and participation. As stated earlier, Huang (2003: 99) argued that action research aims to emancipate

stakeholders in oppressive contexts. However, considering the political landscape in some developing world contexts such as Africa, action research is not entirely suitable. It might actually put both the researcher and the research participants at risk. This is because the political systems in some of these contexts do not support the concept of community members participating to bring about change. In such contexts, the leaders can misconstrue action research as a direct threat to their power.

One such context is Zimbabwe where the government, especially under the Mugabe administration (1980-2017), was highly suspicious of any non-governmental or community-based organizations. This is a well-documented fact, which, I noted in my 2016 publication titled *Citizen Engagement and Local Governments in Zimbabwe: The Case of the Mutare City Council*. I argued that the government was not very receptive of the idea of citizen participation or democracy and accused its proponents as agents of the regime change agenda. To this end, the government then crafted legal instruments, which restricted activities that tried to instill a spirit of participation, change, and democracy among Zimbabweans. These legal instruments included the Private and Voluntary Organizations Act of 1996 and the NGO Act of 2004 (Muchanyuka 2016:110). It is also important to note that these components, which are unwelcome to the government, are the key components of action research. Such a political landscape is not only unique to Zimbabwe but in many other parts of Africa. However, I am not going to delve deeper into it as these challenges have been documented and deliberated at length in many books. Some of these books include *Dead Aid (2009)* by Dambisa Moyo and *An Introduction to African Politics (2010)* by Alex Thomson among others.

Despite the risks related to action research in Zimbabwe, I decided to continue with the study due to a window of opportunity that presented itself when there was a sudden change in the political administration of the country. The new administration, which took over in November 2017, showed signs of trying to promote an unprecedented democratic culture especially during its early days of the new regime. However, when the atmosphere became restrictive once again it was the letters of introduction, personal relationships and the constant

communication with the local authorities on the stages of my research, which helped me through.

5.10 Study Population and Sampling Design

This study utilized the non-probability sample design and the purposive-judgment sampling method. Purposive sampling as mentioned earlier is one of the non-probability sampling methods. According to Kothari (2004:16), it is also called deliberate sampling. Sekeran *et al.* (2016:248) define it as a sampling method whereby the samples are selected based on having the specific information, which the researcher is looking for. They, however, warn that this type of sampling method is quite laborious in locating the individuals with the required information. During this study, this assertion was found to be true in that the research participants were not readily available. It took some time before I found them all. Some would claim that they had the information required for the study, but when the study commences they were found wanting in terms of the information. This then forced me to halt the research process and start again the search for the research participants with the information that I required.

Sekeran *et al.* (ibid) further divides purposive sampling into two types namely judgment and quota sampling. According to Kothari, (ibid) the judgment aspect of purposive sampling is concerned with the selection of a few people with the required information. One might also add that it is suitable when the people to be selected are homogeneous. Purposive quota sampling is used when certain groups need to be represented in the study through a quota system. One can conclude that it is used when the research participants are heterogeneous. It is similar to stratified sampling but on a non-probability basis.

The research focused on 38 participants, as it was a qualitative research. Eight of them were key (as specified in section 1.6). Thirty of the research participants were ordinary community members from the different villages of Chipinge-East constituency with an experience of the RENAMO incursions. These were divided into 2 FGD groups one for women and one for men. In each group, there were 15 participants selected based on their knowledge and experiences with the RENAMO incursions.

The location of the study was Chipinge-East constituency. The location was selected based on the fact that it is one of the Zimbabwean border communities that is most affected by the RENAMO incursions. It is one of the five constituencies of the Chipinge district and is located 66km southeast of Chipinge town. It includes areas such as Mt Selinda and Chikore. The area receives good rainfall but it is also very warm thus, there is a thriving farming community. There are a number of tea estates and macadamia nuts, acacia and pineapple plantations in the area such as Mikiri, Zona, etc. All this economic activity and prosperity also explains one of the reasons why the community is targeted by the RENAMO rebels.

5.11 Data Collection Methods

According to Burns and Groove (2003:373), data collection methods refers to the manner in which information relevant to the research is gathered. Muchemwa (2016:139) divides data collection methods into two types; namely primary and secondary sources. He defines the primary sources of data as those sources of data that are in their original state that have been generated for the first time and yet to be processed, analyzed or interpreted. These sources of data include archival material, diaries, interviews and focus group discussions all of which were made use of in this study.

Secondary sources of data, on the other hand, are second hand in the sense that they are no longer in their original state; other researchers or academics have processed them. Johnston (2014:614) defines secondary data as information that has already been processed and is readily available for other researchers. In other words, secondary sources are based on the views and perceptions of another writer or researcher. These sources include academic texts, journals, newspaper articles, government, and international non-governmental organization reports.

5.11.1 Primary Sources of Data

- i. **Observation:** Saunders *et al* (2009:288) states that it is a data collection technique with a socio-anthropological origin. It aims to discover the meaning that people attach to certain actions. He adds that

it comes in handy when the research objectives involve watching what people do. Kumar (2005: 119) defines observation as a systematic method of gathering information through watching and listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place. Kawulich (2005:02) adds that the observation technique provides a written photograph of the situation under study. It even involves the researcher participating in the activities under study. Whitehead (2005:06) states that this enables the researcher to understand the context of the research participants.

Sekeran and Bougie (2016:130) divide the observation technique into two types namely participant and structured observation. They further state that participant observation is suited for qualitative studies whilst structured observation is for quantitative studies. Structured observation, unlike participant observation, is more concerned about the frequency and duration of activities and not necessarily the meaning that research participants attach to their activities.

Saunders *et al* (2009:289) infer that in participant observation the researcher deeply involves him/herself in the daily lives of the research participants. This helps the researcher to grasp the context of the research participants to better understand their attitudes and behaviours. Aksan *et al.* (2009:900) use the term symbolic interactionism to refer to this process of immersion into the daily lives of the research participants. They state that the understanding of the context is brought about by the researcher's interaction and communication with fellow members of the context, which might be a community or an organization.

Gill and Johnson (2002:149) categorize the roles of the researcher in participant observation into four roles namely:

- Complete participant
- Complete observer
- Observer as participant
- Participant as observer

These categories determine the level of immersion of the researcher into the context of the research participants. However, Saunder *et al* (2009:293) informs that the first two categories i.e. complete observer and complete participant require the researcher to hide their identity and research from the research participants. This, however, has ethical challenges. Regarding the other two roles, the researcher is transparent to the research participants about the study and its objectives.




Figure 9. Patton's Framework for Observation (2002:87)

However, Patton's framework for observation (2002:87) cautions that the researcher should always triangulate the information that is gathered through the observation technique. He adds that it is also vital for the researcher to be able to separate important details from trivia. This is because, during observation, the researcher can be overwhelmed by loads of information that it is necessary to be able to filter what is useful from what is not useful to the research. Furthermore, Saunder *et al.* (2009:297) informs that one of the key issues for participant observation is transcribing the notes of what the researcher has observed. The transcribing is to be done every day without fail or else the observations can easily be forgotten.

For this study, I used the participant observation method. The level of my involvement in the participant observation method was moderate or participant as observer in accordance with the classification of Gill and Johnson (2002). I used the participant observation method to better understand the motives behind the actions and behaviors of Chipinge community members regarding their initiatives towards mitigating the attacks from the RENAMO rebels in Mozambique. This thus required their full involvement to better identify the shortcomings of their initiatives and better prepare for the subsequent intervention. This moderate approach was based on the fear that If I was to become too involved the community members would relax and not want to fully participate in the activities of generating their own peacebuilding initiatives. I limited my participation to an advisory role after they had taken the first step towards initiating their local peace committees.

My observation had different stages. During the initial stages of my fieldwork, my observation was focused on random interactions with community members and leaders from Chipinge town and Chipinge-East Constituency. This involved casual walks within the community or the town and striking a conversation related to my research topic. The questions tried to find out whether the individuals were in Chipinge at the time of the attacks and how they were affected by the attacks and how they think further harm from the attacks could be avoided in the event of another attack. In some cases, the people were clueless regarding how best future attacks could be mitigated. However, these conversations would sometimes give more information than I would get through formal discussions such as interviews or focus group discussions.

I also used the observation method to observe the body language of the research participants during interviews and focus group discussions. I found that through body language I could detect when the participants were uneasy about certain questions. This would intrigue me more and make me follow up after the interview or discussions as to what the source of the discomfort was coming from. This would lead to more nuggets of information that people might be uncomfortable to say during interviews or focus group discussions. The other sources of the information would be the random conversations I had with

people in town or in the village. It was interesting to note that people were more open to share information without any formalities being exchanged. The moment that I mentioned that I was doing research or the moment, I asked for permission to manually or electronically record the information that the person was saying they became tight-lipped. The discomfort to share information became greater under those circumstances. Thus, I kept the conversations random. I also used the observation method to survey the environment of the Chipinge community especially the hot spots of the conflicts that were shared by the research participants.

After the initial focus group discussions and interviews, I designed training based on my findings from these discussions. Following these training, the research participants now had to implement what they learned during the training into their respective communities and beyond. At this stage, again I had to observe the research participants as they implemented what they had been trained on. The implementation stage had three components namely the drafting of contingency plans by the research participants and the presentation of these plans to their fellow community members and to their local authorities. I also observed how the fellow community members and the local authorities reacted to these presentations by the research participants.

- ii. **Semi-Structured Interviews:** the interview technique was used during data collection. DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006:316) define interviews as a set of open-ended questions scheduled in advance at a designated time and location outside of everyday events. McNamara (1999) adds that interviews are useful for getting the story behind the experiences of the participants. Henning *et al.* (2004:52) state that interviews bring forth the research participants' subjective reality i.e. thoughts, feelings, and actions.

During the course of this study, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted during the period April-August 2018. These interviews were conducted with the local authorities in the Chipinge community and government officials in the Manicaland province in which the Chipinge community is located. These officials were selected on the basis that they had information regarding the mechanisms previously employed to address the

ulcer of RENAMO incursions since the 1980s. These officials included the traditional chief, the councilor, the Member of Parliament, the District Administrator, the C.E.O (Chief Executive Officer) of the Rural District Council, a representative from the Civil Protection Unit, the Minister of State in Manicaland Province and the Provincial Administrator of the Manicaland Province. The officials were selected using purposive-judgmental sampling. They were interviewed mostly in the comforts of their offices at a time convenient to them. The length of the interview depended on the interviewee's knowledge of the subject matter. Some interviews tended to be longer than others.

I found interviews helpful in getting more in-depth information from individuals as opposed to FGDs and even the observation technique. This ability of the interviews appears to be based on the closeness between the interviewees and myself. This closeness was forged during interactions between myself and the interviewees in the process of trying to gain access to them, introducing the study and setting up appointments with them. This was an advantage over FGDs in that during FGDs certain individuals would dominate the discussions, which would make other individuals passive.

However, the interviews came with their own challenges especially when it came to interviewing officials who were not present at the time of the attacks. In some institutions, there was a lack of institutional memory to assist these officials. Other officials were not willing to share the information as they regarded it as sensitive. I encountered this challenge when I tried to engage the security agents i.e. the police and the army. I kept being referred to authorities in Harare who were not forthcoming regarding the meetings. I had a similar experience when I approached the Provincial Medical Department. They refused to share their medical records as they considered it to be sensitive. I thus had to find less sensitive ways of getting the information. I found the interviews to be time-consuming at times, in that some of the officials were not available when you needed them. In some cases, it took months of trying to place appointments, but finally, with patience, the appointments took place. One such interview was that of the Member of Parliament for Chipinge

East Constituency. It took over a year to track him down due to his extremely busy schedule.

- iii. **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs):** Kumar (2011:126) defines FGDs as a data collection technique in which attitudes, opinions or perceptions towards an issue, product, service or program are explored through a free and open discussion between members of a group and the researcher. *Saunders et al.* (2009:343) define focus group discussions as a form of group interviews in which the topic is clearly defined and subjected to deliberations by the research participant. *Saunders et al.* (ibid) go on to inform that the FGDs do have a limitation to the number of participants though. Scholars have different estimates, but they all range from 4-12 people per group. The number is also determined by the research objectives at hand. The more complex the research objectives the less the number of the participants in the focus group.

FGDs proved to be a useful method of in discovering the participants' experiences and opinions on the RENAMO incursions in the Chipinge community. Apart from sharing their individual experiences, it became easier for me to pick up trends in the attacks and how they affected the community. It was also easy for me to triangulate the information I got from group members through the information I got from other group members. The experiences shared by the participants would feed into each other to become a comprehensive narrative, which permitted me to get a vivid picture of the community's experiences as a whole. Much as I was not there during the attacks, but these accounts given by individual research participants brought me closer to grasping what occurred and how the community was affected by it.

In this regard, 30 participants were chosen to participate in the focus group discussions on Wednesday 11 July 2019 at Chief Gwenzi's residence. These participants were members of a number of villages in Chipinge East constituency. Their selection was done through purposive-judgmental sampling and based on the criteria of whether they experienced the attacks by RENAMO rebels. These participants formed two groups of 15 members each.

The groups were aggregated by sex, one group was for males and the other group was for females.

This separation was done because the study location was based in a rural community with a deeply patriarchal culture. The patriarchal culture in the community is deeply entrenched such that the women are reluctant to contribute to discussions especially in the presence of men. According to the culture, it is a sign of respect for the men who are perceived as the leaders of both the household and the community. The men have the final say in all discussions and women are supposed to be subservient to what the men say. Opposing or criticizing what the men have said is considered blasphemous in the community. This culture is not only unique in the Chipinge community, but in other Zimbabwean and African rural communities at large. Given this scenario, I decided to separate the groups to make the women comfortable and allow them to voice their experiences and ideas freely.

Compared to other forms of data collection methods I used for my study, focus group discussions were the most complex. I found myself having to manage several dynamics active during the discussions. For instance, to make sure that all research participants in the group got a chance to put across their views. Even when the groups had been separated by sex, it was not enough. There were still other factors at play, which hindered the collection of data. Some research participants tended to be more vocal than others were which overshadowed the views of the less vocal members of the group. Furthermore, the less vocal members of the group tended to be very agreeable with the vocal members at times. I found myself having to be very persuasive with the less vocal members to come out of their shells and share their views without fear. At times, I had to be firm, as I had to regulate the flow of the discussion in order to give others a chance and avoid the domination of the conversation by certain members of the group.

Despite these challenges, I realized some strengths about focus group discussions. For instance, I found out that they allow a wider range of information to be shared within the group as is not possible with key informant interviews. This variety of issues comes from the fact that the research

participants were from a diverse background with differing experiences, therefore, they had a lot to share and contribute to the general discussion. They also allow the immediate verification of the information shared within the group among the research participants.

Overall, it was a rewarding experience despite the challenges. I managed to gather a lot of information that would not have been possible using only the observation method or even the interviews.

5.12 Data Analysis

Babbie (2011:396) defines data analysis as a process of sifting through the data collected in order to understand the inferences emerging from the data. In another publication, Babbie (2004:284) also further explains that data analysis is a process of discovering patterns and trends from the collected data. These patterns and trends then enable the researcher to answer the research questions and achieve the objectives of the study. The data analysis will also make it easier for the researcher to formulate theories emerging from the study if it is an inductive study. Gibson and Brown (2009:128-129) sum it up well when they state that the three main purposes of data analysis are to examine commonalities, distinctive features, and relationships from the elements of the data.

Data analysis is conducted through different methods depending on whether the study was qualitative or quantitative. Since my study was a qualitative study, the data had to be analyzed in a qualitative manner. However, scholars such as Sekeran (2016:334) and Saunders *et al.* (2009:480) concur that the data analysis of qualitative data is not clear-cut. This is due to the complex and voluminous nature of qualitative data. This leads to a situation whereby qualitative researchers have to analyze their data manually. *Saunders et al.* (2009:480) state that there are electronic software for analyzing qualitative data. One such software is called CAQDAS; however, it is not widely available. Electronic methods of data analysis are ubiquitous for quantitative data through software such as Nvivo and SPSS.

Under the qualitative methods of data analysis, there are two types namely interpretive thematic analysis and discourse analysis. According to Braun and Clarke (2013:13), the interpretive thematic analysis involves reading through interview scripts and focus group discussions to identify patterns and trends. These patterns and trends are then coded and categorized so as to make it easier for further analysis. It looks more at the themes emerging from the data collected. Shaw and Bailey (2009:414) defines discourse analysis as the search for the deeper meaning of words and expressions hidden from verbal speech. It is concerned with the surroundings or environment in which the statements were made.

My study employed the interpretive thematic analysis of data. This involved four stages namely:

- Transcribing
- Summarizing
- Categorization
- Structuring

Transcribing: According to *Saunders et al.* (2009:485), this stage involves writing down the notes collected from interviews and focus group discussions. It can also involve writing down notes from audio recordings. *Saunders et al.* (ibid) add that transcribing does not only involve writing down what has been said, it also involves writing down any observations regarding the manner in which it was said. Transcribing also has to be done as soon after the interviews have been made. This is done so as to avoid forgetting what was discussed.

This is what I did as the first stage of my data analysis. I wrote down all the notes of the interviews, informal discussions, audio recordings, and the focus group discussions as soon as possible. Mostly this happened during the evenings when I was settled. This stage of data analysis, however, seemed to happen simultaneously with the data collection. In my notes, I also included any observations that I made especially regarding the body language of the participants. This was common when the research participants felt that the questions were infringing on a political territory.

Summarizing: According to *Saunders et al*, (ibid), this stage involves condensing the transcribed notes. This is essential as the notes for qualitative studies become voluminous as the research progresses. Condensing the notes makes it easier for them to be analyzed and identify the themes coming out from the data. This is done by focusing on the key points of the transcribed notes. It is similar to the qualitative data analysis model espoused by Miles and Huberman (1994) which involves the reduction of data as one of the stages of data analysis. According to Sekeran, (2016:336) summarizing involves codification of data. This is a process whereby labels are attached to units of data. She further notes that the labels might be in the form of words, sentences, paragraphs or even themes.

Following the transcribing of the notes over a period of 18 months, I had to summarize them as they had become voluminous. Unlike the transcribing stage whereby it had to be done simultaneously as the data collection, the summarizing had to be done when I reached the very end of the data collection. I managed to summarize by focusing on the key points only. This was not an easy task as all the information seemed to be important to the study. I codified my data and derived the names of the codes from my research objectives. This made it easier to sort out the data.

Categorizing data: after the summarization of the data, the data has to be placed in respective groups. This is a process of organizing, arranging and classifying coding units (Sekeran 2016:336). Following the development of these categories, the researcher identifies the relationships between the categories of data and draw conclusions from the data.

I categorized my data after the summarization process. The coding made the categorization easier. The categories were shaped by my research objectives.

Structuring: This stage focuses on the narratives given by the research participants during their interviews. It ensures that these narratives have a structure, which will help the researcher to understand what transpired. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) state that narratives should be structured so that the reader knows when the story happened, what it was all about, the consequences and the significance of the events that transpired. I did this

process with the notes from the interviews, which I conducted. I also applied the same procedure to the conversations, which I had with community members.

Validity and Reliability

These two components are meant to ensure the credibility of the research study. Validity, according to Babbie and Mouton (2001:122) is the extent to which an empirical measure reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration. Sekeran (2016:349) posits a more simplified definition and states that validity refers to the extent to which the research findings reflect the collected data. She goes on to dissect the concept of validity into two namely internal and external validity. The former refers to the congruency between the collected data and the research findings the latter refers to the extent to which the study can be transferred to other contexts and produce similar results. Ngwenya (2014:130) states that the validity of the study can be achieved through the triangulation of the data gathered with other sources. McTaggart (1998:228) adds that validity is proven when there is a recognizable change because of the study. Creswell (2014:201) broadens this aspect and lays out eight steps of validating a study. These include triangulation, member checking, use of description, clarifying biases, present negative and discrepant information, peer debriefing and the use of an external auditor.

These were the same steps used in the validation of my study. However, some steps such as the use of an external auditor were not utilized in the study.

- **Triangulation:** this involves the verification of the data collected through crosschecking with other sources of the same subject. I ensured triangulation through cross-checking the data gathered through primary sources with the data of secondary sources i.e. books, journal articles, and newspaper articles.
- **Member checking:** this is whereby the participants verify the data that was captured by the researcher. In my study, this was done through sharing the final drafts of the transcribed notes with the research participants to make sure that what was captured is what they had said. The final findings of the research were also shared with the research participants and other

stakeholders to double-check if the data collected and the subsequent findings were a true reflection with what was on the ground. However, not all research participants were available for the member checking especially the key informants who happen to be government officials with very busy schedules.

- **Descriptive writing:** in this method, the findings of the study are written in a detailed manner to aid the comprehension of the study by the reader. In my study, this was done through the use of detailed descriptions coupled with first-hand experiences from the research participants.
- **Clarifying biases:** the researcher openly declares his or her biases during the study. I clarified my biases in the research findings. The biases were inevitable due to the fact it was a qualitative study dependent on my personal interpretations or views of the world. The biases were further compounded by the use of the participant observation method. In a way, this made me part of the community to an extent and begin to view issues from their point of view. However, these biases were countered by the other validity methods employed to make the study credible.
- **Present negative and discrepant information:** the researcher indicates other views that came up during the research that are opposed to the research he/she is conducting. I did not shy away from including the views and perceptions of other research participants, which were against the study. These divergent views do not water down the significance of the study in any way, but rather bring to the surface the nature of the community on the ground, the human experience of how we all see the same thing differently.
- **Peer debriefing:** this method is concerned with the engagement of different persons to review the research and its findings. This was done by sharing the research findings with research colleagues. These colleagues were former doctoral students who have diverse experiences in the research process for a Ph.D.

Reliability according to Babbie and Mouton (2001:119) is concerned with the consistency with which the study produces the same results when subjected to different contexts. This in a way is similar to external validity as stated by

Muchemwa (2015:146) who states that reliability is intertwined with validity. He further states that reliability involves the dependability of the steps used in the research process. Muchemwa (2015:148) outlines that reliability is achieved through four self-explanatory key methods namely; checking of transcripts, consistency of coding, coordination, and communication of findings with fellow researchers and cross-checking codes. For my study, I used the following three methods of Gibbs' guidelines:

- **Checking of transcripts:** under this method, the transcribed notes need to be revised to rid them of any errors that might have occurred in the capturing of the notes. I did this process repeatedly by referring back to the notes from the interviews and focus group discussions; I also re-listened to the audio files that have been recorded for some of the interviews.
- **Consistent coding:** coding must be consistent in order to be comprehensive. In my study, I stuck to the same coding system throughout my data analysis. I re-checked to ensure whether there were codes that I wrote wrongly.
- **Coordination and communication:** this is normally used in cases of team researches with more than one researcher. The head of the research team will have to ensure that the findings of the research have been shared with the rest of the team to avoid confusion. My research was not team research, but it was necessary to employ this method since this was an action research, the research participants at times participated in the research, such that I had to communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the research principles were observed at all times.

5.13 Ethical Considerations

Ethics is also a very important part of research. It ensures that the principles of the research process are adhered to and at the same time, the sensitivities and rights of the research participants are respected. Ethical considerations were observed in my research. This was also particularly important due to the sensitive nature of the research subject. Action research on its own advocates for change and democracy whilst peace studies also advocate for stability.

These were sensitive subjects in Zimbabwe at the time of my research study such that the study had to proceed with caution. The government officials were suspicious of the study at first and the community members were reluctant to share their opinions at first. However, their fears were allayed through the letter of research from the Durban University of Technology (DUT) which I presented to them in addition to fully explaining the research and what it aims to achieve. This helped to clear the air. Furthermore, before I began my research I engaged the responsible authorities in Zimbabwe for permission to conduct my research. I started with the Ministry of local governance and moved on to the office of the Minister of State in Manicaland Province, the District Administrator's Office in Chipinge District and Chief Gwenzi. These letters helped to put people at ease with my research. I also made sure that I had the consent of the research participants before the beginning of the interviews and focus group discussions. I made the research participants aware that they were free to participate or opt-out of the research anytime they started to feel uncomfortable. After the interviews, I also made sure that the security of the research participants was ensured through observing confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy of the information they shared with me. I also made sure that the names of the research participants were not written in this thesis.

5.14 Summary

This chapter expounded the research methodological orientation, which guided my study in accordance with the research onion model of *Saunders et al*(2009). In summary, the research was predominantly an action research guided by an Interpretivist research philosophy with a deductive approach with a qualitative research methodology and a longitudinal time frame. The sample of the research participants was selected through a purposive-judgmental sampling method. The data was collected through the observation method, key interviews and focus group discussions. The data gathered was thus subjected to an interpretive thematic analysis and Creswell's (2004) model of validity and reliability check.

CHAPTER 6: EXPLORATION I: A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of two chapters that present and analyze the findings of the study. These findings were derived from primary data sources such as key informant interviews and focus group discussions as detailed in chapter five, which dealt with the research methodology of the research. This particular chapter seeks to deliver on the first objective of the research, which sought to examine the nature of the violence that had affected the Chipinge-East communities at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. The data focuses on the two episodes of these incursions upon the Chipinge community. These episodes are namely the Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992) and the resumption of the hostilities (2013-2016). The process of familiarizing with the nature of the violence affecting the community was deemed vital for the study in order to learn what transpired and how the community was directly affected by it. I found it best to learn these experiences directly from the community members by capturing the details and vivid accounts where possible of the incidents that transpired. Some of the incidents experienced by the communities were reported in the media at the time, but this coverage seemed to gloss over the harrowing experiences of the communities and the effects of the incidents upon them. The reports concentrated on the timeline of these incidents i.e. when and where it happened, how many were injured and or affected, but then did not capture physical and mental aspects of these attacks upon the community. The findings established that the violence, which the Chipinge communities experienced, was in the form of theft, armed robberies, abductions, sexual violence, forced recruitment, and extra-judicial killings. It also established that these incursions were initially motivated by the rebels' need for food supplies and basic necessities. Later on, the violence was aggravated by the interference of the ZDF into the Mozambican conflict.

From the KII and the FGDs that were conducted with the members of the Chipinge community, it became apparent that the transboundary violence that

affects the community members is in the form of armed robberies, abductions, extra-judicial killings, landmines, and sexual violence. The violence was much more pronounced during the period of the first civil war (1977-1992) as compared to the resurgence (2013-2016). Furthermore, during the civil war era, the violence became more pronounced towards the end of the civil war i.e. 1986-1992.

6.2 Armed Robberies

The participants stated that armed robberies were part of the violence the Chipinge community experienced at the hands of RENAMO rebels. These robberies often targeted shops and farmhouses near the border. One of the earliest armed robberies they recollected was the one that took place at the South Down Tea Estate shop in December 1980 whereby Z\$ 200 worth of goods were looted. During another attempted armed robbery at Good Hope Farm, 27 rounds of bullets were fired. In 1984, the participants recalled an attack on the Mt Selinda hospital that involved the raiding of medical supplies.

One of the elderly participants in the group indicated that sometimes the rebels themselves warned them of impending robberies. He stated that the rebels would send letters to the community asking for food and money to support their cause. The community members would then collect the required items from the households in the area and then give them to the rebels. Failure to do this would then result in an attack on the community. In 1988, there was an attack on the Jersey tea estate by six rebels in broad daylight around 4 pm. The participants recalled attacks on two buses belonging to Ajay and Siduna bus companies. Attacks were also recalled on the Baiwa homestead, Mzite Township, Jersey secondary school, Mhanda business center, Mikiri (Meikles) farm, and Beacon Primary school.

These armed robberies in the Chipinge communities were more pronounced during the era of the Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992) and were consistent with what other communities along the border were experiencing at the time. There were similar attacks at the Nyambuya forestry estate, and villages surrounding Chiredzi town located further South of Chipinge community. When hostilities resumed in 2013, similar robberies took place in other Zimbabwean

communities along the border such as Nyanga and Nyamapanda. These communities were also subject to cattle rustling by the RENAMO rebels.

The robberies appear to have been motivated by the need for food and medical supplies along with other necessities such as money a view supported by the fact that most of the robberies either targeted shops or farmhouses where the rebels could find supplies they were in need of. This pattern of the robberies follows from the fact that as much as the RENAMO rebels were supported by the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the support was mostly in terms of defense equipment only. The rebels' need for food and supplies could not be sourced from fellow Mozambicans due to the fact that most of them had either fled the country, died due to the famine or were internally displaced through the villagization policy of the FRELIMO government. Consequently, Zimbabwean communities were targeted.

One participant indicated that the armed robberies were intensified by the fact that many of the Mozambicans residing in the Sofala province had fled the area due to the violence of the rebels and flocked across the border into Zimbabwe as refugees. Indeed, Mlambo (1997:45) estimated that as many as 200 000 refugees had flocked into the Zimbabwean communities along the border. As much as this move ensured the safety of the refugees, it left the rebels devoid of a civilian population to depend on for their basic necessities and thus made the Zimbabwean communities along the border vulnerable to these attacks. It is important to note that the rebels employed a guerilla type of warfare, which according to Mao Tse Tung (1937:32) essentially requires a civilian population to thrive on. Mao drew the analogy that the guerilla is like a fish whilst the civilian population is like water without which the fish cannot survive. It is this critical need for a civilian population, which led to the attacks of the Chipinge communities by the RENAMO rebels.

Chiovelli *et al.* (2019: 08) add that during the early 1980s Mozambique was affected by a massive drought, which made the RENAMO forces all the more desperate for food in the neighboring Zimbabwean communities in which the effects of the drought were less pronounced.

6.3 Abductions

The participants indicated that abductions were another form of violence, which they experienced at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. These were closely related to the armed robberies in that following a successful armed robbery, the rebels would kidnap the Chipinge community members for use as porters to transport their goods across the border.

One of the prominent kidnapping cases that the participants recalled occurred in 1982 at the Chisumbanje at the Mabee business center. In this particular incident, 15 rebels kidnapped two men and their four oxen. During the broad daylight robbery at Jersey shop mentioned earlier, the participants indicated that the rebels abducted some of the shoppers, although they could no longer remember the exact number abducted. During the attack at the Nyambuya forestry estate, 20 women were abducted and forced to carry the goods which the rebels had looted. During an attack at the Zona tea estate in Chipinge, an unspecified number of school children were abducted by the rebels to carry the medical supplies they had looted from the nearby clinic. Mukonza (2016: 25) details the case of a Chipinge woman who was abducted on her way from the river by the RENAMO forces and taken across the border into Mozambique to RENAMO camps. Further north of the Chipinge community, the rebels raided Nyamutenha village in Nyanga district during the resurgence of their attacks in 2013. During this particular incident, the rebels also abducted four community members.

When one reflects upon the RENAMO war doctrine, it is clear that these abductions were part of the wider *Gandira system of labour* used by the RENAMO rebels to sustain their war effort. Chiovelli *et al.* (2019: 10) define the Gandira system as labor camps for the RENAMO war strategy. Igreja *et al.* (n.d.) go a step further and define it as a labor system whereby civilians would carry food items and even weapons for the RENAMO rebels. These civilians (mostly women) would cook and even nurse the RENAMO rebels.

The abductions also seem to have targeted Chipinge and other Zimbabwean communities along the border due to the scarcity of able-bodied civilians in

rural Mozambique brought about by the massive displacements of Mozambicans referred to earlier.

6.4 Extra-Judicial Killings

Extra-judicial killings of community members by RENAMO occurred mainly after 1985 when the GoZ officially deployed its army into Mozambique. These killings targeted community members and schoolchildren.

The participants recalled the killing of five students at Jersey secondary school on 27 November 1987. The rebels bayoneted the schoolchildren to death. After the resurgence of the conflict in 2013, the RENAMO rebels also killed three schoolteachers at Zona Tea estate in June 2016.

One of the participants was a victim of the attack at Jersey Secondary School in November 1987. She was 16 years old at the time of the attack. The rebels who were 25-30 in number and invaded the girls' dormitory between 1-2 am in the morning. The rebels woke the girls up and instructed them to take all their belongings and follow them. The girls did as they were told and followed the rebels into Mozambique. They were made to walk for a long distance and were asked to stop and undress. The girls' hands were tied at the back and made to kneel. The beatings then started which resulted in the deaths of some of the students. The rebels attacked the students with axes and machetes; very few had guns. Many of the students sustained deep cuts and survived by pretending to be dead. The participant stated that the rebels targeted the back of the head in the hope that the students would be killed faster. During the attack, she heard the rebels saying that "*muri kufira zvivi zva baba venyu Mugabe ari kutumira mauto eZimbabwe mu Mozambique achibatsira mauto e FRELIMO.*" That is they were being killed because of the interference of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces in the Mozambican Civil War. Other students had their ears cut-off, given to them and told, "*Endai munopa baba venyu Mugabe mumuudze kuti iyi ndiyo passport yeku Mozambique.*" (Go and give this ear to your father Mugabe and tell him that this is the Mozambican passport).

The participant added that the rebels raided the boarding school of blankets, medical supplies, and food. Some of the students were abducted and made to

carry the looted goods across the border. The participant herself sustained five deep cuts on her lower back and on the right side of the lower base of her neck and immediately lost consciousness. The doctors later told her that the axe narrowly missed her jugular nerve. Then she lost a lot of blood to the point where she was very dark and unrecognizable by fellow students, by the time she was found and rescued by the Zimbabwean soldiers the next morning. The participant was airlifted by helicopter to the capital city of Harare for medical treatment where she regained consciousness.

Her experience left her with physical, emotional and mental scars. The physical injuries she sustained from the attack left her with temporal multiple disabilities. She was visually impaired for a while; she was unable to walk and talk coherently for over 3 months after the incident. She stated that she had to learn to write her name again on the get well soon cards which she received during her lengthy hospital stay. She had to regain her speech and her ability to walk through therapy. However, in addition to the physical injuries, she suffered from a mental disorder. She narrated that during her recovery she stated that she had episodes of post-traumatic stress disorder where she could wake up in the middle of the night and start running in the hospital corridors screaming, "*Matsanga ari kuuya! Matsanga ari kuuya!*" (The RENAMO rebels are coming!). In response to this, the hospital staff had to dress her in a straitjacket so as to prevent her from harming herself. The attack disrupted her education for the next 6 years. At the time of the attack, she was in the process of writing her Ordinary level ZIMSEC (Zimbabwe School Examination Council) exams. She was only able to complete her exams in 1993 when she fully recovered.

This case brings insight into the short and long-term effects of these incursions by the RENAMO rebels on the residents of the Chipinge community. The attacks on the community left deep physical, psychological and emotional scars upon the community members.

Similar attacks were also waged upon other Zimbabwean communities along the border such as Chiredzi town in which 10 innocent civilians were killed by the rebels (Chimanikire 1999:10).

It is important to note that the methods used in these killings were similar to the methods that the RENAMO rebels were also using on their fellow Mozambicans. *The Manica Post* of 13 November 1987 (just a week before the attack on Jersey primary school) had a front-page story of a reign of terror being committed by the RENAMO rebels in the Nhamatanda town in Sofala province of Mozambique. The victims of this terror had reported that the rebels were murdering the residents of the area in cold blood.

As mentioned earlier, these killings became common during the period 1986-1989 and can be explained in two ways. First, the RENAMO rebels were responding to the increased involvement of the ZDF in the Mozambican civil war. The involvement of the ZDF officially began in 1985 when Samora Machel formally requested assistance from the Zimbabwe government. However, according to Mlambo (1999), the Zimbabwean army had begun its operations in Mozambique clandestinely since 1982. The request by Machel at this point in time followed the increase in strength of the RENAMO rebels. The essence of this development was captured well by the journalists of international media houses at the time. Much as the articles were written more than 30 years ago and might be considered outdated in academic circles, they serve the purpose of giving insight into the RENAMO incursions at that particular time in history. Sparks (1986) wrote an article in *The Washington Post* regarding the conflict and stated that in 1986 the operations of the RENAMO rebels were becoming intense and extensive. At that time they had managed to capture the greater part of Mozambique's central province and they were on the verge of cutting the country in half whereby RENAMO would now be fully in control of the northern part of Mozambique whilst the FRELIMO government was reduced to governing the southern half only. In another newspaper article of the time, journalist Sheil Rule wrote a special report to *The New York Times* (1987) on the subject and stated that the RENAMO rebels had ballooned to 20 000 from 2 000 in the late 1970s. She also mentions that at this point in time the rebels were stepping up the raids on Zimbabwean communities. Two incidents were happening every week and these incidents involved kidnapping, assault, the killing of civilians, killing militiamen, looting stores, setting tea factories alight and laying landmines.

A second explanation is that Zimbabwean communities along the border were accommodating the Mozambican refugees. The RENAMO rebels required these refugees to provide the rebels with basic necessities such as food, medicine, and clothing. Much as there was the Tongogara refugee camp set up in Zimbabwe for the Mozambican refugees, most of them did not proceed to this camp as they had relatives residing along the border on the Zimbabwean side. The Zimbabwean communities also offered the accommodation just like the Mozambicans had accommodated them during the second Chimurenga liberation struggle.

6.5 Landmines

RENAMO forces planted landmines in communities such as Mugondi and Chitarara along the border with Mozambique. One female participant, a child at the time of these landmine incidents residing in the nearby tea estates, recalled hearing explosions coming from the border area. She stated that the victims of these explosions would be rushed to one of the clinics in the estates for treatment. Some died whilst others would become permanently disabled after losing their limbs. The participants also indicated that in 2016 there was a case of a boy who lost three fingers during a landmine incident. Finding Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) and Exploded Remnants of War (ERWs) was a common sight even in their crop fields. The participants indicated that these areas were targeted as they used to have a lot of ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas in the area and thus the RENAMO rebels who were under the patronage of the Rhodesian governments at the time, planted the mines to discourage the guerilla activity in the area.

The claims of the participants were triangulated with other sources and discovered to be true. *The Manica Post* archives, for instance, have articles, which reported landmine incidents, which were happening along with the communities of the border. For instance, *The Manica Post* issue of Friday, 19 December 1980 had a front-page story of two men who had detonated a landmine in the Birkley South area whilst using one of the many paths to cross the border. One of the victims lost a leg whilst the other was instantly blinded by the blast. Nehanda Radio (2018) had a story of a woman from Jersey Tea

Estate in Chipinge who lost her leg after stepping on a landmine in 1979. *Pindula News Report* of 11 August 2017 revealed that 18 people in Manicaland had lost their lives in landmine incidents during the period 2012-2019; 12 others were injured. This led to the launch of the anti-personnel landmine campaign by the Zimbabwe National Army in 10 schools located in Chimanimani, Chipinge and Buhera districts. During the process of triangulation, I then discovered that the problem of landmines is not unique to Chipinge district only or Manicaland province only. *The Sunday Mail* of 13 April 2014 had a report of a location known as Mukumbura, in Mashonaland Central (382 km northeast of Harare) along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, 410 people were reported to have been maimed by landmines during the 1980s-1990s. The minefield in the area is 25km long and is half kilometer wide.

Many scholars and journalists have documented the menace of landmines faced by Zimbabwean border communities. Hove (2012:201) and Sadomba (2005:638) state that in south-east Zimbabwe alone 53 people have been killed and 260 injured in landmine incidents since 1980 in an area stretching for 61km. Human Rights Watch report (1994: 19) confirms this and states that the Zimbabwean-Mozambique border is one of the most land-mined areas alongside Sofala province, Maputo, Manica, and Inhambane. Anti-tank mines are the most common landmines found in the area. During a hand over ceremony of a landmine cleared area in Manicaland, *Newsday* journalist Nyangani (2019) interviewed Zimbabwe's Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri. In the interview, the minister stated that despite the spirited efforts to demine the border region, three million anti-personnel mines were still buried in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands region, also known as Manicaland province, of which Chipinge district is a part of. She went on to state that the mined area covers an 850km radius and the people in that area do not have freedom of movement, socialization and communication with their relatives (ibid).

The Halo Trust demining organization (2020) posits that the issue of landmines affects 75 000 households and 87 communities, which puts the Zimbabwean border region in the 'heavy' category of landmine contamination. It shares this category with countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Mine Action

Review (2018:282) states that 62 square kilometers/ 24 square miles are yet to be cleared in Zimbabwe at a cost of US\$ 122 million. This means that as much as a lot has been done in terms of demining, there is still a long way to go in clearing the affected communities along the border with Mozambique. The United States embassy in Zimbabwe (2015) donated US\$ 7.1 million for the clearance of mines over a period of 18 years. Much as this is a laudable gesture on the one hand, it is a drop in the ocean on the other, considering the estimated total cost of the whole exercise i.e. US\$122 million. This shows how much of a problem the land-mine issue is affecting Chipinge and other border communities along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. The Mozambican side of the border, however, has managed to clear virtually all the landmines that were planted during the civil war. Mozambique was declared landmine free in 2015 through the efforts of demining organizations such as Halo Trust, which cleared 80% of the landmines in Mozambique at a cost of US\$ 285 million. The remaining 20% was cleared by other demining organizations (Smith 2015).

These landmines have brought much suffering among the community members of Chipinge. Besides the deaths and injuries, they have also had far-reaching repercussions amongst the community members. They stated that these landmines continue to affect their livelihoods to this day through the depletion of their livestock and the inaccessibility to cultivation fields. Most of the victims of landmine incidents are the breadwinners of the family and thus they rob families of their livelihoods. The Chipinge community members also pointed out that because of these landmines they are separated from access to social amenities such as education, health, and water facilities. They end up having to use longer routes to access these facilities because the shorter routes are blocked by minefields. Furthermore, the participants noted that these landmines disrupt their family links with their relatives who dwell on the Mozambican side of the border. These pre-existing family ties already hindered by colonial borders are being further strained due to landmines. The Mine Action Group (MAG) website captures this situation and states that the landmines block access to residential land, they disrupt cross border trade, small-scale farming, primary water sources and livestock production.

The common narrative is that the Rhodesian forces planted the landmines during the period 1976-79. However, the less known fact is that these landmines were planted with the assistance of the RENAMO forces who were being supported by the Rhodesian government during that period. *Chiovelli et al* (2019: 7) state that the RENAMO forces with the help of the Rhodesian forces laid mines on both sides of the border to secure the border from the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas who were crossing the border into Rhodesia to wage their liberation struggle. RENAMO rebels acted as a proxy of the Rhodesian forces at the time with two main objectives. The first of these objectives was to conduct acts of sabotage against the newly independent FRELIMO led Mozambican government. Their second objective was to attack the bases of the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces being accommodated by the Mozambican government and fighting against the Rhodesian colonial regime. *Chiovelli et al* (2019:07) inform that the Rhodesian forces actually trained the RENAMO forces in the use of landmines. Thus, the landmine issue is not only a problem that can be traced back to the Rhodesian government only, the RENAMO rebels also had a part to play in the planting of the mines that continue to affect the Chipinge community along with other Zimbabwean communities along the border.

6.6 Forced Recruitment

Forced recruitment into RENAMO rebels, according to participants became common when the patronage of the RENAMO forces changed hands from Rhodesia to South Africa's Apartheid regime. This was at the time when the RENAMO operations expanded to cover most of Mozambique. *Chiovelli et al.* (2019:8) state that during this transition, the geographical coverage of the operations of RENAMO spread to many other parts of Mozambique such as Zambezia in the north, Sofala in the center and Inhambane in the south. Prior to this period, the RENAMO operations under the patronage of the Rhodesian forces were predominantly focused on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border region only. Commenting on the operations and size of the RENAMO forces at this time (1976-1979), Newitt (1995) states that the RENAMO forces were a mercenary unit of a white colonial army. Scholars such as Tavuyanago

(2011:44) and Hultman (2009: 826) concur that the RENAMO rebels were not more than 1 000 in number between the period 1976 and 1979. However, when the South African backing came in after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the numbers of the rebels increased greatly. Tavuyanago (2011:44) informs that the RENAMO rebels increased to 8000 in 1982, 10 000 in 1983 and 20 000 in 1990.

This expansion of operations undeniably left RENAMO rebels with a need for personnel so it began to embark on forced recruitment campaigns across the border into Zimbabwe. Chiovelli *et al.* (2019:08) indicate that there were some civilians who sympathized with RENAMO rebels and volunteered to join the RENAMO rebels. The sentiments of these sympathizers were based on their opposition to the FRELIMO policies in the rural areas such as the villagization, suppression of community leaders and customs. However, these numbers appear to be negligible to satisfy the demand for new recruits within the RENAMO rebels.

A key factor in the lack of recruits for RENAMO in Mozambican communities was the massive displacement of Mozambican civilians to countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Malawi. The Brogen project (2017) informs that during the Mozambican Civil War 1. 5 million citizens (10% of the population) fled to these neighboring countries. Displacement also happened internally within Mozambique itself. Igreja *et al* (n.d.) note that there was a massive forced displacement of Mozambican civilians from the rural areas into communal villages (*aldais comunais*) which were under the protection of FRELIMO forces. Chiovelli *et al* (2019:5) estimate that there were 1 266 of these communal villages and 2 million Mozambican nationals moved into them by 1981. These internal displacements worsened during the period 1987 onwards. From the historical perspective, this is the period in which RENAMO was at its most brutal and hence the intensification of these internal displacements.

Another factor that led to the shortage of recruits was the death toll among the Mozambican civilians due to the civil war. An estimated 1 million lives perished in the Mozambican civil war many due to the famine resulting from the war.

The participants stated that during attacks on the Chipinge community the RENAMO rebels would forcibly recruit youths from the Chipinge community. This issue of forced recruitment is also echoed by the study carried out by Mukonza (2016: 14) who states that in areas such as Mabeye and Tamandai in Chipinge suffered from RENAMO raids of male youths and young boys who were taken as child soldiers. Weistein (2007:4) confirms this and states that the RENAMO rebels forcibly recruited children. Robinson (2006: 72) explains that RENAMO's preference for child soldiers was based on the assumption that children are easier to brainwash, they are less constrained by conscience and they require fewer resources to maintain.

The demand for the recruits was also increased by the engagement of RENAMO rebels by the attacks being waged against them by the front-line states (i.e. Zimbabwe and Tanzania) following Samora Machel's formal request for assistance in 1985. Zimbabwe, for instance, increased the number of its forces operating in Mozambique from 10 000 in 1982 to 30 000 in 1985 Goncalves (1998:20). Furthermore, the geographical scope of the operations of the ZDF became extensive. At the beginning of the Zimbabwean intervention (circa 1982), the operations were limited to the protection of the Beira corridor and the oil pipeline. However, Mlambo (1999) details how from 1985 onwards these operations even reached far north as the Zambezia region as well as the Gorongosa camp in central Mozambican province of Sofala. The increment of these forces and operations meant that the RENAMO rebels were tied down with these new engagements and thus increasing the need for more recruits.

When one combines all these figures of Mozambican refugees (1, 5 million), deaths (1 million) and internally displaced (2 million), as many as 4.5 million or 34 % of the Mozambican civilians who were unavailable to the RENAMO recruitment and forced labor needs. Hence the incursions into Zimbabwe to try to meet these needs.

It may be noted that the RENAMO forces considered themselves to be descendants of the Ndau tribe which dwells in the Chipinge area in Zimbabwe and thus this could have been a factor in forced recruitment (Robson 2006:62).

It appears the RENAMO rebels expected the Chipinge community members to support their cause. This forced recruitment led to a state of fear among the youth leading some of them to flee from Chipinge and seek protection elsewhere. This left the community at even more danger of attacks from the RENAMO forces and their inability to defend themselves.

6.7 Sexual Violence

The female participants of the research indicated that they suffered sexual violence during the days of the RENAMO incursions into the Chipinge community. However, this is a sensitive topic among the community members both male and female. The male participants seemed reluctant to acknowledge the occurrences of these cases among the female members of the community because this indicated a failure of the male community members to protect their women and ultimately their community. It seemed to be a dent on their masculinities. On the female side, their reluctance was out of fear of stigmatization from the community. Open discussions of sexual violence or anything sexually related remains taboo in Zimbabwe to this day, more so in rural communities, which are deeply rooted in traditional African culture and are thus very conservative and secretive. This is one of the main reasons why the focus group discussions had to be divided along gender lines and facilitated by a female person to help the female participants to feel comfortable enough to share their experiences during the RENAMO incursions.

The female facilitator was a health worker in Chipinge town who was in the area at the time of the FGDs. I had asked her to acquire all the minute details of the cases in order to drive my point home and strengthen my argument. However, she cautioned me on the need to handle with care the information regarding survivors of sexual violence. She went on to educate me on the trauma which survivors of sexual violence go through in the aftermath of their ordeals. She even said that people who experienced sexual violence are not referred to as victims, but rather as survivors.

This was a lesson learned on my part, to balance the demands of my evidence-based research with the interests of the humanity of the participants. This led

me to the idea of putting a disclaimer in this chapter before the discussion of these cases. The disclaimer is to the effect **that the details of these cases of sexual violence have been watered down due to the sensitive nature of the issue and in the interests of protecting the identity and dignity of the survivors of the sexual violence** perpetrated by RENAMO rebels.

Cases of sexual violence were reported especially during the RENAMO incursions in the 1980s especially after the intensification of the military operations of the ZDF in Mozambique. The female participants stated that there had been no cases of sexual violence reported when the conflict flared up again (2013-2016). The sexual violence was perpetrated for different reasons. Chief among these reasons was the need to punish Zimbabweans for the interference of the ZDF into the Mozambican conflict and specifically targeting the RENAMO rebels. The other reason behind the sexual violence was to punish the Chipinge community for not supporting the RENAMO war effort. As stated earlier, the participants informed that sometimes the RENAMO rebels sent a letter to inform the Chipinge community members of the support they needed, usually in the form of food supplies. Sometimes the community members failed to comply with the demands of these letters and this resulted in the RENAMO raids in which women were targeted for rape along with a host of other forms of violence alluded to earlier. This is similar to the reasons why the RENAMO rebels committed extrajudicial killings amongst the Chipinge community members.

Female participants who experienced these attacks detailed how they fled their homes from the RENAMO rebels and hid in the nearby bushes. One of the female participants, who resided in Gwenzi village, had a baby who was merely days old at the time of one of these attacks and had to hide in a nearby bush. She had to give tea to her baby to avoid him from crying and attracting the attention of the rebels. She said even dogs were not allowed within the vicinity of their hideouts.

Mukonza (2016: 26) concurs with these assertions and states that the RENAMO forces committed sexual violence in the Chipinge community during their incursions. She also found that some of the sexual violence cases

reported were committed by Chipinge community men who were taking advantage of the instability created by the incursions of the RENAMO rebels. This sexual violence led to the birth of children sired between the RENAMO rebels and the women in the Chipinge community and the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Some marriages were broken due to these rape cases as rape is considered a taboo in the Chipinge community and Zimbabwe at large. Their husbands shunned some of the survivors. The survivors of sexual violence did not get any assistance other than that from local clinics e.g. Clinical Management of Rape (CMR) or psychosocial support to assist them to cope with the ordeal and its repercussions.

It is important to note that sexual violence was part and parcel of the RENAMO war strategy and was widespread in Mozambique as well. The evidence of this practice is well documented by several academics and scholars. Dava *et al* (2013:70) allude that sexual violence was common in areas, which the RENAMO rebels attacked. He states that the violence was meant to prove to the community members of the incapacity of the FRELIMO government to protect them. It was also used to coerce the community members into supporting their war effort. Chiovelli *et al.* (2019:09) argue that sexual violence was an integral part of the RENAMO strategy of terror. They also point out that (*ibid*: 15) tens of thousands of women were subjected to sexual violence by the rebels.

This inhumane strategy of the RENAMO rebels inducts them into the hall of shame with other rebel groups such as the M23, Boko Haram and Al Shabab, which use rape as a weapon of war.

6.8 Conclusion

From the data collected from the research participants, it is evident that the nature of the violence suffered by the Chipinge community was multi-faceted. The violence was in the form of abductions, forced recruitment, sexual violence, extra-judicial killings, and landmines. This violence led to both physical, mental and emotional scars some of which the communities are still dealing with up to this day. It was deemed important to explore these experiences of the community, as they are not apparent on the surface, rather

they are embedded deep in the psyche of the community as is true to form of the Zimbabwean culture. Unpleasant experiences are seldom relived or spoken about, rather they are swept under the carpet in an attempt to simply forget about them and move on. However, in my view, this approach to violence is rather problematic in that it even opens up the community to such violence happening again in the future. This study meant to revive these experiences so as to find the best way to equip these communities with skills to avoid this violence from affecting their community again. The next chapter will thus focus on the responses of the government and the community to this violence.

CHAPTER 7: EXPLORATION II: COMMUNITY & GoZ RESPONSE

7.1 Introduction

This chapter primarily focuses on presenting the data that addressed the second objective of my research, to analyze the initiatives taken by the Chipinge community and the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to address the incursions of the RENAMO rebels and their effects. This was done in an attempt to better understand the reasons why the Chipinge community continues to be deeply affected by the incursions. This approach was also done in order to gauge how prepared the government and community are should similar incursions recur in the future. I found this to be particularly important considering how unstable the political situation in Mozambique has proven itself to be.

From the research findings, it became clear that the Chipinge community did not take any initiatives to shield itself from the violence of the RENAMO rebels. The community did not take any steps to address the conflict rather the community placed all its faith in the government. The community does have traditional structures to address any issue arising within the community; however, these structures appeared incapacitated to deal with the RENAMO issue. On the other hand, the Zimbabwean government adopted a military stance towards the RENAMO incursions. However, this approach worsened the incursions into the Chipinge community. Whilst the Zimbabwean troops were deployed in Mozambique, it left the communities along the border such as Chipinge exposed and vulnerable to the attacks by RENAMO rebels. In addition to the military approach, the government also referred the issue to the Civil Protection Unit (CPU). However, the CPU was found to be wanting with regards to its capacity of addressing the issues of the RENAMO rebels especially during the second outbreak of hostilities. The chapter ends on the note that since the government and the community faced challenges regarding the mitigation of transboundary violence, it was prudent for the community to take the initiative and equip itself with skills to foresee such attacks and take

precautionary measures to minimize the effects of the violence within the community.

7.2 Community Initiatives

The participants stated that the community did not take any initiatives with regards to addressing the RENAMO incursions. The best that they did was either to approach other community members when the RENAMO rebels sent letters demanding food items from the community or to simply flee into the nearby bushes. Chief Gwenzi of Gwenzi village stated that they did this at night and would then return to their respective homes during the day to get fresh supplies and check if any damage was done or property stolen. Furthermore, the community members would also accommodate the refugees that crossed the border into the Chipinge community. Much as there was the Tongogara refugee camp set up by the Zimbabwean government during the first Mozambican Civil War, the Mozambican refugees were reluctant to be accommodated in the camp due to the fear of being repatriated back to Mozambique. The community members also accommodated the Mozambican refugees because of the pre-existing relations between the two communities. Both the Mozambican and Zimbabwean communities used to be one big community prior to the advent of colonialism. There are chiefs, such as Chief Mapungwana in Chipinge who are in Zimbabwe but their subjects are on the Mozambican side of the border. The participants stated that besides the relations between the two communities, the Mozambicans had also accommodated them during the time of the Zimbabwean Second Chimurenga (liberation struggle) in the 1970s. During this era, the Zimbabwean nationals had gone to seek refuge in Mozambique in the same way that the Mozambicans were now seeking refuge in Zimbabwe.

I inquired further from the research participants why their respective communities did not take any initiatives regarding the violence from the RENAMO rebels. They attributed this to two issues. The first issue was the dysfunctionality of their community engagement structures. They stated that the community members have become fatigued about these structures due to the lack of implementation of the recommendations or the lack of response to

the requests they make at any level of these structures. Some of these committees have not met for months due to this fatigue of empty promises. This is one of the factors that led to the absence of initiatives among community members regarding the RENAMO incursions.

These community engagement structures run from the grassroots to the national level as illustrated below:

7.3 Structure of Zimbabwean Development Committees



Figure 10. Structure of Zimbabwe Developing Communities (Source: Zimbabwe Prime Minister's Directive 1985)

The Zimbabwean government in 1985 through the Prime Minister's Directive established these structures. They were part of the decentralization drive, which the government purported to implement at the time. These structures were meant to facilitate democracy and engagement between community members and their local authorities at all levels. However, an earlier study I conducted of these structures (Muchanyuka 2016:113) proved that indeed these structures were not functional. This was due to a lack of political will in terms of the functionality of these structures. I established that these structures merely appeared on paper only. There was a difference between what the government was saying and what it was actually doing. Much as the

government has been preaching about decentralization since 1985, it is yet to implement 34 years later. Besides the study and conclusion that I reached, there were also other studies, which reached the same conclusion. Kurebwa (2015:106) describes VIDCOs as empty shells. He also notes that the RRDCs do not have any power in them as all the power is vested in the appointed officials in the central government. Jonga (2014:75) also attributed the decadence of these structures of local governance in Zimbabwe to the abuse of power by the appointed officials in the Ministry of Local Government. Thus, the Chipinge community members are not able to do much as the structures are bereft of any political power. The local and government authorities whom they deal with are accountable to the government, which appoints them and not the community members.

The research stated that the other factor, which stifled the spirit of initiatives among them, is that the political environment in Zimbabwe since independence frowns upon such initiatives. The political environment remains highly sensitive to any form of opposition. They stated that such initiatives could be seen as challenging the authority of the political establishment. One of the male research participants stated that making any suggestions to the local authorities was seen as challenging the government. He stated that such initiatives could be misconstrued as claims of the government failure and in the 1980s one could even be labeled as a *Mutengesesi* or sell out of the liberation struggle whilst after 1999 one could be labeled as a member of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party which was formed around that time. He stated that such labels could put an entire family or even community in danger of attacks from the government itself.

I further investigated this notion raised by the community members of whether the fear of political violence was perceived or it was real. I then established that the Chipinge community had indeed suffered from political violence in addition to the violence they had already been subjected to by the RENAMO rebels. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO forum's *Political Violence Report* (2008:12) states how the police were detaining opposition activists in Chipinge unlawfully. Heal Zimbabwe Trust (2010) had a report of a Chipinge woman whose hut was burnt to ashes by youth militias. The article further informs that

the Chipinge community had been affected by political violence to the extent that some of them were displaced temporarily (ibid). However, when the cases of political violence in Chipinge are juxtaposed with other locations in Zimbabwe such as Harare, they are found to be relatively low, but then the political violence from these other locations beyond Chipinge assisted in spreading the fear among its community members.

In addition to the claims made by the participants, it is important to be cognizant of the general climate of the Zimbabwean political environment. It is not an environment in which democracy thrives rather it is an environment replete with political violence and human rights abuses. This has been well documented by several other studies over the years. Political violence has marred post-independence Zimbabwean history. This violence has been a carryover of the violence suffered by the Zimbabweans during the colonial era. Some of the notable examples of political violence include the *Gukurahundi* massacres in the Matebeleland and Midlands regions (1983-1987) in which 20 000 people were killed as well as the pre and post-electoral violence, which has characterized all the elections held from 2000 to 2018.

In addition to political violence, the government has viciously cracked down on activists. There have been numerous cases of the disappearances, torture, and abductions of activists in Zimbabwe. Activists such as Itai Dzamara disappeared without a trace in March 2015. He was a vocal critic of the late former president Robert Mugabe's administration. Other activists who were abducted and tortured include:

- Evan Mawarire of the This Flag movement
- Dr. Peter Magumbeyi acting president of the Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association (ZHDA)
- Jestina Mukoko Director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project
- Promise Mkwanzani leader of the Tajamuka movement
- Beatrice Mtetwa a human rights lawyer
- Violet Gonda a journalist

These are some of the many who have paid dearly for challenging the government. Even comedians are not safe, renowned Zimbabwean comedian

Samantha Kureya known as Gonyeti was abducted and tortured for several hours in August 2019. Her abductors undressed her, made her drink and roll in sewage water before releasing her (Newsnet 2019). Makumbe (2009:01) noted that since 2000, Zimbabwe had moved several steps backward in the realization of democracy.

I took a step back to reflect on this cancer of democratic intolerance in Zimbabwe. From the literature that I read, I reached the conclusion that the government's intolerance of democracy and activism seems to have worsened after 1999. Prior to this period, the government's intolerance for a multi-party democracy was evident through its efforts to create a one-party state. This was achieved through the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987 in which ZANU PF absorbed PF ZAPU. However, this intolerance became more pronounced due to the steady growth of the citizens' disgruntlement with the government during the 1990s. The disgruntlement was evident through demonstrations such as the June 1992 march organized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union and the record-breaking eight-week public workers strike which was later joined by teachers, doctors, nurses and student groups (Saunders *et al.* 2009:10-11). In 1998, there were food riots in Harare and Chitungwiza (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 1998:14). The disgruntlement was primarily due to the effects of a drought in the early 90s as well as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which had a devastating impact on the economy. Companies liquidated, jobs were lost, unemployment was on the rise and so was the cost of living. Hove (*ibid*) notes that unemployment increased from 30 to 50%. The demonstrations held by the citizens against the economic downturn were violently repressed by the government. The government deployed soldiers to chase beat up and tear gas the protestors deployed riot police and even sometimes soldiers.

Regardless of the government's repression, the economic hardships of the 1990s culminated in the formation of an opposition party known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by the late Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai. The party rapidly gained a following owing to the economic hardships in Zimbabwe at the time. This massive support came to light during a referendum for a new constitution in February 2000. The MDC campaigned

against the acceptance of the new constitution resulting in a rejection of the constitution by 55% of the electorate. This came as a shock to the Mugabe administration, prior to the emergence of the MDC there had not been any formidable opposition movement. Of course there was the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led by the late Mr. Edgar Tekere, however, it did not gain much traction to pose a significant challenge to the incumbent government. Some scholars argue that in a bid to retain the support of the masses, the Mugabe administration embarked on the land reform program. However, the land reform was met with serious repercussions from the western countries. The repercussions were in the form of the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in March 2002 and the imposition of economic sanctions through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) by the American government in 2001.

These reactions from the western countries convinced the Mugabe administration that the western powers had a regime change agenda in Zimbabwe. This perception by the government led it to be suspicious of activists, opposition parties and non-governmental organizations. Anyone who opposed the government policies or actions was labeled as agents of the west's regime change agenda. The MDC, for instance, was seen as an avenue for the re-colonization of Zimbabwe by the West.

Given this scenario where the Chipinge community was stifled in terms of making any initiatives towards the RENAMO violence, the community members left the matter of the rebels to be handled by the government and the army lest their actions be misconstrued. They also hoped for the best in terms of the Rome peace process of 1992, however, in 2013, the community was proven wrong.

7.4 Government Responses

In response to the RENAMO incursions, the Zimbabwe government employed three approaches namely the armed response, the Rome Peace Process of 1992 and the Civil Protection Unit (CPU).

Armed response- I tried in vain to interview military officials regarding Zimbabwe's role during the Mozambican Civil Wars. I kept being referred to higher offices in the capital Harare, but to no avail. My request kept being turned down. However, I managed to gather the data required from archival material and other secondary sources. Through this material, I then discovered the reason behind the reluctance of the ZDF officials to give me an audience regarding the RENAMO issue. In the ZDF circles, the RENAMO topic is one that many would want to forget due to the experiences on the ground as will be discussed later.

From the data gathered, the Zimbabwean government dispatched its defense forces to curb the RENAMO ulcer. The forces included infantry, paratroopers and the air force. The president of Mozambique at the time the late Samora Machel formally requested military assistance from the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian governments in 1985. As explained earlier, this was at a time when the operations of the RENAMO rebels had become very widespread in Mozambique to the point of overwhelming the FRELIMO government. However, the ZDF had started military operations in Mozambique as far back as 1982. Dzimba (1998:75) clarifies that this was due to a pre-existing defense pact between the two nations (Zimbabwe and Mozambique) backdating to 1981. Furthermore, he adds that the involvement in the war was for Zimbabwe to return the favor of immense support granted to the Zimbabwean liberation forces by the Mozambican government together with other front-line states such as Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia during its liberation struggle.

The ZDF military operations were initially done in an attempt to safeguard the Beira corridor the Zimbabwean lifeline to the Indian Ocean through the port of Beira. Mlambo (1999) states that the corridor is of crucial importance as it contains the Beira-Feruka oil pipeline, a power line, railway and road all of which connect the city of Mutare in Zimbabwe to Beira in Mozambique.

However, after 1985 the involvement of the ZDF became intensive and extensive. The operations were no longer just limited to the Beira corridor they even reached parts of central and northern Mozambique. The operations now involved attacking RENAMO bases such as Gorongosa and Muxaba,

liberating territories that had been captured by the RENAMO rebels such as Caia, Mutarara and Sena as well as even rescuing FRELIMO forces when they came under attack of the RENAMO forces. Mlambo (1999) details how the ZDF embarked on several military operations into Mozambique as illustrated below:

Table 4. ZDF Military Operations in Mozambique (1980-1990)

Name of Operation	Date	Location	Country
Lemon	December 1984	Northern Manicaland	Zimbabwe
Grape Fruit	August 1985	Muxaba, Casa Banana	Mozambique
Octopus	January 1986	Southern Zambezi area	Mozambique
Zero	February 1986	Casa Banana	Mozambique
Ndonga-Chirenje	June 1990	Mepunga and Djambe	Mozambique

The table above shows how the operations of the ZDF became more extensive and frequent after 1985. The gesture by the Zimbabwean government through the ZDF to intervene in the Mozambican civil war was noble. However, the ZDF did not manage to effectively deal with the RENAMO threat. Mlambo (1999) states that much as the ZDF managed to win many battles against the RENAMO rebels it did not manage to incapacitate them. He equates the whole affair to America's ill-fated involvement in the Vietnam War (1956-1975). He states that the rate of the killing of RENAMO rebels was very low especially considering the effort put in the operation. During the attacks on the Muxamba and Gorongosa bases, the ZDF managed to kill only 200 RENAMO rebels out of 1600 rebels who were suspected to be present at both bases. During the recapture of Casa Banana not a single RENAMO rebel was captured, injured or killed. Furthermore, the FRELIMO forces were no match against the RENAMO forces. This presented a complication to the ZDF forces in that some of their victories were quickly reversed. The RENAMO rebels in a

matter of days would recapture the bases or towns captured and handed over by the ZDF to the FRELIMO forces. A 1986 Washington Post article written by Allister Sparks stated that Casa Banana was captured by the ZDF in August 1985 and handed over to the FRELIMO forces; however, the RENAMO rebels managed to recapture it from the FRELIMO forces. The ZDF had to launch a second raid to recapture Casa Banana in February 1986. The combination of the elusive nature of the RENAMO rebels and the incapacity of the FRELIMO forces ended up over-stretching the ZDF as well.

Above all, the intervention of the ZDF did not manage to resolve the RENAMO incursions into Zimbabwe. The incursions actually became worse due to the ZDF's military intervention. Sheila Rule's Special Report to *The New York Times* in 1987 noted that the RENAMO rebels had stepped up their incursions into Zimbabwe. She stated that two incidents were happening on a weekly basis with the main targets being the Chipinge tea estates. It was after the ZDF's intervention that most of the RENAMO atrocities noted in the previous chapter were committed. These atrocities involved abductions, killings, looting, and sexual violence. The atrocities were committed as a way of punishing the ZDF for their interference into the Mozambican Civil War. This is the message that was spread by the RENAMO forces to the victims of its atrocities as noted in the previous chapter. Thus, the ZDF's pursuit of the RENAMO rebels into Mozambique left the communities along the border vulnerable to attacks by the same rebels.

The research participants indicated that there were Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) units patrolling the border however, they were not effective due to the mountainous and undulating terrain of the border region. This worsened the porous nature of the border and gave an opportunity to the rebels to attack the communities. Mlambo (1999) offers another explanation and attributes the attacks on the border community on the fact that the ZDF operations in Mozambique had overstretched its capacities. He states that all the other activities of the ZNA ceased even training, due to the intervention. Dzimba (1998:80) concurs with the argument and adds that the Zimbabwean government had to rely on the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM) due to the over-commitment of the ZNA in Mozambique. He further adds that the ZPM

failed to cover the gap left by the ZNA as it was paralyzed by a lack of financial resources to fund its activities. This proves that the GoZ intervention in the Mozambique Civil War was not only draining the ZDF, the intervention was having a similar effect on the GoZ coffers. The Zimbabwean government did not formally disclose the actual cost of the war however; some estimates go as high as US\$5 million per month. Dzimba (1998:80) points out that the expenditure for the war became even more than that of education and development planning.

In light of the challenges associated with the armed response to the RENAMO incursions, it is safe to conclude that it was ineffective in its attempt to curb them. The response failed to incapacitate the RENAMO operations in Mozambique. Once their bases or towns were attacked, the rebels managed to elude the ZDF forces, move further north and later recapture their bases and towns from the FRELIMO forces. The armed approach exposed the Zimbabwean communities along the border to more vicious attacks by the RENAMO rebels. However, it is also important to note that the protection of the communities along the border was not the primary concern of the ZDF's pursuit of the RENAMO rebels. The main objective was the protection of the Beira corridor and its assert, the secondary objective was to return the favor to the Mozambicans for the support they had given the Zimbabwean liberation forces during the time of Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation. The protection of the communities dwelling along the border was a marginal concern to the government and the army, which might explain the lackluster response to the plight of these communities.

Rome Peace Process (1992) – Zimbabwe was one of the mediators during the Rome Peace Process of 1992. The peace process eventually settled the hostilities between the RENAMO rebels and the FRELIMO government. Muchemwa and Harris (2018:5-7) detail how the resulting peace deal had seven protocols. The protocols mapped the way that the former belligerents (FRELIMO and RENAMO) were to form political parties, hold elections, conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and cease the war. The peace deal even planned how the donor community would raise money to finance the implementation of the peace deal. The international community

hailed the Rome peace deal; it led to Mozambique's first democratic elections of October 1994. FRELIMO under Joachim Chissano won the elections with a 53.3% margin whilst RENAMO under Afonso Dhlakama managed to garner 33.7% of the votes (Robson 2006:72). Thereafter, elections were held religiously after every 5 years and power was transferred peacefully to new presidents.

Regalia (2017:08) posits that the peace deal was perceived to be an ideal example of the liberal peacebuilding mechanism. Muchemwa and Harris (2018:07) add that the peace deal was seen as a success story. Manning (2015) further notes that the treaty was a striking model of peacebuilding and democracy. Stuster (2013) labeled it Africa's most successful peace treaty.

However, in 2013, nearly 21 years after the signing of the peace deal, RENAMO withdrew from the peace treaty and resumed armed violence in Mozambique. This development saw RENAMO attacking Mozambique's strategic infrastructure such as railways, 10 000 civilians once again fleeing Mozambique to neighboring states such as Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Regalia 2017:08). As noted in the literature review section, the incursions of the RENAMO rebels into the Zimbabwean communities along the border resumed although at a lesser intensity. This shows that the Rome peace deal of 1992 was not effective in terms of resolving the conflict between the RENAMO and the FRELIMO forces. It was also not effective in eliminating the incursions of the RENAMO forces into Zimbabwean communities.

The withdrawal of RENAMO from the peace deal is indicative of the structural flaws of the peace treaty itself. The treaty looked good on paper but proved a challenge to implement on the ground. The treaty glossed over many vital issues that were pertinent to the resolution of the RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict. Some of these issues include a clear road map towards restorative justice and reconciliation between the two belligerents. The war crimes were simply swept under the carpet. This resulted in the achievement of negative peace. This means that the conflict was stopped, but the root causes and the effects of that conflict were not attended to. Muchemwa and Harris (2018:03) define negative peace as the absence of war or direct physical violence without addressing the

unjust relationships. In order for the conflict to have been resolved effectively what was required was positive peace. Positive peace goes beyond addressing physical violence it even deals with the structural violence as well i.e. unjust relationships. Galtung and Fischer (2013:173-74) define positive peace as the absence of unjust, unequal relationships. It promotes social justice, equal relationships and inner peace at the individual level. Thus, it is no surprise that the Mozambican conflict recurred after the Rome peace process of 1992.

Reppel *et al.* (2016:01) attribute the resurgence of the Mozambican civil war to the emergence of new challenges and the mal-implementation of the Rome peace deal. In particular, she referred to the lethargic pace of the integration of RENAMO rebels into the Mozambican army, navy and air force as stipulated in the fourth protocol of the Rome peace deal. Muchemwa and Harris (2018:08) note that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration) process was not done well. They state that the war veterans were simply sent home and given a salary for 2 years. The soldiers and rebels were not properly re-integrated into society. There was no psychological disarmament thus the war veterans remained deeply entrenched in the culture of violence they were used to. Muchemwa and Harris (2018:03) trace the origins of this culture of violence to the Mozambican colonial era under the Portuguese. They state that the Portuguese colonial authorities were very brutal and this culture of violence was passed on to the Mozambican nationals.

Azevedo-Harman (2015:139-143) attributes the conflict to the cloudy democratic prospects in Mozambique. She equally places the blame on the shortcomings of both RENAMO and FRELIMO. She points out that FRELIMO nominally adopted multi-party politics and yet, in essence, it was still suppressing journalists and the opposition. She pointed out that prior to the 2014 elections three prominent newspaper editors had been fired. She also points that prior to these elections FRELIMO had been monopolizing the state media and that the police force was pro-FRELIMO. Regarding RENAMO, she posits that it is a trigger-happy party, which has not really transformed into a regular political party but rather resorts to violence at the slightest provocation. Muchemwa (2018:13) concurs and adds that the FRELIMO government is still

preoccupied with a one-party state of mind. They further point out that, opponents to the FRELIMO government come under attack such as the killing of Giles Cistac a constitutional law professor in 2015 who was representing RENAMO on the issue of decentralization. Regarding RENAMO, Muchemwa and Harris (2018:09) note its reliance on military action to achieve its political objectives.

However, the failure of the Rome treaty of 1992 comes as no surprise considering that the GoZ itself does not have a track record of successfully settling its own internal conflicts. It is unfathomable for the treaty to have been a success when one of its mediators (GoZ) has failed to settle its own conflicts. This assertion emanates from the repeated failures of the GoZ to settle conflicts such as *Gukurahundi*, 2008 and 2018 political violence. The assertion also comes from the history of failed peace commissions in Zimbabwe since it attained independence.

Many scholars have debated about the *Gukurahundi* massacres that took place in Zimbabwe (1983-1987) such that it would not be prudent to delve deeper into it. Furthermore, it is not the focus of this study however; the manner in which the conflict was “settled” illustrates just how Zimbabwe was an ill-suited mediator during the Rome peace process. In brief, the massacres involved the slaughtering by the Korean trained fifth brigade army of an estimated 20 000 citizens from the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces. The massacres were done on the pretext that the GoZ intended to flush out dissidents who were predominantly ex-ZIPRA soldiers who had defected from the ZNA. However, a study conducted by Ngwenya (2014:28) indicated that the ZNA targeted civilians and not dissidents. He also detailed how (ibid: 26-27) the fifth brigade army committed heinous crimes against innocent civilians. He stated that the civilians were forced to kill each other, bark-like baboons, dig their own graves, commit incest, watch as their wives or mothers being raped and pregnant women were cut open. He also stated that (ibid: 15) despite the dead, the massacres left many people psychologically and emotionally traumatized; it destroyed livelihoods and strained the relations between the Ndebele and the Shona.

The GoZ settled this conflict through the Unity Accord signed between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU on 22 December 1987. The Unity Accord managed to end the active conflict that was happening in the Matebeleland and Midlands regions. Among some of its achievements, Todd (2007:35) identifies that the Unity Accord established a one-party state in Zimbabwe with PF ZAPU becoming part of ZANU PF under the leadership of the late former President Robert Mugabe. It also gave some cabinet posts to members of PF ZAPU e.g. Dr. Joshua Nkomo became the second Vice President of Zimbabwe. However, the accord did not manage to address the root causes and effects of the conflict, in essence, the Unity Accord achieved negative peace similar to what the Rome Peace Process achieved in Mozambique.

Dube and Makwerere (2012:298), Muchemwa (2015:109) and Tshuma (2018) critique the Unity Accord as being elitist in nature. It did not involve the masses who suffered at the hands of the fifth brigade army. Muchemwa *et al* (2013: 08) also points out that the Unity Accord did not make an effort to reconcile the victims and the offenders. The report of the massacres was never made public and in 1988, the belligerents of the massacres were pardoned of all the atrocities committed during the *Gukurahundi* period (1983-1987). To the victims, this was perceived as a reward to the perpetrators. To them, the Unity Accord was a betrayal of the victims of the *Gukurahundi* victims. They asserted that without the actual truth of what transpired being publicly acknowledged it will be difficult for genuine reconciliation to take place. Mashingaidze (2005:88) proffers that the proper steps, which the accord should have taken, are:

- Power-sharing agreements.
- The psychological rebuilding of survivors through truth and reconciliation commissions.
- Economic development through compensation of survivors.

Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003:117) adds that post-conflict reconstruction requires the truth to be told officially, damages to be paid, the guilty recognized publicly and punished whilst the victims are restored their honor through remembering their names on memorial stones and literature.

The Unity Accord was a failure in achieving positive peace in Zimbabwe. Unlike in Mozambique, the failure of the treaty is not seen through a resurgence of physical confrontation, but rather through the quality of socio-political relations between the Shona and Ndebele communities post-Unity Accord phase. Politically, failure of the accord is evident through

- The revival of ZAPU under Dumiso Dabengwa in December 2008. It is interesting to note that this happened 21 years after the signing of the Unity Accord similar to the withdrawal of RENAMO from the Rome peace process 21 years after it was signed.
- The mushrooming of secessionist parties among the Ndebele such as the Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF) and pressure groups such as Mthwakazi Action Group on Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Matebeleland and Midlands (Muchemwa 2015:112).
- The voting patterns of the Ndebele community. Mashingaidze (2005:87) posits ZANU PF has not won elections in the Matebeleland between 1995 and 2005. He stated that prior to 1995 ZANU PF had won elections due to the respect that Dr. Joshua Nkomo held among the Ndebele community. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2011) concurs and states that the Matebeleland had become an opposition strong base following the death of Nkomo in July 1999.

Socially, the failure of the Unity Accord can be seen through: the jeering and the lyrics of such well-known songs sung by the Highlanders supporters (predominantly Ndebele) at soccer matches against Dynamos supporters (Muchemwa 2015:153). It can also be seen through the bitter sentiments expressed by the members of the Ndebele community at the funeral of former ZAPU leader Dumiso Dabengwa on June 01, 2019. They booed the government official assigned by the president to speak at the event.

The inadequacy of the GoZ to settle conflicts is evident in its failed peace commissions such as the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). The ONHR was formed during the Government of National Unity (2009-2013) between ZANU PF and two MDC factions under the late Morgan

Tsvangirai and former deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara. The ONHRI was established under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2009. Its primary objective was enshrined in the seventh article of the GPA, which was to deal with the conflicts of pre and post-independence in Zimbabwe.

However, like other past efforts to settle conflicts in Zimbabwe, it failed to deliver its mandate. The ONHRI was haunted by the same challenges that had affected past peace efforts such as the Unity Accord of 1987. Muchemwa *et al* (2013:02) lament that the ONHRI failed because it was a top-down, state-centric and state propelled effort. It did not involve the masses who were affected by the violence. Dube and Makwerere (2012: 302) assert that the ONHRI failed due to the absence of a legally binding framework and support from senior politicians.

The NPRC has just recently started, but its flaws have already manifested and this minimizes the chances of it achieving what the other peace commissions failed to achieve. Legally, the NPRC was established by Zimbabwe's constitution of 2013 (Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013:98-100) however the commissioners were only chosen in 2016 and the bill passed into law in January 2018. The commission's mandate according to section 252 of the act is to promote justice, national healing, reconciliation and facilitate dialogue among disputing parties (National Peace and Reconciliation Act 2018:184). The commission wants to involve the grassroots through the formation of peace committees at national, provincial and district levels. It is also encouraging people to tell the truth about the past. This is an improvement from the top-down approaches to peace done in the past. The commission intends to exhume the bodies of those buried in mass graves to give them a proper burial. There have also been talks about compensating those whose livelihoods were affected by the massacres (*Zimbabwe Situation*: April 16, 2019).

However, despite some of the notable efforts of the commission, once again this seems to be a façade considering the lack of support for the NPRC cause from the political front. The five-year delay in the establishment of the commission indicates a lack of political commitment from the GoZ, as was the

case with the ONHRI and Unity Accord. Furthermore, section 10 of the NPRC act authorizes the blockage of investigations by the Minister of National Security if they are against the interests of the state. Furthermore, the former Minister of Home Affairs was quoted by the media to have said that there was no need to apologize for the massacres. He stated that the Gukurahundi massacres were a closed chapter and that ZANU PF and PF ZAPU had signed the Unity Accord in 1987 (*The Standard*: 4 August 2019).

The lack of support also comes from within the NPRC itself. During independence celebrations held in Gwanda in April 2019, the Chairperson of the Commission was quoted by the media to have said that the reports from the Dumbutshena and Chihambakwe inquiries into the Entumbane disturbances and the Gukurahundi massacres were lost (*Newsday* 22 April 2019). The NPRC later distanced itself from this statement; however, the damage had already been done. Despite the retraction of the statement by the NPRC, the Gukurahundi and Entumbane reports have still not been released to the public and there has been no word regarding any plans to release the reports. This dampens all the efforts of the commission, as the public simply perceives it as a lack of sincerity in the whole exercise. This explains why the Mthwakazi activists have been repeatedly disrupting the NPRC consultative meetings on the Gukurahundi issue (*Newsday*: 21 February 2019).

The incapacity of the NPRC is also seen in its failure to intervene in the recent political violence that has rocked Zimbabwe since the stepping down of the late former president Robert Mugabe. Murambadoro (2019) points out that had the NPRC been effective it would have intervened on August 1, 2018, violence in which six innocent civilians lost their lives at the hands of the military whilst protesting against election results. It also failed to intervene on January 14, 2019, protest in which eight unarmed civilians lost their lives while protesting against poor wages. It thus lays credence to the assertion that the NPRC is a dummy like the previous commissions. It is yet another attempt by the government to appear to be doing something about the massacres, political violence, etc. and yet, in reality, it is just stalling in bringing the perpetrators to justice.

Civil Protection Unit (CPU) - This was yet another avenue that the Zimbabwean government pursued to deal with the RENAMO incursions and their effects on the Zimbabwean communities along the border. The CPU was particularly active during the resurgence of the Mozambican conflict in 2013.

The unit is housed under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean Civil Protection Act Amendment of 2001 enacted it. The 2001 amendment was for the Civil Protection Act of 1989, which replaced the Civil Defense Act of 1982.

The original act of 1989 defines protection as “any service provided or measure taken for the purpose of preparing for, guarding against and dealing with any actual or potential disaster” (The Civil Protection Act 1989 : 19). The 2001 amendment elaborated on what entails a disaster and established the CPU itself. The CPU was established following an amendment to the Civil Protection Act 2001 (Part I, Section 2): qualified a disaster as:

- A natural disaster, major accident or other event howsoever caused
- Destruction, pollution or scarcity of essential supplies
- Disruption of essential services
- Influx of refugees
- Plague or epidemic or disease; that threatens the life or well-being of the community

Furthermore, the act stipulates that the CPU’s mandate is to prepare for, prevent where possible, and mitigate the effects of, disasters once they occur (2001, Chapter 10:06). It operates at district, provincial and national levels and coordinated by the Civil Protection Planning Committees (CPPCs). The Minister of Local Government, Provincial administrator and District Administrator at the national, provincial and district levels respectively, chairs the committees. Its members are drawn from a multi-sectorial pool of health, law enforcement, defense, social welfare departments of the government as well as non-governmental organizations such as Red Cross, Save the Children and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In Chipinge, the CPU has been operational during any of the crises that the district has faced since the beginning of the 21st century. It was also active

during the resurgence of the Mozambican conflict from 2013. During a key informant interview with an official from the District Administrator's office in Chipinge it was revealed that during the resurgence of the conflict, the District level CPU intervened in the crisis by joining forces with members from various government departments and non-governmental organizations. Together, the unit managed to assess the influx of refugees from Mozambique into Chipinge. The assessment focused on the needs of the refugees, the reasons for leaving their country and their safety as well as access to services in their new locations. The statement of the official was confirmed by the October 2016 Assessment Report on the Mozambican Influx into Chipinge District, Zimbabwe.

From the course of action taken by the CPU during the resurgence of the conflict three issues, become evident. The first issue is that the response left a lot to be desired. Much as the CPU is a multi-sectorial entity, the response that was done was only from the NGO sector of the CPU. The other arms of the unit i.e. the police, the army, and even the social welfare appear to have been dormant during the whole period. They were part of the 15 member Chipinge CPU but did not intervene to assist the community. Secondly, the response only focused on the refugees from Mozambique but did not take time to assess the way that the resurgence was affecting the host community. It is a fact that the 2013-2016 conflict had a lower intensity than that of the 1980s-1990s, but incidents of killings and robberies were still being reported in the Chipinge community. The community members indicated that cases of stock theft were rampant during that time and they indicated that teachers were killed at Zona tea estate. The assessment conducted by the CPU itself raised the concern of the pressure that had been put on the social amenities due to the influx of the Mozambican refugees. Thus, assistance was required from law enforcement, social welfare, and military departments. Thirdly, the response was also reactive in nature; it did not come up with any pro-active actions to safeguard against further effects of the conflict. In doing so, the CPU reneged on part of its mandate i.e. "any service provided or measure taken for the purpose of preparing for, guarding against and dealing with any actual or potential disaster" (The Civil Protection Act 1989:19). Pro-action was vital in

this case especially considering the experiences that the Chipinge community went through during the 1980s at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. Pro-action was also critical considering how volatile the political situation in Mozambique had proven itself to be. This volatile nature had been proven by the resurgence of the conflict in Mozambique 21 years after the peace treaty and thus for as long as the conflict is unresolved, the communities along the border remain vulnerable to further incursions.

Following these insights from the key informants, I then had to dig deeper into the matters surrounding the CPU and its responses to the different crises, which are faced by Zimbabwe as a whole from time to time. From the literature I read, it became evident that the CPU itself had been facing several challenges, which robbed it of the capacity to effectively respond to most of the disasters, which have engulfed Zimbabwe recently.

On the night of 14-15 March 2019, Cyclone Idai hit the Zimbabwean border region along with other countries such as Mozambique and Malawi. The Herald of 22 March 2019 reported that the winds of the cyclone reached speeds of up to 170km/hr. and the rainfall was reported to be 6 meters deep in some areas. The humanitarian organization OXFAM reported that the cyclone-affected 2,6 million individuals in all the affected countries. In Mozambique, the AFP news report of 18 March 2019 stated that 90% of Beira, in Mozambique had been destroyed by the cyclone including communication lines and dams. The report likened Beira to a war zone. 600 people are reported to have lost their lives in Mozambique. In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, the cyclone swept away homes, bridges. The Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum (2019) stated that the cyclone had killed 162 people in the border region areas such as Chipinge, Chimanimani, Chiredzi, Gutu, Buhera, and Zaka, many others were missing after the cyclone. Aljazeera reported that the deaths to have reached 185 and 270 000 were in urgent need of food aid.

Following the disaster, fingers were pointed at the CPU for its lack of preparedness regarding the cyclone. This came after the Director of CPU had declared in January 2019, three months before the cyclone that the CPU was prepared for any disaster that might arise in Zimbabwe. Journalists such as

Thomson (2019) indicated that preparedness and early response could have reduced the destruction of the cyclone. He stated that schools could have been shut down in advance and pupils sent home. The situation at St Charles Lwanga High School in Manicaland in which 200 students were stranded could have been avoided had an early warning system been utilized by the CPU. In the villages, people could have been relocated to safety or temporary transit camps. He further, pointed out that the CPU was affected by a lack of financial resources. During the 2019 budget allocation, the CPU was allocated US\$2.4 million and yet it required at least US\$ 10 million. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2019) stated that the CPU could have learned from previous disasters such as the Tokwe-Mukosi floods in which 1500 homes were swept away or even Cyclone Eline of February 2001. The Sunday Mail article of 17 March 2019 also pointed out that the CPU was inadequately prepared for the cyclone given that the meteorological department had given a two-week warning in advance regarding the cyclone. It pointed out that the CPU was reactionary in its approach and not pro-active. The article also pointed out that the CPU had a weakness in community participation.

Aside from the cyclone Idai disaster, the CPU also demonstrated its inability to effectively respond to disasters in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the Tokwe-Mukosi floods of February 2014. The floods occurred following heavy rainfall in Masvingo province in Zimbabwe's southeastern region, which led to the partial collapse of the Tokwe-Mukosi dam. The floods affected 1 500 families in the area. The Zimbabwe Independent newspaper of February 2014 reported that the CPU had not been proactive regarding the flooding. The CPU chairperson at the time, in turn, put the blame on the shoestring budget, which the CPU was operating on. During the 2013-14 budget, the CPU was allocated US\$ 450 000 and yet it required US\$5 million. Scholars such as Hove (2016:135) lamented how the CPU failed to assist the flood victims with access to water, food, education and health facilities.

Based on the CPU's response to the natural disasters faced in Zimbabwe it is no wonder why it also failed to effectively protect the civilians in Chipinge during the RENAMO incursions. It is a unit, which is hampered by financial constraints such that it heavily relies on donor funding. However, as was the

case in Chipinge, the donors do not always act in the best interests of the community. They were primarily concerned with the Mozambican refugees and not the Chipinge host community.

7.5 Conclusion

In light of the three arms of the GoZ's response to the RENAMO incursions critically analyzed in this chapter, it is safe to conclude that all of these approaches failed to effectively deal with the RENAMO incursions. Some of the approaches, for instance, the armed response approach actually worsened the attacks on the communities by the RENAMO rebels. The peace treaty approach was also deeply flawed as it glossed over many issues. The CPU approach lacked the capacity to tackle the problem even though the conflict was at a much-reduced intensity. Moreover, both the government and the community are ill-prepared should the incursions happen again. The community continues to rely on the government. The government, on the other hand, lacks the capacity to peacefully resolve conflicts and firmly believes in employing the armed approach in settling disputes. However, this armed approach has a history of worsening incursions for communities along the border. Given this scenario, the best way forward is for the community to be capacitated with early warning skills in order to minimize the suffering of the community at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. It also has to be noted that even if the resurgence of the conflict in 2013 was at a lesser scale than the initial civil war (1977-1992), the government institutions and the communities should not relax. The conflict between the two parties is yet to be fully resolved even though a new peace deal was signed between the two parties on August 01, 2019. This "new" peace deal contains the same flaws that affected the previous peace treaty. The government and communities should be in a perpetual state of preparedness at all times given the unstable nature of the political situation in Mozambique.

CHAPTER 8: INTERVENTION

8.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on explaining the intervention that I carried out in my research study. The intervention was informed by the issues that I identified in chapters 6 and 7 and follows the objective of action research, which requires the researcher to help bring about change in connection with the identified research problem. To this effect, the intervention of my research into the Chipinge East community was divided into five interlinked phases:

- Local Peace Committee (LPC) and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) training.
- Establishment of the Chipinge-East Local Peace Committee
- Formulation of the Chipinge-East EWER strategy
- Awareness-raising of the EWER strategy in the Chipinge-East community
- Feedback workshops with government officials, local authorities and stakeholders at district and provincial levels.

8.2 Phase 1: LPC and EWER Training

The Chipinge-East community training was divided into two i.e. the LPC and EWER training. The selection of the training was based on the information gathered from the research participants concerning the nature of the violence they have endured (see chapter 6) and also the initiatives which have been undertaken by their community and the Government of Zimbabwe (see chapter 7). The main objective of the training was to equip the Chipinge-East community members with the capacity to take initiatives to protect themselves from RENAMO violence. The training was meant to make them see the importance of taking the initiative as a community and not always having to rely on the government institutions to provide them with protection from violence. That is given the repeated failure to protect the Chipinge-East community members from RENAMO violence by the ZDF, CPU or law enforcement agents. Most of the villages that are affected by the violence are

located in remote areas, far away from the emergency and security services located in the Chipinge urban area. Accessibility of these communities is also a challenge given the deplorable state of the roads in the area as well as the mountainous terrain of the Chipinge district. The distance between Chipinge town and Gwenzi village in Chipinge-East is 66km however, due to the bad state of the roads; the journey took me close to two hours on a good day. Any rescue mission dispatched to these communities would necessarily take a long time before reaching them. Furthermore, the trainings were necessitated by the pre-existing fear in the Chipinge-East community to take their own initiatives to resolve challenges within their community. The LPC training, in particular, was meant to allay this fear by equipping the community members with the skills to take initiatives and their right to do so.

8.3 LPC Training

The training was conducted over two days from 3-4 January 2019 with members of various Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) in Chipinge-East Constituency. The training venue was the homestead of the Gwenzi village chief in the same constituency. Fourteen, community members attended the training, some of these members had been involved in the focus group discussions, and key informant interviews were done between June-December 2018 (see section 5:11). Four of the participants were female and 10 were male. The participants of the training were also drawn from various professions in the Chipinge-East community such as health, education, law enforcement, farmers, local authorities and traditional leaders. The first day of the training dealt with the basic concepts of peace and conflict whilst the second day was dedicated entirely to LPCs.

Prior to the training, the participants wrote a pre-test involving nine questions (see appendix). The questions examined their understanding of the basic concepts of peace and conflict including positive peace, negative peace, peacebuilding, conflict, conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation as well as what the community understood by the term local peace committee. The questions were meant to assess the participants' knowledge of peace and conflict in general and the methods to build peace. It

is often assumed that people are familiar with what peace and conflict entails, but their responses in the pre-test showed that their knowledge was scanty.

The training program was thus influenced by the results of the pre-test. Instead of primarily focusing on local peace committees the training began with sessions on the basic concepts of peace and conflict. Regarding the local peace committees, the training focused on their origins, typology along with a few case studies of some of the LPCs that have managed to address the challenges faced in their respective communities. The case studies included the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in Kenya, the Collaborative in South Kordofan in Sudan and the *Barza Communautaire* in North Kivu region of Democratic Republic of Congo (see section 2.6.1).

The training employed various methods of learning. For the greater part, the training was participatory in nature. Participants were all given an equal opportunity to share their views, experiences, and opinions. This was based on the assumption that each of the participants had information to share. Dramatizations were used at times to illustrate certain aspects of the training such as the different methods of conflict resolution.

Following the training, another post-test was conducted to check whether the participants fully understood what LPCs were all about and the basic concepts of peace and conflict. The post-test showed that the majority of participants had understood the training. In sharing their experiences of the training, the participants indicated that it was the first of its kind and that they had become enlightened on how best they can face the challenges of their community.

8.4 EWER Training

The training was conducted from 11-12 February 2019 at the same venue and with the participants who had done the LPC training the previous month. Ideally, an LPC would engage with the perpetrator of the violence i.e. the RENAMO rebels. However, during a key informant interview, the Manicaland Provincial Administrator stated that this was not possible considering the peculiarity of the situation. He pointed out that much as the Chipinge community was very near Mozambique, the matter of engagement would have

to occur at the inter-governmental level through the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Any local dialogue would require permission from this level. In addition, there was a security risk in the Chipinge community members engaging the rebels, heightened by the unpredictable nature of the rebels themselves. In light of these considerations, I decided to equip the community members with skills that can assist them to predict and protect themselves from the onset of violence. This is how the idea of early warning systems emerged.

As in the previous training, various methods were employed to conduct the training. These methods included simulations, role-playing, group discussions, and presentations. Simulations were used to illustrate how the community could utilize early warning systems in the event of an attack upon the community. Mock-drills were used to this effect. Group discussions were used to discuss the hot spots for attacks, to plan for the vulnerable members of the community and identify safe routes. The different teams would then present their findings to the larger group and obtain instant feedback and recommendations on their presentation. This method of group discussions was meant to engender the spirit of initiative and cooperation among the community members regarding their plight. Through the discussions and the presentations, the community members gained confidence in themselves.

The two-day training was divided into two parts. The first part focused on the early warning systems that could be implemented to foresee the onset of violence or danger to a community. This session included topics such as rumor monitoring, community maps with markings of safety spaces, assembly points and hot spots of the attacks on the community. The second part discussed early response strategies, which the community can use in the event of violence. These methods included contact lists, quick run bags, communication trees and planning for the vulnerable members of the community. These concepts were explained and discussed as follows:

EWER was defined as a broad-based and multi-faceted strategy that strives to ensure the safety of the entire community in times of danger. Danger encompasses various threats and disasters such as man-made and natural

disasters, however, in the case of Chipinge, the EWER mainly focused on the violence resulting from the RENAMO incursions.

Rumor Monitoring: involves the community members triangulating or verifying the information, which they gather from the mainstream or social media or their friends and relatives in Mozambique before informing their leaders or neighbors. The importance of monitoring is to avoid the spread of misinformation as it renders the EWER system unreliable. Together with the participants, various ways to triangulate information were explored. It was agreed that should any community member receive any information pertaining to oncoming violence from the RENAMO rebels they should crosscheck the information with either community leaders or the mainstream media. It was agreed that social media was an unreliable source of information. To this end, the participants stated that it was important to keep abreast of the political developments in Mozambique through two methods. The first method was listening to radio broadcasts from both countries such as the Zimbabwean Diamond FM radio or radio Espungabeira from the Mozambican side. The second method involved regularly communicating with their friends and relatives from Mozambique. The participants agreed that the opportune moment to do this was during a monthly event called *Kwa 2*. This monthly gathering is when Mozambican and Zimbabwean traders met every second day of every month to trade their wares without any customs restrictions.

Community maps: refers to a diagram, which the participants had to draw using their knowledge of their community and its history with the violence from RENAMO rebels. The diagram indicates the hot spots of these attacks and the safe routes to be taken by the community members to assembly points.

Communication Structures: involves the channels, which the community members had to use in the event of an outbreak of violence. Community members developed a list of emergency services that can assist them in the event of an attack e.g. police, army, hospitals, and clinics. In addition, the community members had to develop their own contact lists in their respective neighborhoods.

Evacuation Bags: are bags kept ready at all times. The bag contained essentials to be used by the community members in the event that they had to evacuate their homes due to the onset of the violence. During the training, it was discussed that the contents of the bag differed depending on the person carrying the bag. The contents of the bag of a lactating mother would be different from the bag of an elderly woman. However, generally, the contents of the bag included food, medical supplies, identification documents, and toiletries, among others.

Plan for persons with specific needs: the community members had to develop a plan for the vulnerable members of their community. The vulnerable members referred to those people with a diminished capacity to defend themselves from the violence of the rebels. These persons included children, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant and lactating mothers. The plan was to include how such members were to be protected and how their special needs were to be catered for during the episodes of violence.

The EWER training differed from the LPC training in that it relied more on the contextual knowledge of the participants. The participants had lived in the Chipinge-East community for the greater part of their lives and some of them had first-hand experience of the violence that the community endured at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. Through this knowledge, the participants already knew the hot spots, the safe routes, the vulnerable members of the community as well as the communication tree. The training was more of a facilitation for the community to discuss this knowledge and to bring it into an integrated early warning response plan.

8.5 Phase 2: Establishment of the Chipinge-East LPC

After the first training of the LPCs, the participants formed the Chipinge-East LPC. The participants elected various members to fill in the positions of the LPC i.e. the chairperson, deputy chairperson, women's representative, youth representative, men's representative, as illustrated in figure 8.1. The committee was charged with the task of discussing the ways to better prepare the community against the RENAMO violence and representing the diverse interests of the different groups of people involved.




Figure 11. Membership of the Chipinge-East Local Peace Committee

8.6 Phase 3: Formulation of the Chipinge-East EWER strategy

After the formation of the LPC, the LPC members resolved to develop their own EWER strategy based on the Chipinge context, which would be shared widely with the rest of the Chipinge-East community. This exercise raised awareness of the dangers, which the community members can face, and what they can do in the event of an attack from RENAMO rebels. Through a series of meetings after the training, the LPC members formulated the Chipinge East EWER strategy, which was based on the different experiences of the participants at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. The strategy was put down on paper and developed into flyers that were to be widely distributed to the wider Chipinge community. The flyers included a contacts list, an EWER matrix, an EWER contingency plan, and a community map. Where possible, the flyers were translated into Shona to assist with the comprehension of the message by all members of the community. Examples are included in the images below.

The contacts list included the numbers of the local authorities and rescue services, which they could call upon in the event of an attack, for instance, the chief, police, hospital, Member of Parliament, District Administrator, etc. as, illustrated in the diagram below. However, some of the LPC members felt that some community members might abuse the contact information on the list. The LPC agreed with this point and resolved that the contacts list would not be given to all community members and would not be developed into posters, which would be stuck in public places. Rather, the contacts list was going to be shared with heads of departments, local authorities and traditional leaders who were expected to be more responsible with the information and use it only when it was necessary.

Ward 15, Chipinge South Local Peace Committee Emergency Numbers

VILLAGE ASSEMBLY POINTS	
VILLAGE	ASSEMBLY POINT
Sita	Gandwa
Zibuko A	Musunganyemba
Zibuko B	Mutsamvu
Munasi	Munjerenje
Kwenenhu	Mundanda

1 ORGANISATION / INSTITUTION

Member of Parliament
Provincial Administrator
District Administrator
Ward Councillor
Zimbabwe Republic Police-Grassfats
Chipinge Rural District Council
Zimbabwe Red Cross Society
Veterinary Services
Gwenzi Clinic
Mt. Selinda Hospital
Mt. Selinda Hospital
Ambulance Driver
Zuzumye Village Head
Mazundu Village Head
Munasi Village Head
Zibuko Village Head
Marufu Village Head
Siomamizi Village head
Munamba Village head
Mundanda Village head
Kwenenhu Village head
Mupinzana Village head
Musimbo Village head
Masocha Village head
Gwenzi Primary School
Gwenzi Secondary School
Muzite Primary School
Muzite Secondary School
Magondi Primary School
Jersey Primary School
Jersey Ten Estate
Plan International
Social Welfare
Makande Smallfale
Agricultural Extension Worker
Child Care Worker
Environmental Health Technician
Toll free
Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission
and Distribution Center

2 CONTACT PERSON

Hon M. Muyambo
Mr E. Seenza
Mr W. Mashava
Mr S. Simango
Mr. Makovero
Mr Mamvosha
Mr. J. Sithole
Dr. I. Makuyana
Sister Magoso
Dr. Mhlanga
Mr. Majaricho
Mrs. L. Masunungure
Mr. E. Gwenzi
Mr. Mafella
Mr. E. Munasi
Mr. C. Zibuko
Mr. H. Gwenzi
Mr. S. Siomamizi
Mr. T. Munamba
Mr. K.S. Mundanda
Mr. S. Kwenenhu
Mr. Mupiquana
Mr. Z. Musimbo
Mr. Masocha
Mr. G. Makuyana
Ms. A. Gekoma
Mr. L. Miambo
Mr. L. Derera
Mr. Mwandipendaa
Mrs. G. Kashangura
Mr. S.K. Hlastswayo
Mr. S.H. Dube
Mr. R. Zongoro
Mr. Muchipisi
Mrs. N. Madusise
Mr. M. Mutotwa
Mr. Chin'ono
Zimbabwe Defence Forces
Megawatt House Mutare

3 CONTACT NUMBER

+263 777 661404
+263 772 521 903
+263 772 514 424
+263 777 377 897
+263 773 021 614
+263 772 101 016
+263 772 521 368
+263 777 707 616
+263 773 828 591
+263 774 392 748
+263 772 616 299
+263 773 286 750
+263 777 364 448
+263 782 180 360
+263 777 109 788
+263 777 109 516
+263 779 780 456
+263 777 364 171
+263 783 518 513
+263 774 340 596
+263 775 700 063
+263 773 698 274
+263 777 621 902
+263 774 371 054
+263 776 186 073
+263 775 645 361
+263 775 328 369
+263 773 913 242
+263 772 836 422
+263 774 657 812
+263 772 551 694
+263 774 735 647
+263 773 523 508
+263 777 438 160
+263 772 551 694
+263 774 735 647
+263 773 523 508
+263 777 438 160
+263 785 893 091
+263 776 912 411
+263 773 015 731
+263 712 236 595
+263 0202063181

Quick Run Bags

1

Quick Run Bag
Pack up:
- 1 liter water
- 1 liter food
- 1 liter fuel

2

Pack Up:
Copies of important
documents;
water bucket,
plastic sheet,
food, cooking
pot and
utensils.

3

Don't forget:
Mosquito net,
medicine, change
of clothing,
feminine
products,
money.

4

Also Remember:
Phone and charger,
torch/lamp, small
sewing kit,
cord/rope,
soap,
matches
and
knife

Figure 12. Chipinge-East Local Peace Committee Contacts List

In addition to the contact lists, the training participants came up with an EWER matrix. The matrix contained the threats, which the community face, and the response mechanism, which the community could employ to mitigate the effects of these threats. From the discussions, it emerged that the community was not only affected by the RENAMO violence but also by meteorological natural disasters such as cyclones and earth tremors. The participants went on to identify possible responses to these threats as well. On the threat of the RENAMO violence, the participants' recommended action was for the community to gather at assembly points and carry evacuation bags in the event of an evacuation. Furthermore, the community identified possible assembly points for the different villages i.e. Zibuke, Munasi, Sita and Kwenhenu villages as illustrated in the flyer below:

CHIPINGE-EAST LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEE
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM MATRIX

The following is a matrix containing 3 scenarios which normally affect Chipinge East community. The matrix contains the possible actions and assembly points, which people could gather in the time of emergency.

The community members themselves are supposed to use their knowledge of the community and discuss the recommended actions and possible assembly points they could take in the event of anyone of the threats listed below:

THREAT	RECOMMENDED ACTION	ASSEMBLY POINTS
CONFLICT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A bell will be rung for the community to meet at the assembly point • People are discouraged to cross borders • Children should know the names of their parents and their villages they come from 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zibuke Village - Booster • Munasi Village - Chibvepi • Sita Village - Gandwa • Kwenhenu Village - Madhinga farm
CYCLONE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People should move to upland areas • A bell is rung by an appropriate person for people to assemble at the meeting point for further instructions • Children should know where they come from and the names of their parents • People should not cross rivers • Children should not be allowed to go to school • Community leaders should get accurate information of the cyclone. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zibuke Village - Chinyama • Munasi Village - Munjerenje • Sita Village - Hwehwe • Kwenhenu Village - Mundanda school
EARTH TREMOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People should move out of their houses • Go to places where there are no trees • Vulnerable people should be evacuated on time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zibuke Village - Booster • Munasi Village - Chibvepi • Sita Village - Chikabeta Villie • Kwenhenu Village - Mundanda school

Figure 13. EWER Matrix

The participants also came up with a wider strategy to employ during the times of attacks by RENAMO rebels with the intention of encouraging the setting up of LPCs in other communities, which faced a similar threat. The strategy had a series of steps that included a contingency plan, communication structures, plans for the vulnerable members of the community, rumor monitoring and the contents of an evacuation bag.

CHIPINGE - EAST LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

In conflict/disaster prone areas, (either natural or man-made) community members should take the following steps to minimize the loss of lives during the emergency:






 <p style="text-align: center;">Step #1: Contingency Plan</p>	<p>Using their vast knowledge of their community, the community members need to brainstorm through a matrix of threats that are likely to threaten the stability of the community. They also need to think about how best the community can survive these threats. The plan will involve the identification of the possible directions which the threats might come from and the safe routes which the community can take to avoid the threats as well as the potential assembly points/safe houses for the community members. These plans should be distributed widely within the community for the community members to familiarize with them.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Step #2: Communication Structures</p>	<p>The community also needs to think of communication structures, which will be useful during the time of emergency. These structures might involve the formation of contact groups on social media platforms such as WhatsApp or flyers with contact lists of fellow community members, local authorities and even emergency numbers (police, ambulance and fire brigade).</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Step #3: Planning for Persons with Specific Needs (Vulnerable)</p>	<p>The community should consider how best the vulnerable members of the community would be safeguarded in the event of a conflict or natural disaster in the community. The term vulnerable refers to persons who are not able to fully protect themselves in the event of a disturbance for instance; the elderly, the disabled, pregnant and lactating mothers as well as children. Children, for example, should be taught their full names, parents' full names and their addresses and even phone numbers. Children should be made aware of assembly points. To be effective, these plans should be rehearsed at home or even at school from time to time until they are fully memorized by the vulnerable members of the community.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Step #4: Triangulating Rumors/Information</p>	<p>Individuals should be taught to first confirm information or rumors that they might have heard regarding oncoming threats. This can be achieved through discussing with community leaders, listening to the news or reading newspapers. Community members need to be aware that information needs to be ascertained before any action is taken. Misinforming the community is dangerous.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Step #5: Evacuation Bag</p>	<p>This bag should be kept ready at all times and not on the day of the emergency. The bag should contain items which can make the individual or the whole family be able to survive away from home for a few days until help arrives: copies of important documents; water jerry can, food, cooking pot, mosquito net, medicine, first-aid kit, change of clothing, feminine hygiene products, money, phone and charger, torch/lamp, small sewing kit, cord/rope, soap, matches, knife.</p>

Figure 14. Chipinge-East LPC EWS

The participants drew a community map of one of the locations that are mostly affected by the RENAMO attacks. The map was drawn in order to identify and

mark the hot spots of the attacks as well as the different assembly points to which the community members can rush in the event of an attack or any other emergency.




Figure 15. Assembly Points Map

There was concern that the information might fall into the hands of the rebels themselves.

8.7 Phase 4: Awareness-Raising Sessions

After the development of these flyers, the LPC members divided themselves into two teams to deliver them to the wider community. Besides raising the awareness of the action plan in the event of an attack, this move would also encourage the ownership of the formulated strategy by the community members. The flyers of the early warning matrix and contingency plan were widely distributed into surrounding villages and even schools. The early

warning matrix and the contingency plan flyers were printed into size A3 posters, which were stuck on the surrounding public places such as shops, hospitals, clinics, and farms. The LPC members also took time to explain the contents of these flyers to the members of the public for instance school children and farmers as shown below:

Table 5. Chipinge-East Awareness Raising Sessions

Location	Date	Number of people
Mundanda small scale farmers	26/04/2019	70 farmers
Kwenhenu village	27/04/2019	87 HH (Households)
Gwenzi small scale farmers	30/04/2019	25 farmers
Mzite Primary School	09/05/2019	2000 pupils
Sita village	12/05/2019	52 HH
Munasi village	12/05/2019	62 HH
Zibuke village	12/05/2019	55 HH
Gwenzi Secondary School	13/05/ 2019	331 students

8.8 Phase 5: Feedback Workshops

After the formulation and presentation of the EWER strategy to the wider Chipinge community, it was time to present it to the local authorities and government officials at district and provincial levels. The fact that the Chipinge East LPC already had traditional leaders from the area made it easier. The feedback workshops were an important step for two reasons. The first reason was that considering the sensitivity of the government towards community initiatives it was prudent to keep the government officials posted on every step of the Chipinge-East LPC to deal with any suspicions, which government officials felt towards community initiatives. In other case studies that I read of LPCs (see section 2.6.1) in different parts of the world, I reached the conclusion that tensions with the government arise from the misconception

that the LPC wants to replace the government or local authorities. This misconception arises when the government and local authorities are not kept in the loop regarding the activities of the LPC.

Second, the LPC wanted the support of the government to address issues of violence along the border. The support of the government and the local officials the government's and local officials was seen as essential to the success of the LPC and its activities. While the government and local authorities are part of the problem, which led to the establishment of the LPC, they are also part of the solution. It is undeniable that the government has power, which can be used to either block or support the activities of the LPC. Having the support of the government and local authorities also makes it possible for the LPCs to be propagated in other parts of the country facing similar challenges. This is not to say that the government should be actively involved in the day-to-day running of the LPC, which has been proven to be a bad idea elsewhere, e.g. the case of the Barza Communautaire LPC in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (see section 2.6.1). Rather, the LPC and the government should have a line of communication but maintain their distance. This is the cosmopolitan approach to the running of LPCs advocated by Kristoffer (2009) (see section 2.1).

At all stages of the research, I made sure to keep the local authorities and government officials updated on what the research was all about and how it was progressing. I met with the Provincial Administrator, the Chipinge District Administrator, the Chipinge East Member of Parliament and the traditional chiefs of the villages that participated in the research. To these officials, I presented the letters of research from DUT and explained, in brief, the nature of the research. This was done to ensure that there was no confusion regarding the research and the LPC. It was thus now only fair to appraise them on the outcome of the research study. This is a trait that I imparted to the LPC to ensure its very survival in the Zimbabwean political environment.

8.9 District Level

This was the first feedback session, held on July 11, 2019, at the Chipinge government complex in the District Administrator's boardroom. Twenty stakeholders from various government departments, the NGO sector, and the media were invited to the session. Due to the prohibitive transport costs, the Chipinge LPC chose three members (two males and one female) to present in the session on their behalf.

The DA and his assistant were in attendance. The DA gave opening remarks, I took over and briefly narrated the origins of the research, the reasons behind it and the methodology utilized to conduct it. The three LPC members then presented the challenges they faced within their community at the hands of the RENAMO rebels. They then presented the EWER strategy they had formulated as a community to counter the RENAMO violence. They shared the fliers of the contacts list, the EWER system, and the EWER matrix. The stakeholders were then given time to react to the presentation through questions, suggestions and constructive criticism.

The EWER strategy was well received by the stakeholders at the district level. The DA urged the Red Cross, which was represented at the session to support the EWER strategy and ensure that it, spreads to all the wards of Chipinge i.e. 30 rural and 8 urban. He bemoaned the lack of preparedness to the threats, which face the community, giving the example of fire extinguishers in the building, which were last serviced in 1997. Other stakeholders also raised suggestions, which could strengthen the EWER strategy. It was suggested that toilets should be dug at the designated assembly points so as to avoid the spread of diseases when people assemble. The LPC was urged to ensure that community members sleep with their phones switched on in case of emergencies. The stakeholders implored leaders to be more responsive to alerts brought to them by the community members. The chiefs in the session, in turn, urged community members not to fear their traditional leaders i.e. chiefs and the headmen but to feel free to approach them with information or concerns. It was also recommended that evacuation bags should be accessible to all the members of the household, especially children. All

members of the household should know where the bag is kept in case of emergencies. The officials representing various media houses were impressed by the presentation of the EWER strategy and reporters from Diamond FM, Manicaland's premier radio station, interviewed the LPC representatives at length.

The session ended with the DA urging the LPC representatives to reach out to other communities within the Chipinge district and set up other LPCs. All this demonstrated that keeping the local authorities informed on the activities of the LPC had paid a dividend in the form of a cordial reception and its possible expansion to other areas.

8.10 Provincial Level

The session was held on July 16, 2019, at the Mutare Government Complex in the Minister of State's boardroom with 23 stakeholders drawn from various professions such as the army, the police, and the government departments. The media were not invited to the session and the Minister of State failed to attend due to an emergency meeting held in Harare. However, the Provincial Administrator managed to attend on behalf of the minister.

The session progressed in a similar manner as the one held at the district level in Chipinge. The Provincial Administrator (PA) gave opening remarks; I took over and explained the research background and methodology. The representatives from the Chipinge East LPC presented the EWER strategy they had formulated. Thereafter, the stakeholders were given an opportunity to analyze the EWER strategy.

The PA welcomed the idea of EWER made by the Chipinge East LPC and the progress it had made. He pointed out that it was easier to work with empowered communities such as the Chipinge East. He urged the LPC to be spread to areas such as Beacon, which faces challenges of earthquakes. It was pointed out that the selection of assembly points has to be done with the assistance of geophysical experts to avoid assembling at an unsafe location. The stakeholders also cautioned against the excessive reliance on social

media. The PA suggested the distribution of walkie-talkie radios to all community members because during periods of violence the cellular base stations might not be functional. He pointed out that the government had begun doing this in the aftermath of the Cyclone Idai experience of March 2019. However, there were some reservations about the LPC EWER strategy. One stakeholder stated that given the current peaceful relations along the border with Mozambique, there was no need for such a strategy. The PA pointed out that the government was working effectively with the VIDCOs and WADCOs adding that the planning process in Zimbabwe is always bottom-up. However, the situation that I found on the ground was entirely different.

I took the time to clarify these misconceptions. Regarding the existence of peace currently along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, I pointed to the unpredictable nature of the RENAMO rebels. The chances of the violence continuing are high considering the flaws of the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992 (see chapter 7) and the prevailing skewed political environment in Mozambique as pointed out by scholars such as Muchemwa and Harris (2018). The chances of violence are also heightened considering the split of the RENAMO forces and the rejection of the August 2019 Peace agreement by a new faction of the RENAMO rebels calling itself the Military Junta under the leadership of Mariano Nhongo. Furthermore, the election violence that occurred in Mozambique before and after the 15 October 2019 presidential and provincial elections proved this point. I added that peacebuilding had transitioned from being largely reactionary and concerned with post-conflict reconstruction to a violence prevention emphasis. It also encompasses more activities than just dialogue between the conflicting parties.

8.11 Reflection on the Intervention

As I reflected after the session, I realized a number of issues. The Chipinge-East LPC and its EWER strategy were more warmly welcomed at the district level in Chipinge than at the provincial level. I attributed this to the fact that the district was more in tune with what was happening on the ground. The provincial stakeholders are located almost 200km away in Mutare, the capital of the Manicaland province and thus far removed from the reality in Chipinge

district. In addition, the feedback session came at a time when the provincial government was dealing with the aftermath of Cyclone Idai that had struck the province barely four months prior to the feedback session. Thus, the provincial government was more preoccupied with the Cyclone Idai aftermath and RENAMO rebels were a secondary issue.

Responses from the stakeholders, which discouraged the existence of the LPC, also indicated that the understanding of peacebuilding amongst government officials as a violence prevention method is yet to take root. This came as no surprise considering the history of the Zimbabwean government and peace issues as explained at length in the previous chapter and showed that the government is more inclined to reactionary measures in dealing with the RENAMO violence. It also suggests that the provincial government is not closely monitoring the political developments in Mozambique. This again shows that the communities along the border need to take matters of RENAMO violence into their own hands. It also shows that the concept of LPCs is still in its infancy in Zimbabwe. The government and other stakeholders are yet to fully comprehend the purpose of the LPCs and their potential in addressing some of the issues facing communities.

Despite the discouragement that came from the provincial session, I was not deterred in my efforts. Rather it was just a reminder of how much more work still needs to be done in order to make the stakeholders more receptive to the idea of LPCs. My research alone was not going to be enough to address the issues between the government structures in Zimbabwe and community initiatives such as LPCs. The session proved that keeping the government officials and local authorities informed on the activities of the LPC is not enough. Capacity building is needed for the government officials and local authorities, especially on the concepts of peacebuilding, LPCs, and EWERs.



Figure 16. LPC Member Presenting the EWER Strategy to the Farming Community in Chipinge-East



Figure 17. LPC Meeting in Progress at Chief Gwenzi's Homestead



Figure 18. The Chipinge-East LPC

8.12 Evaluation of the Project Outcomes

This section presents an evaluation of the research in relation to the intended objectives, its impact, and its aftermath. There are a number of evaluation models available. Herrington (2016:08) has the 3R framework of evaluation i.e. Reach, resonance and response. Hunter *et al.* (1996:137) use the smart, soft and soft-smart evaluation methods. The smart method pertains to evaluations with measurable or tangible outcomes; the soft method is for evaluations with intangible outcomes whilst the soft-smart method is for outcomes with both measurable and intangible outcomes. Hunter and Paige (2014:130) use the four principles or 4Ws criteria i.e. what was intended? What emerged? What insights were gained? What happened next? The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) (2018) criteria focuses on the relevance, efficiency, impact, effectiveness, and sustainability of the intervention. I used the OECD's criteria, which captures what the intervention managed to do, and its impact, as well as the challenges and lessons, learned along the way.

Data for the evaluation was collected through a questionnaire that was given to the 14 participants of the research. In addition, these same people formed the LPC and participated in the training that I did in Chipinge. The questionnaire, in Shona and English, was available to the participants was given to the research participants during a follow-up visit in Chipinge in August 2019 when the research had concluded which gave the participants the vantage of hindsight. The questionnaire had five open-ended questions. These last three questions gave the participants an opportunity to explain in detail their views regarding the intervention. Below are the responses from the participants:

Was the intervention of the research helpful in equipping your community against the violence faced by your community at the hands of the RENAMO rebels? Thirteen of the participants indicated that the training was relevant to the issues that they had faced within their community. They stated that the training in particular spoke to the problem of the RENAMO rebels, which they feared, could recur in future. They also pointed out that the training also addressed their lack of knowledge regarding issues of conflict transformation and early warning systems. Two participants voiced their sentiments regarding the effect of the training on their mindsets. The first participant stated that *Before the training the issue of the RENAMO violence was rarely spoken about amongst ourselves as community members. We treated it as taboo because we felt that we did not have the weapons to confront the rebels. We thought it was only the government and its troops that could do that. However, through the training, we have come to realize that as community members we can plan how to spare the community from the violence.*

The second participant added that *Our elders have always said a stitch in time saves nine. The training has helped us to think ahead and plan ahead. This will help us to be one step ahead of the rebels and reduce the damage that they will do to our community.*

Was the intervention activities done in a cost-effective manner? All of the participants indicated that the intervention was done in a cost-effective manner. Indeed the participants used their personal and communal resources

to get the training and the rest of the intervention in place. One of the chiefs in Chipinge East offered his house to be the venue of the training and subsequent meetings. Female participants also voluntarily contributed whatever foodstuffs to the training sessions. Fortunately, the training was done during harvesting season thus there were various crops available for eating, despite the cyclone that struck in March 2019. On some days, I had to supplement the training refreshments with my research funds. The participants also volunteered their time to travel to other communities on foot to spread EWER awareness. The costs I met were the costs of transport to the community as well as the cost of printing some materials.

The fact the participants were so willing to use their personal and communal resources was a powerful indication of their commitment to the project and their belief in its efficacy.

Did the intervention bring about any change in your community? Explain your answer in detail. All the participants agreed that the intervention brought about a transformation in their community, which came at different levels. For some, the intervention brought about intra-personal, inter-personal and systematic transformation. Two of the participants made the following statements:

- a) *In this community we are very reluctant to discuss issues affecting us. Mainly because people feel powerless or fatigued of talking and nothing being done to address the issue raised. These trainings have brought us together to confront an issue that has been at the back of our minds. We have been able to openly discuss and put our minds together. The results have been amazing.*
- b) *Speaking for myself, the training made me realise that I have a duty to raise my voice and act on issues that affect our community. I do not always have to wait for the government or NGOs. I realised that If I keep quiet and expect other people to attend to the issue, nothing will be done.*

Intra-personal transformation: five of the participants felt that the intervention had brought about a personal change. They indicated that they felt empowered through the knowledge they gained from the training, their minds had been opened up by the knowledge they gained. One participant stated that the training had given him the courage to do something about the problems that they face in their community, not only pertaining to the RENAMO violence but even to other challenges such as political violence. One participant succinctly put it across and stated:

a) The training of local peace committees, as well as peace and conflict that we went through, gave me a new understanding of my role within the society. I was one of the people who just wait for the government to do everything for the community and me. I blamed the government for everything wrong in our community. However, the local peace committee training has made me realize that as a community member I have a role to play in the well-being of my community. I have learned that the change that I want to see in the community it also starts with me Overall, I feel empowered by the whole experience.

b) As a woman speaking my mind in the presence of men on community issues was difficult. I would just keep quiet and let them do the talking. The trainings we have had have changed that. I was able to confront my fears and voice my opinions in front of community members. My confidence levels have increased as a result.

Inter-personal change: three of the participants felt that the transformation happened to them at the inter-personal level. They explained that the training and the subsequent presentations that they had made in the community had transformed the way that people perceived them in the community. They stated that the community members and even some traditional leaders had begun to perceive them as resourceful people. They were respected more in the community as a result of the presentations they did to the community members. In the words of one participant:

a) Since I started to present the EWER strategy in other parts of the community people have begun to look and even talk to me differently. They pay more attention to what I say now. I am now seen as a

knowledgeable person who knows how people protect themselves during times of disturbances. I think what has also helped people to be more attentive and welcoming to the EWER strategy is the recent cyclone and its damaging effects on the community members.

b) The training has encouraged us community members to discuss issues amongst ourselves and not just be quiet about it and worry. We have realized that there is power in discussions. They allow us to come up with solutions. If you just keep quiet and worry nothing good comes out of it. If you discuss you feel better.

Systemic transformation: ten participants believed that the intervention had brought about a transformation in their local political system. They stated that as a result of the intervention the traditional and local authorities had come to accept that the community could make initiatives that can be used to avert the violence, which they face from RENAMO rebels. This transformation was confirmed by the support, which the EWER strategy and the LPC gained from the local and traditional leaders.

As mentioned earlier, the traditional leaders were part of the LPC and one of them actually volunteered his house to be the meeting venue of all the meetings of the LPC. The local authorities' support came during the feedback sessions at the district level. They encouraged the NGOs to support the Chipinge-East community initiative. They also invited the LPC to their respective villages, wards, and constituencies to help them set up their own LPCs and come up with their own EWER strategies. While the LPC and EWER strategy did not get as much support at the provincial level, they expected the transformation to eventually reach this level as the intervention expanded to other parts of Chipinge and beyond.

Even though the systemic transformation happened at the district level, the community members stated that it was still a milestone. Prior to this intervention, community initiatives of this nature were unheard of due to the government's suspicion of opposition politics.

The intervention had also transformed the system in that it revived the community structures that had become redundant. At the beginning of the

intervention, community members had stated that the meetings of the VIDCOs and WADCOs were very sporadic. However, since the establishment of the LPC, these meetings had become frequent and committed. This was aided by the fact that the LPC was not only active but was clearly accomplishing the goals they set for themselves.

Has your community managed to come up with an initiative regarding the violence from RENAMO rebels? Explain this initiative. All of the participants agreed that their community initiatives had the potential to protect them from the violence of RENAMO violence. They stated that the community initiative was in the form of the EWER strategy, the community safety plan, the EWER matrix, and the contact list.

Are there any plans to continue the efforts to keep the community initiative after the conclusion of the research study? Explain these plans further.

Plans have been developed to spread the EWER strategy. The participants had two other locations they wanted to visit and raise awareness of the EWER strategy, which they had come up with. They also wanted to help other communities to set up their own LPCs to address the violence from the RENAMO rebels. In addition, I also have personal plans to form a private voluntary organization, which helps communities combat violence through LPCs and EWER strategies.

8.13 Summary

In summary, the nature of the intervention done for the Chipinge East community was in the form of training in Local Peace Committees and Introduction to Peace and Conflict. The design of the training was based on the nature of the violence that is faced in the Chipinge-East community. Following the training, the training participants established the first Local Peace Committee in Chipinge District with a representation of the different members of the Chipinge East Community. They went on to have subsequent meetings in which they discussed and came up with an EWER strategy. This was in the form of community mapping, community safety plan, an EWER

matrix, and a contacts list. They visited different parts of the community to raise awareness of the EWER strategy.

The evaluation revealed that the intervention helped the Chipinge-East community become more pro-active as a community and had taken the initiative to protect themselves from the violence of RENAMO rebels. The intervention further revealed that the intervention led to transformation at different levels in the Chipinge East community. The skills gained through training helped the community develop contingency plans, contact lists, and an early warning matrix. The community also raised awareness among community members regarding the early warning tools that they had devised. However, there is still a need for more capacity building of the LPC. For instance, the community could benefit from additional training and workshops on service maps, referral pathways, first aid, and mine risk education. These trainings will boost their skills and capacity to respond effectively in the event of disturbances in the community. In terms of sustaining the intervention, the LPC intends to establish other LPCs along the border and to train them on the early warning mechanisms.

CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Introduction

This is the final chapter and it provides a summary of the research through narrating how far the research achieved its intended objectives, what conclusions were drawn from the study and the recommendations to the stakeholders of the research. The stakeholders of the research included the Zimbabwean communities located along the border with Mozambique, the local authorities of these communities and the Government of Zimbabwe. In addition to this, I give my personal reflections on the research, the experiences, and the transformation that I underwent during the research.

9.2 Overview of the Research

The aim of the research was to assess how Local Peace Committees can be utilized to assist Zimbabwean communities affected by transboundary violence. These communities are located along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border and they face the risk of transboundary violence from the Mozambican RENAMO rebels. The study was mainly triggered by the lack of both government and community initiatives to implement measures to safeguard the communities from the violence. Each time that the conflict breaks out it transcends the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary to affect the Zimbabwean communities residing along the border.

The theoretical framework that informed the research was the Conflict Transformation theory espoused by Jean-Paul Lederach (see section 2.3.3). In brief, the theory states that conflict can be resolved through altering the relations of belligerents at four different levels i.e. the intra-personal, inter-personal, cultural and structural levels. It also seeks to reduce violence, increase social justice through interaction and social structures. It also seeks to achieve peace through a multi-layered and inclusive approach to peacebuilding. The multi-layered approach involves the bottom-up approach of empowering the grassroots as well as other stakeholders such as the traditional, local and government authorities. This theory dovetailed with the

research problem of violence in the Zimbabwean border communities and guided the research to find a solution to reduce the violence within the community through empowering the grassroots communities and also involving the authorities of the area. Conflict Transformation is a broad theory and certain aspects of it do not apply in the contextual setting of the research; my research focused on the social structural aspect of the conflict transformation theory, which involves LPCs.

I used an action research design, which involved the researcher working together with the research participants to seek a solution to a problem identified within the community. Action research has four main stages namely the diagnostic, action plan, intervention, and evaluation stages. Unlike other strategies of research, action research does not only study a problem and make suggestions for the government to carry out. Rather it comes up with action and proceeds to implement in the intervention stage. Finally, the intervention is evaluated to assess the extent to which the intervention managed to resolve the issue identified in the diagnostic stage.

The field research of the study was conducted in the Chipinge-East constituency located in Chipinge District of the Manicaland Province in Zimbabwe. The field research used a qualitative research methodology because of the need for in-depth information. The study aimed to generate non-numerical data by recording the experiences and perceptions of the research participants. This involved conducting the field research in a flexible, semi-structured and open manner. This had the desired effect of making the research participants more at ease with me the researcher and made them willing to open up and share more of their experiences.

Regarding the validity of the study, I used six steps to ensure that the data that was collected was credible. The steps that were used for the validation of the study were triangulation, member checking, descriptive writing, clarifying biases, presenting negative and discrepant information and peer debriefing. For the reliability of the steps pursued in the research process, these were ensured through checking of transcripts, constant coding, and the coordination as well as communication with the research participants (see section 5.12).

Furthermore, the ethics of the study were ensured through presenting my letter of research from DUT to the communities before FGDs were conducted and to local authorities before KIs were conducted as well (see section 5.13). I also asked for the consent of the research-participants prior to the commencement of discussions or interviews. Furthermore, I kept the authorities informed about every stage of the research so as to avoid suspicion or resistance to the research by the local authorities.

The study's overall aim was to identify and examine how LPCs can be used to protect the Chipinge community in Zimbabwe from transboundary violence of the RENAMO rebels in Mozambique (see section 1.4). The research had the following objectives:

9.3 Objectives

1. To examine the nature, extent, and consequences of the transboundary violence affecting Chipinge-East constituency in Chipinge District, Manicaland, Zimbabwe.
2. To critically examine the initiatives undertaken by the Chipinge-East community and the Zimbabwean government to address transboundary violence.
3. To design and conduct intervention that builds the Chipinge-East peacebuilding capacity against the transboundary violence.
4. To evaluate the short-term outcome of the intervention.

To examine the nature, extent, and consequences of the transboundary violence affecting Chipinge-East constituency in Chipinge District, Manicaland, Zimbabwe.

This objective was addressed in chapter six. The focus of the chapter was to present the information gathered from the research participants regarding their experiences of transboundary violence. The information was based on the in-depth interviews and discussions conducted with the research participants.

From the information gathered from the research participants, the Chipinge-East community and surrounding areas were deeply affected by the RENAMO violence during the two occasions where the violence broke out. The

community suffered different types of violence i.e. robberies, abductions, killings, sexual violence, landmines, and forced recruitment.

From the information that was shared by the community members, it was clear that the community suffered a great deal from the violence perpetrated by the RENAMO rebels. The violence was in different ways and it left deep emotional and physical scars amongst community members.

To critically examine the initiatives undertaken by the Chipinge-East community and the Zimbabwean government to address transboundary violence.

Chapter 7 was dedicated to meet this objective. From the government side, the measures, which were taken to address the RENAMO violence, included a military approach, a peace treaty as well as the Civil Protection Unit (CPU).

The ZDF's involvement in the Mozambican civil war began much earlier in the 1980s but intensified from 1986 onwards at the request of the then Mozambican president Samora Machel. Initially, the ZDF concentrated on protecting the Beira-Feruka oil pipeline, the Mutare-Beira railway line, and highway that provided Zimbabwe's access to the Indian Ocean. However, as the war intensified, to the point where the FRELIMO government was virtually left in control of the southern half of Mozambique, the scope of the ZDF's involvement widened to include attacking RENAMO rebels.

The other government measure towards the RENAMO violence was the formation of the CPU (Civil Protection Unit). However, the CPU is underfunded by the government and heavily relies on donor funds, which are not always available. The CPU's lack of capacity was also revealed by its failure to address other challenges, which the Zimbabwean civilians face including natural disasters and disease outbreaks.

It was clear that the government did not have a viable plan to protect the Chipinge-East community in the event of another outbreak of violence. The government still had faith in its institutions despite the fact that they had repeatedly failed the Chipinge-East community and other Zimbabwean communities along the border.

Given this scenario, it became clear that not all of the government's efforts to deal with the RENAMO violence were successful. Thus, the community members were at more risk should the violence break out again.

The Chipinge-East community itself did not take any initiatives to try to combat the RENAMO violence. Community members feared to be seen to bypass government efforts and thus by implication criticizing their failures. This fear emanated from political violence, which has been part of the Zimbabwean life since independence. Given this scenario, the community just had coping mechanisms such as running into the bushes and evacuating their homes when the violence became unbearable.

To design and conduct intervention that builds the Chipinge-East peacebuilding capacity against the transboundary violence.

This objective was addressed in Chapter 8. The exploratory chapters six and seven showed that the government had, at best, a reactionary approach to the violence, which left the community at risk. Thus, the community had become pro-active and designed its own plan against the violence.

This led to the designing of training for the community in peace and conflict, which covered basic concepts, training in Local Peace Committees (LPCs), Early Warning, and Early Response (EWER). Following the training, the community members formed their LPC and established their EWER strategy against the RENAMO violence and other challenges, which they faced within their community. Thereafter, Chipinge-East LPC visited other parts of their constituency and presented the EWER to their fellow community members. This was followed by two feedback sessions at the district and provincial level whereby the LPC shared the EWER strategy with the local authorities and government officials (see section 8.6).

To evaluate the short-term outcome of the intervention.

This objective was addressed in chapter nine. The evaluation of the intervention was conducted using the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) criteria. The criteria focused on the relevance, efficiency, impact, effectiveness, and sustainability of the intervention. The

evaluation was then done through a questionnaire given to the research-participants during a follow-up visit to the community. From the responses of the research participants, the intervention was relevant, it was conducted in a cost-efficient manner and it had an impact in the community at personal, interpersonal and systemic levels. Furthermore, the evaluation revealed that the research was effective in that it left the community members with an EWER strategy and a community structure equipped with the skills to deal with the violence. The evaluation also revealed that the community had plans to sustain the intervention after the conclusion of the research and export the LPC and EWER trainings to other border communities. I also noted my plans to start an organization, which would train more communities on this issue after the conclusion of my research.

9.4 Three Key Conclusions

From the research, I drew three main conclusions about peacebuilding in communities located along the border with Mozambique. These conclusions emanate from the realization that communities along the natural borders are typically marginalized from the centers of political power.

Border Communities Face Marginalization, Risks, and Threats

The research led me to the realization that communities located along the borders face numerous risks and threats. This fact was proven from the data gathered from the desk review and field research. The marginalization emanates from the failure of African governments to effectively administer their territories. This scenario is attributed to the combination of colonial legacy as well as post-colonial mis-governance. The colonial legacy left the post-independent African governments with boundaries that were designed from the 1884-1885 Berlin West Africa Conference. These inherited boundaries have left African countries with territories that are either landlocked, too small or too big to administer. This configuration thus makes it hard for the African governments to effectively administer the boundaries that constitute their countries. In addition to the colonial legacy, bad governance on the part of

post-independent African governments has led to maladministration of their respective territories.

These two factors contribute to the marginalization of the communities, which dwell along the borders with neighboring countries. This marginalization is in the form of economic stagnation, a lack of developed infrastructure or effective institutions on the ground, which in turn exposes the communities to various risks and threats. These risks and threats include robberies, murders, skirmishes, and sexual violence.

Government is yet to Fully Grasp Peacebuilding

The research revealed that the Zimbabwean government lacks peacebuilding skills and knowledge. This was not the main focus of the study, but it was stumbled upon during the course of the study. This conclusion became apparent during the feedback workshops with government officials. Despite the testimonies of the community members or the numerous media reports of the suffering, which the Chipinge community members go through during the episodes of violence from the RENAMO rebels, the government did not consider it a priority. Despite the fact that the Mozambican politics was volatile and that RENAMO attacks could break out at any given time, the government has not taken any pro-active measures to protect the communities along the border from future violence.

This shows that the government has a reactionary approach to the violence, which these communities face and further, that its reaction focusses on meeting violence with violence. This is despite the fact that the military solution actually worsened the attacks, which the Chipinge community was facing in 1977-1992. It seemed the government did not learn a lesson from the experience of the RENAMO attacks during the Mozambican civil war.

This lack of a culture of peace in government circles is evidenced in many government responses to matters of conflict in and out of Zimbabwe. The government uses violence to deal with opposition parties, activists and protests. The government's lack of a culture of peace is also seen in its long history of failed peace treaties and peace commissions, the Unity Accord of

December 1987, which ended the Gukurahundi massacres of 1983-1987, as well as the Rome peace treaty of 1992, which ended the Mozambican civil war. Peace commissions such as the Organ of National Healing and Reconciliation (ONHR) (2009-2013) and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) (2018-present) failed to address key issues of transitional justice.

Zimbabwean Border Communities Lack a Spirit of Initiatives

The research showed that the Zimbabwean communities are hesitant to take initiatives to address the challenges within their communities. This attitude has its roots in government attitudes and behavior towards perceived opposition. The government's paranoia with opposition politics and the regime change agenda following the land reform program of the year 2000 has led to on-going pre and post-electoral violence. Opposition members are intimidated, attacked by ruling party supporters, and are accused of betraying the revolution led by the founding fathers of Zimbabwe's liberation movement.

This violence and intimidation extended to any person or community, which appears to be criticizing the government. Community initiatives that are meant to address the challenges faced by the grassroots communities fit into that description as well. To the ruling party and its supporters, community initiatives are a way of exposing the government's shortcomings. This violence-affected parts of Chipinge as well and thus the community members became reluctant to partake in any community initiatives. The community members found themselves trapped between the RENAMO violence and political violence from ruling party supporters. Their response has been to just stay quiet and surrender the matter into the hands of the government, despite the shortcomings.

However, the research study revealed that communities have a great potential in dealing with the violence which the community members residing along the border. The local peace committees are on the ground where the violence takes place and they have experience with the manner in which the violence transpires thus they are able to formulate their own early warning systems to safeguard themselves against this violence. Furthermore, the research has

revealed that if the local authorities are kept informed of every step of the way, they are likely to be less resistant and suspicious of the LPC. The authorities are likely to support the activities of the LPC if a clear line of communication is kept between the LPC and the authorities. Through this communication, the authorities are able to see that the LPC is neither criticizing the government nor seeking to topple it. Rather the LPC is aiming to complement the efforts of the government and cover some of the gaps in the services provided.

9.5 Recommendations

The research led me to some recommendations to the Zimbabwean stakeholders the border communities, the Zimbabwean NGOs and the Government of Zimbabwe.

The Border Communities it is vital for these respective communities to formulate their own structures and early warning system. The community should do so for three main reasons. First, there are the challenges faced by the government to provide a peaceful and safe environment during times of disturbances in Mozambique. Second, the community members have the experience of the violence and contextual knowledge of the community. Thus, they are the ones who know the directions from which the violence comes from and the safe places or routes, which the various community members can utilize to keep from harms-way. Third, the border communities are located in remote areas, which are difficult to access due to a deplorable road network. Thus, relying on the police, the army, and other emergency services is not a good idea.

A select group should not formulate the early warning system; rather it should be the outcome of a community-wide discussion. This will aid in ensuring that the early warning system is able to protect the different members of the community from violence.

It is important for the community to always keep the local authorities and the government officials informed about their activities. It is unwise for the communities to isolate the authorities from the activities of the LPC for they run the risk of being mistaken for political activists. Community members are to be

reminded at all times that the LPC is not meant to oppose the government but rather complement its efforts. However, it is also crucial for the LPC not to directly involve the local authorities in its day-to-day operations; the LPC should remain community-driven. If the government or any other external actor drives the LPC, it runs the risk of losing support from the community.

Community members should support the LPC with whatever resources they can find. The research revealed that the LPC is not a capital-intensive venture. It can effectively run with very little by way of material resources. However, at some point resources might be required for members during meetings or awareness-raising activities.

The NGO Sector Various NGOs could assist in the LPCs by equipping them with more skills and information, which they could use during the times of crisis. The Chipinge-East LPCs could benefit from further training in Sexual Gender-Based Violence, first aid, and Mine Risk Education. This is based on the types of violence, which they face. The types of training differ from different community to community and they are dependent on the nature of violence, which a particular community face. It is imperative for the LPC to be multi-faceted; it needs more training besides peace and conflict training. The NGO support will also incentivize the LPCs to do more regarding the use of context-based resources to solve the challenges they face at the community level.

Government of Zimbabwe: all levels of government need to open up to the concept of Local Peace Committees. These LPCs could assist to complement the government efforts through addressing challenges in far-flung or remote areas, which are difficult to reach. The government should also take the threat of the RENAMO rebels seriously. It needs to accept that until a sustained peace is established in Mozambique, cross border violence will re-occur. The moment that clashes occur within Mozambique, the communities along the border are at risk. The government should thus be proactive and help keep the communities in a state of preparedness. The government should also not be fooled by the cordial relations between Mozambican and Zimbabwean communities, which counts for very little in the face of the RENAMO disturbances. Most relatives are not in a position to protect the communities

from the violence, which is perpetrated by the rebels. Rather, experience has shown that these relationships put the Zimbabwean community members at a larger risk because as the Mozambican refugees flee to their relatives on the Zimbabwean side the RENAMO rebels pursue them.

The Zimbabwean government might also need to consider other responses to the RENAMO ulcer as opposed to the military approach. The military approach to the RENAMO ulcer has shown that it also increases the risk of the community. It actually worsens the violence within the communities. Furthermore, the military approach is ineffective in that it is impossible to patrol the whole borderline, which is over 1000km long. There will never be enough soldiers to do this task. The border will always be porous especially considering the mountainous terrain, which characterizes parts of the border, especially in the Manicaland province. Thus, the RENAMO rebels can always find a way into the country to harass the Zimbabwean communities. Furthermore, the RENAMO rebels are a guerrilla unit and thus they will always try and avoid a direct confrontation with the ZDF.

The government is encouraged to learn more about peacebuilding so as to effectively deal with violence and other disputes that arise in the border communities and the nation at large. The government is urged to take advantage of the various peace institutes within Zimbabwe, many located at universities to tap into their skills and knowledge. The government is also encouraged to take heed of the clarion call from Zimbabwean and International academics who have repeatedly called for the spread of infrastructures of peace in Zimbabwe (see section 2.4). The government is also urged not to see the peace institutes and academics as threats to its power, but rather as allies who could bring sustainable harmony and tranquility in Zimbabwe if they are given the chance to implement their ideas.

9.6 Discussion

For the greater part, the research findings were aligning themselves to the points raised in the literature review chapters. For instance, the research findings confirmed the issue of non-hegemonic states as argued by Thomson (2010:16) in section 3.7. In Chapter 6, the research established that the

Chipinge community had been facing attacks from the RENAMO rebels and the Zimbabwean government had repeatedly failed to effectively deal with this threat.

In addition, the research findings confirmed that Conflict Transformation is a constructive change process that reduces violence, increases justice in direct interaction and social structures as argued by Lederach (2014:16) in section 2.4.3. During the evaluation stage of the research (See Section 8.12), the research participants pointed out that the training sessions they went through, the establishment of the LPC as well as the implementation of the EWER strategy had transformed their way of handling conflicts affecting their community.

The research findings also illustrated that Conflict Transformation helps subjects of domination to discover and develop the power to participate in what affects them as argued by Francis (2002:08) in Section 2.4.3. The research participants also confirmed this when they stated that the establishment of the LPC made them feel empowered as they had a say in the way to handle the RENAMO ulcer which had bothered them for long (See Section 8.12).

However, the research findings conflicted with the literature review on the issue of LPCs coordinating with government officials as argued by Lederach (1997:39) and Dube and Makwerere (2012:301) in Section 2.4.3. In the process of the research, provincial government officials were engaged on the issue of the LPC in Chipinge and its EWER strategy. However, they were not open to the idea (See Section 8.8). This led to the conclusion that it's not in all cases that the government structures are supportive to the ideas of grassroots communities resolving their issues. Sometimes they can be suspicious that the LPC wants to subvert their authority.

My research findings also brought to light the fact that its not in all cases that antagonists can be brought together to map a way forward (See Section 2.4.3). My research showed that the Chipinge community was in not in a position to engage the RENAMO rebels about the violence which affects them. This is due to the bureaucracy and protocols involved between the two governments i.e. Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, despite the setback, the research

findings showed that Conflict Transformation and LPCs can still operate in the absence of the other antagonist. The Chipinge LPC went ahead to plan how best to mitigate the violence perpetrated by the antagonist (See Chapter 8).

The research also helped to bridge an existing information gap in the research surrounding RENAMO incursions along the border communities. The only literature available was a dissertation written by Mukonza (2016) an undergraduate student from the Midlands State University. In her dissertation she accounts for the impact and legacy of the Matsanga Movement (1976-1992) (See Sections 6.3, 6.6 and 6.7). However, with the research that I conducted it goes beyond 1992 and looks at the incursions that occurred between 2013-2016. Furthermore, my research goes beyond the effects and legacies and analyzes the response of the both the government and the members of the affected communities (See Chapter 7). In this analysis, I draw out the strengths and weaknesses of the responses of both parties (Zimbabwe government and Chipinge community). This analysis see the focus transcending the Zimbabwean border into Mozambique during the peak of the Mozambican Civil War. In addition, my research put more emphasis on the way forward i.e. formation of the Local Peace Committee and the formulation of an EWER strategy (See Chapter 8). In this dimension, my research puts the community members at the fore front of finding a mitigation to the violence from RENAMO rebels.

9.7 Personal Reflections

The research that I conducted in Chipinge-East had a personal impact on me as well rather than the research-participants. The experience taught me a lot about the silent suffering, which communities along the border face that are barely known to those of us who dwell in the big cities located miles away from these communities. Media coverage is also limited in these areas such that most of the stories of the people in these areas are often untold. The nation's attention is only drawn to these communities when disaster strikes and something major happens in the Chipinge-East community. Prior to the study, I had never set my foot there.

The research also taught me about the resilience and the commitment which people in rural communities have for their communities. The people are more closely-knit than urban dwellers. When a challenge affects their community, they are quick to rally forces and implement coping mechanisms despite the hardships that they face. The community members also apply the same energy and spirit when people try to help their community. During the research, I was often moved by the way the community members would volunteer themselves and even donate the meager resources they had for the research to move on. Some members of the LPC volunteered to walk long distances to raise awareness regarding the EWER strategy. Other members donated various food items during meetings and trainings. As mentioned earlier, one of the chiefs in the area volunteered his home to be the venue of the trainings and meetings. This unity of purpose within the Chipinge-East community led to the formation of friendships, which are going to outlast the research itself. It is this commitment that spurred me to continue with the research even on gloomy days when there appeared to be no hope of getting certain information or completing certain aspects of the research.

My interaction with government officials and local authorities also taught me a lot regarding the political dynamics at play. The government protects its image at all times and at all costs. It does not easily admit if there is a problem, which it is failing to solve. It fears to appear weak in the eyes of its people and would rather place the blame on someone or even bury their heads in the sand. This is why the feedback session with government authorities at the provincial level faced challenges. Nevertheless, the experience with the authorities also taught me the virtue of resilience, persistence and relationship building. Some of the government officials that I wanted to engage with were often unavailable and reluctant to share information. These proved to be the most challenging times of the study. However, through continuous visits to their offices, I became a familiar face around, I built relations with either them or their colleagues who then presented my case to them, and finally, interviews were granted. This tactic, I need to say, did not work with the military officials.

Much more still has to be done in terms of building the capacity of the communities to be confident enough to take initiatives and also for government

authorities to warm up to these community initiatives. This is what inspired me to start my own organization, Harmony International, which will focus on facilitating the formulation of community safety plans and social structures in border communities to deal with challenges from grassroots level. The research taught me that as a Zimbabwean national, I have a duty to take initiatives, which assist to resolve the challenges within my community.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Initial Focus Group Discussion Questions (for Chipinge community members affected by the transboundary conflict)

English

1. Can you narrate the conflict that has occurred between Chipinge and Mozambique over the years?
2. How would you describe the situation nowadays
3. How is your respective community affected by this conflict?
4. What do you think causes this conflict?
5. How have your local or national authorities responded to this conflict?
6. What has been the effectiveness of these responses?
7. What peace initiatives has your community made to resolve the conflict?
8. How successful have been these peace initiatives?
9. In which ways can your communities build more peaceful relations?

Shona

1. Tsanangurai kuti mhirizhonga iri pakati penharaunda dzenyu dzakatanga riini uye dziri kukonzerwa neyi?
2. Mazuvano mhirizhonga iyi yakamira sei?
3. Nharaunda dzenyu dziri kuvhiringidzwa zvakadii nemhiri zhonga iyi?
4. Hurumende dzemunyika menyu dziri kuitei maererano ne mhirizhonga iyi?
5. Matanho ari kutorwa nehurumende dzenyu maererano nebopoto riri pakati pe nharaunda dzenyu ari kubudirira zvakadii?
6. Nharaunda yenyu yakatora matanho api kuti idzivirire bopoto?
7. Matanho aya akabudirira zvakadii?
8. Chii chamungaita imi vagari vemunharaunda idzi maererano nekuunza runyararo nemawirirano maringe ne mhirizhonga iyi?

APPENDIX 2: Interview Guide (For Key Informants/Community Leaders: Chiefs, Headmen, Rural District Council

English

1. What is your nationality?
2. What is your government position?
3. What are the origins and nature of the conflict between the two communities?
4. How has your community been affected by the violence and tension along the border?
5. What efforts have been taken by your respective government to resolve the tension and violence between the two communities?
6. How effective have been these efforts?
7. How best can the conflict be resolved from your own perspective?

Shona

1. Munobva kunyika ipi?
2. Munoita basa ripi muhuremende?
3. Mhirizhongwa iri pakati penyu ne Zimbabwe/Mozambique yakabvepi?
4. Nharaunda yenyu yakavhiringidzwa sei nemhirizhongwa iyi?
5. Hurumende yenyu iri kuitei kuti mhirizhongwa iyi ipere?
6. Matano ari kutorwa nehurumende ari kubudirira zvakadii?
7. Chii chimwe chingaitwa kuti bopoto iri ripere?

Appendix 3 Evaluation of the Chipinge East Intervention

English


1. Was the intervention of the research helpful in addressing the violence faced by your community at the hands of the RENAMO rebels?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
2. Was the intervention activities done in a cost-effective manner?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
3. Did the intervention bring about any change in your life or community? Explain your answer in detail.
4. Has your community managed to come up with an initiative regarding the violence from RENAMO rebels? Explain this initiative.
5. Are there any plans to continue the efforts to keep the community initiative after the conclusion of the research study? Explain these plans further.

Shona

1. Chirongwa chamakaita chakabatsira here kudzivirira nharaunda yenyu kubva kune mhiri-zhonga yemauto e RENAMO?
 - a) Hongu
 - b) Kwete
2. Chirongwa chakaitwa nenzira yaidhura here kune vagari vemunharaunda menyu?
 - a) Hongu
 - b) Kwete
3. Chirongwa chakaunza shanduko here muhupenyu hwenyu kana mumagariro emunharaunda yenyu? Tsanangurai mhinduro yenyu.
4. Vagari vemu nharaunda yenyu vakakwanisa here kugadzira hurongwa hwekuzvidzivirira kubva kune mhiri-zhonga yemauto e RENAMO? Tsanangurai mhinduro yenyu.

Pane hurongwa here hweku enderera mberi nechirongwa kana dzidzo yemunharaunda menyu yasvika kumagumo? Tsanangurai mhinduro yenyu.

Appendix 4 Approval Letter from the University DUT



22 June 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I write as head of the Peacebuilding Programme at Durban University of Technology in South Africa.

One of our postgraduate students - **Muneyi Muchanyuka** – is carrying out research on cooperation and conflict in communities along the Mozambique/Zimbabwe border. He is based in Mutare.

I would be very grateful for any assistance you can provide him.

n.geoffreyh@dut.ac.za

Professor **Geoffrey H. H. H. H.**
Peacebuilding Programme

PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME
DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

Appendix 5 Approval Letter from Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing

Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing

Correspondence should not be addressed to individuals



Office of the Provincial Administrator
(Manicaland)
P.O. Box 535
Mutare

Telephone: 020 625 44, 62589, 62594
Telefax: 020-63726, 61388

ZIMBABWE

REF: C/17

12 June 2016

The District Administrator
Chipinge

AUTHORITY FOR MR MUNEYI MUCHANYUKA TO UNDERTAKE ACADEMIC RESEARCH: CHIPINGE, MANICALAND PROVINCE

Reference is made to the above captioned matter.

We advise that authority has been granted to Mr Muneyi Muchanyuka to carry out a PhD study on *Cooperation and Conflict in Communities along the Mozambique/Zimbabwe Border*. Therefore, the respective District Administrator is implored to render the requisite possible assistance to the cited person.

J. Sibule
FOR PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR
MANICALAND

Copy: The Minister of State for Provincial Affairs-Manicaland
M. Muneyi Muchanyuka
PA's File
RF