DUT DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

Developing and testing new interventions to prevent violent service delivery protests in South Africa

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the
degree Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies in
the Faculty of Management Sciences at the
Durban University of Technology

Prince Charles Zimuto

NOVEMBER 2020

Supervisor: **Dr Sylvia Kaye (BS, MS, PhD)**

Co-supervisor: **Professor Geoff Harris (BComm, Dip Ed, MEc, PhD)**

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Supervisor: ____ __ Date: 6.11.2020

Co-supervisor: _ __ Date: 6/11/2020

Declaration

I declare that the dissertation "Developing and testing new interventions to prevent violent service delivery protests in South Africa" is my original research and that I am the sole author thereof unless explicitly stated otherwise. Instances where I have used the work of others have been referenced in accordance with the Durban University of Technology's referencing style guidelines. The dissertation has not been previously submitted in its entirety or in part to any other institution for the purposes of obtaining any qualification.

6-11-2020

Prince Charles Zimuto Date

Abstract

Previous studies on violent service delivery protests in South Africa are mainly concerned with the causes of violent service delivery protests. Investigating the causes of violence alone in order to map out violence prevention strategies is a narrow approach to the problem of violence. A broader approach requires one to investigate why violence is the preferred form of action over non-violent methods. In light of this, this study sought to investigate the following: firstly, why protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods when expressing service-delivery-related grievances; secondly, the factors which enable violent protests to be a viable option; thirdly, the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests; fourthly, how violent service delivery protests can be prevented; and finally, the study sought to develop and test interventions aimed at preventing violent service delivery protests. To answer these questions and achieve its objectives, the study used a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach and a qualitative research methodology. One hundred residents of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa were recruited to take part in the study. In addition, twenty municipal officials, ten ward councillors and twenty members of the Public Order Police also took part in the study. Results show that protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods due to a lack of confidence in non-violent methods and because they perceive violent protests to be more effective. Unfulfilled promises, negative attitudes towards the police and group ties were identified as factors which lead protestors towards considering violent protests as a possible option. Interestingly, violent protests were found to be less effective in achieving protestors' objectives. The majority of respondents, indicated that violent service delivery protests cannot be prevented. Informed by the results of the study, the intervention developed for the study was mainly targeted at transforming residents' attitudes towards violence. Although there is a need to extend the intervention to a wider population, An assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention revealed that if extended to a wider population, the intervention may positively contribute towards the prevention of violence.

Key words: service delivery protests, violence, non-violence, participatory action research, attitudes towards violence

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Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout the course of my studies.

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
AVP	Alternatives to Violence Project
BCMM	Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
COLACOCO	Coalition for Langa Community Concerns
CSC	Centre for Social Change
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LED	Local Economic Development
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
MPAC	Municipal Public Accounts Committee
MPAEC	Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
NDP	National Development Plan
PAC	Pan African Congress
PAR	Participatory Action Research
POP	Municipal and Public Order Police
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RGA	Regulation of Gatherings Act
SAPS	South African Police Service
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the right to protest. The exercise of this right enables citizens to demand the realisation of socio-economic rights such as the rights to access to housing, to sufficient food and water, and to social security and health care services. The right to protest also enables citizens to express grievances and hold their leaders accountable in an open and public manner. Apart from being a vehicle through which citizens can voice their concerns, participating in a protest instils in the participants a sense of collective identity, collective solidarity and unity of purpose. Through protests, protestors are able to attract the attention of the media, which in turn helps to publicise their grievances and to gain the support of the public for their cause.



Figure 1.1: Protests recorded by the Centre for Social Change (2005-2017), Municipal IQ (2005-2016), ACLED (community protests only) (2005-2017) and Community Protests Barometer (2005-2015) (Sources: CSC database, Municipal IQ, ACLED and CPB extracted from Alexander *et al.* (2018)).

Protest action is one of the most accessible and widely-used forms of political participation for many communities in South Africa. This is arguably true because protests give citizens a voice in a manner which other forms of political participation do not. Figure 1.1 shows how prevalent community protests are in South Africa. While estimates vary, the general picture painted by Figure 1.1 shows that there is a high number of community protests taking place in South Africa, especially in recent years.

Municipal IQ's estimates are amongst the lowest because Municipal IQ records service delivery protests while the other entities record community protests, which are a broader category of protests.

The majority of these community protests are, however, violent in nature or characterised by the use of violence. Figure 1.2 shows the number of media-reported community protests that were orderly, disruptive and violent between 2005 and 2017, as recorded by the Centre for Social Change. These statistics show that, in general, there have been more violent protests than orderly or peaceful protests over the years.



Figure 1.2: The number of community protests which were orderly, disruptive and violent between 2005 to 2017 (Source: CSC database, extracted from Alexander *et al.* (2018)).

In the same vein, data from the Civic Protest Barometer indicates that over the years, community protests have been becoming increasingly violent. In addition, the number of violent protests has been consistently high. As shown in Figure 1.3, over 90% of the total protests were violent between 2013 and 2016.



Figure 1.3: Proportion of protests with violence from 2007 to July 2016 (Source: Civic Protest Barometer, extracted from Chigwata, O'Donovan and Powell (2017)).

This study was intended to investigate why protestors chose violent protests over non-violent methods when expressing service-delivery-related grievances. These protests are popularly known as service delivery protests. However, owing to the diverse range of grievances which form part of the protests, some scholars, for instance, Alexander *et al.* (2018), prefer the term community protests.[1] The term *community protests* is therefore a broader term which includes protests over issues such as municipal service delivery, the lack of employment opportunities, socio-economic inequality, corruption, crime, health services and municipal accountability. Service delivery protests are usually concerned with a limited range of demands such as housing, water, electricity, refuse removal, roads and toilets.

Respondents for this study were recruited from the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM), which is located in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. BCMM incorporates the city of East London and the towns of King William's Town and Bhisho. A number of violent service delivery protests have occurred within the municipality in the past. During a service delivery protest in June 2017, protestors in Breidbach blocked the N2 between King William's Town and East London and stoned vehicles on the road.[2] In November 2017, residents of Nompumelelo in East London threw stones at a ward councillor's house and vandalised his office located nearby, during a service delivery protest.[3] In May 2018 nine residents were arrested for public violence and malicious damage to property for throwing petrol bombs and stones, at the Police and motorists during a service delivery protest in King William's Town.[4] In April 2018 another violent protest erupted on the R346 between Potsdam and Berlin with two protestors being arrested for throwing stones at a councillor's house.[5] Recently, in May 2020, residents of the municipality were left without electricity when an Eskom Substation near Phakamisa Township in King William's Town was vandalised by protestors in the wake of a service delivery protest.[6]

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[1] Other terms commonly used are local protests, civic protests or local unrest.
[2] https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017-06-01-protests-block-2-el-kwt-routes--breidbach-zwelitsha-demands-being-addressed/.
[3] https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017-11-16-protesters-stone-ward-councillors-house-and-office/.



	NMB	MAN	ETH	TSH	Metros	CPT	EKU	COJ	BUF
■ Other	1,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	1,4	1,6	1,7	3,2	0,7
▨ Informal	6,1	11,8	13,0	16,9	17,9	19,4	20,0	21,7	23,3
■ Traditional	0,0	0,3	2,9	0,5	0,7	0,0	0,2	0,1	3,2
■ Formal	92,9	87,5	84,1	82,6	80,0	79,1	78,2	75,1	72,8

Figure 1.4: Percentage of households which lived in formal, informal and traditional dwellings in 2018, categorised by metropolitan area (Source: Stats SA General Household Survey 2018).

Apart from a history of violent service delivery protests within the municipality, the choice of BCMM as a case study was also influenced by the following factors. First, the BCMM has a high number of informal dwellings as compared to other metropolitan municipalities. Since a large number of service delivery protests tend to occur in informal settlements (which are themselves characterised by informal dwellings), this meant that a larger and more diverse pool of potential respondents could be approached. Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of households which lived in formal, informal and traditional dwellings in 2018, categorised by metropolitan area. The metropolitan areas include Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB), Mangaung (MAN), Ethekwini

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[4] https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2018-05-03-ginsberg-residents-in-court-after-violent-protest/.

[5] https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2018-04-10-violent-clashes-erupt-in-potsdam/.

[6] https://www.algoafm.co.za/local/thousands-of-bcm-residents-without-power-following-service-delivery-protest.

(ETH), Tshwane (TSH), Cape Town (CPT), Ekurhuleni (EKU), City of Johannesburg (COJ) and Buffalo City (BUF). BCMM (represented in Figure 1.4 as BUF) topped the list with 23.3% of the households being recorded as living in informal dwellings.

Second, statistics show a general dissatisfaction with the quality of services provided by the metro as compared to other metros. This made BCMM an appropriate case study since at the core of violent service delivery protests lies grievances relating to the provision and quality of municipal services. To begin with, as shown in Figure 1.5, data released by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) shows that BCMM had the lowest percentage (46.6%) of households rating the water quality of the metro as good. 19.5% of the households reported interruptions to water supplies, second only to Mangaung Metro where 21.6% of the households reported water interruptions.



	CPT	EKU	TSH	ETH	Metros	COJ	NMB	MAN	BUF
■ Quality	85,1	80,8	76,3	75,9	74,3	69,5	61,4	49,8	46,6
■ Interruptions	2,0	2,3	10,1	14,6	7,4	4,3	10,9	21,6	19,5

Figure 1.5: Percentage of households rating the quality of water services provided by the metropolitan municipality as good, and those which reported water interruptions in 2018, categorised by metropolitan area (Source: Stats SA General Household Survey 2018).

Figure 1.6 shows the percentage of households which experienced specific kinds of environmental problems in 2018, categorised by metropolitan area. In BCMM, land degradation was rated as the most important environmental problem (43.3%), the highest from other metros. Other common problems which were identified were water, waste and air pollution.



	CPT	BUF	NMB	MAN	ETH	EKU	COJ	TSH	Metros
■ Land	16,4	43,3	2,8	39,7	18,5	13,9	26,6	24,2	21,0
■ Water	13,2	21,1	3,8	20,5	12,8	7,8	23,7	17,6	15,6
■ Waste	27,8	39,6	48,9	64,7	39,2	25,7	44,0	34,9	37,0
■ Air	11,2	32,2	7,7	22,7	20,6	25,1	22,5	18,5	19,8

Figure 1.6: Percentage of households which experienced specific kinds of environmental problems in 2018, categorised by metropolitan area (Source: Stats SA General Household Survey 2018).

Third, there have been a lack of case studies on violent service delivery protests specifically focusing on BCMM.[7] Much of the research on violent service delivery protests has been conducted elsewhere as the following examples show:

1. Naidoo (2010): Ramotshere Moiloa Municipality in the North West Province
2. Banjo and Jili (2013): Msukaligwa Local Municipality, Mpumalanga Province
3. Mchunu and Theron (2013): Khayelitsha, Cape Town, Western Cape Province
4. Breakfast, N.B., Bradshaw, G. and Nomarwayi, T. (2016): Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, Eastern Cape Province.

1.2 Research Sites

As mentioned above, the study was conducted in the BCMM. In particular, the study focused on the following areas: Orange Grove, Nompumelelo, Ducats, Unit P, Ikhwezi Village, Vergenoeg, Egoli, Zwelitsha, Ginsberg and Breidbach. Below is a description of these areas. The information provided was obtained from the residents of the areas concerned, while some of the information is the researcher's own observations made while conducting research in those areas.

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[7] The only study that the researcher came across focusing on issues of service delivery in the BCMM, in particular Duncan Village, is a Masters dissertation by Patricia Ndhlovu entitled "Understanding the local state, service delivery and protests in post-apartheid South Africa: The case of Duncan Village and Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, East London". The research is however not a case study on violent service delivery protests. See for example the following research questions underpinning the study: What informs the allocation and distribution of state resources in Duncan Village? What are the different understandings of a decent life by residents of Duncan Village and BCMM officials? How do different stakeholders understand and interpret protest actions in Buffalo City?

Orange Grove[8] is an informal settlement near the East London Airport. The majority of dwellings are shacks mainly built using corrugated iron sheets, scrap metal, asbestos and wood. Communal taps provide water for residents. Multiple households use a single tap. In terms of sanitation, the municipality put toilets but they are not functioning well. Most residents use pit toilets instead. The residents dug the pit toilets themselves. Not every dwelling, however, has a pit toilet in the yard. This is because some of the dwellings are erected too close together, leaving no space for the digging of a pit toilet. Consequently, residents have to share the pit toilets. The pit toilets pose a danger to children. Reportedly, a child once fell into one and died.

The informal settlement has no electricity supply. Most residents use illegal electrical connections. According to residents, illegal connections are one of the main causes of shack fires followed by candles and paraffin stoves. Individuals known as *Izinyoka-nyoka* (or *Izinyoka* in short) do the illegal connections. The term *Izinyoka* is also refers to the illegal connection itself. Orange Grove has high levels of unemployment. According to residents, a significant number of people are unemployed as they struggle to find jobs. Some residents salvage and sell scrap metal to scrap metal dealers. One such dealer company is Chick's Scrap Metals. The name *Chick's,* however, is now commonly used to refer to the scrap metal itself and any other company that deals in scrap metal. Other residents make a living by collecting plastic bottles and aluminium cans and selling them at recycling centres. Residents that are employed work as domestic workers in the nearby suburbs of Sunset Bay, Greenfields and Sunny Ridge while others work in the nearby factories.

Nompumelelo, also known as Gqobas is a township situated near Beacon Bay in East London. Nompumelelo has formal RDP houses[9] and informal dwellings. The informal sections of the township are extremely overcrowded. The extent of overcrowding is visible from the N2 Freeway. Overcrowding exposes residents to diseases; in particular, residents raised concern over the prevalence of tuberculosis cases in their area. Residents of the informal section share toilets, about 20 households per toilet. Some residents live far from the toilets and this is a problem especially at night. According to residents, at night going to the toilet is a risk because criminals roam the streets. Residents in the informal parts of the township access water from communal taps. The township is accessible via tarred road but as you go further into the township, the roads are in a state of disrepair. Potholes are a major concern. The informal parts of the township are difficult to access by car because of overcrowding.

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[8] Local residents refer to it as Orange Groove but its official name is Orange Grove.

[9] RDP refers to the Reconstruction and Development Programme launched in 1994. Under this programme, the government of South Africa sought to improve the socio-economic conditions of its citizens. Through this program the government built houses, provided clean running water, sanitation and electricity to its people. The houses built under this programme are commonly referred to as RDP

Residents of Nompumelelo access electricity through illegal connections. In some areas, electricity is drawn straight from the main electrical poles into shacks. Even some of the people who reside in the formal RDP houses use *Izinyoka* to bypass the system and use electricity free of charge. Residents indicated that the electricity supply in the entire township is not reliable. More often than not, the illegal connections result in electrical faults. These faults take days to fix. According to residents, the municipality recently indicated that it is tired of fixing electrical faults all the time. Residents stated that too many people have been victims of electrocution. Recently, a man was allegedly electrocuted while climbing up an electrical pole.

Nompumelelo also has a high unemployment rate. Many young people roam the streets during the day doing nothing. Some of the young boys go around with wheelbarrows plugging filling in potholes in the township and ask for money from motorists passing by. Residents indicated that most of the youth in the area use drugs. Community members with skills such as carpentry and bricklaying or are able to provide physical labour spend their time at Spargs Superspar in Beacon Bay and on the traffic circle on Wyse Avenue near Spar Abbotsford looking for jobs. Those that are employed work at the nearby Chinatown, Retail Park, Beacon Bay, Dorchester Heights and Abbotsford.

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houses. Notably, even today, despite the end of the programme, houses built under new socio-economic policies are still referred to as RDP houses.

Ducats is a formal township located about 5km from Beacon Bay on the N6 highway just outside East London. The township has expanded over the years. The township now has informal dwellings that are increasing at a fast pace. In the informal section of the township, residents use community taps to access clean water. Those who can afford, connect their own pipes onto the mainline in order to bring water near their stands. The electrical supply in the township is unreliable. The initial electrical supply for the township was sufficient to cater for the population. The current electricity demands now exceed the needs of the growing population. As a result, power failures are a common problem in the area.

Unit P is a formal township located near Mdantsane and Potsdam, East London. The area has RDP houses that were built recently. The project to build houses in Unit P is on-going, some of the houses are not yet complete. According to residents, phase one of the project was completed but phase two remains unfinished. Residents' concerns in the area evolve around allegations of corruption in the allocation of the houses, a poor road network and shoddy workmanship on some of the houses.

Ikhwezi Village (also known as Gwiqini or Ikhwezi Block), is also situated near Mdantsane and Potsdam, East London. The area lies adjacent to Unit P referred to in the preceding discussion above. There are no formal houses in Ikhwezi Village. Dwellings are mainly shacks. The area has no electricity. Those with electricity obtain it from illegal connections on electrical poles that supply electricity to other areas. Those poles run through Ikhwezi village. According to residents, the place is dangerous at night because of the lack of streetlights. In terms of sanitation, some residents relieve themselves in the nearby bushes. Other residents, however, have pit toilets that they dug themselves. Residents share communal water taps. According to residents, there are only two community taps in the area. The water supply is however unreliable. Residents lament the frequent water supply interruptions which happen without prior notification and seemingly without any reason.

Vergenoeg is a formal township near Buffalo Flats and Haven Hills in East London. Informal settlements have mushroomed in the vicinity of the township. According to residents, some of the owners of the shacks are beneficiaries of houses that are under construction in a nearby area.

Egoli is located near Scenery Park and Haven Hills in East London. Residents lamented the living conditions in the informal settlement. Refuse is allegedly not collected and keeps on piling everywhere in the informal settlement. Sanitation is a major challenge in the area. The toilets that were erected were allegedly vandalised. For water, residents used a shared water tap.

Zwelitsha and Ginsberg are large formal townships in King William's Town. Backyard shacks are common in both areas. Breidbach is also a formal township located about 5km outside King William's Town. The majority of the people that reside in Breidbach are Coloured.

1.3 Problem Statement

The use of violence during service delivery protests is problematic in that it creates a cycle of violence. If protestors are able to obtain concessions through the use of violence, future protestors will be more inclined to use violence as well (Klein and Regan 2018: 492).

Eventually, through the repeated use of violence to obtain concessions, a culture of violence may emerge. A culture of violence is characterised by the normalisation of violence. As observed by Polaschek, Calvert and Gannon (2009: 86), on the normalisation of violence by violent prisoners:

> Violent prisoners spoke of violence as a routine occurrence between people that hardly needs explaining and that could be helpful in achieving some personal and social goals. Violence "resolves" conflicts, "persuades" others to do things, can be exhilarating or simply make you feel better, and usually it makes others treat you with respect. Whatever the end goal, violence is believed to be both acceptable and effective with little or no lasting negative consequences.

In the same vein, research has shown that regular exposure to violence creates the normalisation of or a culture of violence. For instance, research by Thomas *et al.* (2016: 199) revealed that youth who witnessed physical violence on a regular basis ended up viewing violence as acceptable, normal and impossible to avoid. Similarly, research by Baskin and Sommers (2014: 378) shows that the likelihood of involvement in violent criminal behaviour amongst the youth is high where they are regularly exposed to violence.

Violent service delivery protests also have the potential to create service delivery backlogs and exacerbate existing ones. Service delivery backlogs may occur because of violent protests in two ways: first, a municipality can redirect money set aside to facilitate service delivery to repairing or replacing infrastructure damaged during violent protests, and second, a municipality can refuse to rebuild or repair public infrastructure damaged during violent protests. For instance, in response to the violent protests around South Africa in 2016, Gauteng Province Premier David Makhura indicated that government would not rebuild or replace any public infrastructure destroyed during the protests (SABC 2016).

Finally, as Botes (2018: 250-251) argues, violent service delivery protests impact negatively on the South African economy. This is not only because damaged infrastructure is repaired using an already limited tax basis but because the protests interfere with economic production. In addition, violent protests also result in investor flight. Finally, the socio-political instability associated with these protests tends to erode further investor confidence.

That which is not fully understood, however, is why, despite the aforementioned problems associated with violent service delivery protests, communities choose to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods. An investigation into the reasons why protestors choose violence over non-violent methods is therefore an important endeavour because it may provide an insight into the determinants of protestors' choice of tactics when faced with grievances. Ultimately, this will enable the development of effective interventions which can assist in the prevention of future violent service delivery protests.

1.4 Aims of the Study

The main aim of the study was to develop and test interventions aimed at preventing violent service delivery protests. In order to develop interventions to prevent violent service delivery, it was necessary to understand why communities chose to engage in violent protests over issues of service delivery instead of using non-violent methods.

It was also necessary to examine the factors which make violence a viable option for protestors. Finally, it was necessary to ascertain the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action.

1.5 Assumptions

The main assumption guiding this study is that protestors believe their use of violence is justified under the circumstances in which they find themselves. Flowing from this belief is the conviction that violent protests are the best course of action to achieve one's goals. The study, however, sought to develop interventions which could result in a shift in the perception that violent protests are more effective than non-violent methods.

1.6 Research Objectives

The research objectives of the thesis are outlined as follows:

- To investigate why protestors choose to engage in violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods when expressing their grievances
- To identify the factors which make violence an attractive option for protestors
- To ascertain the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action
- To develop and test interventions aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests.

1.7 Methodology

The study used a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach to achieve its objectives. PAR was appropriate for this study because of its orientation towards community participation in the identification, delineation and finding solutions of problems faced by communities. Consequently, the research employed qualitative research methodology in order to capture and describe the social realities faced by communities in an accurate and vivid manner.

Research participants were recruited using the snowball and purposive sampling techniques. The snowball sampling technique was used in order to identify participants in previous violent service delivery protests. The snowball sampling was particularly suited for this task because it gave the researcher access to a ‘hidden’ population. One hundred residents of BCMM were recruited to take part in this study.

Municipal and Public Order Police (POP) respondents were selected purposively. The purposive sampling method made it possible to select municipal respondents based on their role in service delivery, and POP respondents based on their role in crowd control during service delivery protests. Twenty members of the POP were recruited based on their experience in responding to violent service delivery protests in the past. Within the BCMM, twenty officials were chosen by virtue of having senior positions within the departments responsible for various aspects of service delivery and community engagement. Ten ward councillors were also recruited purposively from the “hot spot” areas where service delivery protests frequently occur.

The recruited participants were interviewed individually through the use of structured interviews with open-ended questions. Unstructured interviews were used for focus group discussions. Four focus group discussions were conducted in this study. Finally, the data collected was analysed through a thematic framework of data analysis.

1.8 Significance of the Study

Previous studies on violent service delivery protests have focused on the causes and possible solutions to violent service delivery protests. This study is the first to break with that line of inquiry by probing the motivation behind protestors’ decision to engage in violent protests over non-violent methods. By investigating the reasons why protestors choose violence over non-violent methods, the study avoids studying violence in isolation and excluding non-violence.

Apart from investigating the reasons why protestors chose violence over non-violent methods, the study was significant in that it attempted to identify the factors which make violent protests a viable option for communities. This study was also significant in that it was the first of its kind to conduct an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of grievance resolution.

The study is significant, if for nothing else, for the violence prevention intervention developed herein. The highlight of studies on violent service delivery protests is the suggestion of solutions to the violence associated with such protests. This study, however, together with the relevant stakeholders, took a step further and developed a violence prevention intervention which motivated for the need for a commitment to non-violent collective action even where the use of violence seems justified.

1.9 Delineations

One of the objectives of this study was to develop and test interventions for the prevention of violent service delivery protests. In order to prevent violence, it is important to understand the causes of violence. This study is however not concerned with investigating the causes of violent service delivery protests. This subject matter has been studied elsewhere by other scholars. Instead, this study investigated why communities chose to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods in the face of service-delivery-related grievances.

1.10 Thesis Statement

The central claim or argument of this study is that communities choose violent protests over non-violent methods because they perceive violent protests as a more effective method of action. This belief can be evidenced by the relatively high number of violent service delivery protests across South Africa. Violent service delivery protests are perceived to be more effective than non-violent methods because when communities employed non-violent methods in the past (in particular peaceful protests), they were not able to achieve any material changes to their situation. The effectiveness of violent service delivery protests is however doubtful considering that violent protests, like non-violent protests, have also not resulted in material changes in the lives of those engaging in such protests.

1.11 Summary of findings

The study found that protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods because they have no confidence in non-violent methods and perceive violent protests as an effective political tool of coercion. The study also found that communities will readily resort to violent protests because of unfulfilled promises, negative perceptions towards members of the police and the need to maintain group solidarity or community ties. Violent service delivery protests were generally found to be ineffective in helping protestors achieve their stated goals. As mentioned earlier, one of the main objectives of the study was to develop and test an intervention aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests. The intervention developed as part of this study was informed by the aforementioned findings of the study. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention revealed that the intervention was, to a large extent, effective in changing the attitudes towards violence of the action group which took part in the intervention.

1.12 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 (*Introduction*) introduces the subject matter under investigation in this study. The chapter accomplishes this by providing a brief background to the study, and outlining the problem statement, the research aims and objectives of the study. In addition, the chapter outlines the assumptions underpinning the study and makes a case in support of the significance of the study. Finally, the chapter outlines the delineations and the thesis statement of the study.

Chapter 2 (*Literature review*) provides a review of pertinent literature on violent service delivery protests. The chapter provides an insight into previous studies on violent service delivery protests. In particular, the chapter exposes the known and unknown aspects of the problem of violent service delivery protests. In this way, the chapter not only contextualises the study but also provides a rationale for the study. Most importantly, the chapter outlines how, in light of previous research, this study will add to existing knowledge on the subject matter.

Chapter 3 (*Theoretical framework*) discusses existing theories which may help explain why protestors choose violence over non-violent methods in the face of service-delivery-related grievances. The following theories will be discussed: the human needs theory, the ecological theory, the social learning theory and the rational choice theory. In addition, the chapter will also discuss the conflict transformation theory as an indispensable theory in the formulation of violence prevention interventions.

Chapter 4 (*Conceptual framework*) explains the main concepts underpinning the study. The concepts are, namely, 'service delivery protests', 'violence as a protest tactic' and the notion of 'violence as a choice'. This chapter is important in that it provides a framework within which to understand, in general, how violent service delivery protests unfold in the ways they do and, in particular, why communities choose violent protests over non-violent means of action.

Chapter 5 (*Methodology*) outlines and explains the research methodology which will be used in the study. The chapter also motivates why the chosen methodology is appropriate for the study. The following aspects of the research methodology will be discussed: the research approach; research design; sampling method; measuring instruments; translation, validity, reliability and objectivity; anonymity and confidentiality; ethical considerations and data analysis.

Chapter 6 (*Results and analysis*) presents the results of the study using a thematic framework. In addition, the chapter provides an analysis of the findings of the study taking into account the objectives of the study. This analysis is important in that it makes it possible and easier to make sense of the results and the implications thereof.

Chapter 7 (*Resolving grievances through non-violence*) seeks to ascertain why non-violent methods have not been fully embraced by communities across South Africa. The methods of non-violent action considered are protests, litigation and the use of the media. The chapter is important in that it lays the foundation for the development of the violence prevention intervention intended for the study.

Chapter 8 (*Intervention and evaluation*) outlines the violence prevention intervention developed for the study. The chapter explains how the intervention was conceived and applied. In addition, the chapter provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention.

Chapter 9 (*Conclusion*) presents the conclusions of the study. The chapter also spells out the limitations of the study and offers suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature on violent service delivery protests. In doing so, the chapter provides a useful insight into the pertinent literature on the subject. In order to situate the current study within the existing body of literature on service delivery protests, this chapter discusses literature on the causes and possible solutions of violent service delivery protests. Thereafter, the chapter discusses literature relating to the objectives of the study in order to show or expose the literature gap which this study intends to fill. The discussion will therefore focus on the literature on why communities choose violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods, factors which make violent protests a viable option, and the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests.

2.2 Causes of Violence during Service Delivery Protests

This section identifies the causes of violence during service delivery protests as observed by various scholars. The findings or observations of each of these scholars are presented separately. Thereafter, common themes arising from the causes presented by these scholars will be identified. What follows is a detailed discussion of the themes identified. Such an approach allows for an orderly discussion of the causes of violent service delivery protests. As will be shown below, the literature on violent service delivery protests is vast and voluminous. This makes it difficult to discuss fully each scholar's work separately. In addition, in some cases, the causes of violent service delivery protests identified by some of the scholars overlap. This makes it difficult to discuss each scholar separately.

To begin with, Netswera and Kgalane (2014: 398) trace the history of violent service delivery protests in South Africa to the Apartheid era. It is commonly accepted knowledge that after the demise of Apartheid, the country witnessed a decline in violent protests in general. Netswera and Kgalane (2014: 261), however, observe that recently, the number of protests has been increasing and the violence during those protests seems to be escalating towards the levels experienced during Apartheid. Their research sought to ascertain the causes of violent service delivery protests.

Three main causes of violence during service delivery protests, as identified by Netswera and Kgalane, are noteworthy. First is the lack of confidence in the political systems and political representatives in local government (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 265). They argue that local government is perceived by residents as unsympathetic to the needs of its people. The lack of confidence is attributed to local government's failure to fulfil its promises, the media's portrayal of local government as being composed of corrupt officials, and the lack of understanding of the role of local government in service delivery (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 265).

Second is the racial and class divide (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 266). The provision of services in the Apartheid era was along racial lines. White communities were the beneficiaries of the best services available in the day. This resulted in the underdevelopment of black communities. Both historically and currently, white communities are regarded by poor black communities as receiving better quality services than other areas (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 266). It is this perception or perhaps reality which, as Netswera and Kgalane argue, is one of the causes of violence during service delivery protests.

Third is the display of greed, opulence and corruption by local government officials and politicians (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 267). They observe that corruption occurs in the awarding of tenders and can be seen in the opulent lifestyles of local politicians.

Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi (2016: 409) argue that police involvement in protests often sparks violence because of the brutality that they use to control protests. To illustrate their point, they use the examples of the Marikana massacre, #FeesMustFall campaign and more relevant to this study, the death of Andries Tatane during a service delivery protest in 2011 in Ficksburg (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi 2016: 409). In the Marikana massacre, 34 striking workers at Lonmin platinum mine in Marikana near Rustenburg were killed by police in 2012. The #FeesMustFall was a students' movement demanding from government the stoppage of university fees increases and more broadly, the provision of free tertiary education. Andries Tatane was an activist who died at the hands of the police while taking part in a service delivery protest in Ficksburg in 2011. These events are discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3 below. It is widely accepted that in each of the incidents cited above, the police were the main cause of the violence which ensued during those protests. They note with great concern that police are not adequately trained to deal with community protests at the local government level (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi 2016: 415). For Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi, this lack of training results in violent confrontations between law enforcement and protestors.

Tsheola (2012: 165) identifies the exclusion of the community, or lack of public participation when the local government puts into effect, its Integrated Development Plan (IDP), as the cause of violent service delivery protests. A similar observation is made by Tsheola, Ramonyai and Segage (2014: 396) who note that the local government often implements service delivery programs without the participation of the community in the planning stage of such programs. Section 35 of the Municipal Systems Act defines IDP as “the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development, in the municipality.”

A study was conducted in the Wesselton and Balfour (Siyathemba) Townships, in the Msukaligwa Local Municipality by Banjo and Jili (2013). The Msukaligwa Local Municipality falls under the Gert Sibande District Municipality in the Mpumalanga Province. Banjo and Jili (2013: 261-262) identified four main reasons for violence during service delivery protests:

- First, the local government did not fulfil promises made to the people, and the use of violence was a way for people to vent out their frustration.
- Second is the lack of responses from the local government when demands are made by communities.
- Third, communities invoked violence as a way of extracting a quick response from the government, as they had come to the realisation that negotiation with the local government is not a viable strategy.

- Fourth, the involvement of police often resulted in a peaceful protest turning violent because the police would arrest community leaders who may not have participated in the protest.

Mchunu and Theron (2013) investigate the extent to which the lack of public participation contributes to public protests in Khayelitsha in the City of Cape Town. The study's focus is not on violent service delivery protests. Nevertheless, the findings of their research are relevant to this study. Their findings indicate that violence during public protests was attributed to the use of force by police during protests and frustrations caused by the refusal of authorities to accede to the demands of the community of Khayelitsha (Mchunu and Theron 2013: 121).

Mchunu and Theron (2013) establish a direct link between violence during service delivery protests and police involvement as follows: the use of force by police (to disperse crowds) during protests causes protestors to be violent. The finding that the refusal to accede to the demands of the community is a cause of violent service delivery protests corroborates the views of (Banjo and Jili 2013: 261) who identify the lack of responses from the local government as a cause for violent service delivery protests.

Naidoo (2010) investigated the problem of service delivery in the Ramotshere Moiloa Municipality in the North West province. The research identified the following as some of the grievances raised by community members: faulty street lights, a blocked sewerage network, poor road infrastructure, leaking water metres, lack of piped water, poor road maintenance and a lack of electricity in some areas (Naidoo 2010: 110). It was observed that petitions and demonstrations in the area were often violent because of the aforementioned grievances (Naidoo 2010: 111).

Thus far, the discussion has identified the causes of violent service delivery protests as cited in pertinent literature on the subject. The following subsections further discuss the causes of violence identified above. For ease of discussion, it is important to group the identified causes into themes. Four broad themes emerge from the discussion above, namely, real and perceived disparities in the quality of service delivery between communities, the lack of skilled personnel and ethical leadership, inappropriate crowd control methods and the lack of public participation. Table 2.1 presents the causes of violent service delivery protests identified in the literature review above and the corresponding themes.

Table 2.1: Themes emerging from the causes of violent service delivery protests.

Theme	Causes of violent service delivery identified in literature
Real and perceived disparities in the quality of service delivery	The racial and class divide. The lack of basic municipal services.
Lack of skilled personnel and ethical leadership	The lack of confidence in the political systems and political representatives in local government. The display of greed, opulence and corruption by local government officials and politicians. The failure to fulfil promises made to the people. The lack of response from local government when demands are made by the community. The refusal of authorities to accede to the demands of the community.
Inappropriate crowd control methods	The use of the police to prevent or control protests.
The lack of public participation	The exclusion of the community when local government undertakes its Integrated Development Planning (IDP). Implementation of service delivery programs without the participation of the community in the planning stage of the activities.

2.2.1 Real and Perceived Disparities in the Quality of Service Delivery

As mentioned earlier, there is a perception that historically white suburbs still receive better services than historically black suburbs. Empirical studies confirming this claim are scarce. An older study by Bekker and Leilde (2003) is one which confirms this claim. Their study examines the experiences of the residents of selected Western Cape municipalities concerning life in the communities in which they live. Residents who participated in the research were of the view that their residential areas are discriminated against with regards to the provision of services. One participant remarked that "it is all the fault of the municipality which mistreats black people. They never come here to collect the rubbish but if it were in town, they would do it immediately" (Bekker and Leilde 2003: 155).

While the truth of the claim of disparities existing in the provision of services between historically white and black suburbs may be contested, the same cannot be done for informal settlements. The reality is that there is little to no municipal services in many informal settlements around South Africa. Disparities in the quality of services between informal settlements and other suburbs is not a perception but a reality. An example of this phenomenon is the difference of services provided in the greater Mangaung area and the informal settlements surrounding it. Mangaung is located in the city of Bloemfontein, in the Free State Province. In a study by Mphambukeli (2019: 63) it was observed that while piped water had been supplied to the Mangaung area, residents of informal settlements did not have adequate and clean drinking water.

To be fair, there have been some attempts to provide and improve the quality of services in informal settlements. One such attempt has been carried out through informal settlement upgrading. Despite settlement upgrading, residents of upgraded settlements do not seem entirely satisfied with the outcome of these efforts. Freedom Square in Mangaung, is a case in point. A survey was carried out as part of a study by Ntema *et al.* (2018) to determine the perceptions of residents of Freedom Square in the period between 1990 and 2014. Residents identified poor quality services, in particular waterborne sanitation and roads as one of the negative aspects of life in Freedom Square. It was also observed that an element of informality within Freedom Square still exists despite the upgrading. This informality can be observed through an unreliable electrical supply, sewage blockages, burst water pipes and bad roads.

Similar concerns over the quality of services have also been raised in areas were the government has provided low cost housing. Two settlements, uMhlathuze Village situated within the city of uMhlathuze and Slovos Settlement located in uMfolozi local municipality illustrate this problem. Both settlements are situated within uThungulu District Municipality in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A study by Sabela and Isike (2018) sought to ascertain the residents' levels of satisfaction with the quality of housing, the surrounding environment and infrastructure in both settlements. Residents of both settlements were dissatisfied with the size and quality of houses. In addition, residents were dissatisfied with the quality of roads. Finally, residents complained about sewage pipes, which they claimed, leaked and posed a health hazard especially because the municipality has not been able to fix the pipes timeously.

In other cases, however, the lack of basic services in the upgraded settlements is inextricably linked to poverty and unemployment. Bekkersdal Township, under the Westonaria Local Municipality in Gauteng Province serves as an example. Diedericks and vanEeden (2019: 145) note that despite benefiting from the government's low cost housing projects, residents of Bekkersdal are unable to access basic services. This is because cannot afford to pay for services because most of them are poor and unemployed. The failure to pay for services by residents unfortunately resulted in revenue shortfalls for the Westonaria municipality. Consequently, the municipality failed to provide adequate services to communities. What followed was the vandalism of community property as a result of residents' dissatisfaction with the lack of services.

2.2.2 Lack of Skilled Personnel and Ethical Leadership

Various pieces of legislation emphasise the need for good leadership in local government. Section 195(1)(a) of the Constitution requires a high standard of professional ethics in public administration. Consequently, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 criminalises corruption by bearers of public office.

The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Systems Act) contains a Code of conduct for councillors (hereinafter referred to as the Code of conduct). Section 2 of the Code of conduct requires councillors to perform their duties in good faith, with honesty, in a transparent manner and to act in the best interests of the municipality. Section 6 of the Code of conduct discourages a councillor to use his/her position, privileges or information obtained as a councillor for personal gain or for the benefit of another.

Section 57 of the Municipal Systems Act requires a municipality, municipal manager and managers directly accountable to the municipal manager to enter into a performance agreement. This ensures that the municipal manager and managers are aware of that which is expected from them in the performance of their duties. This is important for accountability purposes.

Viewed together, these pieces of legislation promote leadership which operates in a professional and ethical manner. This is important if local government is to fulfil its service delivery mandate. Literature on the subject, however, shows that the local government struggles to provide effective service delivery because of the lack of ethical conduct, integrity and good governance by its officials, and this is evidenced by the never-ending violent service delivery protests (Mle and Maclean 2011: 1365). The failure of the local government to fulfil its mandate of service delivery tends to erode confidence in the leadership of the South African government (Masuku 2019: 123). The lack of confidence not only arises when leaders fail to fulfil their mandates but also when leaders are viewed as untrustworthy and out of touch with the lived reality of their communities (Ndevu and Muller 2018: 192).

The leadership challenges facing local government can be traced to the practice of cadre deployment. Cadre deployment is a “policy” of the African National Congress (ANC) led government that it uses to appoint loyal members of the party to key leadership positions in various spheres of government and State Owned Enterprises. Cadres deployed under this system, however, often lack the necessary skills, merit or competency required for the positions that they occupy. It is not clear why the party deploys unskilled cadres. Tshishonga (2014: 900) opines that either the party is not “keen” to deploy skilled members or it does not have any skilled members to deploy. Unfortunately, as argued by Mlambo (2019: 218) unqualified and incompetent leaders are significant contributors to the problem of bad governance.

According to Shava and Chamisa (2018: 12-13) cadre deployment is responsible for the diminished capacity of human resources departments to function effectively because of the political interference that takes place in the hiring and firing of public officials. In addition, they also argue that deployed cadres often lack the vision and expertise required to implement government programmes. Indeed, as observed by Phago (2017: 505) in most cases cadres deployed in the various spheres of government in the past proved to be incompetent, resulting in the dismal performance of the institutions that they were heading. In addition, cadre deployment worsens the problem of corruption through nepotism, cronyism, patronage and price collusion during tendering processes (Kroukamp and Cloete 2018: 70).

Research conducted by Mohale (2018: 14) shows that political interference in the work of senior managers is responsible for the flight of skilled personnel from local government. While the cadre deployment policy has resulted in the appointment of unskilled individuals, Mohale's research has also shown that skilled professionals shun the local government sphere as a career option because of the stressful working environment that they have to work under. Senior professional managers find it difficult to give in to the demands of some politicians because fulfilling those demands puts the managers at risk of adverse legal consequences. Thus, where possible, professionals avoid local government as a career path. The cases below illustrate the extent of this problem.

In 2008, within the Gert Sibande District Municipality (Mpumalanga) it was identified that 20% of municipal posts comprising 15 top managerial positions, 85 professionals (including engineers and town planners) and 130 skilled artisans, were vacant (Ababio, Vyas-Doorgapersad and Mzini 2008: 7). In 2012, based on a study of project managers and artisans, Draai and Oshoniyi (2013: 877) found that there was a high number of vacancies at the senior management level in the Department of Infrastructure and Engineering at the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality and this had a direct impact on service delivery. Recently, the Auditor General's Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) report[10] indicated that in the 2017-18 financial year, there had been 43 vacancies for the position of the Municipal Manager. 10 of those posts had been vacant for 6 months or less, 33 of those posts had been vacant for 6 months or more. The report also indicated that there had been 51 vacancies for the position of Chief Financial Officer across municipalities. 15 of those posts were vacant for 6 months or less, while 36 of those posts lay vacant for 6 months or more.

2.2.3 Inappropriate Crowd Control Methods

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[10] https://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports/2017-2018MFMA.aspx.

Police in South Africa have a history of responding to protests with unparalleled violence. While the apartheid years are littered with many incidences of police brutality, the study will limit its focus on two tragic incidences namely, the Sharpeville massacre and the Soweto uprising. The Sharpeville massacre occurred during a non-violent protest against pass laws organised by the Pan African Congress (PAC) on 21 March 1960. Pass laws refer to discriminatory laws such as the Population Registration Act 41 of 1950 and the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. These laws relegated blacks to townships which were characterised by overcrowding and poor basic service delivery. Sharpeville, established in line with the Group Areas Act, was one such township. A number of black Africans from Sharpeville gathered at the local police station to protest against these laws. Police fired live ammunition at the protestors. The protestors fled but the police continued to shoot, resulting in the death of 68 and the injury of 186 protestors (Hopkins 2001: 247).

The Soweto uprising was a protest against the use of Afrikaans as the official medium of instruction in schools. The protest occurred on 16 June 1976. The police on this occasion again fired live ammunition into the crowd of the protesting pupils, killing a number of them.

In the new constitutional dispensation, numerous examples of police brutality also exist but the killing of Andries Tatane and the recent Marikana massacre are notable examples. Andries Tatane was a teacher and local activist in Ficksburg, a small town in the province of the Free State. He died after he was severely beaten by police while taking part in a protest regarding poor service delivery on 13 April 2011.

In the Marikana massacre, police killed 34 striking mine workers on 16 August 2012. They had been striking for better wages and living conditions. The police surrounded the miners with razor wire and fired live ammunition, even as the miners were fleeing the scene. Theletsane (2014: 357) notes with concern that the excuses (justifications) given by the police in the aftermath of the tragedy were similar to those given by the Apartheid police in similar situations, i.e. that protestors threw stones at the police and that the protestors were armed.

The popular narrative on protest violence involving the police seems to be that the police are to blame because of a general inclination towards a militaristic approach to policing and their use of excessive force in dispersing protestors. It has been argued that that these practices occur in present times is an indication that some of the apartheid policing practices have been carried over into the current South African democratic policing regime (Slingers and Obioha 2015: 402). It has also been argued that the use of force by the police during protests cannot be attributed to miscalculations or police mismanagement but to the adoption of a more violent approach to policing (Merwe 2013: 70). In the same vein, Jensen (2014: 459), in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre, observes that:

> Whatever the final outcome of the investigation [into the Marikana massacre] the Marikana massacre brought into sharp focus the use of force by the South African police, the seeming sense of righteousness with which they use that force, how central the police is as an institution for the future of South Africa, and how dangerous it can be if left unchecked.

In a study on police perspectives on service delivery protests (Brooks 2019), police officers acknowledged the right of citizens to protest but expressed dissatisfaction with the manner that citizens go about it. For these police officers, while they sympathise with residents, they indicated that they have a duty to ensure that the rights of others are protected. The police officers are thus caught in the middle when it comes to service delivery protests. Brooks (2019: 25) opines that some officers have difficulty in trying to balance democracy and law and order hence the disproportionate use of violence. For Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi (2019: 115), violent protests are regarded by the police as having “crossed the line” and are thus responded to with brute force.

While the police are sometimes responsible for sparking violence during protests because of inappropriate crowd control methods (for example, their use of excessive force to disperse protestors), research has, however, shown that protestors sometimes initiate the violence against the police. Protestors consider violence against the police as justified especially if they believe that the police have treated them unfairly (Maguire *et al.* 2018). Kynoch (2016: 78) makes an interesting observation in this regard:

> For all the focus on police brutality, it should be acknowledged that the SAPS confronts a population that often does not accept its authority and that is sometimes quick to resort to violence in its dealings with the police. On both sides, the anticipation of the other's aggression can serve as an incitement to violence.

Research has indeed shown that citizens and police have negative attitudes towards each other. For instance, in an investigation into the reasons why citizens do not report crime to the police, Potgieter (2014: 96) identifies three main reasons proffered by citizens: the negative attitude of the police towards their work; acting apathetically when dealing with members of the public and being inefficient in their duties.

2.2.4. The Lack of Public Participation

In the context of public participation within municipalities (Mathebula and Sebola 2019: 116) defines public participation as "pro-active engagement in the affairs of such a municipality in order to ensure that development and service provision is driven within the interests of the public." Chetty (2018: 255) defines public participation as follows:

> It is a process by means of which the citizenry become actively involved in the planning, decision-making, policy implementation and evaluation processes, together with government, officials and other stakeholders, so as to improve the social, environmental, political and economic context in which they reside.

What these definitions entail is that public participation requires pro-active instead of passive participation. In addition, public participation involves not only the consultation of communities on what their needs are but how they wish those needs to be satisfied. Finally, the goal of public participation is the improvement of socio-economic conditions communities live in.

Various pieces of legislation require local government to facilitate and promote public participation in matters which affect the communities concerned. In terms of Section 152(1)(e) of the Constitution, one of the objectives of the local government is to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. Section 23 of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Finance Management Act) requires a municipal council to consider the views of the local community during the tabling of the budget. Section 4 of the Municipal Property Rates

Act 6 of 2004 requires municipalities to ensure community participation before the adoption of a rates policy.

The Municipal Systems Act contains extensive provisions which relate to community participation. Section 2 states that a municipality functions in accordance with, *inter alia*, its community. Section 4(2)(c) states that the council of the municipality has the duty to encourage the involvement of the community in its affairs. Section 4(2)(e) states that the council of a municipality must consult the community about the level, quality and impact of municipal services and the available options for service delivery. Section 5 states that members of the local community have the right to contribute to the decision–making process of their municipality. In addition, the municipality must inform the local community of the decisions of the municipal council. Section 16 requires a municipality to encourage and create conditions for the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality. This includes the IDP, performance management system, budget and provision of services. Finally, Section 42 requires a municipality to involve the community in the implementation and review of the municipality's performance management system.

Sections 72 and 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Structures Act) establish the ward committee system. According to Section 72(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, the object of a ward committee is to promote a participatory democracy in the local government. Section 74 of the Municipal Structures Act states that the functions of ward committees are to relay recommendations on any matter affecting their ward to the ward councillor. Alternatively, ward committees can make recommendations through the ward councillor to the metro or local council, the executive committee, the executive mayor or the relevant metropolitan sub-council. Ward committees provide an avenue for community participation in the municipal council through ward meetings and the dissemination of information (Mofolo 2016: 236). Ward committees thus facilitate communication between local government and the community at large (Ababio 2007: 618).

Despite this legislative framework, literature on community consultation and participation shows that there is little to no consultation and community participation in matters of service delivery. In fact, violent service delivery protests are considered a sign of a "disconnection" between local government and communities in that services offered are often below expectations, or are not in line with immediate needs or fail to solve problems experienced by communities (Bakre and Dorasamy 2018: 2).

An example of the lack of participation within communities is recorded in a case study on participatory communication by Molale (2019) in Jouberton Township in the Matlosana local municipality, North West Province. The study found that the residents' role in municipal IDP processes was limited to receiving information on what the municipality was planning or what had already taken place. Research has also shown a lack of community participation in municipal budgetary processes (Molepo and Maleka 2018) and poor attendance at community meetings (Tshabalala and Lombard 2009: 402). Research has further shown that communities are unfamiliar with their ward councillors and members of their ward communities (Reddy and Sikhakane 2008: 686).

The question is why is there poor community participation through legislated avenues despite the multiplicity of platforms available? Gwala, Theron and Mchunu (2015: 55) argue that legislative prescripts, such as IDPs and ward committees, do not usually allow for meaningful participation because they alienate communities by presenting the local government's perspective on the nature of the problems faced by the community and what the solution to those problems should be. For Plessing (2017: 74) the problem is that government elites do not regard participation as democratic practice but participation as technology. *Participation as technology* means participation is used as a management tool to improve development projects. As Plessing (2017: 79) put it:

> It does not contest hierarchical power relations in a given context or society and it is a means to an end, the end being determined by elites. The less powerful are inserted into a development project, where participation is engineered and the outcomes of processes are decided upon by the powerful, local, national or even international elites.

Conceived in this way, public participation undermines democratic participation because citizens are not able to influence decision-making processes on issues that affect them.

The lack of participation also seems to be attributable to the functionality of the legislated avenues of participation. In the context of ward committees, research conducted in heterogeneous communities in Cape Town by Donaldson *et al.* (2019) shows that the functionality of ward committees is affected by political parties, human and social capital and institutional structure. For instance, when two political parties control the sub-council and ward committee, effective decision-making and communication are compromised because of distrust between parties and conflicting agendas. A sub-council and ward committee without educated, experienced and socially connected individuals will not thrive. Finally, institutional structure problems such as the lack of executive power, the under-availability of committee seats and the haphazard delineation of wards limit the functionality of ward committees.

The lack of participation has also been attributed to the ineffectiveness of avenues of participation. Research conducted in Mitchell's Plain and Khayelitsha, Cape Town, shows that residents were unwilling to interact with local government because of negative perceptions over the effectiveness of the participatory processes in place (Vivier and Wentzel 2013: 245). According to residents interviewed, councillors and municipal officials do not respect residents or care about community needs. In the instances that officials do consult, they are accused of *cherry picking* what suits them and not what the community says.

The ineffectiveness of avenues of participation is not limited to legislated platforms but also includes the media. For Wasserman, Bosch and Chuma (2018: 370) that violent protests occur in a democratic country such as South Africa is an indication that citizens regard the available avenues of participation as ineffective. In particular, they take aim at the ineffectiveness of the media as a mouthpiece of the voiceless. This is because the media's coverage of protests has been found to be biased towards a violence frame and elite perspectives instead of activists' voices.

The findings of these studies have several implications. The needs of the community become secondary if a municipality adopts a top-down approach in its dealings with the community. Poor attendance at community meetings means that only a few community members can voice their concerns. The same can be said for situations where structures put in place for public participation, such as ward committees, are dysfunctional, or where members of the community do not know their ward councillors and ward committee members.

2.3 Possible Solutions to end Violence during Service Delivery Protests

A useful starting point in presenting the various possible solutions suggested in the literature surrounding violent service delivery protests is the research carried out by Netswera and Kgalane (2014), which has been cited in the previous section on the causes of violent service delivery protests. Three solutions stand out from their study. They emphasise the need for political and electoral training, the need to employ qualified and competent officials, and training the police on appropriate crowd control methods (Netswera and Kgalane 2014: 271).

Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi (2016: 420) suggest that the local government must initiate training programs which will equip the police with skills to respond to service delivery protests in a responsible and professional manner. They emphasise that these programs must focus on communication between the police and protestors. They use the diagram depicted in Figure 2.1 to illustrate their intervention strategy.



- **Preparatory phase:**
- All parties outline ground rules and expectations.

- **Action phase:**
- Protesters communicate their demands to party/parties concerned.
- Police monitor the situation.
- Interviews with the media take place.
- Police should explicitly carry relevant weapons.

- **Crowd dispersal phase:**
- All the matters raised are attended to.
- All the parties agree to disperse.

Figure 2.1: Communication between protestors and the police (Source: Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi 2016).

Tsheola (2012: 165) suggests that advocacy service delivery planning may help curb violent service delivery protests. According to Tsheola, advocacy service delivery planning entails bringing in a planner who takes into consideration the needs of the poor and channels resources to those who do not have them (Tsheola 2012: 165). Tsheola is suggesting that if the needs of the poor are catered for, it is likely that there will be a reduction in violent protests.

In a study conducted by Banjo and Jili (2013) in Mpumalanga, the youth interviewed for the study proposed numerous solutions. These solutions can be summarised as follows: the local government must provide services instead of making empty promises and consult the community in order to understand their needs; employ qualified people; introduce youth programs; and utilise financial resources responsibly (Banjo and Jili 2013: 264).

From the discussion above, several solutions exist, as suggested in the literature, for curbing violent service delivery protests. These solutions fit into five broad themes, namely, the need to recruit skilled municipal personnel, the need to enhance police skills in crowd control, the need to promote public participation, poverty alleviation, and sound financial management. Table 2.2 presents the solutions to violent service delivery protests, as identified in the literature review above, and the corresponding themes. The next section discusses these themes further.

Table 2.2: Themes emerging from the solutions identified in literature.

Theme	Solutions to violent service delivery identified in literature
Recruit skilled municipal personnel	Employ qualified and competent officials. Employ qualified people.
Enhance police skills in crowd control	Train the police in appropriate crowd control. Equip the police with skills to respond to service delivery protests in a responsible and professional manner.

Promote public participation	Political and electoral training. Advocacy service delivery planning. Consult the community in order to understand their needs.
Poverty alleviation	Introduce youth programs.
Sound financial management	Utilise financial resources responsibly. Local government must provide services instead of making empty promises.

2.3.1 Recruiting Skilled Municipal Personnel

Qualified personnel are required to manage programmes within the local government and to ensure that it complies with the rules governing financial spending (Ntonzima 2011: 1019). As mentioned earlier, there is shortage of qualified and skilled personnel in the local government sphere. This shortage was attributed to practices such as cadre deployed and the untenable working conditions created by some political leaders. Where skilled and competent individuals are appointed into key positions, it appears that they do not complete their contractual tenure. For instance, the contract duration of a municipal manager is 5 years. The recent Auditor General's MFMA report shows that in the 2017-18 financial year, the average months municipal managers spent in a position was 32 months out of 60. For Chief Financial Officers within municipalities, the average months spent in a position was 37 months. This means that the problem of the lack of skilled personnel is likely to persist.

Those managers that persevere and remain within the local government sphere require training in order to improve their managerial skills. While some municipalities do train their personnel, the perceptions of some employees indicate dissatisfaction with the manner the trainings are coordinated and conducted. The following concerns were raised during a case study involving employees of the Umzumbe Local Municipality conducted by Luthuli, Nyawo and Mashau (2019). The majority of employees highlighted that training development needs are not aligned with the workplace skills plan. Employees were also of the view that training and development were conducted for compliance purposes instead of empowering employees. Finally, employees indicated that there are no proper measures in place for the evaluation of the impact of the training programmes offered.

In addition to recruiting skilled labour, it is important to equip important role players in municipal service delivery such as councillors equipped with critical skills. While councillors are not municipal employees, they play an important role in service delivery. The council of a municipality has the following duties, amongst others, as provided for in terms of Section 4 of the Municipal Systems Act: the council must use the resources of the municipality in the best interests of the community, encourage participation of the community, consult the community on service delivery issues and ensure the provision of services in a financially sustainable manner. It is therefore clear that councillors play a critical role in various aspects of service delivery.

It is surprising, however, that despite the responsibilities endowed on councillors, there are no educational qualifications required for one to be a councillor. This can be attributed to the political nature of their functions. Unlike municipal employees, it is not a requirement for councillors to have educational qualifications or work experience. In light of the above-mentioned obligations placed on municipal councillors, however, some form of training might be helpful in enabling them to perform their functions effectively. The following skills are important for councillors and could perhaps form part of that training (Plessis and Lues 2011: 111; Gqamane and Taylor 2013: 834):

- Community and organisational leadership skills
- Policy-making, implementation and analytical skills
- Strategic thinking and planning skills
- Ability to delegate authority
- Decision-making skills
- Sound communication and negotiation skills
- Conflict management skills
- The ability to manage diversity
- Entrepreneurial skills
- Local government law, local government finance and conflict resolution

2.3.2 Enhancing Police Skills in Crowd Control

Policing approaches such as community policing and the establishment of public order police – a unit trained to control public gatherings, are examples of attempts to resolve the problem of violence during protests.

Sebola (2014), however, argues that new approaches to policing, in particular community policing, have not accomplished much in addressing the challenges relating to crowd control during public protests. The new public order police unit has also not brought about any marked changes (Sebola 2014: 310). The Andries Tatane killing and Marikana tragedy are evidence that the police are still operating in a military style reminiscent of the methods used by the Apartheid police (Sebola 2014: 308).

Enhancing police skills in crowd control might help reduce incidences of the use of excessive force to control crowds. Coupled with this it is important to consider cultivating good relations between the police and citizens because as highlighted earlier, the police and citizens have no mutual respect for each other. Citizens ought to understand that the police are there to maintain law and order while the police ought to acknowledge that citizens have genuine concerns that they need to raise through protests. The police ought to take a step further and facilitate citizens' right to protest provided they do so within the ambit of the law.

2.3.3 Promoting Public Participation

As mentioned before, South Africa has a comprehensive legal framework which promotes public participation. Despite this framework, there has been no meaningful public participation in matters of municipal service delivery. Meyer and Venter (2013: 110), albeit in a different context, warn that a robust legal and policy framework is not enough, and that which is required are institutional arrangements which will convert policies and laws into effective interventions. In the same vein, Plessis (2008: 8) emphasises the need for "real life guidelines" and "innovation and creativity" to realise public participation. Tshabalala and Lombard (2009: 401) make an important observation in this regard: "Legislation is meaningless if it does not translate into fundamental actions and commitments acknowledged by all involved stakeholders."

Other strategies, such as the use of technology, can help promote public participation. A pilot project was launched in Makana Municipality in the Eastern Cape to establish how public participation can be enhanced in service delivery issues using mobile phone technology called MobiSAM (Thinyane, Siebörger and Reynell 2015: 243). The MobiSAM technology on the one hand provides a platform through which residents can engage with the municipality and on the other hand, allows the municipality to collect and collate information (Thinyane, Siebörger and Reynell 2015: 245).

The results of the empirical study indicated that residents of Makana Municipality were dissatisfied with service delivery relating to water, recreational facilities and roads, but only 58.1% had ever formally reported them to the municipality (Thinyane, Siebörger and Reynell 2015: 254). It is hoped that by implementing the MobiSAM technology, the residents of Makana will be able to communicate their needs directly to their municipality (Thinyane, Siebörger and Reynell 2015: 255).

Masango (2002: 60) identifies the following as factors which can contribute to effective and sustainable public participation: cultivating a culture of participation, educating the public, proactive participation instead of reactive participation, capacity-building for participation, utilising appropriate methods of participation and publicising local government affairs. The low levels of public participation alluded to in the discussion of causes of violent protests above are an indication that suggestions to improve public participation have not been implemented successfully. It is not clear why such suggestions have failed, perhaps they have not been applied. If so, it remains unclear why they have not been applied.

2.3.4 Poverty Alleviation

The current government in South Africa has put in place several policies and projects to deal with poverty. Key amongst them are:

1. the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994) https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/governmentgazetteid16085.pdf;

2. the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme (1996) https://www.gov.za/documents/growth-employment-and-redistribution-macroeconomic-strategy-south-africa-gear;
3. the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (2006) https://www.daff.gov.za/docs/GenPub/asgisa.pdf;
4. the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) (2003), http://www.epwp.gov.za/;
5. the National Development Plan (NDP) (2012) https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/National_Development_Plan;
6. the IDP (2001) Section 35 of the Municipal Systems Act; and
7. Local Economic Development (LED) (1996)[11]

The local government has a role to play in the above-mentioned policies and projects, but for the purposes of this study, the IDP and LED are relevant. At the local government level, the IDP and LED inform the initiatives by municipalities towards poverty alleviation and economic development. The IDP provides a platform for reaching decisions on municipal budgets and socio – economic development in a "consultative, systematic and strategic manner" (Mashamba 2008: 423). Section 26 of the Municipal Systems Act requires the IDP to contain, inter alia, a vision for the long-term development of the municipality, its local economic development aims and a financial plan which includes a budget projection for at least three years into the future. An IDP must identify the needs of the community, allocate resources accordingly and ensure effective project implementation (Mashamba 2008: 426). Unrealistic goals must be avoided when planning IDP policy objectives, especially when one considers budgetary and financial constraints (Valeta and Walton 2008: 379). Measurable indicators have to be put in place in order to measure the attainment of the goals set out in an IDP (Marais, Human and Botes 2008: 378).

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[11] The LED policy is closely associated with the concept of developmental local government which can be found in the South African Constitution (1996), White Paper on Local Government (1998) and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000). http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitepaper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf.

Regarding LED, Section 152 of the Constitution requires municipalities to promote the economic development of the areas within their jurisdiction. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government introduced the concept of a developmental local government. It requires municipalities to, *inter alia*, ensure social development and economic growth within their areas of jurisdiction. The preamble of the Municipal Systems Act emphasises the need "to empower municipalities to move progressively towards the social and the economic uplift of communities."

It should however be emphasised that job creation is not the direct responsibility of municipalities, instead the role of the local government is to ensure that the economic conditions within its jurisdiction allow for the creation of job opportunities (Ackron and Auriacombe 2016: 156). LED requires the local government to exercise its functions in a manner which ensures the development of the local economy as the basis for sustainable community prosperity (Ackron and Auriacombe 2016: 156).

LED is meant to enhance the economic capacity of municipalities and improve the local economy and sustainable growth (Malefane and Mashakoe 2008: 477). Due to high unemployment and poverty, LED was put in place to address these challenges and also to ensure local development and effective service delivery (Banoobhai 2011: 4). According to Moyo (2007: 226), the success of LED requires visionary leadership committed to the success of LED and which is responsive to the needs of people and ensures the participation of the people in crafting solutions to their problems.

Poverty alleviation through LED interventions has arguably been a failure. This failure is evidenced by the failures of LED interventions in various municipalities. Cato Manor's LED is one such example. Cato Manor, which falls under the eThekwini Municipality, deals with poverty through the development of small, medium, and macro enterprises (SMMEs) and cooperatives. A study by Thabethe (2012) on the Cato Manor LED revealed that huge investments in terms of human and financial capital were made to support the SMMEs in Cato Manor but the results were not pleasing. This was attributed to the fact that the model did not take into account that not all poor people are entrepreneurs, that people did not understand the cooperative model of business, and that the programs put in place were not aligned to the needs of the community (Thabethe 2012: 751).

Another study was undertaken by Zulu and Mubangizi (2014) in Mthonjaneni Municipality, which falls under the uThungulu District Municipality in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), to ascertain whether the established LED was responsive to the needs of the rural community for which it was created. Several projects, mainly agricultural in nature, were put in place, with some dating as far back as 1994 (Zulu and Mubangizi 2014: 428). The study revealed that little profit was obtained from the projects, financial resources meant to develop the projects for a long-term period were instead used to pay salaries for the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries did not have an understanding of the goals which the LED projects were meant to achieve, and the beneficiaries focused on the short-term rewards of the projects instead of the long-term benefits (Zulu and Mubangizi 2014: 429).

Moyo (2007: 224) identifies the following as reasons for the failure of LED interventions: limited or a lack of understanding of the LED concept, a lack of capacity to implement LED projects, and limited budget or poor management of funds. More recently, Munzhedzi and Makwembere (2019: 663-666) identified the following challenges facing LED programmes. Inadequate monitoring and evaluation systems for LED related programmes; weak municipal reporting structures; poor human resources capacity; limited financial resources; corruption; lack of ownership of land; the absence of an integrated approach to LED; lack of accountability; and weak leadership.

Most importantly, without an accurate evaluation system to measure the outcomes of LED interventions, LED goals become mere "political word play" (Rabie and Cloete 2013: 72). Zulu and Mubangizi (2014: 436) suggest that in order for an LED project to succeed, it has to obtain the support of the private sector and civic groups, and the municipality and community alone cannot achieve results. In the same vein, Meyer and Venter (2013: 108) argue that projects spearheaded by the local leaders, the local community and local businesses are more likely to succeed than those in which the government alone is involved.

2.3.5 Sound Financial Management

Financial management involves the use of public resources in an effective, efficient and transparent manner to fulfil the service delivery objectives of the government (Madue 2009: 414). Sound financial management is important because without it, many municipalities would not be able to fulfil their service delivery mandate, especially to communities which are in dire need of it (Ntonzima 2011: 1015).

Three 'E's are important in establishing sound financial management and accountability: effectiveness (have the outcomes been met?), efficiency (are the outputs sufficient?), and economy (were the outputs delivered in a cost-effective manner?) (Wyk 2004: 418). Fourie (2007: 735) explains:

> A sound public financial management system supports aggregate control, prioritisation, accountability and efficiency in the collection, safeguarding and spending of public resources for the delivery of services, which are critical in the achievement of public policy objectives.

Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) are important institutions in ensuring sound financial management. The MPACs exercise oversight over the allocation and expenditure of municipal finances (Khalo 2013: 590). While this is a noble initiative, it is plagued by limited resources, limited power and a lack of continuity (Khalo 2013: 591). Addressing the above challenges can enhance sound financial management in municipalities.

2.4 Why do Protestors choose Violence over Non-Violent Methods?

The discussion above shows that there is an abundance of research on the causes of violent service delivery protests. The discussion also shows that the causes of violent service delivery protests are known. That which is not known is the reason why communities choose violent protests instead of peaceful methods. As observed by Shaykhutdinov (2011: 143), many studies focus mainly on violent action and disregard the distinction between peaceful and violent action from the scope of their work. According to Shaykhutdinov (2011), it is equally important to investigate why certain groups prefer a particular method of action over another.

Investigating the causes of violence alone in order to map out violence prevention strategies is a narrow approach to the problem of violence. While widely practised and widely popular, this approach is slowly losing its appeal amongst some researchers. Dentan (2008: 52) for instance argues that:

> A discursive approach to violence should address the implicit question raised by President Khatami: why would people voluntarily cut off their own ears and tongues, so that the only language with which they can communicate is destroying and spreading death, when other forms of discourse are available?

More recently, Nissim-Sabat (2016: 477) argues that:

> Rather than address questions regarding causes, which could easily dovetail with reductive abstractions carrying a lot of baggage in the form of ontological and epistemological presuppositions, a more promising approach is to ask this question: How is it that so many people in our culture conclude that they do not have other, nonviolent, nonaddictive options for meeting their profound human need for the feeling of well-being?

Following Dentan (2008), Shaykhutdinov (2011) and Nissim-Sabat (2016), the study investigates why communities choose violent protests over non-violent methods when expressing service-delivery-related grievances. The study also seeks to answer the following questions: Which factors enable violent protests to be a possible option? How effective are violent protests in helping protestors achieve their goals? What can be done to prevent violent protests from being an attractive option?

There is a glaring lack of studies which explicitly investigate why communities choose to engage in violent service delivery protests instead of non-violent methods in the face of service-delivery-related grievances. There are studies which, on a close reading, suggest that communities engage in violent service delivery protests because they perceive violent forms of protest as effective political tools. First, Banjo and Jili (2013: 262), in their study on youth and service-delivery violence in Mpumalanga Province, observed that protestors used violence in an effort to "speed up things". Second, in a study which sought to contextualise public protests in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, Mchunu and Theron (2013: 121) observed that residents used violence in order to cause panic amongst the authorities, as this would in turn compel authorities to attend to their demands. Third, Kynoch (2016: 77) is of the view that service delivery protests are a convincing case of strategic use of violence. This is because communities have learnt that the state will only react to violent confrontation. In addition, despite successful deployment by civic organisations, communities are not willing to use non-violent activism and the law because they are protracted, expensive and less accessible to the poor.

The perception that violent forms of protests are generally considered to be effective political tools is confirmed by empirical evidence. Using data from the 2016 South African Social Attitudes Survey, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Bohler-Muller *et al.* (2017) sought to investigate the perceived effectiveness of non-violent, disruptive and violent protests, respectively. According to the data, the percentage of respondents who perceived violent protests as ineffective dropped from 81% in 1995 to 58% in 2016. As Bohler-Muller *et al.* (2017: 86) conclude, this is an indication that violent forms of protest are increasingly being perceived as effective political tools.

Violence is thus perceived as effective because of its power (real or imagined) to “speed up things” and force local government to respond to grievances. It has been notably observed that in some municipalities, violent protests are accorded top priority since violent protestors are considered more serious than non-violent protestors (Merwe 2013: 78). The question is, however, in which ways are violent protests more effective than non-violent methods? Is the effectiveness of violent protest a fact or mere perception?

2.5 Factors enabling Violence to be a possible Option

Literature on service delivery protests reveals that residents are frustrated with the conduct of their municipalities regarding the resolution of grievances, the lack of accountability and the lack of public consultation. Municipal officials are accused of ignoring community grievances (Alexander 2010: 37; Vivier and Wentzel 2013: 246) (Mottiar and Bond 2012: 311). Municipalities are also accused of ignoring concerns raised through peaceful protests (Marks and Bruce 2014: 371).

Allegations of the failure of municipalities to consult citizens are also prevalent (Mbeki and Phago 2014: 214). Allegations of the failure of municipalities to communicate or explain to the communities which they serve the reasons why promises which have been made have not materialised are also commonplace (Mofolo and Smith 2009: 437). The researcher of this study opines that this conduct of municipalities enables violent protests to be an option for communities.

Apart from the conduct of municipalities, it appears that another factor which enables violent protests to be an option for communities is their exclusion from conventional political participation avenues. The discussion above has already shown that the mechanisms put in place for community participation in matters which affect them have not been widely successful in achieving their purposes. In addition, Paret (2015: 116) observes that in terms of delivering with regards to basic needs, formal democracy has not been successful, hence one sees communities resorting to violent tactics. The argument that for the poor, who have no access to basic services, violent protest is the only leverage which they have at the local government level, is therefore not surprising (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi 2016: 411) (Muller 2013: 58). It is within this context that Mubangizi (2009: 447) warns that "[i]f space is not created for communities to interrogate state policies in a responsible manner, violence and boycotts become the only channel for venting frustrations in service delivery blockages."

Other factors which enable violent protests to be considered as an option can be ascertained from a close reading of literature on violence in general. These factors are namely positive attitudes towards violence coupled with unsophisticated political views; having nothing to lose from employing violence; and the lack of capacity to organise, wage and maintain an effective non-violent campaign, owing to low education levels. These factors are examined below.

To begin, Vergani, Barton and Iqbal (2017: 447), in their study on attitudes towards violent protests, found that social movement members with positive attitudes towards violence had narrow and less sophisticated political views and were less professionally engaged. According to Vergani, Barton and Iqbal (2017: 457), this means that individuals with positive attitudes towards violence are "more overtly driven by the search to find meaning in life and violent protests are perhaps, in part, a manifestation of their struggle to address this quest." In addition, they opine that these individuals seem to have "fewer resources for arriving at meaning, and therefore possibly see violent protest as a means to fill this void."

According to Wang and Piazza (2016: 1680), due to observers generally being likely to be alienated from a protest and withdrawing their support when a protest becomes violent, the use of violent tactics is usually a strategic choice. This means that by using violent tactics, protestors are willing to sacrifice public support in order to achieve their goals. According to Wang and Piazza (2016: 1702), this happens when protestors' claims have narrow appeal such that protestors are unable to obtain wide support for their causes, and when the protestors are marginalised and therefore have nothing to lose by using violent tactics.

Dahlum (2018: 6) argues that educated people have the capacity required for sustaining peaceful movements, and thus non-violent protests are more likely to be an attractive option for them. Dahlum uses two examples of non-violent methods to illustrate this point. First, in order to conduct a successful non-violent campaign, based on symbolic protest, individuals must have the skills to publicise their agenda, to mobilise other people and to develop a campaign strategy (Dahlum 2018: 7). Second, the success of non-violent resistance through non-cooperation is sometimes dependant on the non-cooperation of a large number of professionals with specialised skills because they are not easily replaceable (Dahlum 2018: 8). Conversely, it can be argued that the lack of capacity to organise, wage and maintain an effective non-violent campaign due to low education levels makes violent protest a possible option for protestors. This argument is supported by Shaykhutdinov (2011: 145) who posits that groups with low education levels will most likely employ violent methods because they do not have the ability to comprehend, organise and maintain a non-violent campaign.

The argument that groups with members who are less educated are likely to engage in violent protests is difficult to sustain. While studies have shown higher levels of protest activity amongst educated populations (Dahlum and Wig 2019), the link between education and violent protest is difficult to comprehend. In fact, there are many instances where educated people engaged in violent protests. One such instance in recent memory is the #FeesMustFall movement. In the face of excessive brutality from the state, the movement, which started off peacefully, turned to violence and disruptive tactics in response (Xaba 2017: 100). It seems, therefore, that the use of violence is often a matter of deliberate decision making based on a wide variety of factors such as perceived powerlessness and frustration,

2.6 How Effective are Violent Protests over Non-Violence?

Studies have shown that contrary to popular belief, non-violent methods are more effective than violent protests or violent methods. Empirical evidence that non-violent action is more effective can be derived from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset. The NAVCO dataset is a compilation of data on major violent and non-violent campaigns around the world. In their analysis of the NAVCO 3.0 dataset (which covers violent and non-violent campaigns in 21 countries between 1991 and 2012), Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis (2018: 7) observe that in the 673 cases where governments made concessions, non-violent campaigns contributed to 612 or 91% of those concessions while violent campaigns contributed to 61 or 9% of the concessions made.

Further evidence of the power of non-violent methods can be shown by their role in the fall of various dictators, in the removal of non-democratic governments, and in resisting foreign occupation. Examples include:

1. The Philippine resistance against the dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1983–1986)
2. The 1989 Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution against the Communist regime
3. The Indian movement against the British (1930–1931)
4. The Danish resistance against Nazi occupation (1940–1945)
5. The South African resistance against Apartheid[12]

In a study of major non-violent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 8) discovered that non-violent campaigns were successful in 53% of the cases while violent campaigns were only successful in 26% of the cases. In a critique of *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of*

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[12] While the ANC leaders at one time shifted away from non-violent methods and endorsed violence, the struggle against the apartheid regime was largely non-violent.

Nonviolent Conflict by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) wherein the authors (Stephan and Chenoweth) also present and discuss their findings from their 2008 study, Lehoucq (2016) challenges the effectiveness of non-violent action. For Lehoucq (2016: 284), if one takes into account the efforts to reform dictatorships in Central America which Chenoweth and Stephan's study overlooks, the result is that both types of action are equal in efficacy. In other words, neither method of action is more effective than the other. There is no evidence, however, (at least from the review article), that Lehoucq's claim is based on empirical analysis as does Stephan and Chenoweth's study. As such, it is difficult to attach any significance to the claim that there is no difference in effectiveness between violent and non-violent methods.

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 9) identify two reasons for the success of non-violent campaigns. First, the use of non-violent methods increases the legitimacy of the group's demands, draws domestic and international support for the group and encourages greater participation in the movement, which in turn raises the pressure on the target. Second, by using non-violent methods, resistance groups are able to extract concessions through bargaining or negotiation. Similarly, Simpson, Willer and Feinberg (2018: 2) argue that groups which use violence tend to be perceived as unreasonable, have less recognition from society and receive less public support. Research by (Huff and Kruszewska 2016: 1777) also indicates less public support for governments to negotiate with groups which use violent tactics such as bombing.

Research has shown that violent methods such as terrorism have not been successful in helping terrorists obtain concessions from governments (Abrahms and Gottfried 2016). Research has also shown that terrorism has not been effective in helping rebels achieve their larger political objectives as compared to non-terrorist groups (Fortna 2015). Abrahms (2006: 45) notes that studies on terrorism that argue that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy are not supported by sound empirical evidence. For the most part, the arguments are based on single-case studies or the successes of the Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers and Palestinian terrorist groups (Abrahms 2006: 45). An analysis of 28 terrorist groups by Abrahms revealed that these groups succeeded in accomplishing their 42 policy objectives only 7% of the time (Abrahms 2006: 43). As observed by Abrahms (2006: 76), this is an indication that terrorism as a coercive strategy does not work and this is because countries are not willing to make concessions when civilians are targeted.

These studies show that in general, violent methods are not effective. Literature on violent service delivery protests is, however, silent on whether violence is indeed an effective political tool. It is difficult to make a general statement on the efficacy of violent service delivery protests based on the studies mentioned above. This is because effectiveness is determined or measured by a wide range of indicators. Most common among these is the achievement of stated goals. These goals differ for each movement or organisation. Whether violent protests on issues of service delivery are effective or not has not been tested using empirical methods.

2.7 Conclusion

Studies on violent service delivery protests in South Africa focus mainly on the causes of and solutions to violent service delivery protests. As mentioned earlier, however, despite a wealth of knowledge gained from both theoretical and empirical studies, violent service delivery protests continue to take place in our communities unabated and sometimes with alarming levels of violence. Instead of investigating the causes of violent service delivery protests in order to suggest 'new' solutions to the problem, as most studies have done, this study sought to understand why communities choose violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods.

The literature reviewed suggests that people choose violent protests over non-violence because they consider violence as an effective political tool. Whether this is the case regarding service delivery protests remains to be seen. Five factors were identified as enabling violence to be a viable option for would-be protestors, namely, frustration with the conduct of municipalities; exclusion from conventional political participation avenues; positive attitudes towards violence coupled with unsophisticated political views; having nothing to lose from employing violence; and the lack of capacity to organise, wage and maintain an effective non-violent campaign owing to low education levels. The literature review has also revealed that non-violent methods are more effective than violent protests.

The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework underpinning this study.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter lays out the theoretical foundation of the study. While the literature review in Chapter 2 discussed existing studies on violent service delivery protests, the current chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework within which to understand the issue of violent service delivery protests. In particular, the chapter discusses the theories which help to explain why, in the face of grievances, people resort to violence instead of peaceful means of conflict resolution.

Before embarking on a discussion of the theories used in this study, it is important to provide a working definition of what is meant by the terms *theory* and *theoretical framework*. The word "theory" has a wide range of meanings attached to its use. Hammersley (2012: 394-397) identifies seven such meanings:

1. *Theory in relation to practice*: wherein theory refers to ideas or maxims that can be used to understand for instance how and why a certain task or activity ought to be undertaken.
2. *Theory versus fact*: wherein theory is a speculative statement whose validity is currently uncertain or untested.
3. *Theory as abstraction as against concrete particulars*: wherein theory is considered to be a higher form of abstract thinking whereby generalisations go beyond (or against) our usual experiences or common-sense knowledge.
4. *Theory as concerned with the macro, as against accounts of the local*: here theory refers to accounts of phenomena that have a broader instead of a local focus. In order to understand phenomena, it must be viewed against the broader social system.
5. *Theory by contrast with description*: wherein theory refers to an explanatory principle that is used to explain (what causes) particular phenomena.
6. *Theory as an explanatory language*: wherein theory provides a language for describing or talking about particular social phenomena.
7. *Theory as an approach or "paradigm"*: wherein theory is understood as a set of ontological, epistemological, and sometimes praxiological, assumptions.

For the purposes of this study, meaning 5 is more relevant to this study since one of the main objectives of this research is to understand why, in the face of grievances, people resort to violence instead of peaceful means of conflict resolution. Theory is thus defined in this study as an explanatory principle used to explain causality or as Ulriksen and Dadalauri (2016: 224) put it, theory is a “statement of causality”. It is important to highlight that a number of different theories can help us to understanding why, in the face of grievances, people resort to violence instead of peaceful means of conflict resolution. A theoretical framework presents those theories and the relationship between them in a structured manner that helps to understand the phenomena under examination and make generalisations or come up with hypotheses.

The sections below discuss five theories that underpin this study. The human needs theory, the ecological theory, the social learning theory and the rational choice theory were used to explain why residents choose violent over non-violent methods. The conflict transformation theory was used as a guiding theory for the intended intervention for the prevention of violent service delivery protests in Chapter 8. These five theories were combined into a framework that helps conceptualize the problem of violent service delivery protests and what can be done about them.

3.2 The Human Needs Theory

The human needs theory as conceived by Maslow (1943) stipulates that human behaviour is motivated by five basic needs namely, physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs and the need for self-actualisation. These needs are organised into a hierarchy with physiological needs yielding greater power than the others. To illustrate this point, Maslow (1943: 373) argues that a person without any of the stipulated needs is most likely to be motivated by physiological needs than any other needs. Thus, a person without food, safety, love and esteem is most likely to seek to satisfy his hunger than strive for anything else.

When physiological needs are satisfied, other needs arise and they require satisfaction. According to Maslow (1943: 375):

> It is quite true that man lives by bread alone when there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is chronically filled?
>
> At once other (and 'higher') needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still 'higher') needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency.

Next on Maslow's hierarchy are safety needs. Maslow (1943: 376-378) illustrates nature of safety needs by using infants as an example. For Maslow, children require consistency and predictability thus any change to their routines makes them unsafe. In the same vein, domestic violence within the home may be particularly disturbing for them. The same can be said about unfamiliar situations for children such as being lost, illness or death. According to Maslow (1943: 379), safety needs can also be observed in adults as the desire for things such as secure employment, protection, a savings account and various kinds of insurance such as medical cover, unemployment insurance, disability cover and old age insurance.

Love needs come after safety needs. An example of love needs is the yearning for "affectionate relations with people in general" which may arise from "the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children" (Maslow 1943: 381). Maslow emphasises that sexual intercourse is not a love need; it is most likely a physiological need. Lastly, according to Maslow, embedded in the notion of love needs is giving and receiving love.

Maslow (1943: 381-382) identifies two categories of esteem needs; the "desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom" and the "desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation." According to Maslow, when esteem needs are fulfilled an individual tends to feel confident, strong, capable and useful in the world.

The fifth basic need is self-actualisation. According to Maslow (1943: 382) self-actualisation manifests itself in an individual's need to become what he or she is capable of becoming in life. Thus:

> A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualization.

Based on a reading of Maslow's later works and private journal entries Koltko-Rivera (2006: 302-304) argues that we should add a sixth human need known as self-transcendence to the hierarchy. Koltko-Rivera (2006: 306-307) describes self-transcendence as follows:

> At the level of self-transcendence, the individual's own needs are put aside, to a great extent, in favour of service to others and to some higher force or cause conceived as being outside the personal self.

Such individuals therefore motivated not by the need for self-actualisation but for the desire to be of service for the greater good. For Koltko-Rivera (2006: 310) individuals such as Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi and other lesser known individuals who risked their lives for social justice, environmental or religious causes fit this description of self-transcendence. Most depictions of Maslow's theory, however, do not include the need for self-transcendence as part of the hierarchy.

Maslow's hierarchy of needs appears in popular texts in the form of a triangle or pyramid. This representation of the hierarchy in the form of a triangle has been rejected as an inaccurate depiction of Maslow's ideas. In Maslow's work discussed above, he does not represent the hierarchy of needs in the form of a triangle or any diagram for that matter. For Rowan (1998: 88) the use of the triangle suggests that there is an "end point" or "nothing further" beyond the triangle or listed human needs. Rowan in fact argues for the addition of the human need of competence or effectiveness to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Rowan (1998: 84) describes the need of competence or effectiveness as follows:

> This need has to do with the actual and perceived competence we have in dealing with the environment...It is about mastery and control...


Self Actualization
Esteem (respect)
Love (affection, belongingness)
Safety
Immediate Physiological Needs

Figure 3.1: Typical representation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. (Source: Fergeus *et al.* (2019: 157)

Kenrick *et al.* (2010) have also suggested changes to the hierarchy of needs while maintaining the depiction of the hierarchy in the form of a pyramid or triangle. Kenrick *et al.* (2010) removed self-actualisation and replaced it with three reproductive needs: parenting, mate retention and mate acquisition.


Parenting
Mate Retention
Mate Acquisition
Status/Esteem
Affiliation
Self-Protection
Immediate Physiological Needs

Figure 3.2: An updated hierarchy of fundamental human needs (Source Kenrick *et al.* (2010: 293)

This approach has been criticised by Kesebir, Graham and Oishi (2010: 317) for rendering the theory of human needs "animal centred" instead of "human centred":

> The drawback, however, is that this hierarchy no longer uniquely captures human motivations, as well as the uniquely human malleability of the relative power of different needs at different times and places.

The proposed additions and deletions to Maslow's hierarchy of human needs are an indication that there is no agreed definition of what constitutes human needs. Without undermining the utility of the revised (or new) models of the human needs theory put forward by other scholars, this study adopts Maslow's original conception of his theory of basic needs because of its simplicity and its generalizability. In particular, the theory is well suited explain what motivates violent behaviour.

When the theory is applied to the context of this study, in particular, to explain why residents resort to violent protests instead of non-violent means, the following can be argued. Human beings have needs, and if those needs are not met, they will resort to violence in order to obtain those needs (Kok 2007: 91). The underlying argument here is that when basic needs are not provided timeously or if they are not provided at all, people feel that there is no other recourse than to resort to violence (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi 2016: 411). This is arguably true for people who live in poverty especially when we adopt a definition of poverty which acknowledges the dehumanising effect of not leading a meaningful, dignified life:

> We could understand poverty as a form of "derealisation" or "social death", as a condition that renders certain lives unreal and as an erasure of certain groups of people from the category of the Human. Once such lives are displaced by the violence of derealisation, they no longer appear within the horizon of ethics and thus are no longer regarded as the kind of beings with whom one can enter into an ethical relation. Thus, both at the normative level and at a practical-experiential level, they are made to cease being persons altogether (Modiri 2015: 244).

The human needs theory, however, does not explain the motivation behind violence that does not arise from the lack of basic needs. For instance, heavy handed policing of protests, the lack of responses from municipal officials regarding people's grievances, corruption and broken promises over service delivery. In addition, not everyone who lacks basic needs will resort to violence. In other words, why residents choose violence over non-violence cannot solely be explained by the human needs theory. Maslow (1943: 390) seems to acknowledge this when he states the following:

> Not all behaviour is determined by the basic needs. We might even say that not all behaviour is motivated. There are many determinants of behaviour other than motives.

The most important contribution of the theory to this study, however, is that it shows that the lack of basic needs is a useful starting point if we are to understand the motivation behind violent protests. Critics may argue that if the starting point in the quest to understand the motivation behind violent protests is the lack of basic needs, then the relative deprivation theory should also provide us with useful insights into the problem of violence. In fact, the starting point of the relative deprivation theory as put forward by one of the pioneering scholars, W.G Runciman is an individual who lacks "X". Runciman (1961: 316) defined the relative deprivation theory as follows:

> Relative deprivation may then be broadly defined by saying that a person is relatively deprived when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or imagined time, as having X (whether or not they do have X), and (iii) he wants X (whether or not it is feasible that he should have X).

For Pettigrew (2015: 12) relative deprivation occurs when all the following requirements are met. First, individuals make cognitive comparisons between their situation and that of others. Second, individuals then make cognitive appraisals that they are disadvantaged individually or as a group. Third, they regard the disadvantages as unjust and this arouses anger and resentment.

From the two conceptions of the relative deprivation theory above, it is clear that the underlying feature of the theory is a comparison between one's situation and that of others. In the case of Runciman's conception, an individual wants X after seeing another person or himself as having X. In the case of Pettigrew, an individual begins to realise that he or she is disadvantaged individually or as a group after making a comparison of his situation to that of others. This poses a problem for anyone who wishes to apply the theory to situations of violent service delivery protests for it is doubtful that an individual living in a shack, without electricity and water first makes a comparison between himself and others before he can realise that he wants better living conditions or that he is disadvantaged.

It is also noteworthy that relative deprivation is subjective in nature (Sayre 2010: 443). This means that objectively a group may be worse off than another group but may not necessarily regard themselves as relatively deprived. Conversely, objectively a group may be in a better position than the comparison group but may regard themselves as relatively deprived. This makes it difficult to predict the circumstances that may lead to a protest since for instance, community A may decide to protest yet it is in a better position than community B which may choose not to protest.

The link between relative deprivation in general and violence may be stated as follows. Relative deprivation emanating from “unfavourable social comparisons” may cause frustration and anger thus increasing the chances of violent and criminal behaviour among the deprived (Bernburg, Thorlindsson and Sigfusdottir 2009: 1224). In terms of the relative deprivation theory therefore, violence is traced back to comparisons of one’s situation to that of others. This makes it difficult to rely on the theory to answer the question why protestors choose violence over nonviolence because as highlighted above, individuals need not necessarily compare themselves to others to realise that they are disadvantaged. In other words the frustration and anger that is the basis of violent service delivery protest arguably does not emanate from “unfavourable social comparisons”. It is for these reasons that the researcher argues that the theory has little, if any relevance for violent service delivery protests, at least as they manifest themselves in the South African context.

In addition to the human needs theory, the study also utilises the ecological theory to help explain why residents choose violent protests over non-violent methods. The following section discusses Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory.

3.3 The Ecological Theory

The ecological theory, as conceived by Bronfenbrenner, explains the effect of the exposure to different environments on child development. As Bronfenbrenner (1975: 439) put it:

> With reference to human growth, an ecological perspective focuses attention on development as a function of interaction between the developing organism and the enduring environments or contexts in which it lives out its life.

Bronfenbrenner (1977: 514) described his theory of the ecology of human development as follows:

> The ecology of human development is the scientific study of the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the life span, between a growing human organism and the changing immediate environments in which it lives, as this process is affected by relations obtaining within and between these immediate settings, as well as the larger social contexts, both formal and informal, in which the settings are embedded.

According to Bronfenbrenner (1977: 514-515) the ecological environment consists of four structures: the microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem and exosystem. The microsystem refers to the relationship between a person and the immediate environment such as his or her home, school or workplace. The mesosystem refers to the interrelations between the environments surrounding a person at a particular point of that person's life. The exosystem refers to social structures that influence the immediate environment surrounding the individual for example the world of work, mass media and government agencies. The macrosystem refers to institutional patterns of culture or subculture manifested through the micro, meso and exosystem. Thus, microsystems can be conceived as norms or ideologies or customs.

Bronfenbrenner later added another structure to the ecological environment, which he called the chronosystem. The chronosystem enables us to examine the impact of changes in the environments (in which the individual is living) over time, on the development of an individual. According to Bronfenbrenner (1986: 724) in its simple form, the chronosystem is concerned with a life transition. He distinguishes between two types of transitions, namely a normative transition (for example school entry, puberty, entering the labour force, marriage, and retirement) and a non-normative transition (for example death or severe illness in one's family, divorce, moving, winning the lottery). In its advanced form, the chronosystem is concerned with the combined impact of the normative and non-normative transitions over a long period of an individual's life.

Thus, in its basic form, Bronfenbrenner's ecological theory posits that the ecological environment where children are situated or exposed to influences their behaviour (Lee 2011: 1667). The theory and its variants have been adapted, modified and extended to contexts other than child or human development, as evidenced by the studies outlined below.

Sargeant *et al.* (2017) investigated how the community context affects individuals' perceptions of violence as a conflict resolution method among other community members. Their study found that perceptions that fellow community members support the resolution of disputes through violence were high in communities with a history of high rates of violent crime (Sargeant *et al.* 2017: 12).

Baskin and Sommers (2014) investigated how exposure to community violence affects violent youth offences. The results from their study showed that, independent of other known risk factors, youth exposed to community violence were likely to remain involved in violent criminal behaviour (Baskin and Sommers 2014: 378). In other words, when youth involved in criminal behaviour are exposed to an environment where violence is commonplace, they are likely to continue taking part in violent crime.

A study by Parkes (2007) examined the meanings of violence formed by children exposed to violence in different aspects of their lives. The study revealed that such children did not fully condemn violence but sometimes viewed it as a necessary tool for retaliation and retributory justice (Parkes 2007: 411). The children were thus torn between violent and non-violent forms of conflict resolution (Parkes 2007: 412). Choosing between violence and non-violence is arguably one of the difficult choices with which children are faced when exposed to conflict. If, however, as children grow up, they adopt the view that violence is sometimes necessary to achieve certain objectives, they are likely to use violence as a tool for conflict resolution when they become adults.

The relevance of the ecological theory to this study lies in that it helps to explain violent behaviour that is not motivated by basic needs. In the context of this study, the ecological theory can be restated or applied as follows: if conditions within a particular community encourage or permit the use of violence as a grievance-resolution mechanism, individuals are likely to choose violent means of grievance resolution. In other words, whether an individual will use violence or not can be determined by the environment within which he is situated.

The ecological theory however fails to explain *how* individuals exposed to environments that encourage the use of violence adopt violence as a preferred form of grievance resolution. In other words, it fails to account for the *process* through which an individual develops positive attitudes towards the use of violence. To address this shortcoming of the ecological theory, the study invokes the social learning theory.

3.4 The Social Learning Theory

Akers' social learning theory has its origins in Sutherland's theory of differential association.[13] The basic premise of Sutherland's theory is that criminal behaviour is learned like any other behaviour. The problem with Sutherland's theory, however, was that it did not adequately specify how the learning process occurs (Akers, Burgess and Johnson 1968: 459). In light of this, Burgess and Akers (1966) reformulated Sutherland's theory in an effort to specify the learning process and to incorporate into it modern behavioural thinking. In so doing, they came up with what is known as the differential association-reinforcement theory of criminal behaviour. This early version of the social learning theory has seven propositions:

1. Criminal behaviour is learned according to the principles of operant condition;
2. Criminal behaviour is learned both in non-social situations that are reinforcing or discriminative, and through social interaction in which the behaviour of other persons is reinforcing or discriminative for criminal behaviour;
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behaviour occurs in those groups which comprise the individual's major source of reinforcements;
4. The learning of criminal behaviour, including specific techniques, attitudes, and avoidance procedures, is a function of the effective and available reinforcers, and the existing reinforcement contingencies;

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[13] According to Burgess and Akers, the original formal statement of the theory appeared in Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology, 3rd ed., Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939, pp. 4-8.

5. The specific class of behaviours which are learned and their frequency of occurrence are a function of the reinforcers that are effective and available, and the rules or norms by which these reinforcers are applied;
6. Criminal behaviour is a function of norms which are discriminative for criminal behaviour, the learning of which takes place when such behaviour is more highly reinforced than non-criminal behaviour;
7. The strength of criminal behaviour is a direct function of the amount, frequency and probability of its reinforcement (Burgess and Akers 1966: 132-144).

In this study, however, a more recent version of Aker's theory is used. This recent version is a result of developments, modifications and reformulations of the theory over many years by Akers himself and by Akers together with other scholars. The theory explains the process involved in learning criminal or deviant behaviour. Akers (2009: 50) describes his social learning theory as follows:

> The probability that persons will engage in criminal and deviant behaviour is increased and the probability of their conforming to the norm is decreased when they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behaviour and espouse definitions favourable to it, are relatively more exposed in-person or symbolically to salient criminal/deviant models, define it as desirable or justified in a situation discriminative for the behaviour, and have received in the past and anticipate in the current or future situation relatively greater reward than punishment for the behaviour.

According to Akers (2009: 51), an individual is likely to commit deviant acts when:

1. He or she differentially associates with others who commit, model, and support violations of social and legal norms.
2. The violative behaviour is differentially reinforced over behaviour in conformity to the norm.
3. He or she is more exposed to and observes more deviant than conforming models.
4. His or her own learned definitions are favourable toward committing the deviant acts.

The social learning theory has four major elements namely, differential association, differential reinforcement, imitation, and definitions. These elements are derived from the four propositions listed above. In what follows, these elements are considered in turn. To begin with, according to Akers (2009: 61) differential association is concerned with the exposure of an individual to others and their deviant behaviour. Differential association is also concerned with exposure of an individual to different patterns of norms and values through his association with others. Accordingly, an individual exposed to other individuals who are involved in or have positive attitudes towards anti-social or deviant behaviour is more likely to take part in such anti-social or deviant behaviour (Yarbrough *et al.* 2012: 193) (Gagnon 2018: 4). Peers in this context may share their experiences, knowledge, skills and beliefs with the individual and thus influence his or her potential to engage in the same activities (Miller and Morris 2016: 1547). Notably, as contemplated by Checkel (2017: 594), through socialisation, an individual may be inducted into the culture of a particular community. Such a culture may be comprised of the norms and practices which uphold the use of violence as the right course of action when resolving conflicts.

Differential reinforcement refers to "the balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments that follow or are consequences of behaviour" (Akers 2009: 67). In other words, differential reinforcement refers to the extent to which an individual is reinforced to take part or not to take part in anti-social or deviant behaviour, for instance, the greater the reward, the greater the likelihood that the individual concerned will take part in anti-social or deviant behaviour (Yarbrough *et al.* 2012: 193). This is known as positive reinforcement. These rewards need not be physical but can be symbolic. As Akers (2009: 72) put it:

> Their reinforcing effects come from their fulfilling ideological, religious, political, or other goals. Even those rewards that we consider to be very tangible, such as money and material possessions, gain their reinforcing worth from the symbolic prestige and approval value they have in society.

An individual will also likely engage in a deviant act if the act enables him to escape unpleasant experiences. Akers calls this negative reinforcement. In sum, anticipated and actual consequences flowing from taking part in such anti-social or deviant behaviour are important factors in predicting an individual's choice (Miller and Morris 2016: 1548).

Imitation refers to "behaviour modelled on, and following the observation of, similar behaviour in others" (Akers 2009: 75). An individual who witnesses anti-social behaviours is thus more likely to take part in such witnessed anti-social or deviant behaviour (Yarbrough *et al.* 2012: 193). Family, friends, teachers or the media are possible sources of imitation. Imitation may occur even if the admired model did not intend to encourage imitation, for instance, where the model "reinforces the repetition of a behaviour to the observer either intentionally or unintentionally" (Miller and Morris 2016: 1547). By imitating his or her role model, an individual anticipates obtaining similar reinforcement to that of his or her role model (Cochran *et al.* 2017: 42).

"Definitions" are defined as "a person's own evaluative judgments, attitudes, or meanings attached to a particular behaviour" (Cochran *et al.* 2017: 42). Positive definitions are those which make certain behaviours more attractive or desirable (Miller and Morris 2016: 1547). For instance, when an individual's definitions approve a particular act, the likelihood is that the individual concerned will take part in that act (Cochran *et al.* 2017: 42). Neutralising definitions encourage anti-social or deviant behaviour by establishing justifications for such behaviour (Miller and Morris 2016: 1547). Negative definitions discourage the individual to take part in anti-social or deviant behaviour (Miller and Morris 2016: 1547). These definitions, whether favourable or unfavourable to anti-social or deviant behaviour, are developed through differential association, differential reinforcement and imitation (Cochran *et al.* 2017: 42).

Akers and colleagues have tested the social learning theory extensively over the years. To begin with, Akers, Burgess and Johnson (1968) were able to show that positive and negative reinforcement are responsible for opiate use in individuals. In a test of the theory on marijuana and alcohol use by Akers *et al.* (1979), differential association, differential reinforcement, definitions, and imitation combined accounted for 68% of the variance in marijuana use and 55% of the variance in alcohol use by adolescents. The theory has also successfully explained alcohol use amongst the elderly. In a study by Akers *et al.* (1989) alcohol use by the elderly was found to be a result of differential association with other drinkers and differential reinforcement of drinking alcohol instead of abstinence. Support for the theory was also established in a study on adolescent smoking by Akers and Lee (1996).

Other scholars have also tested and found support for the theory. In a study to examine adolescent cocaine use Schaefer *et al.* (2015) found that associating with peers who use hard drugs, increases the likelihood of cocaine use. When (Norman and Ford 2015) tested the theory to explain adolescent ecstasy use, results showed that adolescents with positive attitudes towards substance use, who have peers that use and whose parents and peers condoned substance use where more likely to use ecstasy. The social learning theory has also been used to explain the use of performance enhancing drugs among professional athletes. A study by Kabiri *et al.* (2020) revealed that an individual who is exposed to people who use or consider the use of performance enhancing drugs to be acceptable; who serve as role models; and are the source of rewards associated with drug use is likely to use such drugs.

Recently, the theory has been applied to non-traditional crimes such as cyber bullying. In a study by Shadmanfaat *et al.* (2019), differential association with people who consider cyber bullying as a good thing and who actually commit the crime of cyber bullying was found to be an important indicator that such an individual will most likely commit cyber bullying. Similarly, the application of the theory to cyber offending by Nodeland and Morris (2020) revealed that associating with peers (on or offline) who support involvement in cyber offending influences an individual's participation in cyber offending.

The examples mentioned above show that the theory is applicable to a diverse range of deviant behaviour. Applied to the context of this study, the social learning theory can be stated as follows. Individuals who are likely to choose violence over non-violent methods are:

1. individuals who have been exposed to people who use violence or consider the use of violence as a good thing (differential association);
2. individuals with positive and neutralising evaluative judgements concerning the appropriateness of violent behaviour (definitions);
3. individuals who as a result of their association with or exposure to people with positive attitudes towards violence anticipate greater rewards from taking part in violence (differential reinforcement); and

4. Individuals who have as their role models people with positive attitudes towards violence and thus tend to imitate such people (imitation).

At this moment, it is important to concede that neither the human needs theory, nor the ecological theory, nor the social learning theory can help explain why some individuals will readily resort to violence in order to resolve grievances while other individuals in the same situation will not. To put this into the context of the study, not everyone lacking basic needs will engage in a violent protest. Similarly, not everyone exposed to or living in an environment that supports the use of violence as a mechanism for grievance resolution will readily choose violence. Again, not everyone exposed to peers who use violence or consider the use of violence as a good thing will engage in violence. In addition, not everyone who attends or is present during a violent protest will engage in the actual violence or even support the use of violence. It can be argued that individuals who take part or refuse to take part in the violence undergo a decision-making process whereby they weigh the advantages or disadvantages of choosing violence. The rational choice theory discussed below helps to understand this phenomenon.

3.5 The Rational Choice Theory

In its basic form, the rational choice theory, as used in the context of crime and crime deterrence, posits that an individual will commit a crime if the perceived rewards flowing from that crime outweigh the perceived costs associated with taking part in that crime (Matsueda, Kreager and Huizinga 2006: 100). The perceived costs of the crime include arrest, conviction or imprisonment (Matsueda, Kreager and Huizinga 2006: 101), while the perceived rewards include income, peer group status, or psychological satisfaction (Matsueda, Kreager and Huizinga 2006: 102).

The rational choice theory can best be understood by the following assertions:

1. Any social phenomenon is a result of individual decisions, actions or attitudes
2. Action can be understood with or without being rational
3. Action is caused by reasons in the mind of an individual

4. The reasons giving rise to such an action are informed by the consideration given by an individual to the possible consequences of such an action
5. An individual is mainly concerned with the consequences of his or her action to himself or herself
6. An individual is able to distinguish between the costs and benefits of a particular action and thus chooses the action with the most benefits (Boudon 2003: 3).

Traditional economic theory is used to explain human behaviour envisages a rational “economic man.” According to Simon (1955: 99) this man is assumed to have vast knowledge of relevant aspects of his environment; has a well organised system of preferences; has great computation skills that enable him to calculate and decide which alternative courses of action available to him will help him achieve maximum utility.

The rational choice theory as conceived by Becker (1968: 176) is based on traditional economic theory and it predicts that a person will commit an offence “if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities.” Becker, however, does not incorporate other elements of traditional economic theory such as the assumption of perfect knowledge or lightning fast calculation on the part of the would-be criminal. In fact, such a man does not exist in real life situations. Becker (1993: 385-386) later improved his theory by clarifying that his economic approach to crime is not entirely premised on the assumption that “individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain”. For Becker, an individual’s actions are determined or influenced by a much broader set of values and preferences. In addition, Becker also opined that an individual’s actions may be restricted by factors such as income, time, imperfect memory, calculating capacities, and opportunities available in the economy.

The rational choice theory used in this study follows Becker’s conception of rational choice. That is, an individual will in the main, commit a crime if the perceived rewards of the crime exceed the rewards that he would get if he had used his time and resources on other activities. The decision to commit the crime is itself influenced by a set of values other than self-gain. Conversely, the decision to commit the crime can also be limited by a broad range of factors other than the high costs of committing the crime.

Those that engage in violence however, are not always rational. In fact, according to Harsanyi (1969: 524) the rational choice theory suffers from an inability to interpret or justify what can be regarded as irrational behaviour. The researcher argues that what is rational should be viewed or examined from a subjective point of view. Following Oppenheim (1953: 350), in order to determine the rationality of one's behaviour or action, we need to consider the following four factors: the actual goal, the information available to the person at the time the decision was made, his/her beliefs at that time, and the standards of evaluation. This decision-making does not occur in a vacuum or independent of context or prior experiences. To the aforementioned considerations we can thus add a fifth, that is the context (historical or present) within which the choice was made, see (Shvarts 2001: 56). Having this information at our disposal enables us to fully understand behaviour presented as a product of rational choice or rational thinking but nevertheless seems irrational.

It is noteworthy that the rational choice theory has been tested and found to be predictive of a wide variety of behaviour, including, but not limited to, why people buy mafia protection instead of opting for (free) state protection (Shvarts 2001); why abused women choose to stay in an abusive relationship instead of leaving (Meyer 2012); and why jihadist suicide bombers agree to take part and kill themselves in suicide terrorist bombings (Perry and Hasisi 2015). In all these instances, the rational choice theory was successful in explaining behaviour that, on the face of it appears irrational.

When applied to this study, the rational choice theory helps to understand the seemingly irrational act of engaging in violent service delivery protests instead of non-violent methods. Violent protests are at face value, irrational in the sense that, as highlighted in Chapter 1, they tend to result in a cycle of violence in that if protestors are able to obtain concessions through the use of violence, future protestors will be more inclined to use violence as well, thus creating a cycle of violence. In addition, violent service delivery protests may result in a culture of violence or normalisation of violence because of the repeated use of violence to obtain concessions. Violent service delivery protests may also result in service delivery backlogs because of the destruction of property. Finally, these protests have a negative impact on the economy. Violent service delivery protests may, however, be regarded as rational if we can understand, *inter alia*, the protestors' goals, beliefs and the context within which the decision to engage in violent protests was made.

The theories discussed so far mainly explain and predict behaviour. In particular, they help to understand why protestors choose to engage in violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods when expressing their grievances, which is one of the main objectives of this study. Another objective of this study, however, is to develop and test interventions aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests. The section below presents and discusses the conflict transformation theory as a theory that can guide this study in the drafting of such interventions in Chapter 8.

3.6 The Conflict Transformation Theory

Two approaches are commonly used to 'resolve' conflicts, namely, conflict management and conflict resolution. The distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution is as follows: conflict management seeks to prevent a conflict from escalating by bringing it under control (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2001: 65), while conflict resolution on the other hand seeks to settle a conflict by encouraging one or all parties in a dispute to make a compromise (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2001: 67).

A new approach called *conflict transformation* has emerged as an alternative to conflict management and conflict resolution. The conflict transformation theory was developed from a realisation that the conflict resolution and conflict management models were not capable of achieving comprehensive change in the relationships between warring parties (Abu-Nimer 2013: 167). In what follows, the study discusses the conflict transformation theory as proposed by Lederach. According to (Lederach 2014),[14] conflict transformation can be defined as follows:

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[14] While his theory has been developed and presented in a number of publications, this research relies on Lederach's 2014 edition of his work *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* originally published in 2003. It is the researcher's view that the aforementioned publication contains the simplified and well-articulated version of his theory. Please note that the publications have no page numbers hence no reference to specific numbers will be made in the discussion of his theory.

> Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.

Certain elements of this definition require analysis. According to Lederach (2014), conflict transformation is dependent on the capacity to *envision* conflict as normal in human relations and a willingness to *respond* to it in a manner that maximises its potential to bring about positive change. The *ebb and flow* of social conflict refers to various episodes or manifestation of conflict. Conflict transformation requires us to view these episodes not in isolation but in light of and as part of a broader pattern of issues. According to Lederach (2014) conflict presents us with *life giving opportunities* which help us to understand ourselves, others and our social structures. Therefore, instead of viewing conflict as a threat, we must view it as a catalyst for positive change. *Constructive change* requires an understanding of the underlying issues of the conflict and a capacity to respond through creative solutions. In order to *reduce violence and increase justice*, conflict transformation insists that people must have a voice in the decisions that affect them. In addition, *direct action and social structures* are pivotal to reducing violence and increasing justice. Direct interaction involves face-to-face interaction, which enables us to exchange ideas and find common ground. Finally, conflict transformation acknowledges that conflicts evolve around *relationships*, in particular, the less visible dimensions of human relationships.

What then are the goals of conflict transformation? According to Lederach (2014), conflict transformation has change-oriented goals that operate on four dimensions of human experience. At the personal level, it seeks to minimise the negative effects of social conflict and to maximise the capacity for personal growth and well-being. At the relational level, it seeks to promote communication between parties and to maximise their understanding of the other. On a structural level, conflict transformation seeks to unearth and address the underlying causes and structural conditions that give rise to violent conflict and to come up with non-violent methods that will minimise and ultimately end the violence. In addition, it requires the development of structures that focus on meeting the basic needs of people and their participation in matters that affect them. Finally, on a cultural level, conflict transformation seeks to identify and understand the cultural practices that contribute to violent conflict and to respond constructively to such conflict.

The following subsections discuss selected aspects of the conflict transformation theory.

3.6.1 Conflict

The conflict transformation theory is conceived on the belief that "conflict is a normal social occurrence" (Paffenholz 2014: 13). Arguably, one of the most significant aspects of the conflict transformation theory is that it acknowledges that conflict is ever-present in society and in relationships. As observed by Muller (2017: 7), conflict is always present in human relationships, including peaceful ones. The *prevention* of conflict is not an objective of the conflict transformation theory. Rather, the conflict transformation theory places emphasis on how to deal with (transform) conflicts without the use of violence. As Redekop (2014: 32) put it

> A basic axiom for conflict resolution and transformation states that the goal of conflict resolution and transformation in interpersonal and in intergroup conflict should be to transform conflicts with the goal of bringing about peaceful relations with others that can be increasingly lively, creative, and productive.

In the context of service delivery, conflict is likely to arise when grievances are ignored. As observed by Mbeki and Phago (2014: 214), when service delivery is delayed or when the municipality ignores the community's grievances without explanation, protests are bound to erupt. Bond and Mottiar (2013: 290) also observe that service delivery protests are in part fuelled by the lack of a response from the local government when people air out their grievances. Similarly, Plessis and Lues (2011: 116) posit that inaction on the part of the local government results in violence due to frustration experienced on the part of the residents.

Conflict may also arise when there is a lack of responsiveness to the needs of communities. 65% of the respondents in a study on public participation in East London, conducted by Reddy and Sikhakane (2008: 690), revealed that municipal officials are not responsive to the needs of the people in the communities which they serve.

Elsewhere, accusations were registered against councillors for arrogance and insensitivity to the needs of the community (Naidoo 2010: 112).

While the examples cited above involve sources of the conflict between communities and municipalities, the critical issue is not to prevent such conflicts from occurring in the first place. The goal, in accordance with the conflict transformation theory, is to discourage the seeming willingness to readily resort to violence as a tool for conflict resolution.

3.6.2 Effective Communication

Conflict transformation emphasises effective communication between parties in a violent conflict. Through effective communication, parties can understand each other's position regarding the conflict. What gave rise to the conflict? What does the other party want? How can the other party's demands be met?

The importance of communication can be illustrated by the following example. Sometimes municipalities face internal challenges which affect their capacity to deliver adequate services to communities. As observed by Mbeki and Phago (2014: 212), the communities which the municipalities serve usually do not know these challenges until there is a delay in service delivery or when unsatisfactory services are provided. In the face of challenges which affect municipalities' capacities to deliver services, communication or information dissemination should therefore be a priority for municipalities. Isaacs-Martin (2009: 148) however observes that "municipalities fail to interact with communities and often label individuals who question service delivery, troublemakers, and so citizens remain uninformed of the quality of services to be delivered." To this end, Mofolo (2016: 231) sounds the following warning:

> In analysing the root causes of these service delivery protests... a number of issues, such as exclusion from decision-making, a lack of accountability and dysfunctional ward committees, come to the fore. To this end, it becomes evident that the methods, or rather mechanisms and channels, of engaging communities in service delivery in various municipalities across the country need to be reinvigorated. Otherwise, if such mechanisms and channels are left without being revamped, the possibility exists that the state of unrest around service delivery in the country will continue.

3.6.3 Changing Attitudes and Behaviours contributing to Violent Conflict

Conflict transformation requires that one addresses attitudes (Warnecke and Franke 2010: 79) and behaviours which encourage violent conflict. The glorification, justification and the trivialisation of violence are some of the examples of attitudes and behaviours which contribute to violent conflict. These attitudes and behaviours are linked to the factors which enable violence to be an attractive option for those involved in conflict. Ultimately, attitudes and behaviours have a bearing on one's decision on whether or not to resort to violence in order to resolve conflict. For instance, if an individual possesses positive attitudes towards violence, in the face of conflict, violence is likely to become an attractive option for conflict resolution for that person. In turn, it becomes easier for that person to choose violence over non-violence in order to resolve conflicts.

3.6.4 Crafting Solutions acceptable to all Parties in a Conflict

The following outcomes may arise during a conflict:

1. X gets what he/she wants and Y gets nothing;
2. Y gets what he/she wants and X gets nothing;
3. both X and Y give up their goals or give up everything to a third party;
4. both X and Y meet halfway; or
5. both X and Y create conditions where they both feel comfortable (Galtung 2010: 28).

Outcome 1 and 2 may result in one party being dissatisfied with the turn of events. Outcome 3 and 4 may leave both parties partially satisfied. Under the circumstances, the conflict in question is likely to recur in future. Outcome 5 is the ultimate aspiration of the conflict transformation theory – a solution which is acceptable to all parties in the conflict. How then can parties develop solutions which are acceptable to all parties in a conflict? One way of doing so is to use the "bottom-up" approach.

The bottom-up approach emerged from the criticisms levelled at the manner in which the United Nations carried out its peacebuilding operations in the 1990s (Campbell 2011: 39). During this time, the United Nations conducted its post conflict reconstruction operations without the input of the local population who had been the victims of conflict. In terms of the bottom up approach, parties to a conflict are central to obtaining an understanding of the conflict situation and the crafting of solutions (Rombouts 2002: 221). A distinction can be made between the bottom-up approach to peacebuilding and the "top-down" approach to peacebuilding. In the bottom-up approach, victims of social injustices are consulted on that which is best for them, while in the top-down approach, that which is best for victims of conflict is decided upon on their behalf by using principles which are considered as universally applicable to conflicts of a similar nature (Rombouts 2002: 219).

3.6.5 Choosing Non-Violence over Violence

Ultimately, the goal of applying the principles of the conflict transformation theory to the problem of violent service delivery protests is to ensure that whenever there is a conflict or grievance regarding service delivery, communities choose non-violence over violence to express themselves or achieve their objectives. One widely-used manner of carrying this out is through peace education. Jun (2018: 10) describes the advantages of education as a strategy for transforming conflict as follows:

> This strategy assists members to see the reality of conflict through increasing their ability to recognise not only the overt phenomena of conflict but also the covert factors of conflict. Education provides a lens through which to see what they have not seen, especially social structural problems such as power asymmetry and injustice. This stimulates members to desire resolving the problematic reality and even to take action to change it.

Teaching members of society how to engage peacefully with one another is important even if there is no conflict or crisis (Culp 2017: 1030). The field of peace studies is premised on the belief that "violence is a learned behaviour; it can be unlearned and effective nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict can be learned" (Harris 2008: 86). Educational activities thus provide the means to promote non-violent conflict resolution and the cultivation of a culture of positive peace (Ensor 2013: 4).

Formal and informal peace education initiatives can help in educating the public on the undesirability of violence. The Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP)[15] is an example of an informal program aimed at educating participants on non-violent conflict resolution. The program emphasises participation through games, activities, dialogue and critical reflection (John 2016: 369). Another initiative involves the Peace Games. The games are modelled around the following assumptions (LaSeur 2000: 437): youth violence results in an adult culture of violence, behaviour can be learned and taught, children can create peace through play, and peace-making is an active process as opposed to a passive and theoretical one.

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[15] (https://avp.international/southafrica/).

The problem, however, with some educational interventions is, as Twort (2019: 101) argues, that they do not at the onset consider what education means to the intended audience or the purpose served by such educational initiatives. In other words, these educational initiatives tend to be imposed on the groups concerned without consultation on the educational needs of the groups or a serious analysis of the relevance of such initiatives to the groups concerned. Such a top down approach is in stark contrast with the conflict transformation theory. The researcher has also made observations similar to those of Twort (2019) regarding educational interventions. Regarding educational interventions, there seems to be widespread if not universal reliance on established educational or training initiatives such as AVP. Such reliance suggests an imposition of such programs on populations by practitioners. While AVP has its advantages, it cannot be applied as a universal intervention in all types of conflicts or conflict situations. Educational interventions need to be tailor-made instead of using ready-made, off the shelf interventions in contexts that are irrelevant to the problem or conflict at hand.

Violence is a destructive form of moral education for young people (Presbey 2006: 163). Owing to the consequences of resolving conflicts through violent means, there is a pressing need to put non-violence education at the core of people's education systems (Smeyers 2014: 81). However, the following statement by Soudien (2015: 347) must always be kept in mind: "Education by itself, and deeply engaged with, will not end the problem of violence, but it will provide young people with some of the means by which they begin to take control of their destinies."

3.7 Outline of the Framework

The starting point within which to understand the theoretical framing of this study, as depicted in Figure 3.1, is that conflict is inevitable in human interaction. In the face of conflict, individuals may choose to resolve their differences through violent means or non-violent means. The circumstances under which individuals will likely use violence in the face of conflict can be explained by the human needs theory, the ecological theory and the social learning theory.

As mentioned earlier, the human needs theory stipulates that when human needs are not met, individuals may resort to violence in order to obtain those needs. In other words, anger fuelled by the lack of basic needs is likely to result in violent protests. This is especially the case in poor communities. As argued by Mamabolo (2015: 145), while poverty does not justify the use of violence, poor people tend to express their anger through violence.

In terms of the ecological theory, if conditions within a particular community encourage the use of violence as a grievance-resolution mechanism, individuals are likely to choose violent means of grievance resolution. Therefore, if an individual is exposed to an environment which is conducive to the use of violence, it will be difficult for that individual to choose non-violent means. If conditions in the community in which the individual lives encourage the use of violence, violence is likely to be the preferred choice for conflict resolution.



That violence is an effective method of grievance resolution can be learned from exposure to peers with positive attitudes towards violence or from role models who have used violence before.

When human needs are not met, individuals, especially in poor communities, are likely to resort to violence in an attempt to obtain those needs.

If conditions within a particular community encourage the use of violence as a grievance resolution mechanism, individuals are also likely to choose violence as a grievance resolution mechanism.

Individuals will resort to violence if the perceived rewards or benefits flowing from the use of violence outweigh the costs.

Conversely, individuals will resort to non-violent methods of action where the perceived costs flowing from the use of violence outweigh the perceived benefits or rewards.

Where individuals routinely choose violence, over non-violent methods of grievance resolution, the conflict transformation theory can be used as a foundation for developing interventions that seek to discourage the use of violence.

Figure 3.3: Theoretical framework of the study. (Source: Author)

Finally, if one considers the social learning theory in explaining why individuals resort to violence instead of non-violence, the following becomes apparent: the decision to use violence arises from one's personal judgments, attitudes, or meanings attached to the use of violence; from exposure to peers with positive attitudes towards violence; from anticipated rewards; or from the imitation of one's role model(s) who have previously used violence.

Despite this, not everyone who has unfulfilled human needs, or who lives in a community which encourages the use of violence as a grievance-resolution mechanism, or who has positive attitudes towards violence, will resort to violent means of grievance resolution in the face of conflict. This implies that individuals are making a deliberate choice to be involved or not to be involved in violence. This decision-making process can be explained by the rational choice theory as follows: protestors will resort to violence if the perceived rewards or benefits flowing from the use of violence outweigh the perceived costs. Perceived rewards can refer to attention from the media, politicians or municipal officials; the speedy resolution of grievances; or obtaining concessions. Perceived costs can refer to arrest, conviction, imprisonment, fines, death, or bodily injury. Conversely, individuals will resort to non-violent methods when the perceived costs flowing from the use of violence outweigh the perceived benefits or rewards.

When individuals routinely choose violence over non-violent methods of grievance resolution, the conflict transformation theory can be used as a foundation for developing interventions which seek to discourage the use of violence. The conflict transformation theory has many elements or tenets. As highlighted above, these include conflict, effective communication, changing attitudes and behaviours which contribute to violent conflict, crafting solutions which are acceptable to all parties in the conflict, and choosing non-violence over violence. Of particular importance for the intervention for this study is changing the attitudes and behaviours which contribute to violent conflict and choosing non-violence over violence.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter considered various theories which may help to explain why individuals resort to violence in the context of violent service delivery protests. These are namely, the human needs theory, the ecological theory, the social learning theory and the rational choice theory. The chapter also introduced the conflict transformation theory as the theory which underpins the violence prevention intervention which this study seeks to develop.

The following chapter outlines the conceptual framework underpinning this study.

CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical framework underpinning this study. This chapter discusses the conceptual framework which guides this study. In the previous chapter, it was highlighted that a theoretical framework discusses theories and the relationship between them in a structured manner that helps us to understand the phenomena under investigation and make generalisations or come up with hypotheses. In contrast, a conceptual framework, can be defined as "a logical presentation of concepts and their relationships that can guide a study" (Wald and Daniel 2019: 4).

It is important to indicate that the theoretical and conceptual frameworks provide a *frame* within which to think critically about the research problem, the research design, empirical observations and conclusions. In so doing, both frameworks play a critical role in highlighting and understanding the knowledge gap that this study seeks to cover. The difference between the two frameworks, however, lies in the manner in which both frameworks achieve this task. As Wald and Daniel (2019: 6) note, a theoretical framework requires a higher level of abstraction than a conceptual framework.

To summarize, in order to situate the study within the wider context of current literature on the subject of violent service delivery protests, both a theoretical and conceptual framework are required. A theoretical framework achieves this by utilising selected theories and this requires a higher level of abstract thinking in order to come up with hypotheses or generalisations. On the other hand, a conceptual framework achieves this by utilising selected concepts in order to make generalisations or come up with hypotheses. The chapter thus explains key concepts underpinning the study and the relationship between them. In doing so, this chapter provides a framework from which one can understand the research problem, the theoretical underpinnings of the study, the research design, empirical observations and conclusions. The discussion below examines the following concepts: service delivery protests, violence as a protest tactic, and the notion of violence as a choice.

4.2 Service Delivery Protests

As observed by Alexander *et al.* (2018: 27), the term *service delivery protests* was used in earlier discussions of popular unrest in South Africa, but the term *community protests* is now gaining more popularity. Alexander *et al.* (ibid) prefer to use the term *community protests* because it encompasses more than the term *service delivery protests*. According to them, the use of the term *service delivery protests* "tends to conceal the complexity of issues that communities raise, which often include criticisms of South Africa's democracy" (Alexander *et al.* 2018: 28). Manyaka (2018: 54) argues that "lack of delivery of basic services is not necessarily a root cause of protest, but a symptom of a much deeper societal problem, the root cause of which can be attributed to high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality." In light of this, Manyaka also opts to use the term community protests instead of the term *service delivery protests*. In the same vein, Mbazira (2013: 268) observes that protests appear to be about service delivery, however, a closer look reveals the presence of "deep and complex political issues". Hough (2008: 6) explains:

> While the more immediate problem is linked to the frustration of promises not kept regarding service delivery, the wider problem includes crime, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the deteriorating condition of government departments such as Home Affairs and Justice.

While the use of the term *community protests* is gaining preference over *service delivery protests* in academic circles, the media has been slow to adopt the term. The use of the term *service delivery protests* by the media has, over the years, attracted strong criticism. For instance, Friedman (2011: 111) views the use of the term as the media's tactic to "explain away, and thus avoid the need to explain, the protests." According to Radu, Morwe and Bird (2012: 48), the labelling of each and every protest as a service delivery protest "obscures the root causes of the protests and hence [causes] the lack of understanding and perhaps an ill-informed understanding of the protests". Recently, Wasserman (2015: 376) lamented that:

> Just by naming these protests narrowly as 'service delivery protests,' the media tend to view them as demands for technical solutions rather than as expressions of a more deep-seated frustration among citizens and a desire to be taken seriously and be listened to.

These criticisms convey that since the protests are not only concerned with service-delivery-related grievances, the term *service delivery protests* is a misleading one. According to these critics, it is necessary to use a term which reflects and takes into account the multiplicity of demands and grievances which form part of these protests and the underlying causes of the protests such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. Such a term, as mentioned earlier, is *community protests*.

Alexander *et al.* (2018: 28) define a community protest as "a protest in which collective demands are raised by a geographically defined and identified 'community' that frames its demands in support and/or defence of that community." The importance of Alexander *et al.*'s conception lies in showing that not all local protests are concerned with service delivery.



Figure 4.1: Grievances cited in the media from 2007 to July 2016 (Source: Civic Protest Barometer, extracted from Chigwata, O'Donovan and Powell (2017).

Although the collective demands of protestors are varied in scope, one cannot ignore that the majority of these protests arise from dissatisfaction with the quality of or lack of basic municipal services. Data provided by the Civic Protest Barometer in figure 4.1 above regarding the nature of grievances, as cited in the media, shows that in the period between 2007 and July 2016, over half (58%) of the recorded protests were concerning municipal services. Party political issues composed 15% of the grievances, while 14% of the grievances were regarding governance issues and 12% concerned socio-economic grievances. An argument can thus be made that, despite the multiplicity of issues raised during local protests, the main grievance underlying most of these protests relates to municipal services.

Nevertheless, the approach adopted in this study, as highlighted in Chapter 1, views the term *community protest* as a broad or umbrella term for local protests over a wide range of issues such as municipal service delivery, the lack of employment opportunities, socio-economic inequality, corruption, crime, health services and municipal accountability. The term encompasses a wide range of protests including protests over service delivery. Service delivery protests thus form part of a wide range of protests which are known as community protests. Service delivery protests are mainly concerned with a limited range of demands such as housing, water, electricity, refuse removal, roads and toilets.

The researcher acknowledges that underlying service delivery protests are socio-economic issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. Defining or classifying a protest using the underlying, instead of the stated causes has its complications. Arguably, most protests in South Africa have socio-economic injustices as an underlying cause for instance, the protests surrounding the #FeesMustFall movement. Considering that at the heart of protests lies deep-seated socio-economic injustices, should we then refer to protests by students within the context of the #FeesMustFall movement as community protests? Probably not. The researcher does not in any way attempt to dismiss the utility of the arguments put forward by critics for the use of the term *community protest*. The researcher's intention is to show that the classification of or the process of defining protests especially in a country such as South Africa is no easy task.

The researcher suggests that protests may be labelled according to the stated grievances or according to the identity of the protestors. For instance, the protests surrounding the #FeesMustFall movement may be referred to as *student protests*, in relation to the identity of the protestors. Similarly, another example would be *community protests*, in relation to identity of the protestors (the protestors are members of a residential community). We can even add some context and label a particular protest as a *community protests over corruption* or over unemployment or any other stated grievance. In the same vein, we can refer to a protest as a *student protest over fee increases* or any other grievance.

Some protests, however, cannot be classified in the aforementioned manner. This is because for example, legislation attaches a particular name and definition to certain types of protest. A protest by workers for better wages may not, strictly speaking, be referred to as a community protest despite any underlying socio-economic grievances associated with it. The proper term to use would be a *strike* (see section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995). Similarly, protests by workers to promote or defend their socioeconomic interests cannot be called community protests or service delivery protests. The appropriate term would be *protest action* (see section 77 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995).

For the purposes of this study, the researcher has retained the term *service delivery protests* because it provides specificity to the phenomenon under investigation, namely, violent protests regarding service delivery issues. However, taking into account that protests are rarely about a single issue, it is more appropriate to state that this study is concerned with protests where the main grievance or issue was related to service delivery. The researcher therefore conceptualises service delivery protests as public demonstrations directed at a municipality where the main demand concerns the lack of services, the slow pace at which services are being rolled out, or dissatisfaction regarding the quality of services being provided.

The researcher is not alone in the belief that the term *service delivery protests* continues to have practical relevance, even in the face of the argument that protests are never about services alone. Municipal IQ, in particular, continues to use the term *service delivery protests*[16]. The Municipal IQ's Hotspots Monitor records major protests directed at municipalities over issues which are or are perceived to be the responsibility of such municipalities. Protests over issues which do not form part of the service delivery mandate of the local government, such as municipal demarcations, industrial disputes or party political issues, are not recorded by the Hotspots Monitor as service delivery protests.

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[16] http://www.municipaliq.co.za).

4.3 Violence as a Protest Tactic

South African law on protests arguably recognises that there are two categories of protests, peaceful and violent. Section 17 of the Constitution, for instance, provides for the right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions. The Constitution demands that those who wish to exercise that right must do so “peacefully and unarmed”. In addition, the preamble of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (RGA) envisages that the exercise of the right to assemble “shall take place peacefully and with due regard to the rights of others.” Finally, Section 8(4) of the RGA prohibits those taking part in a gathering or demonstration from possessing any firearms or dangerous weapons.

An argument can, however, be made that by prohibiting certain disruptive actions, South African law recognises a third category of protests. The RGA prohibits the following actions, which may be described as disruptive in nature: denying other persons access to buildings or premises by blocking entrances to such buildings or premises and the serious disruption of vehicular traffic. Notably, Alexander *et al.* are of the view that disruptive protests form a third category of protests:

> All violent protests are disorderly, but not all disorderly protests are violent; some are disruptive but peaceful. This leaves us with a three-way categorisation of protests: orderly, disruptive, and violent (Alexander *et al.* 2018: 31).

Alexander *et al.* (2018: 31) define these three categories as follows:

> For us, violent protests are those with evidence of damage to property of others and/or injury to persons. Orderly protests are tolerated by the authorities and often negotiated in advance. They include pickets, marches and public meetings. Disruptive protests are identified by tactics such as blocking a road, commonly achieved by placing rocks and/or burning tyres.

As long as there is no physical violence involved, the researcher argues that conduct which is disruptive in nature must be treated as that which is known in the field of Peace Studies as ‘non-violent methods of action’ or ‘nonviolence’. In other words, this study maintains the traditional categorisation of protests as either violent or non-violent. This study therefore considers the use of disruptive tactics during protests falling short of violence such as road blockades (whether accomplished through the burning of tyres or the placing of stones), throwing garbage into the streets, throwing human waste into municipal offices, preventing access to buildings by forming a human chain, or camping outside a councillor's house, as non-violent methods.

The question which arises is what do "actions falling short of violence" mean? In the same vein, what actions constitute violence in the context of violent protests? In order to answer these questions, one needs to define the term *violence*. It is the researcher's view that for most people, violence in general, or a violent protest in particular, is not difficult to identify; *you know it when you see it*. Defining violence, however, is not an easy or simple task. Haan (2008: 28) offers three reasons why defining violence is difficult. First, violence comes in different forms which are exhibited in a variety of contexts. Second, that which violence consists of varies across societies and cultures. Third, violence is ambivalent in that in some contexts, it is condemned, admired, illegal, legal, moral or immoral.

The following questions posed by Jackman (2002) illustrate the difficulty associated with defining violence:

1. Can violence result in psychological, material and social injuries?
2. Do verbal and written actions constitute acts of violence?
3. If force is used on a willing victim, such as in sport, suicide or self-mutilation, does that constitute violence?
4. Are instigators of violence agents of violence in the same way as the physical perpetrators of the deed?

A study by Åkerström involving nurses in an elderly care facility/home further illustrates how violence is a difficult concept to define. According to the nurses, the use of physical force by elderly people does not constitute violence (Åkerström 2002: 521). Nurses framed the aggressive actions by their patients as "nonintentional expressions of illness and confusion" (Åkerström 2002: 527). According to the nurses, the actions of their elderly patients cannot be considered to be violent because they had no tangible consequences (Åkerström 2002: 530).

In the context of protests, the following questions illustrate the complexities of defining that which constitutes violence:

1. Should a protest be considered violent only where participants engage in actual physical violence?
2. Should a protest be considered violent where the atmosphere surrounding the protest is volatile but without any actual acts of physical violence being committed?
3. Should actions such as the blocking of public roads and emptying trashcans on streets be considered as violence in the same way as the destruction of property and physical assault?
4. Should a protest where participants incite violence against certain groups be considered a violent protest?

Apart from illustrating the complexities of defining violence, these questions point to the necessity of an unambiguous definition of or a list of specific actions which qualify as violence for the purposes of service delivery protests. This is important in order to avoid the blurring of the distinction between non-violent methods which are disruptive in nature and outright violent methods. Treating non-violent disruptive methods in the same manner as violent methods of action means that those who wish to use non-violent methods instead of violence have limited means at their disposal to express their grievances or seek redress.

According to Bufacchi, there are two conceptions of violence, namely, the Minimalist Conception of Violence (also known as the narrow conception), and the Comprehensive Conception of Violence (also known as the broad conception). Broad conceptions of violence consider violence as violation:

> Apart from its affinity with the notion of force, violence can also be conceptualized in terms of the verb 'to violate', meaning to infringe, or transgress, or to exceed some limit or norm… The most popular answer to the question 'violation of what?' is 'violation of rights' (Bufacchi 2005: 196).

Some examples of broad definitions of violence are given below.

Jackman (2002: 405) defines violence as "[a]ctions that inflict, threaten, or cause injury. Actions may be corporal, written, or verbal. Injuries may be corporal, psychological, material, or social."

According to Felson (2009: 26), "[v]iolence is physical aggression, i.e. when people use physical methods to harm others. The harm they produce is not necessarily physical, however. It could be a social harm or a deprivation of resources".

Galtung's definition of that which he terms structural violence is arguably a classical example of a broad conception of violence. According to Galtung (1969: 168) (original emphasis):

> As a point of departure, let us say that *violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations… Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual*, between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition.

These conceptions of violence are broad in that they consider actions which are not physical in nature as constituting violence. For instance, actions are considered violent even if they do not cause physical harm – examples include actions which infringe rights, cause psychological harm, cause social harm or prevent human beings from achieving their potential.

On one hand, a broad conception of violence allows for an understanding of the subjective meanings attached to the term by those involved in the violence either as victims or as perpetrators (Haan 2008: 37) (Waddington, Badger and Bull 2005: 145). On the other hand, broad conceptions of violence allow coercive actions, which fall short of physical violence, to be considered as violence (Govier 2008: 64). The outcome is that actions normally regarded as non-violent become considered as violent actions (Govier 2008: 66). In addition, if one accepts Galtung's conception stated above, then violence risks becoming an umbrella term for various forms of injustices, inequality and repression (Parsons 2007: 175-176). Understandably, as Waddington, Badger and Bull (2005: 158) advise, a broad conception of violence may result in markedly different events and experiences being referred to or analysed through the same conceptual framework.

Narrow conceptions of violence define violence as the deliberate use of physical force (Bufacchi 2005: 197). For instance, Yakeley and Meloy (2012: 231) define violence as "the actual bodily harm inflicted by one person on another person, in which the body boundary is breached and physical injury may occur."

Writing in the context of school violence, Henry (2000) criticises a narrow definition of violence which regards violence as the use of force which results in harm. According to Henry (2000: 17), this definition suffers from four major flaws. First, it does not account for the emotional and psychological pain arising from the domination of some over others. Second, it focuses on the harm between individuals and excludes the harm against individuals by institutions or agencies. Third, it ignores violence which produces systemic social injury, for instance, violence perpetuated through institutionalised racism and sexism. Fourth, it ignores "symbolic violence", a "subtle form of violence that brings coercion through the power exercised in hierarchical relationships".

The question, therefore, is how then should one define violence, considering the two conceptions of violence discussed above? Each approach to defining violence has its advantages and disadvantages. That which is important, as highlighted by Haan (2008: 37), is considering whether a particular definition or view on violence is appropriate for the research problem under investigation.

Instead of providing a precise definition of violence, the researcher of this study will specify actions which he considers as violent in the context of service delivery protests. This is also known as the paradigm case approach. As Brownlee (2004: 339) notes:

> A paradigm case approach enjoys some advantages over a definitional approach... the paradigm case approach avoids the dialectic of generalisation and counterexample that applies to definitions. One can undermine a definition for B either by presenting an example of B that does not fit with the definition or by presenting an example of something that is not B but does fit with the definition. By contrast, one cannot undermine an account of a paradigm case of B by either of these methods.

The following actions constitute violence for the purposes of this study:

1. A physical attack which causes physical harm

2. Malicious damage to property, public or private
3. Intimidation which results in a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm.

4.4 Violence as a Choice

Central to this study is the notion of violence as a choice. In order to understand the concept of violence as a choice, four processes which are central to the *adoption* or use of violence during protests are presented. These processes are namely, provocation, instigation, third-force intervention and deliberation or wilful engagement.

Provocation occurs when protest violence is a response to actual or perceived provocation by the state or its agents. A common example of provocation concerns the heavy-handed manner in which the police sometimes respond to peaceful protests. Heavy-handed police responses to peaceful protests, especially when no prior notification of the protest has been made to authorities, are known to provoke anger and violence amongst protestors.

Instigation involves certain individuals encouraging or mobilising members of a group to resort to violence. Such individuals are also known as violence entrepreneurs (see: Misago 2017). They are able to encourage the use of violence because they hold an influential position in society or are in a position of power. In order to ensure participation, people are forcibly removed from their houses. Intimidation and outright violence against persons who do not want to join the protest is a common tactic. Roads leading into and out of the community concerned are blockaded such that no one can go to school or work on that day. There can never be an excuse for non-participation.

Third-force intervention occurs when outsiders or unknown persons join a protest and begin to engage in violence without the consent or approval of the original movement members or protestors. The ensuing violence is attributed to the group although the original organisers and participants did not encourage the use of such violence or take part in the violence. The outsiders or infiltrators often have a different agenda to those who arranged the protest.

Deliberation or wilful engagement occurs when the use of violence is planned and intentional. There is a near consensus amongst the protestors concerned that violence is necessary to achieve their goals. The ensuing violence is not as a result of provocation, instigation or a third force. The protestors do not distance themselves from the violence. In fact, they embrace it and justify its use.

Whether violence is as a result of provocation, instigation, a third force intervention or deliberation, there is always an element of choice involved in the decision-making. People can be provoked into violence but *choose* not to give into the provocation. Powerful and influential people can instigate violence but not everyone will take heed of the call for violence. A third force may hijack a movement but people can *choose* to associate or dissociate themselves with the third-force violence. When the use of violence is planned, some people may support the violence but some may *choose* not to engage in the violence. In fact, not everyone in a community will take part in violence, some may decide to stay home while some may look on as bystanders.

The typology outlined above however, indicates that protestors do not always set out to purposefully pursue a strategy of violence. As highlighted in Chapter Two, some of the violence that occurs during service delivery protests is a reaction to police heavy handedness in responding to protests. It therefore can be argued that when protestors resort to violence as a result of provocation by police and incitement by violence entrepreneurs, one cannot speak of a deliberate strategy to use or resort to violence. The decision to take part in violence under such circumstances is not premeditated.

This study therefore conceptualises violence as a choice where the decision to engage in violence is a result of deliberation or wilful engagement. The decision to use violence must be free of instigation, coercion or duress. When any of these elements is present, the violence which ensues is not by free choice, so to speak.

4.5 Outline of the Framework

The relationship between the concepts discussed above can be stated as follows. Underlying violent service delivery protests are service-delivery-related grievances, violence as a protest tactic and violence as a choice. Simply stated, the conceptual framework within which violent service delivery protests must be understood is that violent service delivery protests are a result of a deliberate choice to use violence as a protest tactic in response to service-delivery-related grievances. This framework is outlined in Figure 4.2.


service delivery related grievances
violence as a method of grievance resolution
choosing violence
Grievances concern housing, water, electricity, refuse removal, roads, sanitation and other issues.
Main demand during protests is concerned with the lack of services; the slow pace at which services are being rolled out; or dissatisfaction regarding the quality of services being provided.
Violence denotes a physical attack which causes physical harm; or malicious damage to property; or intimidation which results in a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm.
Decision to use violence may be made because of provocation or instigation.
Violence may also be influenced by actions of a "third force".
Decision to use violence may be planned or deliberate.

Figure 4.2: Conceptual framework of the study. (Source: Author).

A deliberate choice to use violence denotes that the use of violence was planned, intentional, free of instigation, coercion or duress. Violence as a protest tactic must be understood as actions involving a physical attack which causes physical harm or malicious damage to both public and private property, or intimidation which results in a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm. Service-delivery-related grievances must be understood as grievances concerning the lack of services, the slow pace at which services are being rolled out, or dissatisfaction over the quality of services being provided.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to outline and describe the three main concepts underlining the study. These are namely service delivery protests, violence as a protest tactic, and the notion of violence as a choice. Service delivery protests can be understood as public demonstrations directed at a municipality where the main demand concerns the lack of services, the slow pace at which services are being rolled out, or dissatisfaction over the quality of services being provided.

The second concept under scrutiny was 'violence as a protest tactic'. Instead of providing a definition of violence, the study lists actions which constitute violence for the purposes of the study. These are namely: a physical attack which causes physical harm; malicious damage to public or private property; and intimidation which results in a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm.

The study also considered the notion of violence as a choice. Four processes which are central to the use of violence during protests were identified, namely, provocation, instigation, third-force intervention and deliberation or wilful engagement. In all these instances, an element of choice is always present. Where protestors resort to violence, however, as a result of provocation and instigation for example, the decision to use violence is not entirely voluntary. It is for this reason that violence as a choice is conceptualised in this study as the decision to engage in violent activity as a result of deliberation and wilful engagement.

The conceptual framework within which violent service delivery protests should be understood was outlined as follows: violent service delivery protests are a result of a deliberate choice to use violence in response to service-delivery-related grievances.

The following chapter presents the methodology used in this study.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines and explains the research methodology which was adopted in conducting this research. Most importantly, the chapter justifies the choice of research methodology in light of the objectives of the study. As outlined in Chapter 1, the objectives of this study were fourfold. The first objective was to investigate why protestors choose to engage in violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods when expressing their grievances. The second objective was to identify factors which make violence a viable option for protestors. The third objective involved ascertaining the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action. The fourth objective was to develop and test an intervention aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests. In order to achieve these objectives, the researcher undertook a series of steps outlined in figure 5.1 below. These steps are discussed together with other aspects of the research methodology in the sections that follow.



1 sampling
snowball and purposive sampling
2 data collection
interviews and focus group discussions
3 data analysis
thematic framework of data analysis
4 intervention design
informed by results of study and input of research participants
5 implementation of the intervention
6 evaluation of the intervention

Figure 5.1: Outline of the research methodology steps taken for the study. (Source: Author).

5.2 Research Approach

5.2.1 Participatory Action Research

This study applied the Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach to achieve its objectives. Four key features of PAR made it an appropriate approach to adopt for this study. First, PAR emphasises community participation and transformation (Johnson and Guzmán 2013: 406). Second, PAR emphasises taking action, developing solutions and making a difference together with the communities concerned (Houh and Kalsem 2015: 265). Third, PAR advocates constant reflection on the actions taken (Levin 2012: 133) (Genat 2009: 102). Fourth, PAR emphasises the empowerment and emancipation of the communities concerned (Auriacombe and Mouton 2007: 447) (Huang 2010: 93) (Robinson 2016: 444). The subsections below consider these crucial aspects of PAR, their relevance, and how they were applied to the study.

5.2.2 PAR and Community Participation

In PAR, the experiences of those affected by the problem under investigation are more important than the perceptions or assumptions of the researcher. PAR seeks to uncover the reality of the communities concerned, to understand how they view and interpret their situation and how they can contribute to finding solutions to their problems. This is achieved by involving the communities concerned in the research process. These aspects of PAR made it the appropriate research approach since the study seeks to understand the problem of violent service delivery protests from the perspective of the communities involved.

The emphasis on community participation puts the PAR approach in line with the so-called 'bottom-up' approach to research. In the 'bottom-up' approach, the researchers identify the problems and craft solutions to those problems in consultation with the communities concerned. In contrast, in a 'top-down' approach, researchers identify the problem and suggest solutions to the phenomenon under consideration without consulting the communities concerned. There is thus a complete disregard of the input or contribution of the communities concerned in the identification and formulation of solutions to issues which affect their lives.

The dangers of using a 'top-down' approach, or any research approach which does not incorporate community participation, is that there is a possibility of misconstruing the nature of the problem purportedly faced by the communities concerned. There is also a possibility that the solutions formulated by researchers may not be effective in resolving the problems faced by the communities concerned. There is therefore the danger that the problems and solutions identified are discordant with the reality faced by communities. It is these dangers which the study sought to avoid by adopting the PAR approach.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the study was conducted with the assistance of community members who reside in the following areas of the BCMM: Orange Grove, Nompumelelo, Ducats, Unit P, Ikhwezi Village, Vergenoeg, Egoli, Zwelitsha, Ginsberg and Breidbach. Orange Grove is an informal settlement in East London. The settlement has no electrical supply and relies on illegal connections. Owing to the lack of adequate sanitation, residents of Orange Grove dug up pit toilets as a solution. These toilets are shared with other members of the community since not every dwelling has space to dig up its own. Nompumelelo is a township in East London with elements of formality and informality in that it has both formal houses and shacks. Power failures are a usual occurrence in the area. The informal section of Nompumelelo is notorious for being overcrowded and for illegal electrical connections. Ducats is a township located about 5km outside East London. The township also has formal houses and shacks. Due to an increased demand from the growing informal settlement in the area, Ducats has an unreliable and weak electricity supply.

Unit P is a formal township located near Mdantsane in East London. The township has newly built RDP houses, over which protests concerning allocation of the houses have emerged over the years, with allegations of corruption being levelled against the BCMM and the ward councillor of the area. Ikhwezi Village is located in East London adjacent to Unit P. The area has no formal houses and electricity. Residents share a communal tap for drinking water. Unfortunately, the area is plagued by frequent water supply interruptions. Vergenoeg is a formal township in East London with an ever-increasing number of informal dwellings mushrooming on the edges of the township. Egoli is another informal settlement situated in East London. Refuse collection is a major concern in the area. It is not uncommon to find refuse pilling up everywhere uncollected. The settlement has poor sanitation owing to the lack of toilets, with the few that were erected having been vandalised. Outside East London, in King Williams Town lies the townships of Zwelitsha, Ginsberg and Breidbach. All three are formal townships with formal dwellings. Zwelistha and Ginsberg have backyard shacks in some areas. The living conditions in the three townships are much better than the ones in the informal settlements described above.

Community participation played a critical role in every step of the research process. To begin with, community participation in this study was instrumental in the identification and development of the research problem and the formulation of the research objectives. The researcher's research interests, as he began this study, were in the area of violent protests over socio-economic issues in democratic states. An emerging narrative in the media at that time was that South Africa was the protest capital of the world. Two main drivers of protests in South Africa seemed to be labour protests (industrial action) and the so-called service delivery protests. The researcher was drawn to the area of service delivery protests because, having studied law previously, he had some insight into the South African labour law and the dynamics of violent industrial action. The researcher thus found it unnecessary to study labour protests since it was an area with which he was familiar.

After conducting an extensive literature review, the researcher proceeded to draft and submit his research proposal for approval. The focus of the research was on ascertaining the causes and possible solution to these violent protests. While awaiting the approval of the proposal, the researcher put together a 'working team' which he would work with during the entire research. This team is referred to here as the working group. The terms *working group*, *intervention group* and *action group* are used interchangeably in various parts of the study but they denote the same group of individuals. For instance, in the discussion on the implementation of the intervention developed for this study, the team is referred to as the action group. This team was composed of 10 participants. Seven members of the team were male while three were female. They were all unemployed at the time the study was being conducted. For the most part they depended on part time menial jobs for a living or activities such as scrap metal recycling.

The team held three meetings in which the members discussed the issue of violent service delivery protests in general. From these discussions, it emerged that the problem was more complex than it seemed. Aspects which the community needed were humane and dignified living conditions, and violent protest was one of the means to attain this goal. After obtaining this insight, the research shifted its focus from the causes of service delivery protests and possible solutions to investigating why communities choose violent protests over non-violent methods in their quest for better lives. In summary, community participation, in this instance in the form of the working group, enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of the context of the problem, which in turn enabled the formulation of objectives which are grounded in the reality experienced by the communities concerned.

Second, without community participation it would not have been possible to gather data for the study. Without data from the community, the researcher would not have gained insight into the lives of the participants and the phenomenon under study. Data was collected through interviews and focus group discussions with members of the community.

Third, community participation made it possible to collaborate with community members in the formulation of solutions to the problem of violent service delivery protests. It was through community participation that the research team was able to develop an intervention for the prevention of violent service delivery protests. This 'action' component of the study is dealt with in further detail in the following section.

5.2.3 PAR and Taking Action

Knowledge generation is often the primary goal of research projects. Research participants, however, often require or expect that the researcher, after collecting data from participants, will do something about their plight or problem under investigation. This is the situation which Dawson faced while conducting research on the policing of protests in 2009. During one of the focus group discussions, one research participant remarked:

> We are giving information to you but we do not know the way forward. We do not know if we are going to get help or not. We've had too many people coming to our

> village asking what you are asking. We tell them what they need to know but there is no way forward. Even now, we are giving the information but you are going to file it. You hurt us by doing so (Dawson and Sinwell 2012: 182).

PAR regards communities as being in the best position to find ways of solving their problems (Wood and Govender 2013: 178). The purpose of using the PAR method is to ensure that the participants, as co-researchers, take action in order to solve a particular identified problem (Openjuru *et al.* 2015: 222). The researcher is not an expert who has solutions to all the problems. Instead, the researcher facilitates the process of developing solutions. The researcher's role is to assist communities to solve their problems. The communities concerned are responsible for implementing the solutions which they have identified with the aim of resolving the problem in question. Action thus refers to the steps taken to develop solutions to the problem under investigation, the implementation of those solutions by the communities concerned, and the evaluation thereof.

The solution to the problem of violent service delivery protests was conceived as follows. As mentioned earlier, the specific objectives are a result of consultation meetings with a ten-member working group. After the data collection process and analysis for this study was complete, the researcher presented the findings to the group for discussion. The findings were also presented to a ten-member pilot intervention group. This pilot intervention group should not be confused with the other working group (also known as the intervention group or the action group) discussed above. The pilot intervention group was composed of residents who had participated in the interviews and focus group discussions earlier on during the data collection phase of the study. Their role was to decide on the suitable way in which the problem of violent protests could be dealt with. In other words, the pilot intervention group's role was to decide on the nature of the intervention that was going to be implemented for the study. The pilot intervention group was chosen for this task instead of the working group in order to establish an element of objectivity, especially when considering that the working group had been involved in the formulation of the research objectives. The researcher's role was to facilitate the process of developing the intervention.

At the first meeting, the pilot intervention group raised a number of questions and expressed some concerns over the intended task of developing the intervention. The group inquired whether there was any evidence that violence in general can be prevented; second, that there are effective alternatives to violent protest; third, that violent protests are an ineffective method of expressing grievances; and finally, that there are ways in which ordinary citizens can meaningfully contribute to change in their communities. These questions emanated from a general belief or view that there are no effective alternatives to violent protests and that there was nothing that could be done to stop the protests as long as protestors' needs are not met.

The researcher undertook to provide answers to these concerns at the next meeting with the pilot intervention group. During this meeting, the researcher presented the answers to the group in an informal discussion. Thereafter, after a lengthy debate, the group settled on an education-oriented intervention that focuses on attitude change and one that would incorporate the aforementioned concerns that they had raised. The researcher proceeded to draft a document outlining the intervention for a period of two weeks. Thereafter, another meeting was convened to discuss the draft intervention. At this meeting, the pilot intervention group expressed concern over the formalistic nature of the intervention. According to the group, the intervention was more suited for school purposes than for ordinary people like them. To this end, we added activities such as watching videos and other practical activities to the intervention. After the intervention was finalised, the pilot intervention group's work was over. Thereafter, the working group took part in the testing of the intervention over a four-day period. Further details on the nature of the intervention and the results of the test are presented in Chapter 8.

5.2.4 PAR and Reflection

Reflection is an ongoing process throughout the entire course of the research. After each stage of the research process, the researcher and the participants must look back and analyse (reflect on) their experiences. This enables them to make adjustments where necessary. In this study, the researcher and the working group reflected on the actions taken during six critical stages of the research. These six stages were namely the identification of the research problem, the drafting and pretesting of interview questions, data collection, data analysis, the development of the intervention and the evaluation of the intervention.

5.2.5 PAR and the Empowerment and Emancipation of Communities

This study sought to empower communities through PAR in two ways. First, through participation in all the stages of the research process, participants were able to play a role in the resolution of problems which affect their daily lives. Participation put them in a position where they were able to confront their fears, assumptions, stereotypes, prejudices, behaviours, attitudes and misconceptions. Second, PAR enabled the research participants to act as agents of change in their communities. There was a strong emphasis during the research process that the solution to the problems faced by the communities lies with them and not the researcher or another person.

5.3 Research Design

This research used the qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research is concerned with describing and understanding phenomena by capturing participants' experiences in their own words (Yilmaz 2013: 313). Qualitative research methodology was chosen over quantitative or mixed method methodology for two reasons. First, qualitative research methodology can describe socio-economic reality arguably better than quantitative research (Veltri and Miller 2014: 2). As observed by Vahali and Vahali (2019: 142):

> All of us know how little it takes to glance over numerical data and forget colossal tragedies if they are stated in a distant and detached manner. In contrast, it is far more difficult to forget a single character whose pain is made real by the empathic and nuanced creativity of a writer, novelist, short story teller, poet or artist.

Since this study is concerned with understanding the social reality of communities in their interaction with the local government and law enforcement, this required the study to gain an insight into the personal experiences of the research participants. Personal experiences, as narrated by the participants themselves, provided rich and detailed data which gave greater insight into the phenomenon under investigation, more than any other method of presenting a community's experiences. To put this into perspective, conflict narratives that do not emerge from the victims of the conflict tend to present a different picture of the conflict. The problem with such narratives is that they do not adequately convey the reality faced by victims of the conflict. Ginty and Firchow (2016: 313) explain as follows:

> Crucially, these top-down narratives (from media sources, academics, policy makers, national elites, military and humanitarian spokespeople, and the like) can over-write the everyday narratives that people in conflict-affected areas use to describe their own reality. These narratives may have the benefit of allowing us to compare between conflicts and have a near universal language of conflict. The disadvantages, however, are many. Primarily, they stem from the rendering of someone else's experiences by a third or fourth party. Particularity, detail, personality and context may be ironed out in order to convey a narrative that is generalisable and understandable. But in so doing, the narrative may be stripped of meanings that are locally significant and full of politics.

Second, qualitative research is conducted using unstructured strategies which make it possible to gather a wide range of information by giving participants some freedom to give responses which do not directly address the area of the research or the question asked (Auriacombe 2009: 827). This information may provide context to the phenomenon under investigation or insights into certain hidden aspects of the study which may not have been obvious at the start.

5.4 Sampling Method

Sampling in research is carried out for practical reasons since it is expensive and time-consuming to collect data from an entire population (Burger and Silima 2006: 657). Through sampling, researchers are able to collect data from a part of the population concerned and make generalisations about the rest of the population which was not part of the study. In other words, the findings from the research sample can be attributed to the rest of the population from which the sample was derived. The views of the research participants are regarded as representative of the population from which they were derived.

A common dilemma faced by researchers is determining *a priori* the appropriate sample size for a particular study. Sim *et al.* (2018: 620-623) identify four approaches are generally used in determining sample size namely, rules of thumb, conceptual models, numerical guidelines and statistical formulae. The rules of thumb approach is used to determine sample size by following the methods used in similar studies in the past. Conceptual models are guided by the nature of the research. Numerical guidelines are informed by the saturation of themes or codes. The statistical formulae approach utilises calculations or mathematical models in order to determine the number of informants required to achieve theme saturation.

Sim *et al.* (2018: 630) discourage having a predetermining fixed sample size and suggest having a provisional number that is not based on unnecessary empirical predictions especially when one considers that the appropriate number of respondents can only be determined during the course of the study. Similarly Robinson (2014: 29) is also of the view that when deciding on a sample size, one needs not decide on a fixed number of respondents, instead a researcher may work with a sample size range wherein a minimum and maximum sample is defined.

Following Sim *et al* and Robinson, the researcher settled on a sample size of a minimum of 50 and a maximum of 100 for residents. The number was based on the assumption that in the ten research sites identified for the study, the researcher was going to obtain a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 10 possible participants in each of the 10 research sites. Thus 5 participants multiplied by 10 research sites which brings the minimum sample size total to 50. Similarly, 10 participants multiplied by 10 research sites brings the maximum sample size to 100. The 10 sites as mentioned earlier are Unit P, Ikhwezi Village, Vergenoeg, Egoli, Nompumelelo, Ducats, Orange Grove, Breidbach, Zwelitsha and Ginsberg. For members of the POP, ward councillors and municipal respondents the sample size was not pre-determined. This is because unlike residents, there is a limited number for example, of municipal respondents in managerial positions. In such a case, determining the number of municipal residents *a priori* serves no purpose The two sampling methods used in this study were the purposive and snowball sampling methods.

5.4.1 Purposive Sampling

Municipal and Public Order Police (POP) respondents were selected purposively. The purposive sampling method made it possible to select municipal respondents based on their role in service delivery, and POP respondents based on their role in crowd control during service delivery protests. This technique was appropriate to use as the researcher knew the various departments responsible for service delivery, public participation and community engagement in the BCMM. The researcher was also aware that the POP is the South African Police Service (SAPS) unit responsible for public order policing.

Twenty public order police were recruited based on their experience in responding to violent service delivery protests in the past. Within the BCMM, 20 officials were chosen by virtue of having senior positions within the departments responsible for various aspects of service delivery and community engagement. Ten ward councillors were also recruited purposively from the "hot spot" areas where service delivery protests frequently occur.

5.4.2 Snowball Sampling

In order to identify participants in previous violent service delivery protests, the snowball sampling technique was used. Snowball sampling is particularly suited for facilitating researchers' access to 'hidden' populations such as the Lesbian, Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community, female gang members, criminals and drug users. These populations are 'hidden' in that it is difficult to locate and recruit research participants from these groups of people. Members of these groups typically do not make it public that they belong to such groups. They 'hide' themselves due to the stigma associated with being members of such a group, their vulnerability in society, or the potential legal repercussions of being identified as a member of such a group.

The snowball sampling technique works in the following manner. A member of a social network, which is based on a particular relationship, is asked to name other members of that network who meet certain criteria set by the researcher (Petersen and Valdez 2005: 154). The researcher thereafter contacts the identified individuals and asks them to participate in his/her study. Stated in another way:

> Snowball sampling involves selecting individuals using referrals by insiders within the population to be studied. An individual who has been selected on a certain characteristic (e.g. being an illicit drug user) will be asked to list others with that same characteristic. From this list (at least) one person will be randomly selected and approached for an interview. In turn, the interviewee will be asked to list others with again the same characteristic, and again one person will be randomly selected from the new list, interviewed, and asked to list others with the same

> characteristic. The process will be repeated several times (Jong and Ommeren 2002: 427).

A more precise definition of snowball sampling is provided by vonderFehr, Sølberg and Bruun (2018: 40) as follows:

> Snowball sampling (also called *chain-referral* or *link-tracing*) is a respondent-driven sampling method used in SNA studies to reach unknown members of more opaque or hidden populations (e.g. drug users and terrorists). The researcher uses initial respondents to find other respondents who are included in the target group of the network analysis.

The snowball sampling technique is, however, not without its disadvantages. The use of the snowball sampling technique may result in a homogenous sample that is not representative of the entire research population because participants are not selected randomly (Cohen and Arieli 2011: 428). A homogenous sample may also arise because the participants in the chain share similar characteristics (Waters 2015: 372).The disadvantage of a homogenous sample is that the findings are usually applicable to that particular group, time or place and thus it may not be possible to generalise the findings of the research (Robinson 2014: 27). The success of snowball sampling is also dependent on the existence of a social network and close ties between members of such a network (Waters 2015: 378). What this means is that where the identified research participants are not aware of other people with similar characteristics, the snowball might not roll, to use a colloquial saying. Similarly, where the participants are aware of other people with similar characteristics but have no close relations with them, owing to trust issues, it will be difficult for such individuals to take part in the research especially were the research focuses on aspects of illegality or criminality.

The snowball sampling technique was appropriate for this study because it gave the researcher access to a specific network of people who met his set criteria for participation in the study without consuming or wasting excessive time and resources. Locating potential research participants who met the researcher's criteria would have been difficult if potential research participants were selected at random because while the places where violent service delivery protests are known, not everyone residing in those areas has taken part in the protests. Second, participation in violent activities may in itself be a criminal act and therefore few people are willing to talk about their role in the violence to someone who they don't know or who has no links to someone who they know and trust.

The snowball sampling technique was used to identify two groups of people. The first group was comprised of people who committed acts of violence during violent service delivery protests in the past. The second group of people was comprised of people with information on the identity of people who took part in violent service delivery protests in the past. Only the first group of persons was recruited for participation in the study.

One hundred residents of BCMM were recruited to take part in this study. The table of respondents depicting their biographical data appears in Chapter 6. During the recruitment process, however, the researcher discovered that he was not only encountering people who took part in the violence but also people who did not take part in the violence but supported the use of violence nevertheless. Despite this, the researcher interviewed both groups because the two groups seemed to share the same attitudes towards violence. Research participants were recruited from "hot spot" areas, namely, Unit P, Ikhwezi Village, Vergenoeg, Egoli, Nompumelelo township, Ducats, Orange Grove, Breidbach, Zwelitsha and Ginsberg.

5.5 Measuring Instruments / Data Collection

The researcher conducted a structured interview with open-ended questions with each of the respondents. Structured interviews enabled the researcher to ask all respondents the same questions. Open-ended interview questions were chosen because they allow the participants to express themselves without being limited to specific pre-determined standpoints (Yilmaz 2013: 313). In addition to interviews, the researcher conducted focus group discussions with the respondents. These two methods of data collection are discussed below.

5.5.1 Interviews

Interviews with residents were conducted face-to-face. The researcher's research assistants were instrumental in the process of identifying potential research participants. Once a potential participant was identified and located, the researcher's assistant would introduce the researcher to the individual by stating the researcher's name and the purpose of his visit. As an outsider, being accompanied by an insider was important in that it put the potential participant at ease and made it much easier for that individual to give his or her consent to taking part in the interview. Once the individual agreed to take part in the interview, the researcher would reiterate the objectives of his study, that which was required of the research participant, and the approximate length of the interview. In addition, the researcher would discuss issues of confidentiality, anonymity and consent. Thereafter, the researcher would ask for the research participant to indicate his/her consent (already given) to take part in the study in writing, by signing the consent form.

Asking leading questions, excessive questioning, repeating a question, interrupting interviewees and the failure to establish rapport with interviewees are known to be detrimental to the task of interviewing and collecting reliable data (Vrij, Hope and Fisher 2014: 130). The researcher avoided such kind of questioning in order to maintain rapport with the participants and ensure a smooth interview process. In addition, the questionnaires used in the study were also void of any leading questions in order to ensure an accurate representation of the interviewees' experiences. The questionnaires also contained simple language to ensure that the interviewees do not misinterpret or misunderstand the questions posed to them.

The use of voice recorders in a research interview is usually met with different reactions from research participants. The researcher did not use a voice recorder during interviews because of a general discomfort that the research participants displayed when the researcher sought their consent to record the interviews. Municipal respondents in particular indicated upfront that they did not want their interviews to be recorded. The disadvantages of not using a recorder are unfortunately, numerous. Writing down responses is time consuming and requires a fast writer. In addition, the researcher may miss out on non-verbal communication while taking down notes. Most members of the POP, municipal respondents and ward councillors, however, filled in the questionnaires on their own. The interview process went as planned and the researcher did not encounter any notable obstacles and challenges.

In order to ascertain why residents chose violent protests over non-violent methods, the researcher asked a direct question: "Why did you choose to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods of action?"

In order to uncover the factors which enabled violent protests to be a viable option for residents, the researcher asked residents the following questions:

- "How did the municipality respond to the violent protest?"
- "How did the Police respond to the violent protest?"
- "Considering the manner in which the municipality and the police responded to the violent protest, would you take part in a violent service delivery protest in future? Provide reasons."

In order to test the effectiveness of the violent protests, the researcher asked residents the following question: "Did you get what you were protesting for?"

In order to ascertain what could be done to prevent violent service delivery protests, the researcher asked the following question: "What do you think can be done in order to prevent violent service delivery protests?"

Interviews with municipal respondents were conducted at their places of employment. This was carried out after obtaining permission from BCMM to approach willing employees.

In line with the main objective of the study, municipal respondents were asked to state why they think residents engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods. This question is deliberately similar to the question posed to the residents themselves, as the researcher wanted to check if the responses provided by the residents and municipal respondents corroborated each other. The following question was posed: "In your view, what do you think influences the decision of residents to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods of action?"

In order to test the effectiveness of violent protests over non-violent methods, municipal respondents were asked to describe how they respond to violent protests and the level of priority they attach to concerns raised through both violent and non-violent protests.

- "How do you respond to concerns raised through violent protests?"
- "What level of priority do you accord to grievances raised through violent protests?"
- "What level of priority do you accord to grievances raised through peaceful protests?"

Regarding the prevention of violent service delivery protests, the following questions were posed:

- "What measures does the municipality have in place in order to prevent violent service delivery protests?"
- "What role do you think local government can play in preventing violent service delivery protests in future?"

Ward councillors were also asked to state why they think residents engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods. This is the same question posed to municipal respondents. As mentioned earlier, the intention was to check if the responses corroborated each other. The following question was posed: "In your view, what do you think influences the decision of residents to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods of action?"

Ward councillors were asked the following questions in order to test the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests:

- "How do you respond to concerns raised through violent protests?"
- "How do you respond to concerns raised through peaceful protests?"
- "Is there any difference in the level of priority that you accord to grievances raised through peaceful as opposed to violent protests?"

Regarding the prevention of violent service delivery protests, the following question was asked: "What role do you think ward councillors can play in preventing violent service delivery protests in future?"

Interviews with POP members of SAPS took place after the researcher had obtained permission for interviews. Permission was granted on 22 August 2018. At that time, the researcher had already conducted several interviews with the residents. This gave the researcher insight into how police actions impact the decision by residents to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods. The following questions were therefore drafted as an attempt to ascertain the police's side of the story:

- "What factors do you take into account when deciding on whether to use force or not in responding to violent protest?"
- "What do you think is the role of the police in violent service delivery protests?"
- "What role do you think the police play in the escalation of violence during service delivery protests?"
- "What role do you think the police can play in preventing future violent service delivery protests?"

5.5.2 Focus Group Discussions

An unstructured interview was used for focus group discussions. In an unstructured interview, the researcher does not pose specific questions but rather presents a topic to the respondents for discussion (Jarbandhan and Schutte 2006: 677).

According to Zorn *et al.* (2006: 116):

> Focus groups are small groups of people (usually 6-12 participants) who are similar on some demographic dimension (e.g. age or social role) and who are brought together by researchers for the purpose of investigating participants' views on a particular issue. Typically, a moderator guides the discussion by focusing participants' attention on various issues related to a topic. Participants respond to both the moderator's questions and other participants' responses.

Four focus group discussions were conducted in this study. Each focus group was comprised of 6 participants (4 males and 2 females). The number of focus groups was informed by the research conducted by Guest, Namey and McKenna (2017) regarding the number of focus group discussions which are sufficient for a research study. The literature review which they conducted on the subject revealed that the number of focus groups suggested by various authors on the subject was not based on empirical evidence (Guest, Namey and McKenna 2017: 4). They note that some researchers suggest that saturation must be used as the standard to determine the number of focus groups, however, saturation, as they note, can only be determined during or after data analysis (Guest, Namey and McKenna 2017: 5). They therefore sought to determine the number of focus groups sufficient for a research project based on empirical evidence. Their findings were as follows: two to three focus groups are sufficient to uncover 80% of the research topic themes, and three to six focus groups are sufficient to uncover 90% of the research topic themes (Guest, Namey and McKenna 2017: 16).

In conducting focus group discussions, the skill of the moderator is essential:

> The moderator must be able to encourage equal participation, re-focusing the interview if necessary and pulling participants back together if the interview breaks down into two or three discussions (Twinn 2000: 141).

During focus group discussions, participants may speak all at once especially during a heated discussion. When that happens, it becomes difficult to keep track of who said what especially when the discussion is audio recorded. For these reasons, as Kidd and Parshall (2000: 298) suggest, it is important to have no less than two researchers present during focus group discussions. In light of this, the researcher was assisted by two research assistants in order for them to help me take notes and make observations on participant interactions during focus group discussions.

It is, however, impossible to write down what the focus group participants say, observe them and moderate the discussion all at once, even with the assistance of two research participants. Unlike the individual interviews, focus groups discussions were recorded using a voice recorder. Recording the discussions enabled the researcher to moderate the discussion while the two research assistants observed and took notes. Recording the focus group discussions enabled the researcher to revisit the discussions and make additional observations long after the focus group discussions.

As mentioned earlier, the individual interviews went ahead with no major problems. The same cannot be said about focus group discussions. The focus group discussions conducted by the researcher were his first. The researcher had no prior experience conducting focus group discussions. In light of this, the researcher spent extended periods of time familiarising himself with academic material on how to conduct focus group discussions. A significant amount of time was spent planning how the discussions would be held. No amount of advance planning, however, could have adequately prepared the researcher for all the possible eventualities that lay ahead. The researcher's experience was a far cry from the description of focus group discussions described by Getrich *et al.* (2016: 750) below:

> The principal concern over "how to" conduct focus groups has resulted in the orientation of viewing the focus group as a controlled scientific endeavour, in which the perfectly constituted sample is chosen, an exact number of participants actually show up as planned, the ideal set of questions are crafted ahead of time and deployed with precision by the moderators, the conversation among similarly situated participants flows naturally and smoothly, and the data generated from the encounter are ultimately the end-result of the exercise. This approach to conducting focus groups assumes that the control over the session is held by the researchers.

To begin with, bringing together participants to a central venue was a considerable challenge. After identifying the first group of participants and having obtained their consent to participate, we agreed on the date, time and venue in the East London CBD. Only two participants showed up on the date agreed. In light of this, the discussion did not go ahead as planned because there were not enough participants. Upon inquiry I found out that one member had found temporary employment also known as a piece job and thus he could not attend. The other participant who did not show up collects plastic bottles for recycling for a living. The day in question was the designated day for the municipal collection of garbage in a nearby suburb. Every week when residents take out their trash he has to go and scour the trash bags for plastic bottles. On the day in question, he could not attend because he had gone to the nearby suburb to collect plastic bottles for recycling. Instead of conducting the focus group discussions at a venue in town, we decided to conduct them at one of the participant's place of residence in order to avoid unnecessary travel.

Another challenge was that our focus group discussions attracted the attention of other community members living in the shacks close by or friends passing by. There were constant interruptions and at one point in time individuals who were not part of the research joined us in the discussions.

Once the discussions started the one of the challenges was creating an atmosphere conductive for a lively discussion. At the initial stages, it seemed as if participants' understanding was that focus groups were group question and answer sessions rather than a platform for the discussion of issues. The researcher's assumption was that it was difficult for some of the participants to open up to and be in conversation with "strangers". While some of them may have taken part in the same protest, for some of them it was the first time that they were interacting with each other at that level.

The final challenge was moderating the groups. Often the participants strayed away from the topic at hand. While the researcher would redirect the group back to the topic at hand every now and then, he was reluctant to do it too often at the risk of appearing too controlling or too formalistic. It is noteworthy that the focus group discussions were held after a significant number of individual interviews had been conducted. The researcher realised that the focus group discussions yielded no new information other than what the researcher had already obtained from the individual interviews. This was not bad, however, since the focus group discussions were used as a method of source triangulation. In other words, data collected through the focus group discussions confirmed the data obtained from the individual interviews with residents.

Overall, despite the aforementioned challenges, the process was a learning curve. When used by an experienced researcher, focus group discussions can be a quick and easy way to obtain information from a large number of respondents than conducting individual interviews.

5.6 Translation

Interviews with residents were conducted mainly in IsiXhosa for three reasons: most of the resident respondents speak IsiXhosa as their first language, and second, resident respondents felt more at ease when they were interviewed in their mother tongue. A further reason was that interviewing them in their mother tongue helped the researcher to build rapport with the respondents, most of whom were amazed by his level of command of the language considering that he is not of Xhosa origin. There was thus no need for the researcher to employ an interpreter. Member checking allowed the researcher to determine if he had captured the respondents' views accurately. While the respondents responded in IsiXhosa, the researcher wrote down their responses in English. In other words, the researcher translated the interviews on the scene.

5.7 Pretesting

Pretesting is defined as "a method of checking that questions work as intended and are understood by those individuals who are likely to respond to them" (Hilton 2017: 21). The interview questions were pretested by administering the interview questions to the researcher's working group. This was done in order to identify possible shortcomings which could have undermined the process of data collection. During pretesting, the researcher assessed the following:

1. The research participants' understanding of the questions posed
2. The research participants' interpretations of the questions posed
3. The time it took for research participants to answer the questions
4. The level of difficulty of the questions
5. The level of detail in the participants' responses
6. Whether the questions posed produced relevant answers
7. The questions the participants were not willing to answer

5.8 Validity, Reliability and Objectivity

5.8.1 Internal Validity or Credibility

Internal validity or credibility of the data collected was ensured through triangulation, member checking and through a prolonged stay in the field. Triangulation is defined as "a methodological approach that contributes to the validity of research results when multiple methods, sources, theories, and/or investigators are employed" (Farmer *et al.* 2006). Based on this definition, the following is instructive:

1. Methodological triangulation involves using more than one data collection technique, for instance, interviews, document analysis and focus groups.
2. Source triangulation involves using more than one source of data, for instance, professionals and laypersons.
3. Theoretical triangulation involves the use of more than one theory to explain or analyse the research findings.
4. Investigator or researcher triangulation involves the use of more than one researcher to collect or analyse data (Farmer *et al.* 2006: 379).

Triangulation, however, is time consuming and expensive to conduct. There is also no guidance on which set of sources or method or theory to use in order to achieve triangulation. In addition, the process may result in different results or divergent findings. These divergent findings however, can be used to the researcher's advantage in that they can result in the creation of new theories and open up opportunities for further research (Perlesz and Lindsay 2003: 34).

This study utilised methodological and source triangulation. Methodological triangulation involved the use of interviews and focus group discussions. Source triangulation was conducted by interviewing four different classes of respondents. These were namely, residents, municipal officials, ward councillors and members of the SAPS. When embarking on a research project, researchers have to decide on the appropriate data collection method. In qualitative research, researchers often have to decide whether to use interviews or focus groups. Each of the methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. For instance, Guest *et al.* (2017: 705) observe the following disadvantages of focus group discussions over individual interviews. Focus groups require more participants than individual interviews per data collection event. Focus groups are also difficult to set up and require more than one researcher. In addition, they are more time consuming in terms of data collection, transcription and analysis. However, focus group data are said to be more suited for the generation of sensitive disclosures than individual interviews. Methodological triangulation therefore made it possible to make use of the advantages of both individual interviews and focus groups.

The second manner in which internal validity or credibility was ensured was through member checking. Member checking occurs when the data collected is read to the research participant in order to check the participant's reactions and whether or not the data, as recorded, accurately reflects the participant's perspective (Cho and Trent 2006: 322). In such an instance, member checking involves giving research participants the opportunity, before the process of data analysis, to review the accuracy of the information collected from them (DeCino and Waalkes 2019: 374). Member checking may also occur after the process of data analysis, wherein research participants are provided with a copy of the findings and the themes, so that they can check whether such themes are in line with their lived experiences (Kornbluh 2015: 398).

The internal validity or credibility of the data collected was also ensured through the researcher's prolonged stay in the BCMM. Notably, the researcher stayed in the BCMM throughout the entire research. This enabled the researcher to immerse himself in the lives of the respondents who, over time, opened up and gave him a glimpse into the more personal aspects of their lives. This enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of the socio-economic conditions in which the respondents lived and how they are linked to the phenomenon of violent service delivery protests.

5.8.2 External Validity or Transferability

Transferability refers to the generalisability of the findings of a study (Nowell *et al.* 2017: 3). In order to ensure that the conclusions of the study could be generalised or transferred to other situations or communities, the researcher interviewed a diverse group of respondents from different communities. Regarding the pool of respondents, there was a great variation in terms of age, education and employment. In relation to places of residence, resident respondents were recruited from both formal and informal settlements. While the study focuses specifically on one metropolitan area, the residential areas within the BCMM are numerous and varied.

5.8.3 Reliability or Dependability

A study satisfies the requirement of reliability if another researcher is able to obtain similar results should he or she repeat the same study in the same context, using the same methods and with the same participants (Shenton 2004: 71). Before each respondent was interviewed, it was emphasised that the information provided to the researcher would be kept confidential. This ensured that participants were not tempted to justify their use of violence based on the fear that the information provided might be obtained by law enforcement authorities and used against them. In order to ensure that respondents did not fabricate answers in order to obtain approval of their actions, the researcher assured the research participants that there were no correct or right answers to the interview questions, and that the researcher was looking for their experiences, no matter what those experiences entailed. The researcher also emphasised that his task was to gather information for research purposes and not to judge the participants' actions, in order that the participants would not alter their narratives in fear of the researcher disapproving of their actions.

5.8.4 Objectivity or Confirmability

A study satisfies the requirement of objectivity or confirmability if the research findings are informed by the experiences of the participants rather than the researcher's own preferences (Shenton 2004: 72). While qualitative research requires that a researcher presents the narrative of those that he or she is researching, one cannot ignore that researchers have their own views on the subject matter they are investigating. These views may negatively influence the research outcome if not stated and acknowledged at the beginning of the study. It is important to ensure that as a researcher, such biases do not interfere with the duty to present an objective account of the lived experiences of the research participants. The following were the researcher's biases, attitudes and assumptions as the study began:

1. That while protests can be justified, the use of violence can never be justified
2. That violent protests are a cover for criminal activities
3. That violent protests are attributable to a *third force*
4. That the inhumane conditions prevailing in informal settlements cannot be justified in a democratic South Africa

A researcher must, however, strive to ensure that the results are not tainted by his or her own view point on the subject under investigation. In order to maintain objectivity, the researcher of this study set aside his own biases, views and assumptions during the data collection and data analysis processes. The researcher also avoided seeking from the data information which confirmed his own assumptions; instead, the researcher deliberately searched for information which contradicted his own views and assumptions. Finally, the researcher restrained himself from making interpretations which confirmed his biases by always looking for alternative interpretations of the data.

5.9 Anonymity and Confidentiality

Research with human subjects requires the researcher to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the research participants. The need for anonymity and confidentiality is even greater in studies in which sensitive issues are investigated. There is, however, a fine line between anonymity and confidentiality. While anonymity is one of the ways to achieve confidentiality, confidentiality is not limited to the anonymisation of data (Wiles *et al.* 2008: 417). Confidentiality means not disclosing or discussing information gained from a research participant with others and presenting research findings in a manner that ensures that the identity of the research participants is not revealed (mainly through the process of anonymisation) (Wiles *et al.* 2008: 418).

The issue of participation in violent protests under investigation in this study is particularly sensitive because it raises concerns over the possibilities of incrimination, criminal prosecution, exposure and retaliation. At the start of each interview, each respondent was informed of their right to anonymity and confidentiality, as well as what the two rights entailed. Anonymity was ensured by recording participants' chosen pseudo names on the questionnaires instead of their real names. While there may be a temptation to arbitrarily choose pseudo names for research participants, Maringe and Sing (2014: 543) alert one to a case in the United States where legal action was taken against researchers for giving a research participant a pseudonym which she "violently detested".

In the light of the foregoing case, research participants were allowed to choose their own pseudo names. In the final report, however, the respondents were referred to using codes because some of the participants chose the same pseudo names which made it difficult to distinguish between participants during data analysis. The codes were informed by two considerations: first, the group which the participant belonged to – for instance, whether the participant was a resident, ward councillor, member of the POP or municipal employee; and second, the number of the individual on the participant list – for instance, whether the participant was the first, second, or third to be interviewed (and so on). To illustrate this point, if a participant was a municipal employee and was the first to be recruited, he or she would be referred to as "BCMM 1". A ward councillor would be referred to as "WC 1". A resident would be referred to as "RES 1". A POP member would be referred to as "POP 1".

When participants insisted on being referred to by their real names, the researcher followed the advice of Maringe and Sing (2014: 543) and persuaded them to reconsider their position because several years into the future, after the completion of the research, matters may change and they may require the anonymity which they were refusing at this point in time. Ntseane (2007) faced this dilemma first hand when she was conducting research with female entrepreneurs in Botswana. One of the participants, Mama-K (her nickname), in opposing the idea of using pseudonyms stated the following:

> Everybody in this town knows me because of this vegetable street vending business. So if my 20 years of hard [work] is to be recognized in the University libraries, I want my great grand-kids to associate that legacy with me not some funny name that will not be recognized even by my people. Since you insist on not using my real name at least use my affectionate nickname from my valued customers. They call me 'Mama-K' (Ntseane 2007: 50).

Anonymity was also achieved by the omission of information which may have revealed the identity of the participants from the final research report. Maringe and Sing (2014: 542), by way of an example, highlight that by describing a research participant in a research report as *a 40-year-old single mother studying physics at university who travels to class on a bicycle*, may be an adequate description to identify a research participant, despite the use of a pseudonym in the research report. Thus, one may identify the research participants through the use of a deductive or inference process of reasoning.

The research participants were assured that the data collected would be treated with the utmost confidentiality. Confidentiality was achieved by ensuring that participants' names and raw interview data were not revealed to anyone.

5.10 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations refer to the issues concerning the appropriate manner in which to conduct research without causing harm to the research participants (Schurink 2009: 789). The notion of ethics as minimising harm is arguably a narrow conception of ethics in research involving human subjects. A broader approach to research ethics is proposed by Cascio and Racine (2018). Their conception of research ethics, which they call a person oriented approach, is underpinned by five guide posts namely: respect for holistic personhood; acknowledgement of lived world; individualization; focus on researcher-participant relationships; and empowerment in decision (Cascio and Racine 2018: 177-189).

Respect for holistic personhood requires the researcher to acknowledge and respect the right of research participants to make their own decisions. Acknowledgement of lived world requires the researcher to be mindful of external factors or experiences outside the research setting that may have an impact on the research participants. Examples include personal beliefs, norms, values, life situations, personal relationships and the historical and social context within which the research is carried out (Cascio and Racine 2018: 185). Individualisation requires the researcher to be mindful of the uniqueness of each individual participating in the research even though such individuals may belong to the same race, gender or religion. Focus on researcher-participant relationships requires the researcher to take into account the power dynamics present in the relationship between the researcher and research participant. Empowerment in decision-making requires the researcher to respect the research participant's decision-making abilities and in addition, provide the necessary information or support required for them to make informed decisions.

As mentioned earlier, before taking part in the study, potential research participants were informed of the nature and objectives of the research and that which was required of them should they wish to participate. Thereafter, they were required to sign a consent form if they wished to participate. The researcher explained the contents of the consent form, what it meant and the terms to which they were consenting. Research participants were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at any time and refuse to answer certain questions without any fear of adverse consequences for their decisions. Finally, participation in the study was voluntary, and no payment was made to the research participants for their participation in the study.

5.11 Data Analysis

The data collected was analysed manually without the use of data analysis software. A thematic framework was used in the process of data analysis. It should be emphasised from the outset that themes are not descriptive summaries of the research participants' responses to the questions posed to them by the researcher (Braun and Clarke 2016: 740). The process of data analysis started in the field during data collection where the researcher wrote down notes on important observations which he had made. After data collection, the researcher familiarised himself with the data collected by reading it and making further notes. This helped the researcher to identify the core meanings from the text which were relevant to the research aims and objectives. Thereafter, the researcher was able to categorise the information at hand and identify the dominant or major themes as they appeared from the data.

As mentioned before, each question posed to the participants was linked to a specific objective of the study. The responses provided were analysed and categorised into themes. A category or theme was created only when there was evidence of multiple and varied instances in the data which showed a repetition of an idea, concept or story. A wide range of evidence in the data supporting the existence of a category was required to be present before the category was established. Eleven major themes were identified from the data. These themes were however not all identified in one interview.

Following (Kidd and Parshall 2000: 301) in analysing focus group data, the researcher identified whether a viewpoint was held collectively by the group or by a few group members. Distinguishing between a widely held view and one shared by a few group members enabled the researcher to determine the significance and implications of a particular viewpoint.

5.12 Conclusion

The study placed a large emphasis on community participation in the identification and delineation of the problem under investigation – violent service delivery protests. Equal emphasis was also placed on community participation in finding possible solutions to the use of violence during service delivery protests. As such, the study opted for the PAR approach to achieve its objectives.

In order to describe the social realities faced by communities and to capture them in the words of the community members, the research employed the qualitative research methodology. Research participants were recruited using the snowball and purposive sampling techniques. Consent was sought from each participant before his or her participation in the study. The recruited participants were interviewed face-to-face through the use of structured interviews with open-ended questions. Unstructured interviews were used for focus group discussions.

The research design was pretested through a working group in order to identify possible shortcomings which could have undermined the quality of the data collected for the study. The validity of the data collected was ensured through triangulation, member checking, a prolonged stay in the field, and recruiting a diverse group of participants from a wide range of communities.

Anonymity was ensured by recording pseudo names on the questionnaires, by referring to participants with codes in the final report, and by omitting information which could have revealed the identity of the respondents from the final report. Confidentiality was achieved by limiting access to the raw data collected.

Data was analysed manually in order to categorise it into themes in line with the research objectives. Eleven major themes emerged from the data. These themes, together with the general findings of the study, are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction

As presented earlier, the objectives of this study were to investigate why communities choose to engage in violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods. In addition, the study sought to identify factors which make violent service delivery protests a viable option for communities. Furthermore, the study sought to test the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action. This chapter presents and discusses the main findings of this study through a thematic framework. A thematic framework makes it easier to understand the results of the study.

6.2 Biographical Data

Table 6.1: Biographical data (residents).

Biographical data (residents)			
Characteristics		**Number**	**Percentage**
Gender	Male	78	78%
	Female	22	22%
Age group	18 – 25	54	54%
	26 – 35	32	32%
	36 – 45	14	14%
Education level	Grade 10	38	38%
	Matric	40	40%
	College	15	15%
	Tertiary	7	7%
Employment status	Full-time	11	11%
	Part-time	35	35%
	Self-employed	13	13%
	Unemployed	41	41%

Table 6.1 presents the biographical data of residents. As highlighted in the previous chapter, 20 municipal officials, 20 POP members, 10 ward councillors and 100

residents were interviewed for this study. The only biographical data which was collected, however, was that of residents. The biographical data of municipal officials, POP members and ward councillors was omitted for two main reasons. First, some of the biographical details would have made it easy to reveal the identity of some of the respondents. For instance, for ward councillors, details such ward name, sex, age and race reveal much about the identity of that particular councillor. Second, their biographical data was omitted because it had no material relevance to the objectives of the study.

6.3 Cited Grievances

Different grievances cited by residents are given in Table 6.2 below:

Table 6.2: Grievances cited by residents.

Main grievances	%	Other grievances	%
Formal houses	63	Jobs	25
Electricity	68	Removal of councillor	13
Public infrastructure (schools, clinics, community hall)	40	Fair recruitment process for the employment of local residents	5
Refuse removal	45		
Potholes / roads	53		
Water	70		
Sanitation / toilets	70		

6.4 Why Residents choose Violent Protest over Non-Violence

In order to find out why residents choose violent protests over non-violent methods, a direct question was posed to residents: why did you choose to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods of action? Municipal respondents' and ward councillors' views on why they thought residents choose violent protests over non-violent methods, were also sought. Two main themes emerged, namely, the lack of confidence in non-violent methods and the perceived effectiveness of violent protests.

6.4.1 Lack of Confidence in Non-Violent Methods

The main reason cited by the majority of residents (72%) for choosing violent protests was a lack of confidence in non-violent action as a method to resolve grievances. One resident stated that "…to the municipality the lack of running water in my community is not a serious matter. We have to be violent in order for the municipality to listen to our challenges. Peaceful protests will always fall on deaf ears in this country" (*RES 5*).

Other residents contributed the following:

> All this talk of peaceful engagement with the municipality does not and will never work. They never take anyone seriously, especially if you don't burn or break things. Everyone knows this (*RES 12*).
>
> You can never get the attention of the municipality if you don't use violence. We have tried it before. Peaceful protests are not a priority for these people. You can protest all you want but I can tell you, nothing will get one as long as you protest peacefully (*RES 17*).
>
> It's like talking to a brick or deaf person. That's what happens when you approach the municipality in peace or using non-violent protests. No one can hear what you are trying to say, that is why violent protests are the way to go for us (*RES 18*).
>
> You cannot expect the government to take you seriously if you march to the City Hall, give them petitions and go back to your shacks. Those things [petitions] don't mean anything to them. They are just pieces of paper that will be torn and thrown away into the dustbin as soon as you leave. It's not a protest if the freeway is still open, if there are no tyres burning and if there is no property up in flames (*RES 38*).

In line with the responses of the residents, municipal respondents linked the preference for violent protests over non-violent action to the failure of the municipality to take peaceful protests seriously:

> It is apparent that protestors are not being taken seriously when protesting peacefully, so it is in this regard that they decide to partake in a violent protest because they believe by burning buildings and destroying municipal infrastructure, they will be taken seriously (*BCMM 1*).
>
> There is a very low level of priority given to grievances aired during peaceful protests. The communities then feel that they are not taken seriously and as a result turn to behaviour that they think is viewed in serious light (*BCMM 4*).

In the same vein, ward councillors stated that:

> There is too much delay in responding to issues raised by residents through peaceful means and or no response to issues especially issues on development. The alternative ends up being violent protest because for them peaceful means do not produce results (*WC 8*).

> Peaceful protests are treated as business as usual, which in most cases means there is lack of feedback by departments. What then happens is that they turn to methods that according to them are more effective than peaceful protests (*WC 9*).

6.4.2 Perceived Effectiveness of Violent Protest

Apart from the lack of confidence in non-violent action, results show that residents (28%) chose violent protests instead of non-violent action because they consider violent protest as an effective method of action. One resident commented: "Like I said before, violence is the only language that they know. Nothing is going to change without using force" (*RES 27*). Other residents commented: "…it has become a customary practice that violence is the only language that the municipality understands" (*RES 40*); "…this is how this government listens, it's the only language they know" (*RES 49*); and:

> In as much as violent protests are dangerous, violence is the only language that our government seems to understand. If it is a peaceful protest, the government never shows up when we call them to address us (*RES 22*).

Municipal respondents were also of the view that residents resorted to violent protests because it was more effective than non-violence. Their reasons for this view were that residents believed that the municipality would only act when confronted with violent protests:

> They see it [violent protests] as a catalyst for speedy reaction by the municipality. In most cases they go to the extent of saying the municipality only reacts when they barricade and close roads (*BCMM 7*).
>
> They resort to violence because of a misguided belief that the only way to get the attention of the authorities is to cause damage to property and to stop anyone else from enjoying services and facilities available to all citizens (*BCMM 9*).

Similarly, ward councillors were of the view that residents resort to violent protests because they are more effective. This response was based on the councillors' belief that it has been proven over time that violent protests have the power to force the municipality into action:

> They [residents] are aware of the history of this country. They know that in order for the government to respond and in order to attract the attention of government, they have to use violence. It has always been like that since Apartheid (*WC 4*).

> A precedent has been set that our government only listens to its people when things get 'hot'. This was the case even before democracy. It actually gave birth to democracy so people see it as the way to go (*WC 10*).

6.5 Factors enabling Violence to be a Viable Option

In order to ascertain the factors which enable violence to be a viable option for residents, the researcher sought to find out how the municipality, ward councillors and the police responded to the violent protests. In addition, despite the manner in which the three entities responded, the researcher sought to find out whether residents would continue to take part in future violent protests. Results showed that unfulfilled promises, negative attitudes towards the police and group solidarity or social ties are factors which enable violent protests to be a viable option for residents.

6.5.1 Unfulfilled Promises

For the most part, residents indicated that the municipality is said to have responded to the violent protests by making promises to residents. Residents were, however, not confident that the municipality would fulfil its promise to resolve their grievances:

> They called a meeting with the community and promised us that they will resolve our grievances. They even took the name of a community member who was part of the residents' committee. We knew they were just pasting butter into our eyes, they all tell lies (*RES 8*).

The lack of confidence in the promises made by the municipality for some residents stemmed from the fact that similar promises had been made in the past yet nothing had changed:

> We were called for a meeting by the mayor but they only made empty promises. They are always making empty promises. People have been protesting and complaining about houses for a number of years but their complaints and demands fall on deaf ears (*RES 41*).

> They agreed to meet with us in order to discuss issues but there was nothing new, the same old promises (*RES 67*).

Notably, municipal officials and ward councillors who were interviewed did concede that some of the promises made to residents were unrealistic:

> The problem is we promise people things that are impractical and by doing so we are setting up ourselves for failure. Funny enough no one wants to stand in front of the masses and admit failure. So we keep quiet and sweep issues under the carpet (*WC 8*).
>
> Leaders must follow time frames on projects promised to communities. They should be transparent and stop making promises that they can't keep because people become impatient and end up showing their frustration through violent protest (*BCMM 14*).

Police respondents also warned against the practice of making unrealistic promises:

> Government and the local municipality should stop lying to the people and then use the police to respond to protests because it always ends badly for the police. They [the police] are either charged, arrested or dismissed for acting or seemingly acting above the law. Some end up being killed by the community. Some commit suicide due to stress and lack of support from superiors (*POP 3*).

Until such a time that the municipality meets their demands and makes good on their promises, some residents (32%) indicated that they would continue to take part in violent protests:

> Yes I can be part of such a protest if there is no serious action taken on service delivery. Local government must do the right thing and fix everything in our community instead of putting money into their pockets (*RES 32*).
>
> It's not about their [the municipality and police] response. It's about what we want as a community. I will always participate until this government can be able to account and use the budget for the right things. Anyway, anyone who takes part in a protest knows the risks involved. Everyone knows that service delivery protests are the worst. Even if it is a peaceful service delivery protest it is likely to end up being violent (*RES 25*).
>
> As long as our problems are not resolved, we will keep on protesting. We are tired of false promises. Too many promises yet nothing is ever done. It's just a way of calming down the situation but it won't work because we are tired of being treated like children. If no concrete steps are taken to sort out our problems, we are going back to the streets (*RES 39*).
> The people at the municipality are not honest. They keep on making false promises but until the municipality honours its promises I will always take part in violent protests (*RES 64*).
>
> If the municipality keeps making promises and breaking them we will continue with the struggle. We have to maintain the pressure otherwise they will keep on making more promises and breaking them again (*RES 65*).

6.5.2 Negative Attitudes towards the Police

Residents who were interviewed indicated that the police responded to their protests largely through the use of force. Police reportedly used rubber bullets and tear gas on the protesting residents.

> They used rubber bullets and tear gas because they were given orders by the government. They are nothing but government puppets. We fought back throwing stones and lit up car tyres (*RES 12*).

Residents expressed their disappointment in the manner in which the police responded to the violent protests:

> We were shot with rubber bullets. They were following their job description but not in a good way (*RES 33*).
>
> I have a feeling that the police do not understand their role or they are not trained properly on how to deal with this. They were violent while they were supposed to maintain order. I was also afraid of being arrested because I was one of the leaders of the protest (*RES 14*).
>
> There is nothing wrong with putting people in jail for vandalism but the brutality involved in their arrests was totally wrong (*RES 51*).

Despite the use of force by the police, a significant number of residents (39%) indicated that they were not going to stop organising and taking part in more violent protests. The reason provided was that whether the protest was violent or not, the police would always use force instead of maintaining law and order:

> Why should I not take part in violent protests when the police respond to every protest using violence? Violence is in their blood. Violence is what they know best. They will always use it even when there is no need to do so. These people are paid to maintain order not to beat us (*RES 22*).
>
> Whether it's a peaceful protest or not, the police will always use violence. It doesn't make sense. To me it's better to be violent because either way, when the police come, they will respond using violence (*RES 43*).
>
> I will always take part in violent protests. The police do not scare me anymore. Whether I get beaten or shot at doesn't matter. The problem is that the police cannot differentiate between peaceful and violent protests. To them, there is no difference. They will shoot us and throw tear gas even if we are not being violent so it's better to be violent and be beaten for something that we are guilty of rather than for something that we are not (*RES 46*).

In view of the responses by residents, members of the Public Order Police were asked to identify conduct on their part which contributed to the escalation of violence during protests. They identified the following conduct:

1. The use of unnecessary, unjustified and unreasonable force under the circumstances
2. Intolerance
3. Brandishing specialised equipment
4. Improper shooting decisions
5. Using equipment in a wrongful manner
6. Lack of knowledge of the law
7. Not being impartial
8. Confronting protestors based on preconceived perceptions

Regarding preconceived perceptions about protestors, one POP member stated the following:

> Sometimes the police use force on the protestors because they assume that protestors are violent people even before they have engaged in negotiations with them. The problem is that some police officers may have had a bad encounter from one area and then they tend to think that all service delivery protests are the same (*POP 8*).

6.5.3 Group Solidarity / Social Ties

Some residents (29%) also indicated that despite the police and municipal responses to their protests, they would participate in future violent protests because they want to maintain solidarity with fellow community members. For them, the manner in which the municipality and the police responded had no bearing on their decision to take part in violent protests in the future:

> The municipality may not have responded in the manner that we expected but that won't stop us from taking part in future violent protests because we need to be united. Unity is power. Once people start giving up, we won't achieve anything. We need to fight together as a community (*RES 4*).
> I won't hesitate taking part in any future violent protest. The police came out in full force to stop our protest and some comrades were injured in the process. That won't discourage us because we have to act together. We have to show that we are united and determined to fight together (*RES 10*).

> Yes I will because our people need us to stand by them and support them no matter what! (*RES 52*).

> I will take part in the protests because as a community, we need to stand together. Whether we are going to be beaten up by the police or arrested for violence it doesn't matter, we must be united (*RES 55*).

> Of course I will be involved in the protests. What matters most is to show a united front. Everything else doesn't matter. Everyone knows the risks that are involved but we still take part in the protests anyway because unity is more important (*RES 68*).

6.6 Effectiveness of Violent Protests over Non-Violence

The effectiveness of the violent service delivery protests was tested by posing the following questions to the respondents. Residents were asked whether they were able to achieve their protest objectives or not. Municipal respondents were asked to describe how they responded to violent protests and the level of priority which they attached to concerns raised through both violent and non-violent protests. Ward councillors were asked to state how they responded to concerns raised through violent and peaceful protests. Ward councillors were also asked if there was any difference in the level of priority which was accorded to grievances raised through peaceful as opposed to violent protests.

6.6.1 Violent Service Delivery Protests are effective

A few residents (16%) indicated that they were able to achieve their goals through violent service delivery protests:

> The mayor came together with some officials from the municipality and addressed us, which is what we wanted in the first place (*RES 27*).

> Some people from the municipality came and addressed us. Before the protest, no one was willing to talk to us. No one was willing to listen to our problems (*RES 40*).

> What we wanted was to voice our concerns to the municipality. We have been trying to do so for a long time without any success. When you get to the municipality they keep referring you to so and so or they tell you that the person in charge is not around. Surprisingly, after the protest, they were willing to listen and to talk to us (*RES 49*).

> The mayor came down in person to talk to us, despite ignoring us when the protest started. I think he realised that we were not backing down with our demand that he must come and address us. For us this meeting would not have been possible if we had not been forceful (*RES 22*).

In line with the responses of residents, municipal respondents (25%) and ward councillors' (20%) responses indicate that there are instances where demands for meetings made through violent protests are acceded to:

> We go to the scene and look for the leadership or committee and listen to them but also ask them to stop the violence for now. We will then take them to the person that they were expecting a response from and secure them a meeting. If the person is not available, we will agree on a particular time that is convenient for all stakeholders. We will make sure that all the relevant key people are part of the meeting together with the executive mayor or speaker and chart a way forward. Time frames will be set as to what will be done by who and when (*BCMM 18*).
>
> We normally go and request them to stop the violence and invite them to the offices for engagement. On many occasions, I have gone and asked them to remove the barricades and they responded positively. We call them to the meeting and listen to their grievances. We invite all affected directorates and seek answers on the matters raised. We inform communities on the estimated time by which their problems can be solved (*BCMM 6*).

Ward councillors (20%) provided similar responses:

> We identify the leaders of the protest so that we can engage with them in order to resolve the issue (*WC 5*).
>
> There is always a leader in a protest. We start by identifying the leaders of the violent protest and engage them. We then take them to the relevant offices so that they can get information that they will take back to the angry residents (*WC 6*).

A few municipal officials (15%) indicated that violent protests are accorded top priority:

> We give them high level priority because if you don't they [residents] will cause more damage to the facilities (*BCMM 12*).
>
> It becomes a priority to deal with such grievances as they always give ultimatums for a feedback, between 7 – 14 working days (*BCMM 19*).
>
> They are accorded high priority in order to end the violent protest. What residents don't know is that in terms of addressing the grievances, no amount of violence can force the municipality to speed up things. There is no genuine urgency given to grievances raised through violent protests by top management in the municipality and everyone here knows that (*BCMM 8*).

A few councillors (20%) indicated that they treated violent protests as a matter of high priority:

> Both protests are a priority but violent protests get another level of priority since they can result in damage to community property (*WC 6*).

> Yes, there is a difference in the level of priority. With violent protests comes damage to property and the government ends up spending a lot of money to repair the damage. So, we prioritise violent protests because of the pressure from residents. If we don't then these people will destroy everything that they can lay their hands on (*WC 5*).

6.6.2 Violent Service Delivery Protests are not always effective

Some residents (19%) indicated that the objectives of the protests were achieved but that they were not happy with the overall turn of events. Such cases were classified as partial successes:

> After the protests, houses were built for us although it took a long time. The problem is that some of us were not put in the list of people who were going to receive houses. They gave the houses to other people who are not even part of our community, so despite fighting for houses, we still don't have houses (*RES 61*).

> The mayor came to address us just as we had wanted him to but we were not satisfied with the response that he provided. We wanted him to set out a plan of action, complete with timelines. That did not happen. Without any plan in place and nothing binding the municipality, nothing will ever get done (*RES 36*).

> Because of the protest, government officials came to our area to see for themselves the challenges we are facing. This was a victory for our struggle. What remains is for government to make good on its promises. So far, none of the promises have been fulfilled. No one knows how long we are going to wait (*RES 73*).

> I guess to an extent you can say that we got what we wanted which is to get a response from the municipality. Nevertheless, we are not happy with what transpired. At first, we were happy when municipal officials came to us after the protest. We were all saying finally someone is going to listen to our demands and do something about it. Municipal officials however, told us point blank that the issue of houses and electricity was not their responsibility. They told us to approach Eskom and the Department of Human Settlements (*RES 78*).

The residents' disappointment with the outcome of the meetings held with municipal officials can be explained by the intended objectives of the meetings according to municipal officials. Most municipal officials (60%) indicated that the meetings which they call in the wake of a violent protest are mainly to ensure that there is an end to the violence and chaos:

> Our response has always been to go and meet the residents and talk to them about their grievances. However, we won't suddenly start to build schools and clinics simply because residents used violence. Our main aim is to ensure that protestors stop the violence and disruptions (*BCMM 2*).

> We go to the people and hold meetings with them. From our side the purpose of the meetings are to try and persuade them to stop the violence. The truth of the matter is that we have to do whatever it takes to ensure that things return to normal. Grievance resolution is a secondary issue (*BCMM 15*).

6.6.3 Violent Service Delivery Protests are not effective

Most residents (65%) however, indicated that the protests did not enable them to achieve their intended objectives:

> In our area, we have never had any electricity or water. There are no houses here just shacks. It's been like this for a long time. Nothing has changed despite the protests. I don't know what has to happen before anything can be done in this area (*RES 76*).

> They condemned the violent protest but promised to take the matter to the provincial housing department as they claimed that the municipality does not have enough funds for the project. To date, we still don't have houses (*RES 63*).

> They didn't want to listen to us. They sent the police to arrest those who were at the forefront of the struggle (*RES 44*).

> They did what they always do which is to call the police. The police then did what they know best which is to beat people and lock them up in jail (*RES 2*).

A few municipal officials (15%) indicated that they were not willing to engage with residents where violence was involved:

> We alert law enforcement agencies about the violent protests in order to curb loss of lives and damage to property. There can be no discussions when residents resort to violence, we have to bring in law enforcement otherwise lives will be lost and properties will be destroyed (*BCMM 10*).

Most municipal officials (75%) indicated that peaceful protests are accorded top priority over violent protests:

> In peaceful protests, the grievances receive all the attention but when we are faced with violent protests, there are a lot of issues such as damage to property, protection of citizens and so on that must be prioritised before the grievances raised by the community can be attended to. It is sad that in most instances the grievances end up not being resolved because all the time and effort is focused on the violence (*BCMM 13*).

Similarly, most ward councillors (80%) indicated that they were more responsive to concerns raised through peaceful protests:

> If they come peacefully we refer them to the relevant offices (*WC 1*).
>
> It is easy to deal with grievances raised through peaceful protests because there is room for discussion. It is my responsibility as a councillor to facilitate the resolution of grievances raised by residents in my ward. I can easily identify the main problem and engage the community if they come to me peacefully (*WC 7*).
>
> Peaceful protest allows us to respond in a fruitful manner because the environment allows it. The more peaceful the engagement, the more efficient we become in resolving the grievances raised. In a violent protest, people want everything now! They don't give you any room to breathe. They don't understand process or protocol. They will shout and howl at you (*WC 2*).

6.7 Preventing Violent Service Delivery Protests

Regarding the question of preventing violent service delivery protests, the researcher probed municipal respondents on the measures put in place to prevent violent protests. The main strategy identified by most municipal respondents (80%) was the establishment of a 'Rapid Response Task Team'.

> There is a Rapid Response Task Team from the office of the Executive Mayor that was established in order to address and co-ordinate meetings between all stakeholders. Relevant departments from the municipality play a major role in such meetings. The 'Rapid Response Task Team' that was put into place has been shown to be inadequate to the task as violent protests still occur on a regular basis. It is basically dysfunctional (*BCMM 13*).

Apart from the task team, some municipal officials (20%) indicated that they collect intelligence in order to pre-empt any violent protests which might be imminent:

> We interact with intelligence officials to foretell the possibility of violent service delivery protests, establish the issues of concern, plan accordingly, advise the Executive about such possibility. If they occur then law enforcement agencies execute their mandate in terms of the relevant legislation (*BCMM 5*).

Police responses were varied and without much elaboration. The following are police responses to the question of the role which the police can play in the prevention of violent protests:

1. Educate the community about the role of police during protests and on how to protest legally
2. Facilitate negotiations amongst all role players before the protest
3. Engage in full participation in community programs
4. Gather reliable intelligence to predict protests before they occur
5. Communicate with protestors
6. Arrive on time

Two main themes emerged from the respondents' responses. First, respondents (residents in particular) casted doubt on the possibility of preventing violent service delivery protests. Second, respondents were of the view that the timeous resolution of disputes would ensure that violent protests do not occur. Third, respondents emphasised the need to promote residents' participation in the resolution of matters which affect them. These three themes are presented in the subsections which follow.

6.7.1 Violence cannot be prevented

Most residents (66%) were mainly of the view that it was not possible to prevent violent protests. For them, violent protests would always be the preferred method to facilitate the resolution of grievances.

> I don't think I have the right answers to this question. In fact, I don't think anyone has the answer to this problem because our experience has been that nothing is going to change without violence. So as long as we have a problem in our community that needs to be resolved, we will always use it [violence]. That's the way it is (*RES 88*).

> I do not know if it is possible [to prevent violent protests] because every time we need something from our government we have to show how serious we are about it by being violent in one way or another. So I don't think this prevention thing can ever work to begin with (*RES 31*).

The main reason for the insistence on violence seems to be linked to the conviction that non-violent methods do not work:

> I do not know how violent protests can be prevented. What I know is that we have tried using peaceful means in the past but we did not achieve anything until we started being forceful. It will be difficult to convince anyone around here to change because we know for a fact that being peaceful will not help us in any way (*RES 80*).

6.7.2 Timeous Responses to and Resolution of Grievances

Some residents (34%) were adamant that as long as their grievances were not attended to or resolved on time, they would always use violence:

> You will never see any violent protest if our problems are resolved on time. Why would anyone protest if the government is taking care of things? (*RES 65*).

In line with the residents' responses, most ward councillors (70%) mainly emphasised the need to respond timeously to grievances:

> When residents raise an issue, we must not waste time sending them from one office to another. Some issues that affect residents can honestly be resolved quickly but that is not always the case. A simple matter takes ages to resolve and this causes residents to express their frustration through violence (*WC 2*).
>
> Time is of the essence. It is important to categorise the grievances raised and then find short term and long term solutions before these grievances give rise to violent protests (*WC 10*).

Only a few municipal respondents (15%) suggested the timeous response to grievances as a solution:

> Residents' problems take too long to be attended to. There is never any sense of urgency when dealing with residents. If we can manage to handle complaints in a timely manner, then all this violence will certainly go away (*BCMM 17*).

6.7.3 Communication

Municipal respondents (85%) emphasised the importance of communication:

> The key is to communicate with the community before they get frustrated and resort to violence. Tell them that you are listening to their grievances and show them the steps that you are going to take to try and solve the problem (*BCMM 8*).
>
> I think we need to establish effective lines of communication between the municipality and ordinary residents of this metro. There is a lot of information that I think residents need to be made aware of on a regular basis. Residents don't know a lot of things and once you tell them what's going on within the municipality in order to solve their problems, I don't think there can be any violent protests (*BCMM 4*).

Some ward councillors (30%) also emphasised the need for communication:

> We have to explain to our people what we are doing for them all the time instead of keeping quiet. Sometimes all it takes to prevent protests is to provide an update on what you promised your people. Honesty plays a huge role in the process if you are not able to deliver as promised say so instead of lying to the people (*WC 3*).
>
> It is important to communicate with your constituency regularly. The problem is that some of our comrades when they get elected, they forget about their people, they forget about the promises that they made before being voted to office. They forget were they come from (*WC 1*).

6.8 Discussion

The first objective of this study was to ascertain why protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods. The main findings were that protestors had no confidence in non-violent methods and that they perceived violent protests to be an effective political tool of coercion. The lack of confidence in non-violent methods stemmed from allegations that the local government ignores concerns raised through peaceful means. The effectiveness of violent protests was premised on the belief that it is the only form of communication which has the power to extract a response from the municipality.

These findings confirm the findings of other studies only in so far as the existence of a belief in the effectiveness of violence amongst respondents is concerned (Banjo and Jili (2013: 262); Mchunu and Theron (2013: 121). The findings differ, however, from other studies, in particular the findings of the 2016 South African Social Attitudes Survey conducted by the HSRC and cited in the study of Bohler-Muller *et al.* (2017) in terms of the percentage of respondents who perceive violent protests as effective. Only 21% of the respondents in the HSRC study perceived violent protests as effective, while 72% of the respondents in this study believe that violent protests are effective. This difference in percentage can be explained by the fact that the HSRC survey relied on a relatively heterogeneous sample of respondents. The 3,079 respondents who took part in the HSRC study consisted of a representative sample of the adult population in South Africa, drawn from all nine provinces of the country. This study, on the other hand, utilised a relatively homogenous sample comprising 100 respondents drawn from a single metropolitan municipality and from specific communities. The difference can also be explained by the fact that 21% of the respondents in the HSRC study remained neutral i.e. they did not indicate whether, in their view, violent protests were successful/effective or not.

These findings are significant in that, in line with the rational choice theory, they suggest that resorting to violent protest is not random but a deliberate decision which is made based on weighing up the perceived advantages or benefits of violent protests over those of non-violent action. The findings of the study are also significant in that they establish the lack of confidence in non-violent methods as the dominant reason why communities choose to engage in violent service delivery protests instead of non-violent methods. While the study confirms the existence of a belief in the effectiveness of violent protests as observed by previous studies, the finding on the lack of confidence in non-violent methods is one which has not been established in previous studies on violent service delivery protests.

The second research objective was to investigate the factors which make violent protests a viable option for protestors. Three main factors were identified. The first factor was unfulfilled promises. Results show that protestors will readily resort to violence if promises made to them are not fulfilled. The second factor was negative attitudes towards the police. Results show that these negative attitudes stem from the heavy-handed manner in which the police sometimes respond to peaceful protests. The third factor was group solidarity or community ties. Results show that residents are willing to consider taking part in violent protests for the sake of maintaining group solidarity or community ties, despite any possible adverse consequences or outcomes of the protests.

The first finding suggests that where state institutions are considered unwilling to live up to the expectations of citizens, violent protests are likely to occur. The second finding suggests that where the police continually use force to respond to peaceful protests, negative perceptions towards the police will develop which in turn will make it easier for communities to resort to violent protests in the future. The third finding suggests that in certain instances, violent protests are more likely to occur where residents share a "sense of community". Sense of community describes how community members feel about fellow community members and their community (Ross and Searle 2019: 751). According to one of the pioneering scholars on the subject, McMillan and Chavis (1986: 9), a sense of community is composed of four elements, namely:

1. *membership*, which is one's feeling of belonging to a particular group;
2. *influence*, which is a sense that one matters to a group and that the group matters to the individual;
3. *fulfilment of needs*, which is the feeling that membership in a group will result in the fulfilment of one's needs; and
4. *shared emotional connection*, which is the feeling of a shared history and experiences with members of a group.

The first finding confirms the observations in previous literature in so far as the existence of a general dissatisfaction with the non-fulfilment of promises by municipalities is concerned (Banjo and Jili (2013: 261), Netswera and Kgalane (2014: 266). The second finding confirms the observations in previous literature in so far as the existence of negative attitudes towards the police is concerned (Roberts *et al.* (2017: 75) Roelofse (2017: 11). The third finding, however, was not expected. While it has been argued in previous literature that a sense of community can increase the civic participation of individuals (Farahani (2016), not much is known about how a sense of community influences an individual's participation in violent protests. This finding is therefore significant in that it establishes, for the first time, a sense of community as one of the factors which enable violent service delivery protests to be an option for would-be protestors.

The existence of a sense of community within a relatively diverse community can be explained by the role of social networks in service delivery protests in general. The role of social networks in service delivery has been examined in detail in a case of Gugulethu, Cape Town in a study by Chiwarawara and Masiya (2018). In their study, they define social networks as "social connections and links that exist between individuals that enable them to identify with each other and that influence decisions to participate in collective action". The findings of their study confirm the existence of social networks in Gugulethu. These social networks can be attributed to the fact that most participants in their study belong to social institutions such as churches, political parties, area or street committees, or share a particular history. People within the same institution therefore tend to identify with each other while some individuals may identify with members from other groups thus a social network is created. Their study shows that strong social networks create bonds, shared meanings, mutual trust, solidarity, cooperation, contextualised relationships and cliques all which are important in the organisation of service delivery protests.

Partisanship is another possible explanation of the existence of a sense of community in a diverse community. In their research on party identification and service delivery in the Eastern and Northern Cape, (Matebesi and Botes 2017) found that contrary to literature on the subject, membership and support of the ruling ANC encourages people to take part in service delivery protests. In their research, partisans were found to have relations not only within the party but also with external groups (Matebesi and Botes 2017: 88). The implications of these findings for the researcher are that a community with diverse members can be mobilised successfully along party lines in order to take part in a protest. In fact, as mentioned in the discussion above, political party membership is one of the ways in which social networks are created and strong social networks are critical in protest mobilisation.

Shared grievances can also help explain the sense of community experienced in communities with a diverse population. In a study on xenophobic violence in South Africa, Misago (2017: 42) dispels the notion of a faceless mob and shows that xenophobic attacks are organised and led by identifiable groups and individuals. These individuals (also known as violence entrepreneurs) and groups have little difficulty in mobilising community members as they, the community members, already harbour deep-seated negative attitudes and resentment towards foreign nationals (Misago 2017: 44). In other words, shared grievances, in this case the hatred towards foreign nationals, make it easy to mobilise individuals, who may have nothing else in common besides residing in the same community, to participate in the violent attacks.

The third research objective was to investigate the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests in achieving protestors' objectives. The results show that a small number of residents (16%) indicated that violent protests were successful. The results also show that 19% of the residents indicated that the objectives were achieved but not to their satisfaction. The majority of the residents (65%), however, indicated that violent protests were not successful.

These findings show that violent service delivery protests are, to a large extent, not effective in achieving protestors' stated goals. This finding was not expected considering that the respondents interviewed for this study believe in the effectiveness of violent protests. The finding was also not expected because the continued rise in the number of violent service delivery protests gives the impression that such protests are effective. The finding that violent service delivery protests are not effective is in line with the claims in literature that in general, violent methods of action are rarely effective in helping communities achieve their objectives (Abrahms (2006); Stephan and Chenoweth (2008); Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis (2018).

The question which arises is that if violence is not effective, then why do protestors continue to engage in such protests? Koos (2016: 6) argues that while violent uprising is fraught with danger, its use by ethnic rebels shows the government, *inter alia,* the seriousness of the rebels to their cause. Koos (2016: 8) also adds that rebels, by using violence, do not intend to overthrow the government but increase the costs for the government to a point where suppressing the rebels becomes more costly than acceding to the demands of the rebels. If Koos' arguments are applied to violent service delivery protests, the following can be argued: protestors engage in violent service delivery protests in order to increase the financial costs for the local government to a point where ignoring protestors' demands become costlier than giving in to those demands.

The problem of applying Koos' argument to violent service delivery protests is that rebel forces are by their nature militaristic and one would expect them to readily resort to violence in their engagements. The overarching question which remains is why would a group of ordinary people who are simply living their lives and trying to make ends meet, turn to violence, even if it does not seem to work? The researcher's view is that the answer lies in the demographics of the respondents in this study and their socio-economic circumstances. These may be referred to as the underlying contributors to violence as they are not as easily discernible as the three factors listed above, namely unfulfilled promises, negative attitudes towards the police and group solidarity.

As highlighted in Chapter 1, most of the respondents reside in informal settlements under squalid living conditions with little or no access to basic services. Most of the respondents are unemployed and those that are employed work menial jobs. As highlighted in Chapter 6, the majority of the respondents were male and aged between 18-25. The picture presented here is of unemployed youth living in poverty. It has long been argued that frustrated youth, rendered powerless by the socio economic structure under which they live tend to express themselves through violence (Kramer 2000: 134). Recently, empirical research has shown that there is indeed a link between, poverty gender and violence. For instance, McAra and McVie (2016) have shown that violence is strongly associated with gender and poverty in that individuals living in poverty tend to gain a sense of self-worth through the use of violence. In addition, gender stereotypes meant that violence is likely to be used by young males as a way to retain their status and identity amongst their peers. These displays of violent masculinity are also present in young boys of school-going age. Research by Bhana and Mayeza (2016) has shown that boys attach great significance to the ability to fight or use violence as a measure of what it means to be "real boys". Mayeza and Bhana (2020) have also shown through their study on young boys at a primary school located in an impoverished neighbourhood that being a "real boy" is associated with the ability to use violence to access limited resources such as food and money.

Research has also shown that there is a link between violence, poverty and perceived group injustice. This link, as established by Tollefsen (2020), can be stated as follows: areas with high levels of poverty and perceived group grievances are faced with a high risk of violent conflict. In the context of service delivery protests the link between poverty, gender and the youth is best articulated by Langa and Kiguwa (2013: 26) in the following terms:

> Young male protestors' bravery in confrontations with the police was widely celebrated in these communities. The same men who are often seen as having no social value or status, poor and unemployed, have reasserted their manhood through the act of protest, which may require public displays of violence in

> defending themselves. They perceived themselves as agents of change for their communities to gain the access to basic services, such as water, electricity and housing.

What this quote reveals is that the socio-economic status of these young men has stripped them of their manhood and dignity. By displaying acts of bravery during violent confrontation with authorities, their perceived status in the community is elevated as they place themselves at the forefront of the struggle for better services. This confirms the role that gender, age and poverty play in violent service delivery protests.

The fourth research objective was to develop and test an intervention aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests. The findings of this study, in relation to this final objective, will be discussed in full in Chapter 8. One of the steps taken in order to achieve this objective was to ask respondents what they thought could be done in order to prevent violent service delivery protests. It suffices to mention at this stage the findings of this study in relation to that question. The findings of this study are three-fold. The first finding is that there is a general belief among residents that violent service delivery protests cannot be prevented. The second finding stipulates that violent service delivery protests can be prevented through timeous responses to and effective resolution of grievances. This solution emerged in part from protestors' conviction that as long as their grievances were not attended to or resolved on time, they would always use violence. The third finding was that regular communication with residents is required in order to prevent violent protests.

The finding that violence cannot be prevented was not expected because of the multiplicity of solutions to the problem of violent service delivery protests identified in previous studies. The finding that violence cannot be prevented indicates that there is a strong commitment to violent protests. The finding also indicates the possibility of the existence of a culture of violence amongst the communities concerned. A "culture of violence" implies that the community concerned views violence as a normal way to resolve problems (Merwe 2013: 74). It also implies that violence is "embedded in the broader shared values and norms" of the community (Steenkamp 2005: 254).

The finding also demonstrates the possible influence of cultural violence in the communities concerned. We need to distinguish, however, between a culture of violence and cultural violence. A culture of violence as indicated above denotes the normalisation of violence as a grievance resolution mechanism. It is how people have become accustomed to respond in conflict situations. Culture in this sense denotes habit or a way of life or a way of doing things that has become embedded into the fabric of that particular society. Cultural violence, however, refers to aspects of culture that can be relied upon to justify violence for example, aspects of religion, ideology or language (Galtung 1990: 291). In this sense, culture denotes beliefs and practices that emerge from a broad spectrum of our social institutions. In relation to violence these may refer for instance to views on masculinity discussed above, that one must be able to fight in order to be considered as a "real man". Cultural violence and a culture of violence are often inextricably linked. The practice or adherence to beliefs emerging from cultural violence may lead to a culture of violence.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter sought to present and analyse the results of the study. The main findings of the study illustrate that communities choose violent protests over non-violent methods because of two reasons: first, because of a lack of confidence in non-violent methods, and second, because they perceive violent protests as an effective political tool. Unfulfilled promises, negative attitudes towards the police and group ties were identified as factors which make violent protests a possible option for protestors. In general, violent protests were found to be less effective in achieving protestors' objectives. Communication, timeous responses and resolution of grievances were identified as possible solutions to the prevention of violent service delivery protests. The majority of respondents, however, indicated that violent service delivery protests cannot be prevented.

CHAPTER 7: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES THROUGH NON-VIOLENCE

7.1 Introduction

One of the main objectives of the study was to investigate why communities choose to engage in violent service delivery protests over non-violent methods. As observed in Chapter 6, the results show that an overwhelming number of residents (72%) indicated that they have no confidence in non-violent methods as a tool for conflict resolution For residents, non-violent methods have been ineffective, hence the shift to violent methods of action. This chapter seeks to ascertain why non-violent methods have not been effective or successful in helping communities achieve their goals. Since the ultimate aim of the study was to encourage the use of non-violent methods over violence, understanding why non-violent methods have been a failure to date is important. Such an understanding provides valuable information for the development of the intervention intended for the study. The objectives of this chapter will be accomplished through desk research by examining the pertinent literature on the challenges associated with the use of selected non-violent methods. The chapter will focus on three main strategies or methods of non-violence. These are namely, protests, litigation and the use of media.[17]

7.2 Protests

The right to protest is provided for in Section 17 of the Constitution, which states that "[e]veryone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions". The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (RGA) regulates the holding of public gatherings and demonstrations. It is noteworthy that the Constitution makes no mention of the term "protest" in Section 17. Similarly, the RGA does not refer to "protests" but to demonstrations and gatherings. Section 1(2) of the RGA defines a demonstration as follows: "'demonstration' includes any demonstration by one or more persons, but not more than 15 persons, for or against any person, cause, action or failure to take action."

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[17] The chapter will not discuss the reasons why there is a lack of confidence in statutory or democratic avenues of conflict resolution as forms of non-violent action. This has been discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. As mentioned before, residents have no confidence in democratic forms of participation because the platforms are either dysfunctional or they feel alienated from the processes. See Sections 2.2.4 and 2.5.

Section 1(2) also defines a gathering as:

> any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air-
> (a) at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political party or political organization, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms of any applicable law, are discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or
>
> (b) held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government, administration or governmental institution.

The discussion which follows in the subsections below regarding various aspects of protests as a form of non-violent action in South Africa, will largely revolve around the provisions of the RGA. Before delving into those aspects, it is important to highlight that the RGA makes provision for three persons who play a critical role in the holding of public gatherings and demonstrations. These are namely, an authorised member, a convener and the responsible officer. An authorised member is defined as a member of the Police authorised to represent the Police in terms of the RGA. A convener refers to any person who, acting on his own will, convenes a gathering, or a person appointed by an organisation to convene a gathering. The responsible officer refers to a person appointed by the local authority within whose area of jurisdiction the gathering will take place, to perform the functions, exercise the powers and discharge the duties of a responsible officer in terms of the RGA.

7.2.1 Notice of Gatherings

Section 3 of the RGA requires the convener of a gathering to give notice of the intended gathering to the responsible officer concerned in writing, seven days before the date of the gathering. Provision is made for the notice to be given less than seven days before the gathering if it is not reasonably possible to give notice timeously (earlier than seven days). However, the responsible officer may prohibit the gathering if the notice is given 48 hours before the intended gathering. It is important to emphasise that the notice is only required for an intended gathering, not a demonstration.

The responsible officer who has received a notice of an intended gathering is required in terms of Section 4 of the RGA to consult with the authorised member regarding the necessity for negotiations on any aspect of the proposed gathering. If the responsible officer, after such consultation with the authorised member, is of the view that negotiations are not necessary and that the gathering may take place as specified in the notice, he shall accordingly, notify the convener. If, however, after consultation with the authorised member, the responsible officer is of the view that negotiations are necessary, he shall call a meeting, commonly known as the Section 4 meeting or the golden triangle meeting. The responsible officer, the convener, the authorised member and representatives of public bodies attend the meeting.

A gathering may be prohibited if credible information on oath is brought to the responsible officer's attention regarding the threat of serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, injury to participants in the gathering or other persons, or extensive damage to property, and if the Police and traffic officers will not be able to contain such a threat. A convener may however apply to a magistrate to set aside the decision to prohibit a gathering or a condition imposed concerning the gathering.

A common problem faced by convenors who wish to convene a gathering is that municipalities, for their own reasons, may prohibit a gathering from taking place by rejecting gathering notices. Some of the reasons for which gathering notices are usually rejected do not fall within the ambit of the reasons permissible under the RGA. In a study by (Royeppen 2016), it was discovered that:

- In Tshwane, a protest notice was rejected on the basis that there were too many marches scheduled to take place in the capital.
- In Rooigrond, outside Mafikeng, leaders of a protest were asked to pay a fee to the traffic department before they could protest.
- In one case concerning the Palmiet Road branch of the Abahlali base, Mjondolo protestors were told that they needed to obtain permission from shop owners since their protest route went past a shopping centre.

- In another case concerning the Anti-Eviction Campaign in Cape Town, the notification was rejected and no reasons were ever provided for such (Royeppen 2016: 346-349).

From the standpoint of municipal officials, the RGA requires convenors of a protest to seek permission to protest from municipal officials (Chamberlain 2016: 377). Consequently, municipalities consider themselves as having the power to grant or deny such "applications" (Govender 2016: 118).

The requirement of notification is also misunderstood by the police and is open to abuse (Dlamini 2009: 104). In this context, Bond and Mottiar (2013: 297) record that in 2012, the women of Marikana sought to conduct a protest march after the death of Paulina Masuhlo due to wounds sustained when she was shot by the police using rubber bullets. The police and municipal officials refused to allow the women to conduct their march. It was, however, only after legal intervention and persistence that the women were able to go on with the march as planned. It is important to emphasise that what is required is notification of the protest and not permission to protest. Chamberlain (2016: 376) notes that in 2014, when the Marikana women again sought to gather in support of striking workers in their community, the municipalities concerned shifted responsibility for the holding of the triangle meeting between each other. It was only after the intervention of lawyers that the women were able to go forward with their protest as planned.

It is also commonplace for gathering notifications to be ignored or responded to at the last minute (Chamberlain 2016: 379). Ignoring gathering notices has the potential to disrupt the timing of the planned protest. The timing of a gathering has a bearing on the achievement of the objectives of such a gathering. A gathering to commemorate the Marikana massacre, for instance, would be of lesser significance if it does not take place on 16 August, the day on which the massacre occurred. Similarly, a gathering to commemorate the death of Andries Tatane would be less symbolic if it does not occur on 13 April, the day on which he died.

7.2.2 Civil Liability

According to Section 11(1) of the RGA, when an organisation holds a gathering which results in any form of riot damage, the organisation or convener will be liable for such damage together with any other person who unlawfully caused or contributed to such damage. The imposition of civil liability is problematic in that it may discourage convenors from convening protests in future (Dlamini 2009: 92). The following defences are however available to such a claim in terms of Section 11(2) of the RGA:

- The person or organisation did not permit or connive at the act or omission which caused the damage.
- The act or omission which caused the damage fell outside the scope and objectives of the gathering or demonstration in question and was not reasonably foreseeable.
- The person or organisation took all reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent the act or omission which caused the damage.

7.3 Litigation

Litigation as a non-violent method of action involves taking legal action in order to enforce rights or seek redress for the infringement of rights. This part of the chapter focuses on the practical modalities of litigation as a non-violent method of action in general. In particular, the discussion which follows will touch on four key aspects, namely, access to courts, legal representation, the Constitutional Court's approach to socio-economic rights cases, and the public's perceptions about the legal system.

7.3.1 Access to Courts

Section 34 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to access to courts, states that: "[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum." In addition, Section 38 of the Constitution empowers the following persons to approach a competent court in order to seek redress where a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened:

- Anyone acting in his or her own interest
- Anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in his or her own name
- Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons

- Anyone acting in the public interest
- An association acting in the interest of its members

Section 34 thus makes provision for the resolution of "any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law" whereas Section 38 provides for the resolution of disputes arising from the infringement of or threat to a right in the Bill of Rights. Both of these provisions are the cornerstone of the right to access to courts.

Despite the right to access to courts, when seeking legal redress, a litigant cannot approach any court of his choosing for two reasons. First, in order for the court to hear a matter, that court must have jurisdiction. In other words, in order to decide on a matter, a court has to be competent or empowered to hear that type of matter. Where a court is not competent or empowered to hear certain matters it is said that it lacks jurisdiction. Second, even when the court does have jurisdiction, it might not be able to hear and decide on the matter because of what is known as a hierarchy of courts. A hierarchy of courts means that one cannot approach, for instance, the Constitutional Court as a court of first instance. There is however an exception to this rule. The Rules of the Constitutional Court allow for direct access to the Constitutional Court.

From her research on direct access to the Constitutional Court, Dugard (2006: 273) observes that the jurisprudence of the Court reveals that there are three principles which impact on direct access to the Constitutional Court. The first principle is that the Constitutional Court must shy away from acting as both a court of first instance and as a court of last resort. Second, applicants seeking to make use of the direct access procedure must show that they have exhausted other avenues of redress. Third, the applicant must have reasonable prospects of success. It is not surprising therefore that Dugard (2006: 275) states that: "[o]verall, my research on direct access reveals that the Court has been extremely reluctant to act as a court of first and last instance."

Access to courts is often associated with access to justice. In some texts, the terms are often used interchangeably as denoting the same concept. The terms do overlap but they do not necessarily have the same meaning. Access to courts refers to the ability to approach a court, forum, or tribunal in order to have a dispute settled. Access to justice is a broader concept which encompasses access to courts and legal representation. However, in addition to this, access to justice is also concerned with punishment of offenders, fair compensation, the independence of the judiciary, speedy resolution of disputes, legislation or legal frameworks and affordable legal services.

The importance of the right to access to courts lies in that it ensures that people do not take the law into their own hands and bring society into a state of lawlessness and disorder (*Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another* 1999 (12) BCLR 1420 (CC) (para 22). Access to courts also ensures that parties to a dispute have, at their disposal, an "institutionalised mechanism to resolve their differences without recourse to self-help" (*Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA and Others* 1997 (11) BCLR 1624 (LAC) at 1644F).

The right to access to court requires a prospective litigant to have the knowledge of the applicable law, the knowledge that he or she may obtain a remedy from a particular court, the knowledge on how to obtain access to such a court, and the skills to initiate and present his or her case to the court (Budlender 2004: 341). Not many ordinary people possess these skills as they lack legal training. Prospective litigants thus require legal advice and legal representation in order to give full effect to their right to access to courts.

7.3.2 Legal Representation

Despite the adage *he who represents himself has a fool for a lawyer*, a litigant may institute or defend legal proceedings on his behalf without legal representation. Rule 52(1)(a) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates' Courts of South Africa provides that "[a] party may institute or defend and may carry to completion any legal proceedings either in person or by a practitioner". Where a litigant represents himself, the Constitutional Court has held in *Xinwa & others v Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd* that in the presentation of their cases, laypersons must not be held to the same standard of accuracy, skill and precision as that which is required of legal representatives ([2003] 5 BLLR 409 (CC) para 13). In line with this approach, the Constitutional Court in *S v Twala (Human Rights Commission*

Intervening) accepted a handwritten letter to it as an application for leave to appeal (2000 (1) BCLR 106 (CC)).

Regarding legal representation in criminal matters, Section 35(3)(g) of the Constitution provides every accused person with the right "to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly." Section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution provides every child with the right "to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result." Every accused person thus has the right to legal representation in criminal matters at state expense if substantial injustice would result if such legal representation is not provided. In addition, children have the right to legal representation in civil matters if substantial injustice would result if such legal representation is not provided. The right to legal representation at state expense, however, does not apply to civil and non-criminal constitutional matters.

Despite this, the rules of the Supreme Court of Appeal, High Court and Magistrates' Court contain provisions which assist indigent litigants to obtain legal representation (even in civil litigation). Rule 15 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules (the *in forma pauperis* procedure) provides that a person who considers himself to be indigent may request the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to prosecute or defend an appeal *in forma pauperis*. To be deemed indigent, such a person must satisfy the registrar that "except for household goods, wearing apparel and tools of trade, he or she is not possessed of property to the amount of R10,000 and will not be able within a reasonable time to provide such sum from his or her earnings or obtain legal aid."

Rule 40 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court provides that a person who wishes to institute or defend proceedings *in forma pauperis* may apply to the registrar, who may refer such a person to an attorney. If the attorney is of the view that the matter is one in which he may act *in forma pauperis*, he must request the local society of advocates to nominate an advocate who is willing to act in the matter. The advocate and attorney will thereafter act for the person concerned gratuitously and the registrar shall issue all process and accept all documents without charging a fee. In order to qualify for this procedure, a person must show that he or she is not possessed of property to the amount of R10,000 and will not be able, within a reasonable time, to provide such a sum from his or her earnings. The property excludes household goods, wearing apparel and tools of trade.

Rule 53 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules refers to *pro Deo* applicants instead of *in forma pauperis*. Despite the difference in terminology, the process is similar. According to Rule 53, a party wishing to institute or defend proceedings as a *pro Deo* litigant may apply for leave to do so. The applicant must satisfy the court that:

- he or she has a *prima facie* right or action or defence;
- he or she is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him or her to pay the costs of the action, court fees and sheriff's charges; and
- that he or she will not, within a reasonable time, be able to provide such sums from his or her earnings.

If his or her application to institute or defend proceedings *pro Deo* is successful, the court may order that:

- the process of the court be issued and served without charge except for the sheriff's disbursements;
- an attorney be appointed to act for such applicant; or
- that the registrar of clerk of the court write the process, affidavits, notices and other documents free of charge as may be required to comply with the Magistrates Court Rules.

Dugard (2008: 224) however laments that the *in forma pauperis* procedure is under-utilised by judges and those who are intended to benefit from it. In the researcher's opinion however, the real problem is the lack of knowledge of the procedure by those intended to benefit from it. In order to utilise the process, the indigent needs to know that it exists in the first place.

Litigants may also obtain legal representation from legal practitioners *pro bono*. When a legal practitioner acts *pro bono*, they do not charge a fee for their work and legal services provided. The litigant may however be required to pay for disbursements. Disbursements are expenses incurred by the legal practitioner such as postage, faxes and sheriff's fees. In addition, large law firms have a department within the law firm dedicated to *pro bono* work. The criteria used to qualify for such representation varies from one practitioner to another. In general, however, a litigant must pass a means tests, in order to confirm that he or she has no income or earnings below a set threshold. In addition, the case must have some merit.

Public interest litigation organisations and Law Clinics have also been instrumental in providing legal representation and legal advice to the indigent. It is through providing legal representation, acting as *amici curiae*, giving expert advice and raising awareness on various issues affecting the poor that they facilitate litigation for service delivery.

Legal representation is expensive. Failure to obtain legal representation at the state's expense, through the *in forma pauperis* procedure, *pro bono*, from public interest litigation organisations or law clinics, often means the end of the road for an indigent litigant.

7.3.3 The Constitutional Court's Approach to Socio-Economic Rights Cases

The Constitution provides for the right to access to adequate housing, and access to health care, food and social security. These are also known as socio-economic rights. The state has the duty to fulfil these socio-economic rights progressively by taking reasonable legislative and other measures, and by keeping within its available resources. Progressive realisation means that the state is not required to fulfil these rights immediately, but over time.

The case of *Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg* 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) is an example of the practical application of the progressive realisation of the right to access to sufficient water. In this case, the residents of Phiri in Soweto challenged the lawfulness of the installation of prepaid water metres and the City of Johannesburg's decision to supply six kilolitres of free water per month to every account holder, as in conflict with Section 27 of the Constitution or Section 11 of the Water Services Act.

The Court was called upon to determine the content of the right (not merely its minimum content) in Section 27(1)(b) by quantifying the amount of water sufficient for a dignified life. It was argued on behalf of the residents that the amount of water sufficient for a dignified life is 50 litres per person per day [para 51].

The court held that the positive obligation of the State to provide access to sufficient water requires the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures progressively in order to achieve the right to access to sufficient water within available resources [para 57]. In addition, it was held that the right does not confer the right to claim "sufficient water" from the State immediately [para 57]. It was held further that it is the task of the legislature and the executive, and not the courts, to "determine precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right" [para 61]. The court will only intervene where:

- no steps are taken by the government to realise the right;
- if the government adopts unreasonable measures; and
- if the government adopts a policy with unreasonable limitations and exclusions [para 67].

As Cooper, Swan and Townend (2014: 127) state, the outcome of the Mazibuko case illustrates the difficulty in the realisation of socio-economic rights because of the tension between progressive realisation versus immediate fulfilment.

The lack of available resources is also another impediment to the realisation of socio-economic rights. The case of *Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal* 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) is on point. The applicant in this matter suffered from chronic renal failure. He approached Addington State Hospital in Durban to seek dialysis treatment. He was, however, refused treatment because there was a shortage of resources to provide dialysis treatment. In *lieu* of the shortage of resources, the hospital had put in place a policy where only those who suffered from acute renal failure who could be treated and were eligible for a kidney transplant could be given dialysis treatment [para 3]. The applicant contended that patients suffering from terminal illnesses such as his were, in terms of Section 27(3), entitled to be provided renal dialysis treatment by the state and that the state must provide funds and resources to fulfil that obligation [para12].

The court emphasised that the Constitution requires the state to provide health care services "within its available resources" [para 22]. Evidence before the Court showed that the Department of Health in KwaZulu Natal did not have enough funds to cover the cost of the services which it was providing to the public. At the time which the matter was heard, the Department had overspent its budget by R152 million and was expected to overspend it in the coming year by R700 million [para 24]. In addition, the renal unit at Addington hospital was not only servicing patients from KwaZulu Natal but from parts of the Eastern Cape as well, hence the need for a policy which was aimed at curing patients and not prolonging their life [para 25]. Ultimately, the Court held that it was reluctant to interfere because the decision about funding and how such funds must be spent was a decision to be taken at a political level according to the health budget, and at a functional level by deciding on the priorities [para 29].

Where the state relies on the lack of resources as the reason for unfulfilled rights, the quantity and nature of the available resources remains unknown (Cooper, Swan and Townend 2014: 128). As observed by (Sinwell 2010: 167), it is important to question the adequacy of resources on offer by the government for the poor. One is therefore tempted to argue that the courts must not accept the lack of resources as a justification for the state's failure to fulfil its obligations at face value. Instead, they must make an inquiry into the available resources and how they are utilised, especially in the face of reports of large sums being utilised in unauthorised expenditure and rampant corruption. Unfortunately, as Budlender (2004: 352) argues, this may require the courts to assess and evaluate the state's budgetary priorities, a task which the courts regard as outside their mandate and capabilities. A more acceptable approach is for litigants to ask the Court to issue a structural interdict, the aim being to facilitate the government's compliance with its constitutional obligations or order of the court (Amit 2011: 36).

7.3.4 Perceptions of the Legal System

It is the view of those seeking service delivery or seeking to change their situation that the courts favour the government and the wealthy (Pithouse 2006: 176). The courts are also accused of turning a blind eye to the cause of social movements. One example, cited by Bond (2014: 469), took place on Human Rights Day, 21 March 2004, during the grand opening day of the new Constitutional Court building. Activists of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) marched to the new building protesting against the installation of pre-paid water metres in Soweto. Many activists were arrested and buses ferrying APF members were blocked from entering Johannesburg. Bond (2014: 469) notes that none of the judges present at the opening ceremony stated anything about the incident.

Another issue which affects the public's perception of the legal system concerns bail proceedings. Chamberlain and Snyman (2017: 12) note that the bail system is often abused in four ways, namely, the unjustified denial of bail before the accused's first court appearance, unreasonable delays and unjustified postponements, tough bail conditions, and excessive bail amounts. The case of a group of 17 residents of Marapong, Lephalele, is on point. The bail hearings for the group were delayed on various occasions due to postponements requested in order to verify addresses, the unavailability of a magistrate, overcrowded court rolls and on another occasion, the absence of the investigating officer (Chamberlain and Snyman 2017: 12). When bail was finally granted, it was set at an excessive amount of R4,000.00 per person, without the consideration that the people concerned were unemployed (Chamberlain and Snyman 2017: 12).

Another example occurred in Mandela Park, Cape Town, on 5 July 2002, when the Sheriff was sent to attach the goods of a pensioner who owed R800 on her water account. The community came together to defend the pensioner but police responded by firing rubber bullets and tear gas and arrested the protestors including Max Ntanyana, one of the leading activists of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC) (Desai and Pithouse 2004: 254). Bail was granted, albeit under stringent conditions which made political participation almost impossible for him (Desai and Pithouse 2004: 255).

7.4 Media

7.4.1 Media and Non-Violent Action

The researcher regards the use of the media as both a form of non-violent action and as a medium to promote or give effect to other forms of non-violent action. The discussion which follows is based on this conception. As a form of non-violent action, the media can be a platform to challenge unjust policies or to highlight the plight of those fighting for change. The media's role as a medium to promote or give effect to other forms of non-violent action is a critical one. Non-violent methods such as open letters, protests and political satire, for example, have greater impact if published in the print media or if they are televised. Through the media, protestors can spread their message to a wide audience. It is also through the media that "wider support and legitimacy for their actions and aims can be potentially won – or lost" (Cottle 2008: 853).

The use of the media as a form of non-violent action can best be exemplified by *Abahlali base Mjondolo*. The actions of sympathetic journalists have resulted in the publishing of the struggles by *Abahlali base Mjondolo* in Durban's *Mercury*, the *Mail and Guardian*, the *Sunday Tribune*, *Drum*, *Huisgenoot* and *YOU* (Bryant 2008: 53). Outside South Africa, *The New York Times*, *The Economist* and *Al Jazeera* have all reported on Sbu Zikode, the first chairperson of *Abahlali base Mjondolo* (Patel 2008: 98). The struggles of *Abahlali* have also been documented in films such as *Dear Mandela* and *Kennedy Road and the Councillor*. In addition, a number of sympathetic academics have published articles on the *Abahlali base Mjondolo*'s struggles for housing, for instance, Richard Pithouse, Jacob Bryant and Raj Patel.

The researcher wishes to highlight that the effectiveness of the media as both a non-violent method of action and as a medium to promote or give effect to other forms of non-violent action is largely dependent on sympathetic journalists or control by the activists over the media or the content which becomes published. Where communities have neither sympathetic journalists in their corner nor control over the media or the content which gets published, the community's fate is mainly dependent on two factors, newsworthiness and the protest paradigm.

7.4.2 Newsworthiness

For the media to report on the plight of communities, the subject matter must be newsworthy. Similarly, for the media to report on a protest, the protest or complaint must be newsworthy. As McLeod (2007: 185) phrases it:

> A peaceful protest that focuses on articulating issue positions is not likely to fit established news conventions for what makes a good news story. As such, protest groups often engage in activities that provide the kind of drama that garners media attention.

Similarly, Cammaerts (2012: 122) states that "standard protest and demonstrations receive less and less media attention, unless violence can be reported or when the numbers are really spectacular." The protests over the death of Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown in the USA are a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. Trayvin Martin was a 17 year old, unarmed African American young man who was shot and killed by a neighbourhood watch volunteer George Zimmerman in 2012. 18-year-old unarmed Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police officer, Darren Wilson, in 2014. Zimmerman was acquitted of any wrongdoing while a grand jury decided not to indict Wilson. Peaceful protests followed Zimmerman's acquittal. On the other hand, peaceful protests over the decision not to indict Wilson soon turned violent. According to Kilgo, Mourao and Sylvie (2019: 425), peaceful protests over Martin's death received 10 per cent less coverage in elite publications than Brown. In addition, news coverage only occurred when conflict occurred or when potential conflict was expected.

Due to selective reporting, activists are forced to choose actions that draw media attention but that are at the same time not harmful to their cause. In this context, Boykoff (2006: 203) observes that:

> This creates a dilemma where dissidents feel compelled to foment protest activities that are novel enough to be newsworthy, yet not easily dismissible as gimmicky, violent, or weird, or that distract from or trivialize their social movement goals.

Thus while violent or disruptive protests may attract media attention, they may also work against the cause of protestors. Finding a balance between the two is not an easy task as the environmental protest group Plane Stupid's actions at Stansted Airport, in Britain, illustrate. The group, protesting against the construction of a third runway at Heathrow Airport, broke through a barrier and onto a runway, thus causing numerous flight cancellations and disruptions at the airport. The group's protest managed to obtain significant media attention in the national press as compared to the limited news coverage they had received for their other actions at regional airports (Gavin 2010: 462).

7.4.3 Protest Paradigm

Protest paradigm refers to the delegitimisation of protests and protestors by the media (Reul *et al.* 2016: 3). Where the protest paradigm is employed by the media, coverage focuses on the protest and not the cause of the protest, the resulting media reports rely on officials as their sources instead of the protestors, and the reports focus on negative aspects of the protests instead of providing an objective account and balanced frames (Wouters 2015: 900). Other features of the protest paradigm include a focus on the following: the violent, criminal or disruptive elements of a protest; the costs of dealing with the effects of the protest; the responsible behaviour of the authorities; and quotes from bystanders or those affected by the protest (Gavin 2010: 463).

Empirical evidence for the existence of the protest paradigm is not hard to find. The researcher wishes to refer first to the Plane Stupid example cited above. Despite significant media attention of the Stansted protest, the coverage focused on breaking into the runway, cancellations of flights, the resulting prosecutions and the social background of the protestors (Gavin 2010: 463). A cursory look at the headlines offers a glimpse into how this played out:

- 'Stansted brought to stand still by Plane Stupid protesters' (*Independent*)
- 'Protest causes chaos at Stansted airport' (*Express*)
- 'Three days of chaos after airport invasion' (*Mail*)
- 'Kyoto is worthless (and you don't have to be a sceptic to believe that now)' (*Independent*)
- 'You can't be serious' (*Independent*)

- 'Voice of the Daily Mirror' (*Mirror*)
- 'Could they stop air terrorists? Flight security fears as protesters close Stansted' (*Mirror*)
- 'Thousands of passengers stranded at Stansted after the invasion by climate change protesters' (*Telegraph*) (Gavin 2010: 462).

Hughes and Mellado (2016) studied the framing of (political) news stories by the Chilean press from 1990 to 2011. Their findings indicated that citizens were represented as atomized individuals instead of being given a voice in the Press (Hughes and Mellado 2016: 58). Their findings also showed that there was an overwhelming presence of official actors as sources of information as compared to civic organisations (Hughes and Mellado 2016: 60).

In South Africa, a study by Chiumbu *et al.* (2016) on the framing of stories relating to socio-economic rights by three South African weekly newspapers, is noteworthy. The conclusion reached was that while some stories adopted a positive tone and gave a voice to the marginalised, the majority of stories were silent or contained gaps on issues relating to the causes of inequality and poverty and, in addition, the social movements advocating for social justice were either excluded from the stories or "poorly contextualized" (Chiumbu *et al.* (2016: 14).

Perhaps the classical example of the protest paradigm in the South African context is the coverage of the Marikana massacre. An analysis of articles published by the Press between 13-22 August 2012 revealed that mine workers accounted for only 3% of the sources of information for those articles (Duncan 2013: 6). As Duncan (2013: 9) observes, this meant that the narrative offered by the Press (which was based on official accounts) went unchallenged and was largely accepted as true by the public.

In the context of service delivery protests, research conducted by Wasserman, Chuma and Bosch (2018) also indicates that print media coverage of service delivery protests follows the protest paradigm approach. All four newspapers examined emphasised the disruptive nature of the protests, and neglected the underlying structural causes of the disruptions (Wasserman, Chuma and Bosch 2018: 152).

Results of a study by Mawokomayi and Dube (2018) on service delivery protests that took place in 2015 in Malamulele, Limpopo Province, also show that newspaper coverage of the protests followed the protest paradigm. The study analysed twenty newspaper articles published by *News24* on the protest. In those articles, protestors were depicted as violent and anarchistic, as a threat to the economy and as a threat to security (Mawokomayi and Dube 2018: 46-47),

The protest paradigm in the context of service delivery protests also extends to broadcast media. An analysis of talk radio by Day, Cornell and Malherbe (2019: 8) identifies the existence of two discourses namely, the naturalisation of the commodification of everyday life and market over welfare. Within the discourse of naturalisation of the commodification of everyday life, the commodification of basic services is legitimised by linking a culture of non-payment of services with cost recovery programmes and the criminalisation of protestors. For instance, the common narrative does not attribute protests to the commodification of services such as electricity but to the allegations of a culture of not paying for services protests. Therefore, according to this narrative, poor people protest because they want free services and in such cases, when they burn and destroy property they must be arrested. Within the discourse of market over welfare, the financial implications of the protests are given priority over the social justice issues raised by the protests. In addition, protests are framed as irrational, spontaneous, sporadic, and without reason or context.

Research has shown that social media platforms such as Twitter have been used successfully to bypass mainstream media and advance the protest narrative frame favourable to them (Oz 2016: 189). Similarly, Bosch, Wasserman and Chuma (2018: 2166) observe that nanomedia (pamphlets, press statements, videos, flyers, stickers) and social media play a critical role in overcoming the challenges of access to mainstream media and unequal access to digital media by South African activists.

7.5 Making Non-Violent Action work

The results of the study have shown that both violent and non-violent protests have had limited success in helping protestors to achieve their goals. This chapter has further highlighted the challenges and hurdles faced by communities who wish to engage in non-violent methods to advance their objectives. The argument advanced in this chapter is that non-violent protests alone are less likely to result in any meaningful concessions from the local government or any significant change in the socio-economic situation of protestors. Communities need to make use of multiple and diverse methods of non-violent action and act together under an independent community organisation. These two conditions are discussed further below.

The researcher wishes to refer to Gene Sharp's three-way classification of the methods of non-violent action (Sharp 2013: 23-45) in order to illustrate the point on the necessity of employing multiple and diverse methods of non-violent action. The first group of non-violent action methods is called protest and persuasion. This group consists of actions such as public speeches, mass petitions, prayers and vigils. The second group is called non-cooperation and consists mainly of boycotts. The third group is called non-violent intervention and consists of disruptive actions such as sit-ins, non-violent invasion, non-violent interjection, non-violent obstruction, dumping, non-violent land seizures and civil disobedience. A campaign which uses protest and persuasion methods alone is unlikely to bring about meaningful change. For meaningful change, a combination of protest and persuasion methods, together with non-co-operation and non-violent intervention, is necessary. For example, it is likely that a campaign which involves litigation will be successful if coupled with a broader campaign of advocacy and mobilisation (Dugard and Langford 2011: 48) (Greenstein 2006: 432) and a strategic media plan which will ensure media coverage of legal battles and victories (Amit 2011: 35). In this example, the media is important because sometimes court victories may not yield the intended outcome but they may change the manner in which the media frames the struggles of the poor and may also result in greater coverage of such struggles (Pithouse 2014: 197).

Community organisations enable community members to mobilise themselves and work towards a common objective. Through community organisations, they can act as a single entity with one voice under unified and competent leadership. Community organisations provide a platform through which community members can plan, strategize and embark on activities that can help them achieve their goals. The successes of organisations such as Abahlali base Mjondolo and the Western Cape

Anti-Eviction Campaign have demonstrated in the past, the power of acting under organised structures as compared to challenging policy as fragmented groups.

The argument put forward in this chapter is that the lack of independent community organisations which are able to lead communities in their struggle for service delivery has been one of the major reasons why communities have largely been unsuccessful in changing their situation through non-violent action. This lack of independent community organisations is alluded to by Zuern (2014: 288-289):

> There is a profound shortage of township-based watchdogs, but there are plenty of guide dogs and bulldogs and, certainly, many underdogs... Many popular organizations struggle with the co-optation of their organization as a whole or of key leaders (as was the case with SANCO). They also face the challenges of working with aspirants to positions in the dominant party (as is often the case in the recent service delivery protests). Other organizations battle just to gain access to members of the governing party and to have a voice in a system of governance that is so fully dominated by a single party... In many cases, individuals wore two hats, playing a role in the ruling party and in popular organizations... Some central players in service delivery protests also used protests actions as a way to position themselves to access not just positions in government but also government contracts.

In the paragraph above, Zuern laments the lack of community-based organisations with a large following or influence, such as the ruling party, and that can meaningfully challenge government policy or act as a watch dog. The few organisations that exist face the risk of or have already been subsumed by powerful political parties. This process of weakening an organisation occurs through giving members of the organisation influential positions in the political party. These individuals are chosen because of their position, influence or status in the organisation or because they pose a threat to the political party. An organisation with individuals who play a role in both the ruling party and the community organisation loses its independence and most importantly its ability to act as a watch dog.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to ascertain whether or not the lack of confidence in non-violent methods is misplaced. This was carried out by examining literature on three forms of nonviolence, namely, protests, litigation and the use of the media.

Regarding protests, five main challenges were identified: first, the prohibition of gatherings by municipalities for reasons which are not provided for by the law; second, the misplaced view by municipal officials that convenors of protests must seek permission to protest from municipal authorities; third, ignoring gathering notices or responding late to such notices; fourth, the need for legal intervention when a protest is prohibited; and fifth, civil liability for riot damage.

Concerning litigation, the challenges relate to access to courts, legal representation, the Constitutional Court's approach to socio-economic rights cases and the public's perceptions about the legal system. Concerning the media, the challenges relate to newsworthiness and the protest paradigm.

Having highlighted some of the challenges faced by communities wishing to engage in any of the three non-violent methods discussed above, the discussion focused on the possible ways in which non-violent methods could be used to greater effect. The argument advanced in this chapter was twofold. First, it is important to rely on multiple and diverse methods of nonviolence. Second, communities seeking change via non-violent methods should do so under an independent community organisation.

CHAPTER 8: INTERVENTION AND EVALUATION

8.1 Introduction

The results of the study thus far have shown that there is a widespread belief that violent protests are more effective than non-violent methods. Results have also shown that this perception is misplaced. One of the objectives of this research is to develop an intervention to facilitate the prevention of violent protests and the promotion of non-violent engagement. This chapter outlines the nature of the intervention, its conception, implementation and evaluation of its effectiveness.

The intervention adopted in this study was drawn mainly from the results of this study and through consultation with a pilot intervention group. Since the study is participatory in nature, the pilot intervention group's role was to decide on the nature of the intervention. The researcher's role was to facilitate the process of developing the intervention. At the first meeting, the pilot intervention group raised a number of questions and expressed some concerns over the intended task of developing the intervention. Similar to the respondents for the study, the intervention group was doubtful whether violent protests could be prevented. The group also questioned if there were any effective alternatives to violent protests. In summary, the attitude of the pilot intervention group was that as far as they were concerned, violent protests would always be part of the political landscape of this country and there was little, if anything, which could be done to prevent them from occurring or to change people's attitude towards the effectiveness of violent protest.

Before the group could decide on an appropriate intervention, they requested that the researcher provide evidence that violence in general can be prevented; second, that there are effective alternatives to violent protest; third, that violent protests are an ineffective method of expressing grievances; and finally, that there are ways in which ordinary citizens can meaningfully contribute to change in their communities.

In the sections which follow, the researcher provides the answers to these questions and shows how they have influenced the intervention adopted for the study. Next, the structure of the intervention will be outlined. Thereafter, the study will outline how it was implemented. Finally, an evaluation of the outcome of the intervention will be provided.

8.2 Can Violence be prevented?

The challenge in addressing the problem of violence seems to involve people accepting violence as a normal part of their lives, as something which they have to live with, something that cannot be prevented. As Dahlberg and Butchart (2005: 93) phrase it, "[v]iolence is often seen as an inevitable part of the human condition – a fact of life to respond to, rather than to prevent." The reality is, however, that violence can be prevented.

If violence can be prevented, the question which follows is how can it be prevented? Violence can best be prevented through multidisciplinary approaches on multiple levels and in multiple sectors of the society (Nel 2006: 23). "Multidisciplinary approaches" to violence prevention rely on insights from various disciplines. A multidisciplinary violence prevention approach can thus incorporate perspectives from disciplines such as law, sociology, psychology, peacebuilding and public health simultaneously. The idea behind a multidisciplinary approach is that the problem of violence is multifaceted. Tackling the problem of violence from a single disciplinary approach overlooks the point that there is usually no single cause of violence. A legal approach to the problem of violent protests, for example, excluding other approaches causes one to focus on the criminality of violent conduct alone. In doing so, one ignores other facets of the problem such as the role of poverty, inequality, culture and group values.

"Multiple sector" violence prevention approaches are implemented through or in collaboration with the different sectors of society. These sectors can include the business or corporate sector, the public or government sector, and the civil society or non-governmental sector.

"Multiple level" violence prevention interventions focus on three "levels" of human interaction or human relations. These are namely, the individual approach, the community approach and the relationship approach. At the individual level, Nel (2006:

23) suggests violence prevention interventions aimed at cultivating healthy attitudes in children and young people. For those who have already become violent individuals, Nel suggests interventions aimed at changing their attitudes and behaviour. Community-based approaches seek to address the causes of violence, raise public awareness of, encourage debate on and stimulate community action around issues of violence (Nel 2006: 24). The relationship approach focuses on interventions which seek to improve the relationships between the victims and perpetrators of violence and the people with whom they interact (Nel 2006: 23).

The next question to consider is which characteristics a violence prevention intervention should have in order to be effective? Sabol, Coulton and Korbin (2004: 332) encourage structuring violence prevention interventions in ways which contribute to the building of the community's capacity to prevent violence. Similarly, in an empirical study on the prevention of electoral violence, Birch and Muchlinski (2018: 397) found that the implementation of interventions which focused on capacity building resulted in a decline in electoral violence.

Interventions which focus on attitude transformation have also been found to be effective in violence prevention (Birch and Muchlinski 2018: 397). This is an important observation because attitudes can often not be divorced from behaviour. In other words, certain attitudes usually contribute towards violent behaviours. Interventions which target attitudes are thus likely to result in a change of behaviour, that is, violent behaviour.

According to Schoeman (2010: 10), effective interventions are those "based on a sound understanding of the risk factors and social dynamics of the phenomenon and should be validated by scientific research." Similarly, Abt (2017: 269) argues that a framework for violence prevention must not only be "theoretically sound but also [be] grounded in the empirical reality of the problem it seeks to address."

Gevers and Dartnall (2015: 53-54) provide seven factors to consider when selecting a violence prevention programme. These guidelines were set out to help practitioners who wanted to implement an already-existing programme. The guidelines are, however, also useful as a checklist for practitioners who are in the process of drafting new interventions. Below is a list of six of the factors relevant to this study:

1. The programme must be evidence-based
2. The programme must have a reality-based implementation strategy
3. Implementers must understand the costs of implementing the programme
4. The programme must be based on a sound theoretical framework
5. The programme must use participatory methods
6. The programme must have a clear and easy-to-use manual

In summary, violence can be prevented. Interventions which have previously worked tackled the problem of violence through multidisciplinary approaches on multiple levels and in multiple sectors of the society. Effective interventions are those which are focused on behavioural change, attitude change and capacity building and are based on sound theoretical and scientific or empirical evidence.

8.3 Effective Alternatives to Violent Protest

The alternative to violent protests is non-violent methods. When one speaks of non-violent methods, many people think of marches to municipal or government offices to submit memorandums or petitions. Non-violent methods, however, not only consist of marches and demonstrations but also of a variety of actions. Gene Sharp, a prominent scholar in the field of peacebuilding, identified 198 different methods of nonviolence. These methods are divided into three groups. The first group is comprised of methods of protest and persuasion. The second group consists of methods of non-cooperation. Methods of non-cooperation are divided into social, economic, and political non-cooperation. The third group, non-violent intervention, is comprised of actions which disrupt or create new patterns of behaviour, policies, relationships or institutions (Sharp 2013: 43).

Many communities which seek change through non-violent methods tend to rely on methods of protest and persuasion alone. While non-violent methods of protest and persuasion may raise awareness and influence public opinion in ways which violent protests cannot, raising awareness and influencing public opinion, however, is usually not enough to bring about meaningful change. As argued in Chapter 7, a combination of various methods of non-violent action are required to bring about meaningful change. The example of the Occupy Movement illustrates this point. As Juris (2014: 244) explains, the Occupy Movement may have raised awareness on issues of inequality but it will require more than this to adequately address issues of inequality. Indeed, the Occupy Movement's preferred method of action, occupying and camping in public spaces in protest of global economic inequality, did little other than raise awareness.

8.4 Mobilising for Change

Sharing common grievances does not necessarily result in a concerted, unified effort to act upon those grievances by marginalised groups, owing in part to internal conflicts (Leonard 2014: 383). In the same vein, vulnerable groups in society do not necessarily exist in the form of an organised and unified entity (Leonard 2014: 386). Community mobilisation is therefore necessary in order to bring community members together and rally them towards a common goal or objective. Community mobilisation can be undertaken by members of the community themselves or through efforts of an external entity.

In addition to mobilisation, communities seeking change need to speak and act with one voice. One of the ways to do so is through independent community organisations. Community organisations are important in that they give a voice to the marginalised, excluded and disadvantaged sections of society (Arias 2000: 167). As Williams (2006: 211) notes, there can be no meaningful representation of the interests of the community at the local government level without the creation and involvement of community organisations.

Community organisations, however, require competent and dedicated leadership to help communities achieve their objectives and goals. As McKinley (2016: 279) notes, from his study on the Anti-Privatisation Forum:

> A movement may be in touch with the mood of the masses, but if it does not have committed, skilled and democratically oriented activists to mobilise and manage the movement's resources, to facilitate and strengthen internal democracy and to

> sustain organisation within communities, then the ability to acknowledge such challenges is not much more than an intellectual exercise.

McKinley (2016: 279) recommends that:

> What is needed is a core of dedicated, principled and disciplined activists, who take their identity and vision from what its constituency members confront and desire to change, to overcome its internal and external challenges. Without such a core, the myriad struggles of social movements and community organisations that continue to dot the South African landscape are doomed to remain at best an occasionally effective nuisance, and at worst, irrelevant to all but those who are simply seeking to further their own political or personal agendas.

Besides competent leadership, the strategies adopted by an organisation are also critical to the success or failure of the organisation in achieving its goals. Tapscott's analysis of the tactics used by the Joe Slovo Task Team and The Coalition for Langa Community Concerns (COLACOCO), in their fight for access to free public housing in Langa, Cape Town, is noteworthy. The Joe Slovo Task Team is considered to have been more successful than COLACOCO in obtaining concessions from the state because of a number of reasons (Tapscott 2011: 64 ff). One of the main reasons cited is that the Joe Slovo Task Team sought the assistance of and alliances with external organisations such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign, Abahlali base Mjondolo, Slum Dwellers International and the Legal Resources Centre. In doing so, the Joe Slovo Task Team was able to obtain skills, resources, legal aid and access to the media. In contrast, the COLACOCO decided to fight alone without any external support. Without the support of established and experienced organisations, COLACOCO's campaign was unable to achieve anything meaningful.

8.5 The Intervention adopted for the Study

8.5.1 The Conception of the Intervention

As mentioned before, the process of developing the intervention was participatory in nature. The insights of a pilot intervention group were critical in the formulation of the intervention. The researcher's role was to facilitate the process and provide the necessary support, skills and knowledge in order to develop an intervention which could easily be understood and utilised by its intended target group.

8.5.2 Data / Evidence underpinning the Intervention

The data and evidence underpinning the intervention were obtained from the results of the study and from the pilot intervention group. The following findings and observations were instrumental in the conception of the intervention:

1. Violence is considered an effective method of engagement
2. There is a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of non-violent methods
3. There are doubts that violence can be prevented
4. There are doubts that alternative ways exist to effectively express grievances or advocate for change other than through violent protests

8.5.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

The conflict transformation theory is the underlying theory guiding this intervention. In Chapter 3, five main components of the conflict transformation theory were identified, namely, conflict, effective communication, changing attitudes and behaviours which contribute to conflict, crafting solutions which are acceptable to all parties in the conflict, and choosing non-violence over violence. Two of the five components of the conflict transformation theory are relevant for this intervention. These are namely changing attitudes and behaviours which contribute to conflict and choosing non-violence over violence. Consequently, the objective of the intervention is to prevent violent protests and to help communities choose non-violent methods over violence, by changing attitudes and behaviours which contribute to violent conflict.

8.5.4 Attitudes and Behaviours which need to be changed

The intervention targets the following attitudes and behaviours:

1. Violent protests are an effective method of engagement or expressing grievances
2. Non-violent methods are ineffective in obtaining concessions from the local government
3. There are no effective alternatives to violent protests as a method of expressing grievances
4. It is not possible to prevent violent protests

5. Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them
6. Choosing violent protests over non-violence
7. Non-compliance with legislative prescripts on how to conduct protests

8.5.5 Barriers to Attitude and Behavioural Change

The attitudes and behaviours identified above not only contribute to violent protests but also act as barriers to attitude and behavioural change.

8.5.6 Benefits of Attitude and Behavioural Change

Violent protests have had little success, if any, in extracting concessions from the local government. Instead, violent protests have resulted in a growing perception that protestors' grievances are not genuine and that their real objectives are to destroy public property. Some believe that these protests are in reality a cover for criminal activity. This has resulted in the press's reports focusing on the violence instead of the grievances which give rise to the protests. Violent protests have also resulted in protestors not being taken seriously. Violent protests also alienate those who may be sympathetic to the cause of the protestors. For these reasons, the benefits of attitude and behavioural change cannot be overemphasised.

8.5.7 Tools chosen for Attitude and Behavioural Change

The tools chosen for attitude and behavioural change were in the form of a four-part intervention. The first part of the intervention focused on violent protests as a method of expressing grievances. The second part dealt with expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence. The third part involved protesting lawfully. The final part focused on mobilising for change. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the intervention was developed from the data collected as part of the study and the input of a group of participants who formed a pilot intervention group. The complete document detailing the intervention forms part of the appendix attached to the end of this thesis. Table 8.1 presents the attitudes and behaviours that each intervention targeted and the expected outcomes of each of the intervention.

Table 8.1: Attitudes and behaviours targeted by the intervention and expected outcomes

Intervention	Violent protests as a method of expressing grievances
Attitudes targeted	Violent protests are an effective way to express grievances.
Behaviours targeted	Choosing violence.
Expected outcome	Accurate knowledge of the outcomes of violent protest.
Intervention	Expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence
Attitudes targeted	Non-violent methods are ineffective in obtaining concessions from local government. There are no effective alternatives to violent protests.
Behaviours targeted	Choosing violence.
Expected outcome	A comprehensive understanding of the diverse methods of non-violent action.
Intervention	Protesting lawfully
Attitudes targeted	There is no need to notify the police or local authorities of an intended protest.
Behaviours targeted	Non-compliance with legislative prescripts on how to conduct protests.
Expected outcome	Increased capacity of participants to comply with legislative requirements concerning the right to protest. Increased awareness of the legal requirements for lawful protests.
Intervention	Mobilising for change
Attitudes targeted	Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them. It is not possible to prevent violent protests.
Behaviours targeted	None.
Expected outcome	Increased capacity of participants to mobilise their communities towards a common good.

Each of the four parts of the intervention contained a brief description of the objectives and desired outcomes of the particular intervention. This information enabled participants to have an understanding of what the intervention was about and what was to be expected from the intervention. Second, each part consisted of a pre-intervention and a post-intervention questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaires was to ascertain the effectiveness of the intervention. Third, each part contained a 'reflection box'. Participants were required to 'reflect' on a specific scenario or subject matter related to the intervention concerned. Fourth, each part contained a list of activities. These activities are practical exercises designed to help participants to better understand the intervention. The four parts of the intervention are examined in turn below.

As mentioned earlier, the first part of the intervention was 'violent protests as a method of expressing grievances'. This part explored the effects of violent protests. It also attempted to show why violent protests are an ineffective method of advocating for change or expressing grievances. The objectives of this part were thus to raise awareness on the effects of violent protests and, at the same time, to expose the ineffectiveness of violent protests.

Participants were required to 'reflect' on the use of violence and non-violent methods in the struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The aim was to show the significance of non-violent methods during the struggle against the Apartheid regime as compared to the use of violence.

Participants were also required to do the following activities. First, participants were required to watch the documentary *The Weather Underground*[18] and comment on the effectiveness of violence. Second, participants were required to identify conduct during previous protests which they consider as violence. Third, participants looked for old newspapers and cut out stories on service delivery protests. Alternatively, those with internet access could look up the stories on the internet. Thereafter, they commented on the manner in which journalists reported on the protests.

Ultimately, the desired outcome of this intervention was for the participants to develop accurate knowledge of the outcomes of violent protest.

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[18] A documentary about an anti-Vietnam group in the US, 1960s, who advocated violence.

The second part, 'expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence', sought to raise awareness on the various methods of non-violent action. Most importantly, it attempted to show that non-violent methods are effective.

Participants were required to 'reflect' on the various methods of non-violent action which were adopted during the struggle against the Apartheid regime. The aim was to show the diversity in the methods of non-violent action. This was important in order to show that non-violent action is not limited to peaceful marches and demonstrations. This reflection was important because in the researcher's opinion, not many people realise that the fall of the Apartheid regime was made possible mainly through non-violent methods.

Activities in this part required participants to identify methods which are categorised as protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention from the list of non-violent methods used in the struggle against Apartheid. Participants were also required to watch the film *A Force More Powerful* [19]and share their thoughts on the power or effectiveness of non-violent action.

The desired outcome of this intervention was a comprehensive understanding of the diverse methods of non-violent action.

The third part, 'protesting lawfully', addressed important aspects of the exercise of the right to protest, as provided for in the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA). The objective was to ensure that participants understand the prescripts of the law relating to protests. This was necessary in order to ensure that any future protests would be conducted in compliance with the law. In addition, compliance with the law would help participants avoid unnecessary conflict with law enforcement officials.

Participants were required to 'reflect' on the common problems and misconceptions surrounding the exercise of the right to protest in terms of the RGA. Both the public and law enforcement officials misunderstand a number of provisions of the RGA. In certain instances, these provisions are deliberately misinterpreted to the detriment of protestors. It was therefore important to clear these misconceptions and provide the correct interpretation of these provisions.

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[19] Series of short documentaries depicting non-violent campaigns. Available: https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/force-powerful-english/ and YouTube.

Activities in this part of the intervention involved obtaining the name and contact details of the designated authorised member at the police station which is closest to the area in which the participants reside. Participants were also required to obtain the name and contact details of the designated responsible officer at the nearest local municipal office. The designated responsible officer and authorised member play an important role in the exercise of the right to strike by protestors. It was therefore important to have their details ready in case there is a need to contact them in order to notify them of an intended gathering. Participants were required to draft a notice of an intended gathering (Section 4 notice). Drafting a Section 4 notice is one of the most important steps required of would-be protestors. This activity ensured that participants familiarise themselves with how to draft one, should they wish to do so in future.

The desired outcome was an increased capacity of participants to comply with legislative requirements concerning the right to protest and increased awareness of the legal requirements for lawful protests.

The fourth part, 'mobilising for change', focused on ways to bring community members together in order to work towards a common goal. The objective was to explore community mobilisation as a process and community organisations as vehicles through which participants can achieve meaningful change in their communities.

Participants were required to 'reflect' on the objectives and achievements of selected community organisations in South Africa. It is hoped that in doing so, participants can understand the power of community mobilisation and acting through community organisations.
As part of their activities in this section, participants were required to watch the documentary *TAC: Taking HAART* and share their thoughts on the power of community mobilisation and community organisations. *Dear Mandela* is another documentary which the participants are required to watch and comment on how Abahlali base Mjondolo proceeded with fighting against evictions in Durban.

Participants were also required to create a Facebook page and/or a WhatsApp group for the community in which they live. Thereafter, they were to, together with fellow community members, conduct a cleaning campaign for their area. These activities were intended to provide participants with the capacity to mobilise their communities and act towards a common objective.

The desired outcome was an increased capacity of participants to mobilise their communities towards a common good.

8.6 Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Interventions

The intervention or action group was comprised of 10 people. Seven of those were male, while three were female. Each part of the intervention was allocated its own day. Consequently, the intervention was conducted with the action group over a period of four days.

As mentioned before, each part of the intervention consisted of a pre-intervention and a post-intervention questionnaire. A comparison between the responses to the two questionnaires made it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of each intervention. Below is an assessment of the effectiveness of each of the interventions.

8.6.1 Violent Protests as a Method of Expressing Grievances

This part of the intervention was targeted at the perception that violent protests are an effective method of engagement or expressing grievances. The pre- and post-intervention questionnaires were composed of the following statements:

1. Violent protests are an effective way to engage with the local government on service delivery issues.
2. Violent protests enable us to be taken seriously.
3. Violent protests enable us to get meaningful responses from the municipality.
4. I will always take part in a violent protest even if they result in the destruction of public property.
5. Violent protests have a negative impact on our society.

Participants were required to indicate whether they strongly disagree, disagree, are not sure, agree or strongly agree with each statement posed.

The results of the survey before the intervention thus indicate that participants had positive attitudes towards the effectiveness of violence. As Table 8.2 shows, seven out of 10 participants strongly agreed that violent protests were an effective way to engage with the local government. Table 8.1 also shows that before the intervention, eight out of 10 participants strongly agreed that violent protests enabled them to be taken seriously. Before the intervention, eight out of 10 participants strongly agreed that violent protests enabled them to obtain meaningful responses from the municipality.

After the intervention, responses provided by participants indicated a consensus that violent protests are in general not an effective political tool. As Table 8.2 shows, after the intervention, only two out of 10 participants remained unconvinced that violent protests are not an effective way to engage with the local government. In addition, after the intervention, nine out of 10 participants strongly disagreed that violent protests enabled them to be taken seriously. Furthermore, after the intervention, seven out of 10 participants disagreed that violent protests enabled them to obtain meaningful responses from the municipality. The change in attitude towards violence can be attributed to the following:

1. a critical reflection on the role that violence played in the dismantling of the Apartheid regime,
2. a reflection into the not-so-obvious consequences of violent service delivery protests, and
3. using real life examples to dispel the notion that violent methods of action are superior to non-violent methods.

Table 8.2: Results of the intervention – Violent protests as a method of expressing grievances.

Violent protests are an effective way to engage with local government on service delivery issues

	strongly disagree	disagree	not sure	agree	strongly agree
Before intervention	–	–	–	3	7
After intervention	–	8	–	2	–
Violent protests enable us to be taken seriously					
Before intervention	–	–	–	2	8
After intervention	9	1	–	–	–
Violent protests enable us to get meaningful responses from the municipality					
Before intervention	–	–	–	2	8
After intervention	3	7	–	–	–
I will always take part in a violent protest even if they result in the destruction of public property					
Before intervention	–	–	1	3	6
After intervention	5	4	1	–	–
Violent protests have a negative impact on our society					
Before intervention	–	–	–	10	–
After intervention	–	–	–	10	–

Source: own data.

8.6.2 Expressing Grievances effectively without the Use of Violence

This part of the intervention was targeted at the perception that non-violent methods are ineffective in obtaining concessions from the local government and that there are no effective alternatives to violent protests as a method of expressing grievances. The pre- and post-intervention questionnaires were composed of the following statements:

1. Non-violent methods are not as effective as violent protests.
2. We can never be taken seriously if we express our grievances through non-violent methods.
3. Non-violent methods do not attract the attention of the municipality.
4. Non-violent methods can only work if the municipality is willing to listen.
5. Non-violent methods can never work in South Africa.

Participants were required to indicate whether they strongly disagree, disagree, are not sure, agree or strongly agree with each statement posed.

Before taking part in the intervention, the general attitude towards non-violent methods by participants was that non-violent methods are not an effective political tool. As Table 8.3 shows, before the intervention, nine out of 10 participants were of the view that non-violent methods were not as effective as violent protests. This attitude can be attributed to the general lack of awareness of the various methods of nonviolence available other than protests, and the lack of awareness of the instances where non-violent methods were used successfully and how such successes were achieved.

Responses to the post-intervention questionnaire indicated a marked change in the perception that non-violent methods are not as effective as violent protests. As shown in Table 8.3, after the intervention, eight out of 10 participants disagreed that non-violent methods were not as effective as violent protests. This change can be attributed to the discussion of the numerous methods of nonviolence, most of which the participants were not aware of, and how these were applied during the struggle against Apartheid with great success. The discussion on the various methods of nonviolence was reinforced by watching a documentary film, *A Force More Powerful*, which documents successful non-violent struggles not only in South Africa but also in India, USA, Denmark, Poland and Chile.

Table 8.3: Results of the intervention – Expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence.

Non-violent methods are not as effective as violent protests					
	strongly disagree	disagree	not sure	agree	strongly agree
Before intervention	–	–	–	9	1
After intervention	2	8	–	–	–
We can never be taken seriously if we express our grievances through non-violent methods					
Before intervention	–	–	–	2	8
After intervention	3	7	–	–	–
Non-violent methods do not attract the attention of the municipality					
Before intervention	–	–	–	6	4
After intervention	–	8	2	–	–
Non-violent methods can only work if the municipality is willing to listen					
Before intervention	–	–	–	8	2
After intervention	–	7	–	3	–

Non-violent methods can never work in South Africa					
Before intervention	–	–	–	9	1
After intervention	3	6	1	–	–

Source: own data.

8.6.3 Protesting Lawfully

This part of the intervention was targeted at the belief that there is no need to notify the police or local authorities of an intended protest. This belief leads to non-compliance with legislative prescripts on how to conduct protests. The pre- and post-intervention questionnaires were composed of the following statements:

1. Protestors must seek permission from the police and municipal authorities before they can protest.
2. Protestors must seek written permission if they want to protest within 100 metres of a court building, parliament or the union buildings.
3. A protest of more than 15 people that takes place without notifying local authorities is illegal.
4. During a protest, it is permissible to wear masks or clothing that covers our faces and prevents us from being identified from the crowd.
5. In order to protest legally, protestors must pay a fee to the municipal police.

Participants were required to indicate whether they strongly disagree, disagree, are not sure, agree or strongly agree with each statement posed.

Table 8.4: Results of the intervention – Protesting lawfully.

Protestors must seek permission from the police and municipal authorities before they can protest					
	strongly disagree	disagree	not sure	agree	strongly agree
Before intervention	–	3	7	–	–
After intervention	7	3	–	–	–
Protestors must seek written permission if they want to protest within 100 metres of a court building, parliament or the union buildings					

Before intervention	–	1	5	4	–
After intervention	–	–	–	4	6
A protest of more than 15 people that takes place without notifying local authorities is illegal					
Before intervention	–	4	6	–	–
After intervention	–	–	–	1	9
During a protest, it is permissible to wear masks or clothing that covers our faces and prevents us from being identified from the crowd					
Before intervention	4	2	4	–	–
After intervention	9	1	–	–	–
In order to protest legally, protestors must pay a fee to the municipal police					
Before intervention	2	2	6	–	–
After intervention	10	–	–	–	–

In their response to the pre-intervention questionnaire, a significant number of participants ticked the 'not sure' option to the questions posed to them. For instance, as shown in Table 8.4 above, seven out of 10 participants indicated that they were not sure that protestors should seek permission from the police and municipal authorities before they could protest. This indicates that before the intervention, participants showed a general lack of awareness of the legal framework surrounding the exercise of their right to protest. After the intervention, participants' responses indicated a change in awareness of some aspects of the law relating to the conduct of protests. Nevertheless, the positive responses do not necessarily mean that participants are fully conversant with the law on protests. This is because the RGA is not a piece of legislation which can be mastered in a single day of training. Nevertheless, it is hoped that participants will revisit the material contained in the manual in order to refresh their memory.

8.6.4 Mobilising for Change

This part of the intervention was targeted at the belief that it is not possible to prevent violent protests and that violent protests are a normal part of people's lives, and that there is nothing that one can do about them. The pre- and post-intervention questionnaires were composed of the following statements:

1. Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them.

2. Violent protests can be prevented.
3. It is possible to mobilise our communities towards a common objective.
4. It is possible to convince members of our communities to stop violent protests in future.
5. Meaningful change in our lives can be achieved through community organisations.

Participants were required to indicate whether they strongly disagree, disagree, are not sure, agree or strongly agree with each statement posed.

Before the intervention, participants were convinced that violent protests cannot be prevented. For instance, Table 8.5 shows that before the intervention, seven out of 10 participants strongly agreed that violent protests were a normal part of their lives, and that there was nothing that one could do about them. Responses to the questionnaire administered after the intervention indicated that participants were persuaded that if community members came together they could achieve certain objectives such as the prevention of violent service delivery protests. As the results in Table 8.4 indicate, nine out of 10 participants agreed that it is possible to convince members of their communities to stop violent protests in future. This change in outlook was arguably made possible by providing participants with examples where community mobilisation played a critical role in the attainment of objectives which seemed impossible to achieve. The two films *TAC: Taking HAART* and *Dear Mandela* shown to participants are two such examples. The *Dear Mandela* film was particularly important in that Abahlali base Mjondolo, who are the main focus of the film, are facing the same struggle as the communities from which the participants come from, yet they have chosen to use non-violent methods and have had considerable success doing so.

Table 8.5: Results of the intervention – Mobilising for change.

Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them					
	strongly disagree	disagree	not sure	agree	strongly agree
Before intervention	–	–	–	3	7
After intervention	5	5	–	–	–
Violent protests can be prevented					

Before intervention	8	2	–	–	–
After intervention	–	–	–	4	6
It is possible to mobilise our communities towards a common objective					
Before intervention	–	–	1	5	4
After intervention	–	–	–	6	4
It is possible to convince members of our communities to stop violent protests in future					
Before intervention	6	4	–	–	–
After intervention	–	–	–	9	1
Meaningful change in our lives can be achieved through community organisations					
Before intervention	–	2	7	1	–
After intervention	–	–	–	8	2

8.7 Reflection

In this section, the researcher reflects on the activities undertaken as part of the intervention and the general experience of the participants. Under the first intervention, participants were required to watch the documentary *The Weather Underground* and comment on the effectiveness of violence as a method of action. Participants were in agreement after watching the documentary that violent means of action as depicted in the film were generally ineffective in bringing about political change.

Participants were also required to identify conduct during previous protests that they consider as constituting violence. Participants identified the following conduct as violent actions committed during previous protests in their area: throwing stones at the police and motorists passing by; physical assault; threats of assault and burning/petrol bombing buildings. Interestingly, they did not mention the burning of tyres and blocking of roads as violent actions. It is not clear whether this is because they were aware that the definition of violence as used in this study does not consider such actions as violence or not.

Finally, participants were required to look for old newspapers and cut out articles on service delivery protests. The researcher realised that the participants did not have any newspapers to cut out. The researcher then decided to download the articles online instead. The researcher downloaded ten newspaper articles published online on service deliver protests that occurred during the year 2018. The purpose was to show that reporting on protests follows a protest paradigm frame. Participants were able to recognise that coverage of the protests emphasised the effects of the protests and the violence or drama associated with the protests. The following headlines from the selected articles are noteworthy:

1. *Service delivery protest hits N2 traffic*
2. *Councillor's house set on fire as she sleeps*
3. *Protest on N2 causes road closure*
4. *Many hurt in service delivery protest*
5. *Egoli protests erupt in chaos*
6. *Violence rears its ugly head during protest action: BCM, Komgha, Ginsberg and PE feel the brunt*
7. *Ginsberg residents in court after violent protest*
8. *Violent clashes erupt in Potsdam*
9. *Two arrested for attempting to burn councillor's house*
10. *Residents 'provoke' state with Ginsberg land grab*

As part of the second intervention, participants were required to identify non-violent methods which can be categorised as protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention from a list of non-violent methods used in the struggle against Apartheid provided to them. For participants, categorising methods of non-violent of action was a difficult task. This was mainly because the participants had not adequately understood the three categories of non-violent action. The researcher ended up spending a substantial amount of time trying to explain the three categories so that the activity could be completed successfully. It was particularly important for the participants to understand the categories because it made it easier for them to understand and identify the various forms of nonviolence depicted in the documentary videos that they were going to watch. Participants watched the film *A Force More Powerful* and shared their thoughts on the power or effectiveness of non-violent action. Participants were particularly impressed with the power of seemingly trivial acts of nonviolence depicted in the documentary. The documentary challenged their belief over the effectiveness of non-violent methods.

The main activity under the third intervention was drafting a Section 4 notice. To make the task easier, participants were presented with a sample Section 4 notice as an example to learn from. After drafting the Section 4 notice, participants were released so that they could go to their respective areas and conduct the second activity. The activity required participants to obtain information regarding the name and contact details of the designated responsible officer at the municipal offices, and authorised member at their nearest police station. Participants gave feedback on the task the following day before the start of the final intervention. The third intervention did not involve screening documentaries.

In terms of the final intervention, participants were required to watch two documentaries. The first documentary that they watched was *TAC: Taking HAART* followed by *Dear Mandela*. Thereafter participants shared their thoughts on the power of community mobilisation and community organisations. Participants lamented at the lack of organisations in their respective areas that are as powerful and influential as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) or Abahlali base Mjondolo. For the participants, it was only political parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the ANC that wielded such power and influence in their communities. According to participants, any formal community organisation that can amass a large following and challenge government decisions or policy in the manner displayed in the two documentaries would come into direct confrontation with members of the ruling ANC party. This is because they would view it as a direct challenge to their power or domination in the community.

Participants were also required to create a Facebook page and/or a WhatsApp group for the community in which they live. While preparing for this task, we realised, however, that the communities in which the participants lived already had either an active and established Facebook page or a Facebook group with a large following. Creating another group or page would not serve any purpose. Instead, participants ended up joining the already existing groups. For instance, the following groups were discovered: *Nompumelelo/gqobas B/bay E.L; Proudly Zwelitsha*; *Breidbach onse kassie*; *Ginsberg Natives*; *Unit P, Mdantsane* [Facebook page]; *Vergenoeg ikasi lam*; *Orange Groove, Santa, Fort Grey and Bongweni*; *Orange groove li kasi lam*; and *Potsdam eMonti* (covering Ikhwezi Village). Within these groups, members post on a wide range of subjects. These range from issues such as power failures, goods for sale, general inquiries, the weather, complaints and jokes. We then discussed how social media platforms could be used to mobilise community members towards a common goal or just to raise awareness on social issues. The researcher realises in hindsight that perhaps what can be done in future is to create a Facebook page or group whose purpose is to help encourage communities across South Africa choose non-violent methods. The social media platform would publish selected aspects of this study and the intervention itself over a period of time in a manner that is easy to understand.

The final task, under this intervention was for the participants to conduct a cleaning campaign for their area on their own. They had to set up a date, time and place to conduct the cleaning and provide the researcher with feedback. A follow-up on the research participants' progress revealed that they had not been able to organise cleaning campaigns in their areas. Participants indicated that residents in their respective areas would only act collectively if there were a serious issue at stake. For some participants, the problem was that it was difficult to organise people to do something of that nature without anything material being provided to the community in return such as, food parcels, cleaning materials or any other benefit in return for their participation in the campaign. While this activity did not go ahead as planned, the researcher does not consider the failure to be material because the majority of the activities were successful. In addition, the intervention as a whole was aimed at changing participants' attitudes towards violence and to a lesser extent, community mobilisation. Consequently, the failure of an activity aimed at increasing participants' capacity to mobilise their communities does not compromise the success of the main objectives of the intervention.

As a general comment, the researcher wishes to highlight that during the course of the intervention, participants showed more enthusiasm during activities that involved watching documentaries. The discussions after watching documentaries were also lively than others. The benefit of using documentary videos to stimulate attitude and behavioural change or as a teaching method in general is advantageous in that people tend to remember visual material for longer periods of time than word of mouth. The documentary videos used are freely available on YouTube. While documentary videos attracted the attention of participants, greater impact was achieved by the documentaries with content that participants resonated with. These are *TAC: Taking HAART* on the TAC's fight for the provision of free anti-retroviral treatment in South Africa, *A Force More Powerful* on the South African Struggle against the apartheid regime and *Dear Mandela* on how Abahlali base Mjondolo mobilised and fought against evictions in Durban.

Watching videos, however, is a time consuming exercise. In light of this, the intervention as mentioned earlier was conducted over a period of four days. It would have been impractical to watch all the videos in one day. In order to watch videos online, however, one requires an internet connection and a device like a laptop, television or smart phone. The researcher used a laptop with internet connection and a projector in order to broadcast the documentaries. The problem, however, is that the majority of the population for which this intervention is intended are poor. They cannot afford the data costs or the appropriate devices required to watch the documentaries. This means that it will be difficult for the intervention to be replicated in full unless if the facilitator has the necessary resources. The researcher, however, on the final day of the intervention, with the help of a friend, managed to download the videos and copy them onto 10 USB memory sticks for each participant.

The long term effectiveness of the intervention is dependent on the roll out of the intervention to a larger audience. Despite the encouraging results of the intervention, it should be mentioned that it is necessary for the intervention to be applied to a greater number of people such that there can be a significant change in the attitudes towards violence in the communities prone to violent service delivery protests. Admittedly, ten participants may not be adequate to influence the desired outcome in their community. In addition while the manual itself is easy to understand, a skilled individual is required to facilitate the intervention especially where a large number of participants is involved. Finally, since the majority of residents interviewed speak IsiXhosa as their mother tongue and are not highly proficient in the English language, it is important to have the intervention manual or booklet translated into IsiXhosa.

8.8 Conclusion

The researcher's observation is that the residents interviewed in this study are in dire need of decent housing, dignified living conditions, sanitation, water and electricity. This intervention is important in that it equips the participants with the skills and knowledge necessary to conduct sustained non-violent campaigns aimed at applying pressure on the local government and political leaders such that they can attend to the needs of the most vulnerable people in this country. The results of the evaluation of the intervention are encouraging. There was a significant change in the attitudes of participants towards violence after the intervention and participants showed a general willingness to engage in non-violent methods in the future.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions of the study. The chapter begins by providing an overview of the research aims and objectives. Thereafter, the chapter restates the gap in the literature which the study sought to address. Following thereafter is a reflection of the research approach and methodology used in the study. Thereafter, the chapter sums up the main findings of the study. This is followed by an outline of the main contributions of the study, the recommendations, and the limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter offers suggestions for future research.

9.2 Overview of Research Aims and Objectives

The main objectives of this study were:

1. To investigate why protestors choose to engage in violent service delivery protests rather than using non-violent methods when expressing their grievances
2. To identify the factors which make violence a viable option for protestors
3. To ascertain the effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action
4. To develop and test an intervention aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests

9.3 The Literature gap which the study sought to address

While the causes of violent service delivery protests are known, it is not known why protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods, especially in the face of service-delivery-related grievances. In the same vein, the factors which make violence a viable option for protestors in the face of service-delivery-related grievances have not been adequately explored.

A closer reading of literature on violent service delivery protests reveals that some communities resort to violent protest because they believe that such tactics help them to achieve their objectives. In other words, they believe that violent protests are an effective political tool. That which is not known is whether violent protests are indeed effective in reality. No empirical evaluation has ever been made to test this claim.

While previous studies have suggested possible solutions to combat violent service delivery protests, none of the studies have combined the solutions into a violence prevention model which can be applied to prevent service delivery protests and encourage the use of non-violent methods in the face of service-delivery-related grievances.

9.4 Overview of Research Approach and Methodology

In order to achieve the research objectives of the study, it was essential to interview members of the community who have taken part in violent service delivery protests in the past. The intention was to gain an insight into their experiences regarding violent service delivery protests. It was also essential that community members take a leading role in developing solutions to the problem of violent service delivery protests and the development of the violence prevention intervention. It is against this background that the Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach and the qualitative research methodology were used in this study.

The PAR approach was considered appropriate for four main reasons. First, as shown in Chapter 5, PAR requires community participation in the research process. Second, PAR emphasises that the communities concerned must take appropriate actions to solve their problems. Third, PAR requires communities to reflect on their actions. Ultimately, PAR envisages, after taking part in the research process, the empowerment of communities to confront their attitudes, behaviours and prejudices and to be the agents of change in their own lives.

The qualitative research methodology was considered appropriate for the study for two main reasons. First, it made it possible to capture and present detailed narratives of the research participants' experiences. Second, it made it possible not only to capture participants' experiences but also the context of those experiences.

9.5 Main Findings

The study found that protestors choose violent protests over non-violent methods because they have no confidence in non-violent methods and perceive violent protests as an effective political tool of coercion. These findings are important in that, in line with the rational choice theory, they suggest that resorting to violent protests is a deliberate decision which is made based on an assessment of the benefits of violent protests over those of non-violent action. This insight into the dynamics concerning the choice of action resulted in the development of an intervention which challenges the perception that violent protests are more effective than non-violent methods.

In relation to the second research objective, the study found that communities will readily resort to violent protests because of unfulfilled promises, negative perceptions towards members of the police and the need to maintain group solidarity or community ties. The finding on group solidarity or community ties suggests that violent protests are likely to occur when residents share a sense of community. This finding was unexpected because while there is literature which suggests that a sense of community can increase the civic participation of individuals, not much is known about how a sense of community influences the participation of individuals in violent protests. This finding is significant in that it establishes, for the first time, a sense of community as one of the factors enabling violent service delivery protests to be an option for would-be protestors.

In relation to the third objective, the study found that violent service delivery protests are, for the most part, not effective in helping protestors achieve their goals. This finding was not expected owing to the widespread belief amongst the residents interviewed for this study that violent service delivery protests are an effective method of action. The finding was also not expected because the frequency with which violent service delivery protests occur in South Africa suggests that they are an effective form of action. The significance of this finding lies in that it implies the existence of a possible culture of violence that is informed by aspects of cultural violence. This finding forces us to channel violence prevention efforts to demystifying the efficacy of violence as an effective grievance resolution mechanism and eradicating cultural beliefs surrounding the use of violence especially amongst young men who make up the bulk of the participants in violent service delivery protests.

Viewed together, the findings in relation to the three objectives, outlined above, bring the realisation that the problem of violent service delivery protests is complex and cannot be attributed to one cause or factor. To illustrate, while factors such as unfulfilled promises, negative perceptions towards members of the police and group solidarity or community ties were easily identified from the participants' responses, the role of underlying factors such as poverty, age and violent conceptions of masculinity in violent service delivery protests was not obvious. The answer to the main research question would therefore be stated as follows:

> *People are likely to resort to violence over non-violent methods if they perceive the rewards or benefits flowing from the use of violence to be greater than the perceived costs. Violence is most likely to occur in poor communities without access to basic needs against the backdrop of unfulfilled promises and negative attitudes towards the police. Participants are most likely to be young men, previously exposed to violence, have a sense of community and subscribe to violent notions of masculinity. While they are generally ineffective, these protests are likely to recur owing to or as a sign of continued discontent with the prevailing state of affairs.*

The fourth research objective, as mentioned earlier, was to develop and test an intervention aimed at preventing future violent service delivery protests. The developed intervention was informed by the findings of the study in relation to the three objectives discussed above. In particular, the intervention targeted the following attitudes and behaviours:

1. Violent protests are an effective method of engagement or expressing grievances
2. Non-violent methods are ineffective in obtaining concessions from the local government
3. There are no effective alternatives to violent protests as a method of expressing grievances
4. It is not possible to prevent violent protests
5. Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them
6. Choosing violent protests over non-violence

7. Non-compliance with legislative prescripts on how to conduct protests

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention revealed that the intervention was, to a large extent, effective in changing the attitudes of the action group which took part in the intervention towards violence. It was not possible, however, to ascertain whether this change in attitude will result in a change in behaviour. At the time of writing, however, the participants had not participated in any violent protests. A change in attitude is the first step to a behavioural change, however, this change does not necessarily mean it will be accompanied by behaviour change. This makes measuring behaviour change a difficult task. It is safe to say therefore that the intervention was largely successful in changing attitudes that contribute to violent conflict.

9.6 Main Contributions of the Research

An important contribution made by this study was that it was able to show that resorting to violent protests is a deliberate decision which is made based on an assessment of the perceived benefits of violent protests over those of non-violent action.

This study was also able to contribute to a broadening of one's understanding of the factors which enable violence to be a viable option for protestors. The main contribution of this study in this regard is the finding that violent protests are likely to occur when residents share a sense of community. This is a significant finding because until now, no explicit study which has managed to link a sense of community and participation in violent service delivery protests, has been conducted.

Another contribution of this study involves it dispelling the view that violent service delivery protests are an effective form of action. Using empirical evidence, the study was able to show that violent service delivery protests are not as effective as they are perceived to be.

A significant contribution of this study is its development of an intervention designed to prevent violent service delivery protests and to encourage the use of non-violent methods. If applied correctly to a wide audience, the intervention has the potential to change perceptions concerning the effectiveness of violence and to empower communities with the tools to effectively obtain meaningful concessions from the local government and ultimately change the community's conditions through non-violent means.

9.7 Suggestions to Stakeholders

9.7.1 The SAPS

The police play an important role in maintaining law and order during protests. Without police presence or visibility during protests, matters can easily get out of control. As shown in Chapter 6, however, residents accused the police of heavy-handed policing of peaceful protests. Residents also accused the police of being government puppets who did not understand their role during protests. It is noteworthy that Public Order Police (POP) respondents confirmed the allegations against them of the use of unnecessary, unjustified and unreasonable force against protestors as true.

Currently, that which happens is that protests occur without any notification to the South African Police Service (SAPS) or local authorities. The reasons range from the lack of knowledge of the RGA to the outright lack of confidence that the police will not arbitrarily prohibit the intended protest. Since the police have no prior knowledge of protests, their role is limited to responding to protests and their response has been mostly to disperse protestors, often times using force. As the findings of the study show, this has resulted in the formation of negative attitudes towards the police within communities, especially with regards to the policing of protests.

Based on the findings of this study, it is the researcher's view that the SAPS should consider establishing good relations with members of communities where violent protests occur regularly. In particular, lines of communication must be open between community leaders and the SAPS. Community leaders must feel confident to notify the SAPS whenever they want to protest, without any fear that their protest will be prohibited or that they will be arbitrarily arrested, intimidated and threatened for convening protests. Good relations will enable meaningful dialogue between the police and those wishing to protest. This will ensure that the police are involved in the planning stages of protests such that when the protests occur, they are in a position to meaningfully facilitate protests.

9.7.2 Communities

This research has shown that violent protests are not as effective as perceived by most protestors. Despite the ineffectiveness of violent protests, it is likely that violent protests will continue unabated as long as residents believe that violent tactics are superior to non-violent methods. As shown by the intervention developed for this study, however, non-violent methods have been used successfully in various contexts with overwhelming rates of success as compared to violent methods of action. With this in mind, it is the researcher's view that communities should therefore consider a shift from using violent protests to using non-violent methods.

In order to achieve any significant change in their condition, communities should consider employing diverse methods of non-violent action instead of relying on protests alone. In addition, communities should consider establishing independent community organisations in order to effectively coordinate their campaigns.

9.7.3 Local Government and Ward Councillors

As the findings have shown, one of the factors enabling violent protests to be an option for residents is unfulfilled promises. It is recommended that local government and ward councillors should avoid making promises which they cannot fulfil to the communities which they serve.

It is also recommended that local government and ward councillors should be in constant communication with the communities which they serve. Constant communication enables communities to be up-to-date with the progress on current and future projects.

9.8 Limitations

The first limitation of the study concerns the generalizability of its findings. In order to fulfil its objectives, this study utilised data obtained from residents of selected areas of BCMM. These areas were chosen since they are the "hot spots" where violent service delivery protests have occurred in the past. The problem of violent service delivery protests is, however, a countrywide phenomenon. The findings of the study may thus not be applicable to other areas outside BCMM. It is nevertheless hoped that the findings have applicability in communities with similar problems of service delivery, population demographics and violence.

The second limitation concerns the timing of the interviews. Ideally, the researcher was hoping to interview residents during or immediately after a violent service delivery protest. The advantage of conducting interviews while the violence is in action is that events are still fresh in the minds of the people. While a number of violent service delivery protests occurred while the researcher was carrying out this research between 2017 and 2019, by the time the researcher obtained the news through the media, the crowds were dispersed and tracking them down was a difficult, time-consuming task, even with the assistance of insiders. The narratives of violence recorded were thus of violent service delivery protests which occurred weeks or even months prior to the interview. Despite this limitation, interviewing residents long after the violent protests had occurred enabled the residents to revisit their experiences and give an in-depth and more reasoned perspective of what had transpired during the protests.

The final limitation relates to the inability to expand the intervention to a wider audience. Research interventions focusing on attitude and behavioural change, such as the one conceived by this study, need to be applied to a wide variety of people in different communities in order to make an assessment of the effectiveness of such interventions. Due to time and resource constraints, the intervention could not be applied and tested with a wider audience. Despite this, the results of the intervention with the study's action group revealed positive and encouraging results.

9.9 Suggestions for Future Research

This study leaves room for future studies to examine why protestors choose to engage in violent protests instead of non-violent methods in the face of other types of conflicts such as labour or political disputes.

Owing to the limitations of generalising the findings of the research to other areas outside the BCMM, future studies may replicate the study in other hot spot areas across the country to ascertain whether there will be any significant differences between findings.

Most importantly, however, future studies may apply the intervention developed in this study to a wider audience in order to achieve greater attitude and behavioural change.

9.10 Conclusion

The most common approach to the problem of violent service delivery protest has been to investigate the causes of the protests and suggest possible solutions. The question why protestors resort to violence instead of non-violent methods has largely remained unanswered. This study found that protestors tend to resort to violent protests because of a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of non-violent methods. In the same vein, protestors believe that their demands can be met if they resort to violence. This indicates the existence of positive attitudes towards the use of violence amongst protestors. On a closer look however, violent protests are not as effective as they are perceived to be. It is against this background that this study developed a violence prevention intervention that seeks to transform protestors attitudes towards violence. Initial testing revealed that if extended to a wider population, the intervention may significantly contribute towards the prevention of violent service delivery protests.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVENTION MANUAL

PREVENTING VIOLENT PROTESTS
&
PROMOTING NON-VIOLENT ENGAGEMENT

Introduction

This manual is the result of research undertaken together with the residents of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa, from March 2017 to October 2019. During this period, we sought to understand why residents resorted to violent protests instead of non-violent methods in the face of service delivery related grievances. Our intention was to use this information in order to develop a violence prevention intervention.

Two of the main findings of the research are noteworthy. First, we found out that residents chose violent protests because they believed they were an effective way to express their grievances to the local municipality. Second, we found that residents were not confident that their grievances could be resolved through non-violent methods of engagement. These findings were presented to a pilot intervention group whose purpose was to help develop this intervention.

During the initial discussion with the pilot intervention group, a number of questions and concerns were raised. The most notable questions were whether violent protests are preventable and whether there were effective alternatives to violent protests. These questions became the foundation of the intervention presented in this manual.

The intervention is made up of four parts under the following headings:

i. violent protests as a method of expressing grievances;
ii. expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence;
iii. protesting lawfully; and
iv. mobilising for change.

Each of the four parts of the intervention contains four sections. First, each part contains a brief description of the objectives and desired outcomes of the intervention. This information enables participants to have an understanding of what the intervention is about and what to expect from taking part in the intervention. Second, each part consists of two questionnaires, a pre- and post-intervention questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaires is to ascertain the effectiveness of the intervention. Third, each part contains a “reflection box”. In this section, participants are required to “reflect” on specific subject matter aligned to the intervention concerned. Fourth, each part contains a list of activities. These activities are practical exercises designed to help participants gain some practical skills.

Each intervention targets specific attitudes and behaviours as shown in the Table 1 below.

Table 1: Attitudes and behaviours targeted by the intervention.

Intervention	**Attitudes targeted**	**Behaviours targeted**
Violent protests as a method of expressing grievances	Violent protests are an effective way to express our grievances	Choosing violence
Expressing grievances effectively without the use of violence	Non-violent methods are ineffective in obtaining concessions from local government There are no effective alternatives to violent protests	Choosing violence
Protesting lawfully	There is no need to notify the police or local authorities of an intended protest	Non-compliance with legislative prescripts on how to conduct protests
Mobilising for change	That violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them It is not possible to prevent violent protests	

1. VIOLENT PROTESTS AS A METHOD OF EXPRESSING GRIEVANCES

This part explores the effects of violent protests. It also attempts to show why violent protests are an ineffective method of advocating for change or expressing grievances. The objectives of this part are thus to raise awareness on the effects of violent protests and at the same time expose the ineffectiveness of violent protest. Ultimately, the desired outcome of this intervention is the development of accurate knowledge of the outcomes of violent protest by participants.

Questionnaire 1									
1. Violent protests are an effective way to engage with local government on service delivery issues									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Violent protests enable us to be taken seriously									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. Violent protests enable us to get meaningful responses from the municipality									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. I will always take part in a violent protest even if they result in the destruction of public property									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. Violent protests have a negative impact on our society									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

Consequences of violent protests

One of the most common consequences of violent service delivery protests is criminal liability that may arise where protestors intimidate, threaten and assault individuals or damage property.

Violent protests may cause service delivery backlogs. Service delivery backlogs may occur where a municipality redirects money set aside to facilitate service delivery to repairing or replacing infrastructure damaged during violent protests. Service delivery backlogs may also occur when a municipality refuses to rebuild or repair public infrastructure damaged during violent protests.[20]

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[20] In response to violent protests around South Africa in 2016, Gauteng Province Premier David Makhura indicated that government will not rebuild or replace any public infrastructure destroyed during the protests.

Violent service delivery protests may also result in a cycle of violence, loosely defined in this context as the repeated use of violence in the face of service delivery related grievances.

A cycle of violence may in turn result in a culture of violence. In this context, a culture of violence means that individuals believe that violent protests are the only effective method of communication to express their grievances and will thus use violence as an option of first resort to resolve their grievances.

Reflection

While the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa adopted violent tactics on various occasions, non-violent methods played a major role in the fall of the Apartheid regime. In fact, the struggle was largely non-violent than what most people would acknowledge. If the struggle had adopted violent tactics, exclusively, it is doubtful that the movement would have succeeded for the following reasons:

i. the use of violence by Umkonto We Sizwe alienated some black people and resulted in more violence from the regime;
ii. South Africa at that time had a superior military in terms of numbers and equipment;
iii. white South African troops would have fought with unparalleled commitment because they had a lot to lose;
iv. the black townships, with their wide through fares were designed to make it easy to quell any armed uprising;
v. it was also difficult, if not impossible to launch an armed resistance against Apartheid forces from the rural Bantustans because of geographical fragmentation;
vi. the South African countryside, with its open terrain, made it unsuitable for guerrilla warfare;
vii. the numbers of black South Africans exiting the country to undergo military training was relatively small compared to the size of the South African army[21]

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[21] These reasons are derived from Stephen Zunes' paper entitled "The role of non-violent action in the downfall of apartheid", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, (1) (I999), p 140-145.

The ineffectiveness of violent protests

The effectiveness of violent service delivery protests as a method of action is in doubt for several reasons. First, promises made by municipal officials or political leaders to protestors at meetings in the wake of violent protests are usually not kept. In many instances, the promises made are unrealistic.

Second, violent protests do not always guarantee an audience with municipal officials. When confronted with violent protests, municipal officials are often unwilling to engage with the protestors.

Third, where a municipality grants the violent protestors an audience, the aim is usually to stop the protests in order to prevent further violence or damage to property. It is rarely about resolving grievances raised by the protestors.

Fourth, violent protests result in negative reporting by the media. Media coverage of violent protests tends to focus on the violence instead of the reasons for or underlying causes of the protest.

Finally, violent protests alienate those that may be sympathetic to the cause of the protestors.

Reflection

Despite what many people think, using non-violent methods has more advantages than resorting to violence. Four main reasons can be identified:

i. Non-violent action has lesser financial implications. Violent action on the other hand may require the training of participants and the purchasing of weapons and provisions.
ii. It is easy to take part in non-violent action whereas taking part in violent action often requires certain attributes like physical fitness and courage.
iii. Violent action begets violent repression. While non-violent action may also result in violent repression, the violent repression of non-violent action paints a bad picture of the state.
iv. Non-violent action attracts large numbers of participants than violent action.

The superiority of non-violent action over violent action can be shown by the example of the struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It is generally accepted that non-violent action played a critical role in bringing down the Apartheid regime than violent action for the following reasons:

i. the participation of notable figures in openly defying authorities encouraged others to join in;
ii. due to the white minority's dependence on the black majority for their day-to-day needs and survival, non-violent action posed a more serious threat to them than violent action;
iii. non-violent action made it possible for large numbers of the population to participate compared to what a guerrilla army would have made possible;
iv. non-violent action drew the sympathy of some white minorities thus creating divisions amongst whites;
v. by using non-violent action, they allayed fears that life under black majority rule would be repressive;
vi. non-violent action drew the international community's attention to the plight of the black majority and sympathy to their cause.[22]

Activities

1. *The Weather Underground* is a documentary about an organisation in the United States called the Weatherman or the Weather Underground Organisation. The organisation used various forms of violence in expressing their opposition to the Vietnam War and other issues such as racism and inequality in America. After watching the documentary, comment on the effectiveness of violence in helping the organisation achieve its objectives.
2. Identify conduct that occurs during protests that you consider as violence and give your reasons for saying so.
3. Look for old newspapers and make cuttings of stories on service delivery protests. Alternatively, if you have internet access you can look up the stories on the internet. Thereafter, comment on the manner in which journalists reported on the protests.

Questionnaire 2

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[22] (Zunes 1999: 161-166).

1. Violent protests are an effective way to engage with local government on service delivery									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Violent protests enable us to be taken seriously									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. Violent protests enable us to get meaningful responses from the municipality									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. I will always take part in a violent protest even if it results in the destruction of public property									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. Violent protests have a negative impact on our community									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

2. EXPRESSING GRIEVANCES EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT THE USE OF VIOLENCE

This part seeks to raise awareness on the various methods of non-violent action. Most importantly, it attempts to show that methods of non-violent action are effective. The desired outcome of this intervention is a comprehensive understanding of the diverse methods of non-violent action.

Questionnaire 1									
1. Non-violent methods are not as effective as violent protests									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. We can never be taken seriously if we express our grievances through non-violent methods									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. Non-violent methods do not attract the attention of the municipality									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. Non-violent methods can only work if the municipality is willing to listen									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. Non-violent methods can never work in South Africa									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

Methods of non-violent action

There are numerous methods of nonviolence available to anyone who wishes to embark on a non-violent campaign. The list of examples of non-violent methods in Table 2 below is derived from Gene Sharp's classical work: "How nonviolent struggle works". The methods of nonviolence are divided into three groups namely, protest and persuasion; non-cooperation; and non-violent intervention.

Table 2: The three groups of non-violent methods.

Protest and persuasion	**Non-cooperation**	**Non-violent intervention**
	1. Social non-cooperation	
Formal statements:	**Ostracism of persons:**	**Psychological intervention:**
Public speeches	Social boycott	Self-exposure to the elements
Letters of opposition or support	Sexual boycott	The fast
Declarations by organisations and institutions	Excommunication (religious boycott)	Reverse trial (defendants become unofficial "prosecutors")
Signed public statements	Interdict (suspension of religious services)	Non-violent harassment
Declarations of indictment and intention	**Non-cooperation with social events, customs and institutions:**	**Physical intervention:**
Group or mass petition	Suspension of social and sports activities	Sit-in
Communications with a wider audience:	Boycott of social affairs and withdrawal from social institutions	Stand-in
Slogans, caricatures and symbols (written, painted, drawn, printed, gestured, spoken, or mimicked)	Student strike. Social disobedience	Ride-in
Banners, posters and displayed communications	**Withdrawal from the social system:**	Wade-in
Leaflets, pamphlets, books	Stay-at-home	Mill-in (gather in some place of symbolic significance and remain mobile)
Newspapers and journals	Collective disappearance (the population of a small area abandons its homes)	Pray-in
Records, radio, TV and video	Protest emigration (a deliberate permanent emigration)	Non-violent raids (march to designated key point and demand possession)
Skywriting and earth writing	**2. Economic non-cooperation**	Non-violent air raids (perhaps bringing leaflets or food)
Group presentations:	**Action by consumers:**	Non-violent invasion

Deputations	Consumers' boycott of certain goods or services (local or from another country)	Non-violent interjection (placing one's body between a person and the objective of the work or activity)
Mock awards	Reducing consumption to an absolute minimum	Non-violent obstruction (generally temporary)
Group lobbying	Rent withholding. Refusal to rent	Non-violent occupation
Picketing	International consumers' boycott (several countries against the products of a particular country)	**Social intervention:**
Mock elections	**Actions by workers and producers:**	Establishing new social patterns
Symbolic public acts:	Workmen's boycott (refusal to work with products or tools provided by the opponents)	Overloading of facilities
Displays of flags and symbolic colours	Producers' boycott (refusal by producers to sell or otherwise deliver their own products)	Stall-in
Wearing of symbols (advocacy buttons, patches)	**Action by middlemen:**	Speak-in
Prayer and worship	Suppliers and handlers' boycott (refusal by workers or middlemen to handle or supply certain goods)	Guerrilla theatre (improvised dramatic interruptions)
Delivering symbolic objects	**Action by owners and management:**	Alternative social institutions
Protest disrobing	Traders' boycott (refusal by retailers to buy or sell certain goods)	Alternative communication systems
Destruction of own property (homes, documents, etc.)	Refusal to let or sell property	**Economic intervention:**
Symbolic lights (e.g. candles)	Lockouts	Reverse strike (working to excess)
Displays of portraits	Refusal of industrial assistance	Stay-in strike (occupation of work site)
Paint as protest	**Action by holders of financial resources:**	Non-violent land seizure
New signs and names	Withdrawal of bank deposits	Defiance of blockades

Symbolic sounds (using whistles, bells, sirens, etc.)	Refusal to pay fees, debts, interest and assessments	Politically-motivated counterfeiting
Symbolic takeover of land or buildings	Severance of funds and credit	Preclusive purchasing
Rude gestures	Refusal to provide the government with revenue voluntarily	Seizure of assets
Pressures on individuals:	**Action by governments:**	Dumping
"Haunting" officials (constantly following them, silently, respectfully)	Domestic embargo Blacklisting of traders International sellers' or buyers' embargo International trade embargo	Selective patronage
Taunting officials (mocking and insulting them)	**Ordinary industrial strikes:**	Alternative markets
Fraternization (subjecting persons to intense direct influence to convince them that the regime they serve is unjust)	Establishment strike (in one or more plants under one management) Industry strike (suspension of work in all the establishments of an industry)	Alternative transportation systems
Vigils	Sympathetic strike (to support the demands of fellow workers)	Alternative economic institutions
Drama and music	**Symbolic strikes:**	**Political intervention:**
Humorous skits and pranks	Protest strike and Quickie walkout	Overloading of administrative systems
Performances of plays and music	**3. Political non-cooperation**	Disclosing identities of secret agents
Singing	**Rejection of authority:**	Seeking imprisonment
Processions:	Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance	Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws
Marches	Refusal of public support (for the existing regime and its policies)	Work-on without collaboration
Parades	Literature and speeches advocating resistance	Dual sovereignty and parallel government
Religious processions	**Citizens' non-cooperation with government:**	
Pilgrimages	Boycott of legislative bodies by its members	

Motorcades	Boycott of elections	
Honouring the dead:	Boycott of government employment and positions	
Political mourning	Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies	
Mock funerals	Withdrawal from government educational institutions	
Demonstrative funerals	Boycott of government-supported organizations	
Homage at burial places	Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents	
Public assemblies:	Removal of own signs	
Assemblies of protest or support	Refusal to accept appointed officials	
Protest meetings	Refusal to dissolve existing institutions	
Camouflaged meetings of protest	**Citizens' alternatives to obedience:**	
Teach-ins (with several informed speakers)	Reluctant and slow compliance	
Withdrawal and renunciation:	Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse	
Walk-outs	Non-cooperation with conscription and deportation	
Silence	Hiding, escape, and false identities	
Renouncing honours	Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws	
Turning one's back	Sit-downs	

Evidence that non-violent methods are effective

As Table 2 above has shown, non-violent methods do not only refer to peaceful marches but a wide range of activities. In this part, we want to show or provide evidence of the effectiveness of non-violent methods. To begin with, non-violent methods have been used to topple dictatorships, undemocratic governments and in resisting foreign occupation. Examples include:

i. The Philippine resistance against the dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1983–1986)
ii. The 1989 Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution against the Communist regime

iii. The Indian movement against the British (1930–1931)
iv. The Danish resistance against Nazi occupation (1940–1945)
v. The South African resistance against Apartheid

Evidence from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset also shows that non-violent methods are more effective than violent action. The NAVCO 3.0 dataset contains data on violent and non-violent campaigns in 21 countries between 1991 and 2012. Campaigns during this period resulted in 673 concessions from governments. 612 or 91% of those concessions were due to non-violent campaigns, while 61 or 9% of the concessions were attributed to violent campaigns.[23]

Reflection

In part one, we showed that the struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa was successful because of its use of non-violent methods. Many communities that seek change through non-violent methods, however, tend to rely on methods of protest and persuasion alone. While non-violent methods of protest and persuasion may raise awareness and influence public opinion in ways that violent protests cannot, raising awareness and influencing public opinion, however, is usually not enough to bring about meaningful change. A combination of protests and persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention is often necessary. Table 3 below shows the various methods of non-violent action that were used to bring down the Apartheid government.

Table 3: Methods of non-violent action used by South Africans and the international community to bring down the Apartheid government.

Methods of non-violent action used by local South Africans	Methods of non-violent action used by the international community
Industrial strikes	Boycotting products of companies doing business in South Africa
General strikes	Sports boycott
Hunger strikes by political prisoners	Disrupting sports games in which the South African Springboks were playing in the 1969 tour of Britain

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[23] Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis (2018: 7).

Protests	Exclusion of South Africa from international sport
Multi-racial peace marches	Demanding that South Africa be expelled from the Commonwealth
Marching without permits	Cultural boycotts (artists pledging not to perform in SA)
Red meat and potato boycotts	Picketing in front of South African consulates and high commissions
Consumer boycott	Sanctions against South Africa
Bus, rent and school boycotts	Arms embargo
Sports and cultural boycotts	Raising of funds to support the anti-Apartheid movement
"Stay at home" campaign	Widespread press coverage of events such as the Sharpeville massacre
Defiance campaigns	Providing refuge to anti-Apartheid activists
Campaign against evictions and resettlement	Signing of petitions for the release of all Apartheid detainees
Urban migration	Memorial services for deceased anti-Apartheid activists
Burning passes	Closing businesses in South Africa (e.g. Barclays Bank)
Marrying mixed race couples illegally by the clergy	Stopping financial support to the SA government
Enrolment of blacks in white only schools	Awards for anti-Apartheid activists
Refusal to serve in the South African military	Release of songs and performance of concerts
Replacing the South African flag with the ANC flag	
Burning the flag	**UN Security Council Resolutions:**
Graffiti	Res 134 calling upon the government to end its policies of Apartheid and racial discrimination
Parallel/alternative community based institutions	Res 181 calling for an arms embargo against South Africa
Deliberate arrests to fill in prisons	Res 191 calling South Africa to release political prisoners
Public declarations (Freedom Charter)	Res 554 declaring null and void the new racist constitution of South Africa
Alternative press	
Circumventing press censorship through the use of affidavits	**UN General Assembly Resolutions:**
Music	Res 395(V) declaring that Apartheid is based on racial discrimination

Renaming public facilities	Res 1899(XVIII) urging all states to stop supplying oil to South Africa
Non-cooperation with the tricameral legislative system	Res 3068(XXVIII) International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
Symbolic clothing (Green black and gold which symbolised the banned ANC	

Activities

1. From the non-violent methods used in the struggle against Apartheid identified above, identify methods that fall under protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention respectively.
2. *A Force More Powerful* is a film documenting non-violent struggles in India, USA, South Africa, Denmark, Poland and Chile. After watching the film, what are your thoughts on the power or effectiveness of non-violent action?

Questionnaire 2									
1. Non-violent methods are not as effective as violent protests									
Strongly Disagree	☐	Disagree	☐	Not sure	☐	Agree	☐	Strongly Agree	☐
2. We can never be taken seriously if we express our grievances through non-violent methods									
Strongly Disagree	☐	Disagree	☐	Not sure	☐	Agree	☐	Strongly Agree	☐
3. Non-violent methods do not attract the attention of the municipality									
Strongly Disagree	☐	Disagree	☐	Not sure	☐	Agree	☐	Strongly Agree	☐
4. Non-violent methods can only work if the municipality is willing to listen									
Strongly Disagree	☐	Disagree	☐	Not sure	☐	Agree	☐	Strongly Agree	☐
5. Non-violent methods can never work in South Africa									
Strongly Disagree	☐	Disagree	☐	Not sure	☐	Agree	☐	Strongly Agree	☐

3. PROTESTING LAWFULLY

This part addresses important aspects of the exercise of the right to protest as provided for in the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA). The objective is to ensure that participants understand the dictates of the law when it comes to protests. This is necessary in order to ensure that any future protests are conducted in compliance with the law. In addition, compliance with the law helps participants avoid unnecessary conflict with the police.

Questionnaire 1									
1. Protestors must seek permission from the police and municipal authorities before they can protest									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Protestors must seek written permission if they want to protests within 100 metres of a court building, parliament or the union buildings									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. A protest of more than 15 people that takes place without notifying local authorities is illegal									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. During a protest, it is permissible to wear masks or clothing that covers our faces and prevents us from being identified from the crowd									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. In order to protest legally, protestors must pay a fee to the municipal police									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

The number of protestors

The RGA defines a protest by 15 people or less as a demonstration. A protest by more than 15 people is called a gathering. This distinction is important in that where a protest is by 15 people or less, they need not notify the local authorities of the protest. Where more than 15 people will take part in the protest, notification of the intended protest is necessary.

Important role players

There are four important role players when it comes to protest namely a convener, authorised member, responsible officer and a marshal. A convener refers to any person who, acting on his own will, convenes a gathering or a person appointed by an organisation to convene a gathering. An authorised member is a member of the Police authorised to represent the Police in terms of the RGA. The responsible officer refers to a person appointed by the local authority within whose area of jurisdiction the gathering will take place, to perform the functions, exercise powers and discharge the duties of a responsible officer in terms of the RGA A marshal refers to any person appointed to control participants in the gathering and to take the necessary steps to ensure that the gathering proceeds peacefully and in accordance with the applicable notice.

Notice of the intended gathering

The convenor must give notice of the intended gathering no less than seven days before the date of the intended gathering. If this is not possible, a convener may give less than seven days' notice but is required to give reasons in the notice why the notice was not given timeously. A gathering may, however, be prohibited if the notice is given less than 48 hours of the commencement of the gathering.

The notice must contain the following:

(a) the name, address and telephone and facsimile numbers of the convener and his deputy;
(b) the name of the organisation on whose behalf the gathering is convened or, a statement that the gathering is convened by the convener;
(c) the purpose of the gathering;
(d) the time, duration and date of the gathering;
(e) the place where the gathering is to be held;
(f) the anticipated number of participants;
(g) the proposed number and, where possible, the names of the marshals who will be appointed by the convener, and how the marshals will be distinguished from the other participants in the gathering;
(h) if a petition or any other document is to be handed over to any person, the place where and the person to whom it is to be handed over.

In the case of a gathering in the form of a procession, the notice must also contain the following:

i. the exact and complete route of the procession;

ii. the time when and the place at which participants in the procession are to assemble, and the time when and the place from which the procession is to commence;
iii. the time when and the place where the procession is to end and the participants are to disperse;
iv. the manner in which the participants will be transported to the place of assembly and from the point of dispersal; and
v. the number and types of vehicles, if any, which are to form part of the procession.

Reflection

It is important to highlight that what is required in terms of the RGA is for a convenor to give notice of the intended gathering. Permission is only required in the case of a gathering or demonstration that will take place within 100 metres of the Parliament, the Union Buildings or a Court building. Permission must be sought from the Chief Magistrate of Cape Town; the Director General: Office of the State President; and the magistrate of the district concerned, respectively. The permission must be granted in writing.

A common problem faced by convenors is that municipalities, for their own reasons, may prohibit a gathering from taking place by rejecting gathering notices. Some of the reasons for which gathering notices are rejected do not fall within the ambit of the reasons permissible under the RGA. For instance:

- In Tshwane, a protest notice was rejected on the basis that there were too many marches scheduled to take place in the city.
- In Rooigrond, outside Mafikeng, leaders of a protest were asked to pay a fee to the traffic department before they could protest.
- In one case, concerning the Palmiet Road branch of Abahlali base, Mjondolo protestors were told that they needed to obtain permission from shop owners since their protest route went past a shopping centre.
- In another case concerning the Anti-Eviction Campaign in Cape Town, the notification was rejected and no reasons were ever provided.[24]

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[24] (Royeppen 2016: 346-349).

After the Constitutional Court's judgment in *Mlungwana and Others v The State and Another* [2018] ZACC 45, it is no longer a criminal offence to convene a gathering without notice to the responsible officer.

The Section 4 Meeting

After receiving the notice, a responsible officer must consult with an authorised member to determine whether it is necessary to call a meeting to discuss any aspect of the conduct of the intended gathering. If after consulting the authorised member, the responsible officer is of the view that negotiations are not necessary and that the gathering may take place as proposed in the notice, the responsible officer must notify the convener accordingly.[25]

If, however, the responsible officer is of the view that negotiations are necessary, he shall call a meeting between himself, the convener, the authorized member and any representatives of public bodies that he may consider necessary. The meeting is popularly known as the Section 4 meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss any amendment of the contents of the notice and conditions regarding the conduct of the gathering.

If agreement is reached at the Section 4 meeting on the contents of the notice or the conditions regarding the conduct of the gathering, the gathering may take place in accordance with the contents of the notice or amendments made to the notice agreed to during the meeting If no agreement is reached at the Section 4 meeting, the responsible officer may impose conditions with regard to the holding of the gathering. There must be reasonable grounds for imposing such conditions and the responsible officer must give reasons for imposing such conditions. The convener of the gathering may apply to an appropriate magistrate for the setting aside or amendment of such condition within 24 hours after the responsible officer has given notice of the imposition of or refusal to impose the condition in question. No order as to costs shall be made by a magistrate in respect of the application.

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[25] The meeting may also take place as proposed if a convenor has not, within 24 hours after giving notice in terms of Section 3 (2), been called to a meeting.

Prohibition of a gathering

A responsible officer may prohibit a gathering if credible information on oath is brought to his or her attention concerning the possibility of following:

i. a serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or
ii. injury to participants in the gathering or other persons; or
iii. extensive damage to property; and
iv. if the Police and traffic officers will not be able to contain the threat.

Before prohibiting the gathering, the responsible officer must, however, be convinced that no amendment to the contents of the notice or imposition of conditions on how to hold the gathering would prevent the threat concerned. A convener may apply to a magistrate to set aside the decision to prohibit the gathering.

Conduct of gatherings and demonstrations

The following conduct is prohibited during gatherings and demonstrations:

i. The holding of the gathering at a locality or on a route that is not specified in the notice
ii. The holding of the gathering in a manner and during the times outside of those specified in the notice
iii. Possession of any firearm or any dangerous weapon by a participant
iv. The incitement of hatred of other persons or any group of other persons on account of differences in culture, race, sex, language or religion by way of a banner, placard, speech or singing or in any other manner
v. Performing any act or uttering any words, which are calculated or likely to cause or encourage violence against any person or group of persons
vi. Wearing any form of apparel that disguises, masks, or obscures a participant's facial features and prevents his identification
vii. Blocking entrances to any building or premises
viii. Compelling any person to attend, join or participate in the gathering
ix. Wearing any form of apparel that resembles any of the uniforms worn by members of the security forces, including the Police and the South African Defence Force

Civil liability

The Act places joint and several liability on an organisation or convener together with any person who unlawfully caused or contributed to riot damage during a gathering or demonstration. The following defences are available to a defendant:

i. That the person or organisation did not permit or connive at the act or omission which caused the damage.
ii. That the act or omission which caused the damage fell outside the scope and objectives of the gathering or demonstration and was not reasonably foreseeable.
iii. That the person or organisation took all reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent the act or omission which caused the damage.

Criminal liability

Upon conviction, a person who commits the following offences may be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine and such imprisonment:

i. Failure to attend a Section 4 meeting
ii. Contravention or failure to comply with any provisions in regard to the conduct of a gathering or demonstration[26]
iii. Knowingly contravening or failing to comply with the contents of a notice or a condition regarding the holding of a gathering or demonstration
iv. Convening or attending a prohibited gathering or demonstration
v. Knowingly contravening or failure to comply with a condition imposed on the conduct of the gathering
vi. Failure to comply with an order issued, or interfering with any steps taken, by the police in terms of the RGA
vii. Supplying or furnishing false information

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[26] These are listed in Section 8 of the Act and we have listed them in the section on the conduct of gatherings and demonstration above.

viii. Hindering, interfering with, or obstructing a member of the Police, responsible officer, convener, marshal or other person in the exercise of his powers or the performance of his duties under the RGA

Possession of or carrying a firearm or dangerous weapon carries a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.

Activities

1. Draft a notice of an intended gathering (Section 4 notice)
2. Find out the name and contact details of the designated authorised member at your local police station
3. Find out the name and contact details of the designated responsible officer at your local municipal office

Questionnaire 2									
1. Protestors must seek permission from the police and municipal authorities before they can protest									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Protestors must seek written permission if they want to protest within 100 metres of a court building, parliament or the union buildings									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. A protest of more than 15 people that takes place without notifying local authorities is illegal									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. During a protest, it is permissible to wear masks or clothing that covers our faces and prevents us from being identified from the crowd									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. In order to protest legally, protestors must pay a fee to the municipal police									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

4. MOBILISING FOR CHANGE

This part focuses on ways to bring community members together in order to work towards a common goal. The objective is to explore community mobilisation as a process and community organisations as vehicles through which participants can achieve meaningful change in their communities. The desired outcome is an increased capacity of participants to mobilise their communities towards a common objective, albeit in a non-violent manner.

Questionnaire 1									
1. Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Violent protests can be prevented									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. It is possible to mobilise our communities towards a common objective									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. It is possible to convince members of our communities to stop violent protests in future									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. Meaningful change in our lives can be achieved through community organisations									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

Community mobilisation is a process through which members of a community are brought together to unite and work towards a common objective. Persuading community members to come together to work towards a common goal is the first step towards meaningful change. The second step is to create a community organisation,[27] through which community members can act as a single entity with one voice and under unified and competent leadership. The third step is to plan, strategise and embark on activities that will help them achieve their goals.

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[27] Some refer to them as community based organisations.

How to mobilise communities

Social media is an important tool in mobilising communities. In this regard, social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and social networking applications such as WhatsApp are considerably cheaper and quicker tools to mobilise communities. Traditional media such as radio, TV and newspapers can also be utilised. Institutions such as churches, schools and hospitals also play a key role in community mobilisation. Gatherings such as community meetings, celebrations and funerals are another platform through which community mobilisation can take place. Influential and respected figures such as community leaders, the clergy and teachers are important figures that can assist in the mobilisation of communities.

How to form community organisations

Community organisations in South Africa can be in the form of a Non-Profit Company, a Non-Profit Trust or a Voluntary Association. These three entities are also known as Non-Profit Organisations since they exist not to generate profit for its members but in order to serve a public purpose. A Non-Profit Company is registered through the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC). A Non-Profit Trust is registered through the Master of the High Court.

A Voluntary Association is the easiest and most widely-used way to create a community organisation. What is required is an agreement, between three or more people to work towards a common objective without making profit. While the agreement can be made verbally or in writing, it is advisable to reduce it into writing. It is not a requirement that the voluntary association be registered with the Department of Social Development. Registering, however, enables the organisation to register for tax exemption and to open a bank account.

Advantages of using community organisations as vehicles for change

i. Community members know best, the issues affecting their community. Through community organisations, therefore, issues affecting the community are able to get the full attention that they deserve. This in turn creates cohesion amongst members of the community on important issues.

ii. Solutions to the problems affecting the community come from the community members themselves and therefore tend to be relevant for the community concerned. This in turn promotes local ownership of solutions and interventions.
iii. Community organisations are able to act as the voice of the community.
iv. Community organisations promote collective action instead of individual action.
v. Community organisations are an important vehicle for community representation and participation because everyone can take part in the activities of the organisation, educated or not, young or old, male or female.
vi. Unlike a partnership, when one person dies or retires, the organisation continues to exist because it exists independently of its members.
vii. Community organisations are able to collaborate with other NGOs and benefit from such collaboration.

Advantages of taking part in the activities of a community organisation

1. It empowers community members with skills and knowledge
2. It builds a sense of purpose or relevance
3. It boosts self confidence
4. It helps create more leaders
5. It creates informed community members
6. It strengthens the capacity of community members to work together towards a common goal
7. It strengthens the capacity of community members to address future problems

Reflection

There are many organisations in South Africa that have and continue to represent the interests of poor and vulnerable communities. The successes of these organisations show that communities are likely to achieve more if they mobilise and act under organised leadership and structures, than if they act in an uncoordinated manner.

Examples of these organisations are the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), the Concerned Citizens' Forum (CCF), the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC), Landless People's Movement (LPM), the Social Justice Coalition, the

Mandela Park Backyarders, and the South African Unemployed Peoples' Movement.

Activities

1. *TAC: Taking HAART* is a film documenting the Treatment Action Campaign's fight for the provision of ARV treatment in public health institutions. After watching the film, share your thoughts on the power of community mobilisation and community organisations.
2. *Dear Mandela* is a documentary film about the shack dwellers movement called Abahlali baseMjondolo. After watching the film, comment on how the organisation went about fighting against evictions.
3. Create a Facebook page and or a WhatsApp group for the community that you live in. Thereafter conduct a cleaning campaign for your area together with fellow community members.

Questionnaire 2									
1. Violent protests are a normal part of our lives, there is nothing that we can do about them									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
2. Violent protests can be prevented									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
3. It is possible to mobilise our communities towards a common objective									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
4. It is possible to convince members of our communities to stop violent protests in future									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	
5. Meaningful change in our lives can be achieved through community organisations									
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly Agree	

OVERALL EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE

Structure and delivery

1. The objectives of the intervention clearly defined.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

2. The facilitator was knowledgeable in the subject matter.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

3. The facilitator explained information and concepts clearly.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

4. The speed of the facilitator was appropriate.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

5. The facilitator was well prepared.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

6. The facilitator welcomed and responded to questions appropriately.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

7. How can the structure and delivery of the intervention be improved?

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Content

8. The content provided was relevant.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

9. The content was practical and applicable to real life situations.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

10. The case studies helped you to understand concepts more clearly.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

11. What additional content should be included in the intervention?

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Activities

12. The activities were relevant to the objectives of the intervention.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

13. Participation and interaction were encouraged.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

14. There was a good variety of activities.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

15. The activities challenged your thinking.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

16. The activities took place at appropriate intervals.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

17. How can the activities be improved?

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Videos

18. The videos provided were of good quality.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

19. The videos were relevant to the objectives of the intervention.

Strongly disagree		Disagree		Not sure		Agree		Strongly agree	

20. Did you experience any technical issues with the videos? If so, please explain.

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21. How can the videos be improved?

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Effectiveness of the intervention

22. What is your general view (attitude) on violence after taking part in the intervention?

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23. Do you feel that your knowledge or skills have improved after taking part in the intervention?

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24. Do you have any other comments that you wish to make?

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