REDUCING NIGERIAN YOUTHS INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE: AN ACTION RESEARCH APPROACH

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies

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DECLARATION

I, Olaoluwa Babatunde Adeyanju Oyinloye, declare that:

a. This thesis herewith submitted to the Durban University of Technology has not been previously submitted for any degree or examination at any other university
b. The research reported in this thesis is my original research.
c. All data, pictures, graphs or other information sourced from other sources have been acknowledged accordingly – both in-text and in the references sections.
d. In the cases where other written sources have been quoted, then:
    1. The quoted words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced:
    2. Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks and duly referenced.

Olaoluwa Babatunde A. Oyinloye

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to Almighty God and the memory of my late sister Miss Oreoluwa Temitope Oyinloye.

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I acknowledge heartily the grace, wisdom, goodness, provisions and inspiration of God bestowed upon me throughout the period of this study by God Almighty.

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's political landscape has the potential to be, and it is divided along, several fault lines including ethnicity and religious affiliations in the midst of widespread poverty and unemployment, especially among the large population of the youth. Hence, the contest for political or electoral posts, by default, is shaped by these factors and others highlighted in the study. Thus, the youth of Nigeria find themselves in a space where supporting a particular candidate usually translates into choosing one of the several fault lines to associate with rather than individual merit and competence. This invariably leads to their involvement in acts of electoral violence, as merit and competence are usually not the factors that count in most of the elections but, rather, the might of a particular group or party.

The use of action research as an approach to this study has allowed an in-depth exploration of the problem of youth involvement in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria. It has also allowed the engagement of a number of youth, not just in understanding the disadvantages of electoral violence but also in the dangers of engaging in it, both for the nation and the perpetrators. So also, the benefits of peaceful engagement in the electoral processes were also highlighted. The use of action research allowed the youth a major role in the study as it is focused on "doing with" rather than traditional research of "doing for". Thus, the participant youth were trained and equipped with relevant skills and supervised in a process of engaging their fellow Nigerian youth on the subject matter of electoral violence.

The findings from this study offer some multidimensional, conceptual and practical frameworks to reduce the involvement of the Nigerian youth in acts of electoral violence. Thereby promoting societal peace and a sustainable democratic system of governance in Nigeria, bearing in mind that such are necessary for the sustainable growth and development of the nation. The practical training and interventions approach developed by this study are easily replicable and affordable, and it is intended as a template for use in areas that need to curb the involvement of youth in the acts of electoral violence, both in Nigeria and across the African continent.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AD:	Alliance for Democracy
APC:	All Progressives Congress
APP:	All Progressives Party
AR:	Action Research
AVP:	Alternative to Violence Project
CDC:	Centre for Disease Control
DFID:	Department for International Development
EMB:	Electoral Management Body
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FPI:	The Ivorian Popular Front
HRW:	Human Rights Watch
IFES:	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
INEC:	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPV:	Intimate Partner Violence
JDPC:	Justice, Development and Peace Commission
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
NOA:	National Orientation Agency
NPC:	Nigerian Peace Committee
PDCI:	The Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire
PDP:	People's Democratic Party
RDR:	Reassemblement des Republicains
RTI:	Radiodiffusion Television Ivorian
OSCE:	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
TMG:	Transparency Monitoring Group
USAID:	United States' Agency for International Development
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The involvement of youth in violent acts is a global phenomenon. The CDC (2014) claims that it is the second highest source of deaths among youths aged between 15 and 24 years. In a similar vein, Krug (2002: 25) posits that violence perpetrated by youths is a global occurrence and one of the most visible forms of violence reported on a daily basis by the media worldwide. They both posit that young people are often the architects and recipients of such violence either as gangs, in schools or anywhere else.

The experiences of electoral violence have been mixed across the 54 African countries, with some countries experiencing few or no electoral violence acts, while several African countries such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya, DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda have all at one time or the other experienced violent electoral episodes. Low intensity violence has also been a pervasive feature of electoral processes of most other African countries (Adolfo *et al.* 2012). These low intensity electoral violence acts include the intimidation of contestants and voters alike, imprisonments, forced protections, armed clashes, murder, destruction of properties, ballot box snatching, ballot box stuffing, disruption of voting or collation of votes (Adolfo *et al.* 2012; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015). Furthermore, Adolfo *et al.* (2012) also identified countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Madagascar as some of the countries with features of low intensity electoral violence activities including the countries that have earlier been identified with episodes of violent electoral acts.

The occurrence of electoral violence has been observed to take place at any point during the electoral process or throughout the electoral process, that is, pre-elections, during elections and post-elections. The identified sponsors of electoral violence include the incumbents and opposition parties who both employ acts of electoral violence to advance their respective causes (Collier and Vicente 2014: 1; Onapajo 2014: 21) . The scope of electoral violence extends from acts of physical violence to psychological violence and structural violence acts employed during an electoral process.

The situation is not much different in Nigeria where elections have often been accompanied by waves of violence that usually have severe consequences which include loss of lives and

properties since independence (Bratton 2008; Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010; Okeyim, Adams and Ojie 2012: 6; Collier and Vicente 2014; Bello 2015)

Electoral violence in Nigeria is traceable to the 1964/65 post-colonial era in which crisis brought the first republic to an abrupt end and, in 1979, a bitter contest over results ensued with a military takeover, while the 1993 elections were annulled by the military junta and resulted in unprecedented post electoral violence (Danjibo and Oladeji 2007; Olusola 2013). After alternating between military rules and civilian administrations since independence in 1960, Nigeria finally embraced democracy in 1999 and this has been uninterrupted for the past 17 years the longest experience ever (Nossiter 2011). Thus, it can be said that Nigeria's democracy is a nascent one and needs to be consolidated for political and socio-economic stability, including the stability of the sub-Saharan African region. As credible elections are essential in ensuring democratic and political stability, they are therefore, the lifeblood of all democracies (Afe 2015).

The 1999 elections were conducted as a compromise to ease the military out of power, while the elections held in 2003 were acclaimed to be an exercise in massive fraud and violence, just like the 2007 elections that President Obasanjo declared as a do or die affair (Danjibo and Oladeji 2007; Collier and Vicente 2014).

The build up to the 2003 elections claimed the life of Chief Bola Ige the incumbent federal minister of justice in his country home in December 2001 – a murder yet unresolved and handled shabbily (Dike 2003: 3). Several political elites were assassinated during this period, along with Chief Bola Ige among whom are Alfred Rewane an elder statesman and Chief Harry Marshal just to mention a few (Igbafe and Offiong 2007: 3). Available records from the Transparency Monitoring Group Nigeria (TMG) (2007) cited in Onapajo (2014: 38,39) also show that the 2007 elections recorded serious bouts of violence with the assassinations of leading gubernatorial candidates in their homes in Ekiti and Lagos States. Dr. Ayo Daramola and Mr. Funsho Williams both of the PDP (People's Democratic Party), were brutally murdered in their bedrooms by political assassins. The TMG also recorded more than 31 gruesome deaths and with 60 fatalities in the limited areas of 13 States which they covered.

The 2011 elections in Nigeria also abounded in violence beyond description, as Edet (2015: 3) noted in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections that more than 65,000 people were rendered homeless, more than 800 lives were lost and over 350 churches were razed to the

ground. In 2015, the election results were mixed (Edet 2015). However, the 2016 rerun elections especially in oil rich River and Bayelsa States have taken violence to the extremes, with citizens engaging the military in shoot outs and gruesome murders of political opponents, paramilitary and military officers (All Africa 2016; Asomba 2016; Ikeke 2016; Oluwalana 2016).

Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 10) also noted that residential houses, party offices, media houses, and cars are normally vandalized during election periods when electoral violence acts are being carried out. Even more interesting is that the perpetrators (thugs and supporters of political parties), who are mainly youths, often fall victim to electoral violence in which some lose their lives or are wounded or maimed for life.

In the view of Afe (2015), the violence that results from the declaration of candidates perceived by the people as unfair or rigged in Nigeria has often led to violent eruptions with attendant destruction of people's property, the burning of human beings alive, and the incursion of military into governance (Afe 2015: 12).

1.2 Problem Statement

The problem of youth involvement in electoral violence as both perpetrators and victims deserves urgent attention as they (youths) have been identified as being directly responsible for 95% of electoral violence acts in Nigeria since independence (Okafor 2015). Electoral violence has claimed so many lives, resulted in the loss of massive properties, and induced fear among citizens to engage in the electoral process. This has the capability of not only affecting the credibility of elections in Nigeria but also of bringing about political instability and derailing the Nigerian project. It is a truism that it is only in the atmosphere of peace that sustainable development can take place.

Some commentators (Okafor 2011: 10; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015: 112; Okafor 2015) have specifically identified Nigerian youths as being directly responsible for almost all the acts of electoral violence perpetrated in Nigeria from independence to date. These activities of violence have included killings, the disruption of economic activities and property destruction. These developments have made taking part in elections in Nigeria a liability and most citizens are afraid to participate. Journalists also get their cameras and cars damaged. The weapons left with the youths after the elections, after being dumped by the politicians, are often subsequently used for criminal activities (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015). Hence

the conclusion of Monday and Simon (2013) that it is only the bold, wicked and violent who can take part actively in Nigeria's party politics and electoral contests.

Thus, the problem which this study seeks to address is the high levels of youth involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria.

1.3 Research aim and objectives

The general aim of this study is to identify ways of reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in acts of electoral violence.

The study objectives include:

a. To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence

b. To assess the effectiveness of current strategies, if any, being used to limit the incidence of electoral violence among Nigerian youths

c. To work with an action team consisting of a group of youths who are active politically to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria.

1.4 Justification for the study

Several studies have been carried out on electoral violence in Nigeria with a few on the involvement of youths. However, there is a dearth of study on addressing the involvement of youths of Nigeria in electoral violence, especially from an action research perspective. The youths are crucial stakeholders who not only represent the future but are also a needed resource in the building of any society (Okafor 2011: 1), including Ekiti State (the research area) of Nigeria. This is despite the pervasive political instability in Nigeria in general and Ekiti State which, at seven, has the highest number of State Chief executive turnovers – more than any other Nigerian State, between 2006 and 2010.

Hence, this study is essential for relevant bodies to address youth involvement in electoral violence through an actionable research perspective and to provide essential literature on the handling of youth involvement in electoral violence in Ekiti State. This is bearing in mind that youths are not only important stakeholders in any society but are also the future of the society, and that electoral violence poses a great threat to human lives and properties, societal peace, democratic stability, and consolidation in Ekiti State as well as the whole of Nigeria in general.

And, given the population of Nigeria, any political instability might pose serious challenges to the entire sub-Saharan Africa.

Okafor (2011), in an effort to explain the implications of youth unemployment on democratic stability, posits that youths are a very important section of any society. They are crucial stakeholders which not only represent the future of any society but are also a needed resource in the building of any nation. However, in order for youths to measure up to these requirements or expectations in any society, they must be gainfully employed (Okafor 2011).

Krug (2002: 25) categorizes youths as people whose ages are between 10 and 29 years. However, bearing in mind that the extent of offending and victimization goes up to those aged 35 years, it is necessary to extend the age bracket for the youth study to effectively understand and address youth violence.

The concept of youth can be described as an intermediary phase between adulthood and childhood (Furlong 2013). Its scope extends beyond the specific confinement of age ranges, and the involvement in certain activities does not delineate its termination point. Such activities include having sexual relations, being a parent or taking up paid employment (Furlong 2013: 1).

Thus, it can be said that the concept of youth, unlike adolescence, transcends specified developmental phases which start with puberty and terminates with the attainment of physiological and emotional maturity. The concept of youth instead covers a more random and extended period of time (Furlong 2013: 1, 2). Unlike Furlong, the United Nations and several of its member States employ chronological precepts of age to define youth. The United Nations defines youths as those between 15 and 35 years of age.

For van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward (2012), defining the age group we refer to as youths is not as simple as it seems. The categorization differs from country to country (Van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward 2012: 2). While they conceptualize youth as those whose ages are between 15 and 25 years old, the South African National youth policy is more open minded and categorizes youths as those within the age range of 14 and 35 years old. This, van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward (2012) explained, is due to the context in which the South African youth grew up, which often involved a lot of compromises. This necessitates a definition that includes those who had been disadvantaged one way or the other (van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward 2012: 3).

Heinz (2009:6) explains that the variations in the conceptualization of the term 'youth' is because of the socio-economic and educational policies in the various States. He further said that the life course of the youth is also dependent on the social structures which differs from one society to the other. There are also different policies and arrangements peculiar to different societies and States about life transitions which, at times, is regulated by means of educational and training provisions limited by age or the required age in which one can vie for political office, and any other exclusionary policies including those specified by an explicit youth policy (Heinz 2009:4; Furlong 2013:3).

However, for this study I will be adopting the legal definition of youth as specified explicitly by the 2nd National Youth Policy 2009 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In this document, the youths are declared as the proportion of Nigerians between the ages of 15 and 35 years old (Nigeria 2009). It is worth noting that, of the people aged 15 and 35 years of age globally, 35% reside in Africa. That population statistic, especially in Africa, is expected to increase until the year 2050 (van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward 2012: 96). According to Van der Merwe**,** Dawes and Ward (2012: 96), those who are 15 and 25 years of age make up a total of 18% of the global human population, out of which 86% reside in developing countries. The size of the world's youthful population is expected to have a clear impact on societal development as the engagements of the youth with institutions either promote social justice or breed divisions in their respective societies and, consequently, the world at large. Thus, the study of youth is essential, and it has been described as the best measure of the cost and benefits of a country's socio-economic and political decisions (Wyn and White 1997: 6; Van der Merwe, Dawes and Ward 2012; Furlong 2013: 5)**.**

1.5 Research design

This study is an action research with exploratory, intervention and evaluation components using Ekiti State as a case study. The study was guided by both the post-positivist and transformative research paradigms. I employed the mixed methods research approach and that which Creswell (2014: 224) termed as a sequential explanatory strategy of mixed research methods, in which data is collected in two distinct phases. Phase one is the quantitative data collection and analysis which informs or guides the second phase of data collection which is the qualitative one, and engages purposeful sampling methods building on the results obtained from the phase one data collection done with the quantitative data collection methods (Creswell 2009: 211; 2014: 224, 225; 2015: 2).

The adoption of the mixed research methods is predicated on Creswell's (2014) position that the usefulness of the mixed research methods design combats the inherent weaknesses in both the quantitative and qualitative research designs when used alone. And in this study of youth involvement in electoral violence in Ekiti State, Nigeria it helped me to generalize the findings from the study sample to the main population of Ekiti State as well as to develop a detailed knowledge of the phenomenon of electoral violence in the study area (Creswell 2014: 14,15).

Hence, I did a survey on a large number of respondents (youths) across the study area and did a qualitative follow-up with fewer participants in an effort to obtain their detailed, specific language and voices to help accept, reject or explain the findings in the quantitative survey done earlier (Creswell 2014: 19). I also used closed ended survey field research instruments like questionnaires to generate quantitative data and followed up with open ended field research tools such as interviews, observations and focus group discussions for collecting qualitative data. These two sets of data formed the baseline data (addressing study objectives 1 and 2) upon which the action agenda of the study was built.

Action research of the study consisted of a series of interventions which were designed in line with the findings obtained from the analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data collected for the study. The action interventions were carried out in two phases namely: phase one for the action group as specified in objective three of the study, while phase two, consisting of larger interventions, was designed and carried out by the members of the action group in conjunction with the researcher.

1.6 Structure of Dissertation / Thesis Chapters

Part I Introduction and Background

Chapter One: This chapter contains the introduction and background to the study, an overview of Nigeria as a country, and the context of the study will also be discussed. Other elements contained in this section include: the study objectives; the justification of the study; the problem statement; the study limitations and delimitations or scope; an overview of the research methods, as well as the structure of the dissertation.

Part II Literature Review

Chapter Two: This chapter outlines relevant literature concerning the theoretical foundations of the study as predicated on the conflict transformation theory as well as the frustration and aggression theory. It will also include the review of literature on key concepts or conceptual

discourse in which several key concepts pertaining to the study will be explained highlighting how they relate to the study. Some of the key concepts examined include: conflict, peace, violence, models of conflicts and types of violence from the perspectives of different scholars.

Chapter Three: This chapter discusses empirical literature on elections, electoral violence and the youths. It also examines the backgrounds, causes, dynamics, extent and consequences of electoral violence and the involvement of youths in selected African states such as Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. A section of the chapter includes the strategies that have been employed to address the issues of youth participation in acts of electoral violence across the case studies examined.

Part III Research Methods

Chapter Four: Contains a breakdown of research, outline, research design, methodology, data collection and evaluation methods employed in the study.

Chapter Five: This section of the study contains the presentation and analysis of data collected from the study field done in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria. The data for this research work were sourced using mixed (quantitative and qualitative) methods of data collection among which were the use of questionnaires, interviews and observations. The questionnaires were used to collect baseline data in line with the adopted sequential research methods adopted for this study in chapter four. The qualitative data were sourced via interviews and observations, and were used to gather more in-depth information on the involvement of youths in electoral violence which the broad-based questionnaires could not do.

Part IV Action Intervention Design, Implementation and Evaluation

Chapter Six: This chapter deals with objective three of this study that states: To work with an advisory group to design, implement and evaluate an action plan aimed at reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in Ekiti State in acts of electoral violence. Hence, following from this, the advisory group deliberated on the results of the analysis of data collected from the field in the previous chapter. A training session was designed and implemented for the action and advisory team members to equip them for further intervention plans among the youths in the study area.

Chapter Seven: The purpose of this chapter of the study is to present the action team's process of arriving at or designing its action plans and the kinds of interventions planned towards

fulfilling the aims of the study, which is to reduce the involvement of Nigerian youths in acts of electoral violence in Ekiti State, the study area.

Chapter Eight: This chapter presents the implementation of the interventions designed by the action team members as discussed in the previous chapter.

Chapter Nine: This chapter deals with the evaluation of the intervention implemented in chapter eight. This is in line with the third objective of this study which is: To work with a reference group of politically active youths to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria. Hence, the last part of the third objective deals with the evaluation to be done as proposed in the literature on evaluation.

Chapter Ten: This contains the conclusion and summary of the study with recommendations for future researchers interested in the subject matter of this study or the study area to consider. It also contains recommendations from the study findings for the stakeholders in the study area.

Endnotes

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PART II LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter will focus on the review of theoretical considerations and discussion about key concepts relevant to the study.

2.1 Conflict as a concept

The term 'conflict', according to Barash and Webel (2002), Miller and King (2005: 22), was derived from the Latin word *confligere* which means or can be interpreted to mean, "to strike together", clash or take part in a fight. In this case, Barash and Webel (2002) posit that it will be impossible for two physical objects to occupy the same space at the same time. Hence, the clash which often resorts in the two of them taking up new positions towards a resolution of the conflict (Barash and Webel 2002, Miller and King 2005: 22, Oyinloye 2013: 119).

Conflict, according to many different scholars, has also been described as an intrinsic aspect of human life that is inevitable, ubiquitous and pervasive; therefore, it can't be removed but kept in bounds (Zartman 1997: 197, Lederach 2000: 9, Miller and King 2005: 23, Tillett and French 2010, Fisher 2011). For Max Weber cited in Williams (2005: 14), and Oyinloye (2013: 119), conflicts cannot be divorced from social life, and that peace is nothing more than just a change in the variables supporting a conflict. This includes variables like actors, issues, perceptions and chances of selection. The occurrence of conflicts is not location specific; they can happen anywhere and at any time; they can occur over a period, or erupt suddenly like a flash (Francis 2007: 20, and Tillett and French 2010: 1). They also described the act of fighting and of armed conflicts as some features of a conflict rather than the conflict itself. It involves the employment of armed violence and force towards the pursuit and attainment of specific incompatible goals and interests (Francis 2007: 20). Violence is deemed as an entirely different concept from conflicts, but one of the options – albeit not a totally wholesome option of addressing conflicts (Tillett and French 2010: 2). In like manner, a distinction between armed conflict and war has been said to be in the number of casualties involved. Thus, when the number of deaths amounts to a thousand people, such an armed conflict situation is regarded or defined as a war situation (Demmers 2016: 3).

For Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), *"conflicts, especially intergroup ones, are a permanent, repressive and pervasive feature of social life"* and they can take place at any level of

intergroup relationships when the parties have contradictory goals (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 12, 13). The drawback in this definition stems from its focus on large groups of people, as conflicts do not only happen between groups but also between and within individuals (interpersonal and intra-personal). Also, goals do not have to be contradictory, but can be perceived to be incompatible without being exclusive, as the definitions of conflict by the Responding To Conflict (RTC) team suggest (Fisher 2011).

One of most popular definitions or conceptualizations of conflict was presented by Chris Mitchel (1981) in the first chapter of *Structure of international conflict.* There he presented a definition that is believed to be inspired by the works of Johan Galtung in which Mitchel posits, "*conflict as any situation in which parties perceive they have mutually incompatible goals". (Mitchel 1981: 17; Demmers 2016: 5, 6)*. However, Mitchel's definition was rephrased in another manner by Fisher (2011) where he conceptualized conflict, according to Mitchel, as the sort of relationship which exists between two or more parties, in this case individuals or groups of individuals who have or think they have incompatible goals (Fisher 2011: 4). The distinguishing factor of this definition is the words "think they have or who have", which means the incompatibilities might be real or unreal as so many case studies have proved**.**

However, other scholars have different ideas about conflict. Some of these include Wilmot and Hocker (2007: 9) who posit that conflict is a struggle involving parties who are interdependent and who perceive resource scarcity, goal incompatibilities, and different interferences from others in achieving their goals. Coser (1967) argues that conflicts are a struggle over values, resources, power and scarce status claims in which an involved party seeks the elimination or neutralization of a perceived or identified opponent or their injury (Coser 1967: 8; Wilmot and Hocker 2007: 8). On his part, Deutsch (1973b) aptly views conflict as that which exists as a result of incompatible activities or whenever incompatible activities takes place (Deutsch 1973b: 156; Wilmot and Hocker 2007: 8).

Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011: 7, 8) conceptualized conflict as a universal characteristic of any society of humans originating from economic differentiations, psychological developments, cultural formations, social change as well as political organizations or affiliations, all of which are in themselves very conflictual and become more pronounced when people form groups about any of the originating issues with goals and interests which are believed to be or really are mutually incompatible, thus setting up a relationship of conflict.

It is believed that conflicts arise from such conditions in one's environment that precipitate incompatibilities of goals as well as ensuing behaviours and attitudes (Mitchel 1981: 26, Demmers 2016: 9). Conflicts are also non-static but are dynamic processes in which the constituent elements are consistently changing and altering or influencing the other elements of the conflict which includes behaviours, attitudes and incompatible goals. These incompatible goals that lie behind or form the basis of conflicts is what Galtung calls contradictions (Mitchel 1981: 33, Galtung 1996, Demmers 2016).

Conflict attitudes refer to the emotional/emotive and cognitive processes involved in a conflict in which the cognitive processes include elements such as stereotyping or vision tunnelling, while emotional processes consist of feelings of anger mistrust, fear, resentment, envy, suspicion and so on. Conflict behaviours are understood as those actions taken by a party aimed towards ensuring the modification or abandonment of goals by its opponents (Mitchel 1981: 29, Demmers 2016: 6,7).

The dynamism of conflict is evident in its ability to escalate or de-escalate and, as the field of normative conflict resolution advocates, the destructive aspects of conflict should be ignored while its constructive aspects should be embraced (Deutsch 1973a; Fisher 2011: 5; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 8). There's also be a differentiation between the intensification and escalation of conflict. Whereas conflict escalation involves increasing levels of tension and violence, conflict intensification deals with a hidden or unseen conflict being made deliberately more visible towards positive non-violent outcomes (Fisher 2011: 5a, 5b). It is believed that conflict intensification is needed and, in fact, is an essential instrument to engender the necessary changes a society requires which might have been unnoticed or unacknowledged, since those who might have been able to make a difference have enough resources while marginalizing the disadvantaged population (Fisher 2011: 5a, 5b). It is in this light that human rights activists like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jnr. and others, as well as other anti-apartheid activists in South Africa, worked to bring an end to the regimes fraught with violence in all its forms.

In similar manner, conflicts can also both be consensual or disensual. Consensual conflict takes place when the conflict actors want the same goal or goals which are not mutually attainable, while disensual conflicts occur when the parties involved want different things which are also perceived to be mutually exclusive (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 8, 9).

The effects of conflict have been described to be ambivalent: that is, both positive and negative. Hence, they are not entirely negative as most people believe them to be. Some of the positive effects of conflicts identified by Tillett and French (2010) include the prevention of stagnation, the instigation of change including social change, which allows salient problematic issues to be examined, the ability to improve understanding, and to bring cohesion among people, thus facilitating stability and relational integration. Positive conflict also enhances communication by making each party aware of both their own needs and preferences as well as those of others of which they were hitherto unaware. Conflicts also can bring about innovative and creative ways of doing things. However, all these positive effects occur when there is a constructive handling of the conflict (Tillett and French 2010: 14).

Likewise, other scholars such as Coser (1956); Deutsch (1973b); King (1981); and Anstey (2006) also suggest that conflict serves ambivalent functions depending on the way and manner it is handled. It can be dysfunctional or functional. Dysfunctional conflict occurs when escalation results in mutual confrontations between parties to a conflict with the aim of eliminating each other. A functional conflict ensures that problem-solving ideas are birthed by the conflicting parties, which often result in new patterns of interaction and communication while promoting creativity and innovations. This includes building trust and sensitivity to one another. Hence, they also agreed with Tillett and French (2010: 14) that the propensity of a conflict to either be functional or dysfunctional is not about the conflict itself but is dependent on the way it is handled by the parties involved in the conflict or the mediators.

The features of dysfunctional or negative consequences of a conflict which, according to Tillett and French (2010) were easier to identify by the general populace, was also highlighted by Deutsch (1973b); Tillett and French (2010) and Anstey (2006) to include poor or wrong perception of issues, relationship breakdown, broken communication, prohibition of self-development, misjudgement. That often creates entrapping situations for the actors and blows the conflict out of proportion, brings about positional negotiations instead of interest and needs-based ones. It also facilitates the initiation of destructive behaviours and violence in different forms, promoting distrust, anxiety and distress. All of this may hinder the capacity of the parties involved to attain their desired goals and even endanger their respective survival (Deutsch 1973b; King 1981; Anstey 2006: 10; Tillett and French 2010: 15).

Finally, Galtung (2009) suggests that the existence of goal compatibility precipitates increased peace levels and an atmosphere of conviviality which then enables the parties to handle

constructively other issues of conflict and goal incompatibilities that may also still exist. This agrees with the earlier stated positions of other scholars (Anstey 2006; Tillett and French 2010).

2.2 Models of Conflict

2.2.1 The ABC Triangle Model of Conflict

Various scholars at one time or the other have designed different models designed to understand conflict. One of these includes the ABC triangle model of conflict designed by Galtung (1996: 72).

Figure 2. 1 Galtung's ABC triangle



Source: http://eissr.blogspot.com.ng/2015/06/conflict-dynamics-approach.html

In this model, conflict is viewed as a triangle in which the vertices are modelled after the key elements of a conflict namely: (i) Attitudes, (ii) Behaviours, and (iii) Contradictions. Attitudes represent the perceptions by the conflict actors of each other and themselves which could be positive or negative, stereotypic or tunnel vision. This covers the emotive, connotative and cognitive aspects of the conflict (Galtung 1996: 71, 72; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 10).

The other vertices of B and C depict the conflict behaviours and contradictions respectively. The contradictions, according to (Galtung 1996: 71), refer to the underlying situation of conflict or the structures supporting or precipitating it, while the conflict behaviour can be that of co-operation, coercion, hostility and conciliation. Hence, the attitudinal aspects are referred to as the expressive characteristics of the sources of conflict, while the behaviours are viewed as the

instrumental aspects of the conflict. Galtung believes that, to have a full-fledged conflict, all three components must be present or else what we may have will be a latent conflict (Deutsch 1973b: 10; Mitchel 1981; Galtung 1996; Fisher 2011: 25; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 11).

Other popular models include the conflict escalation and de-escalation model, or the stages of conflict model, which is a graphical expression of the dynamism of conflict (Fischer, 2002). This is defined as the graphical depiction of the fluctuations in conflict intensity plotted against corresponding time periods. The process of escalation and de-escalation of conflict can be quite complex as conflicts can gestate for long periods at the latent phase, or move rapidly in a flash through all the phases and resort to violence, war or crisis depending on the scale of the conflict. This model is usually depicted by a normal distribution curve, but that does not mean that real life conflict situations always follow the pattern depicted therein. It is very useful in matching the appropriate, respective phases of conflict progression with the appropriate resolution efforts (Fisher 2011: 19; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 13).

2.2.2 The Conflict Tree Model

This is a very influential model of conflict developed by the Responding to Conflict (RTC) team in Birmingham. It is a pictorial illustration of a tree employed to stimulate debates and dialogues about the reasons for and the impacts of conflicts, in an attempt to assist a group to identify their essential difficulties and to help them tackle conflict issues with priority, while enhancing the capacity to link causes and effects of conflicts together in relation to the goals of the concerned parties (Fisher 2011: 29; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 15).

Figure 2. 2 RTC conflict tree diagram



*Source: Working with conflict (*Fisher 2011)

The conflict tree helps to address the issues within a conflict in different phases characterized by the parts of the tree. Here, the roots of the tree symbolize the root causes of the conflict, while the trunk of the tree signifies the core problems or core issues in a conflict, and the branches and leaves represent the effects of the conflict. This model is very useful in groups where the parties to the conflict might be having challenges on agreeing about the root causes, core issues and effects of the conflict (Fisher 2011: 29). Thus, in this study, the conflict tree model is very important in getting youths from different sides of the divide – that is, with political, ethnic or religious differences and so on – to work together for the purpose of agreeing on the core issues, root causes and the effects of the involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence, which is the main purpose of this study. However, the shortcomings of the conflict tree model include its inability to identify actors in an issue or the time of occurrence of such issues, unlike some other models of conflict analysis. But for this study, those factors did not present any problem as other methods as the review of literature and the methodology engaged for data collection helped to overcome these identified challenges.

2.3 Conflict management

In defining conflict management, Miller and King (2005) say that conflict management refers to all interventionist efforts geared towards the reduction, regulation, containment and downgrading of conflicts to prevent its escalation and avoid negative or dysfunctional and

destructive effects of ongoing conflicts. It also involves the avoidance of future violence through positive conflict behaviours from the actors or conflict parties involved (Miller and King 2005: 23; Best 2007a; Francis 2007: 21; Fisher 2011: 7). Miller and King (2005) also believe that not it is a rarity for conflicts to be completely resolved but rather managed and that conflict management is a constant process when actively conducted (Miller and King 2005: 23). They argue that conflict management is distinct from conflict resolution, although both can be described as a process. But conflict resolution is also a field of academic study subsumed in peace research. Thus, both can be an unconscious set of activities that people carry out without ever using such terms (Miller and King 2005: 25; Francis 2007: 21). In addition, other scholars have also distinguished the two concepts by suggesting that the purpose of conflict resolution is to address the root causes of conflict by providing a set of permanent solutions to a specific conflict acceptable to those involved, unlike conflict management, settlement and containment, which seeks to reduce or contain the conflict (Burton 1988: 2; Tillett and French 2010: 2). Hence, while conflict resolution addresses the root causes of conflict, conflict management merely attempts to suppress or check the conflict.

Furthermore, conflict management is an array of activities and processes geared towards influencing individual and group relations (Best 2007a: 71). It involves a process of positively handling conflicts at different stages. These include proactive efforts like conflict prevention, and reactive ones like conflict containment, conflict limitation and, even, litigation. Best argues that there is, perhaps, no other means or term like 'conflict management' to admit that conflict is inevitable and unavoidable, since it is a natural occurrence in daily human existence and interactions. It emphasizes the reality that not all conflicts are resolvable, thus limiting the options of peace practitioners and intermediaries to the regulation and management of such conflicts (Best 2007b: 95). Conflict management according to Best (2007b: 101) seeks to approach conflicts through non-violent methods.

Anstey (2006) suggests that the success or failure of managing conflict essentially rests on the understanding of such conflict. Thus, there is a distinction between what is termed as the process of and the structural models of a conflict. He defines the structural model as concerning how underlying or environmental factors, which are external to the conflict, shape the events in the conflict. The slow changing or fixed nature of such factors, coupled with their benign externalities, defines their structural nature (Anstey 2006: 10). On the one hand, factors that are central to the structural model include: social pressures, procedures and rules of conflict

engagement, and prejudices, all of which exert influences in different ways on conflict behaviours of the actors. On the other hand, the process model deals with internal factors, or the dynamics of episodes of conflict, such as the effects of previous events on subsequent ones in the conflict episodes (Anstey 2006: 11).

Therefore, while the two models might seem disconnected, they are, however, very closely intertwined in real life situations. Hence, for a conflict management process to be effective, an in-depth understanding of the conflict by giving due attention to both the structural and process aspects of human or societal relationships, and how they influence each other as well as the conflict itself, is essential (Thomas 1976: 894; Anstey 2006: 11).

2.4 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution can be viewed as a problem solving approach which is multidisciplinary, analytical and is geared toward enabling parties in a conflict to work together in a collaborative manner in an effort to resolve their conflict (Tillett and French 2010: 2). However, Burton (1988: 2) posits that conflict resolution refers to the termination of conflict by means of analytical procedures that address the root problems of the conflict. He went further to state that, in the view of the conflict parties, conflict resolution is looked upon as a permanent solution rather than a stop gap measure. This might be linked to the belief that conflict resolution holistically embraces the totality of human lives, and their peculiarity in terms of socio-cultural and other personal traits which sets them apart from others (Burton 1988: 2; Tillett and French 2010: 2).

For other scholars like Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 11), conflict resolution is viewed as all the methods and mechanisms, including all the means through which conflict parties address their conflict issues peaceably. Bar-Siman-Tov (2004) goes on to list some of the processes involved in a conflict resolution spectrum to include mediation, negotiation or bargaining, and arbitration, all of which are geared towards and often lead to, mutually agreed solutions that symbolize the end of a conflict. Bar-Siman-Tov (2004) advocates a transcendence beyond conflict resolution to reconciliation as he believes that the episodes of conflict resolution often take place at the leadership levels mostly excluding the followers who, in most cases, still retain the worldviews that instigated the conflict *ab initio*. This retains the potentials and required conditions of instability when conflict resolution is devoid of reconciliation. Reconciliation on its own encompasses more than addressing the root causes of a conflict. It involves changes within the larger society of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, behaviours and so on, to create stable,

co-operative foundations for friendly interactions and acts. This, in turn, builds a more stable and lasting peace beyond formal conflict resolution or peace agreements. It is also believed that a genuine peaceful resolution of a conflict forms a crucial cornerstone for a successful reconciliation process (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 12; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 12).

Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011) on their part traced the origins of conflict resolution as a defined field of study or discipline to the peak of the cold war era which posed a credible threat to wiping out human existence due to the accumulated nuclear weapons at the disposal of the major actors. This era pushed scholars from different disciplines to devote themselves to the study of conflict at all levels and contexts, such as family, industrial, international and intrastate conflicts (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 4). The end of the cold war era saw a proliferation of conflicts in different continents which were both inter- and intrastate. This development gave impetus to the field of conflict resolution as political leaders and international organizations embraced the idea of conflict resolution. This then led, partly, to the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) becoming defunct and the subsequent establishment of the African Union (AU). The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) set up structures and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. It is led by ex-President Jimmy Carter who set up the Carter Foundation, which has been a leading light, and also the Nyerere Foundation in Africa (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 5).

Ram view conflict resolution as a very comprehensive and encompassing concept that addresses not only the root causes of conflicts but also seeks a transformation of the conflict from hostile or violent attitudes or behaviours to non-violent and non-hostile ones. They view conflict resolution as consisting of both a process as well as a product. In this case, the intention or ways of bringing about a desired change is termed the process, while the change attained is the product (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 31, Best 2007b: 94). For Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011), just like Bar-Siman-Tov (2004), and Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), conflict resolution is an incomplete process. Thus, while some, such as Bar-Siman-Tov (2004), and Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), advocate reconciliation of the parties in conflict, Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011: 32) advocate conflict transformation as the deepest part of conflict resolution. This contrasts with other scholars such as Lederach (2003: 33), Miller and King (2005), who see conflict resolution as a distinct field different from conflict transformation. Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011: 9) view conflict resolution

as a holistic spectrum that consists of conflict settlement at one end and conflict transformation at the other end.

In addition, conflict resolution has also been described as a multicultural, multilevel and multidisciplinary problem-solving approach to conflict which employs knowledge from a wide range of disciplines. Among these are economics, psychology, philosophy, chemistry geography, anthropology, history, sociology, religious studies, social work, political science and law to mention a few (Tillett and French 2010: 3, 4; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 8).

The field of conflict studies also combines an interplay between theoretical understanding and practical experience of what works or does not. When connected, this ensures an informed experience devoid of overt theoretical assumptions that may have catastrophic consequences in real life situations. The multicultural character of conflict resolution recognizes that conflict occurs across the globe between people in diverse geographical locations and diverse cultures, which necessitates the deployment of complex conflict resolutions to tackle them (Lederach 2000: 9; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 8).

On his own part, Wallensteen (2015) conceptualizes conflict resolution as a situation in which conflict parties enter into an agreement which solves their central or key incompatibilities with a mutual acceptance of each other's continued existence, coupled with a cessation of all forms of violent conflict behaviours towards each other (Wallensteen 2015). However, this definition is less encompassing than that of Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011) whose conceptualization of conflict resolution goes beyond peace agreements to seek change in both behaviours and attitudes by incorporating conflict transformation. This is unlike Wallenstein who speaks of both change in conflict behaviour and mutual agreements on key incompatibilities, leaving out the change in attitudes which, when not included can provide a fertile ground for the precipitation or resurgence of conflicts between the same parties of concern.

2.5 Conflict Transformation as a concept and a theoretical approach

Miall (2004: 31) suggests that conflict transformation advocates or theorists view engagement in conflict as going beyond identifying win-win outcomes or the re-framing of positions by the conflict participants. This is because the structures supporting a conflict may be beyond the visible, present or immediate situations. He defined conflict transformation as entailing, *"a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if*

necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (Miall 2004: 4).

Although European structural theorists initially examined conflict formation ideologies, Johan Galtung, in his later work in 1996, brought about a new breath of life. He argued that conflicts are of two aspects which are life enriching or life destructive. Both arise from contradictions in the societal systems and structures (Galtung 1996: 90; Miall 2004). Hence, he believed that by transcending contradictions, the use of compromise, the dissociation or association of conflict actors, or by the expansion of the structures and systems supporting a conflict, we can address the incompatibilities in the conflict. He understood that, more often than not, specific conflicts have interplays or are offshoots of larger conflicts which are embedded in global economic relations and world structures and systems (Galtung 1996: 70-126; Miall 2004).

However, Curle (1971) quoted in Miall (2004), in an attempt to view peace as a separate field of study, traced how asymmetric conflicts can be transformed into balanced relationships through a plethora of processes that include negotiations, development, and confrontation. He used about 14 case studies on his experiences ranging from interpersonal conflict experiences to inter-state. But these were criticized for being too theoretical and selective, too personal to be of relevance to others, and lacking in-depth analysis, even though it was acknowledged as a useful piece of introductory text on peace making (Banton 1972; Burton 1973). It was on Curle's ideas that John Paul Lederach and other conflict transformation theorists built years later.

Conflict transformation as an approach in the field of peace studies was chiefly introduced by Paul Lederach, a faculty member at the Eastern Mennonite School of Peace-building (Best, 2007b: 95-96). It was assumed that peace-building transcends conflict resolution to facilitate long term relationships. Lederach (2003) developed a comprehensive framework for the theory or approach in his book *"The little book of conflict transformation: Clear articulation of the guiding principles by a pioneer in the field"*. He is of the opinion that conflicts are a normal occurrence in human relationships and that they are not necessarily destructive, but can provide the potential or catalyst for change. This view is shared by Simon Fisher who argues that conflicts are a fact of life, are inevitable and creative (Lederach 2003: 2; Fisher 2011: 3). Fisher (2011) defined conflict in relational terms between people who perceive they have incompatible goals. Transformation, then, can be described as providing a clear cut vision of

what we want to achieve, and the path to follow in terms of building relationships which are healthy locally and globally (Lederach 2003: 4-5).

Conflict transformation in Lederach's terms can be described as a way of seeing through different lenses. He categorized them into three aspects, namely:

- The 'immediate situation' view
- The 'beyond immediate/present problems' view to the deeper patterns of relationships and contexts that gives space for the conflict to express itself, and
- The conceptual framework for holding the two views together. These, Lederach (2003) stated, will provide an overall understanding of the conflict and, hence, create a platform by which to address the immediate situation as well as bring about the necessary changes that may be needed at the level of deeper relationship patterns and conflict context (Lederach 2003: 7-11).

Conflict transformation seeks to bring about constructive change processes through conflict by creating a framework that acts, not only on the content and context of a conflict, but also on the structure of relationships in a conflict (Lederach 2003: 27).

In defining conflict transformation, Lederach (2003: 14) proposed the following:

> *"Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships."*

Deconstructing the definition, he points out that conflict transformation as an approach rests on two critical pillars which are:

- The capacity to envision conflict in a positive manner, and as ubiquitous in human relationships, with a bias for its potential to facilitate constructive growth
- The willingness to respond to conflict in ways that maximize its potential for positive change (Lederach 2003: 15). Hence, he argues that the ability to see conflicts in a positive manner and as a vehicle for constructive growth are a crucial key in conflict transformation.

Other aspects of the definition include,

- The ebb and flow, which suggests that conflicts move in an oscillating manner or character with peaks and valleys, just like the sea which can be termed the escalation and de-escalation patterns of a conflict. It is a characteristic that Brahm (2003) and Fisher (2011: 19-20) also referred to as stages of conflict. This is illustrated as a graph showing the increasing and decreasing conflict intensities plotted with a corresponding time scale.

Figure 2. 3 Conflict Stages Graph



. Source: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages

The human relationship aspect of the definition was conceptualized by Lederach (2003: 17) as having both visible and less visible aspects, and being both immediate and long term. He advocated that, to bring out the positive potential in a conflict, we must not only focus on the clearly seen dimensions of the relationships which are immediate or present situation, but also focus on the less visible aspects of human relationships which affect the long-term concerns.

Lederach (2003: 18), in the same vein as Fisher also viewed conflicts as live-giving, that is they can create life and, conversely, conflicts also flow from life. Similarly, Lederach (2003) likewise viewed conflict being constructive as a verb, that is, to build, shape or form, as well as an adjective – to be a positive force. In addition, reducing violence requires addressing the immediate situations in a conflict as well as the underlying causes and patterns. It must be accompanied by work on justice issues, while also proceeding in an equitable manner towards change and giving people opportunities to participate (a voice) in decisions affecting their lives. Nor should it forget to redress factors that breed injustice, both at the structural and relationship levels (Lederach 2003: 21).

Direct interaction and social structures suppose that change processes need to take place at multiple levels that is, inter-group, inter-personal and at the socio-structural levels. Dialogue is recognized as a fundamental ingredient of conflict transformation both to attain constructive changes at various levels and as a lifeblood of both justice and peace on either the interpersonal or structural levels (Lederach 2003).

It should be noted that dialogue here entails communication to exchange ideas and opinions aimed at finding common definitions to issues while trying to find positive solutions to them. Hence, in change processes of conflict transformation, people must be given the space and opportunity to engage with one another toward shaping the structures, systems and relational patterns that influence their community life. That is giving the conflict actors a "voice-in" (Lederach 2003: 21-22).

Finally, in conceptualizing conflict transformation, (Lederach 2003: 22) declared that the heartbeat of the approach is the creation of adaptive responses through change processes that promote justice and reduce violence in human conflicts at all levels.

For Fisher (2011), conflict transformation assumes that the causes of conflict are problems associated with inequality and injustice which find expression in the socio-economic and cultural frameworks that are often very competitive. He asserts that the main objectives of conflict transformation theory include: the improvement of longer term relational attitudes among the people in conflict, the facilitation of positive social changes in structures and frameworks responsible for the injustice and inequalities, as well as economic redistribution among the populace. It also includes the development of systems and processes capable of promoting values such as justice, peace, forgiveness, understanding, enablement, and respect (Fisher 2011: 8, 9).

The understanding of conflict transformation as a theoretical construct by later scholars like Miller and King (2005) is that a change or changes in one or several key factors in a conflict can bring about opportunities for reconciliation or resolution of a particular conflict. Among the key issues identified by Miller and King (2005: 26) to be transformed are:

- Issue transformation; this involves a re-framing of the conflict issues
- Actor transformation; that is a redefinition of who the real actors are and their roles in the conflict
- The transformation of the general context of the conflict, and
- A transformation of the rules governing engagement in the conflict.

Miller and King (2005: 27) submit that conflict transformation can be managed through deliberate actions of a party external to the conflict or even as a result of unintended consequences of the actions of either parties to the conflict. This theoretical approach will be employed in the study to examine and explore if there can be deliberate or non-deliberate changes in any or some of the factors supporting the incidence of youth participation in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria.

2.5.1 Conflict Transformation and Change

The existence of conflict induces several changes wherever it occurs in all levels, namely: individuals, interpersonal or relational levels, structural or systemic levels, and on the cultural level. Lederach (2003) proposed that conflict transformation theory has two approaches: the descriptive and prescriptive. The descriptive approach examines the changes that have occurred at all levels because of a conflict. The prescriptive approach deals with the needed interventions to address such identified changes to minimize a conflict's destructive potential and, at the same time, to maximize its potential for growth and development at all levels. These are briefly described below:

- Changes at the personal level refer to changes both experienced and desired for individuals in conflict. This includes the changes in cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and spiritual experiences of individuals over the course of a conflict. Prescriptively, Lederach (2003) advocates that, for conflict transformation to take place, there should be deliberate interventions toward minimizing the negative effects of conflicts on the social level, yet maximizing its opportunities for human growth in the emotional, physical or spiritual dimensions.
- Interpersonal or relational conflict distorts relational communication patterns between individuals or groups. Hence, the descriptive approach carefully examines in what manner the communication patterns have become distorted, while the prescriptive approach endeavours to intervene in a bid to improve communication and understanding among the conflict parties.
- Structural or systemic changes refer to the systems and structures which are the essential fabric that holds any society together. This includes how people meet their basic needs, have access to resources, and participate in decision making processes that affect them. Lederach (2003) also contends that the descriptive approach of conflict transformation theory tries to examine how societal structures and systems have been

influenced by conflicts or how they (the systems and structures) precipitate conflict. Likewise, the prescriptive aspect deals with an intervention that seeks to understand the structural/systemic roots of conflicts, especially violent ones. It reduces the associated violence, promotes structures and systems that empower people to meet their basic needs, and provides opportunities for participation in decision making processes that affect their lives.

- The cultural dimension of the changes in conflict transformation tries to identify such practices and norms that engender violent conflict embedded in the values and culture of a society. At the same time, it also examines such values, norms and practices that promote constructive handling of conflicts (Lederach 2003: 23-27).

2.5.2 Criticisms

Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011) have criticized the positions of Lederach, Miller and King (2005) as an attempt to present a caricature of the field of conflict resolution when talking about conflict transformation. They submit that conflict transformation is the deepest level of conflict resolution and is not a distinct and different concept, which they believe is incoherent unless it is linked to conflict resolution (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 9, 10). This view contradicts those of Lederach (2003), Miller and King (2005), and Moolakkattu and Uzodike (2012) who all view conflict transformation as a distinct field and concept different from that of conflict resolution. However, Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011) believe that, instead of being a stand-alone concept, conflict transformation basically refers to those activities that form the basis of peace-building in both the structural and cultural spheres, while conflict resolution is a manifestation of such activities (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 32).

2.6 Violence as a Concept

In one of the most popular texts in the field of peace studies, Galtung (1969, 1990, 1996), conceptualizes violence as being present and noticeable when human being's actual and somatic realizations are below their potential due to a violent influence (Galtung 1969: 168). This violent influence, he says, is the cause of differences between actual and potential realizations and the phenomenon that brings about an increase in that gap, and which, at the same time, frustrates attempts at closing such gaps. However, later scholars such as Fisher (2011) have advanced this definition of violence to consist of all the attitudes, words, actions, structures and systems which impede people from attaining their full possible human potential (Fisher 2011: 4). Galtung (1969) argues that a form of violence is present even when people die from or are infected by avoidable causes.

2.6.1 Violence Types: Direct Violence, Structural Violence and Cultural Violence

Going further, Galtung (1969: 171) categorized violence into different types, mainly direct and structural violence, while in a later article in 1990, he discussed the third type, cultural violence. For Galtung, direct violence can also be called personal violence. It refers to violence in which an act deemed violent is attributable to the consequences of the actions of an identifiable actor. In situations where such cannot be attributed to any actor, or where no identifiable actor is responsible, it is termed as structural violence, otherwise known as indirect violence or social injustice Galtung (1969: 171). Also, he defined cultural violence as consisting of those aspects of culture which can be employed to legitimize or reinforce violence in all forms, including both direct and structural violence (Galtung 1990).

In the direct and structural violence spectrums, Galtung says that people may be killed, injured, manipulated or suffer hurt. However, the key distinction between the two types of violence remains the traceability of these consequences to the acts of concrete, identifiable persons directly responsible for then in the direct violence form. Structural or indirect violence has no traceable personality directly responsible. Instead, it is built into the fabric, structure and systems that supports the society in which it occurs. Examples of structural violence given by Galtung (1969: 171) include an unequal distribution of resources including power, and life chances that are not equal. He equated all attempts at deliberately keeping other people ignorant and dependent as clear cases of structural violence or social injustice (Galtung 1969: 171).

In his view of personal or direct violence, Galtung (1969) suggests that the victim or recipient of such violence perceives it and can protest. However, direct violence in itself is like a wave or ripples in a tranquil water, while that seeming tranquillity itself is what Galtung called structural violence in that it is usually silent and not readily or easily identifiable or visible, unlike direct violence (Galtung 1969: 173). He further explains that, although conservative societies register direct violence, they see structural violence as natural or normal. This is unlike dynamic societies where direct violence is considered detrimental and wrong, whereas structural violence becomes very noticeable as its existence creates all kinds of impacts and consequences which makes it stand out.

In a bid to clearly illustrate his views on the concepts of violence and peace, Galtung (1969: 183) provides an extended model for a clearer explanation of the inter-relationship between peace (both positive and negative), and the different types of violence and how they reinforce each other.

Figure 2. 4 Extended concept of violence and peace model



Source: Galtung (1969: 183)

The diagram above clearly illustrates that the absence of direct violence, which Barash (2000: 61) equated to or interpreted as the prevention of wars or armed conflicts, is not synonymous with our desired positively designed peace conditions. Rather, it is the absence of indirect/structural violence, also known as social injustice (Galtung, 1969: 171) that precipitates the desired positive peace conditions. These, according to Galtung, include the distribution of resources, both economic and power, in a manner deemed egalitarian. This is because structural violence or social injustice has the consequences of depriving the people of their socio-political and economic rights and equality. Also, indirect violence is accompanied by a feeling of a lack of self-respect, inaccessible basic health amenities, as well as a denial of rights to naturally nourishing and nurturing surroundings (Galtung 1969: 183; Barash 2000: 129). However, a point of divergence between the two scholars is that, while Galtung (1969: 171), equates social justice with structural violence, Barash (2000:130) views social justice as a contributive component in structural violence. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, I

will adopt the conceptualization of Galtung due to its simplicity and wide acceptance in the field of peace research.

Hence, the kind of peace that brings positive conditions – otherwise known as positive peace – does not only exclude the existence of direct and structural violence, but also includes vertical development (Galtung 1969: 183). Thus, Galtung linked peace theory with both conflict and development theories, implying that the costs of the continued existence of structural violence appear huge, relative to the costs of direct violence in the short term (Galtung 1969: 184).

Cultural violence, on its part, could be any aspect of culture – religion, art, ideology, value systems, language or behaviour – that reinforces, justifies, and legitimises either of or both direct or indirect violence, personal violence or social injustice, and renders them acceptable and normal in the society (Galtung 1990, 1996: 196). The converse of this term is cultural peace, just as violence is the antonym of peace (Galtung 1969: 183). Hence, the coining of the terms 'cultural peace', 'structural peace' and 'direct peace' as opposites of the terms in reference to violence. Galtung (1996: 196) submits that the field of violence study in peace research should be concerned with ways in which violence is employed and how such uses are legitimized. Cultural violence is key in peace research because most of the knowledge we have as humans and our ways of life are acquired through culture. Thus, it is through culture that human beings are taught, admonished and dulled into believing and perceiving exploitation and repression as natural and normal, or dulled into not being able to identify such factors at all (Galtung 1996: 200). The efforts to get out of this vicious cycle of structural violence, and the struggles to remain a top dog or major beneficiary and feeding off such systems are what Galtung (1996: 200) called blue-collar and white-collar crimes respectively.

At the core of all structural violence is exploitation in which some benefit much more than others, within the complexity of relations and interactions within such structurally violent societies (Galtung 1996: 198) To sustain a structurally violent system, which scars both the body and the soul, the beneficiaries engage in two basic strategies which include impeding the conscious formation of awareness by the populace, and destroying their capacity to mobilize themselves (the disadvantaged people) through the following methods:

- Impeding the consciousness of the disadvantaged, which is the first crucial pillar essential to the sustenance of structural violence through two tactics, namely: Penetration (implantation of the beneficiaries in the disadvantaged) + Segmentation

(not giving the disadvantaged a holistic view of the happenings in the system as a whole);

- Incapacitating the disadvantaged population's ability to mobilize against the social injustice which is executed through the freezing out, relegation or marginalization of the disadvantaged (keeping the disadvantaged outside the beneficiaries cycle) + Disintegration or Fragmentation of the disadvantaged or exploited populace (keeping the disadvantaged divided) (Galtung 1996: 199).

Relating the three forms of violence, Galtung (1996) explains that structural violence is process oriented, while direct violence is more of an event, and cultural violence is a constant, often fixed or invariable, at it is embedded in the culture of the society in which it exists. This is due to the often fixed or static nature of culture which does not change for extended periods of time (Galtung 1996: 199). These can be illustrated pictorially as shown in the figure below:

Figure 2. 5: Galtung's violence triangle



; Source: Peace by Peaceful means(Galtung 1996: 199)

For Krug (2002), the presence of violence as a part of human existence often has impacts that are visible to the naked eyes, such as wars, civil uprisings and terror attacks. Annually over a million persons die or suffer injuries because of violence which can be interpersonal, self-directed or collective/group violence. He said further that violence is one of the leading causes of morbidity globally for people aged 15–44 years (Krug 2002: 3).

Violence, including what may appear to be non-violence, may often seem very simple to the layman. However, disagreements are frequently characterized by having a strait-jacket

definition of either of them, especially when we attempt a comparison of both terms (Govier 2008:1). Ackerman and DuVall (2002), in a chronology of "people power", argue that the existence of such a concept as non-violent force or non-violence could be very effective in stripping the target of the ability to maintain control or exercise power by working on their weaknesses. It has been established that the goals of non-violent mass action include coercion, conversion and compromise, all of which are deemed favourable results (Govier 2008).

However, there is a presumed belief that political violence is physical, especially as demonstrated by the assaults, murder, and property destruction that often characterizes political contexts, and that political theories are more favourably disposed to physical violence most of the time believes it involves psychological or at times structural violence elements. For May (1972) cited in Van der Dennen (1980: 5), relating violence or aggression to power and powerlessness involves no less than five strata of relationships, namely:

> *... the power to be; The power of self-affirmation – not only to be, but to be significant; the power of self-assertion – "I demand that you notice me; the power of aggression – taking some of the power of another for oneself; and lastly, violence, largely physical [power], because the other phases, which can involve reasoning and persuasion,* ipso facto, *have been blocked off.*

For Bloom (2013), exposure of individuals to family violence, wars and acts of terrorism or natural disasters predisposes them to antisocial personality disorder risks. While also looking at violence, especially among youths from the perspective of crimes as a social control theory as proposed by sociologist Donald Black in 1983, Wilkinson, Beaty and Lurry (2009) postulated that violence and crime are more often a moralistic fall-out of self-help to attain protection and justice, especially in situations where the official form of legal protection fails. They used variables such as communal protection from violence, personal safety, effectiveness of the justice system in respect of crimes and violence in the society, and the role of law enforcement officers, especially the police. Thus, in the failure of all these stated indices, youths are often forced to rely on self-help in the form of violence or crime to protect themselves.

Furthermore, de Haan and Nijboer (2005), in examining youth violence in Amsterdam and Groningen, found out that several conditions exist to classify the involvement of youths in acts of violence as self-help. Among such conditions are:

a. Exposure to constant threat of violence

b. Lack of trust in the security forces and the societal legal systems (de Haan and Nijboer 2005: 14; Wilkinson, Beaty and Lurry 2009: 28).

Some of the youths also identified the lack of jobs as setting the pace for the causes or instigation of violence stemming from the larger economic context. Thus, the youths are pushed into the informal or black-market economies where the law does not regulate their activities and where self-help is the norm rather than the law, for example, the drugs trade, armed robbery, and so on. Others highlight the paradox of the criminal justice system that creates a diminished opportunity for youths to get legitimate economic opportunities after incarceration, thus propelling a vicious economic cycle (Wilkinson, Beaty and Lurry 2009: 31)

In addition, the youths also expressed a profound lack of faith in police protection (Wilkinson, Beaty and Lurry (2009: 33), as the policemen themselves are also scared about their own personal safety, especially in situations of armed violence involving the youths. These situations can be related to that existing in the Nigerian society where police normally arrive at an armed violence scene long after the perpetrators might have disappeared, only to arrest innocent passers-by and, sometimes, even the victims of such incidents.

Hence, Anthony in his study on violence, demonstrated a dichotomy between the imagined scenarios that keep people awake at night and the actual violent incidents or risks of violence obtained from incident studies, including the "*National Victims of Crime Survey in South Africa, 2003.*" This was a study by the Institute of Security Studies (Burton *et al.* 2004; Collins 2013: 29b, 30a). He claimed that there is a huge gap between popular opinions about violence and research data on violence.

He goes on to explain that public opinion even influences researchers at times, even though the specific claims of their studies might be derived from rigorous research backed up with data. However, he insists that there are underlying assumptions based on popular opinion that still shape how the research is conceptualized, how the research question is formulated, and the kind of theories tested (Collins 2013: 30a). Another challenge Anthony observed in the understanding and eradication of violence is that of the political elites who, instead of seeking long term solutions to specific problems, choose to pander to serious societal issues while relying on their personal, uncritical beliefs instead of being led by detailed research data and analysis. This, Collins noted, is often due to political populism to cater for the anxious voters, without going deeply into the underlying issues in order to generate sustainable solutions (Collins 2013: 30a).

Although I agree with his opinion that scholars should be wary of the influence of popular opinion about violence in research studies and should separate violence from crime, although both have intersections, nevertheless, I disagree with his classification of some crimes, such as assault, robbery and rape as violent, while he posits that other crimes like theft and fraud are not violent. This is based on the classifications of violence by Johan Galtung as direct or personal violence, as well as structural violence. Both direct and structural violence are capable of exerting physical and psychological violence. Hence, theft and fraud, although they may not be harbingers of physical violence, they are capable and often do impose psychological and structural violence on their victims. This may do even more damage beyond what assault can ever achieve (Galtung 1969, 1990, 1996; Fisher 2011; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011; Collins 2013: 30).

Collins (2013: 30b) is also of the opinion that there are non-criminal forms of violence which are generally deemed as acceptable, justifiable and, perhaps, necessary in specific social contexts. These descriptions of violence are consistent with Galtung's conceptualization of cultural violence (Galtung 1990). Collins (2013) went further to link these acceptable forms of violence to criminal behaviours especially in the context of his study area. He noted that, while the threat of a violent crime is a hindrance to quality of life through the inducement of anxiety which, in itself, is a form of violence (Fisher 2011), people are quite at home – and even very enthusiastic about – other forms of violence such as wrestling, action movies, horror movies and video games that often induct the young into large scale virtual violence. In addition, violence is often also encouraged in law enforcement Collins (2013: 30b). This is exemplified by the actions of the security agents in the Marikana riots in South Africa in which unarmed protesters were shot from the back, and the extra-judicial killing of about 800 Shiites in Kaduna, Nigeria, both in 2016 respectively (Soifer 2012: 9; McClenaghan 2013; Amnesty International 2015; Chan 2015; HRW 2015; Isuwa 2015). Another scenario is where the security agents fail to intervene or are late, and where zealous citizens then seize the opportunity to take the law into their own hands, being cheered on by members of the public who often stand by watching and even recording a person being burnt alive extra-judicially (Collins 2013: 31a).

Collins (2013: 31a) also surmised that the people believe that violence is often the most effective way to address criminality within the society, as the fear of a credible promise of violent reprisals will serve as an effective disincentive in violent crime matters. He says that

the most effective disincentives will be those holding the promise of the most terrifying repercussions (Collins 2013: 31a). Although this belief system is consistent with the axioms of rationality or the rational choice theory, retributive justice has never been proven to have an overwhelming success in handling criminal matters, or of transforming the individuals involved (Anderton and Carter 2009).

Going further a list of other commonly acceptable forms of violence in Africa using South Africa as a microcosm include: The use of violence to raise and correct children, often through corporal punishment; the use of violence to regulate interpersonal relations; as an indispensable tool in intimate relationships also known as intimate partner violence (IPV); as a means of disciplining students in educational institutions; and also as a means of establishing social status (Collins 2013: 31a)

In this manner, then, children's behaviours, which might be perceived as disturbing or anti-social, can be addressed effectively and quickly with a whack or smack; an unwilling sexual partner can be forced into submission; or a jealousy inducing lover can be slapped into their "right senses"; and a successful fight can often serve as an antidote to humiliations triggered by an insult. Violence is also used as an instrument of removing perceived threats posed by political opponents in a democracy; this can be through murder or large scale organized violence (Collins 2013: 31a). Other examples include the murders of key political candidates, and the intimidation of candidates and their supporters. In similar manner, violence is also used as a tool for eliminating perceived economic competitors and, even, competition for feminine affections, as witnessed in South Africa's xenophobic uprisings against foreign nationals' resident in South Africa who were accused of "stealing their jobs and their women." There is also the belief that foreigners have money; this, too, happens in matters of sexual orientations, through 'corrective rape' of lesbians and gay bashing (Harris 2002; Mkhize *et al.* 2010; Collins 2013: 31b).

Therefore, it can be stated that, contrary to the belief that violence is a hated concept that the world will like to see fizzle away from society, people widely accept and defend violence as a critical tool in dealing with a wide range of issues within the society. Another example is the Section 55(d) of the Nigerian penal code which, as an aspect of the Nigerian constitution, allows for the man to beat his wife, children and servants, provided it "*is corrective and does not lead to grievous bodily harm"* (Gamawa 2013). This highlights another problem of boundaries between what the society terms as non-violence/acceptable violence behaviours and

antisocial violent crimes. Collins (2013: 31b) says that the latter is just a reinforcement of societally acceptable aggression which may go out of hand and cause more damage than imagined, or where the societal criticism of lesbians becomes an affirmation for a group to engage in what is termed 'corrective rape'.

Thus, it can be said that the major hindrance to the removal of violence in society is not the deficiency in theories or research about violence but, rather, in the conceptualization of our everyday "common sense" which reinforces violence in several ways, and yet does not see the nexus between the acceptable forms of violence and the non-acceptable ones. This is a phenomenon that Galtung referred to as cultural violence (Galtung 1990: 291; Collins 2013: 35). Consistent with the submission of Collins (2013), Sen (2008: 5) suggests that violence can be said to be ubiquitous and present everywhere in human society. This he relates to the culture and the political economy of poverty, which he believes do not adequately explain the occurrence of violent incidents, although they offer some plausibility in certain forms.

Sen (2008), instead, advocates that scholars and policy makers should avoid isolationist explanations of violence using either the prisms of economic deprivation or social inequality exclusively, or in terms of culture and identity factors. He believes that none of these, on its own, can give a comprehensive picture of the causes of widespread violence and lack of peace in human society (Sen 2008: 15). Rather, he says there is a need to connect the listed factors to generate such a comprehensive explanation about the occurrences and incidences of violence. In a similar manner, Kane-Berman (1993: 13) also asserts that violence cannot be rooted solely in problems associated with poverty or, better put, socio-economic factors alone. This he predicated on the happenings in Pretoria and Witwatersrand in South Africa where the personal income of individuals is double that of the national average, yet these areas were responsible for more than half of the violence recorded in South Africa during the study period.

2.7 The Frustration and Aggression theory

This theory was first proposed by Dollard *et al.* (1939). The theory centres on the link between frustration and aggressive behaviours, by conceptualizing frustration as the blocking of one's goal attainment. This, in turn, produces angry reactions which, in terms of this study, can predispose a person to acts of electoral violence. The central thesis of the theory then was that:

a. Aggression is always based on frustration, and
b. That frustration always leads to aggression.

Hence, frustration becomes the determinant factor that must lead to, or predispose individuals or groups to, acts of hostility or aggression (Zillmann 1979, cited in Van Der Dennen 2005). However, after a barrage of criticisms, Miller (1941) revised the key assumptions or theses of the theory to say,

a. Aggression is always based on or stems from frustration
b. That the consequences of frustrations are multi-various, and one of them is the instigation of some aggressive responses.

The theory proposes that persons may respond to the sources of frustration, or those close to them, provided there is no severe punishment, as such acts of aggression will attract to the aggressor. Van Der Dennen (2005) went further, saying that aggression can be manifest or latent, that is visible or hidden. It can be hidden in pent up fury that can burst out at any time, or manifest in an unprecedented manner later on (Van Der Dennen 2005: 2). He also says that the use of punishment as a constraining factor in aggression is limited in that it does not address the underlying factors of aggression, that is, the immediate and underlying causes of aggression.

2.7.1 Application

For this study, the sources of frustration which the theory links to the instigators of aggression and violence include poverty, conditions of lack, and disease that permeates the Nigerian society, which is mainly composed of more than fifty percent of a youthful population. Unemployment, underemployment, lack of access to basic healthcare, lack of access to education, and an upbringing in a peasant working class family that exposes the child to a daily life of lack in all dimensions may lead to an accumulation of frustrations eventually dovetailing into acts of violence. In the case of this study, the youths are vulnerable to electoral violence with little financial instigation and arbitrary promises of a better future (Zillmann 1979: 4; Van Der Dennen 2005; Planck 1969).

Other identified explanations for aggression include circumstances of upbringing as noted by Bandura and Walters (1959). They averred that the continued exposure to aggression and violence desensitizes the youths' perception of aggressive and violent acts, and reinforces cultural violence to justify aggressive behaviours (Galtung 1990). This is evident in the Yoruba proverb that says, *"Bi teni kan o baje, telomi olee dara",* meaning *"someone must suffer disrepute for another to gain favour."* It is a way of viewing the daily life of individuals as a zero-sum game.

Zillmann (1979) and Van Der Dennen (2005) noted that affective reactions like disappointments are often the outcome of frustrations, and that the use of aggression is encouraged by records of past successes from using such behaviour to subdue frustrations in time past. The latter makes a predisposition to acts of violence high.

2.7.2 Criticisms

Van Der Dennen (2005) criticized the theory that frustration is a sufficient but not necessary condition for aggression since individuals can still be aggressive without necessarily being frustrated.

2.8 Peace as a Concept

The concept of peace has been given different definitions and meanings across cultures, religions, and among scholars. However, for this study, two were examined briefly, these being peace as a political condition and peace as a process. The concept of peace as a process recognizes that peace is achieved through the continuous efforts to transform violence (Fisher 2011: 11). This is because peace is far more than the absence of war, which is denoted as negative peace but goes further to positive peace. This latter exhibits certain features such as the presence of universal human rights, economic well-being of the populace, and the presence of other values regarded as essential. But more importantly, positive peace is devoid of all forms of violence (Fisher 2011: 11, 12).

The second concept is peace as a political condition. Here, peace is viewed as something that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices and norms (Miller and King 2005: 55). Adherents of this perspective go further to itemize certain settings that must be met for the fulfilment and sustainment of peace in a society. These include the balance of power among the different constituent elements or groups in that society; a sense of impartiality; and mutual reverence within and between groups in attitude and behaviour. Also, there is need for legitimacy for people in authority who make and execute decisions, which would be supported by accountability and transparency; having the flexibility to accommodate one another despite obvious or not so obvious incompatibilities, and lastly, the mutual understanding and respect for one another's rights, interests and intents (Galtung 1990; Miller and King 2005: 55-56).

Thus, this study is chiefly concerned with the two perspectives of peace as a political condition and peace as a process, as outlined above. Recognition must also be given to Fisher (2011: 12, 13), who argues that there are always certain individuals who dread the idea of peace in any

form, especially positive peace which is the complete absence of violence. This he alludes to their fear of loss of their power, wealth and status in society, which may be as a repercussion of certain actions of theirs taken in time past. Hence, it is the goal of peace, both as a process and as a political condition, to have a society or situation devoid of violence in any form, even in the event of conflicts that have been declared as inevitable (Fisher 2011: 13). The extended peace diagram showing the inter-relationships between peace and violence is shown above in figure 2.4.

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CHAPTER THREE

ELECTION VIOLENCE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses relevant literature on electoral violence, and examines the backgrounds, causes, dynamics, extent and consequences of electoral violence, together with the involvement of youths in selected African states such as Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. It will also include strategies that have been employed to address the issues of participation electoral violence, especially where youths are involved.

3.2 Election

According to Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 23), the origins of elections are traceable to the Greek aristocracies. They described them as an undertaking to choose a better candidate in which there are equal rights for all involved. Elections have become a benchmark practice in most parts of the world, as voting is being hailed as a sign of having legitimately elected governments, and is often seen as a means through which conflict ridden societies can resolve intractable disputes (Staniland 2014: 99). Also, elections have been described as a key factor that enhances stabilization in a democratic society, especially in the representative democratic system (Edet 2015: 2). He further noted that it is the means by which political office holders who make decisions for the people are voted for by their respective constituencies Edet (2015: 2). For Abdullahi (2013: 2) an election is the process of casting votes in favour of a particular candidate or political party. In conflictual terms, he describes elections as the means through which political groups attempt to resolve conflicts between them, or as a means for addressing various political issues facing a country. Abdullahi (2013) further describes elections as a struggle between competing interests grounded in political compositions.

Monday and Simon (2013: 1), posit that democratic elections empower the citizens of a State to choose those who govern them and thus play a part in influencing government policies. They argue that respect for the principles of democracy, when observed, has the capacity to bring about socio-economic and political expansion and development. This is consistent with (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 16) who suggest that elections are essential elements of democracy especially when non-violent. They assert that elections embody the power of choice (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 23).

From the Marxist prism, Abdullahi (2013: 3), describes elections as the process which periodically enables the populace of a particular State to elect their *executioners*. This

Abdullahi attributes to the fact that the masses are given very limited participatory roles in decision making after elections. However, for Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 1), the electoral process is seen as electioneering, which they defined as the means by which politicians persuade the electorate through political campaigns to elect candidates for political offices through the ballot box. It entails all the activities involved in the electoral processes.

For Afe (2015), elections are the life blood of modern democracies, while the frequency, openness and fairness of each election are germane to democratic stability, consolidation and survival. The animosity and crisis that elections have generated in Nigeria have been such that it has often led to military incursion into the sphere of governance (Afe 2015: 1). He explains further that the results of elections in Nigeria have been so hotly contested to the extent of threatening the nation's corporate existence.

3.2.1 Elections and Violence

It is paradoxical though that elections and electoral politics have been harbingers of instability and a lack of peace in human society as result of what Staniland (2014: 99) describes as a mixture of voting and violence that pervades the global democratic space. From the Philippines, through Pakistan, Russia, and much of Africa and South America, electoral competitions have been laced with scary bouts of violence. These, Staniland (2014) alleges, range from the State use of security forces to intimidate voters to thugs and insurgents also attacking voters; local elites also often pursue old rivalries and feuds using elections as smokescreens (Bekoe 2010; Popoola 2012; Nagel 2014: 76; Staniland 2014: 99). As Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 18) say, *"Ballots may avert bullets, but ballots seem to provoke bullets too, because violence appears in each phase of the election process."*

Despite the belief that elections or ballots have the propensity to eliminate violence or manage it, especially in conflict ridden societies, there still exists worries about their ability to generate occasions for violence that is, the violence generating propensity of elections. Hence, Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 16) assert that there is a paradoxical relationship between elections and violence. However, they feel that this paradox is a feature of all legitimate modes of power succession.

Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 15) also argue that, although elections perhaps remain the most discussed subject and most attractive discourse among political scientists, most authoritative texts written on democracy, elections and violence are grossly deficient in that some discuss democracy/elections without regard to violence, while others discuss the issue of violence very

well, but without considering the contexts of the elections. Yet, for those who do acknowledge that violence accompanies elections, they mostly do not investigate the phenomena of violence in detail, (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 16, 17). However, the weakness of their thesis lies in the fact that they did not examine and compare the forms of violence prevalent in different democracies; they only tried to examine the links between elections and violence (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 17).

Quoting Matti Dogan in his work, *How civil war was avoided in France,* they stated that, "When electoral results are clear cut and plain to all, agitations of the minority must subside and extremists withdraw into the shadows." (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 17).

This quote underscores the importance of elections as a violence reducing component in human society, especially when the electoral processes are well conducted. Hence, in this way, elections have been used to end serious agitations and even wars in human societies. Examples include the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as Nigeria's 1999 elections that helped to end tensions occasioned by continuous military rule and the cancelation of fairly conducted election results (Clark and Worger 2013; Chukwu and Chidume 2014: 1b). The same developments were witnessed in the fierce dispute between ex-President Gbagbo and President Qattara in the Ivory Coast presidential run-off elections of 2010, and the Liberian 2011 elections, which were meant to bring the UN operations to a close in that country. Venezuela, and France have also not been left out. Perhaps one of the most remarkable and debatable instances is the termination of a thirty year civil war in Namibia, assisted by elections (Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 17, 18; Bøås and Utas 2014: 48, 54, 55; Levine 2015).

Thus, the power and ability of elections to address violence and violent conflicts cannot be over-estimated. As Rapoport and Weinberg (2013) point out, elections have been used to end civil wars when conflicting parties find it difficult to win, or when the cost of wining proves to be too much. Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 18) go on to state that, even in the event of a party wining the conflict, the winner still conducts some sort of elections to legitimize themselves in power as exemplified in Rwanda after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces took over the country under now President Paul Kagame. Hence, they declared that violence alone cannot legitimize itself. They are also of the opinion that the appearance of legitimacy is to prevent or guard against the incidence of a successful counter violent seizure of power in the future.

Conversely, elections also have the capacity to induce violence of any form, lending credence the statement of Sir Winston Churchill that, *"democracy may be the casualty of elections"*

(Austin 1995; Rapoport and Weinberg 2013: 18). This statement probably applies to the situation cited in the Zimbabwean elections of June 2000, where election violence ceased on the day of election after the lives of twenty-nine candidates had been lost even before the actual elections. Rapoport and Weinberg (2013: 28) conclude that, in any situation where the rules of elections and or succession are incomplete, quarrels are bound to occur in such elections.

The last statement relates to the position of Staniland (2014), that there are dangers inherent in rapid political liberalization that is not accompanied by sufficient institutionalization, thus making such a system a harbinger of ferocious political violence. He also opined that post-cold war electoral practices, particularly in Africa where the international electoral community has often succeeded in promoting a façade of democracy without the substance of democracy, often promotes unintended consequences that generate canonical violence (Staniland 2014: 100, 101).

3.2.2 Electoral violence

Of the seventeen elections that took place in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011, eleven (60%) were fraught with different types of violence. These bouts of violence included widespread killings and destruction of property, intimidation, and harassment or other forms of coercive threats (Bekoe 2010: 1). This is synonymous with election violence, and has been a recurring theme associated with elections in present times. It has been defined and conceptualized in different forms by many researchers. Among them is Fischer (2002), who defined electoral violence as those acts of violence organized towards influencing the electoral processes through threats, which can be in verbal or non-verbal forms, intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, assassination, blackmail, the withholding of food aid, and the destruction of property.

From another perspective, Edet (2015: 6) defines electoral violence as all forms of violence that are perpetrated in the course of an electoral process, or political activities. This includes the pre-election phase, during the election, and the post-election phase of the electoral process. For him, the acts carried out include the disruption of an opponent's rally, the disruption of the voting process, the snatching of the ballot boxes, the stuffing of ballot boxes, and violent protests to demonstrate disagreements with the perceived manipulation of election results. Citing the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2011, he also described electoral violence as consisting of all acts of violence directed at any person or property who is partaking in the process either during, before or after the elections (Edet 2015: 7).

Abdullahi (2013: 4), on his own, focused on electoral violence being the engagement and threat of force or violence against an opponent while competing for political power during elections.

However, his view left out the pre-election and post-election phases of violence. A broader idea of electoral violence is found in Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 1) who cite different scholars. Electoral violence is construed as all types of violence, whether structural, physical or psychological, employed as an instrument of influencing the political process and stakeholders before, during and after elections with a view to determining the results of an election or delaying the election. They called it electioneering violence, which sounds more like present continuous or ongoing violence instead of a one-off occurrence. The activities employed in electioneering violence include kidnapping, instilling fear, blackmail, arrest, armed raids on voting and collation centres, the snatching of ballot papers, and the manipulation of electoral results to favour a candidate, among other acts (Albert 2007; Nwolise 2007; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015).

The last view of electoral violence by Albert (2007), Nwolise (2007), Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015) will be adopted for this study. This is due to its comprehensiveness in the coverage of the electoral phases and the types of violence. The latter includes psychological, structural and physical violence, to which l will add cultural violence. This is in line with Collins' (2013) study on violence cited earlier, in which he argues that all types of violence are best understood from the prism of a nexus between society's permissive violence and those acts deemed as non-permissible.

So also electoral violence has been described as a component of political violence which is differentiated by the objectives, methods, victims, perpetrators and timing (Bekoe 2010: 2). As Bekoe (2010) noted, not all the violence that takes place in an election period is tantamount to electoral violence. In clarifying the timing, it is argued that electoral violence has a range of six months before polls, during the polls (election day), and three months after polls (Bekoe 2010; Straus 2011). In agreement with Albert (2007), Nwolise (2007), Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015), Bekoe (2010) avers that electoral violence can take place at any point in time in the electoral cycle, pre-elections, post-election, as well as during the election phases.

3.3 Youth and Electoral Violence

In a study by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), it was observed that the youths of Africa are in a crisis (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014). This assertion is based on the myriad of challenges facing the African youth, among which are the disrespect and disregard for the rule of law and human rights, the lack of viable economic opportunities, as well as pervasive and endemic corruption in almost all the strata of society (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014: 109). These, they claim, have given rise to the undesirable effects of disillusionment and lethargy towards any sort of socio-political growth and development. This,

in turn, results in strong tendencies for destruction. They argue that there is a direct linear relationship between the destructive and negative political expressions among the youths and the governance crisis in their respective societies. They claimed this was evidenced by the exacerbation of violence to vent frustrations, especially during election periods (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014: 109, 110).

They were of the view that most of these agitations become violent due to the involvement of youths engaged and financially induced by politicians with a view to influence the electoral process in their favour, in other words, the disruption of elections deemed unfavourable to their sponsors (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014: 117). They also observed that most of the agitators are youths, even young boys. Although they may not be the essential cause of the violence, they feature as prominent actors/perpetrators as well as victims of such violence. Hence, it is important to enlighten the youths on the risks and vulnerabilities posed to them by electoral violence, and how they can exercise their legal rights towards the assertion of the kind of future they desire through peaceful elections (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014: 117). It is believed that the stability of democracies will be enhanced if the youths make concerted efforts to engage positively in their nation's political processes (Almami Cyllah and Sidi Diawara 2014: 119). It is on this note that I will review electoral violence in a few select sub-Saharan African countries.

3.4 Overview of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa

Of the seventeen elections held in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011, eleven consisted of some sort of violence. These bouts of violence included widespread kidnappings and destruction of properties, mass killings and assassinations, as well as intimidation and harassment (Bekoe 2010: 1). Although elections are often expected to solidify peace agreements, they often result in violence as noted in the study of electoral violence in Ivory Coast by Straus (2011). He identified two different forms of violence in Ivory Coast. The first he called urban repressive violence, perpetrated by the pro-government forces of Laurent Gbagbo as against the opposition led by Alassane Qattara using both state and non-state apparatus. The second form of violence he called rural violence, which was carried out by both pro-government forces as well as the opposition forces, and involved the collective reprisal killings of civilian communities as punishment for violence perpetrated by their members. Often, these acts were carried out on a very large scale (Straus 2011: 2).

3.4.1 Electoral violence in Ivory Coast

Ivory Coast is a country located in the western region of the African continent, bounded by countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Ghana and Guinea. It is a multi-ethnic country which gained independence from the French on the 7th of August, 1960 (Educational Technology Department 2007: 5-8). Just like many other sub-Saharan countries, the prerogative of land allocation rests solely with the government, but in Ivory Coast with the central government (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 90).

In a bid to boost commercial farming of export crops like coffee and cocoa, which are grown in the then sparsely populated regions of Ivory Coast, namely the centre-west and the south west regions, President Houphouet-Boigny (1960-1993) encouraged the influx of people from other regions and countries who were interested in the cultivation of these cash crops into these two regions. In so doing, the government granted land rights to the settlers and protected them and their investments against attacks and resentment from the unwilling host communities. These were called the *autochthonous* communities who felt disenfranchised of their ancestral land rights and ownership, while the migrants, who grew in economic prosperity, were called the *allochthones*. These included foreigners who were the immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea (Chauveau 2000: 69; Bassett 2003; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 90, 92). This was reinforced by the Code Domanial of 1963, ceding to the national government the rights to administer all lands not registered under an official title (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 91).

Thus, the stage was set for conflicts with the presence of value-based and resource-based contradictions involving ancestral land ownership and administration rights, coupled with the resentment of the *autochthones,* making the conflict a latent one, with the only absent factor being the conflict behaviours (Galtung 1996; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 91).

The government of Houphouet-Boigny responded with a carrot and stick approach, intimidation and incentives to the *autochthones* to allow more land to be allocated for the settlers for economic crop cultivation and the exportation expansion programme of the government (Marshall-Fratani 2006: 20; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 92). The president and his political party (the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire - PDCI) were propped up through a strong alliance between his own core central (Baoule V) ethnic base and the northern leaders whose regions benefited immensely from the subjugation of the centre west and the south west regions of Ivory Coast, where the resentment against the government increased. Matters were

aggravated in some of the affected communities due to the fact that more than 80% of the cocoa farmers in the affected regions were not *autochthones* (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 92, 93).

However, the return of multi-party politics created a crack in the strategic political alliances that had perpetuated Boigny and his party, the PDCI, in power (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 93). President Laurent Gbagbo, who was a history professor, was one of the government's harshest critics, and found a voice on the FPI (the Ivorian Popular Front) political party. Given his origin of the centre-west region (a disadvantaged area), Gbagbo focused his campaign around the return of stolen land to the indigenous population, the *autochthones*. The FPI also criticized the Boigny government of voting rights granted to foreigners, and queried the electoral support the PDCI got from the foreigners, who they believed, kept the government in power in return for the granting of land rights of the indigenous population to foreigners (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 94).

It is in the light of the above that the allocation of land rights by the Ivorian central government became, and remains, an issue and a critical factor in the politics of Ivory Coast, as it provided an alliance between Boigny's central and south-eastern regions, the northern region and the foreigners who benefited from the central government land policies. Hence, with the sudden death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 and the policies of his successor, Henri Konan Bedie, the PDCI became factionalized. By early 1994, a faction of PDCI broke away, with key southern politicians, parliamentarians and the northern political class forming a new political party called the *Reassemblement des Republicains* (RDR). This effectively increased the number of major political parties in Ivory Coast to three. All of them vied for power in the 1995 presidential elections, as well as the 1996 parliamentary polls (Crook 1997: 224; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 95).

3.4.1.1 Causes of Electoral Violence in Ivory Coast

The concept of the *Ivoirite*, introduced into the constitution of Ivory Coast by the Bedie regime, divided the politics of Ivory Coast along ethnic fault lines all in a bid to win the 1995 presidential elections. It watered the seeds of violent conflicts planted by his predecessor due to the land and migration policies (Bah 2010: 602). The goal of the *Ivoirite* was simple: to establish a distinction between the migrant Ivoirians and the indigenous Ivoirians with ancestral roots, conveniently lumping the anti-foreigner and anti-northerner sentiments together in order to marginalize them politically (Bah 2010: 602).

The refusal of the Bedie government to withdraw these laws of the *Ivoirite* led to the boycott of the 1995 presidential elections by the alliance of RDR led by Alassane Ouattara and the FPI led by Professor Laurent Gbagbo respectively. The instruction to boycott the non-competitive elections was interpreted in the FPI strongholds of the centre west and south west regions as license to oust the settlers, suspected PDCI faithful, the burning of their households, and allowing the indigenous people to reclaim the land in such localities (Crook 1997: 235; Chauveau 2000: 115; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 97).

Thus, a system for effective discrimination and marginalization was institutionalized and entrenched in Article 35 of the Constitution of Ivory Coast in 2000, and executed in the political sphere, public service and civil service employments. Bah (2010: 603) suggested this development was targeted at Alassane Ouattara whose father was alleged to be a Burkinabe. The concept was also used in the property or land ownership system, national identity and employment policies. It was a good ground for disenfranchising many northern Ivoirians. These policies did not die with the Bedie regime, but lived on through his successor, Robert Guei, who came to power through a military coup, as well as the civilian regime of Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI party. Gbagbo reinforced the Ivoirite concept and made it mandatory for national identity to be issued based on a statement of origin issued to an applicant by the relevant village committee. This, then, indicated one's origin as an *autochthon* (Bah 2010). This development made some scholars such as Chauveau (2000) and Marshall-Fratani (2006) believe that the Gbagbo regime was determined to reverse the melting point policies of the erstwhile regime of Houphouet-Boigny who ruled the country for four decades, and actively promoted and protected migration, and migrants' rights. Gbagbo's FPI regime, on the other hand, resurfaced the long-standing indigenous people's rights and identity of natives which has been in existence since the pre-independence days (Chauveau 2000); Marshall-Fratani 2006: 10). Hence, the labelling of rebels as foreign terrorists was a statement laden with meaning, according to Marshall-Fratani.

Therefore, what were the key causes of, and was at stake in, the Ivory Coast's electoral violence crisis was beyond the struggle for political power. It was, primarily, an identity and resource conflict, together with a desire to right the perceived wrongs of the past as well as the present, on the part of all those involved in the crisis.

3.4.1.2 Dynamics of Electoral Violence in Ivory Coast

In the 1995 presidential polls, the threat of displacement of settlers and foreigners in the centre west and south west was pronounced if the opposition won, and this was amplified by the ruling PDCI government of Bedie to the settlers in order to secure their votes (Chauveau 2000: 111; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 97). This was illustrated in 1995 by the displacement of not less than 10,000 Baoule settlers from the centre west and south west regions respectively.

In the aftermath of the disputed 2010 presidential election results in Ivory Coast, there were allegations that the forces loyal to ex-president Laurent Gbagbo were involved in the unleashing of excessive force to disrupt or prevent public demonstrations and protests, and the indiscriminate killing of protesters. This included disappearances and murders, especially in opposition strongholds, killing on a collective identity basis, and the mounting of roadblocks and checkpoints to harass identified opponents of the regime as well as other West African nationals in Ivory Coast by the pro-government forces (Human Rights Watch 2011a: 9; Straus 2011: 482).

Other identified patterns of electoral violence by the pro-Gbagbo forces included: the targeting of worship places, especially Friday Jumaat services, as the opposition were predominantly Muslim by religion; the use of xenophobic hate speeches dished out by the *"Radiodiffusion Television Ivorian"* (RTI), with the intention of inciting intolerance; violence and hate (Human Rights Watch 2011a; Straus 2011: 2). Youths were actively involved in all dimensions, as Charles Ble Goude, the pro- Gbagbo youth leader, and the youth minister in the Gbagbo regime, mobilized and encouraged youths to perpetrate acts of electoral violence against foreigners, especially west African nationals' resident in Ivory Coast (Human Rights Watch 2011a: 2; Straus 2011: 484). In fact, it was suggested that the youths have been germane to the strategies that brought the Gbagbo regime to power and sustained it for ten years (Straus 2011: 488). Also, armed attacks on the French and UN forces in Ivory Coast were included in the mix (Merrill 2005; Human Rights Watch 2007: 8; 2011a; Straus 2011: 484, 486-488).

The use of violence by Gbagbo's government was designed to achieve three goals: first, the signal to the opposition that domestic opposition would not be tolerated but totally crushed; second, that defectors from the government to the opposition will be visited with profound violence; and third, that meddling by third parties, such as the French and UN forces, will not be tolerated. This was clearly demonstrated by attacks on those forces (Straus 2011: 489).

However, the pro-opposition groups, too, were not left out in the acts of violence, especially in the western Ivory Coast region. In fact, Straus (2011: 486) claims that the worst singular massacre during the Ivory Coast electoral crisis was perpetrated by the pro-opposition groups in reprisal for the series of attacks carried out by the pro-government forces. As the pro-opposition forces advanced from the northern region of Ivory Coast and gained control of territories in the west, the ethnic Guere people were deliberately targeted, killed, raped and robbed with more than 244 bodies found in just a few days (Straus 2011: 486). In fact, international observers stated that the violence perpetrated by the opposition forces was both widespread and severe (Merrill 2005; Educational Technology Department 2007; Straus 2011: 486).

According to Human Rights Watch (2011a, 2011b) and Strauss (2011: 487), among the patterns and dynamics of violence employed by the opposition forces were:

- The intimidation of pro-government supporters in the opposition strongholds of northern Ivory Coast, using tactics such as rape of both men and women; beatings, murder and detention of pro-government supporters; the execution of youths loyal to the government; the persecution of communities who supported the Gbagbo government; sexual slavery and abuses by the opposition; and the public display of disembowelled bodies to serve as a deterrent to would-be resistance or opposition by the Ouattara forces.
- In the northern areas under opposition control, civilians who voted for or supported the government were subjected to violence and persecution which included rape, the burning of their homes and other properties, the burning alive and slitting of people's throats, impaling them on a stake to death, and deliberately targeting those believed to be loyal to the Gbagbo government.

As Collins (2013) has said, all violence is often an offshoot of violence permitted by society. Straus (2011) concurred with this when he said that the post-electoral violence crisis in Ivory Coast followed the patterns of violence that had been in existence in the country since the 1950's and 1960's from the regime of Houphouet-Boigny and continued through that of his successors Bedie and Guei, but subsequently became more pronounced under the regime of ex-President Laurent Gbagbo whose decade in power witnessed no accountability for the widespread human rights abuses. Those are believed to explain the intense violence that ensued in the aftermath of the disputed 2010 presidential polls, according to Straus (2011: 489).

The 1995 electoral violence in Ivory Coast displaced 10,000 Baoule farmers with over half of them fleeing permanently back home (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 97). At the same time, the attempted coup in 2003, because of the 2000 disputed elections, resulted in the country breaking into two sections – north and south – with the former (northern and far west regions) controlled by the rebels, and the latter by Gbagbo. During this period, foreign settlers totalling about 250 000 Burkinabe from Burkina Faso were expelled from Ivory Coast, while an estimated one million-plus internally displaced persons were also uprooted (Human Rights Watch 2007; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 103).

Moreover, in the perpetual state of pre-election violence between 2000 and 2010 in Ivory Coast, people were targeted based on religion and ethnicity (Straus 2011; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 104). It is also on record that, as at 2007, at least 800 000 people of foreign origin had been expelled from their various abodes in the government controlled areas of southern Ivory Coast. This included 450 000 Burkinabe, and 350 000 Malians who were not first-generation immigrants. In the rebel held northern and far west regions, a pool of 700 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were expelled (Human Rights Watch 2007: 20; Bah 2010: 604).

So also, the refusal of the incumbent to cede power after the 2010 presidential polls resulted in the five-month 2010-2011 electoral violence, which resulted in the deaths of more than 3 000 people and the rape of hundreds of both men and women. It also recorded more than one million internally displaced persons and 100 000 refugees in neighbouring States occurring in the first four months (December 2010 to March 2011) of the Ivorian crisis (Straus 2011; Human Rights Watch 2016: 6). It is on record that, in that period of four months, pro-Gbagbo supporters opened fire on opposition supporters during demonstrations and conducted lethal raids in strongholds believed to belong to the opposition. These resulted in 173 deaths and more than 90 were tortured with 500 arrests. Even women protesters were not spared in their March protest as live ammunition was used against them (Scott 2011:3).

3.4.1.3 The Role of the Youth in the Ivory Coast Electoral Violence

Urban regional violence was authored and executed by the youths on both sides of the Ivory Coast electoral crisis. The *patriotic galaxy*, a militant youth wing and key pillar of support for the Laurent Gbagbo regime since its inception in 2000, was at the forefront of electoral violence acts perpetrated by government loyalists in connivance with Ivory Coast's security forces. They constantly engaged in acts of political violence in the decade-long pre-electoral mobilization in the country (Straus 2011: 488). Straus (2011) further declared that the youths

were one of the most potent sources of intimidation, violence and harassment. They were employed to consistently intimidate, harass, cause disappearances and even murder political opponents on each side of the divide (Straus 2011: 488).

It is documented that the FPI youth militants and security forces took over the streets during the 2000 presidential elections in Ivory Coast following an attempt by Robert Guei to manipulate results in his favour. They teamed up to enforce Gbagbo as president in a two hour non-stop duel in Abidjan, which led to Gbagbo being declared winner with 59% of the votes to Guei's 32.7% (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 102). However, the youth violence did not cease with the results declared; rather, the terrible violence continued unabated for a period of not less than ten days, during which the Gbagbo forces consisting mainly of youths, tracked down and killed more than 50 young men in Yopougon and Abidjan localities (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 102). Throughout 2000-2002, the youth militia of the FPI continued their unprovoked violence against the northern Ivoirians and Muslims, seizing their voting permits and national identity papers. Despite this, the RDR still won the majority of votes in the 2001 municipal polls (Bassett 2003: 25). These acts were in addition to the involvement of the youth militia, in tandem with the FPI, to take over farmlands of *non-autochthones* using extreme violence (Bassett 2003; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 103-104). However, the youths were also victims on both sides of the divide, as the pro-government forces and rebels targeted youths on each side, with the rebel forces executing youths loyal to the government and vice versa.

The aftermath of the Ivory Coast's crisis can be termed the *"victor's justice"* in which the vanquished alone is guilty and is punished; hence, breeding another round of latent conflict or negative peace, occasioned by the pervasive injustice (Straus 2011: 489).

3.4.1.4 Strategies to Combat Electoral Violence in Ivory Coast

At the swearing in of the Ouattara government in 2011, President Ouattara promised to bring all who had been involved in acts of electoral violence during the crisis to justice. To fulfil this pledge, he took several actions among which were:

- The establishment of a national commission of enquiry with the responsibility of investigating the abuses perpetrated during the 2010/2011 post-electoral violence. The body recommended in its submission that perpetrators of violence on both sides of the divide be put on trial, notwithstanding their party affiliation

- A task force, known as the Special Investigative and Examination Cell, consisting of judges and prosecutors was also inaugurated in June 2011 to prosecute all crimes involving post-election violence in the country
- At the international level, the main perpetrators, such as ex-president Gbagbo and Ble Goude, the pro-Gbagbo youth militia head, have been transferred to The Hague to face trial for their roles in the electoral violence and crimes against humanity during the crisis in Ivory Coast (Human Rights Watch 2016: 7).

Although the Ouattara government has always voiced the rhetoric of bringing perpetrators to justice, the pace of progress is worrisome as it was not until 2014 preceding the 2015 elections that the government of Ivory Coast was seen to give some sort of consistent support to the bodies set up to handle the issues (Human Rights Watch 2016: 7). The report listed a series of obstacles to the effective implementation of the strategies employed to provide accountability and justice for acts of electoral violence in Ivory Coast. These include: Lack of government's consistent support for the bodies responsible until late 2014, perceived partiality and lack of fairness when perpetrators are brought to trial, which is more often on the Gbagbo side, interference by the government and its officials in the affairs of the bodies while discharging their duties, and lack of adequate protection for persons involved in securing credible justice for victims. The latter includes the legal officers, workers, lawyers, judges, victims and witnesses being protected from intimidation and retaliation by perpetrators and their cronies. Lastly, there is the lack of respect for the fundamental rights of accused persons standing trial in the court (Human Rights Watch 2016: 2, 18, 27, 31, 35, 37, 38).

It is believed that taking steps to address these challenges will, no doubt, assist in providing credible justice and hope for the victims, thereby preventing retaliation and employing violence. It will also ensure that a resurgence of violent conflict occasioned by past hurts is reduced, if not eliminated.

3.4.2 Electoral Violence in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe electoral violence kicked to life in Zimbabwe almost immediately after the independence elections in 1980, in which two parties contested at the polls: ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). The winning party, ZANU, pushed for the complete annihilation of the opposition ZAPU party led by Joshua Nkomo in the aftermath of the pioneering elections of 1980. This task was executed by a combination of a ZANU militant youth wing and a section of the military forces called the 5th brigade (trained by North Koreans) which was deployed in the ZAPU stronghold of the

southern region of Matabeleland from 1982 until 1987 when ZAPU was fused into ZANU to form ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) (Lindgren 2003: 2a, 2b). In this military action, code-named *Gukurahundi* ("the rain that washes away the chaff"), Zimbabwean civilians were targeted at will by the soldiers of the 5th brigade and ZANU PF youths (Lindgren 2003: 3a; Ngwenya 2014; Ngwenya and Harris 2015).

The key elements in the dynamics and nature of electoral violence in Zimbabwe have been the use of racial or ethnic rhetoric and the use of economic resource patronage, especially land use rights and jobs, as instruments of political mobilization and incitement (Lindgren 2003: 2a; Boone and Kriger 2012b). The policing of the voting process is also rampant in Zimbabwe, and it has typically involved an army of youths, mainly but not exclusively from the ZANU PF youth wing. They were named the "green bombers" because of the colour of their uniform and their tactics of invading the strongholds of the opposition parties and their perceived loyalists. The intention was to coax, cajole and intimidate them into voting for ZANU-PF. Where a vicinity recorded votes for the opposition, mayhem was unleashed upon the inhabitants in the area (Lindgren 2003). Such was the violence that people had to compulsorily vote for ZANU-PF just to avoid the mayhem by the "green bombers", who moved like locusts destroying everything in their path (Lindgren 2003: 2a).

The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai as a contender for political power in Zimbabwe, after a decade of ZAPU's extinction, saw the ZANU-PF government intensify its rhetoric on land reallocation and racism as core issues for voter mobilization (Lindgren 2003). The government institutions were also purged of all who were perceived as sympathetic to the opposition, and party loyalists were recruited in their place (Boone and Kriger 2012b: 83).

The dynamics of electoral violence in Zimbabwe range from intimidation, harassment, assault, and murder of perceived political opponents and their supporters, to forced or coerced voting imposed on the citizens through violent reprisals from the ZANU-PF if they voted for the opposition candidates. The disenfranchisement of voters in MDC's strongholds, especially in Harare in the 2013 polls, the politics of patronage, where loyal members are rewarded by ZANU-PF, extortion and wilful destruction of property of civilians suspected of supporting opposition parties are carried out by the ZANU-PF youths during their constant "patrols". The mass murder of political opponents and enforced disappearances of political opponents and their supporters, journalists and other activists who are perceived as critical of the ruling ZANU-PF government have also occurred. Alongside all this, there was the invasion of

commercial white-owned farmlands, instigated by the war veterans aided by unemployed youths with support from the ruling ZANU-PF and government security forces. This was ostensibly to redistribute land, but it also punished the farm inhabitants, who were assumed to support the opposition, for voting against the government in a constitutional referendum in 2000 (Lindgren 2003; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 84; Alexander and McGregor 2013: 760; Cross 2016: 1, 3, 6, 8).

The above summarises some of the dynamics of electoral violence in Zimbabwe by the ZANU-PF youth militia and security forces, and shows how they inflict violence on the electorate in suspected opposition strongholds before the elections, monitor how they vote (vote policing) during elections, and inflict violence on any area where votes are registered for the opposition, or where the votes are not enough for the ruling ZANU-PF government.

3.4.2.1 Causes of Electoral Violence in Zimbabwe

A key cause of electoral violence in the Zimbabwe political sphere remains the "sit tight" syndrome of the political leadership of the ruling ZANU-PF and intolerance for any form of opposition. This began with the maiden post-independence election which later led to the violent decimation of the opposition Nkomo-led ZAPU. The country has had only one ruling political party since independence and only one president. Despite economic challenges, and amidst a worsening security situation, former President Mugabe who declared he would be president for life (Boone and Kriger 2012b; Mushava 2016).

Thus, the causes of electoral violence in Zimbabwe can also be linked to the efforts to appease the Zimbabwean youth, whom Lindgren (2003) declared as the greatest threat to the hegemony of the ZANU-PF government. Mobilizing against political opposition is said to be one of the core causes of electoral violence, as well as government's forceful occupation of white-owned farmland, and the incitement to violence against political opponents and their perceived sympathizers (Lindgren 2003: 3b).

Bradfield (2013) links the involvement of youths in electoral violence in Zimbabwe to what he called organizational dynamics, in which ZANU-PF is bent on maintaining the existing power status quo by the recruitment of disillusioned, marginalized and unemployed youths. They are offered transient incentives to boost their social status, and then mobilized to execute the intimidation, harassment and attacks on the lives and properties of opponents (Bradfield 2013; Cross 2016).

Other tactics include the forced recruitment of youths by ZANU-PF into a youth militia with threats and coercion, the involvement in identity politics (that is, Shona versus Ndebele), and participation in political events like campaigns also provide a breeding ground for instigating and participation in electoral violence (Bradfield 2013; Cross 2016).

It is on record that the *Gukurahundi* violence in Zimbabwe saw the loss of an estimated 20 000 lives mostly in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions of Zimbabwe in an act of deliberate violence perpetrated by the 5th brigade of the national army and other security forces, including the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) of Zimbabwe (Alexander and McGregor 2013: 751; Doran 2015; Ngwenya and Harris 2015: 1). Ostensibly, it was to eradicate some ZAPU "dissidents" or defectors from the Army after the Liberation war. It was a deliberate effort targeted at individuals associated with, or suspected to have sympathies for, the opposition (Doran 2015; Ngwenya and Harris 2015: 2). In the same manner, the MDC which rose up decades after the demise of ZAPU as an alternative opposition party in 1999, has also had its members targeted at will by the government security forces as well as ZANU-PF youths and the CIO. All combine to challenge the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean government (Hickman 2011: 30).

Opposition party supporters, including more than 54 MDC supporters, as well as 13 white farmers, were killed and many others injured during the presidential elections in 2003. Also, barrages of intimidation, threats, and actual assault of opposition supporters in their thousands was the order of the day (Lindgren 2003: 3; Ngwenya and Harris 2015). Land grabbing, especially of the white-owned farmlands, caused the loss of jobs as the occupied farmlands had hundreds of thousands of black employees who were dependent on the farms (Lindgren 2003: 3b). Some of these farmworkers were murdered over the suspicion of their loyalty to the white farmers as well as the MDC, due to their close association to the white farmers. More than 40 farmworkers were killed, and more than 500 farm schools were closed (Lindgren 2003; Boone and Kriger 2012b).

These activities had a very negative effect on the national economy, resulting in a very weakened currency, the onset of abject poverty, and retrogressive development. As a direct fall out of the land reallocation and land grabbing policy, more than 3 000 commercial farms were used to resettle political cronies while forcefully ejecting the white owners. The irony of the policy of land settlement is that, although the rhetoric was directed at the white farmers, the people who bore most of the brunt were the hundreds of thousands of farmworkers and their dependants who relied on those farms for survival, as noted earlier (Lindgren 2003). The new

owners lacked the competency to run such farms (Lindgren 2003: 4a). This eventually led to hyperinflation and an abandonment of the Zimbabwean currency for the US dollar for domestic use (Ferguson 1999; Lindgren 2003: 3b). A related effect was the denial of the reallocated land to about 350 000 workers and up to two million of their family members, except for some in ZANU-PF strongholds in Mashonaland. This subjected the bulk of the farmworkers to endemic poverty, as most lost their homesteads and jobs, with their children being displaced from schools (Waeterloos and Rutherford 2004: 13b; Boone and Kriger 2012b: 84).

3.4.2.2 The role of Youths and Consequences of Electoral Violence in Zimbabwe

Lindgren (2003) noted that, among the plethora of actors in the Zimbabwean crisis and electoral violence, are the male youths mostly involved in the perpetration of much of the wilful violence and devastating destruction in the country. He also observed that they populated the security agencies and, in the ZANU-PF youth militia, have been collaborative actors in the harassment and intimidation of perceived political opponents of the ZANU-PF government. The bulk of the violent activities have been attributed to male Zimbabwean youths who carry out the mob beatings, abductions and enforced disappearances, seizures and occupation of white-owned farmlands (Lindgren 2003: 9b). This he attributed to the tendency of the ZANU-PF government to recruit disillusioned youths and offer them patronage incentives such as land, scholarships and employment opportunities in return for inflicting violence on political opponents and their supporters (Lindgren 2003: 9b; Boone and Kriger 2012a; Bradfield 2013). Even opposition youths of the MDC were not left out of the involvement in violent activities, as pointed out in the narration of the activities of the MDC's drugs section. This was established as a counter-force to neutralize the ZANU-PF government's use of force during MDC's political engagements such as rallies for protests and campaigns (Alexander and McGregor 2013: 756, 757).

Conversely, youths have also had a major share as victims of electoral violence, either as targeted supporters, relatives or belonging to an ethnic group, as in the ZAPU versus ZANU annihilation conflict that terminated in 1987 (Doran 2015; Ngwenya and Harris 2015). Youths were also a bulk proportion of the displaced farmworkers and school children in the seized white-owned farms. Others have been abducted in consistent raids by ZANU-PF youth militia and often tortured, sexually abused, and forced to join them in the patrols; some were even killed (Bradfield 2013: 3; Cross 2016: 6-7). Many intellectually inclined Zimbabwean youths see no place for themselves in the Zimbabwe of today, and opt to exit, preferring to stay out of the country, mostly in nearby South Africa. Others have decided to stand against the pervasive

political violence in the country by joining Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGO's) as the workings of the ZANU-PF government give them little or no space and opportunities in the country (Lindgren 2003).

3.4.3 Electoral Violence in Nigeria

3.4.3.1 Nature and Extent of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Electoral violence in Nigeria is traceable to the 1964/65 post-colonial era, which crisis brought the first republic to an abrupt end, as well as in 1983 when a bitter contest over results led to a military takeover, while the 1993 elections were annulled by the military junta and resulted in unprecedented post-electoral violence (Danjibo and Oladeji 2007; Olusola 2013). The 1999 elections were conducted as a compromise to ease the military out of power. That ensured that Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 was unexpectedly smooth, as it recorded much less violence than subsequent elections. This may be attributed to the oneness of purpose among the Nigerian populace, which was to get the military out of government and the nation's political space (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015: 2).

More so, the two contenders for the office of Nigerian President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Olu Falae, are from the same ethnic group – the Yoruba – and both are Christians; hence, the divisive issues of ethnic disputes and religious divisions were ruled out of the electoral processes at the time. However, subsequent elections conducted by civilian administrations witnessed unprecedented episodes of violence (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015). The 2003 elections were acclaimed to be an exercise in massive fraud and violence, just like the 2007 elections that President Obasanjo declared as "a do or die affair" (Danjibo and Oladeji 2007; Collier and Vicente 2014).

Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 1) and Edet (2015: 6), in discussing electoral violence in Nigeria, both identified three different stages during which electoral violence acts take place as the pre-election, election and post-election phases. They listed the activities for the first phase as, pre-election assassination, rally disruptions, hate speech, misinformation, blackmail and intimidation. The election phase violence acts include ballot box snatching, voter intimidation, and armed raids on collation centres. The post-election violence sees widespread property destruction, and the deliberate targeting of persons perceived as sources of their grievances or alternative targets close to them.

The 2011 elections in Nigeria also abounded in violence beyond description, as Edet (2015: 3) noted in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections, where more than 65,000 people were rendered homeless, more than 800 lives were lost, and more than 350 churches were razed to

the ground. The 2015 election results were mixed, but the election was generally peaceful (Edet 2015). However, the 2016 rerun elections have taken violence to the extreme, with citizens engaging the military in shoot-outs and gruesome murders of political opponents and military officers (AllAfrica 2016; Asomba 2016; Ikeke 2016; Oluwalana 2016).

Other patterns of electoral violence involve the kidnapping, forced protection and assassination of key political figures or candidates. Among these were: Engr. Funsho Williams, a forerunner in Lagos State gubernatorial contests who was slaughtered in his bedroom; Chief A.k Dikibo, Chief Harry Marshal, Chief Bola Ige, Dr Ayo Daramola in Ekiti State; and the pouring of acid on Chief Mrs Aborishade, an opposition woman leader in Ekiti State, who was eventually murdered while admitted at a government hospital ward (Sahara Reporters 2011; Durotoye 2014: 236, 237-239). There was also the intimidation and harassment of candidates and their supporters, both at the intra-party and inter-party levels, as well as the arrest and forcible transfer of opposition figures and candidates on trumped up charges to Abuja. The Ekiti State Chief, Jide Awe, the State chairman of the opposition party, suffered the latter in the heat of the 2014 governorship campaigns in Ekiti State (Adebusuyi 2013). This, according to Sisk (2012), was done to prevent them from campaigning and to dampen their supporters' morale.

Another pattern is vote-buying, which Sisk (2012) explains as the purchase of poor people's votes, since they largely determine whether elections are won or lost in Nigeria, given the proportion of the poor voters in Nigeria whose votes are prone to being exchanged for monetary or other material rewards (Sisk 2012). Intimidation and harassment of opposition candidates and their supporters occurs at both the intra-party – that is, during the primaries to seek party nomination – and at the inter-party levels during the main election process and voting (Sisk 2012: 55, 56).

In a similar manner, Abdullahi (2013: 3) citing Etannibi, identified the stages through which acts of violence take place during the electoral process in Nigeria as: the period of delimiting constituencies, voter registration, candidate nomination by political parties, political campaigns and rallies, the voter register display process, at the polling booth during voting, when votes are being collated and counted, the declaration of results, and lastly, when tribunal judgements are given.

Explaining further, Abdullahi (2013) said that the partiality and corruption of security and electoral personnel often take place driven by the activation of ethnic and religious sentiments, coupled with other primordial factors. He also noted that acts carried out at these phases of the electoral process include forced protections, the use of security officials to scare away

opposition leaders and candidates, denying opponents the use of public spaces under the guise of security concerns, or the clash events and programmes. At times, even candidates participating in their own elections can be scared away. At the extreme, is the use of assassinations, kidnappings, forced resignations of elected officials, and State-sponsored terrorism.

3.4.3.2 Nigerian Youths and Electoral Violence

Abdullahi (2013: 10) and Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 3) all posit that youths constitute the most politically active group in Nigeria and are predisposed to violent acts with financial inducement from political elites. This they attributed to a pervasive lack of employment opportunities, or underemployment which, in turn, makes them readily available as thugs during electoral processes.

Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 10) also identified the youths as the major perpetrators of electoral violence. They described the youths as homeless, underemployed or unemployed, illiterates with no meaningful or formal education, who work with adults whose only or main source of income is to act as party thugs and field agents. Going further, they identified the items or weapons used in performing electoral violence to include broken bottles, cutlasses, charms and guns.

More than 50% of university graduates are unemployed and, pooled with those without formal education who are also mostly unemployed, Nigeria thus has an army of energetic, unemployed and underemployed youths available as potential threats to societal peace, democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria (Okafor 2011: 10). This is owing to the influence of politicians who wish to capture power at all costs and, hence, they recruit the youths to unleash mayhem on their political opponents (Okafor 2011: 10)

Okafor (2011) identified four ways in which this army of unemployed and underemployed youths have been engaged in acts of violence to include: the use of youths as political thugs and assassins, the use of unemployed youths in the perpetuation of politically motivated ethno-religious violence common in Northern Nigeria, the engagement of youths as militants, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria, who also actively engage in electoral violence and are well armed. And lastly, there is the engagement of urban urchins, popularly called “area boys” (an equivalent of the Durban *eita* boys), who extort money and steal from innocent citizens, and are readily available for electoral violence acts; they are given political cover by politicians while engaging in their daily nefarious activities.

3.4.3.3 Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

For Abdullahi (2013: 1), the poor state of Nigeria's economy has created a large pool of jobless people, mostly youths, which has seen them as the main actors of electoral violence in Nigeria. The abject poverty has made these youths an easy prey to be paid and instigated into electoral violence (Abdullahi 2013: 2). He also noted that the vast wealth put at the disposal of political office holders amidst pervasive mass poverty feeds electoral violence due to the desperation to attain or retain political power and access to economic power at all costs (Abdullahi 2013: 4,5,6).

Abdullahi (2013: 5) notes further that the stupendous wealth available to political office holders provides fuel for violence sponsorship, and serves as an incentive to attain political or elective office. It is another opportunity to get rich quickly amidst the endemic poverty that pervades Nigerian society. Thus, funds expended on seeking an elective office are deemed an investment to be recouped later. This has also made the unseating of incumbents an almost impossible task due to the enormous wealth and influence of both the security and electoral personnel wielded by the incumbent governments (Abdullahi 2013: 5).

Similarly, other studies have also linked Nigerian youths with acts of electoral violence (Okafor 2011, 2015), with the latter study suggesting that Nigerian youths have been responsible for 95% of all acts of electoral violence ever perpetrated in Nigeria since independence. He blames this on the advantages of youthful vigour which they enjoy, as well as the lawless attitudes displayed by youths coupled with impunity and a lackadaisical disposition towards the Nigerian project. All this makes the youths ready-made weapons of violence in the hands of desperate politicians who are determined to win elections at any cost. While agreeing with Abdullahi (2013) and Edet (2015) on the causative problem of too much wealth at the disposal of political office holders, Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 4-6) introduced additional causes of electoral violence in Nigeria. These include, but are not limited to: God-fatherism or patronage politics, inordinate ambition of the political elite to be in power at any cost, lucrative political offices, clientelism or money politics, the lack of employment opportunities, corrupt and weak security agencies, an ineffectual judicial system, and the blasé reactions to the rigging of elections.

Sisk (2012), in his study of electoral violence in Nigeria, identifies four key causal drivers of electoral violence which he explained as: The political economy of capturing the instruments and offices of State power, where the stakes of victory and loss motivate the contending parties

to engage in desperate methods in an attempt to seize State power. As such, a victory is perceived as synonymous with having the keys to livelihood, not just for the winning candidates but also for their respective supporters, families, clan, and ethnic groups, as well as the relevant political party. Thus, with such high stakes, winning elections in Nigeria is pursued as a must (Sisk 2012: 44-45). The second driver of electoral violence in Nigeria identified by Sisk (2012) is the circumstances of mobilization and democratization in Nigeria. He submits that the dynamics involved influence the occurrence of election violence, especially with Nigeria coming from the context of decades of military dictatorships. This, he asserts, makes the country prone to election related violence which he believes is purposefully organized in most cases, although lone acts of violence by individuals are possible. But Sisk (2012) believes that acts of electoral violence on a large scale require, and are the result of, careful planning, organization and deployment. He further explains that Nigeria, just like Kenya, has been an epicentre of acts of instrumental and spontaneous electoral violence, often times perpetrated by the youths acting as political agents (Sisk 2012). This buttresses the point of Okafor (2015) who asserts that 95 percent of acts of electoral violence are executed by the youths in Nigeria.

The third cause is what Sisk (2012) calls the institutional and structural drivers of conflict within Nigerian society, among which he includes religious dichotomies of the Christian-Muslim divide (Buhari vote for Muslims), ethnic politics, and economic and demographic factors. The last two he explained that there is a 'youth bulge' in Nigeria coupled with limited or non-existing economic opportunities commensurate with the growth and development needs of the youth population. This may lead to the creation of a ready and willing pool of human resource mostly youths for enrolment into all kinds of nefarious activities including electoral violence (Sisk 2012: 45, 46).

And lastly, Sisk (2012) identified the fourth causal driver of electoral violence in Nigeria as what he terms the failure to manage the electoral processes, which could be deliberately done by the incumbent government. Nigeria's electoral system forbids independent candidatures; hence, all electoral political offices can only be contested for by candidates who are nominated by their respective political parties recognized by the State. This creates a very powerful opportunity for the political elite to nominate only individuals they are comfortable with and will serve their interests for election into political offices. This gives rise to what Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015) refer to as god-fatherism and patronage politics (Sisk 2012: 46, 53; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015: 4,5,6). It is no longer news in Nigeria that

the ruling party, at various levels of government, ensures that different obstacles are put in the path of the opposition parties and their candidates to retain power. This is often fuelled by patronage politics which creates a very dense political network (Sisk 2012: 53).

Other acts of electoral violence caused by the mismanagement or mishandling of the electoral processes by the management body called Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), includes the deliberate supply of inaccurate materials for elections such as non-serially numbered sheets, the theft of ballot boxes or the stuffing of ballot boxes in active connivance with the field agents or officials of INEC, allowing under-age voters, deliberately choosing which court judgement to obey on the part of INEC to the detriment of a particular opposition party, which gives INEC, the perception of being partisan in the discharge of its duties. This was seen in the 2016 Ondo-State gubernatorial electoral processes, where the duly nominated and popular People's Democratic Party (PDP) gubernatorial candidate, Eyitayo Jegede, was substituted for another (Jimoh Ibrahim), who allegedly did not partake in any validly recognized primary elections of the PDP within Ondo-State nor was he monitored by INEC officials as stipulated in the Nigerian electoral act (The Daily Vanguard 2016; The Punch 2016). This singular action led to violent protests in Ondo-State (Sisk 2012: 57).

Finally, the theoretical underpinning of this study is the frustration and aggression theory (see Section 2.7). In this study, the sources of frustration impacting the instigators of aggression include poverty, conditions of lack, and disease that permeate Nigerian society, which is mainly composed of more than 50% of youths. Unemployment, underemployment, a lack of access to basic healthcare, a lack of access to education, and an upbringing in a peasant working class family that exposes the child to a life of lack in all daily dimensions, may lead to an accumulation of frustrations. This, in turn, makes them vulnerable to electoral violence with little financial instigation and arbitrary promises of a better future (Zillmann 1979: 4; Van Der Dennen 2005).

Other identified explanations for aggression include circumstances of upbringing as noted by Bandura and Walters (1959). They showed that continued exposure to aggression and violence desensitizes the youths' perception of aggressive and violent acts, and reinforces cultural violence which is then used to justify aggressive behaviours (Galtung 1990). This is evident in the Yoruba proverb that says, *"Bi teni kan o baje, telomi olee dara"*, meaning "Someone must suffer disrepute for another to gain favour." It is a way of viewing the daily life of individuals as a zero-sum game.

The assertion by Okafor (2015) that Nigerian youths are responsible for 95% percent of all forms of electoral violence can be understood by a thorough examination of the role of frustrations faced by the youth, as well as the instigation into political violence and their conditions of upbringing, as highlighted by Bandura and Walters (1959) above.

3.4.3.4 Consequences of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

It is no falsehood that the involvement of youth in violent acts is a global phenomenon. The Centre for Disease Control, CDC (2014) claims that it is the second highest source of deaths among youths aged 15–24 years. However, the mortality is just a segment of the total picture, as other effects involved include injuries, which may be fatal or non-fatal ones requiring medical attention. It is also a phenomenon which the CDC (2014) says has consequences for everyone's health, brings about a decrease in property value, increases the cost of health services, and disrupts socio-economic activities. For Krug (2002: 25), the involvement of youths in acts of violence, including electoral violence, has harmful effects not only on the victims but also on all those associated with them – for example, relatives, friends, and others in the community. Youth violence also has its attendant consequences which he listed as reduced quality of life, disabilities (which are sometimes permanent), and death.

Other consequences include those listed earlier such as the mass destruction of lives and property, coupled with the death of the youths themselves, the proliferation of arms for other criminal activities, a deep fear of and reluctance by the citizens to participate in elections, either as candidates or as voters. Lastly, electoral violence by the youths portends a grave danger to the future of Nigerian society, because the youths are the leaders of tomorrow and, unless something is done urgently, the nascent democracy that Nigeria enjoys might be derailed, leading to other problems too numerous to mention (Monday and Simon 2013; Afe 2015; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015; Okafor 2015).

In addition, political instability, which is another outcome of electoral violence, consists mainly of the presence of violence, together with the existence of a government deemed as illegitimate and unconstitutional. Simply put, it is characterized by a profound lack of order in the political sphere, a lack of peace, no amiable civil relations among participants, and insecurity. Most importantly, socio-political changes are not pursued through institutionalized and functional processes and procedures but, rather, through a system fraught with aggression and violence in which it is believed that the end justifies the means. Thus, the struggle for elective positions is pursued with the crudest form of desperation, with no civility but, instead, through the

acquisition of State power by any means. This includes the use of the youths as tools of violence. This, then, creates a problem of insecurity for the nation in the present and near future (Okoli and Iortyer 2014: 20, 21, 22).

Since independence, elections in Nigeria, typically, have been accompanied by waves of violence, usually with severe consequences including the loss of lives and property (Bratton 2008; Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010; Okeyim, Adams and Ojie 2012: 6; Collier and Vicente 2014; Bello 2015). This was also the case in the 2016 rerun elections in Rivers and Bayelsa States, both of which are in the oil-rich region of southern Nigeria. Many violent acts, including several human head decapitations and gunshot exchanges with the military, were recorded (All Africa 2016; Asomba 2016; Ikeke 2016; Oluwalana 2016). Likewise, Edet (2015:3) noted in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections that more than 65,000 people were rendered homeless, more than 800 lives were lost, and more than 350 churches were razed to the ground.

Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun (2015: 10) also noted that residential houses, party offices, media houses, and cars are normally vandalized during periods of election peri violence is carried out. Interestingly, the perpetrators themselves (thugs and supporters of political parties), who are mainly youths, often fall victim to electoral violence in which some lose their lives, or are wounded or maimed for life. Even security and electoral officials have not been spared, and innocent residents have also been bullied by party thugs right in their homes (Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015: 9).

In the view of Afe (2015), the violence that results from the declaration of candidates perceived by the people as unfair or rigged in Nigeria has often led to violent eruptions with attendant destruction of people's property, the burning of human beings alive, and the incursion of the military into governance (Afe 2015: 12). It is in this light that Monday and Simon (2013: 2) declared that electoral violence has been one of the greatest hindrances to credible elections and democratic consolidation attempts in Nigeria. This is so as the cumulative effects of electoral violence, such as intimidation, harassment, murder, kidnappings and forced protection, coupled with lack of freewill to vote and vote buying, has made most Nigerians withdraw, not only from contesting for political office, but also persistently to abstain from voting. This ensures that the ultimate goals of political/electoral violence are achieved, which are to prevent people from freely exercising their constitutional right and civic duties to vote candidates of their choice, or to contest for electoral positions (Bratton 2008: 626-631; Sisk

2012: 53). Conclusively, only the bold, wicked and violent can take part actively in Nigeria's party politics or electoral contests (Monday and Simon 2013).

3.4.3.5 Strategies to Combat Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria has employed different strategies aimed at limiting or even preventing the occurrence of electoral violence and the involvement of youths in those acts. Some of these approaches include the use of peace accords between the leading candidates at different levels of electoral competition. The most pronounced of these was in the last presidential elections of 2015 which witnessed the conclusion and signing of a Peace Accord between 14 presidential candidates on the 10th of January 2015 in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. Among these 14 candidates were the two leading presidential candidates, namely the then incumbent president, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, and his main challenger, General Muhammadu Buhari, who eventually won the polls (Alli 2015; Ugbudian 2015). The Peace Accord was necessitated by the widespread loss of lives in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections. That violence claimed more than 800 lives, the loss of property worth billions of naira, disrupted so many people and their economic and religious activities, and generated many internally displaced persons (IDP's) (Orji 2016: 25). In essence, the 2011 polls worsened the polarization between the citizens of Nigeria along different fault lines of religion, ethnicity and regionality (Ugbudian 2015: 9; Orji 2016).

The 2015 Peace Accord was thus aimed at preventing a recurrence of such disaster witnessed in 2011. The Accord was brokered under the guidance of Chief Emeka Anyaoku, a former Secretary General of the Commonwealth Organization of States, and Mr. Kofi Annan, a former secretary General of the United Nations, who acted as an observer as the signing of the Peace Accord on 10th of January 2011 in Abuja, Nigeria (Alli 2015: 13; Ugbudian 2015: 10). Similarly, in Ekiti State, a Peace Accord was also signed by the leading gubernatorial candidates by the then incumbent governor, Dr. Kayode Fayemi of the All Progressives Congress (APC), and his main challenger, Mr. Peter Ayodele Fayose of the PDP, who eventually won the polls by winning all the 16 local governments in the 2014 Ekiti State gubernatorial polls.

On signing the Peace Accord on January 10th, 2015, the Nigerian Peace Committee (NPC) was established to monitor the implementation of the agreements. The NPC was peopled by distinguished Nigerians from different walks of life. Their mandate was to monitor the implementation of the signed agreements and mediate as need arose and where deemed necessary (Alli 2015: 15; Ugbudian 2015: 11).

However, renewed tensions and hostilities during the 2015 presidential campaigns necessitated the signing of a second Peace Accord which was signed on the 26th of March 2015, brokered by the Nigerian Peace Committee chaired by a former military Head of State, retired General Abdulsalam Abubakar (Ugbudian 2015: 12).

Alli (2015) and Ugbudian (2015) both believe that these efforts of signing peace agreements and the shuttle diplomacy of the NPC eventually paid off as Nigeria recorded a peaceful transfer of power from a defeated incumbent president to the opposition. There was acknowledgement of defeat and conceding of victory to the opposition, even before the results were fully announced and before any violence could occur (Ugbudian 2015: 13, 14). Notable, too, was the popular statement by the then incumbent President that his political ambition was not worth the blood of any Nigerian (Ugbudian 2015: 14). This statement still reverberates across the Nigerian political landscape to today. Invariably, the supporters of President Jonathan, including the youths, had no choice but to follow the lead of their leader. So also, were the effects of the peace accords signed across several States of Nigeria, including Ekiti State in 2014.

Although the elections still witnessed pockets of violence, Ugbudian (2015: 15) suggests that the peace agreements proved vital both on election day and the post-election periods. This is in spite of the pre-election predictions for the 2015 polls in Nigeria, none of which occurred as a result of what Ugbudian (2015: 15) attributed to the efforts of the NPC, stakeholders and even the candidates themselves at various levels, in particular the then President, Dr Jonathan, who provided an enabling environment needed for the peaceful conduct of the 2015 elections.

The use of the Biometric Data Capture Verification Machine (the Card Reader) and Permanent Voter Cards (PVC) were features introduced to the 2015 Nigerian general elections to prevent electoral violence associated with rigging, multiple voting, and ballot box snatching episodes. All these usually occur on the day of the election, followed by reprisal post-election violence that occurs in retaliation (Nwangwu 2015: 2; Ugbudu 2015: 69). However, several shortcomings were identified, among which were the widespread malfunctioning of the card-reading machines and the non-recognition of registered voters, which also happened to President Jonathan and the opposition vice presidential candidate in 2015. This made them resort to manual accreditation (Nwangwu 2015; Ugbudu 2015: 80). Although a good idea, the associated challenges need to be critically looked into, in particular the allegations of an ethnic agenda favouring the North through the use of the PVCs distributed to under-age persons to

vote in there, to the detriment of the south (Ugbudu 2015: 79). An initiative adopted toward having violence free elections was peace messaging, championed by several individuals, notable among them being the Nigerian music icon, 2face Idibia, in his "Vote not fight" campaign aimed at the youths and broadcast on multiple TV and radio stations across Nigeria. Also, among the numerous peace initiatives employed prior to the 2015 polls was that of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) (Alli 2015: 19).

Afe (2015) believes the establishment of election tribunals have helped in a huge way to douse post- electoral violence, as the aggrieved parties now have a place to direct their grievances to, instead of resorting to self-help via violence. However, he noted that the election tribunals should be urged to speedily carry out their duties to ensure that justice is delivered as soon as possible so as not to precipitate an atmosphere of tension in the society, and to remove illegal occupants of government offices as soon as possible (Afe 2015: 13).

Okafor (2011), on his own part, advocates that there should be a thorough revision of curricula in Nigerian tertiary institutions to make the graduates of such institutions employable. He also argues that entrepreneurial skills be inculcated to enable graduating youths to become employers of labour and job creators rather than job seekers or employees. Both suggestions have only been met halfway and half-heartedly by the Nigerian authorities, and it will require the politicians who constitute the government to make such laws.

Nevertheless, there has been limited progress in peace education and training with the introduction of peace studies as a general course of study at the undergraduate level, and as a specialist field of study at postgraduate levels in Nigeria. Also, the several NGO's among which are the DFID, JDPC (Justice, Development and Peace Commission) and USAID are assisting with these efforts. Alli (2015: 17, 19), in collaboration with the Nigerian Electoral Management Body, has been involved in several anti-electoral violence mass media advertorials especially during the 2015 presidential electoral process targeted at the youths. This has had limited success as most have no electricity to view such campaigns, or deliberately chose to ignore them in search of monetary and other likely benefits involved in engaging in acts of electoral violence. The relatively peaceful nature of the 2015 presidential elections might be linked with the conclusion and signing of peace agreements between the main political gladiators at all levels, in particular the presidential candidates. The agreements sought commitment to peaceful conduct during and after the electoral process, as well as to

mobilize their supporters to do likewise and shun acts of electoral violence (Sisk 2012: 58; Collier and Vicente 2014).

All the same, the 2015 elections as well as subsequent polls, did not go on without some pockets of scary electoral violence perpetrated by youths as well as security agencies. In fact, subsequent polls after the 2015 general elections have witnessed unprecedented violence levels in Rivers State, Edo State and the Ondo State gubernatorial electoral processes of November 2016, with the youths at the epicentres of the violence (Afe 2015; Akinrujomu 2016; The Punch 2016; Uwugiaren 2016).

A limitation to curbing the involvement of youths in electoral violence remains that of the appropriate authorities implementing the nation's laws. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended on the issue of electoral violence in Section 227, states that,

> No association shall retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of display of physical force or coercion in promoting any political objective or interest or in any such manner as arouses reasonable apprehension that they are organized and trained or equipped for that purpose (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999: 64; Adoke 2011b).

The 2010 electoral act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended in Section 81 prescribes punishment for the violation or contravention of section 227 of the Constitution of Nigeria. It provides that any political party or association that contravenes the provision of section 227 of the Constitution commits an offence and is liable on conviction to: (a) N500,000 for the first offence; (b) N700,000 for any subsequent offence; (c) N50,000 for all the days the crime continues. Hence, it is established that the laws of Nigeria clearly cover acts of electoral violence (Nigeria 2010: A1128)

Furthermore, the 2010 Electoral Act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria goes on to specifically criminalize the aiding and abetting of electoral violence acts by specifying that persons found thus are guilty of a crime and shall be liable if convicted to imprisonment of three years, or a fine amounting to N500 000, or both. Other provisions of the Act with attached sanctions includes the conduct of political parties' campaigns, behaviour at rallies, the forbidding of engagement in violence at rallies, campaigns or political meetings and all forms of threatening conduct. All these are contained in the 2010 Electoral Act of Nigeria (as amended) Sections 94, 95, 96, 119, 128, 129, 131 (Nigeria 2010: A1136, A1137, A1146, A1150, A1151; Adoke 2011b).

Another notable point is that there has been a dearth of neighbourhood peace initiatives among Nigerian youths to devise mechanisms limiting or preventing electoral violence in their own communities and among their peers. This, then, is the crux of this study, as a participatory action research project.

3.5 Summary

This chapter examines empirical works on electoral violence incidents in Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and Nigeria by looking at the nature and dynamics, causes and consequences of electoral violence in the mentioned sub-Saharan countries. It also examines the involvement of the youths as well as strategies aimed at limiting the incidence of electoral violence in the selected case studies among political participants with special focus on the youths.

It was discovered that both Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe have no specified approach to addressing this menace, although Ivory Coast seems to be employing a partial court trial approach. The Zimbabwean government is in denial, even repudiating the widely acknowledged activities of the youths, especially the ZANU-PF youth wing. In the case of Nigeria, although the legal framework seems sufficient to address the problem of youth involvement in electoral violence, the relevant laws are not implemented. This is like most other laws in Nigeria where implementation remains a concern. And this case is compounded by the fact that the 2010 Electoral Act of Nigeria (as amended) in Section 150(2) of it clearly vests the power to prosecute electoral offences including electoral violence in the electoral management body, in this case the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) or any legal representative nominated by it (Nigeria 2010: A1156). This becomes a very serious problem owing to the limited number of legal officers in the employment of the body and their busy schedule of defending the commission in a never-ending litany of election related litigations all over the country! And as suggested by the former attorney general of Nigeria/Minister of Justice INEC is ill-equipped and ill-staffed to effectively prosecute electoral offences in Nigeria. More so they are so preoccupied with the smooth conduct of elections that engagement in electoral offences prosecution will be a huge distraction and result in utter chaos (Adoke 2011a).

So far, I have been able to also identify several strategies employed in tackling electoral violence in Nigeria. However, a challenge common to all of them is that none of these seems to be directly targeted at the youths specifically and especially the youths in the grassroots like Ekiti State the study area of this research. This is because peace messaging falls short where

there's predominant non-availability of electric supply to view the tv or listen to radios a common feature of several Nigerian homes. The second shortcoming of the strategies identified in Nigeria is that almost all of them are aimed at both the election day and post-election activities without serious concerns to pre-election periods where much of these acts of electoral violence takes place across board. Thus, this chapter has succeeded in addressing the concerns raised in the second objective of this study which is specifically aimed at identifying electoral violence management strategies and their shortcomings.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The research design for this study is action research with exploration, planning, implementation and evaluation components using Ekiti State, Nigeria as a case study. The study is guided by both the post-positivist and transformative research paradigms and is exploratory in nature. The post- positivist paradigm identifies linkages between causes and probable outcomes or effects; it is chiefly centred on identifying the causes that produce specific outcomes. The transformative paradigm is necessary because neither the constructivist school or worldview nor the post-positivist school involve sufficient action agendas to bring about the desired change. Hence, the post-positivist worldview will largely serve the explanatory factor, and address objectives 1 and 2, while the transformative paradigm, using action research, will address objective 3 of this study. The outlay of this research is divided into five phases as shown diagrammatically below in figure 4.1.

Figure 4. 1 Research Outline





4.2 Research Methods

There are two basic models of research methods which are mainly the qualitative and quantitative, with a combination of both called mixed methods of research. The quantitative and qualitative designs are not to be viewed as opposites but, rather, as two extreme ends of a single continuum, while the mixed methods approach incorporates elements of both quantitative and qualitative designs (Newman and Benz 1998; Creswell 2014: 3). Creswell's distinction between the two designs is that, whereas quantitative design leans towards the collection and use of numerical data, the qualitative design favours textual data such as opinions, behaviours and so on. He also notes that quantitative design favours closed questions more than open ended questions, unlike the qualitative design. All three, however, are usually influenced by the philosophical worldviews that the researcher brings to the study (Creswell 2014: 4).

A quantitative design is also very useful in testing theories and in the examination of relationships between variables, provided such variables are measurable statistically. This is unlike qualitative research which deals with understanding of a social phenomenon from the

perspectives of individuals or groups and are mostly inductive in nature, that is, it moves from the specific to the general, making use of data collected from participants in the participants' social settings (Creswell 2009; 2014: 4). The results of the quantitative design are usually fixed in nature, while that of the qualitative design are usually flexible and emergent in nature (Creswell 2014: 4).

This study adopted the mixed methods research design as it incorporates both the qualitative and quantitative arrangements to give a greater strength, and eliminates the biases and weaknesses of either design when used collaboratively (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Creswell 2014: 4, 218). Another reason for selecting the mixed methods approach is that it seeks to provide a better understanding of the research problems using multiple methods of data collection and analysis to examine a research problem (Creswell 2014: 14). Hence, mixed methods research is a combination of traditional field survey methods (quantitative) with qualitative field approaches such as observation and interviews.

The type of mixed methods research I used in this research work is that which Creswell (2014: 224) termed as a sequential explanatory strategy of mixed research methods, in which data is collected in two distinct phases. Phase one is the quantitative data collection and analysis, which informs or guides the second phase of data collection, that is, the qualitative data collection, which engages purposeful sampling methods building on the results obtained from the phase one data using the quantitative data collection methods (Creswell 2009: 211; 2014: 224, 225; 2015: 2). This mixed research method also assisted me in this study of youth involvement in electoral violence in Ekiti State, Nigeria to generalize my findings from the study's sample to the main population of Ekiti State as well as to develop a detailed knowledge of the phenomenon of electoral violence in the study area (Creswell 2014: 14,15). This addressed a key shortcoming of the action research process consisting of too small a sample, which renders the action research results unrepresentative of the general population as stated earlier.

In addition, the emergence of the idea of triangulation as a method of eliminating the biases and limitations contained in using any single research method of data collection was greatly enhanced using the mixed methods research design (Jick 1979; Creswell 2014: 14). As stated earlier, the mixed methods research approach is an integrated method in which a careful examination of the results of one method can provide help with the questions to ask or identify participants for the other approach (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2010 cited in Creswell, 2014: 15)

. The results of statistical approaches thus can be better explained, corroborated or rejected using data from qualitative methods such as observations and interviews to seek better clarification (Creswell 2011). Therefore, the two reinforce one another, as survey methods are believed to be usually more objective and influence the researcher but lack depth, unlike qualitative methods which are usually depth-intensive but without the breadth of the quantitative method. Hence, they can balance each other to give a more robust research. This provides a form of triangulation of data which eliminates or reduces the limitations of either method when applied individually and at the same time ensures data validity and reliability (Creswell 2014: 15).

Using the sequential explanatory mixed methods research design, I used surveys for baseline data gathering using questionnaires to source data quantitatively to generate numeric descriptions, trends, attitudes, and opinions of selected samples of people across the three legislative constituencies of Ado-Ekiti in Ekiti state, and to generate baseline data to be used for generalization from the samples of the Ekiti youths interviewed in Ado-Ekiti as a whole (Creswell 2014: 13).

For the qualitative approach, I chose to focus on a case study that allowed me to explore cases intensively of youth involvement in electoral violence in Ekiti state within the specified boundaries of time, geographical space/location, and using multiple sources of information or specified activities such as interviews, observations and the use of focus group discussions, documents, audio-visual materials and reports as in-depth data generating sources (Creswell 2014: 14).

Thus, the sequential explanatory mixed methodology design is employed, with the findings of the quantitative research, that is, the survey questionnaires, being expanded upon or rejected, and then coupled with the qualitative methods of observations, interviews, and focus group discussions, as well as a detailed exploration of a few key individuals or cases (Creswell 2007: 73; 2014: 14).

Both the post-positivist and the action research paradigms were used sequentially, with the post- positivist approach first followed by the action research paradigm. In a similar manner, the data collection process was done sequentially to allow for the findings of one to guide the focus of the other. The findings of the one provided better explanations and reinforced the other. In this case, I began with a broad survey that covered the three legislative constituencies

of Ado-Ekiti in Ekiti state, using closed questions, and then followed up with open-ended, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and observations to collect in-depth data that will strengthen the research overall (Creswell 2014: 17).

Creswell (2014: 14,15) says that the usefulness of the mixed research methods design is unassailable as it helps to combat the inherent weaknesses in both the quantitative and qualitative research designs. In this study of youth involvement in electoral violence in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, it will help me to generalize my findings of the main population of Ekiti State, as well as to develop a detailed knowledge of the phenomenon of electoral violence in the study area. Thus, I employed what Creswell (2014: 224) termed as sequential explanatory strategy of mixed research methods, which involved a survey on a large number of participants across the three legislative zones in the study area, and then did a qualitative follow up with fewer participants recruited during the quantitative survey processes to obtain their specific language and voices to help accept, reject or explain the findings in the earlier quantitative survey (Creswell 2014: 19).

In the explanatory sequential approach which I am employing, qualitative data is useful when unexpected results from quantitative data analysis. The second phase of data collection, which is the qualitative stage, engages purposeful sampling methods to build on the results obtained from the phase one data collection (Creswell 2009: 211; 2014: 224-225). Its strength lies in its straightforwardness and easy implementation, as the stages are clearly distinguishable. However, it has a peculiar weakness in the length of time to be spent on data collection, provided the two types of data are to be given equal weight (Creswell 2009: 211). This I countered, though, by giving equal attention to both as the quantitative data collected formed the baseline of the study and informed the second phase of the qualitative methods which was be used as primary exploratory data.

4.2.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Data Collection

As intended, I collected the quantitative data by means of a questionnaire (see Appendix III) which was completed by 306 youths from the three legislative constituencies in Ado Ekiti, using stratified random sampling. The questionnaire was administered prior to the intervention (January 2017) to generate baseline data for the study.

For the post intervention analysis, the quantitative data was sourced through the pre-training and post training KSCI questionnaires to determine the impact of the KSCI training on the action team participants.

Qualitative data collected were (guided by the results of the analysis of the quantitative data) sourced from observations and key participants interviews. These involved youths from the three legislative constituencies in Ado Ekiti selected from the survey respondents (see Appendix IV. Appendices V and VI are the FGD evaluation and observation forms respectively). Given that participants in these interviews were volunteers, it was important not to portray them as representatives of all youths in Ado Ekiti. I also used this process to recruit the action team based on the individual willingness of the youths to participate.

Similarly, the post action interventions qualitative data was generated from review questions asked during the post training focus group discussions with the participants action research team conducted as evaluation of the programme.

4.3 Research Design

This refers to the plans and procedures pertaining to research that extends from the basic assumptions to the details of data collection, and the selected techniques of data analysis (Creswell 2009; 2014: 3). The choice of a research design is determined by several factors among which are the worldview or philosophical assumptions, which can also be referred to as research paradigms with which the researcher decides to engage in the study. There are also the strategies of inquiry and the specified research methods of collecting data, the data analysis, and the interpretation techniques (Creswell 2009, 2014). Other factors to consider are the experience and training of the researcher, and the target audience of the study (Creswell 2014: 3).

4.3.1 Research Paradigm

This can also be called worldview or the philosophical underpinnings of the study. It is a set of "basic beliefs that guide action" which in this case is the research process (Guba 1990:17). Hence, this study will be anchored on the pragmatic research paradigm as a mixed methods research, which will draw liberally from both post-positivist and participatory/advocacy research philosophies.

4.3.2 The Post Positivism Paradigm

The post-positivist paradigm identifies linkages between causes and probable outcomes or effects; it is chiefly centred on the identification of the causes of specific outcomes. It seeks to generate knowledge based on objective realities employing careful observation and measurement (Creswell 2014). It encourages researchers to challenge notions concerning absolute truth of knowledge. It usually begins with an identified theory and the collection of

data which are analysed to either refute or support the theory. In addition, knowledge from this worldview is derived from objective reality measured numerically, plus observations. As Creswell (2014: 7) also notes, developing numeric observation measures, and the study of human behaviours are germane to the post-positivist researcher.

The post-positive paradigm or philosophy is anchored on five key assumptions as identified by Phillips and Burbules (2000) as follows:

a. Knowledge is conjectural, not fixed, and links knowledge to context; hence, it disapproves of or rejects the notion of absolute truth
b. It believes that engaging in research involves the process of making claims which are either refined or abandoned for more acceptable claims. Thus, it argues that research enables knowledge refining, rejection and advancement
c. This philosophy assumes or believes that knowledge is shaped by collected data and evidence as well as rational considerations
d. This paradigm also assumes that research seeks to explain causal relationships or situations via the development of true and relevant statements
e. Assumption of objectivity: It also postulates that researchers must be objective and avoid biases in the engaged methods and conclusions, which can be done through checks for validity and reliability, especially in quantitative studies (Creswell 2009: 7).

4.3.3 Action Research Paradigm

The second paradigm I used in this study is the transformative worldview, which Creswell (2009: 9) formerly called the advocacy or participatory research paradigm, also known as the action research paradigm. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011); Creswell (2014: 9), this came into existence in the 1980s and 1990s from individuals who believed that the frontiers of a positivist worldview or research paradigm was limiting and needed to be extended to cover the marginalized individuals and groups in society, as well as to tackle issues of social justice. This research philosophy is predicated upon the needs of groups or individuals that may be experiencing marginalization or disempowerment in specified contexts. Its advocates also believed that the constructivist school or worldview and the post-positivist school did not involve sufficient action agendas in their beliefs to tackle issues to do with marginalization, disempowerment, social justice and other forms of inequalities.

Advocacy or participatory research is also called action research, and is an approach to research design with impact in mind. It does not conform to the traditional models of research as it

seeks to extend the limits of traditional research designs and merge them with practice (Noffke 2009: 65). Thus, the principal distinction of advocacy or participatory research is the inclusion of the action agenda which, in this study, will enable the research to go beyond the limitations of traditional research by creating an intervention to test for the validity or otherwise of the research findings.

Greenwood (2007) has defined action research as social research undertaken by teams of both community stakeholders and trained researchers who work collaboratively in an effort to improve the situation or address the issues facing the stakeholders. Thus, apart from promoting broad participation in the process of research, it supports actions leading to social change for the stake holders (Greenwood 2007: 3). It is conceptualized as a set of deliberately collaborative and democratic strategies for generating knowledge and designing actions or interventions for change. It involves a process in which experts in social and other forms of research work together with local stakeholders in a form of a joint learning process through relationships (Greenwood 2007: 2). The central thesis of action research is focused on the doing "with" as against the traditional research approach of doing "for". Action research recognizes and gives credit to the local stakeholders as a repository of knowledge and experience (Greenwood 2007). It is described as a product of multi-dimensional approaches to social change in different fields. It is believed that action research presents a different perspective on how the field of the social sciences can, and should operate. Proponents of action research argue that no better option exists for learning by doing (Greenwood 2007). More so, action research is a collaborative problem analysis and problem-solving process geared towards fairer, more peaceful societies. This is because action research and intervention processes engage democratic means by including the local stakeholders, while also not sacrificing the quality of such research through the involvement of expert social research professionals and strategies (Greenwood 2007: 2, 3)

In a similar manner, Reason and Bradbury (2001: 1) and Adebayo (2015: 101) also defined action research as:

> A participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people and, more generally, the flourishing of individual persons and their communities.

Action research provides a direct connection between theory and practice; it eradicates the disconnection or interruptions between research and its applications, according to Noffke (2009: 89). This is done by integrating both in one continuum. Noffke (2009) went further to state that action research comes from within a social setting by the participants themselves, or with the researchers working in collaboration with them, rather than research merely on the participants in a social setting. This gives the research immediate impact in a seamless manner. The action agenda, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), may be geared towards change in the lives of the participants or researchers, and may also bring about changes in the systems, structures and institutions within which the individuals exist, work and live. The factors that an action agenda looks at include social issues such as oppression, political and economic domination or marginalization, disempowerment, suppression, and alienation (Walker 2001: 240; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 9). Noffke (2009: 91) suggests that action research is entrenched in the values of the participants, which can be translated to mean that the methodology or design takes on the character and values of the different social groups; it adapts in different ways within various social groups.

Furthermore, for Noffke (2009: 90), action research necessarily involves a reflective practice. But not all reflective-practice researchers are action researchers. This research methodology involves the gathering and analysis of data by the researcher which provides him with a level of objectivity and distance or detachment by limiting his influence on the process. This enables him to look at his own work from various perspectives, and allows him to employ different kinds of data in the process of triangulation (Noffke 2009: 90b). For Walker (2001), data validity in action research can be done through the techniques of triangulation, that is, using multiple data sources to generate data bearing in mind the different contexts (Walker 2001: 249, 250). She claimed that validity and reliability in action research is not so much about truism but more about the contexts within which meanings are produced (Walker 2001: 250). Thus, action research is an objective approach to research based on collected data during practice, and so it frees the researcher from interpretations constrained by memory and influenced by individual perceptions and biases (Noffke 2009).

The history of action research can be traced to the 1940s and 1950s led by Karl Lewin. Also identified were Kemmis and Robin McTaggart as proponents of the action research school of thought in Australia's Deakin University (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998). Action research in South Africa is embedded in the struggles against apartheid oppression, and thus, it assumed a

strongly political character with emphasis on social justice concerns (Walker 2001; Noffke 2009: 91).

Hence, the suitability of action research for this study of managing youth involvement in electoral violence in Ekiti state Nigeria, is most appropriate since one of the key assumptions of this paradigm is that it begins with an identified issue as the focal point of the study. In this case, the focal issue is that of electoral violence and the involvement of Nigerian youths. The action research paradigm also requires that the researcher works hand in hand with participants to design, implement and evaluate an intervention with a view to resolving the issue. Moreover, the advocacy aspect of the paradigm involves raising the awareness of the populace affected, and working collaboratively for change and reform (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 9).

The importance and of this advocacy and participatory action research paradigm for this study, and a critical tool of examination for it has been captured by Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998) cited in Creswell and Plano Clark (2011: 10) as follows:

a. Helping to free individuals from limitations placed by media in terms of language, power relations, and work procedures either in the print or electronic media
b. To create debates to bring about change to emancipate people from limitations that affect self-development and self-determination brought about by dysfunctional social systems and structures
c. To present a proposed change agenda formulated by a combined team of participants (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 10).

Other advocates of action research, such as Ferrance (2000), point out that action research is not about doing research on or about other people, or finding out what is wrong but, rather, trying to find ways to improve one's skills, techniques and strategies. It is not so much about finding out why certain things are done as it is about how things can be done better by the people involved (Ferrance 2000: 2, 3). According to Ferrance (2000), the term 'action research' was coined a social psychologist, Kurt Lewin, in the 1940s. He was an advocate of doing research in what he called natural settings to change the way researchers interact with the setting. He eventually coined the term to describe research that did not disengage investigations from interventions needed to address the issues of concern (Ferrance 2000: 7).

4.3.3.1 Action Research Stages

There are several stages that an action research process passes through, starting with the identification of a problem in which the researcher has an interest (Sax and Fisher 2001: 72; Adebayo 2015: 102). Other scholars, such as Greenwood (2007), list some of the steps to include; for instance: problem definition or identification, collaborative generation of relevant knowledge about the identified issues, learning about and executing social research techniques (designing an intervention), implementing the intervention(s) and, finally, evaluating and interpreting the results. Hence, the steps in the diagram below are usually followed:

Figure 4. 2 Action research cycle



Source: (Ferrance 2000: 9)

Ferrance (2000), Adebayo (2015: 102), Nielsen (2016: 419a) and Wilson and Virginia (2016: 64a) detail these steps as follows:

a. Problem or issue definition, identification, or conceptualization – this is one of the most critical aspects of action research as it defines what the issues or problems the research process will address through a carefully planned intervention. This is germane to this study, bearing in mind that problems cannot be solved or issues addressed except when correctly identified and that, without this proper identification, the research will have

no direction and no impact (Adebayo 2015: 118) Johnson 2011, Johnson 2002:21 in Adebayo). Thus, without adequate preparation and planning at this stage of the research, there is bound to be a plethora of false starts and, consequently, frustrations in the research process (Ferrance 2000). She went further to suggest that, for meaningful problem identification, the questions asked to elicit the issues should be put in simple terms be devoid of jargon, be concise, have meaning, and should not already have an answer. Yet, it must be a higher-order question that is not a yes and no answer question (Ferrance 2000: 10).

b. The second step in the action research process to be used in this study involves the collection of data about the identified issues. The data will be collected from various sources to help in understanding the scope of the issues using either qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods of data collection. This may include, but is not limited to many of the following: Interviews, journals, photos, logs of meetings, videotapes, case studies, surveys, records – tests, report cards, attendance, and self-assessment, projects, performances, focus groups, anecdotal records, check lists, portfolios, diaries, field notes, audio tapes, memos, questionnaires, and individual files (Ferrance 2000: 11). She urged that data should be selected based on their suitability, availability and ease of collection, using at least three different sources for triangulation. These data should be organised in such a manner that it will be easy to make relevant and important deductions or inferences from them (Ferrance 2000).

c. The third phase in the action research spectrum adopted for this study is the interpretation of the data collected in the second phase. This is usually done through a careful analysis of the collected data to enable the research team to make valid deductions to be used in the next phase of the research, which is the design and implementation of actions aimed at addressing the problems or issues identified at the first phase. Careful and thorough interpretation and analysis of comprehensive data can help the action researcher have a better grasp of the issues being studied (Ferrance 2000: 12; Adebayo 2015: 105).

d. Following on from the data analysis and interpretation is the action design and intervention phase. This is usually done after the researcher is satisfied that the collected and analysed data provides sufficient responses for making valid deductions relevant to the objectives of the study (Ferrance 2000: 12; Adebayo 2015: 105).

e. The fifth and final stage is evaluation or assessment. This elaborated upon below.

Evaluation Phase: To get a view of the impact of the intervention carried out in the previous phase, it is recommended that a monitoring and evaluation of the intervention be carried out. Whereas monitoring is an ongoing process carried out simultaneously with the intervention, evaluation is usually done at the end of each intervention implementation stage to find out if there has been any improvement or not in the issues the intervention set out to address. If there were improvements, there is still a need to determine if such were supported by the evidence from the data collected. In particular, behavioural change is assessed to check if some new practices have been acquired from the intervention which differ from the former ways of doing things (Townsend 2013: 111; Adebayo 2015: 106). Thus, evaluation is necessary for the action research process, which means it is a cyclical process, as shown in the figure above. It assists in designing the next step of re-strategizing in the process, and is done after reflecting on the intervention. During this stage, suggests Adebayo (2015), questions can be asked such as: Was the intervention effective or not? How does any change (in attitude or behaviour) relate to my chosen course of action or inaction? And, what should happen next? (Townsend 2013: 109; Adebayo 2015: 106).

Other scholars, such as Guskey (2002), define evaluation as an intensive, thoughtful, deliberate, collection and examination of relevant data through appropriate methods and procedures employed to review the capacity of an intervention to accomplish its intended outcomes. This is done to find out if the intervention is better than other approaches used in the past. A cost-and-benefit analysis of the approach can also be done to compare it with other approaches (Guskey 2002: 1,2).

Evaluation helps to establish the necessary linkage between the intervention and the goal of the action research study which, in this case, is focused on reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence. Evaluation will help to appraise the causes and effects of the intervention and its ability to effectively bring about the desired change (Townsend 2013: 111; Adebayo 2015: 106). Appendix VII was employed to evaluate the intervention undertaken. Going further, Guskey (2002: 2) itemised critical levels involved in professional development evaluation, which becomes more complex as one progresses through the levels. Each level in the range builds on the previous levels before it. He also observed that success at one level is a necessary condition for success at higher levels after it. This is diagrammatically presented in the table below:

Evaluation Level	What questions Are Addressed?	How Will Information Be Gathered?	What is Measured or Assessed?	How Will Information Be Used?
1. Participants' Reactions	Did they like it? Was their time well spent? Did the material make sense? Will it be useful? Was the facilitator knowledgeable and helpful? Were the refreshments fresh and tasty? Was the room of the right temperature? Were the chairs comfortable?	Questionnaires will be administered at the end of the session	Initial satisfaction with the experience	To improve programme design and delivery
2. Participants' Learning	Did participants acquire the intended knowledge and skills?	Questionnaires administered at the end of the session. Simulations, Demonstrations, Participant Reflections (oral/written)	New knowledge and skills to participants	To improve programme content, format, and organization
3. Communal Support & Change	What was the impact on the community? Did it affect the communal political	Observation of participant's political participation activities. Questionnaires	The community's or youth groups' advocacy, support, accommodation	To document and improve community youth groups' support

	climate and procedures? Was implementation advocated, facilitated, and supported? Was the support public and overt? Were problems addressed quickly and efficiently? Were sufficient resources made available? Were successes recognized and shared?	Structured interviews with participants and their editors	facilitation, and recognition	To inform future change efforts
4. Participants' Use of New Knowledge and Skills	Did participants effectively apply the new knowledge and skills? (How are participants using what they learned?) (What challenges are the participants encountering?)	Questionnaires, Structured interviews with participants and their leaders; Participants' reflections (oral and/or written) Observation of the participants in political activities	Degree and quality of implementation	To document and improve implementation of programme content

Table 4. 1 Evaluation guidelines Source: Adapted from Guskey (2002) and Adebayo (2015.)

At the same time, action research has been criticized for the impression that results generated might not be valid or useful as a basis for generalization. This is attributed to the small sample size that is usually involved in the action research process, making it unrepresentative of the larger population (Wilson and Virginia 2016: 64a). This is an issue I addressed using survey methods of data gathering, in particular, the questionnaire as explained in the data collection methods section. This is to enable the study to cover a larger sample of youths in the study area that will make the results more representative and less prone to error when used as a basis for

generalizations or inferences about the subject matter of youth involvement in electoral violence.

4.4 Sampling methods

The population of the study area was given as 101,093 people who are youths aged 18-35 years old in Ado Ekiti, the capital city of Ekiti State (NBS 2013: 11).

Hence, a representative sample population of 306 youths were used for the study's survey. This sample population was derived using the formula for a finite sample $n = z^2pq/e^2$ where n = sample size, z = the standard normal deviate of 1.96, p = the proportion of the population with desired characteristics (which stands at 27.6% of youths aged 18-35 years in Ado Ekiti [NBS 2013: 11]), while q = 1 – p, and finally, e = the maximum allowable error of 0.05. Also, 24 other youths were recruited using purposeful sapling methods for three focus group discussions from the three legislative constituencies of Ado Ekiti. This was for the second phase of data collection in the explanatory sequential mixed method design.

For the quantitative data, I applied the stratified random sampling technique, which allowed the selection of youths in Ado Ekiti who meet the required criteria and are available and willing to participate in the study. For the qualitative data, non-probability or purposive sampling methods were used to select politically active youths for the focus group discussions from participants of the survey questionnaire. These recruitments were based on a willingness to voluntarily participate in further research activities beyond the survey, and the level of political participation in electoral processes in Ekiti State, Nigeria.

4.5 Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to produce frequencies and cross tabulations, which assisted in identifying the trends, patterns, causes and consequences of electoral violence among Ekiti youths of Nigeria.

Qualitative data analysis was carried out using thematic content analysis in which data was grouped together based on relativity of their meanings or interpretations. This can be employed to scrutinize any form of data including those employed in this study like the interview questions responses, focus group discussions, observations and other secondary sources (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Moretti *et al.* 2011). Thematic content analysis technique was employed using both the inductive and deductive approaches to group data into classes based on identified or recurrent patterns or themes, a process that can also be called coding (Stringer 2014: 141;

Braun and Clarke 2013: 224). Thus, data from the audio recordings of the interviews, and video recordings of the interventions were transcribed diligently. The content analysis of these data were then presented using the thematic approach (Struwig and Stead 2013).

Once the intervention had been implemented, the evaluation of the interventions was done using both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data was sourced through the pre-training and post training KSCI questionnaires to determine the impact of the KSCI training on the action team participants while the qualitative data was generated from review questions asked during the post training focus group discussions with the participants action research team conducted an evaluation of the programme. This intervention evaluation was also done using the post-training interview guide (see Appendix V).

4.6 Validity and Reliability of Data

4.6.1 Qualitative Research

Validity in research refers to the credibility of interpretations, the believability and internal consistency of study objects, data and findings (Sin 2010: 308; Rossman and Rallis 2011: 65; Silverman 2013: 285). Data triangulation helps to ensure the validity of data via the cross authentication of data from two or more methods of data collection on the same subject matter. This was employed to ensure validity of research data by collecting data using multiple sources or methods like administration of questionnaire for quantitative data collection, use of interviews for qualitative data collection and observations. The mixed methods approach, as discussed in the research methods section, helped to boost data triangulation which, in turn, fortified the validity of research data. Pretesting will be used to ensure reliability of the instruments used. Reliability involves the capacity to replicate successfully the study's findings in another context (Hair 2006: 3), while Hesse-Biber (2010: 3) noted that triangulation of data in the mixed method design enriches the study's findings. The convergence of data from the focus group discussion provided greater confidence that what was being targeted was accurately captured (De Vos *et al.* 2011: 436).

4.6.2 Quantitative Research

In quantitative studies, external validity refers to the degree to which one can draw inferences and thus generalise from a sample to the whole population of study. Hence, external validity arises from accurate sampling. This I addressed by using the sampling formula for a finite population to derive the sample figure of 306 youths using the survey instruments as a base (Biddix 2009).

Content or internal validity deals with the capacity of the research questions to accurately measure the knowledge being sought in relation to the study objectives. This I have addressed by ensuring that the survey questions adequately cover the study objectives (Biddix 2009).

To ensure reliability and improve the strength of the research instruments, pilot testing was conducted on 18 participants in a nearby town not included in the study. That was done with ten participants for the questionnaire and eight participants for the focus group. Changes to the questionnaires, and focus group discussion instruments were incorporated before dissemination to the target group. This was done to test the research design and avoid possible mistakes that could have happened and caused havoc in the main study, as well as contributing to knowledge which might improve the main study.

4.7 Ethical Considerations

Data was handled professionally and pseudonyms were used to protect the identities of the participants. De Vos *et. al.* (2011: 120) remarked that anonymity ensures participant privacy, while confidentiality implies that only the researcher and possibly a few others should be aware of the identity of the participants. For this study, only the action research team could know the identity and privacy of the participants.

I ensured that participation in this study was voluntary by ensuring there was informed consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were adhered to during focus group discussions, interviews and evaluation process. However, the action research team who planned and implemented the intervention were not anonymous since the participants knew them. Also, all ethical requirements of DUT were adhered to as they relate to this study.

4.8 Study Area

This study was carried out in Ekiti State, located in the South-Western region of Nigeria and specifically in Ado-Ekiti the capital city of the State. I chose Ekiti State because of its history of political turbulence that has seen it produce nine different State governors, which is more than any other State in the country since the return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999.

Ekiti State was created out of the old Ondo State in October 1st, 1996 by the administration of the late General Sani Abacha. It is located in the South western region of Nigeria within the latitudes 7(0)20' and 8(0) 02'N, and longitudes 4(0)55' and 5(0)50'E. Ekiti State has a land size of 6,353 sq. km. (ekitistate.gov.ng) (Oguntuyi 1979: 5). It shares boundaries with Kwara and Kogi States to the north and east respectively, and Osun and Ondo States to the West and South respectively. The State of Ekiti can be likened to a compact country with an indigenous

population coming from different parts in a bid to either hunt or farm. Migrants also come from other parts of Nigeria, such as Ijebu, Ile-Ife, Oyo, Ibadan, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Edo, Urhobo and Igbira and are now resident in Ekiti with the Ekitis who are the aborigines of the land. However, there are different dialects of the Ekiti language spoken by the different groups in Ekiti State, with each group represented in Ado Ekiti the capital city of the State. Movement into Ekiti is still ongoing, especially with the Igbo, Igbira, Urhobo, Hausa and Fulani (Oguntuyi 1979: 3, 5).

The term Ekiti denotes a hinterland area populated with hills and mountains and called *Okiti* in the local dialect. Despite the immigration of people from other tribes into Ekiti State, the people of Ekiti are predominantly culturally homogeneous with a population of 2 800 000 people projected for 2011 (Source: citypopulation.de). Most citizens of Ekiti are educated to the level of tertiary schooling; it is even said that each house in Ekiti has at least one professor. Hence, its motto as the fountain of knowledge.

However, farming is a major occupation among the indigenes of Ekiti and, among the cultivated crops are cocoa, kolanuts, maize, plantain, banana, rice, cowpeas, yam, timber, and cassava. Although the natural endowment of Ekiti is not limited to fertile farmlands, the State also has many solid mineral resources which include quartzite, lime, kaolin, clay, cassiterite, tin, foundry sand, granite and uranium to mention a few. Industries in Ekiti include the Ire burnt bricks, Omolayo Standard Press Ado Ekiti, Adegbemile Food industries in Oye Ekiti, Gossy Water Industry, and Ikogosi Ekiti (Oyinloye 2015: 1, 2).

Politically and administratively Ekiti is divided into 16 local government areas, three senatorial districts, six federal and 18 State constituencies in all. The State is headed by a democratically elected chief executive called a governor, who also doubles as the chief security officer and chief accountant of the State. This is similar to the other 35 States of the Nigerian federation. Ado-Ekiti, the capital city, is in the central region of Ekiti State and has a population of 366,280 people as at the 2011 projection. The target population of study, which is the youth, is given to be 27.6% of the general population (NBS 2013: 11).

Map 4. 1: Map of Ekiti State



Source: researchgate.net

4.9 Summary

This chapter has presented the research and data collection methods, and the research philosophies underlying the study, as well as other relevant research protocols. The action research processes, a review of the study area, and sampling methods were covered. Finally, issues of validity and reliability were also the discussed. The next chapter will present an analysis of the data collected using the methods specified in this chapter.

Endnotes

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Part IV

Chapter Five

EXPLORATION

5.0 Introduction

This section of the study deals with the presentation and analysis of data collected from the field, that is, in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State. The data for this research were sourced using both quantitative and qualitative research methods together – that is, a Mixed Methods approach – as well as data collection tools, among which were questionnaires, interviews and observations. The questionnaires were used to collect baseline data in line with the sequential explanatory research method described in chapter four, while the qualitative data were sourced via interviews and observations.

The quantitative data analysis was done using the SPSS to generate frequency tables and charts, while thematic analysis was employed for the qualitative data. These were done with the aim of meeting the study's stated objectives which are:

- Objective 1: To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence
- Objective 2: To assess the effectiveness of current strategies if any, being used to limit the incidence of electoral violence among Nigerian youths.
- Objective 3: To work with a reference group of politically active advisors to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria.

However, this chapter of the study will only deal with objectives one and two listed above, with objective three will being addressed in subsequent chapters.

In sourcing this quantitative data, questionnaires were administered to 306 politically active Nigerian youths' resident in Ekiti State and who are between the ages of 15 to 35 years old. They were selected to answer the questionnaire using purposeful sampling techniques. This was described in section 4.4 of the study that addressed methods of data collection.

The characteristics of the respondents are given in the tables below:

The population sample of 306 Nigerian youths' resident in Ekiti State Nigeria consists of 85 females (27.8 percent) and 221 males (72.2 percent).

Thus, the age range of the population sample employed for the quantitative data going by their age distribution shows that all the respondents fall within 15 to 35 years of age, which is the age range required for the respondents of this study

5.1 Addressing Objective One

Towards the fulfilment of objective one, several questions were asked concerning factors that might be responsible for youths to engage in electoral violence acts, namely their gender, educational levels, poverty, employment, status, political affiliations, ethnicity and religious differences. The responses from the questionnaires, which form the basis of the quantitative data, were analysed using the (SPSS) software, and the results are presented as follows:

5.1.1 Respondents' experiences and participation in electoral violence

The respondents were asked about their experiences in the involvement of youths in electoral violence acts.

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	62	20.3
	Probably not	31	10.1
	Probably yes	95	31.0
	Definitely yes	106	34.6
	Don't know	12	3.9
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5.1: Youth and electoral violence experience

The frequencies in Table 5.1 above show that almost a third (30.4 percent) of the respondents have not been involved in electoral violence acts. However, a majority accounting for nearly two thirds (64.6 percent) of the respondents believe they have experienced incidents of youth involvement in electoral violence acts before.

5.1.2 Youth involvement in electoral violence acts

Respondents were asked if the youths were involved in acts of electoral violence in Ado-Ekiti

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	45	14.7
	Probably not	33	10.8
	Probably yes	106	34.6
	Definitely yes	90	29.4

	Don't know	32	10.5
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5 2: Ado-Ekiti youths' involvement in electoral violence

From Table 5.2 above, a total of 64 percent which accounts for almost two-thirds of the total number respondents believe that Nigerian youths resident in the study area of Ado Ekiti, the Ekiti State capital are involved in acts of electoral violence. However, a quarter (25.5 percent) of the respondents also believe that Nigerian youths' resident in Ekiti State under study are not involved in acts of electoral violence.

5.2 Causes of Youth Involvement in Electoral Violence

5.2.1 Influence of educational level on the involvement of youths in electoral violence

Respondents were asked if the educational level of the youths' influence their involvement in acts of electoral violence.

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	56	18.3
	Probably not	51	16.7
	Probably yes	77	25.2
	Definitely yes	82	26.8
	Don't know	40	13.1
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5 3: Influence of education level

On the influence of the level of education as shown in Table 5.3, it is observed that more than half (52 percent) of the total respondents believe higher educational training prevents the involvement of the youths under study from engaging in acts of electoral violence. While a third of the respondents (35 percent) believe that the educational level does not influence the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence acts in anyway whatsoever.

5.2.2 Involvement of women in electoral violence acts

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	37	12.1
	Probably not	40	13.1
	Probably yes	113	36.9
	Definitely yes	88	28.8
	Don't know	27	8.8
	Total	305	99.7
Missing	System	1	.3
Total		306	100.0

Table 5 4: Involvement of women in acts of electoral violence

Respondents were asked if women were involved in electoral violence acts in Ado Ekiti. The frequency table 5.4 above shows that close to two thirds of the respondents believe that women participate in electoral violence acts, while a quarter of the respondents believe women do not.

5.2.3 Role of employment in electoral violence

The respondents were asked if having a gainful employment decreases the incidence of youth involvement in electoral violence.

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	30	9.8
	Probably not	46	15.0
	Probably yes	67	21.9
	Definitely yes	142	46.4
	Don't know	21	6.9
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5 5*:* Influence of employment

Table 5.5 shows that majority of about two thirds of the questionnaire respondents overwhelmingly believe that having a gainful employment prevents youths from being

involved in electoral violence acts. While a quarter thinks otherwise that youths will get involved in acts of electoral violence whether gainfully employed or not.

5.2.4 Influence of poverty on electoral violence

Respondents were asked if they thought that poverty is a major causal factor in the involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	26	8.5
	Probably not	39	12.7
	Probably yes	103	33.7
	Definitely yes	126	41.2
	Don't know	12	3.9
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5.6 Poverty and electoral violence

From table 5.6, three quarters– that is, an overwhelming majority – of the respondents believe that poverty is a core causal factor of the involvement of youths in electoral violence. This was 229 respondents out of the total of 306. However, a fifth (21.2 percent) of the respondents believe that poverty is not a major causal factor of the involvement of youths in Ekiti State, Nigeria in electoral violence acts.

5.2.5 Political affiliation influences

Respondents were asked if differences in political affiliation have a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence:

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	16	5.2
	Probably not	29	9.5
	Probably yes	143	46.7
	Definitely yes	91	29.7
	Don't know	27	8.8
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5 7: Differences in political affiliations

From table 5.7 above, slightly more than three quarters of the respondents believe that there is a strong influence of political affiliation differences in the involvement of the youths in electoral violence acts. Nearly 15 percent of the respondents believe otherwise – that is that political affiliation has no impact on electoral violence for the youths.

5.2.6 The role of ethnicity

Respondents were asked if ethnicity or race has a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	40	13.1
	Probably not	53	17.3
	Probably yes	103	33.7
	Definitely yes	72	23.5
	Don't know	38	12.4
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5.8 Role of ethnicity or race

Table 5.8 above reveals that more than half (57.2 percent) of the respondents believe that differences in ethnicity or race have an influence on the involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence among youths, while almost a third (30.4 percent) believe that ethnic affiliations or differences have no bearing on the involvement of youths in electoral violence acts.

5.2.7 Role of religious differences

The respondents were asked if differences in religious beliefs have a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence.

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Definitely not	47	15.4
	Probably not	45	14.7

	Probably yes	110	35.9
	Definitely yes	85	27.8
	Don't know	19	6.2
	Total	306	100.0

Table 5 9: Differences in religious beliefs

Table 5.9 shows that most respondents, about two thirds believed religious beliefs do influence the involvement of youths in electoral violence acts, while nearly a third believe that religious beliefs have no influence on whether youths become involved in electoral violence or not.

5.2.8 Reflections

Most participants in this survey indicated that the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence is a serious issue. The analyses above reinforce the position of various scholars in the literature review section that certain factors are causes for the involvement of Nigerian youths in acts of electoral violence. Among these factors are religion, unemployment, lack of education and, not surprisingly, poverty, which goes hand in hand with unemployment or underemployment. Both situations are widespread in Nigeria, especially among youths. Other causative factors that converge with the literature include differences in political affiliations and ethnicity. The findings on the gender composition of participants also revealed that young women are actively involved; this, too, agrees with the literature. Thus, one can confidently say that the findings on the causative factors of electoral violence by Nigerian youths substantiate claims by other scholars on the issue.

5.3 Qualitative Data

Five respondents were interviewed as it was not feasible to conduct a focus group discussion. This was due to several factors among which was suitable timing for the participants, and fear of being quoted by another party through mutual suspicion. Hence, the respondents selected for the study, based on the pre-set criteria (see section 4.4) of this study, included:

Respondent one: a male youth market leader and president for Fayose market in the heart of Ado-Ekiti, the State capital

Respondent two: a youth market trader

Respondent three: a youth politician

Respondent four: an artisan panel beater without educational qualifications

Respondent five: a human rights activist and an election observer.

5.3.1 Nature and extent of youth involvement in electoral violence

All the respondents affirmed that the involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence is a pervasive phenomenon in Nigeria and especially in Ekiti State specifically. Respondent three said that one of the main origins of electoral violence is the desperation for political power, coupled with endemic poverty among the general populace, which enables the politicians to instigate the people and youths in particular to acts of electoral violence. This is while acting as if they are the saviour of the people, yet providing them with arms and ammunition. Respondent one, on the other hand, said that the phenomenon of violence originates from the fact that youth participation in the election process is restricted, because primary elections for political parties are compromised by the various party leaders. This is done by selecting their cronies as candidates and not persons who reflect the wishes of the general populace. He believes youths are not allowed to choose freely, and are not involved in the decision-making processes. Hence, candidates are often imposed, and so people who are not representative often emerge as candidates of the political parties.

The unpopularity of these candidates results in a situation where party leaders must employ inducement tactics, including money distribution and other material inducements, to garner electoral votes. In agreeing with the inducement theory of respondent one, another respondent, in narrating his experience, claimed that, *"Politicians induce youths to disrupt the electoral processes or activities of the electoral management body (EMB) officials if the elections are perceived as not in the favour of their party. They also give money to the electorate via proxies to influence votes in their favour by asking them to vote for specific candidates even during the voting itself."* Respondent four went further to narrate that this sort of disruption often occurs during the collation and counting of votes if the possible result is perceived to be heading towards an unfavourable outcome which negates their (youths') interests or that of their candidates. He explained that the supporting youths, assembled on standby, try all means and methods to disrupt the counting and collation of votes or the announcement of the voting results at the polling units or ward levels employing physical violence, organized chaos, ballot box snatching, ballot papers destruction or the voiding of already cast ballot papers. In doing these, the security officials and electoral management body officials are usually attacked and pursued if they are perceived to be uncooperative. He added that they may even use fake security officials and dangerous weapons such as guns. These would be fired indiscriminately to disperse the crowd of legitimate voters who scamper for safety, while the hoodlums (mostly

youths) cart away the election materials, or take over the entire voting process as the case may be.

Most of the respondents strongly believe that the imposition of party candidates often results in violence, as the party members do not participate in the candidate selection processes within the party. The result is that unpopular candidates are forced upon the people in both the primary elections as well as the general inter-party elections. In fact, respondent two strongly asserted that, *"Elections have got to the point where people carry weapons and ammunition such as cutlasses, guns and charms to perpetrate acts of electoral violence. These are used to intimidate people to influence the electoral processes."* Buttressing the idea of candidate imposition, the fifth respondent vividly narrated how, before the 2007 Ekiti State governorship general elections and during the PDP party primaries in 2006, the name of the presumed and actual winner of the People's Democratic Party governorship primaries, Mr. Yinka Akerele, was jettisoned and the person who came third, Engineer Segun Oni, was announced as the winner of the primary election. On announcing Segun Oni as the candidate of the party, respondent five claimed that the youths went amok, instigated by Akerele's supporters, as the announcement went against the outcome of the PDP gubernatorial primary election results. The youths protested, destroying everything in sight. Even though Segun Oni eventually won the general election, he still did not have a good term in office as he lacked the support of his own party, as well as having to cope with a vibrant opposition that eventually ousted him through a Court of Appeal judgement in 2010.

In a similar vein, the third respondent commented that the political elites, while acting as if they are the saviour of the youths, provide them with arms and ammunition to commit political violence. He noted, "*The politicians also capitalize on these sentiments during campaigns by saying, 'We are your people,' instead of campaigning on the electoral issues and what they propose to do if elected. This mobilises the people against each other, heating up the polity, which is often done along religious and ethnic lines."*

While ethnic discriminations are not really pronounced in Ekiti State, although they do exist, respondent 3 asserted that this is more a pervasive feature of the national polity. They (the politicians) do not base their activities on any quantifiable agenda but, rather, focus on manipulating the mindset of the people. That is why you commonly hear people say, *"He is our son, so he is better than the other candidate"* or, *"It is better that we are in power or, at least, have power in our own local government, township, or religious group."* He said most

of the time these positions are often taken without recourse to the merits of the other candidates' agendas, which may be geared more towards non-violence, anti-corruption and other developmental goals that may, in fact, be better clearly stated.

The experience of the fourth respondent was interesting. He stated that he had seen the use of other people's data or identities in an attempt by groups of people to vote, over-vote or to vote multiple times in favour of their desired candidates. When this is done by those believed or identified to be "outsiders" to a voting area, and who have been brought in to manipulate the polls or discovered to be attempting to influence votes by illegal means, it can result in violence due to opposition resistance by voters who live in that polling unit.

However, the fifth respondent reckoned that political gladiators consider the number of youths they have as a back-up as their political strength. This is because such strength is viewed as the might to do and undo electoral victory. This is because it takes the energy and vibrancy of the youths to go all out to actualize the claims of other respondents by creating violence to destabilize, destroy or manipulate the primary elections. During the main elections, it is also the youths who are used for ballot box snatching, ballot box stuffing, and the disruption of orderliness in voting centres.

Perhaps the most striking contribution to the narrative of the dynamics of electoral violence was given by the fifth respondent, who was an active civil society member in Ekiti State where he was the co-ordinator for a civil society organization, the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO). The CLO monitors elections in Nigeria as an observer, and the group monitored elections in Ekiti State. The fifth respondent noted that Ekiti State is in another watershed point today because of the influx of many youths from different parts of Nigeria into the State. As the state is perceived to be very peaceful and security is excellent. Most of these people had to move to the State to thrive in their businesses while others who were originally from Ekiti State also returned home. He alleged that these people brought along with them the different trainings they have received in their previous places of abode which rubbed off onto the resident youths. He gave an example of a person among several others who relocated to Ekiti, whom he called Ade Ojota, who was a commercial driver at Ojota motor park in Lagos State, the commercial capital of Nigeria. The respondent stated that Ade Ojota used his exposure in Lagos to take over a motor park in Ekiti State, graduated to mobilizing youths for elections in which they are tilted towards any preferable party that is perceived to have paid more. Thus, he became a strike force for the political parties or candidates who are willing and able to pay for his services.

He also noted that, unlike in the past where most youths in Ekiti are occupied mostly by going to their various farms early in the morning, these days they are found in the pubs very early in the morning so that even before sunrise some are already drunk or high. He explained that Ade Ojota started by funding different pubs to harness his disciples. Eventually, he formed several squads for election purposes. And while the political gladiators were in the neighbourhood campaigning, it was these squads that visit the opposition groups there with violence destroying their homes, offices, properties, and even killing politicians who are suspected to have too much influence that might be detrimental to the success of their own candidate. Anyone who stands in the path of their unbridled savagery and destruction is summarily dealt with, thereby creating a sense of panic, chaos and mass destruction. Notably, their patron, the election candidate, goes to the press to claim that his campaign entourage was attacked while campaigning, instead of saying that it was his strike force squad that instigated and executed the organized violence to intimidate opposition figures. Respondent five categorically declared that they maim whoever they see, and identified opposition houses, campaign offices, or party secretariats of the opposition parties. "Those were their works" he concluded solemnly.

5.3.2 Causes of youth involvement in electoral violence

All the respondents agree – albeit with varying differences – that one's level of education influences the involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence. Respondent two explained that the proportion of educated youths involved in electoral violence is not more than 30 percent of the entire population of the perpetrators. He said that most of the perpetrators are youths with little or no education who probably have some basic primary or secondary education. They often become motor park touts, commercial motor bike riders popularly known as okada riders. However, in a differing opinion, respondent five believes it takes an educated youth to change election figures or manipulate the electoral process to get a desired outcome from the process, and not a stark illiterate. Although the people involved in election violence are predominantly less educated or uneducated youths, the educated ones also have areas in which they perpetrate their own electoral violence. This may not be physical in nature but more of structural and psychological violence.

There is also no unanimity on the issue of employment status as a precursor to electoral violence although some, including respondent one, see it as important. He believes that people who are not well read, or lack understanding, might be easier to manipulate and induced to perpetrate acts of election violence. They are often promised several things and opportunities such as landed properties, public appointments, cars, money and so on. Hence, he suggests

that there is an interplay between poverty, educational levels and the employment status of an individual to influence as to whether the person will be involved in acts of electoral violence or not. Respondent two surmised that, *"It is a pity that, in Nigeria of today, there is an increasing massive unemployment and underemployment among the general population, especially the youths, including the ones with tertiary education as well as those with little or no formal education. So, this provides automatic fertile ground for things they are not supposed to be involved with."*

However, these claims of unemployment being a precursor of youth involvement in electoral violence were rubbished by respondent four who declared that the engagement of youths in electoral violence is not an issue of poverty or unemployment because most of these youths believe that these monies or gifts they collect are a form of transitory income (that is income not planned for). They often spend this money recklessly by drinking to a stupor, or engaging in drugs to empower them for the acts of electoral violence. Thus, in his words, *"The involvement of youths in acts of electoral violence is more often a means to get 'free' money."* He also reckoned that most of these youths involved in electoral violence are employed in one way or another, but during elections they seek people (party leaders or candidates) to mobilize them to offer their services. This means that, whoever pays more must be supported to secure the desired electoral wins – at least in their own domains. Therefore, he reiterated that, *"The issue of electoral violence is not because of unemployment or poverty, ethnicity or religion."*

Explaining further, the fifth respondent suggested that the unemployed or underemployed youths are vulnerable to inducements by political gladiators who have both money and influence to throw around. This often breeds the kind of situation in which people do not know or care about their rights, the rights of others; nor do they care much about personal dignity. All they need, there and then, is money and a means of survival.

In his words, he declared that, *"Most gainfully employed youth, or those well-educated, will not be involved in the level of violence such as he witnessed. This is because such a person will still have the belief that, one day, his certificate will be very useful as a source of livelihood far away from violence."* This view corroborates the opinion of respondent four who claimed that unemployment and poverty are not the real issues causing the involvement of youths in electoral violence. However, the fifth respondent went further to state that some of the youths involved in acts of violence have certificates that they do not value, simply because they see people in society who seemingly live in opulence even without possessing tertiary educational

certificates. Yet, those who do have the certificates are living in abject poverty and penury. This was further buttressed by respondent two who, in a vivid description, explained that someone who is hungry can do anything or everything, since many family units have failed because the parents are owed several months' wages and salaries and, hence, they have lost control of their homes. This, in turn, has forced the children to seek greener pastures outside the home. Hence, he argues that unemployment, underemployment, and the general lack of gainful employment, all of which engender poverty, remain the major issues that predispose youths to acts of electoral violence, among other vices.

However, on ethnicity and religious affiliations, all the other respondents, except the second, agree that these play a major part in electoral violence activities, mainly between Muslims and Christians who like to do everything to support candidates of their faith. This is done in the hope or belief that such candidates, when elected, will promote their rights and agendas. Thus, everything possible is done to sabotage the candidates of the other religion, based upon the mutual suspicion of each other's faith agenda when in power. Such attempts to perpetuate or impose candidates of a faith on the people may result in violence, especially in areas where there is a stiff opposition to such a religious faith. One respondent gave an example that it will be a misnomer for a Christian to be elected as a governor in a State like Kano in northern Nigeria or a Muslim be elected governor in Rivers State in southern Nigeria as both are based on the predominance of a religion in such areas. He added that, in Ekiti State for instance, it will not be easy to elect a Muslim governor as most citizens are Christians by default, even though religious tensions are not pronounced in Ekiti State. Furthermore, he claims that the Christian citizens of Lagos State, the commercial capital of Nigeria, compelled the ruling All Progressive Congress party (APC) government in the State prior to the 2015 governorship elections to produce a Christian candidate or risk losing at the polls. This was after 16 years of Muslim governors, despite the widely acclaimed good performance of the Muslim governors in Lagos State. This development saw the two major parties in the election, the PDP and the APC, pick a Christian governorship candidate in response to the call.

For the same reasons, but differently put, respondent two believes that religion and ethnicity are not serious issues, especially in Ekiti State, compared to the country in general where it can be said to be divisive. This is because there is an unspoken rule that Christians would not contest elections in Muslim dominated areas, nor would Muslims contest elections in Christian dominated areas. The same is true for ethnicity, he said, but argues that the two have less

impact on elections and electoral violence in comparison to other factors such as unemployment, poverty and differences in political affiliations, especially in Ekiti State.

At the same time, the fifth participant describes the situation more succinctly, as he avers that these two factors are intertwined with politics. In agreeing with points as noted in the literature review, he noted that, on a national scale, the loss of President Buhari in his attempts to clinch the presidential position in 2003, 2007 and 2011 saw the youths in northern Nigeria mobilized to wreak violence in an ethno-religious pattern. Similarly, the loss of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 witnessed several months of massive rampage on oil installations by youths from his region in south Nigeria. This was one of the factors that plunged the nation into a serious economic recession from which it is yet to recover, some two years after the polls. Thus, respondent five believes that there are times that the actions of the youths are informed based on ethnicity and other times by religion, although there may also be a rare conflation of both factors. But for Ekiti State, he says that religion is not as big of an issue as ethnicity, unlike the national political scene. Nevertheless, he concluded that the key determinant factor as to whether the youths react based upon ethnicity or religion is the candidates' sponsorship of the youths. Are the sponsors religiously or ethnically inclined; that is, do they see either of these factors giving them an edge in the election process?

On the involvement of women, most respondents argue that women are actively involved in acts of electoral violence in a variety of ways. For example, respondent two said, *"They are involved in the asking for, collection and sharing of inducements either financially or materially to influence them to vote for specific candidates."* Even though he says he does not see them carry guns and cutlasses, in other ways they actively participate in electoral violence acts. Respondent five agreed that women are involved, but not as deeply or as prevalently as their male counterparts. He commented that there are very vibrant females who can outsmart their male counterparts in terms of violence. He noted the case he witnessed where a female led a gang to disrupt a collation centre simply because of her affinity with one of the candidates in the election. In his words, *"She led a squad that saw to the effective disruption of the process in that collation centre, which led to the cancellation of the results in the area."* However, it was also noted that women tend to be involved more in inflicting psychological violence during the election cycles as they participate in political campaigns and rallies, often more than the men where they are at the epicentre of singing abusive and denigrating songs about the opposing parties and their candidates. They may even lead the rallies in composing such abusive songs and hurling insults at their candidates' opponents and supporters.

Regarding differences in political affiliation, all the respondents agreed that this is a major cause of electoral violence if there are different or conflicting political interests. Participants one and two, however, pointed out that the instigation of the youths is usually done by the candidates or party officials and leaders who encourage them to use all means (do or die) to ensure victory in their respective polling stations. They often also consider that these candidates have mobilized them with money, promises of appointments and jobs. Hence, on their part the youths must ensure that they "deliver" electoral wins for such candidates in their respective electoral domains at all costs using whatever means. This will ensure that the candidates fulfil their vows to the voters. It is believed that the youths often join political groups (not parties *per se*) in which they feel they have more to gain in terms of money or other material benefits and opportunities for them personally, rather than what or who benefits the society. Hence, the main causative factor for youth involvement in electoral violence, in the words of respondent 4, *"is predicated on the sponsorship and instigation by the political leaders and/or the candidates themselves."*

In summary, the respondents identified several factors as responsible for motivating the youth in election violence. Among these are poverty, sponsorship, peer influence, unemployment and the societal cultural value system that rewards and celebrates sudden acquisition of wealth without any notable source. These developments, according to respondent five, lead the youths to view money as a core value, a must-have by all possible means. Therefore, they undertake life endangering activities just because of money, wealth accumulation, and affluence. This, he says, has led to a paradigm shift in the socio-cultural value system of society, especially among the youths, from that of hard work, honesty and peace to that which embraces violence, laziness, easy money and dishonesty.

In the experience of respondent five, during the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Ekiti, a senatorial candidate of the ruling PDP went about visiting polling units before the commencement of voting with a bus-load of youths. At each unit, he instructed the EMB personnel to step aside while his boys took over the duties of the INEC officials. This was under the watchful eyes of the security agents who are often powerless to stop them because he belongs to the central ruling party in Abuja which controls the national government. Hence, any attempt to protest may cost them their jobs or result in very unfavourable postings. In this fashion, the youths took over and conducted elections in Ekiti State. This account was one piece of evidence presented at the election petition tribunal that led to the annulment of certain election results and the eventual deposition of the then governor, Mr. Segun Oni.

However, the key point is that it was the youths who were used as agents of subversion and election manipulation. It is also clear that they were educated because illiterates or those with little education cannot undertake such assignments. The youths were also involved in post-election violence at various times, including in the gubernatorial rerun between Segun Oni, formerly of the PDP then and now a chieftain of the APC, and Kayode Fayemi of the Action Congress (AC), now the All Progressives Congress APC. This happened when the principals received indications of possible unfavourable results at the polling collation, counting and announcement venue located in Ado Ekiti, the State capital, opposite one of the biggest police stations in the State. Note that, by this time, the women and elderly had voted and had gone back home to await the announcement of the results. The youths took to the streets in protest, burning tyres and making bonfires across major roads.

Reflecting on these responses of all the participants, we see they corroborate the issues already raised in prior literature on the dynamics, extent and consequences of Nigerian youths' involvement in acts of electoral violence. One issue left out of the literature review was that of religion as a cause of instigating acts of electoral violence. Some of the interviewees asserted that it is not universal, but rather, is dependent on the religious mix of the particular society under consideration. A second point overlooked in the literature was the implication of migration on the electoral politics of a society. This was covered succinctly by respondent 5 in his interview session.

5.4 Existence of Strategies to Prevent Electoral Violence by Youths

Objective Two: To assess the effectiveness of current strategies if any, being used to limit the incidence of electoral violence among Nigerian youths.

5.4.1 Quantitative results addressing objective two

Question 12: Respondents were asked if there were strategies put in place to address the issue of youths' involvement in electoral violence.

The majority, representing almost two-thirds (64.1 percent) of the respondents, believe that there are strategies put in place to address the issue of youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria. At the same time, slightly more than one-third (35.6 percent) believe that there are no strategies in place to address the issues bordering on the involvement of youths on electoral violence in Ekiti State.

Question 13: How effective are the strategies put in place to prevent youth involvement in acts of electoral violence?

Respondents were asked if the available strategies have been effective in addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence. A majority representing more than half (54.9 percent) believe that the strategies put in place were not effective, while two-fifths (41.2 percent) believed the strategies being employed are effective.

5.4.2 Qualitative results addressing objective two

On the availability and effectiveness of strategies to combat electoral violence, the respondents unanimously agree that although there are efforts at addressing the issue on a general note but there are no specific and identifiable strategies directly targeted at addressing the involvement of Nigerian youths in election related violence. This is despite there being some general approaches in place to mitigate electoral violence. In addition, the second respondent noted that most attempts at tackling electoral violence are most visible on election days. He reckoned that tackling fraud on election days is not sufficient to address issues of election violence or, even, to impact it significantly. However, all the respondents gave pointers on how such programmes to reduce the involvement of youths in acts of election violence can be carried out. Among these are:

a. The political leaders and political parties should make the party primaries transparent to all
b. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) a government agency saddled with sensitizing the citizens of Nigeria about government policies and programmes should conduct intensive orientation programmes to prevent inducement of youths and stem their engagement in election violence
c. Religious leaders should be engaged in preaching peace during the electoral processes and thus influence electoral peace as they are often well respected by the people
d. The electoral management body in Nigeria, the INEC, needs to improve its activities such that they are seen to be unbiased and make the election environment free and open to all concerned.

The interviewees noted that, unless there is discipline and lack of corruption among the populace, efforts aimed at addressing electoral violence perpetrated by youths are wasted. Most participants counselled that public offices should be made less attractive, as most people, instead of coming to serve as elected officials, have the mindset of winning elective positions or political appointments to embezzle public funds, enriching themselves and their cronies in the process. This is because candidates and their cronies will not be motivated to spend large amounts of money during campaigns because it is assumed that they will not recover such when they are eventually voted into power. In the words of the second respondent, *"If salaries are clearly well stated and allowances are commensurate, people will not be encouraged to*

make elections a do or die affair." Hence, his antidote to electoral violence is to tackle corruption and to make public offices less attractive for self-enrichment. This, he said, will go a long way in addressing the menace of electoral violence in general, and the involvement of youths in particular.

In a majority position, four of the five respondents noted that the electronic accreditation of voters is indeed a welcome development, but that it is only for the voting day. But respondents two and three said that accreditation machines often break down without replacement, or may not recognize some persons. This can lead to violence as such parties may feel they are being denied the opportunity and right to vote through a suspected collusion between the INEC or EMB officials and their opponents, which may or may not be true. Likewise, respondent three buttressed this position by declaring that the voter's card or electronic voter accreditation, has not been effective. He said key players can manipulate the electoral process by creating bottlenecks such as making it difficult for continuous voter registration to take place so that all persons eligible to vote can be registered. Instead, they wait until the elections are very near which results in overcrowding and a sheer waste of people's time, coupled with millions of unclaimed voter's cards lying around the electoral management body's offices. This is because most people become disenchanted due to the stress involved in voter registration and in the collection of the permanent voter's cards. This is in addition to the stress and dangers involved during the voting proper. Hence, respondent three explained why most people do not register to vote, while most people who do register do not vote for to one reason or another.

He advised that, if voter registration processes including permanent voter's card collections and voting are made easily, people will be encouraged to perform their civic duties without stress. The plethora of stress and bottlenecks discourages people from registering or voting. So, for respondent three, to the best of his knowledge, there has been no identifiable, effective strategy put in place to combat the incidence of electoral violence. He added that there is always a whole lot of talk about it, but little action, and even less on targeting the youths as a specific group. Though he acknowledged the advantages of the biometric voters' registration, the bottlenecks have not allowed this to transform into effective strategies to tackle electoral violence.

In conclusion, respondent three stated that making the entire process less cumbersome and more accessible will make it difficult for manipulation, electoral violence and money sharing to occur. For example, he suggested that more polling units should be created to make voting

quick and to enable people to vote in their neighbourhoods instead of travelling long distances on foot just to cast your vote. (Distance is a factor because human and vehicular movements are restricted on the day preceding the elections as well as on the election day itself.)

In a contrasting minority position, respondent four noted that the electronic, biometric accreditation and use of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) is very effective, even though not specifically targeted at the prevention of youths' involvement in the acts of electoral violence. He noted that the number of accredited voters at each polling unit is lodged on the servers of the electoral management body's headquarters in Abuja. This is eventually tallied with the number of voters while the ballot papers are serially numbered and tagged against the names and numbers of the respective voters in the electronic voters' register. Now, also the PVC must not only bear the holder's names but must have biometric validation through their fingerprints and a photograph. Hence, the permanent voter's cards are not transferable and, therefore, cannot be sold or bought, and are useless if stolen. This is a departure from the past where politicians would even buy the voter's cards long before elections and redistribute them to different youth groups in their camps to be used for multiple voting in favour of the concerned candidate. These changes, respondent five said, have eliminated the related problems.

Respondent four, like the others, also identified other strategies employed in addressing electoral violence in Nigeria. These include the signing of peace agreements between the candidates prior to the polls in which they express support for the process and admonish their supporters to eschew violence in the overall interest of the community, local government, state or nation. This is usually broadcast in the media (print, electronic, television, radio and social media) for all to see and hear the peace messages. It was his opinion that these messages and agreements between the candidates go a long way in curbing the involvement of their supporters in acts of electoral violence. This is because the supporters usually ask one another, "Why kill ourselves over these people drinking tea together?" He also noted that the continuous broadcasting of such peace agreements by the candidates and media before, during and after the polls also encourages electoral peace and harmony within the larger society.

The fifth interviewee believes that all these strategies are not specifically targeted at the youths; rather, they are general approaches applying to anyone. He believes that youths need to be targeted deliberately, especially the semi-skilled or semi-educated ones. Thus, he suggested that youth education or orientation should be implemented on a broad scale. This should be especially in the form of civic education which should be re-introduced into the primary

schools and carried onto the tertiary levels. The same applies to the value systems to make the youths aware of their roles in society, and not become clogs in the wheels of societal progress, peace and development.

Following the pattern of others, the fifth interviewee recommended that the Nigerian electoral management body (INEC), in order to buttress the peace agreements, should prosecute electoral offenders to deter others who may aspire to get involved in violent or illegal activities. He noted that, up to the time of the interview in 2017, this has largely been left undone. Hence, the instigators and executors of electoral violence believe that there are no consequences for their actions and, therefore, became more emboldened to do more damage as elections roll by.

The finances of the election management body, he further noted, should also be made directly from the consolidated accounts of the nation and not depend on the executive arms for funds. Also, these funds should be released once the budget has been passed by Parliament, and not in tranches to avoid situations where they become starved of funds as a direct consequence of them not dancing to the tune of the executive arm of government. Moreover, he argued that the appointment of the election management body functionaries should not be limited to the discretionary powers of the president subject to confirmation by the Senate. Instead, the judiciary should have input, such that the three arms of government have equal powers for such appointments, which should not be left to the will and caprices of whoever occupies the office of the President.

5.5 Summary and Reflections

This chapter has presented and analysed the results of data collected from the field towards the fulfilment of objectives one and two of the study. The analysed data has assisted in the fulfilment of objective one by examining the nature, causes, extent and consequences of the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence. Among these are: political affiliation differences, instigation, poverty, unemployment, peer group influences, an opportunity for transitory incomes, substance abuse, and a general decline in the socio-cultural value system of society. It has been noted that many youths involved are employed, but not gainfully or effectively so. Interestingly, religion and ethnicity, although acknowledged as causes in prior literature, have not been found, however, to be key, unlike other causes of electoral violence as mentioned above. Importantly also, the data has revealed that women are actively involved in electoral violence just as are the men, albeit on a much lower scale. Furthermore, the study has identified some of the strategies employed in addressing the issues of electoral violence,

such as the use of permanent voters' cards, electronic accreditation of eligible voters, mass media campaigns, and peace agreements.

Objective two, which is concerned with the availability and effectiveness of strategies employed to address electoral violence has also been addressed by the study. The study has discovered that there is a dearth of strategies deliberately and specifically targeted at addressing the issue of youth involvement in electoral violence; rather, general issues of electoral violence are the focus. Some of these general strategies employed in addressing the issues of electoral violence include the use of permanent voters' cards, electronic accreditation of eligible voters, mass media campaigns, and election tribunals to address disputes arising from elections. Whereas the study shows that the strategies have been quite ineffective for the youth, where general strategies do exist, gaps have been identified. The major one of these is the dearth of strategies targeted specifically at the youths. As also noted, most of the identified strategies are targeted at the election days, not the pre-election or post-election times when most violence occurs.

Some of the respondents have also suggested several ways in which these strategies can be strengthened to ensure increased efficiency and effectiveness. They have also made suggestions on what new measures can be employed to have direct impact on the youths. These include: the prohibition of alcohol sales; the prosecution of election offenders by the Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC), which is constitutionally empowered to do so; the inclusion of civic education in the curriculum of primary schools up to tertiary educational institutions; and the reorientation of socio-cultural values.

Perhaps the most important factor identified and agreed upon by most respondents in this study is the dearth of strategies aimed at curbing electoral violence specifically targeted at the teeming population of youths in Nigeria. The significance of this is highlighted by Okafor (2015) who reports youths being responsible for 95 percent of all issues bordering on electoral violence in Nigeria. The next chapter, then, will look at the design and implementation of the training workshop interventions and an overview of the training process. These are aimed at equipping several youths (to serve as the action team), with the necessary non-violent conflict engagement skills, which would fulfil the third objective of this study.

Endnote

Okafor, F. 2015. Don blames 95% of electoral violence on youths. *The Vanguard Newspaper*, February 3, 2015 Available: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/02/don-blames-95-electoral-violence-youths/ (Accessed 28/01/2016).

CHAPTER SIX

INTERVENTION: TRAINING THE ACTION TEAM

6.0 Introduction

The purpose of training selected youths is to equip them with the requisite skills and understanding to serve as the action team for the design and implementation of this study's intervention. The secondary aims include developing communication, empathy, confidence and conflict resolution skills among participants, with the purpose of equipping them to take part in the intervention as a team supporting one another. This chapter deals with objective three of this study, which states: To work with an advisory reference group to design, implement and evaluate an action programme aimed at reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in Ekiti State in acts of electoral violence. Hence, following from this, the reference advisory group deliberated on the results of the analysis of data collected from the field in the previous chapter. It was observed that there was a dearth of interventions directly targeted at the youths (see Section 6.5); thus, the resolve to create interventions targeted at youths directly. This is to fulfil the main aim of this study which is to reduce the involvement of youths in electoral violence. The participants were recruited from among the questionnaire respondents and from participants in the in-depth interviews, based on their ages, and their willingness to volunteer.

The chapter focuses on the comprehensive narrative of the Alternative to Violence Project (AVP) basic training workshop, and gives a profile of the context in which the training was conducted. The AVP Basic Training workshop was carried out using a handout prepared from the basic coaching manual designed by the AVP (AVP 2002). The decision to use the AVP stems from its efficacy, practicality and relative cost. It also helps to create an atmosphere in which the participants can deal with conflicts constructively, without engaging in any form of violence. There is also the empowerment to empathize with other persons, that is to see through their eyes, to improve communication so as to express their feelings without being judgemental of the other person.

6.1 The Training Context

The Basic AVP workshop was carried out in Ado-Ekiti, the capital city of Ekiti State, in south west Nigeria. This was chosen due to its centrality to the study area of Ekiti-State and because it is an epicentre of most of the political activities in the State. More so, all the constituent communities in Ekiti State are represented in Ado-Ekiti the capital city (see Section 4.6.1).

The venue of the training was inside the campus of Afe Babalola University Ado-Ekiti (ABUAD), which was perceived as safe and free from any disruption by all the participants. It was also chosen because the students were on break; hence, there was space and calm in the environment. Police clearance was unnecessary because the campus has its own security teams. Also, trainers were sourced from the Roman Catholic church's Justice, Development and Peace Initiative (JPDI) head office in Ekiti-State to ensure a smooth running of the workshop, as the successful conduct of an AVP workshop requires more than one facilitator (Newheart 2008: 34). The trainers were Mr. Stanley Okonkwo, a lawyer and seasoned facilitator, together with staff of the Catholic Church's Justice, Peace and Development Initiative based in Ado-Ekiti. He was assisted by Dr. Azeez Ademola, a seasoned trainer and political scientist.

6.2 Ethical Considerations

De Vos *et al.* (2011: 120) note that anonymity ensures participant privacy and confidentiality. Thus, pseudonyms were used to protect the identity of the participants; only the trainers and members of the action team were aware of the identity of their fellow participants. I also ensured that participation in this training was voluntary, via informed consent. Also, all ethical requirements of DUT were adhered to as it relates to this study.

Some 15 youths were recruited from the questionnaire administration sessions, although only ten of them could attend the training for one reason or another. A section of the questionnaire contained a space where the respondent was to indicate if they were willing to participate in the research beyond answering the questions. On this basis, the youths who indicated such interest were contacted and recruited for this exercise. The easiest way to ruin an AVP workshop is to compel people to participate (AVP 2002: A4). The recruits were all between the targeted ages of 18 and 35 years, as required by the study.

Number	Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Background
1	Kind Kingsley	M	22	Student youth leader
2	Rich	F	23	Worker/Student
3	Jovial Loveth	F	22	Student youth leader
4	Nice Niyi	M	24	Security officer
5	Capable Kemi	F	23	Student 3rd year
6	Sounds	M	21	Student 1st year
7	Knowledge	M	25	Security Officer
8	Sunshine	M	24	Trader
9	Timely Tosin	M	25	PG Student
10	Firm Friday	M	26	Artisan

Table 6 1: Action team training participants

6.3 The Training

The AVP Basic workshop was conducted on the 26-27th of August 2017. The workshop manual was adapted from the AVP Basic workshop manual and modified to suit the purposes of the study's third objective, which is: To design, implement and evaluate an action programme aimed at reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in Ekiti State electoral violence.

The purpose of the modified AVP Basic workshop was to train youths in Ekiti State in the alternative ways through which conflict can be managed non-violently, while deploying them as agents of non-violence in the local communities. Thereafter, they were to use these skills in non-violent engagement in elections among their fellow youths, to lower the levels of violence in the process. It is the sowing of a seed that germinates over a period of time (AVP 2002).

6.3.1 Alternatives to Violence Project

Owing to the experiential orientation of the AVP workshops, Bethel and Girvin's (2016: 8) exercises were strongly designed to give participants experience before the concepts were covered. After the exercises, guided by the facilitators, they could understand both the concept and the purpose of the exercises. This was because Kreitzer and Jou (2010); and John (2015: 8) believe that understanding stems from feeling and experience in the AVP programme. The foundational principles of the AVP are affirmation and self-esteem, communication, community and co-operation, conflict management and transforming power, all of which binds all together, and is believed to be inherent in all persons (John 2015: 81b; Bethel and Girvin 2016: 240, 241). Note: all exercises are outlined at the end of the adapted manual (see end of chapter).

The workshop schedule was divided into six sessions of three hours each, which was then spread across two days of implementation.

Session One: This was the introductory session, and had the principal focus on affirmation and confidence building both in the individual participants and collectively. It consisted of the following agenda:

- Opening Talk
- Agenda Preview with the names of the team
- Introducing the team members
- General introduction of everyone in a cyclic fashion, with each person stating one thing they hope to take away from participating in this workshop

- Ground rules were stated
- This is followed by the Trash bag exercise, where we put down all we do not want to occur on a piece of paper and dump them in a trash bag. This is done to remove hindrances to community building
- A mini-matriculation ceremony using the adjective name exercise, in which each person picks a positive adjective using the first letter of their names
- An affirmation exercise in twos to boost self-esteem and confidence of the participants as individuals as well as collectively
- A light and lively exercise is then introduced (as needed) to keep the team active and the exercise chosen will depend on the mood of the team
- Distribution of the Kraybill Conflict Instrument exercise to be completed by participants and submitted
- Brainstorming exercise and discussion on the concept of violence. one of the three violence brainstorming exercises will be used
- Listening exercise
- Evaluation and closing.

Session Two: More on communication –

1. Agenda preview and Gathering
2. The concentric circle
3. Sharing in the group a conflict I solved non-violently, see
4. Live and lively session
5. The Broken squares exercise for cooperative construction
6. Evaluation and closing

Session Three

1. Agenda Preview and Gathering
2. Transforming Power talks
3. Principles and Queries on Transforming Power
4. Light and lively exercise as needed
5. Empathy Exercises
6. Evaluation and Closing

Session Four

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Role Plays: Six-point problem solving exercise
3. Lowering levels of violence exercise
4. Light and lively exercise as needed

5. Trust lift
6. Evaluation and closing

Session Five

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Strategy
3. Evaluation and closing

Session Six

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Reflection of who I am exercise
3. Completion of the second Kraybill Conflict Instrument
4. Treatment of unanswered questions
5. Write own queries
6. Affirmation posters or shields
7. Evaluation of entire workshop

The participants and facilitators were very punctual and excited to be part of the workshop; this might have to do with the more than two months of processing towards the workshop which I engaged in at different times. To begin with, there was clearly a palpable tension among some of the participants as they later revealed. The facilitators and participants introduced themselves briefly and said a word or two about themselves. This was followed by setting the ground rules of the workshop in which all the participants and facilitators contributed by writing out what they felt would hinder their full participation in the workshop. This was led by one of the facilitators, Sunshine (adjectival name given at the workshop). This helped to break some ice and few banters were shared among the group. Some of the ground rules set included: no interruptions, respect for another person's opinions even if you do not agree with them, the right to pass, confidence and freedom to express oneself, confidentiality that whatever was shared there stays there, equality among group members, the use of language, phones should not be allowed to distract, and willingness to volunteer for activities.

These rules helped to create and regulate the relations among group members and dissolve any form of patriarchal and hierarchical baggage that is common within the training context, especially among young adults who often feel younger ones must respect them and have no right to disagree with their views. This also helped dissolve religious and cultural lenses in which some often see women as inferior to men.

The affirmation exercises broke down some barriers in the room as most of the respondents expressed satisfaction at finding someone to listen to them. They felt acknowledged, respected and important. Significantly, it helped to build community through communication.

The AVP Basic workshop was presented in a circular form, with the facilitators distributed among the participants. This arrangement allowed all to be at ease, and to follow the AVP training pattern of bottom-up instead of the usual top-down approach to learning, which the AVP process negates.

The use of the 'I' messages strengthened the communication skills in the group, and helped them to ensure that they pass information across in a receptive and effective manner while mutual respect is observed. The participants practised several conflict scenarios in which they had to use the 'I' messages repeatedly in subgroups, which were then presented to the whole house. These were corrected and/or contributed to as they deemed fit. This is very germane in electoral conflict scenarios where there is a high tendency to be misinterpreted and misquoted. The participants were able to even relate this non-judgemental mode of communication (AVP 2002: E29, E30, E31, E32,) to their personal lives and relationships in both their work and home contexts.

The discussions of transforming power were presented to the participants, and traced to their respective individual cultures and religions. For example, the Yoruba culture promotes the concept of "omoluabi" where it is often said that, *"Omo aale eeyan laarinu ti oni bii; Omo aale laa siibe ti onigba."* This is interpreted as, "It is only a bastard that will be angered and will not be angry, but a bastard that will be apologized to will not cease to be angry." Another is the Yoruba proverb that says, *"Ahon ati eyin maa nja tan pari e,"* meaning that the tongue and the teeth do quarrel but settle it." This can be related to the concept of transforming power as outlined by the AVP Basic workshop; indeed, it is the core of all AVP workshops. It is the mortar that holds all the building blocks of the AVP together. Transforming power is also embedded in all religions no matter their origin (AVP 2002: A6, B2). The transforming power concept was presented using the *Madala* printed on papers and distributed among the group members (AVP 2002: E53, E54; see the attached Manual). The concept of transforming power helped the participants to understand that it is in them and, therefore, that all people have the power to shun violence in conflict situations and to seek ways to transform conflict into win-win situations.

The group also practised non-violent conflict resolution through role plays that enabled them to draw upon all the previous exercises engaged in earlier on. The role plays ensured that non-judgemental communication skills were practised over and over and reinforced as well as

listening skills, while cognizance was taken of non-verbalized forms of communication during the reflection moments.

6.3.2 The Kraybill Conflict Style Inventory

While the AVP gives people skills to deal with their conflicts effectively and non-violently, the Kraybill Conflict Style Inventory informs people about the way they deal with conflicts. Thus, this second intervention module was focused on equipping the youth participants with the different conflict handling styles available, based on the Kraybill Conflict Style Inventory (KCSI).

The KCSI was authored by Ron Kraybill, a mediator and scholar at the Eastern Mennonite University. He is reputed to have developed this Inventory from experimentation which spanned several years as a trainer. The KCSI was designed to give practical help in dealing with differences in conflict handling styles, as well as providing help in understanding one's own dominant style. This self-awareness helps the user to consciously and deliberately respond to conflict situations from the available choices as revealed by the KSCI, and to improve on the weaknesses of their dominant styles. It also helps in responding to others in conflict in a constructive manner (Kraybill 2017).

The decision to use the KCSI among other available approaches to conflict styles, such as the Thomas/Kilman Conflict Instrument, is because of the ease of use and the cost. Also, the KCSI is a pioneer in adaptability to cross-cultural contexts. Moreover, it contains psychometrically validated questionnaires that have been evaluated and widely accepted (Kraybill 2017: 4, 38). Another advantage is that, unlike the Thomas/Kilman Conflict Instrument, the KCSI helps the users to separate their conflict handling styles under calm situations from that which they use under stormy contexts. These styles are ranked in order of their dominance or tendency of the user to employ such styles in conflict situations, either in calm contexts or stormy contexts.

The KCSI was given to participants to complete before the discussions on conflict handling styles. This was done to discover how the participants respond to conflict situations in their individual lives, as it is often easier to explain how others handle conflicts than to identify one's own methods with clarity (Kraybill 2013: 2a). The KCSI consists of 20 questions that requires the participants to tick their most suitable responses based on a Likert scale of seven points. It gives users a picture of who they are and how they act in varied conflict situations. The KCSI is designed to enhance a learning process of thoughtful self-reflection. It also helps to answer questions such as, "How do I best respond constructively to conflicts?" The KCSI consists of

a quad-directional axis, and can be used to measure the impact of the training and intervention processes on the participants during the evaluation sessions conducted at the end of the intervention.

The Kraybill approach presents five styles of handling: Directing, Harmonizing, Compromising, Co-operating and Avoiding. The style in which one scores highest is that which one invariably relies on the most, and often reflects the greatest gifts one possesses as an individual. However, the individual may run the risk of over using it (Kraybill 2013: 8b, 9a). Conversely, the styles in which the participant scores lowest will indicate an area that the individual is less likely to use and an area where he can develop new abilities (Kraybill 2013: 9a). The key is to develop flexibilities to engage each style as the situation demands, and to avoid being locked into a style based on the strengths and weaknesses of each.

Both the Thomas-Kilman and the KCSI instruments present five styles of handling conflicts using the vertical axis for assertiveness and the horizontal axis for co-operation. The assertiveness level depicted on the vertical axis focuses on how much concern the party in conflict has for itself and its goals. The level of co-operation on the horizontal axis shows how much concern a conflict party has for others and their goals in a specific context of conflict. These two factors, employed by both the Kraybill approach and the Thomas-Kilman instrument, give the five different styles of handling conflicts as shown in the two figures below:

Dealing With Conflict – Thomas/Kilmann model



Figure 6. 1: The Thomas/Kilman Conflict Style Diagram

Figure 6. 2 The Kraybill Style Conflict Instrument



Source: Kraybill (2013:11)

The diagrams above show the two models and the five styles of responding to conflict on two and four axes respectively:

a. High focus on own agenda/High assertiveness

b. Low focus on own agenda/Low assertiveness
c. High focus on relationship/High co-operation
d. Low focus on relationship/low co-operation

The different conflict handling styles can be understood from their location on the axes or quadrants in the KCSI diagram, which is our focus in this study. They can be summarised as follows:

- Directing: high focus on own agenda and low on co-operation/relationship,
- Co-operating: High focus on agenda and high focus on relationship
- Harmonizing: low focus on agenda and high focus on relationship
- Compromising: Moderate focus on both agenda and relationship
- Avoiding: low focus on both agenda and relationship (Kraybill, 2013: 11, 12, 13, 14)

These are explained in the table below:

Style name	**Directing**	**Co-operation**	**Avoiding**	**Compromising**	**Harmonizing**
Strategies	Persuasion, insistence, demand, competition, control, non-negotiation. As leader, deter challenges, quote policy, set boundaries and penalties.	Assert self *and* invite other views. Co-operate in Seeking and evaluating additional information.	Withdraw, delay or avoid response. Divert attention, suppress emotions, be inaccessible or inscrutable.	Urge moderation, bargain, split the meet them halfway, give a little and take a little.	Agree, support, acknowledge error, give in, convince self it's no big deal, placate, smile and say yes, grin and bear it.
Power Sources	Derived from occupying a position, a role, resource control, capacity to impose penalties.	trust, skill, ability, co-ordination, goodwill, creativity, mutuality	From calmness, silence, non-co-operation, being unavailable or "above it all."	From moderation, sense of fairness, practicality, and pragmatism	From relationships, approval From others, from fitting in.
Advantages	Swiftness, certainty, acquisition or	Trust and mutuality. High potential for	Freedom from entanglement in trivial matters or	Relatively fast, provides a way out of stalemate,	Flexible and easy to work with, wins

	shielding substances important to the Director. Valuable in crises - no time lost haggling when the ship is sinking. Firmness under reliable direction	creativity and personal growth. Others blossom and develop new gifts. This style has immense rewards of satisfaction, energy and joy if positively used on meaningful issues.	blocking others without seeming negative	enables the show to go on. Emphasis on fairness is readily understood by most people. Builds atmosphere of co-operation	approval and appreciation of others, creates pleasant atmosphere. Freedom from hassle, at least in the short-term.
Disadvantages (when over-used)	Breeds inequality, dislike, distrust, loss of teamwork. In time, others display lower self-motivation, waste of gifts, reduced self-respect, or depression. Diminished emotional and spiritual progress in the director *Director* if others fear to challenge them.	Fatigue and time loss, distraction from more important tasks, analysis paralysis.	Periodic explosions of pent-up anger, "long stretches of cottony silence punctuated by terrifying explosions," slow death of relationships, residue of bad feeling. Stagnation, dullness, declining interest and energy. Loss of engagement and accountability	Mediocrity and blandness, possibility of unprincipled agreements, likelihood of patching symptoms and ignoring causes. Everyone gets a little, but no one is really happy. Too-quick compromises may short-circuit needed in-depth discussion	Frustration for others who want the engagement of problem-solving? Resentment, depression, and stunted growth of personal gifts in the h*armonizer.* Dependency on others,

Table 6 2: Summary of the Kraybill Conflict Handling Styles

From the two diagrams above, it is shown that, although the five styles are basically the same for the two models, they give slightly different names for the categories. For Kraybill, high

co-operation and low assertiveness is called “Harmonizing,” while Thomas-Kilman calls it “Accommodation.” The same applies to Thomas-Kilman’s “Collaboration,” which Kraybill labels “Co-operating.”

In using the KCSI, it is important to note that the approach is designed for use in both individual and collective conflict contexts, also known as low and high conflict contexts respectively. Since the issue of youths’ engagement in electoral violence is usually a collective phenomenon rather than individual, the respondents were urged to select a high conflict context in which they pictured themselves in any collective dispute situation, preferably an electoral dispute. With this picture in their minds, the respondents were given the KCSI questionnaires to complete. The questionnaire (see Appendix IV) consists of two sections in which A-J deals with the responses of the participants to conflicts at the opening or initial stages when they were not upset or frustrated, otherwise called the Calm conflict context. The second section, with questions lettered K-T, deals with their responses when they were already upset and frustrated, also known as the Stormy conflict context.

After completing the questionnaire, the participants entered their scores for the two conflict modes of Calm or Stormy in their order of ranking, starting from the style with the highest score to the lowest in each of the conflict modes. The results of the tabulated and ranked scores reveals the most used styles of each respondent and their least used styles. In cases where they have similar scores or where the scores are very close, Kraybill says this shows that the respondents with such results are flexible; that is, they can switch between the closely tied styles. He described this as very good because it means they can change styles as demanded by the conflict contexts confronting them, and it indicates that they are equally skilled in such styles (Kraybill 2013: 9).

The participants were then asked to stop and, for homework and meditation, to work through the characteristics of each conflict handling style, considering the power sources, and the advantages and disadvantages of each, as depicted in the table 1 above.

From the participants’ responses given during the first session of the Basic AVP training, a representative response sample of four persons were chosen at random to assess the participants’ predominant styles of handling conflicts. This was easy because pseudonyms were used instead of actual names of the participants. Hence, responses from Jovial, Capable Kemi, Tosin and Rich were selected to represent the experimental group before the Basic AVP workshop and after the interventions. A summary will be presented in the evaluation chapter.

6.4 Reflections

The chapter showed that each of the selected exercises (see attached manual) were geared towards the building blocks of the AVP Basic workshop. These are: affirmation and self-esteem, communication, community and co-operation, conflict management and transforming power. The chapter also showed the highlights of the workshop and the profile of the community in which the workshop was conducted, as well as why the community was used. The participating youths, who were so well behaved and patient, despite some differences, were commended by the facilitators.

Here are some participants' reflections, when asked about the changes experienced after the AVP Basic workshop:

> *"Before the workshop, I used to lose my power in conflict, but now I have learnt that it is not healthy for me. Rather, I should also consider my swell-being in conflicts."* Jovial Loveth, 22-year old female youth leader.
>
> *"The workshop has exposed me to know that my school classroom is filled with violence. Now I can locate the source and I know how to address it."* Sounds, 21-year-old male 1st year student.
>
> *"I have learnt how to express myself more effectively, to be heard by the other party, and not just to bottle up until I explode in fury.*" Nice Niyi, 24-year old male security officer.
>
> *"I now know that, through the "Broken Squares" exercise, co-operation helps us to achieve greater things rather than trying to be a hero. I should not be ashamed to ask for help when at a loss or do not have enough capacity for a conflict situation*." Capable Kemi, 23-year old 3rd year female student.
>
> *"I can handle my feelings better after the AVP workshop. Especially when dealing with annoying clients."* Sunshine, 25-year old male trader.
>
> *"I overcame my feelings of inadequacy after the listening exercise. It felt good to have someone to listen to you talk."* Firm Friday, 26-year old male artisan.

These responses by some of the Basic AVP workshop participants underscore the efficacy of the workshop in sowing seeds of non-violent conflict engagement in the participating youths. These reflections are in line with the goal of the AVP in ensuring a transformation from confrontation to co-operation among the participants. Self-reports like these show the effectiveness of the AVP in engendering self-esteem, communication skills, and non-violent conflict resolution skills, as well as affirmation of one's self, which are germane to creating alternatives to violent conflict engagement, and which are the objectives of the AVP Basic workshop, as stated in the purpose of the workshop (see Section 7.0). Following the ABC triangle of conflict, a change in attitudes, behaviours or context of a conflict is needed to break

the cycle of conflict, especially when it is tending towards violence (see Section 2.2.1). Hence, from the foregoing reports and reflections about changes brought about as a result of the AVP Basic workshop, it is seen that the AVP has the capacity to bring about such changes in behaviours and attitudes of parties in different conflict contexts to ensure non-violent dispute resolutions.

6.5 Summary

This chapter has dealt with an aspect of objective three of this study, and has focused on the training of youths in non-violence skills using the AVP Basic workshop. The workshop also familiarised them with the different conflict handling styles using the KCSI. All this was done to equip them better for the intervention sessions, so that they can work together as a team supporting one another. It further highlighted that the transformation sought by the study should begin with the youths themselves. Finally, the intervention plans of the study were also presented in this chapter. The next chapter presents the intervention plans by the members of the action team trained in the workshop.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

DEVELOPING AN ACTION PLAN

7.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the action team's process of designing its action plans and the kinds of interventions planned towards fulfilling the aims of the study, which is to reduce the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence in Ekiti-State. (Note: the action team, also known as the support group, are the youths who were trained in the Basic AVP and Kraybill Conflict Styles workshops as reported in the previous chapter, while the reference advisory group consists of professionals and community stakeholders who serve as a consultative body to the group's interventions.) It is worth emphasising that this designing process was entirely at the discretion of the volunteer action team members, supervised by the researcher, but without imposition as such would have been unethical. The action plan will also help in identifying relevant sectors of society through which action interventions can best be implemented, bearing in mind the capabilities and capacities of the action group.

The action team comprised eight youths, selected from ten. All of them were aged between 15-35 years, and were trained in the AVP Basic skills of communication, affirmation, self-esteem and conflict resolution, as well as the Kraybill conflict handling styles. They have learnt to work together as a team in which none is superior to any other; rather, they all have equal rights and obligations on the project. They are to report back to the whole group or the researcher as the need arises. It should be noted that the action interventions presented in this chapter are directed at different levels of society, that is, the youths and the authorities. This is because electoral violence, as seen in this study, is a somewhat complex issue that is reinforced at various points in our society.

Therefore, in undertaking the project, the action team members met for a planning meeting at 9 A.M on the 10th of September 2017 at Satellite Campus located in a quiet part of Ado-Ekiti. The agenda was to deliberate upon and plan the action interventions. However, out of the ten members of the team, only seven attended, as others had to travel for different reasons; they had already informed the team about their inability to join us. Even so, the meeting did not start until 9:45 A.M, as we had to wait for two members who gave the excuse of believing that African timing would be applicable. The meeting took longer than expected due to the group being engrossed in the planning, and not minding the extra time to get a reasonable result in harmonizing their varied proposals.

The eight members of the action team who were at the planning meeting were:

No	Name	Gender	Age	Status
1.	Loveth J. Bamigboye	Female	22	Year one student leader
2.	Rachael Adedipe	Female	23	Part time student year three
3	Adeniyi Akinleye	Male	24	Out of school security officer
4	Bello Kabir Kamoru	Male	25	Security officer
5	Adebayo Tosin	Male	25	Post graduate student
6	Ojeniyi Seun	Male	21	Year one student
7	Adekola Kemi	Female	23	Year three student leader
8	Friday Joseph	Male	26	Artisan

Table 7 1: Action team attendance list

In this session, key planning factors were taken into consideration as much as possible. Among these are the inclusion of diverse opinions, conflict management among the planning team, encouragement of brainstorming without rejection, efficiency and timeliness of the meeting sessions (both physical and virtual), and having an open communications channel via a closed social media group where the results of the planning meetings are circulated among team members for revisions and inputs (Fawcett *et al.* 1994: 4). The final draft and documentation was circulated among the members of the advisory committee for their input and opinions.

Also, the planning activities helped in the clarification of the problems, the barriers to the problem, resources, solutions or alternatives to the identified barriers, the extent and consequences of the issue of electoral violence, existing programmes and resources among other issues as advocated in the community intervention for youths manual by Fawcett *et al.* (1994: 1,2). This is presented in the following section on the planning overview.

7.1 Planning Overview

7.1.1 Identifying the problem or issue of concern

7.1.1.1 The involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence

The problem of youth involvement in electoral violence as both perpetrators and victims deserves urgent attention as the youths have been identified as being directly responsible for 95% of electoral violence in Nigeria since independence (Okafor, 2015). It has been noted that electoral violence has claimed many lives, resulted in massive loss of properties, and induced fear among citizens to engage in the electoral process. This has the potential of not only affecting the credibility of elections in Nigeria, but also bringing about political instability and derailing the Nigerian project. It should be borne in mind that it is only in the atmosphere of

peace that sustainable development can take place. Thus, the problem to be addressed is the high levels of youth involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria.

7.1.1.2 Factors that motivate youth involvement in electoral violence

Some of the identified causes or barriers include:

A. Poverty
B. Unemployment
C. Peer group influence
D. Desperation to capture/retain political power for economic reasons due to mass poverty
E. Ethnic/religious differences
F. Little or no formal education
G. Instigation by the political elite

(See Sections 3.4.3 and Chapter 5 on exploration).

7.1.1.3 Identifying relevant stakeholders

Stakeholders needed	*Potential/Existing stakeholders*
The electoral management body	The electoral management body
The youths	The youth (in the action group)
The media	JDPI, a community based organization
The teachers/schools	The teachers/educational authorities
The religious leaders	The Nigerian Police authority
The Nigeria Police	

Financial resources: Mainly provided by the researcher's DUT research funds and private funding.

7.1.2 Brainstorming and selecting possible solutions or alternatives to identified hindrances

The main barrier that may pose a hindrance to the planned intervention is the political elites who benefit from the dividends of Nigerian youth involvement in electoral violence. Hence, a viable solution is to work directly on the youths, devoid of any political platform so as to avoid stoking tensions and political differences which may result in violent exchanges.

Thus, we will work directly with the youths along the paths of least resistance. I have also notified the Police authorities and institutional authorities seeking their consent and provision of protection.

7.1.3 Extent and Consequences of Electoral Violence Among Youths

Some of the identified consequences and the extent of Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence includes reduced quality of life, disabilities which are sometimes permanent, and death.

Other consequences include those listed earlier, such as the mass destruction of lives and properties, the proliferation of arms for other criminal activities, a deep fear and reluctance by the citizens to participate in elections, either as candidates or mere voters. Lastly, electoral violence by the youths portends a grave danger to the future of Nigerian society because the youths are the leaders of tomorrow and unless something is done urgently, the nascent democracy which Nigeria enjoys might be derailed, leading to other problems too numerous to mention owing to the position of Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa (Monday and Simon 2013; Afe 2015; Akanmu, Fagbohun and Adenipekun 2015; Okafor 2015). It has been noted that Nigerian women are also actively involved in electoral violence in a variety of ways.

The presence of youth violence and violence in general has been noted to affect the entire community on diverse levels. Among these are psychological trauma in the form of fear and mistrust; economic consequences as it deters businesses and reduces the worth of properties in the affected areas; and physical damage through injury, death or restrictions on freedom of movement (David-Ferdon and Simon 2014: 8; Morrel-Samuels *et al.* 2016: 191). See also section 3.4.3.

7.1.4 Existing Programmes and Resources

One of the existing channels to curb the involvement of youths in electoral violence can be found in the nation's laws. This is because there is clarity in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended on the issue of electoral violence in Section 227 which states that:

> No association shall retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of display of physical force or coercion in promoting any political objective or interest or in any such manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organized and trained or equipped for that purpose (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999: 64; Adoke 2011b).

The 2010 Electoral Act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, in Section 81 prescribes punishment for the violation or contravention of section 227 of the Constitution of Nigeria. (Nigeria 2010: A1128). Also, sections 94, 95, 96, 119, 128, 129, 131 are relevant on this point (Nigeria 2010: A1136, A1137, A1146, A1150, A1151; Adoke 2011b). For further explanations see section 3.4.3.

However, most of the interviewed youths believe that there are no real identifiable strategies targeted directly at the youths aimed at addressing the involvement of Nigerian youths in election related violence especially in the pre-election days. (Read more in chapter 5 on exploration.)

7.2 The Action Plan

7.2.1 Group diversity and integration

The group consists of both male and female youths some of whom are Christians and Muslims by religion, while by profession, some are traders, artisans, security men, and tertiary students. Several of them are leaders within their respective subgroups. All have been trained to work together, leaving whatever titles they have aside, and working together as a team towards a common goal of reducing Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence. Also, they have formed a group called "Youths for Peace."

7.2.2 Vision

To promote non-violent electoral engagement among Nigerian youths in Ekiti-State.

7.2.3 Mission

To reduce the involvement of Nigerian youths (aged 15-35 years old) living in Ekiti State in acts of electoral violence through a comprehensive sensitisation approach.

7.2.4 Objective

By November 2017, the group hopes to have reached out to about 100-200 youths living in Ekiti-State on non-violent engagements in the electoral processes through sensitisation and skills training.

7.2.5 Strategies

The broad strategies of the intervention initiatives include: to enhance the personal experiences of the target groups (youths) and decrease environmental barriers and stressors. The specific strategies aimed at changing behaviours of the individuals include: skills training, policy changes at the school management level to canvass for non-violent training for elected youth leaders, modelling violent and non-violent electoral engagement through dramas. In addition, strategies will also be devised aimed at working on the general development of the youthful community through public awareness campaigns using posters and handbills and, if possible, radio stations.

7.2.6 Targets of intervention initiatives

The targets of these initiatives include all Nigerian youths aged between 15 and 35 years living in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State who are at the risk of involvement in electoral violence.

7.2.7 Identified agents of change

These are the people identified as being in pole position to influence the changes sought by the intervention initiatives; among them are peer group and action group youths, teachers and school authorities, youth religious leaders and elected youth officials.

It is essential to identify such community sectors that might be of help to build a coalition towards helping the group achieve its mission, as the issue of addressing youth violence involves a cosmopolitan approach that usually requires a diverse range of people and organisations across varied sectors adapted to the specific context of the interventions (Fawcett *et al.* 1994: 19; Morrel-Samuels *et al.* 2016: 191). The diagram below shows an array of community sectors identified by the group. We will explore those with which the group can work effectively to eliminate or reduce the involvement of the youths in electoral violence.



Figure 7. 1 Broad Key Stakeholders/role-players identified by the Action Team

The diagram above outlines the key community stakeholders in terms of youth bodies, schools, religious organisations, markets, security agencies, media, community-based organisations (CBOs) and government among others that can be leveraged upon to fulfil the group's mission, which is to reduce the involvement of the Nigerian youths in electoral violence. However, due to the capacity, and the time and resources available to the group, only some of these sectors will be selected since they provide a credible means of reaching the youths who are at risk of engaging directly in electoral violence. It should be noted that previous findings from the exploration chapter in this study (see chapter 5) identified that there is a dearth of approaches to non-violent electoral engagement interventions directly targeted at Nigerian youths. Hence, the sectors selected will attempt to correct this anomaly, and thus create programmes specifically oriented to the youths domiciled in the study area of Ado-Ekiti, and who are between the ages of 15 and 35 years old.

After engagement and deliberations within the action intervention group (consisting of already trained volunteer youths), it was decided that, to build an effective intervention, various community sectors must be worked with simultaneously. Some of these were selected due to their prospects of engaging with the youths more directly to implement programmes that can assist in transforming the behaviour and attitudes of the youths towards acts of electoral violence. The criteria used for this selection were: (1) the ease of access to enable the action group to reach the targets of change, that is the large number of youths that fall within the age category liable to engage in electoral violence ; (2) access to community members who have the interest and responsibility of ensuring that the target groups are not engaged in acts of violence including electoral violence; and lastly, the feasibility of involving the selected sectors in the efforts of the action team. Hence, after careful consideration, the group selected the following community role players which are:

a. The schools: this is because youths from diverse walks of life comprise the main group on the campuses, and because most of the action team members are students who have access to the school community. Furthermore, the schools provide easy access to pools of youths within the school environments.
b. Faith-based organisations and community based organisations (FBOs and CBOs): religious bodies and CBOs are an integral part of the society and, in fact, some of them, especially religious organisations, are run by student religious leaders. Some of the team members are part of those groups, and they believe that these organisations can guarantee access to large numbers of a youthful audience. This

will enable the team to spread the message of non-violent electoral participation to their fellow youths.

c. Youth organisations and school management: this is the third and final sector the action group selected with the aim of instituting policy changes in conjunction with the office of student affairs targeted at the Student Union governments and other student associations. The idea is to institute a scheduled annual training session in non-violence for the newly elected student leaders of youth organisations recognised by the schools. This would be a standard policy to work on the general behaviour and attitude of the youth leaders towards violence in general, and to provide alternatives to engagement in violent activities, either within the school or outside the school community.

In summary, the action team, in a bid to fulfil the main aim of this study, identified certain constituents of society with which they can easily work to achieve the stated aim. These include community based organisations, youth organisations, schools and religious bodies.

7.3 Proposed interventions

The responses of the group on goal congruency and feasibility led to the determination to undertake specific activities at the selected sectors, which are listed as follows:

a. By October 2017 – To provide information on the causes, dynamics and consequences of youth involvement in electoral violence through workshops and debates in the selected community sectors of schools and religious organisations;
b. By October 2017 – To enhance the skills of at least 100 youths in conflict resolution through seminars or workshops;
c. By November 2017 – To facilitate support from influential others by increasing membership of the created Youths for Peace organization as a peer support group in non-violence;
d. By December 2017 – To meet with the local arm of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) or relevant CBO in Ekiti-State. The group hopes to negotiate a wider role in society toward peaceful conduct of elections through non-violent participation of their fellow youths.

The advisory group then reviewed the choices of interventions aimed at reducing youth involvement in electoral violence to consider if the proposed actions are complete. In doing so, the following were considered:

- Are these interventions capable of maximizing each sector's contribution to the desired goal of reducing youth involvement in electoral violence?

- Are there any other changes in the proposed actions or policies and organizational practices that could be made in each of these sectors relative to the resources available to the intervention group?

The advisory group also looked at all the interventions proposed and considered their efficiency and effectiveness, asking such questions as:

- Would all the proposed changes, taken together, be sufficient to reduce Nigerian youth involvement in electoral violence in the study area?
- Is there any other intervention in terms of programmes, practices and policies which should or could be made in the chosen sectors?

It was during these discussions that a suggestion was raised for the modification of the policies of the school on non-violence/conflict resolution workshops or skills acquisition through the office of the Dean of Student Affairs, especially for elected or appointed student leaders.

After the review of the reference advisory group, the action group met again on the 22nd of September 2017 to re-examine the changes proposed by the advisory group, and to deliberate on each of the proposed action interventions. To reach a consensus, this was done in a group discussion in which the following questions for each action plan were asked:

a. Is this proposed plan of action important to the goal of reducing engagement in electoral violence among Nigerian youths in the research area?
b. Is the proposed action intervention feasible?

The action group members were unanimous in their support of the proposed action plans. However, it was decided that I join them in lobbying the relevant authorities to facilitate successful implementation of the proposed interventions.

Formal approval of the entire support group was secured, as they were each given an opportunity to decide on the proposed action interventions for the selected community sectors. The complete action plan was put to a formal vote after the discussion on building group consensus, and the results were unanimously in the affirmative.

7.4 The Action Plan Schedule

Action Steps for Reducing Electoral Violence among Nigerian Youths in Ekiti-State

Community Sector:	Youths
Intervention Mission:	Reducing Ekiti Youths Involvement in Electoral Violence
Intervention Objective:	By November 2017, 100-200 youths sensitised on non-participation in electoral violence

Action Step(s)	**Person(s) Responsible**	**Time line: Start/End**	**Resources Needed**	**Communication**
What needs to be done	Who will act	By what date will the action be done	What financial, human, political and other resources are needed/available?	What individuals and/or organisations need to be informed about these actions?
1. Identifying the community problem/goal to be addressed and what needs to be done	The researcher	January 2016-June 2016	Time, books, journals, newsprint	The supervisor, action team, concerned authorities
2. Appraising the level of the problem or goal: the methods of assessment used for this study include:	The researcher	September 2016 – April 2017	Funds for printing, transport, snacks for respondents, books	The concerned authorities, action team, supervisor
3. The prioritized groups to benefit: youths between the ages of 15 to 35 years old in the study area	The researcher	April 2017 – May 2017	Time, trained youths to form action team to implement the interventions, funds for their trainers, refreshments and transport costs for the participants	The action team, concerned authorities, supervisor
4. The target group's input will be obtained in identifying and analysing problems and goals to be addressed by the intervention using personal contacts, interviews and FGD's	The researcher/ action team of youths and diverse youth groups	February – August, 2017	Time and resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	
5. In analysing the problem or goal to be addressed by the intervention, respondents' inputs will be factored in	The researcher, the action team and diverse youth groups	April - September, 2017	Time and resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	

6. Goals and objectives for what "success" would look like; this includes: reduction in youth involvement in electoral violence. Specific target is reaching out to 100-200 youths on non-violent engagement in electoral violence	The researcher and the action team	September, 2017	Time, resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	The security agencies, the school authorities and the youth leaders
7. The core components and elements of the intervention include provision of information on non-violence, enhancing support services through the establishment of youth for peace programme to be monitored by a local CBO	The researcher/ action team	By November, 2017	Time, resources for transportation, and bringing participants together. Lobbying the school authorities to sign an MOU with JDPI on training of the youth leaders	The security agencies, the school authorities and the youth leaders
8. The mode of delivery of each component and element of the intervention; this includes workshops, campaigns debates and drama shows	The researcher/ action team	September–November, 2017	Facilitation by the youths who form the action team	The security agencies, the school/religious authorities and the youth leaders
9. The intervention will be adapted to fit the needs and context of the sectors selected for intervention (e.g., differences in resources, cultural values, competence, language). E.g., use of an interpreter, ensuring female team members are well dressed for religious organisations	The researcher/ action team	By September 2017	Inputs from youth leaders in the religious sections and use of interpreters when needed	The security agencies, the school/religious authorities and the youth leaders
10. Development of an action plan for the intervention, which is this chapter	The researcher/ action team	September, 2017	Time and resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	Project supervisor

11. Small pilot-test of the intervention. This has been tested by the researcher, hired trainers and research assistants for its efficacy and consequences. Feedback has been used to develop and adapt an improved version of the planned intervention	The researcher/ action team	August 2017- September, 2017	Time and resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	The security agencies, the school authorities and the youth leaders
12: Implementation of the intervention, monitoring and evaluation of the process (e.g., quality of implementation, satisfaction) and outcomes (e.g., attainment of objectives) The knowledge, attitudes and behavioural model will be used for the evaluation	The researcher/ action team	By November, 2017	Time and resources for transportation, and bringing participants together	The security agencies, the school authorities and the youth leaders

Table 7 2 Action plan schedule

7.5 Summary

This chapter has presented the action plan interventions as designed by the action team which consists of youths who have been trained in the Basic AVP workshop and Kraybill Conflict Style Instrument. This chapter also contains the processes by which key decisions were made and how the inputs of the advisory team were utilized. It also shows the multi-level approach of the action intervention using different levels of the society to attain the aim of the study which is the reduction of youth involvement in electoral in Ekiti-State, Nigeria. The chapter also clarified the issues, barriers to planned action intervention, resources needed and resources available, possible solutions to the barriers identified, existing programs addressing youth involvement in electoral violence, key persons to be involved in the intervention were also identified, group diversity, vision, mission and objectives of the action intervention were all clearly stated amongst others e.g. strategies, targets of intervention initiatives, agents of change. The next chapter will report on the implementation and evaluation of the action interventions outlined in this section.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION TEAM'S INTERVENTION

8.0 Introduction

In conjunction with trainers from the Catholic Justice and Development Initiative in Ado-Ekiti, I trained ten Ekiti youths in conflict handling styles using the Kraybill Style and the Basic AVP workshops during this study. This was done to create an action team of youths and to equip them with the necessary skills to enable them to design and implement interventions aimed at reducing the involvement of their fellow youths in electoral violence in the study area. The training also prepared them to act as peace agents by creating an atmosphere of non-violent engagement in the electoral processes in their respective communities in particular and the area of study in general. Hence, this chapter discusses the implementation of the interventions designed by the action team members as outlined in the previous chapter.

The interventions were implemented in Odo village, a satellite town a few kilometres from Ado-Ekiti, and along NTA road to Ado-Ekiti. These communities were selected because of the vast number of youths living there. Odo village is a small area with a tertiary institution, but with virtually no social amenities and recreation centres to cater for the youths. Also, the youths, who are mostly students, live within the community as the institution there is a non-residential one. Thus, after school hours, they have enough time on their hands without regulations of hostel authorities. In the same vein, NTA road, the venue of the second session, is also dominated by many youths who are part-time workers and students owing to the presence of a continuing education centre in the community. Some of the youths are commercial motorcycle riders (popularly known as Okada riders in Nigerian parlance); they are the ones who are seen to herald the campaign trains of politicians during campaigns, and the motorcycles are also used as getaway transportation after performing acts of electoral or other forms of violence.

For the safety of participants and freedom from harassment from hoodlums who may not be favourably disposed to the intervention programme, the action team members secured the permission of the institutions in the localities to use their halls. This would give enough security within the institutions and reduce costs of holding the programmes in other civic centres. Also, apart from their perceived neutrality, the venues ensured accessibility for many youths without incurring extra transportation costs to other venues. The written consent of the

relevant authorities was sought and obtained. The intervention sessions were offered for free and open to everyone, but with special emphasis on the stated age group. Owing to the locations for the training sessions, it was unnecessary to apply for police clearance to hold such gatherings. Lastly, involvement was voluntary as all participants freely came and those who wanted to leave were not compelled to stay.

Of the ten trained members of the action team, three were unavoidably absent, leaving seven who participated in the intervention sessions. The group consisted of four males and three females as tabulated below:

No	Name	Gender	Age	Status
1.	Loveth J. Bamigboye	Female	22	Year one student leader
2.	Rachael Adedipe	Female	23	Part time student year three
3	Adeniyi Akinleye	Male	24	Out of school security officer
4	Adebayo Tosin	Male	25	Post graduate student
5	Adekola Kemi	Female	23	Year three student leader
6	George Kingsley	Male	19	Part time year one student leader
7	Friday Joseph	Male	26	Artisan

Table 8 1: Attendance list

8.1 Selection of Participants

The recruitment of participants to the action team for these sessions was done using the principles of purposive sampling using the criteria of age (between 15 and 35 years old), and situation (those who are believed, from the study, to be in danger of being disposed to engage in electoral violence).

8.2 Intervention 1: Community awareness campaigns

The action support team members embarked on awareness campaigns within the community using banners, posters and handbills distributed to fellow youths in the Odo village suburb of Ekiti-State. These campaigns were carried out between September 7th and September 21st, 2017. In conducting the campaigns, the following kinds of banners were used as depicted below:

Figure 8. 1: Poster A

Source https://teecubethahoodscholar.wordpress.com/2015/02/16/nigeria-pre-elections-anxiety-and-post-elections-violence-phobia/

Figure 8. 2: Poster B

Source http://www.pakvoter.org/blog/only-mature-political-leadership-can-mitigate-electoral-violence

Some of these banners were culled from previous campaigns, modified and reproduced for this intervention. They were distributed in the critical stakeholders' environs such as schools, places of worship and residential communities, targeting youths who are between 15–35 years of age in Odo village and Falegan suburbs of Ado-Ekiti. This was done to recruit people to attend the sensitisation/debate sessions to be carried out by the group. Also, the purpose of the publicity awareness campaigns was: (1) To conscientize the youths in these suburbs, and across the identified critical stakeholders, on the significance of electoral violence, highlighting the consequences of the youths' participation in violent activities on the individual level; and (2) To recruit participants for the debate and discussion sessions, as outlined in the planning chapter, to target 100-200 youths to participate in the two-hour debate/seminar/discussion sessions on electoral violence.

Hence, the attendance in the second phase of the intervention is dependent on the success of the awareness sessions to recruit youths and, thus, the level of attendance can serve as a basis for evaluating the success of the awareness programme, which forms the first phase of the intervention. In all, we made about 500 posters on electoral violence, some of which were pasted publicly, while others were handbills distributed to would-be participating youths.

8.3 Intervention 2: Drama and discussion

These sessions were held between November 4th to 12th 2017, in the Odo village and Falegan suburbs of Ado-Ekiti respectively. A total of 240 youths in the age range of 17 and 25 years attended. The action team facilitated these sessions and divided themselves into teams of two to handle different groups in the sessions. The sessions were carried out via discussions on conflict handling styles and the presentation of short dramas by the action team, which were focused on the recruitment, participation and consequences of youth engaging in electoral violence. The dramas stimulated heated debate on electoral violence among the youth; these are summarised below.

The creativity of the youths was reflected in the handling of these sessions as skills learnt in the Basic AVP workshops came into play. The short six-minute dramas told the stories of how young Nigerians are lured into acts of electoral violence by the political elites, and how some youths willingly volunteer to perform violent acts during elections in support of a candidate in exchange for material benefits. It also portrayed the tragic end of some of these youths and the impact on their families. All the while, the political elites shield their own children from the violence and, in one case, even from voting for him! However, the politician's families benefit immensely from winning elections, while some of the youths who

risked their lives in electoral violence end up dead, injured or maimed for life. Very often, the politicians then abandon them immediately after the elections.

Drama One:

The title of the first drama was "Think Politics, Think People," and was directed by Saint Stephen Ighabor and published by the ABS Innovation Group. This drama highlighted the role of partners in assisting others to abstain and shun acts of electoral violence. It showed the girlfriend of one of the lead youthful characters insisting on the boyfriend keeping away from electoral violence by waging a non-violent campaign against him. She told him that all parties in an election should see themselves as working towards a common goal of electing the best representatives for their respective communities, local government councils, States and even the President of the nation. She went further to ask him where the children of their political sponsors were. Who benefits more after the polls, the children of the political elites or the youths implementing an electoral violence agenda? These questions prompted some deep thoughts in the young man, who then asked his political godfather who supplied them arms and funded them for electoral violence to bring his sons to join them in actualizing the campaigns for him (the godfather) too. This request was vehemently and angrily turned down by the godfather, who claimed that his sons can never be thugs. This encounter led to the conversion of the lead character and his group from engaging in the facilitation of electoral violence. They then started holding rallies in support of non-violent electoral participation, one of which his girlfriend came to witness and they reunited. It highlighted the roles young people can play in the lives of their friends and partners to desist from electoral violence by bringing positive, non-violent influence to bear on them (Stephen 2015).

In terms of the lessons learnt, this play shows that young people, especially females, have a great deal of influence as to what their friends and partners engage in, and that they are persuasive enough to stop their friends and partners from participating in electoral violence. Positive action can be taken to change attitudes that clearly express a principled non-violent stand against such vices.

Most of the ladies at the sessions were very glad: they felt empowered to know that there are steps they can take to stop their partners from engaging in acts, not only of electoral violence, but other forms of violence as well, such as cultism and money rituals, which are rampant among the youths in Nigerian society. Some of the participants, especially the females, exclaimed, "I now understand how to take a principled stand against violence without exposing

myself to dangerous reactions from the perpetrators." At the same time, the young men saw that the sponsors of electoral violence really see them as thugs and not supporters as they are called. In addition, they noticed the vehement reaction of the political godfather to the request that his children join the youths in perpetrating electoral violence, and they understood that, no matter the party or candidates they support, everyone ought to have only one goal, which is good governance and societal development.

Drama Two

The title of drama two was "Shun Electoral Violence," directed by Adeola Fayehun and produced and published by the electoral management body in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC). Unlike drama one, the second short drama was set in northern Nigeria. This was used to give the northerners in the research area a sense of inclusion. The drama focused on some youths who came to self-realization after they saw the family members of their political violence sponsors being kept in a safe place far from voting and other electoral activities due to the "dangers" involved. Meanwhile, the politicians had armed them with dangerous weapons and a plethora of psychotropic substances for them to commit violence at the polling centres, where their own (the youth's) relatives were casting their votes. The politician declared that he did not need his wife's and children's votes and they ought to have even stayed far away in the United Kingdom instead of coming home to vote for him. When the wife and son queried him for arming the youths for violence, he responded, "I'm doing this so you people can have the good life, living and studying abroad in the United Kingdom, while the children of the 'have nots' remain here and can be used to do electoral violence."

The youths, on overhearing this conversation, took the money, weapons and drugs from the politician and went out for the electoral violence assignment. However, on the way, their leader, Kyaure, called the attention of his followers to what took place at the home of their sponsor: how he was shielding his family and even preventing them from casting their votes in support of him. Yet, he was more than willing to allow them, the children of the poor, to go into armed violence just for him to win the polls. At this point, the youths declared that they were not going to perform violence on their siblings, relatives and anyone else in the community, just for the political aspirations of their sponsor, who kept his own family safe and away from voting for him.

The lesson learnt here was: Political violence sponsors do not allow their family members to engage in or move near scenes of the violence but, rather, give a token to the youths to go into armed violence at huge costs to the youths and their respective families. The use of drama is very useful in capturing the attention of the youths to stimulate ideas in changing behaviour and attitudes.

The members of the action team gave ample time for the participants to make comments after each drama presentation. These comments sparked debates moderated by the action team members. The debates allowed the participating youths to vent their opinions, exchange ideas, learn from one another. Debates are noted for the ability to inspire, and facilitate the exchange of knowledge and ideas from several views. Hence, these allowed for the presentation of different viewpoints from the youths about electoral violence, its instigation and the youths' participation.

The debate sessions dovetailed into the second module of the intervention session, which looks at how to handle disputes during the electoral processes without resorting to violence. This led to the presentation of seminars on conflict handling styles as illustrated in the following section 8.4. Most of the youths who spoke at the sessions corroborated the story lines of the drama presentations on electoral violence and the involvement of the youths. That shows that they were aware of the problems of electoral violence beforehand. However, most lacked the know-how of how to deal with such issues, and commented on the fact that the drama presentations gave them insights on how to abstain and dissuade fellow youths from also participating in electoral violence. Many wished that the programme could be made available to a wider range of youths who, like them, are also at risk of being involved in electoral violence too.

8.4 Intervention 3: Understanding personal conflict handling styles

The debates and discussion sessions were followed by the second training module, which featured talks on understanding conflicts and violence, and how to differentiate between the two. It also included a brief talk on how to handle conflicts in which the different conflict styles, as depicted by Kraybill, were discussed and explained. The advantages and uses of the different styles were covered, as well as the need for each person to be versatile in the use of different styles as the occasion warrants (see section 6.3.2 of this study). This was related to their involvement in electoral violence and conflicts. The distinction between conflicts and violence was explained so that the participants understood that conflicts can take place and, in fact, should take place, without having violence as a compulsory component. The lesson from

the conflict handling style session was that conflict does not necessarily have to involve violence and that clear distinctions can be made between the two.

8.5 Reflections

The Ekiti youths involved in the sessions were very enthusiastic in bringing about change even though it was an arduous task getting the youths to attend the programmes led by the action team members using the public awareness sessions. However, the help of the student leaders and other leaders of youthful associations, as well as educational, religious, market and community groups, had a great influence in getting the youths to attend the programmes held at Odo and NTA/Falegan suburbs respectively. More importantly, is the fact that I could observe that, despite the level of reported and actual animosities in terms of election related violence perpetrated by the youths, Nigeria still has a great deal of bright hope in her youths. This was seen as they exhibited general conviviality and a desire for an atmosphere of peace despite the differences in religion, tribes, gender and political affiliations. They showed a spirit of genuine thoughtfulness and abhorrence towards the involvement in acts of electoral violence among the youths. However, there is the widely held belief that, for someone to be fortunate, another person must suffer misfortune. This can be attributed to a form of cultural violence embedded in the belief system of the people in the study area. It can be linked, too, to the position of Galtung and Collins as earlier mentioned in this study, see Section 2.7.1 (Galtung 1990; Collins 2013). I also noticed that the society does not have a reward system for the youths who are keen to keep the peace in the community, but recognises the ones who are willing to participate in violence, especially electoral violence, for at least the duration of time they engaged in it.

I also saw a great gap between the societal authorities and the youths: that is, the youths are not provided the opportunity and space to contribute their quota or made to feel a part of those whose decisions have a great impact on the society. Rather, most of them have the feeling of "they" the authority, as opposed to "we" which would instead reflect a more inclusive societal system that involves its youth in the public affairs of the community. This was more pronounced at the end of one of the sessions when a female participant stood up to ask me if we can cover topics on unwanted pregnancies and rapes! I saw the passion to do good, without the wherewithal, guidance or knowledge of what to do. Like her, some of them have matters burning in their hearts but without the enabling environment on how to deal with these issues. It was a sobering experience for me, as I saw that more work still needs to be done with the youths to have a better society, since the continued neglect of the youths will ultimately create

a more difficult chaos than we have ever witnessed in Nigeria, especially if we take cognizance of the population of youths in Nigeria.

8.6 Summary

This chapter covered the implementation of the interventions designed by the action team members as discussed in chapter eight. These interventions, consisting of public awareness, drama/debate and conflict handling sessions, were planned and co-ordinated by the youths of the action support team. It was evident that the interventions were designed to create a pool of sensitised youths who now have the seeds to shun the culture of violence planted in their hearts, especially in terms of election practices. These efforts contribute directly to the overarching aim of the study, which is to reduce the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence. Success in these will go a long way to give a sign and hope that a peaceful conduct of election related activities is possible by the youths of Nigeria, particularly in the study areas. The key here is the planting of the seed of non-violent electoral engagement in the youths. The next chapter focuses on an evaluation of the interventions.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER NINE

EVALUATING PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES

9.0 Introduction

This chapter of the study deals with the evaluation of the intervention implemented in the previous chapter. This is in line with the third objective of this study which is: to work with a reference group of youths who are active politically to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in acts of electoral violence in Nigeria. Hence, the last part of the third objective deals with the evaluation to be done as proposed in the literature on evaluation. The evaluation will be done in two ways, namely process evaluation, knowledge and skills transfer, or outcome evaluations. It is important to point out that there was insufficient time to assess the intervention outcomes in terms of reduced youth involvement in electoral violence as pointed out in the study limitation. Nevertheless, insofar as there have been changes in attitudes and skills in resolving disputes, we can be optimistic but not cannot claim more than that as of this period for this study.

9.1 Process Evaluation

9.1.1 Process evaluation – action team

The primary purpose of the Kraybill and the Basic AVP workshops was to train selected youths to serve as the action team for the design and implementation of this study's intervention. The secondary aim was the development of communication, empathy, confidence and conflict resolution skills among participants, to equip them to undertake the intervention as a supportive team.

To do this, three statements and two questions were employed to find out the perceptions of the participants about the seminar presentations. Among the questions and statements used as a guide for the FGD are the following: (see Section A of Appendix V)

a. The objectives of the interventions were clearly defined.
b. Were the intervention objectives were met?
c. Interaction and participation was encouraged
d. The causes of youth involvement in electoral violence were addressed
e. What do you like most about the intervention?

Statement One: The objectives of the intervention were clearly defined

The primary and secondary purposes of the action team training through the workshops are noted above. These were set in order to fulfil the main objective of the study, which was to

reduce the participation of youths in electoral violence in Ekiti State. The members of the action group all agreed that the intervention objectives were clearly stated. And, as previously outlined, clearly defined objectives are crucial to any intervention as it enables the facilitators to become aware of some quantifiable behaviours that the participants are expected to display. Also, meeting the objectives as stated aids in creating an expectation and a sense of fulfilment in the participants.

Statement Two: The intervention objectives were met

The action team further agreed that the stated objectives were met, thus creating a sense of fulfilment for them. It was clear that they felt the difference in their personal abilities after the training. For example, as quoted earlier, some of them commented: *"Before the workshop: I used to lose my power in conflict, but now I have learnt that it is not healthy for me. Rather, I should also consider my well-being in conflicts"* – Jovial Loveth, 22-year old female youth leader. This response by a team member shows that the intervention was able to assist the participants to regain their confidence in conflict situations which is essential for self-esteem. Consequently, their approach to conflict and their self-affirmation or assertiveness is enhanced. Other participants also gained skills in conflict management as evidenced by the response of one of the participants named Sounds, a 21-year-old 1st year male student who professed that, *"The workshop has exposed me to know that my school classroom is filled with violence. Now I can locate the source and know how to address it."* Another plus is the acquisition of communication skills as reflected in the comment of Nice Niyi, a 24-year old male security officer who said, *"Now I have learnt how to express myself more efficiently, to be heard by the other party and not just bottle up until I explode in fury,"* This is a very important point, as communication is key and a defect in communication skills has been identified as one of the key causes of conflict. In addition to the communication skills, other participants such as Capable Kemi, a 23-year old 3rd year female student who declared that they understood the power of co-operation. In her words, *"I now know through the 'Broken Squares' exercise that co-operation helps us to achieve greater things rather than trying to be a hero. I should not be ashamed to ask for help when at a loss or do not have enough capacity for a conflict situation."* Finally, other respondents added empathy to the pool of skills acquired, as evidenced by the statement of Sunshine, a 25-year old male trader, who said, *"I can handle my feelings better after the AVP workshop. Especially when dealing with annoying clients."* Thus, a plethora of skills can be said to have been acquired by the participants judging from some of

their responses. The acquisition of these skills is a core mandate of the Basic AVP programme as discussed earlier in this study.

Statement Three: Interaction and participation was encouraged

This statement was introduced into the evaluation questionnaire to establish if the participating youths felt that they were encouraged by the facilitators to interact freely during the sensitisation and seminar sessions. This is bearing in mind that unhindered interaction is key to a successful intervention implementation. All the action group participants agreed that the facilitators gave room for and encouraged free interaction during the entire process without compulsion. This signified that they could clear their minds on issues that had bothered them during the intervention process. It also shows that the facilitators allowed the participating youths to have ownership of the intervention process, which is essential for effective performance.

Statement Four: What do you like most about the action group training sessions?

- In my view I liked the preparedness of the facilitators and their attitudes of not putting the youths down – Knowledge.
- It helped me to regain my self-confidence … and now I am a happier person – Loveth.
- The simplicity of the training and the unpredictable nature of the Basic AVP sessions – Timely Tosin, a 25-year old postgraduate student.
- I particularly liked the exercises in the Basic AVP, especially the Broken Squares; it was so real – Kemi, a 23-year old 3rd year female student.
- That I learnt to listen and have someone listen to me was a happy experience for me – Nice Niyi, a 24-year old male.
- It is highly educative without the boredom of academic work – Sounds, a male 21-year-old 1st year student.
- I learnt the importance of working together as a team, which I liked, and the importance and impact of the "I" messages too – Sunshine, a 25-year old male trader.
- The training venue was conducive and pleasant. Especially doing this evaluation session under the canopy of trees gives a refreshing and reinvigorating feel after the long sessions – Kingsley.
- All respondents agreed with loveth who commented that, "The hospitality was great, the food and drinks were sufficient. This enabled me to overlook the long sessions, coupled with the facilities available (the restrooms).

From these and other comments, it is obvious that the action team participants indeed experienced some changes or had such changes initiated in their lives as a result of their participation in the training sessions.

9.1.2 Process evaluation – trainees

The process evaluation of the training of the 240 trainees was carried out by means of a post-intervention focus group discussion (FGD – see appendix) on the 12th of November 2017, in Odo village, Ado-Ekiti. A total of ten people were selected at random to participate, based on their willingness without coercion. In doing these the same questions asked from the action group were posed to a sample of trainees FGD group listed in the table below (See Appendix V)

Number	Pseudonym	Gender	Age
1	Ajiyebi	M	22
2	Modinat	F	17
3	Jesumoni	F	21
4	Bolatito	F	23
5	Nofisat	F	17
6	Olaore	M	20
7	Obaseki	M	22
8	Bankole	M	18

Table 9 1 Sample of the 240 trainees

The responses of the representative sample of the 240 trainees are presented below:

Statement One: The objectives of the intervention were clearly defined.

The facilitator at the beginning of the intervention implementations clearly stated the objectives to the participating youths. The main objective was to reduce the participation of youths in Ekiti State in acts of electoral violence. The members of the focused group from the 240 trainees strongly agreed that the intervention objectives were clearly stated. It is essential to note that clearly defined objectives are crucial to any intervention implementation as it enables the facilitators take cognizance of some quantifiable behaviours that are expected to be

displayed by the participants who were part of the process. As earlier said this aids in creating a sense of expectation fulfilment in the participants if the initially stated objectives were met.

Statement Two: The intervention objectives were met.

The participating youths also agreed that the stated intervention objectives were met. Thus, creating a sense of fulfilment in them. While one Modinat a female participant noted that, "it is easy for people to claim to have changed from perpetrating violence, but when the chips are down in the face of inducement how many will maintain that stance?" She queried and another chose to remain neutral to the statement asking if the stated intervention objectives were met or not.

Statement Three: Interaction and participation was encouraged

As earlier stated, this point was introduced into the evaluation questionnaire to know if the participating youths felt that they were encouraged to freely interact and participate during the sensitisation and seminar sessions by the facilitators. All the participants agreed that the intervention programme and its facilitators encouraged free interaction during the entire process. That gave the participating youths 'ownership' of the intervention process, which is essential for effective performance and validity.

Statement Four: The causes of youth involvement in electoral violence were addressed

This statement is a central theme to the issue of youth participation in electoral violence as it is closely related to efforts aimed at reducing such involvement. To reduce or eliminate a phenomenon like youth involvement in electoral violence, the key causes need to be clearly identified and agreed upon. All eight of the youths in the evaluation process strongly agreed that the causes of youth participation in electoral violence were well addressed.

Statement Five: The respondents were asked what they liked most about the intervention.

Most of them said that they were encouraged to say 'no' to electoral violence. Some made comments about the conflict handling sessions, among which was Ajiyebi a 22-year old, male participant who responded that, *"The intervention strategy employed brings emotions to people's life and stimulates us to be self-controlled and non-violent in all we do in our community and nation."* Others, like Bankole, commented on the drama and debate sessions:

"[I enjoyed] the video clips because they were very educative and expository," a comment reinforced by 17-year old female participant named Modinat, who said, *"The video clips have a lot of messages to teach and they are self-explanatory so they are easy to understand ... It has helped me to know I should not be involved in electoral violence because it is not good."* This comment shows that it was clear that the drama and debate sessions were well understood by the participants. This was affirmed by Bolatito, 23-year old female, who declared that all the sessions taught them a lot and, in her words, *"They taught us to abstain from bad intentions, rigging and fighting during elections. The intervention has helped us to know that electoral violence brings nothing positive to human lives. Rather, it only causes more problems for people yet far less for the contestants themselves."*

Other notable responses show what the respondents appreciated about the intervention sessions: *"The inter-relationship (that is interaction) and motivation of participants to contribute and learn from each other, based on our contributions and views on each of the three video clips shown"* – Olaore, a 20-year old male respondent. *"The intervention sessions were highly educative, and enlightened us more on the topic of electoral violence and how to eradicate or reduce it by encouraging the youth to say no to electoral violence and thuggery. It also taught us how electoral violence affects the society and nation adversely"* – Jesumoni, a 21-year old male participant. Perhaps the most succinct of all the responses was that given by Obaseki, a 22-year old male who stated that, *"I think the intervention is okay, well prepared and captivating.*" In conclusion, these comments reveal that the respondents recognised various benefits from the intervention sessions.

9.2 Outcomes evaluation

The purpose of the assessment was to gauge the knowledge and skills transfer and outcomes of the interventions implemented in the medium term. This involved data collection of the changes in the behaviour of learners (both the action team members and a representative sample of the 240 trainees). This was to assess how well the intervention has addressed the original gap identified in the study or contributed to the general aim of the study which is to reduce the involvement of youths in electoral violence.

As specified by Equitas (2011: 102), evaluations of outcomes and transfer is possible either multiple times or as a one-time event within a time frame of three to six months after the intervention and then again 12 to 24 months later for multiple ones. However, for this research I evaluated the one time, three to six months transfer and outcomes. The group focus of the evaluation here is twofold:

a. The action team of youths who were trained by myself and other professionals for the intervention implementations, and
b. The representative sample of the 240 youths who were trained by members of the action team

In doing this the following key themes were kept in mind:

(1) What changes have occurred?
(2) What was the role of the learners in the change?
(3) How did the intervention contribute to the learner's capacity to influence the change?

Whereas outcome evaluation deals with the *contribution of the learners* to changes in their environment influenced by the training they had received from the intervention, transfer evaluation looks at the *extent of the learner's capability and behaviour improvement* or changes because of the intervention.

The youths who participated in the series of workshops were quite enthusiastic about the training and discussions. Although the objectives of the intervention – which was to reduce the involvement of youths in Ekiti in electoral violence – seem to have been met, to be more certain that the interventions had the desired effects, an evaluation was carried out as follows.

Data collection methods

In conducting the evaluation, data was sourced using both quantitative and qualitative data for the action team. However only qualitative data was used for the sample of the 240 trainees. Thus, qualitative data for the evaluation was collected using interviews and focus group discussions involving the action team members and a representative sample of the 240 trainees that is involving the key participants (Equitas 2011: 106, 108).

Both the youths of the action team and a representative sample of the 240 trainees were asked the following questions for this purpose:

a. What new skills have you gained because of this intervention?
b. In what ways have such skills been of help to you and your community?
c. Have you ever been to similar youth and electoral violence workshops before or in recent times?
d. How has the knowledge and skills gained during these interventions helped to influence changes from electoral violence?
e. How do you hope to conduct yourself to not be involved in electoral violence acts in future?

Quantitative data for the evaluation of action team members was collected using the Kraybill Conflict Instrument questionnaires administered to members of the action team before and after the basic AVP workshops.

Data analysis methods

Analysis of the evaluations involving qualitative data were done using thematic content analysis methods and results were presented as described in section 4.5. The quantitative data was also analysed as advocated by the Kraybill conflict instrument approach and presented in tabular forms using ordinal values ascribed to each style as shown below in section 9.2.1. This was done with aim of finding out if the AVP workshop experience has had any impact on the action team members' conflict styles.

9.2.1 Outcome evaluation – action team

Quantitative evaluation: Kraybill conflict inventory assessment

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
14	1st	Directing	13	1st	Cooperating
12	2nd	Cooperating	12	2nd	Avoiding
11	3rd	Compromising	11	3rd	Compromising
10	4th	Avoiding	11	4th	Harmonizing
6	5th	Harmonizing	5	5th	Directing

Table 9.2a Kingsley before the AVP workshop

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
11	1st	Harmonizing	13	1st	Compromising

11	2nd	Avoiding	12	2nd	Harmonizing
10	3rd	Compromising	11	3rd	Cooperating
9	4th	Cooperating	9	4th	Avoiding
7	5th	Directing	4	5th	Directing

Table 9.2b Kingsley after the basic AVP workshop

The tables 9.2a and 9.2b shows that in a calm conflict context Kingsley's preferred conflict style had moved from low concern for others or relationships with focus on his own agenda to harmonizing where he also has concern for others in calm conflict situations after the basic AVP workshops

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
13	1st	Compromising	13	1st	Cooperating
11	2nd	Cooperating	12	2nd	Directing
10	3rd	Harmonizing	10	3rd	Compromising
9	4th	Avoiding	6	4th	Harmonizing
7	5th	Directing	5	5th	Avoiding

Table 9.3a Sounds before the basic AVP workshop

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
12	1st	Cooperating	12	1st	Cooperating
11	2nd	Harmonizing	11	2nd	Harmonizing
10	3rd	Compromising	10	3rd	Compromising
9	4th	Avoiding	10	4th	Avoiding

7	5th	Directing	4	5th	Directing

Table 9.3b Sounds after the AVP workshop

Tables 9.3a and 9.3b also reveals that Sound's dominant style which was compromising in calm contexts and cooperating before the basic workshop had moved to cooperation which is evident of his ability to now purposefully and creatively engage with conflict parties more. The new dominant styles show that he now has a balanced concern for himself and others in both conflict contexts. This may be attributed to effects of the basic workshop he took part in.

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
14	1st	Directing	12	1st	Compromising
12	2nd	Cooperating	10	2nd	Cooperating
9	3rd	Compromising	8	3rd	Harmonizing
6	4th	Avoiding	6	4th	Avoiding
3	5th	Harmonizing	4	5th	Directing

Table 9.4a Capable before the basic AVP interventions

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
13	1st	Harmonizing	14	1st	Cooperating
11	2nd	Cooperating	10	2nd	Compromising
9	3rd	Compromising	9	3rd	Directing
8	4th	Avoiding	6	4th	Avoiding
3	5th	Directing	5	5th	Harmonizing

Table 9.4b Capable after basic AVP workshop

Tables 9.4a and 9.4b both shows a dramatic turnaround in the dominant styles of Kemi aka Capable has her post basic workshop dominant styles under the calm conflict contexts shows she now has consideration for others rather than having a unidirectional focus on her own agenda as shown in table 9.4a under the calm conflict contexts. This posits a great turn around in her as the same improvement is witnessed in the crisis conflict contexts where she had moved from the compromising to cooperating conflict style which shows she is now more disposed to joint problem-solving efforts aimed at finding solutions to issues rather than win some lose some style of compromising.

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
13	1st	Directing	13	1st	Directing
12	2nd	Cooperating	12	2nd	Compromising
12	3rd	Compromising	12	3rd	Harmonizing
11	4th	Avoiding	12	4th	Avoiding
7	5th	Harmonizing	10	5th	Cooperating

Table 9.5a Knowledge before basic AVP workshop

Calm			Storm		
Responses when conflicts arise			Responses during crisis		
Scores		Style name	Scores		Style name
14	1st	Cooperating	13	1st	Compromising
12	2nd	Harmonizing	13	2nd	Cooperating
9	3rd	Directing	9	3rd	Harmonizing
6	4th	Compromising	8	4th	Avoiding
3	5th	Avoiding	5	5th	Directing

Table 9.5b Knowledge after basic AVP workshop

Tables 9.5a and 9.5b reveals that Kamoru aka Knowledge was high on directing conflict style both in calm and crisis conflict contexts before the basic workshops, however there were changes to both his dominant calm and crisis conflict styles after the basic workshops to cooperating and compromising respectively. This shows that he now has more concern for the needs of others and in fact willing to work together to find solutions to issues in the calm conflict contexts. While in the crisis context he is now disposed to letting others having their ways at times unlike before the basic AVP workshop where he was only interested in his own agendas at the expense of others.

The outcomes of the basic AVP workshops as evaluated by the pre-training and post training KSCI questionnaires shows that there were changes after the basic AVP workshops as revealed in the preference of the representative sample of action group members who were participants to desist from employing directing as a dominant style of handling conflicts in favour of cooperating, compromise and harmonizing. Thus, it can be said that the basic workshop has had some desired effect on the action team members producing key changes in the ways they handle conflicts. These claims are valid since there has been shifts in their dominant attitudes from directing conflict styles where there is low concern for relationships and high concern for personal agenda which often breeds more conflicts in comparison to other styles like cooperation, compromising and harmonizing.

Qualitative evaluations

Further evaluation of outcomes was carried out on members of the action team, using interviews/focus group discussions in which members of the action team assessed the training during the post training discussion sessions:

George Kingsley: “Before the workshops, I was not aware that the issue of electoral violence occurs in different dimensions. I only understood it in terms of physical violence. Hence, as long as there was no physical violence, I used to believe that everything was okay. However, my views about electoral violence changed drastically after the series of workshops and discussion sessions, including the video presentations during the intervention sessions. I became more aware of what the term “electoral violence” stands for, and perhaps more importantly, that electoral violence is an ill wind that blows no-one any good.” (Kingsley is a male participant aged 19 and a member of the reference team).

Loveth: “I have come to the realization that, as an individual, I can take a stand against electoral violence activities in my immediate context. [I have realised] that I am not as powerless as I used to think I was. The seminar sessions really opened my eyes to see the steps which I can take to assist in stemming the tide of electoral violence in my locality. Hitherto, as a female, I was afraid of getting involved in politics, but now I can, and I have started encouraging my friends to be involved in electoral politics non-violently. [That is] by not taking bribes, or singing abusive songs at rallies, or hurling insults at the opposition parties. But that we should rather endeavour to showcase why the candidates we are supporting are preferred to theirs.” (Loveth is a female aged 22, and a member of the reference team.)

Seun aka Sounds: “My experience was awesome. Now I have been engaged in planning seminars and teaching my fellow youths about the evils of electoral violence as a direct result of the interventions and trainings I received in this programme. I feel empowered to make a difference.” (Seun is a male aged 21.)

Kemi aka Capable: “I have witnessed a lot of changes in myself, as now I have gained the confidence to address a crowd of people and even talk to strangers because of my experiences as a member of this Youths for Peace team. I have also come to realize that we need to constantly remind our youths not to destroy their future by engaging in electoral violence.” (Kemi is a female aged 23.)

Niyi aka Nice: “There has been a dramatic change in me as I now realize that the political elites who recruit people for electoral violence do so not out of love or out of regard for the youths used in perpetrating these acts. But rather for their own selfish ends of attaining or retaining power at all costs, not minding whose sons and daughters get killed or wounded in the violence. It is not for service!” (Niyi aka Nice is a male aged 24.)

Racheal: “Now I understand that some of the fun we had during the campaigns and other electoral processes were deep forms of violence and should be abhorred.” (Racheal is a female aged 23.

Kamoru aka Knowledge: “My views have changed as a person, as I have learnt to appreciate myself and refrain from being used as a tool to perpetrate violence, just to be accepted as a ‘cool guy’. But rather, [I should] respect my fellow human beings [and] myself, and to work for peace in my area by sensitizing fellow youths like myself on the dangers of electoral violence. The sessions have been inspiring.” Kamoru is a male aged 26.)

Reflections

The changes in conflict handling styles and other responses to the interview questions above show that the intervention sessions have really been quite successful in bringing about certain desired changes in the respondents. This reflects a successful transfer of knowledge of non-violence engagement in electoral activities, which has enabled the respondents to be more aware of the evils of electoral violence. Their own admissions validate the belief in literature and pre-intervention data (see chapter 6) that the issue of electoral violence participation is rampant among Nigerian youths. This is despite the fact that many of them were even ignorant about what constitutes electoral violence apart from physical violence!

However, it is not a certainty that these changes in attitudes and behaviours can be sustained in the long run. Nevertheless, one can safely say that there is bound to be a multiplier effect because of the seeds that have been sown by this intervention.

The outcome evaluation also examines the contribution of the members of the action team to changes in their environment, influenced by the training they had received from the intervention. The action team members are the focus of this level of evaluation because they have been involved in the project for several months, unlike the 240 youths they trained. Some of their comments are paraphrased below:

"The action team seminar sessions helped me in being a part of the organizers of further intervention sessions for my fellow youths in different locations where we were able to sensitize them on the menace of electoral violence. I now know that the campaign against electoral violence can start from our own individual spaces, our homes, churches, and immediate community" – George Kingsley.

Kemi aka Capable: "I have been able to positively influence my friends on the dangers of getting involved in electoral violence and brought some of them to the workshops organized by the action team."

Loveth: "Now I can freely talk to others about the evils of getting involved in election violence. The part of the lady called Laura in one of the videos really emboldened me. I have also been a part of the action team organizers of the youth interventions."

Niyi aka Nice: "I was able to bring youths from different political parties together for a common purpose. Rather than being continually hostile to one another, they could see that, instead of being enemies, they both have a common goal which they have been pursuing negatively,

whereas they could pursue those goals in a non-hostile manner and still benefit from one another."

Racheal: "The youths I spoke to during the intervention sessions came to the realization that poverty is not an excuse for getting involved in electoral violence but, rather, greed and intolerance. This makes them fight for things unnecessarily at the expense of their common goal of good governance, lives and properties."

Seun aka Sounds: "The intervention sessions we, the action team, conducted revealed that the participating youths realized that they have more sacred obligations to their communities in terms of peaceful coexistence and relationships, including mutual respect, no matter the political affiliation. This is because they are all partners in the quest for their communal development, at least ideally."

Reflection

The responses of the action team members reveal that, indeed, there were many positive outcomes from the training they had received from the research team. This invariably assisted them in their own interventions, all purposed towards the overall aim of the study geared to reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence.

9.2.2 Outcome evaluation – participant trainees

To ascertain the claims of transfer of knowledge to others (outcome evaluation) by the action team, members were asked several questions (see Appendix V, Section B). Their responses were then analysed thematically as follows:

- "I have learnt from Laura in the *Think Politics: Think People* video how to orally and physically discourage acts of electoral violence among youths in my community" – Jesumoni, a 21-year old male participant in the sessions directed by the action team members.
- "What I have learnt is how to say 'no' to participation in electoral violence" – Obaseki, a 22-year old male participant of the sessions directed by the action team members.
- "The workshop made me realize that it is possible, and how to influence others [away] from acts of violence including electoral violence" – Bankole, aged 18, a male participant of the sessions conducted by the action team members.

Usefulness of the new skills and knowledge learnt so far:

- "It has made me have a sense of deep reflection, to think through before acting" – Nofisat, a 17-year old Muslim female participant in the sessions conducted by the action team members.

- "The lessons learnt from the workshops have been enlightening. Now I believe that no-one can just walk up to me and ask me to participate in acts of electoral violence, because I now know the effects and repercussions of doing so" – Bolatito.
- "My perception on electoral violence has changed positively, because I used to be a partaker in electoral violence. I saw it as a form of fighting for our 'rights' then. But after the workshop sessions, my perceptions changed totally. If not, I do not know where I could have been now. The lessons in these workshops have prevented me from going back to such a life through my refusal to team up with youth groups involved in electoral violence, despite their entreaties, because I now realize that there's a real possibility of losing my life or getting maimed forever in the process, and that it is destructive to societal peace. Although it has not been easy as a friend of mine just got a car from one of the political candidates in exchange for his support" – Jesumoni.

When asked how they hope to conduct themselves not to be involved in acts of electoral violence in the future because of the training received, some commented:

- "By not getting involved in bribery for votes, either as a recipient or a giver, as this training has made me understand the impact of receiving such gratifications to vote" – Modinat.
- "By giving counsel to fellow youths, and I will henceforth endeavour to dress normally and not like a thug. This is because you are addressed the way you dress most of the time" – Bankole.
- "By having self-contentment and not seeing politics as a means of income generation but service to the community and country, as shown in one of the training's video clips" – Obaseki.
- "I will continually advise the youths to control their tempers and refrain from violence, [not] destroying properties or causing conflicts during the process of elections, because, in one way or another, it impacts negatively them too" – Olaore, 20-year old male participant of the sessions conducted by the action team members.
- "Through prayers for peace during elections" – Nofisat.
- "I will not be part of the people causing frustration, violence, etc. to the citizens and leave them to vote for the parties and candidates of their choice" – Jesumoni.
- "As for me, as a lady, and from now on, I will undertake to query the source of my husband's, boyfriend's or, fiancé's source of finance. And I will carefully extricate myself from anyone involved in unwholesome activities, including political violence" – Bolatito.
- "I will advise youths around me and influence them not to get involved with bad gangs (like Squirry in one of the training videos), due to peer group influences or poverty. But, rather, they should have self-control in all they do. Personally, I will imbibe self-control to foster peaceful electoral practices in my own community" – Ajiyebi, 22-year old male participant of the sessions conducted by the action team members.

In summary, it is self-evident from the responses of the youths that in-depth introspections have been stimulated towards non-participation in acts of electoral violence among the participating youths. There is a clear awareness of the dangers of being involved in electoral violence. It can also be deduced from the responses that resistance to violence has been stirred in some of the youths. Moreover, based on their feedback, a deeper and clearer understanding of what electoral violence entails has been established. Some of them, who previously had received inducements for their support for their respective candidate or political party, could now see the intents of the sponsors, and the extent of violence spawned by such manipulation inflicted both upon them and by them. Also, due to these sessions, some of the youths have been able to distinguish between advocating for fundamental human rights and perpetrating acts of violence. Others have also been able to understand how to improve their personal conflict management styles to prevent outbursts of temper or rage and its associated violence. Finally, there was a consensus among the youths to act henceforth as peace agents in their different spheres of influence.

9.5 Reflections

My observation shows that the youths of the action group evolved more as a team with each activity they did together. The overall feeling of togetherness and teamwork was a constant feature of the team. For example, I have seen members who were shy becoming confident; those who found it difficult to talk about their problems gained self-confidence to do so, and so on.

Comparing the responses of the action team and the sample of 240 trainees, also indicate a transfer of knowledge to the participating youths and a replicating transfer of that knowledge to other youths by the action/reference team during their own intervention implementation. So, while it may be too early to do an impact evaluation, since social changes take time to be noticeable (Equitas 2011: 104), I am quite positive that seeds of change have been planted in a significant number of Nigerian youths in the research area. This is evidenced by the claims of changes in attitudes and behaviour, and new skills and knowledge transferred to the youths by both the training team as well as the reference team. It can be inferred that, with the provision of resources and motivation, Nigerian youths can walk the talk, if given a nudge in the right direction. They can make a difference in their communities in terms of non-violent conduct and participation in the electoral process and other developmental schemes.

9.6 Data validity and reliability

To ascertain the validity of the data, the member checking method was employed (Creswell and Miller 2000: 127b). In doing this, I assembled members of the action team to present the results of the interventions and their comments in a focus group discussion held on the 7th of February 2018 at Ado-Ekiti. The study data from the interventions were presented, and I consistently asked if the data were accurate and realistic in accordance with the proceedings carried out; the responses were affirmative. The intention was to provide the action team members the opportunity to correct whatever errors were noted, to challenge any misinterpretation perceived or provide an opportunity for clarification, and possibly, to give additional information by the action team members. This method of data validity has been adjudged as one of the most useful for ensuring data credibility, despite the possible pitfalls (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 314; Creswell and Miller 2000:127b). While it might not be prudent to generalize based on the findings of this study due to the fact it was conducted in Ado-Ekiti southwestern Nigeria. However the employed model and results of the study can be used as a archetypal of teaching people conflict resolution skills because if this methodology is replicated in similar contexts the results will not be different.

9.7 Summary

This chapter of the study has presented an evaluation of the twofold interventions, namely the assessment of skills transfer, and outcomes evaluation. The Kraybill questionnaire responses administered pre- and post-basic AVP workshop for the action team was used in the outcome evaluation for the team. Both received positive feedback to reduce the involvement of Nigerian youths in electoral violence. A continuation of the evaluation, especially about the long-term impact, will be ongoing, especially toward the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. This might be made possible because all the 240 participants in the action team's intervention sessions dropped their follow up contacts. The short training video clips have also been uploaded on mobile platforms for easy and wide circulation among Nigerian youths by volunteering participants. It is believed this will help viewers to learn how to say 'no' to electoral violence. The next chapter, then, will examine an overview of the study so far to draw conclusions as well as recommendations.

Endnotes

Creswell, J. W. and Miller, D. L. 2000. Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry. *Theory into Practice*, 39 (3): 124-130.

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PART V

CHAPTER TEN

Summary, Reflections and Conclusions

10.0 Introduction

This research was carried out with the aim of reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in acts of electoral violence. As elections are the lifeblood to sustaining any democracy, especially in a multi-cultural entity like Nigeria, and given that electoral violence has been a pervasive feature of elections in Nigeria since 1964/65, with the youths of Nigeria identified as being responsible for about 95 percent of such acts of violence, either as perpetrators or victims of such activities, the general focus has been on ways to reduce or, even, eliminate such violence. The specific objectives were to:

a. To explore the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence
b. To assess the effectiveness of current strategies, if any, being used to limit the incidence of electoral violence among Nigerian youths, and
c. To work with a reference group of politically active youths to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria.

10.1 Summary and Overview of Findings

Objective 1: To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of Nigerian youths' involvement in electoral violence.

To fulfil this objective, of the data was sourced using a mixed methods approach of administering questionnaires to Nigerian youths numbering 306 between the ages of 15-35 years of age. This was followed by a series of individual interviews for further clarification. Both sets of data were analysed using the SPSS and content analysis respectively, as reported in Chapter Five.

Findings from these revealed that there were certain major factors that influence Nigerian youths in participating in acts of electoral violence, either directly or indirectly. Among these were:

a. Poverty
b. Level of education
c. Unemployment and underemployment

d. Differences in political affiliations, religion and ethnic differences. (See section 5.3.8 on reflections)

The inclusion of poverty was not seen as important as some of the respondents believed that some of the people engaged in electoral violence are employed and gainfully too! But still, they are often after transitory incomes motivated by greed rather than need. This buttresses the assertions of the Frustration and Aggression theory used in the study that frustrations borne out of need, including poverty, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for aggression which, in this case, involves electoral violence.

Further probing also revealed that the participation of youths in Ekiti State in electoral violence often stems from the restrictions imposed upon them by party elders who impose candidates for elective positions on the party members. In situations where such candidates are unpopular, conflict and violent protests occur. These prompt the political elites to attempt to induce party members and the candidates, through the distribution of money and other material resources, to garner their support and votes (see section 5.4.1).

Another aspect of electoral violence in Nigeria is the sponsoring of youths to disrupt the activities of the electoral management body, INEC. The youths are sponsored by politicians at various stages of the election process when they perceive it will not be in their interest. Other findings revealed that some youths used fraudulent identities to cast multiple votes and, when discovered, it often leads to outbreaks of violence, thus making the polling stations and/or collation centres unsafe places to be during elections.

It was further demonstrated that youths form themselves into groups to seek patronage and sponsorship from political elites in exchange for support during elections as a form of income generation. In addition, substance abuse was also identified as a causal factor of electoral violence in that it is a common sight to see youths in Ekiti State who are already drunk before sunrise. Very early in the morning and during elections, these psychotropic substances are supplied by the political godfathers to get the youths worked up enough to inflict violence without an iota of human feeling (see chapter five).

The involvement of women was also found to be widespread and, at times, they outdo their male counterparts in acts of electoral violence. This involves, especially, verbal violence and, sometimes, physical violence; they are the major recipients of distributed material resources to induce voters during elections. Some women even lead their own squads to perpetrate all manner of violence. However, their predominant form of intimidation is the singing of abusive

songs during rallies and making a mockery of the opponents. Lastly, the value system of the society, which rewards and celebrates the sudden acquisition of wealth without a notable source of income, peer group influence and low levels of education are also among the causal factors of youth involvement in electoral violence. This is detailed in section 5.4.1 of this study.

Objective 2: To assess the effectiveness of current strategies, if any, being used to limit the incidence of electoral violence among Nigerian youths.

The findings from this study revealed that most of the respondents (64%) believed there are certain strategies put in place generally to address or prevent electoral violence in Nigeria. However, 55% of respondents believed that the strategies employed by the authorities are largely ineffective in preventing youth involvement in electoral violence (see section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2).

A closer look at these results, through analysis of individual interviews, revealed that, although the electoral prevention strategies are well documented on paper, they are only noticeable on election days during the voting process proper. However, all the respondents agreed that there is a dearth of strategies targeted at the youths, especially in the study area, to prevent their participation in electoral violence both in Ekiti State and nationally (see section 5.5.2). It was revealed in the same section of the study that, although most of the tactics employed to prevent electoral violence are only seen on election days, yet most of the electoral violence happens in the build-up to the voting day.

Several general strategies which could help to prevent electoral violence among the youths were identified. Among these were the use of permanent voters' cards and the use of biometric data machines to prevent multiple voting. But these machines often fail, which can lead to widespread violence. The most important shortcoming was that these machines are yet to be accepted as evidence in Nigerian law courts for election related disputes (see section 5.5.2). Other strategies identified were the advent of election petition tribunals created to speedily try disputes arising from electoral processes. However, it was revealed that the sheer length of the process, and the dismissal of cases on technicalities, have made the populace resort to self-help most of the time, rather than wait for an uncertain outcome from the courts. Lastly, the use of mass media campaigns was also identified. Even so, these have been bedevilled by a lack of consistency, and they are mostly used only when elections draw near; in any case, many people lack access to electricity supply to even listen most of the time (see section 5.5.6).

In summary, findings of the study as reported in Chapter Five revealed that most respondents agree that, while there are certain general strategies put in place to address issues concerning election violence, there is a dearth of such policies specifically targeted at the youths to prevent them from engaging electoral violence. Indeed, even the few existing general strategies have not been effectively carried out, perhaps deliberately so. Hence, the need for this study to create interventions targeted at the youths in the study area.

Objective 3: To work with a reference group of politically active youths who are to devise, implement and evaluate an intervention to limit the incidence of youth involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria.

In line with this objective, eight youths (see table 7.0) were recruited from the respondents in the data collection session for objectives one and two, based on their willingness to participate further in the study's projects. They formed the reference or action group, who were trained in the Basic AVP and Kraybill Conflict Styles; this was reported in Chapter Six. The training materials were designed in line with the results obtained from the pre-training questionnaires and individual interviews. Chapter Seven then reported on the training of the action team who were engaged in the design of their own interventions, in line with the initial data collected for objectives one and two, and with supervision and guidance from one of the training facilitators and myself. Next, Chapter Eight discussed the implementation of these interventions. This was done in different phases, namely, awareness campaigns to recruit youths to attend, using handbills and posters; videos were also used to catch and hold the attention of the participants, and to provide narratives by which everyone has something with which to identify. Hence, robust discussions were held at the end of each video in which the youths contributed actively and with deep reflections. Finally, the interventions were evaluated in Chapter Ten, and it was shown that seeds of non-violent engagement in the electoral process have been sown in many youths in the study area. This is still ongoing, with the sharing of the training videos on mobile platforms.

10.2 Validity and reliability/trustworthiness

Data for this study was sourced through a mixed methods approach as employed in data collection using questionnaires for the quantitative data and interviews and focus group discussions for the qualitative data. Data triangulation and pretesting of the research instruments were used to ensure the validity and reliability of the instruments used. As discussed earlier, Hesse-Biber (2010: 3) noted that triangulation of data in the mixed methods design enriches the research findings. The convergence of data from the focus group discussion

and questionnaires provided confidence that the needed data was accurately captured (De Vos et al. 2011: 436).

External validity, in quantitative studies, refers to the ability to draw inferences and to generalise from a study sample to the whole population. For this study, external validity was derived from the sampling size which I used.

Lastly, content or internal validity looks at the ability of the research questions to accurately measure the knowledge being sought in relation to the study objectives. This I addressed by certifying that the survey questions adequately covered the study objectives (Biddix 2009). And, as earlier said, the reliability of the survey instruments was also ascertained through pretesting and then adjusted as needed. The intervention data was subjected to member checking as discussed in section 7.3. In this case, the action group was unanimous in its positive responses supporting the proposed action plans. The formal approval of the entire support group was secured, as each team member was given an opportunity to decide on the proposed action interventions for the selected sectors of concern. The complete action plan was put to a formal vote after the discussion to enhance and build group consensus, and the results were unanimously in the positive – albeit with the proviso that I join the group in lobbying the relevant authorities as needed.

10.3 Delimitations and limitations of the study

Delimitations are factors that have an impact on the study over which the researcher has a certain degree of control in deciding on the scope of the study and establishing boundaries for it. The limitations of this study include its inability to really evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions in reducing youth involvement in electoral violence as this would require an actual election period in which the trained youths were closely monitored. Also, it was not possible to select youths who had participated in acts of electoral violence in the past. Hence recruitment was based on whether youths had been actively involved in the electoral and voting processes in the study area.

Also, due to the large number of potential participants in the study population (youths in Ekiti State and across Nigeria), the population involved in the current study focused only on youths located in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State. Hence, the study's findings cannot be generalised to all youths across Nigeria. Thus, as is typical with case studies, restraint should be exercised in extrapolating and generalising from the findings of the study. Nevertheless, given the in-depth

approach to the subject matter of this study, it is believed that many of the results obtained in will resonate in comparable contexts.

10.4 Some key themes

10.4.1 Frustrations among the Nigerian youth

Following from the thesis, it is evident that many Nigerian youths are disillusioned and frustrated in more ways than one and, according to the frustration and aggression theory, this is a major precursor to aggression. That, in turn, leads to violence of which electoral violence is a prime offshoot. As discussed earlier, aggression and violence always stem from frustration, while the consequences of frustration are multi-various with one of them being aggression and violence. Thus, it can be said that frustrations as identified in the study as a central factor that predisposes Nigerian youths, as individuals or groups, to acts of hostility or aggression.

Hence, in accord with the theory, the availability and visibility of targets that are perceived as being major causes of the frustrations they are experiencing, increases their penchant for aggression and violence. The only thing the instigators of electoral violence may need to do is to cloak the opposition with the garments of being liable for the frustrations of the youths. A successful incentive for such ideas is aided by religious, ethnic and political differences.

This is more so in situations where such youths are bankrolled by their instigators of electoral violence, as it takes little to blame the political opponents as being responsible for life's frustrations and as a stumbling block to getting out of them. Thus, the use of proverbs such as, *"Bi ti eni kan o ba baje, ti e lomi olee dara,"* that is, if someone does not suffer misfortune, another cannot prosper. This perfectly sets up a zero-sum political relationship between opposing interests, such that each side sees the other as an obstacle that must either be overcome or bulldozed and, at times, even annihilated. This explains the occurrence of electoral violence as reported in different sections of the study. Because political parties often engage in various underhand tactics to attain political and electoral goals, the weaknesses and strengths of the youths are exploited: their physical strength is needed, while their education is useful to manipulate figures, and their numbers may overwhelm the opposition. The weaknesses include unemployment, lack of adequate educational level, and poverty. Others are imputed through propaganda such as ethnic and religious rivalries.

In working towards the goal of this study, it is noted that, although certain punishments are stipulated for perpetrating electoral violence, such are rarely implemented as those who are supposed to execute them are often the major beneficiaries of such systems. In addition, some aspects of the frustration and aggression theory suggest that, in the absence or non-implementation of severe punishments and repercussions upon the aggressors, they become emboldened to do even more. It has also been observed that aggression and violence can be either hidden or manifest. Furthermore, a careful consideration of the stipulated methods of addressing electoral violence in Nigeria, which rests primarily on the electoral management body are all reactionary approaches coming after the acts of electoral violence. Often, they are not even implemented anyway, as the body is bogged down by voter's registration and distribution of the permanent voters' cards. Thus a requirement of diverse approaches to engage the menace of electoral violence among Nigerian youths, such that proactive measures are implemented rather than reactionary ones. This will enable the measures proposed in this study to address the instigators of electoral violence, rather than deal with the after-effects of such acts.

10.4.2 The action research approach and electoral violence

The action research approach to this study was not done just *for* the youths but *with* the youths. Moreover, the use of action research enabled the study not only to address the issues of engaging in electoral violence, but also to consider the underlying causes of the violence, as well as a transformation of the would-be perpetrators.

This was possible because action research gives ownership of the issues under consideration to the people concerned rather than to outsiders to the issue. In this study, the youths were trained and consequently engaged to design their own interventions aimed at curbing the involvement of their fellow Nigerian youths in electoral violence. This enabled them not only to be hearers and learners, but also teachers of the message. It was an approach that allowed horizontal communication between the youths such that they were able identify with one another, as age-mates living within similar contexts, in collaboration with the research team. The strength of action research is embedded in the joint learning process through relationships it establishes between the stakeholders – in this case, the youths – and the research team. It is an approach that entails the philosophy of "doing with" rather than traditional research which is focused on "doing for". This approach allowed me to give much credit to the local stakeholders as the repository of knowledge and experience of their own situations and experiences in electoral violence. The use of action research enabled me to directly link theory with practice, avoiding

the interruption of the flow between research and its application. Thus, this study was able to have an immediate and seamless impact by integrating the research and its applications in one single continuum with the use of a learning-by-doing approach.

10.4.3 The key role of conflict resolution training

Finally, the reflection on this study will not be complete without a mention of the roles and effects of the Basic Alternative to Violence Project as used in this study. The Basic AVP was predicated upon its four building blocks which are: affirmation, community building, communication and conflict resolution, all of which were learnt experientially. This gave the action team certain requisite skills and knowledge that helped them in their own intervention later. The Basic AVP helped to transform and develop members of the action group from a disparate group of people, which they were initially when brought together, into a unified team. They were equipped with essential skills such as listening, empathy and confidence building or self-affirmation.

Perhaps the most important experience of all is transformation, which is described as that power which exists and can transform violent and destructive conflict into liberating constructive experiences, attitudes and behaviours. It helps to lower a disposition to anger and bad behaviours in participants. It is acknowledged that such power is universally available in all persons, including parties to violent conflict behaviours, and can function in people who are open to it. Furthermore, it is believed that the transforming power cannot be manipulated by humans; rather, it uses humans and not vice versa. It enables us to acknowledge our emotional states such as anger and frustration among others, and to link them to what is good or perceived to be good in us. This in turn, enables us to express such feelings or emotions more peacefully, constructively and positively, devoid of violence. This last statement emphasizes the whole essence and relevance of the AVP to this study via its central thesis, which is the power to transform.

10.5 Challenges and personal learning

I noted at the beginning of this research it was difficult to get the relevant respondent youths together for focus group discussions due to a barrage of reasons; hence I resorted to in-depth interviews. So also, it was not easy to get the buy in of the local arm of the Catholic church's JDPC as AVP was quite strange to their facilitators; hence I needed to first take the facilitator through the rudiments of the basic AVP. Then came the issue of seeking out the youths of the action team. All these took me a long time as a lot of them were suspicious of my intentions

and purposes and my link person to them was often unavoidably absent. This setback continued until I met certain youth association leaders who volunteered to assist in getting to meet other leaders of different youth associations.

Then came the issue of venue, I learnt I had to get a permission from the security agencies for us to congregate and they (the security agency) volunteered a plainclothes detective to monitor our activities and to also provide security cover. This I politely rejected as it may affect the dynamics of discussions among the participants as no one will like to get implicated knowing a police officer is around.

Although the evaluation showed evidence of changes in conflict handling styles of the action team members, I was more interested to observe them organise and execute training for the 240 trainees, all the more as they now had access to the local branch of JDPC for follow up support when needed.

This research has underlined for me the power embedded in action research. It has made me see action research in practice outside the classroom or theories as an effective instrument for peacebuilding. It was a pleasure to see my research in practice and to know that my study did not start and end on paper but that it had direct and meaningful impact in the lives of the youths involved. This was revealed in their comments and in the changes in their conflict styles; they were impressed to learn that they could pursue different agendas while not losing focus of the relationships with others. The basic AVP demystified perceptions about certain situations the participants were faced with and before long a workshop of people from different lives blended together in a warm atmosphere. They realised that having diverse viewpoints does not necessarily mean they are enemies and that in fact it his okay to have dissimilar viewpoints without affecting the health of their relationships.

I have also learnt that there is mutual suspicion created by the election management body in Nigeria, INEC, through unnecessary obstacles in the processes for voter registration and the collection of the permanent voters' cards. Also, the non-availability of functional card readers at the polling centres, together with back-up units in case of failures, create large-scale frustration for potential voters. These shortcomings create tensions and suspicion among the voters towards the sincerity of the electoral body and its officials. I also noticed that INEC,

which has the constitutional responsibility to prosecute electoral offenders, hardly pursues offenders. Yet, this should serve as a deterrent to those who may aspire to get involved in such activities.

Another point which emerged from the study is the need for a deliberate targeting of the youths with a broad-scale youth education or orientation programme with necessary value systems in the form of civic education. This should be re-introduced into the primary schools and carried through to the tertiary education levels. Civic education may help overcome the focus on accessing public office, which are seen as avenues to acquire the access or license to public funds, to enrich oneself and associates.

However, given the cost effectiveness, attention catching abilities and general success of the interventions created and implemented in the study, I have approached the partnering organization JDPI to assist in expanding such sensitisation projects in the study area. This will be done with willing members of the action team and other youths trained during this study. In addition, there is an ongoing process to target more youths with the short videos on non-violent participation shared on mobile platforms before the 2019 general elections in Nigeria.

10.6 A final word

This research has contributed to the participant youths' knowledge on electoral violence and the development of skills, especially the ability to say 'no' to electoral violence. Regarding the research, I have a better understanding of the research problem, and have acquired new skills in communicating with youths, better understanding of action research, and am a witness to what the AVP can achieve in individuals.

After completing my research, I came across the study by Anderson and Olson (2003), who identified three ways by which training exercises can be made most effective. Happily, my research followed these three, at least to some extent. Their first recommendation is to focus on content that is locally grounded and practical. This was done via short videos that reflected the context of the trainees, in the languages they understood and also the basic AVP workshops which emphasised learning by doing. The second way is to select participants who have a way to use the training to address the issue at the socio/political levels: this the study did by targeting youths who are leaders of different youth associations. Their third strategy is to do a follow up to assist the trainees. While I cannot do this as part of my project, the connection with the local Catholic church's JDPC throughout the interventions means that follow-up and support is

possible. As Anderson et al (2003) noted, access to direct support on ground is essential to ensure that the training received has broader meaningful impacts.

Endnote

Anderson, M. and Olson, L. 2003. *Confronting war. Critical lessons for peace practitioners*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Available: https://www.cdacollaborative.org/publication/confronting-war-critical-lessons-for-peace-practitioners/

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Pre-Intervention Questionnaire

Addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria: an action research approach.

Pre-intervention questionnaire

Presented by

Olaoluwa Babatunde A. OYINLOYE

Supervised by: Prof. Geoffrey Thomas Harris

May 2016

Addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria: an action research approach: These questions refer to the perceptions and opinions of the youth concerning the causes of electoral violence

Respondent's occupation	
Place of questionnaire administration	
Respondent's educational level	

(Please tick as appropriate)

1. Your gender

1. Male	2. Female

2. Your age range in years

15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 35	35 and above

3. Have you experienced electoral violent acts involving the youths before?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

4. Are the youths involved in acts of electoral violence in Ado-Ekiti?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

5. Does the educational level of the youths' influence their involvement in acts of electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

6. Are women involved in political violence acts?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

7. Does having a gainful employment decrease the incidence of youth involvement in electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

8. Do you think that poverty is a major causal factor in the involvement in acts of electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

9. Do you think differences in political affiliation has a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

10. Do you think differences in ethnicity or race has a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

11. Do differences in religious beliefs have a bearing on youth involvement in electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

12. Are there strategies put in place to address the issue of youths' involvement in electoral violence? **Yes/No**

13. If yes have they been effective in addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence?

1. Definitely not	2. Probably not	3. Probably yes	4. Definitely yes	5. Don't know

14. Would you be interested in been part of a Focus Group Discussion to discuss about the causes, consequences and strategies to address the issues of youths' involvement in electoral violence? If so, please write your cell number/name below
……

Appendix II

Pre-Intervention In-depth Interview guide

Addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria: an action research approach.

Date: _____
Time: _____
Venue: _____

Participants: male number _____ female number _____
I introduce myself and the purpose of the interview. I welcome participants and thank them for attending. I outline the ethical considerations and ask for permission to tape record the session. I will state that the tapes will only be listened to by the researcher (myself) and that the tapes will be stored in a secure place.

1. Can you briefly narrate the ways in which you have experienced acts of electoral violence perpetrated by youths before?

Probe: was it personal, as a perpetrator, victim, witness or reported?

2. What do you feel motivates these youths to carry out acts of electoral violence?

Probe: poverty, religion, ethnicity, sponsorship, peer influence, unemployment, culture?

3. Can you identify the current strategies that have been employed to address these acts among youths?

4. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches?

5. How do you think these strategies can be improved upon or can you suggest better ways of addressing this incidence of youth involvement in electoral violence?

Thank you

Appendix III: In-depth interview evaluation/observation form

Title: Perception of youths on electoral violence in Ado Ekiti, Nigeria

The characteristics given below are to be used as a guide for the observer.

Subject_____ Date_____

Duration_____ Number of Participants_____

Name of Observer_____

Discussion characteristic	Comments
1. Organization of session Welcome, space, clear instructions and use of resources. Ground rules, rapport….	
2. Presentation Clear introduction, purpose of study, clarity of aims and objectives. Clarity of presentation and organization. Appropriate pace and timing. Responsiveness to the needs of participants. Attitude to participants (distractive mannerisms, style). Content: Questions? Probes? How far? How deep? Suggestive? Appropriateness?	
3. Facilitation approach. Choice of words, dressing and its influence on discussants. Methods used to check/evaluate understanding. Effective use of question and answer. Encouragement of participants' interaction. Management of the session, including opening and closure.	
4. Participants' responses Level of participation. Level of attention and interest. General group atmosphere.	
5. Other observations: were the objectives of the study comprehensively covered?	

Appendix IV

Modified Basic AVP Workshop Manual

Modified Basic AVP Workshop Manual on

Reduction of Youth Involvement in Electoral Violence in Ekiti-State, Nigeria

26-27 August 2017

Introduction

This workshop manual is adapted from the manual of AVP basic workshop and modified to suit the purposes of the study's third objective which is stated as: To design, implement and evaluate an action aimed at reducing the involvement of Nigerian youths in Ekiti State in acts of electoral violence.

Thus, the purpose of this workshop is to train youths in Ekiti State in the ways conflict can be managed non-violently while deploying them as agents of nonviolence in the local communities thereafter to try and use these skills towards nonviolent engagement in elections among the fellow youths, and generally lower the levels of violence in the process.

The adaptation stems from the combination of elements of the Kraybill Conflict Style approach with the pure Basic AVP workshop processes.

Due to the experiential orientation of the AVP workshops exercises are strongly deigned to give participants the experience before the concepts. And after the exercise they can now figure out the purpose of such exercises themselves. Hence the purposes of the exercises are usually not mentioned. But they are built around the foundations of the AVP itself which are AFFIRMATION AND SELF ESTEEM, COMMUNICATION, COMMUNITY AND COOPERATION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND TRANSFORMING POWER WHICH BINDS ALL TOGETHER. Note all exercises are outlined at the end of the adapted manual

The schedule of this workshop is divided into six sessions of three hours each which is then spread across two days of implementation.

Session One: This session in the introductory session and has the principal focus on AFFIRMATION and CONFIDENCE BUILDING in the individual participants as well as a collective. It will consist of the following agenda:

- Opening Talk
- Agenda Preview with the names of the team
- Introducing the team members
- General introduction of everyone in a cyclic fashion with each person stating one thing they hope to take away from participating in this workshop.
- This is followed by the Trash bag exercise where we put down all we do not want to occur on a piece of paper and dump them in a trash bag. This is done to remove hindrances to community building.
- Mini convocation using the adjective name exercise in which each person picks a positive adjective using the first letter of their names.
- Affirmation exercise in twos to boost self-esteem and confidence of the participants as individuals as well as collectively.
- A light and lively exercise is then introduced (as needed) to keep the team active and the exercise chosen will depend on the mood of the team.
- Distribution of the Kraybill Conflict Instrument exercise to be completed by participants and submitted.

- Brainstorming exercise and discussion on the concept of violence. One of the three violence brainstorming exercises will be used.
- Listening exercise see exercise
- Evaluation and closing

Session Two: More on communication

1. Agenda preview and Gathering
2. The concentric circle exercises
3. Sharing in the group a conflict I solved non-violently, see
4. Live and lively session
5. The Broken squares exercise for cooperative construction
6. Evaluation and closing

Session Three

1. Agenda Preview and Gathering
2. Transforming Power talks
3. Principles and Queries on Transforming Power
4. Light and lively exercise as needed
5. Empathy Exercises
6. Evaluation and Closing

Session Four

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Role Plays: - Six-point problem solving exercise
3. Lowering levels of violence exercise
4. Light and lively exercise as needed
5. Trust lift

Session Five

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Strategy
3. Evaluation and closing

Session six

1. Agenda preview/Gathering
2. Reflection of who I am exercise
3. Treatment of unanswered questions
4. Write own queries
5. Affirmation posters or shields
6. Evaluation of entire workshop

Note all exercises are listed in detail as follows

BAG EXERCISE

Purpose: To help remove the blocks to community in the beginning of the workshop.

Time: 15 minutes

Materials: Newsprint, markers, transparent trash bag.

Sequence:

1. Participants are asked to brainstorm things that might block the sense of community in the group. This would include items such as fear, put downs, ego, jealousy, etc. All the items are written down on newsprint.

2. Then the sheet is placed in a transparent trash bag to symbolize that this is the trash which needs to be avoided in the workshop. The bag is then taped to the wall for the remainder of the workshop.

3. If problems arise during the workshop, the participants are then referred to the Trash Bag to see if this problem is listed. This can lead to a discussion of how to keep the problem in the trash bag rather than in the workshop.

AFFIRMATION EXERCISE

Purpose: To "affirm" is to recognize and to give strength to. When we recognize the goodness of the human spirit in all of us, we strengthen our confidence in that spirit. In this exercise, we bring out and recognize and affirm the positive qualities in ourselves with the support of others in the group.

Time: Time: 20 to 30 minutes, depending on whether you want each pair to introduce each other to another pair, or to the whole group.

Sequence:

1. I will divide you into pairs. One person in the pair will talk for three (3) minutes to the other on the topic "What I like about myself." while the other person listens. At the end of the three minutes, I will call "time," and the listener will become the speaker. After both of you have spoken, you will be introducing your partner to another pair (or to the whole group; the team should make that decision ahead of time).

   The only rule is that you may not say anything negative or bad about yourself, including any negative limitations on the good things about yourself. You cannot, for example, say that you are a good cook but you can't make gravy.

   The listener should listen intently, without talking, for the whole three minutes. If speakers say anything negative, you can stop them to remind them to keep positive. If the speaker runs out of ideas before the three minutes are up, both parties should remain silent, unless the speaker gets some additional ideas. NO CHATTING.

2. Ask if everybody understands, and entertain questions.

3. Divide the pairs, have them shake hands and give their adjective names, and then remind them to choose who will go first.

4. Announce time to start. Call time after 3 minutes, have them exchange roles, and begin again. Call time after the second 3 minutes.

5. Ask each pair to join another pair and introduce their partners to the new pair. OR, each person introduces partner to whole group, using the information they've learned.

Processing:

- Would anyone like to share some thoughts or feelings about this experience?
- Why is feeling positive about ourselves important when we deal with others?
- How do we build ourselves up?
- How do we keep from having our sense of self and feeling good depend on other people or other things (money, drugs)

NOTE:
This exercise is usually used earlier than the Listening Exercise, which requires the participants to practice specific listening skills

Appreciation Exercise

Purpose: To increase awareness of what there is in life, in people, in our surroundings, that is worth valuing.

Time: About 20 minutes

Sequence: Put people in groups of three. Tell them they have ten minutes to walk around together and find things to appreciate. At the end, often minutes, ask them to share some of these things.

Variation: Ask the groups to recall triumphs of the human spirit that they have heard about or that people they know have experienced. Share them.

WHAT IS VIOLENCE? (I)

Purpose: To get participants to think consciously about what, to them, is the essential nature of violence. To share these perceptions and from them, to gather a ballpark consensus on the nature of the problem we will be dealing with in the workshop.

Time: Twenty to 30 minutes.

Materials: Pencil and paper for everyone.

Sequence:

1. Before beginning exercise, facilitator should be ready with his or her own definition of the worst, essence of violence, to use as an example see 4, below.
2. Pass out pencils and paper.
6. Facilitator opens with a talk that goes something like this:

"This is a workshop to explore alternatives to violence-to find ways to live, and to solve problems, nonviolently in a society that is very violent. And the first step in solving a problem is to be clear what the problem is. So, we need to have a ballpark idea of what this group means by 'violence.'

"But everybody knows what violence is. right? Violence is assault, rape, murder-physical aggression that hurts or kills. And that's all there is to it.

"Or is it?

"Violence doesn't have to be physical. It can be verbal, as when a parent habitually puts down a child, or a wife habitually nags a husband, or a boss yell at an employee. {Sometimes this kind of verbal violence provokes physical violence, then or later.) Violence can also be institutional-there are many examples of this in schools, prisons, the military, hospitals—anywhere where an institution has impersonal power over people. Violence can be part of the structure of the society. If a landlord rents property that is unheated in winter, so that old people or babies freeze to death, and the law allows this to happen, that is violence. Violence can be open or hidden; it can be an immediate or a delayed response. Even the very same behavior, used with different intentions, can be violent or peaceful. Silence, for instance, can be used in meditation to worship God; or it can be used in a family to punish and to exile and to deprive family members of love and belonging.

"But people differ in their sensitivity to violence, so that one man's meat may be another man's poison. The behavior that I find most outrageous, might seem to you to be a normal part of life, and vice versa. Even so, the violence that does not outrage me, might nevertheless be hurting me without my knowing it; and the same is true of you.

"So, the purpose of this exercise is to find out from you, the participants in this workshop, what you experience as the worst essence of violence."

7. Give instructions: "You have all received a piece of paper and a pencil. I will give you three minutes to think about it, and at the end of that time, I want you to write down, in one sentence, a definition of the kind of violence that you personally find the worst, the most hurtful, the hardest to cope with. To give you an example, my own definition is: (*Here facilitator gives his or her own example. One such is: "Violence is the treatment of me by other people that makes me know that nothing I am, or say, or do, is important to them and that there is nothing I can do about it."}*
8. Begin the period of thinking and writing. At the end of it, divide the group quickly into small groups of four. Have people share in groups what their perception of the worst kind of violence is, and why they feel that way. (Respect the right to pass.) Then bring the group back together and let all who are willing, share their perceptions in the larger group. Write the perceptions on newsprint, brainstorm fashion, and see if a consensus emerges as to the types of violence this group would like to deal with in its workshop. Even if no consensus emerges, leave the newsprint up to refer to later during the workshop; it might prove useful in connection with later discussions.

WHAT IS VIOLENCE? (11)

BRAINSTORM AND WEB CHART

Purpose: To get participants to think consciously about what violence is. To share our perception that violence is not merely physical and that it includes the violence of society. To gather a working consensus on the nature of violence and of nonviolence.

Time: Twenty to 30 minutes

Materials: Blackboard and chalk, or newsprint and magic markers.

Sequence:

1. Write on board two large headings: Violence, Nonviolence. Explain the nature of brainstorming: that we throw out words and phrases without censorship or criticism of ourselves or others. If we disagree with someone else's idea, we are free to throw in our own idea but not to argue.

2. Brainstorm what violence and nonviolence are all about. The team is free to add its own ideas to the list, and has the obligation to see that such things as hunger and injustice go into the violence list, and that working for justice gets into the nonviolence list.

3. The team sums up the lists, with attention to what we in AVP believe: if "passivity" has appeared on the nonviolence list, now is the time to say that part of the purpose of the workshop is to change people's perceptions of nonviolence in that respect.

4. On another sheet, write heading *Roots of Violence*. Ask people to throw out words that are causes of violence (greed, racism, etc.) Write these words in a scatter form all over the sheet. When this seems to have run its course, make connections between these causes by drawing lines (e.g., a line from fear to racism). Very shortly you will have a tangled web all over the sheet.

5. Sum this up. Explain that we will be going more deeply into these roots. Ask for comments. If all goes well, a good discussion should ensue.

Variation: Drawing a tree with roots and fruits of violence and nonviolence can illustrate this brainstorm quite well.

LISTENING EXERCISE

Purpose: We do this listening exercise to practice specific skills that are used in effective listening. Effective listening is extremely important in resolving conflicts (or. avoiding a conflict that might come about from a misunderstanding).

Time: Thirty to 40 minutes (about 20 for the listening itself and 10 to 20 to debrief). Each sequence is 3, 2, 1. Three minutes for the speaker, two minutes for the listener to feed back to the speaker what s{he) heard, and one minute for the speaker to correct or clarify anything for the listener.

Materials: 1. A watch with a second hand, for timing.
2. A list of the "do's and don'ts" of effective listening, posted on large paper

Do 's: Maintain Eye Contact, Look Interested - Be Interested, Be Aware of What *Is* Said, Be Aware of What *Ls Not* Said, Questions to Clarify

Don'ts: Interrupt, Give Advice, tell a Better or "One-up" Story, Judge, Express Opinions

Sequence:
1. Arrange participants into pairs. Explain the purpose of the exercise (if you did the Affirmation Exercise earlier. emphasize that in this one you are taking an additional step in practicing specific skills}. Review the list of do's and don'ts.
2. Instruct the participants: "When I say "begin", the ones (if you counted off by one and two to get the pairs} will speak to the twos for 3 minutes on a topic that I give. The twos will listen attentively. If your partner runs out of ideas before the time is up, the listener should ask helpful questions to draw him/her out. At the end of the 3 minutes I will call time."
3. Assign topic. (See topics with Concentric Circles (page E-20). One suggestion is "A goal I am working on and some things I am doing to achieve it ...")
4. Give a 15-second warning ("Bring your thoughts to a close. ") and then call "time" at the end of 3 minutes. Then instruct the twos {the listeners in each group to repeat back to the speaker everything he or she can remember of what was said.
5. After 2 minutes, call "time." Then ask the speaker to remind the listener of anything s/he forgot to mention, or to clarify anything s/he misunderstood. (This needs only 1 minute).
6. After about 1 minute, call "time." THEN, REVERSE THE PROCESS, THIS TIME THE SPEAKER BECOMING THE LISTENER AND VICE VERSA.

Processing:
- What did you notice about yourself during the experience of being the speaker?
- What kinds of things might have helped you feel comfortable? express yourself more clearly or confidently?
  What did you notice about yourself during the experience of being the listener?
- How does any one of the "do's and don'ts" of effective listening affect communication between two people?
- Are there any other guidelines or suggestions you can give to help people listen effectively?
- How might effective listening help in a conflict situation among people who live or work together?

Note: *This exercise can be used as more than a practicing of listening skills. You may wish to focus on a topic (power, anger, values} that the participants need to really clarify, and after the paired listening exercise, have the participants share with the large group their partner's ideas on the subject. as well as their own, giving time to the partner to clarify or even disagree. You may wish to select a conflict, and have a volunteer pair follow the listening skills exercise format in expressing their own views on the conflict (in this case, don't set a time limit).*

CONCENTRIC CIRCLES

Purpose: To start to break down barriers by getting people talking to each other.

Time: Including moving time, approximately 5 minutes per question.

Sequence:

1. Count off by twos.
2 Have the one's turn their chairs to form a circle facing outward. The two's form an outer circle—each two directly opposite a one. An alternate where space is limited is to form two parallel lines.
3 When you meet your partner, shake hands and give your adjective name.
3. You and your partner will take turns talking about a topic I will give you. When you are listening, you are ONLY listening, so please do not make comments or enter into discussion, and respect your partner's pauses to think.
4. After I give you the topic, you will have a few moments of silence to think about it, and then I will say "begin," and you will have two minutes to talk.
5. State which circle or row will be the speaker, and give the question.
6. Wait 5-15 seconds, and say "begin."
7. Call "time" at the end of two minutes.
8. Have the partners change roles, the speaker becoming the listener. Repeat the topic.
9. When both partners have had a turn as speaker and listener, have them shake hands, and have one group move to the RIGHT.
10. Repeat the process again until you have completed your topics.

NOTE ON MOVING PEOPLE:
Have both lines or circles move to the right. Since as they are facing one another, that will mean they move in opposite directions and get new partners. If you develop a system that the person who speaks last is the one to move, and then speaks first the next time, you will be truly alternating roles.

Processing:

- Did you find it difficult to talk/listen for two minutes without changing roles?
- What did you notice about your reaction when you found yourself or your partner silent?

Concentric Circles Topics

Someone I admire and why.
Something good that happened to me on the way to growing up.
A quality I admire in a leader and why.
A quality I look for in a friend and why.
A time I did something I am proud of.
A time I overcame fear.
A positive influence that is helping me now.
A part of me or my life I want to work on this next year.
Some things I do to show I respect myself.
Some ways other people can help me grow toward my goals.

SHARING: "'A CONFLICT I RESOLVED NONVIOLENTLY"'

Purpose: To get participants to share experiences they have resolved nonviolently; to make the group aware that this is something that we already do.

Time: Thirty to 40 minutes

Materials: Pencil and Paper for each group.

Sequence:

1. Divide the group into smaller groups of 4 or 5 people each.

2. Have each group select a scribe to take notes on the discussion.

3. Give instructions: "I am going to ask each person to share with the small group an experience that (s)he has had of resolving a conflict nonviolently. I, will give everyone a minute to prepare, and then each person in the group, will have three minutes to tell his or her story. The scribe should take notes on each story. Then after all members of the small group have had their say, one story should be selected by the group for sharing with the larger group after the larger circle has reformed. (The person who tells the story to the larger group may be the scribe, the person who told the story, or a third person selected by the group; it does not matter.)

4. When all groups are ready, have people rejoin the larger group. Have each group's selected story told. Then elicit feedback. Suggested questions: "How did you feel about the stories?" "Doesn't it feel good when you are able to take control of the situation?"

Note: No story should be lost just because it was not selected by the groups for sharing in the larger circle. If time allows after the large group has given feedback, ask if there are any stories not selected whose owners would like to share them now. If time does not allow, ask participants whether we may collect and keep the stories as written by the scribes. Let them know that we care.

This can be an excellent lead in to the Transforming Power talk. As the stories are shared, a facilitator can listen for TP guidelines and, when they seem clear in a story, write the guidelines on newsprint. e.g., "It really made a difference when you listened respectfully to your friend" or "It sounds like the atmosphere changed when you found out you had something in common with your neighbor."

(This should not be forced. Not every story will fit into the guidelines.)
Later, during the discussion of TP guidelines, the facilitator can refer back to those examples listed on the newsprint. " So, in Joe's story, without his knowing it, Transforming Power was operating through him when he was willing to apologize for his mistake, rather than argue about it with his girlfriend. "

BROKEN SQUARES

Purpose: This exercise reveals aspects of cooperation in solving a group problem. It should sensitize the participants to some of their own behavior (productive and obstructive) in solving group problems.

Time: About 40 minutes (15 to 20 minutes for the task, and about 20 minutes for discussion. It is important for the groups to finish if they can.

Materials:

1. Sets of instructions (page 2 of this exercise). You will need one set of instructions for each working group and one set of instructions for each observer judge.
2. Sets of broken squares—one set for each group of participants. (See page 3 of this exercise for instructions on making and packaging sets of broken squares.)
3. Tables—sufficient to give each group enough space to work. Groups must be spaced far enough apart so they cannot observe each other's work. If tables are not available, use the floor.

Sequence:

1. Divide the participants into groups of six (five participants and an observer/judge). Extra people can serve as second observers in some of the groups. Note: People who have done this exercise before are not allowed to be participants. Assign each group to a working space and give each group a set of broken squares.
2. After forming the working groups, assign observers. Give observers their **instructions.**
3. Give members of the working groups closed envelopes containing their pieces of the puzzle. They are not to open these envelopes until the signal is given to begin the game.
4. Now distribute group instructions. Read them aloud and ask if there are any **questions.**
5. Draw on board large square, tiny square, parallelogram, rectangle, and several equal squares. Cross out all but the equal squares.
6. Give the signal to begin. Team members should watch the groups during the game **and assist the observers in enforcing *the* rules.**
7. Now let things take their course. Some groups will finish earlier than others, and are likely to be exuberant about it; they should be instructed to remain quietly until all other groups are finished. Occasionally a group will not be able to finish. In this case, as a last resort and to give closure, facilitator may help them; but avoid interfering in this process unless forced to by time constraints.
8. When all groups have finished the task, begin the general discussion with the **observers reports. Then throw the discussion open and solicit responses and** observations from all, especially about their feelings during the exercise, rather than technical insights into the game. Try to get the group to compare the game **experience with similar life experiences.**

Some points to bring out during the discussion:

a) *Communication:* Point out the need of humans to communicate in order to cooperate, and the feelings of isolation and frustration, and less than peak performance, that result when communication is barred. Note the power that **comes from communication.**

b) *Observation of the needs of others:* Point out how this empowers the whole group.

c) *It does not "help" others* to give them too much help.

d) *Did the group follow the rules?* (Almost no one manages to refrain from breaking them.) What does this say to us about rules that seem unreasonable **and unenforceable?**

e) The group was given a group task. Almost everyone feels an initial closure when an individual square is completed. Yet that completed square may prevent other people from completing theirs. *How does that relate to our tasks given to us in life?*

TRANSFORMING POWER BRIDGE EXERCISE

Purpose: To get participants to think consciously about one aspect of the Transforming Power Mandala. Then associate a word that reflects one's feelings or understanding of TP pertaining to one or more of the individual cells. This will indicate how participants have internalized the concept of TP.

Materials: One "cut out" TP Mandala; enough felt markers and 8 ½" x 11" sheets of paper for each participant.

Time: About 20 to 30 minutes

Sequence:

1. Put TP Mandala in the middle of the group circle, spreading cells apart about 12 inches.
2. Distribute material to participants.
3. Explain the purpose of the exercise.
4. Ask people to spend 5 to 10 minutes to reflect and choose one word pertaining to their understanding of TP. (It may help to use meditative music at this time.)
5. After reflection period, give the group 5 minutes at most, to write their word on the paper in large letters. Explain that it is acceptable to use drawings to enhance the word's meaning. (Some groups like to be artistic.)
6. Then go around the circle asking each person to place their word among the Mandala cells—close to one word that relates or bridges to the TP core.
7. Then ask the person to share (limit their sharing to one or two minutes each) why they chose this word, and how it relates or bridges to the TP Mandala.

This particular symbol is one way some people have found useful to gain a greater understanding of Transforming Power. Facilitators may want to have groups, working from the "Guidelines to T.P." develop their own creative symbol, (see page E-54) expressing the most important aspects of T.P. to them.

DIRECTIONS FOR MAKING A TP MANDALA

1. Use sheets of BRIGHT poster board of several different colors.

2. Make a circle about 6 - 8 inches across and print "Transforming Power" on it.

3. Make 12 arcs out of various colors. Print one or two key words on each piece.

   Inner circle applies more to self:
   - —respect self
   - —be patient
   - —stay calm
   - —be courageous
   - —think before reacting

   Outer circle applies more to interactions with others:
   - —affirm others
   - — ask questions
   - — use surprise
   - — try humor
   - — seek reconciliation
   - — accept others as they are
   - — take a risk

4. Below are small-scale samples of different TP Mandalas which you can create.

Note: Making a sample pattern out of paper that is easier to cut than poster board may prove helpful. It's not necessary to use the mandala shape. Bright moveable poster board pieces in shapes of your choice will do. Cover pieces with clear contact paper.

EMPATHY EXERCISE

Purpose: To enlarge understanding of the problems of others and to give help in solving them. To experience what one's own problem looks like seen through the eyes of others. To experience the wisdom of the group aiding with each person's problem. To become aware of common threads in all of our experiences.

Materials: Small cards or paper and writing instrument for each participant. **Time**:

One hour

Sequence:

1. Divide the group into small groups of no more than 5 persons each. Provide each person with cards (paper) and a writing instrument.
2. Instruct the group that each person is to write on a card, "A problem I'm working on is..." and finish the sentence. The cards are not to be signed. Once written, they are collected and shuffled, and redistributed at random within the small group. (If in the redistribution, a person receives back his/her own card, this is to be exchanged with someone else so that each participant has a problem to deal with other than his/her own.)
3. Each person then reads to the group the card that he or she received, reading it as if it were his or her own problem. Then each person explains it to the group, perhaps including ways of solving the problem. Others then give their own experience with solving that sort of problem, and their own suggestions.
4. Repeat this process until every problem raised in the small group has been dealt with by the group. Return to large circle for processing.

Processing:

- What was it like to "put yourself in someone else's shoes?"
- What was it like to hear someone else describe having your problem?

Note: Give plenty of time to this exercise. For many, it becomes the heart of the workshop. It can be a turning point for a person who has been isolated and not understood.

SIX POINT PROBLEM SOLVING

Purpose: To develop problem solving/conflict resolution skills in relationships in cases where the resolution is not obvious nor easy.

Time: 45 minutes

Materials: Flip chart or handouts (see following pages—Father Coming Home and Family Vacation).

Sequence:

1. Divide participants into groups of 5 or 6. Post flip chart or pass out handouts. (See following pages) Explain that each group is a family, and ask participants to divide the assigned roles among their group.

2. Working from the roles chosen and using the steps of Six Point Problem Solving, the group will decide on a solution to the problem which all family members are willing to accept.

3. As each group goes through the steps, they are to write their solutions on newsprint. A volunteer from each group will present how the group arrived at the solution.

Processing:

- How did that go?
- Was it difficult to arrive at a solution?
- If so, what was difficult about this? What was easy?
- How did the steps of Six Point Problem Solving help?
- Did all family members feel heard and taken into account?
- If so, how did that happen? If not, what prevented it from happening?

6 Point Problem Solving - Father Coming Home

We are all problem solvers - we do it every day and each of us has a way to approach it in a way that frequently works. This is *another* approach to solve problems where:

- there is no **easy solution** and
- where we want to **preserve our relationships** with the others involved.

The Situation

Father has just been released from prison and does not want to live in his old neighborhood. He wants to get away from the bad influences there, so he wants to relocate his family. He has some savings but finances are limited. His wife has located an apartment available for rent on the other side of town.

Positions:

- **Father:** Wants to relocate—wants to find another place to live.
- **Mother:** If family relocated she might have to give up her present job.
- **Teenage Son:** Wants to stay in your present dwelling near where his friends are.
- **Teenage Girl:** Is very involved with sports and does not want to give up her place on the swim team.
- **Younger child:** Is very musical and is a very important member of the dramatic club in school.
- **Grandma:** *(when 6 on team)* Is very active in Senior Citizens Club and a Deaconess in her Church.

Your Task :

Using 6 Point Problem Solving, put steps 2 thru 5 on Newsprint and select someone to present how you arrived at your solution..

1. ***Identify and Define the Problem:*** **to identify the needs of each individual.**

2. ***Restate the Problem:*** **in a way which states the *common need* of all.**

3. ***Brainstorm Alternative Solutions:*** **Generate a variety of solutions. Do not evaluate, judge or belittle any solutions offered.**

4. ***Evaluate These Solutions:*** **Which looks best? Ask each person how s/he feels about each solution.**

5. ***Decide on the Best Solution Acceptable to All:*** **Keep testing until everyone feels satisfied. Does it meet the needs stated in step 2?**

6. ***Evaluate:*** **Periodically check with everyone to see how your agreement is working.**

6 Point Problem Solving - Family Vacation

We are all problem solvers - we do it every day and each of us has a way to approach it in a way that frequently works. This is *another* approach to solve problems where:

- there is no **easy solution** and
- where we want to **preserve our relationships** with the others involved.

The Situation

Your family wants to take a vacation. Finances are very limited and each family member seems to have a different goal in mind. Think of this as an opportunity for all to build new relationships within the family.

Positions:

- **Father:** Prefers a hotel or motel with service. After a year of working he wants luxury - he doesn't care for camping.
- **Mother:** Wants a change of routine from cooking / housework. She enjoys the out-of-doors.
- **Teenage Son:** Is excited by the outdoors and the possibility of camping, hiking and fishing.
- **Teenage Girl:** Wants some social activity - would like to bring a friend along.
- **Younger child:** Just wants a "family vacation."
- **Grandma:** *(when 6 on team)* Enjoys visiting with the grandchildren but doesn't want to be stuck baby-sitting them while the adults go off by themselves. Would like some nice scenery and perhaps going to a summer stock theater production.

Your Task :

Using 6 Point Problem Solving, put steps 2 thru 5 on Newsprint and select someone to present how you arrived at your solution..

1. ***Identify and Define the Problem:*** **to identify the needs of each individual.**

2. ***Restate the Problem:*** **in a way which states the *common need* of all.**

3. ***Brainstorm Alternative Solutions:*** **Generate a variety of solutions. Do not evaluate, judge or belittle any solutions offered.**

4. ***Evaluate These Solutions:*** **Which looks best? Ask each person how s/he feels about each solution.**

5. ***Decide on the Best Solution Acceptable to All:*** **Keep testing until everyone feels satisfied. Does it meet the needs stated in step 2?**

6. ***Evaluate:*** **Periodically check with everyone to see how your agreement is working.**

LOWERING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE

Purpose: By reflecting on places where violence is at a minimum, we can increase awareness of how to reduce violence.

Time: 45 minutes

Sequence:

1. Have all participants think of the safest home they know. Go around the circle collecting responses. Each participant should name and then briefly explain the safest home they know.
2. Have all participants think of the safest neighbourhood they know. Repeat as above.
3. Have all participants think of the safest workplace they know. Repeat.
4. Have all participants think of the safest country they know. Repeat.
5. On the board, brainstorm feedback from all participants of what qualities made the homes, neighbourhoods, workplaces and countries they listed safe

Processing:

- What would it take to make safety more widespread? Normal?
- Who or what could bring change from the way things are to the way these safe locations are?
- What is blocking this process from taking place?
- What would it take to overcome these blockages and bring some changes?
- When can these changes begin?

Note: The opposite of your list on the board is a good idea of the conditions that promote violence.

STRATEGY EXERCISE

Purpose: To develop skills of strategizing and planning nonviolent campaigns: to learn ways people can, work smoothly together to achieve goals nonviolently.

Materials: Newsprint and magic markers (sufficient for use by several small groups)

Time: 1 to 1½ hours

Sequence:

1. Explain that we are going to practice planning and strategizing to achieve together, nonviolently, a goal that the group really wants to achieve. Brainstorm possible goals or problems to work on, recording ideas on newsprint.

2. Pick the one of greatest general interest (allow voting with the proviso that a person can vote more than once: but pick the topic that gets the most votes). Record the topic picked on newsprint and post it on the wall.

Variation:

Instead of all groups working on the same goal or problem, let each group pick from the first brainstorm the goal or problem it wishes to work on. It is important that each group work on something that really interests them: otherwise this exercise will not hold their interest for long enough to make it meaningful.

3. Divide into small groups of 5 or 6 people each. Give each group some newsprint and a magic marker.

4. Each group is to decide on the steps and tactics the group considers necessary for success. Brainstorm for some wild, attention-getting ideas to be included. Pick one or two the group thinks might work.

5. Next, each group is to decide upon the order of the steps to be taken and estimate how long each will take.

6. Make a time line showing the length of time for completion of each step. Mark the steps along the line. Record this on newsprint. as in the following timeline for a campaign to repeal a law:

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4
Start	Publicity	Organizing	Lobbying	Repeal
Now	3 mos.	6 mos.	1 year	21 mo.

7. Each group analyzes the process that it used to develop its strategy, covering the following points:
   a) Did you appoint a moderator or recorder?
   b) Did everyone speak?
   c) Was time allowed to consider each person's remarks?
   d) Did you affirm each other and avoid put-downs?
   e) Did anyone speak too often or too long?
   f) Did group members keep to the task?
   g) Did they interrupt each other?

Team members announce time for ending the discussion ten minutes in advance.

8. Each group appoints a member to describe how the group handled each of the six points listed above, and shows their newsprint to the whole group. Each group reports. Be sure they don't forget to report on Point 7 or to describe their wild attention-getters!

Note: Encourage people to make serious use of this exercise, make it as real for themselves as possible. Think of it as a start towards something they might really do. The extension of AVP into the community first happened in Owego, NY as an outgrowth of a strategy game.

REFLECTION EXERCISE

Purpose: This exercise gives an opportunity to take stock of where one is and how one can continue to grow in life. [implicitly, it also gives permission to see oneself in several ways that have been forbidden to many people. It assumes, for one thing, that participants are capable of growth and change and is not frozen in their present place, and invites them to take an active part in the growth process. Also, it assumes that growth is not a do-it-yourself proposition, but can be helped by other human beings, and it gives the person permission to admit a need for help and to seek it when appropriate.

Time: Thirty to 40 minutes.

Materials:

1. Paper and pencils for all participants.
2. List of questions written on newsprint (or blackboard) and posted (see below).

Sequence:

1. Distribute paper and pencils and briefly explain the purpose of the exercise: "This exercise allows us to take stock of ourselves, to see where we are, where we are going, and what we should be doing to get there."
2. Post newsprint (or write on blackboard) the following list of questions:
   a) What are my strong points?
   b) What kind of person am I becoming? How am I growing?
   c) What things in life/relationships/conflicts have been hard for me? What's going to be hard now? What will be hard about tuning into the Transforming Power within me?
   d) How can I get help? Whom can I ask? How can I ask them?
   e) What can I promise myself to do so that I grow, use my strengths. become who I want to be?

   Read the list of questions to the participants and tell them that they will have 20 minutes to think about these questions and to write whatever answers they wish on their papers. Assure them that this exercise is private; they won't be asked to hand in the papers or tell their contents to others.

   (Facilitators should be sensitive to the presence of people who may have a literacy or a language barrier problem and make this exercise as simple for them as possible.)

3. At the end of 20 minutes, divide into groups of five or six to discuss the exercise. How did they like it? How did it make them feel? Do they think it will help them to grow? Each can share as much or a little as (s)he wishes of what is written on his/her paper.

4. Ask one person from each group to report the sense of the small group discussion to the whole group.

The Kraybill Conflict Style Inventory

Calm Settings

When I first discover that differences exist and feelings are not yet high. . .

A. I take steps to make sure all views are out in the open equally, both mine and others'. I make it clear to others that their needs matter as much to me as my own.

B. I am more concerned with communicating the truth or getting the job done than with pleasing others.

C. I make my needs known, but I tone them down and try to strike a bargain somewhere in the middle.

D. I try to avoid the topic or person causing difficulty. Silence or distance prevents argument.

E. I give priority to harmony and set aside my personal preferences as necessary to achieve it.

F It matters more to me to keep things relaxed between us than it does to have the last word.

G. I devote as much energy to understanding my opponent's situation as to explaining my own.

H. I am more concerned with goals or responsibilities I know are important than with how others feel about things.

I. I decide the differences aren't worth worrying about; I change the topic or withdraw from discussion about it.

J. No one can have everything they want. I offer to give up some things in exchange for others; give a little here and get a little there.

Storm Settings (cont'd)

If differences persist and feelings escalate, what do I do?

N. I back off and let things rest as they are, even if it means that none of us gets what we really want.

O. I set aside my own preferences and go along with the other person so as not to damage our relationship.

P. I move away from the topic or the person causing difficulties and look for ways to keep a safe distance without actually giving in.



Q. I focus more on my goals and less on how others feel about things.

R. I see how much the other cares about the matter and give in. I adapt so there is harmony.

S. I focus on mutual understanding; I go to great lengths to make sure that I really understand why others are upset and that they understand why I am upset.



T. I urge moderation and compromise. Everyone should accept a little less than what they really want so we can get on with things.

Appendix V: Post-Intervention Discussion Guide

Addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria: an action research approach.

Post-Training Discussion Guide

Presented by

Olaoluwa Babatunde A. OYINLOYE

Supervised by: Prof. Geoffrey Thomas Harris

May 2016.

Focus group discussion guide for Evaluation

Addressing youths' involvement in electoral violence in Nigeria: an action research approach.

Date: _____
Time: _____
Venue: _____

Participants: male number _____ female number _____

I introduce myself and the purpose of the interview. I welcome participants and thank them for attending. I outline the ethical considerations and ask for permission to tape record the session. I will state that the tapes will only be listened to by the researcher (myself) and that the tapes will be stored in a secure place.

Section A: Process Evaluation

f. The objectives of the interventions were clearly defined.
g. Were the intervention objectives were met?
h. Interaction and participation was encouraged
i. The causes of youth involvement in electoral violence were addressed
j. What do you like most about the intervention?

Section B: Knowledge, Skills and Outcome Evaluation

f. What new skills have you gained because of this intervention?
g. In what ways have such skills been of help to you and your community?
h. Have you ever been to similar youth and electoral violence workshops before or in recent times?
i. How has the knowledge and skills gained during these interventions helped to influence changes from electoral violence?
j. How do you hope to conduct yourself to not be involved electoral violence acts in future?

Thank you

Appendix VI: Focus group discussion evaluation form

Your feedback will help us to plan for the next focus group

Venue_____

Male ☐ Female ☐

Beside each of the following statements, please place a tick in the appropriate box	Yes	No	Not Sure
The focus group was better than I expected			
The topics discussed were interesting			
The questions were easy to understand			
I enjoyed discussing this topic with the group			
We were given enough time for discussion			
The facilitators encouraged participation			
I got a chance to have my say			
I felt that I was listened to			
A focus group is a good way of consulting with stakeholders			
I will participate in another focus group discussion			

Please tick the response you agree with:

Overall, the focus group discussion was……. Great, Good, Ok, Poor
The facilitators were…… Great, Good, Ok, Poor

Was there something you think we should have discussed but did not?

_____

_____

_____

Is there any other comments or suggestions on how the group can be improved upon?

_____

_____

Thank you.

Appendix VII Focus Group Discussion Observation Form

Title: Intervention Evaluation

The characteristics given below are to be used as a guide for the observer.

Subject_____ Date_____

Duration_____ Number of Participants_____

Name of Observer_____

Discussion characteristic	Comments
1. Organisation of session Welcome, space, clear instructions and use of resources. Ground rules, rapport….	
2. Presentation Clear introduction, purpose of study, clarity of aims and objectives. Clarity of presentation and organization. Appropriate pace and timing. Responsiveness to the needs of participants. Attitude to participants (distractive mannerisms, style). Content: Questions? Probes? How far? How deep? Suggestive? Appropriateness?	
3. Facilitation approach. Choice of words, dressing and its influence on discussants. Methods used to check/evaluate understanding. Effective use of question and answer. Encouragement of participants' interaction. Management of the session, including opening and closure.	
4. Participants' responses Level of participation. Level of attention and interest. General group atmosphere.	
5. Other observations	

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