Using dialogue to transform youth involvement in political conflict in Zambia

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies in the Faculty of Management Sciences at the Durban University of Technology

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August, 2021

Declaration

I declare that the thesis herewith submitted for the PhD: Public Administration – Peace Studies at the Durban University of Technology (DUT) is my original work and has not been previously submitted for a degree at any other university.

Kabale Ignatius Mukunto 16/8/2024

Abstract

While some senior leaders within the Zambian polity may embrace dialogical engagement when handling dissent, young people are seldom socialised to do so. This thesis is a product of a community-based participatory action research (PAR) anchored on contact and conflict transformation theories in the Kalulushi constituency of Zambia's Copperbelt province. It assesses the efficacy of dialogue as an intervention in transforming political conflict among young people and averting a degeneration into violence. Contextual data from a survey, individual in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions provided talking points for dialogical engagement between young supporters of the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and leading opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) parties.

This thesis therefore advances that political conflicts and violence among young party cadres driven by social, economic, and political factors are characteristic of Zambia's current political landscape. A male-perpetrated phenomenon, it is immortalised by young PF and UPND supporters with some of the political elites bearing the culpability for their recruitment and financing their actions. The thesis further establishes youth as indispensable actors in Zambia's nascent democracy and their involvement in the dialogue process as timely. Inspired by the coexistence of or pluralistic approach to intergroup contact, the process encouraged mutual understanding, tolerance, and appreciating commonalities and diversities between young supporters from the two parties.

The thesis also contributes to illuminating PAR and dialogue's transformative value. While the intervention in Kalulushi signaled the dawn of some semblance of peace and coexistence between young PF and UPND supporters, immediate and long-term outcomes have a bearing on personal, social, relational, and structural transformation. The dialogical engagement yielded a collaborative guiding framework for action – an implementation platform to garner a greater youth voice in improving inter-party relations and synergies. Sustained relational contact would contribute meaningfully to structural change within the polity by deconstructing 'enemy' images and accounts and conversely constructing shared meanings and narratives. Overall, the study has demonstrated the potential of PAR's viability to facilitate dialogue and transformation at different levels of society.

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my parents, Mrs. Margaret Kangwa Mukosa Mukunto (1956 – 2008) and Mr. Ackim Wellington Mukunto, for igniting the peace vocation in me, and my wife, Audrey Kalonga Mukunto, for unconditional love and support during this arduous undertaking.

Acknowledgements

I wish to first and foremost thank my supervisor, Professor Geoffrey Thomas Harris, for providing me with valuable, consistent, and unwavering support and feedback during my study at DUT. I am also grateful to DUT through the academic and administrative staff of the School of Management Sciences, Department of Public Management and Economics, for providing me with the space to do my doctoral studies through the International Centre on Nonviolence (ICON). I am in particular thankful to the ICON Director, Crispin Hemson, deputy head of the peacebuilding programme, Dr Sylvia Kaye, and administrator, Prashna Hansjee, for their support without which my studies would not have been possible.

I am grateful to my employers, the Copperbelt University (CBU) through the Staff Development Committee for awarding me a three-year study leave and special research fellowship enabling me to successfully complete my PhD studies. Additionally, I am thankful to the Staff Development Officer, Ms. Hildah Chellah, for her time and patience in attending to all my study- and upkeep-related queries. At the Dag Hammarskjöld Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (DHIPS), I am indebted to the current head, Professor John Bwalya, who not only inspired me to pursue a PhD but remained committed to ensuring that my studies were hurdle-free. Thank you for your support, knowledge, and valuable counsel during this undertaking.

During my field research in Kalulushi constituency, I was fortunate to receive assistance from several people, in particular from my assistant, Mr. Isaac Mwansa, and research team members for their time during data collection and generous advice making the study possible. I am also grateful to the office of the Area Member of Parliament (MP), Hon. Kampamba Mulenga Chewe, for all the necessary support, and young supporters and senior party leaders from the MMD, PF, and the UPND for their time and support as part of my key informants. The Kalulushi Municipal Council through the Town Clerk's office merit appreciation for providing space for dialogue sessions.

Deepest gratitude to my wife; our children, Musonda Comfort Mukunto and Bukata Grace Mukunto; nephew, Temwani Mayuni; and niece, Christine Mayuni, for their encouragement, understanding, and endurance during my long absence.

Lastly, I am grateful to the almighty God for giving me the strength to carry forward with my studies.

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List of Acronyms

ACLED	: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
ANC	: African National Congress
CBU	: The Copperbelt University
CCZ	: Council of Churches in Zambia
DRC	: Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUT	: Durban University of Technology
ECZ	: Electoral Commission of Zambia
EFZ	: Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia
FDD	: Forum for Democracy and Development
FGD	: Focus Group Discussion
IEP	: Institute for Economics and Peace
KAYED	: Kalulushi Alliance for Youth Empowerment and Dialogue
LAZ	: Law Association of Zambia
LPI	: Life and Peace Institute
MCDSS	: Ministry of Community Development and Social Services
MMD	: Movement for Multiparty Democracy party
MNGRA	: Ministry of National Guidance and Religious Affairs
NGO	: Nongovernmental Organisation
NIMD	: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
PAR	: Participatory Action Research
PF	: Patriotic Front
SVA	: Conflict Structural Vulnerability Assessment
UN	: United Nations
UNIP	: United National Independence Party
UPND	: United Party for National Development
ZANU-PF	: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZCCB	: Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops
ZCID	: Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue
ZSA	: Zambia Statistical Agency

Chapter One:

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction

Since its return to multi-party politics in 1991, Zambia has sought to settle a myriad of political issues using dialogue. From 1991, Christian churches facilitated the process between the then ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and the newly formed, pro-democracy party Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to the National Dialogue Act. No.1 of 2019, through which the efficacy of dialogue has been tested. Dialogue has, to varying degrees, reinforced smooth political transitions as the 1991 case attests, but has also polarised the Zambian polity, as discussed later following the enactment of the 2019 Act. However, dialogue as a conflict-handling and relationship-building mechanism is neither unhealthy nor health-giving. When applied well with firm adherence to the necessary principles, it can be a constructive tool, and if employed devoid of these basics, the results can irrefutably be negative.

Prior to the enactment of the National Dialogue Act, attempts in 2018 to mount a national dialogue process within the Zambian polity had not yielded the anticipated outcomes. Conversations around the convener have been particularly controversial, sluggish, and have ground to a halt. Although the credibility of a convener is crucial to circumvent perceptions of bias (Siebert 2014); Stigant and Murray (2015: 139); Goswami (2017: 80), exchanges that characterised pre-dialogue were needlessly protracted. Beyond the convener, the effectiveness of national political dialogue hinges to a greater extent on that which Stigant and Murray (2015) explain as providing space for all key groups with divergent interests to participate. An inclusive dialogue process carries the potential to illuminate and address fundamental drivers of the conflict between the parties involved.

The call then is for the materialisation of all key stakeholders' needs and aspirations. National dialogue-driven political settlements that are seen as elitist, as Hartmann (2017: 5) contends, will only limit the achievement of peace dividends such as

socio-cultural relations, coexistence, political tolerance, unity, harmony, peace, and the respect of human rights. Thus, in contexts such as Zambia, the national dialogue process which includes sections of society considered as peripheral, including young people, is essential.

1.2 Background to the Study

While it is not strange for some senior leaders from political parties to communicate civilly when dealing with dissent, young people are seldom socialised to do so. For the latter, political differences or conflicts are synonymous with violence. The evidence suggests that these young party cadres handle their disputes using violence resulting in physical assaults, injury, and loss of life (Namaiko and Etyang 2017; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017). Thus, the political socialisation of the current cohort of young people is devoid of peace-oriented mechanisms of dealing with or handling political conflicts.

In the Copperbelt Province, for example, during the 2016 general elections, five towns were "conflict hot spot locations" involving 20 or more incidents (Namaiko and Etyang 2017: 15). These areas include Luanshya, Mpongwe, Kalulushi (study area), Kitwe, and Ndola. Beyond the general elections, relations between youth cadres from different political parties have remained antagonistic, as evidenced by cases of violent engagements during by-elections. For example, by-elections held in February 2019 in Sesheke constituency, Western Province, were characterised by severe clashes and injuries between cadres from the UPND and PF. In Luanshya's Roan constituency, during electoral campaigns for by-elections held in April 2019, cadres from the PF were accused of attacking members of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). One of the youth leaders from the NDC died, prompting Zambia's Human Rights Commission (HRC) to demand for the arrest of the perpetrators (Muleya 2019).

It is undeniable that Zambia's young political party cadres are associated with political conflicts, electoral violence, and intolerance of divergent political views. Further, during the electoral campaigns of 2016, as observed earlier, youth were actively involved in the massive destruction of their political opponents' campaign materials. They participated in the inter-party fights that marred the campaigns and created anxiety

among the voters. As some observers note, the violent outlook of politics has a negative bearing on ordinary citizens' participation in the electoral process, ultimately resulting in low voter turnout (Yezi 2013; Zambia Election Information Centre 2016).

However, despite the fact that political conflicts and their emergent violent outlook may seem impenetrable, cases of dialogue's power to transform situations abound. Dialogue's uniqueness as a process lies in that which Schirch and Campt (2007: 7) describe as drawing participants' attention to listening for understanding, in other words, paying attention with the intent to appreciate the other party's perspective rather than simply to rebut it. The polity is no exception to this fact. Young people in particular may not have been fully exposed to the tenets of dialogue but they undeniably deserve immersion in this process. The tutelage of those who have employed dialogue among young people is imperative. They argue that for young people to feel empowered to deal with social issues and conflicts with which they are faced in their contexts, they should not merely engage with the problems but with each other (Ungerleider 2012: 382).

In the case of Zambia, the call for this engagement may have been long overdue. As early as 2013 and 2018, various sections of the Zambian polity have called on players to dialogue. The earlier calls were premised on creating positive opportunities for young people to grow their interest and contribute to political dialogue through youth-centered forums, events, television, and radio programming (International Youth Foundation 2014: 29). Similarly, latter calls revolved around constitution reforms; institutional reforms/challenges; electoral reform; and the need to institutionalise a culture of dialogue, tolerance, civility, and respect for basic freedoms (Yezi 2013: 32; Gambari 2017). Therefore, this study was conceived not only as a contribution to accomplishing these 'national' aspirations but also to kindle a sense of duty among young political party supporters in Kalulushi constituency. As such, it is imperative to clearly explain the core problem steering this research.

1.3 Research Problem

Political party cadres, especially young people, are becoming increasingly unruly to the extent that they have no regard for law enforcement agents. They are now prime drivers

of political and election-related violence. Since the 2011 elections, Zambia has witnessed high levels of political intolerance and hostilities among the political players, civil society organisations, and sections of the media (Yezi 2013; Zambia Election Information Centre 2016). Unfortunately, young unemployed males with limited knowledge of civic duties, obligations, or responsibilities within the polity typically take the front line. Despite their significance as a proportion of the population, they are disengaged from participating in the political process and governance.

During the 2016 general elections, three deaths and many injuries were reported during electoral campaigns. Local observers' coverage revealed daily levels of two to three cases of violence between two 'rival' political parties, the PF and UPND. Currently, that which is evident is that there is a lack of political tolerance and 'civil' engagement among young party members, especially from these two parties. Therefore, through this research project, a space was created for young party supporters from the PF, UPND, and one member from the newly formed DP to engage constructively in a dialogical process. This opportunity enabled the participants to appreciate political tolerance and coexistence through dialogue.

This process and practice, as Dessel, Rogge and Garlington (2006: 304) write, brings individuals and groups together to explore societal issues on which their views differ, often to the extent that polarisation and conflict occur. With Zambia's next general elections to be held in 2021, the need for dialogical engagements to curb that which the International Youth Foundation (2014: 29) describes as negative assumptions, suspicion, and bitterness, is large. This is reinforced by the need for full political participation as well as bringing to light issues that may keep the polarisation afloat.

1.4 Motivation for Research

Broadly, the motivation to undertake this project is twofold. First, the transformation of young people's involvement in political conflicts and violence cannot be realised through externally prescribed solutions. Their active participation and contributions in re-orienting their circumstances and destiny is crucial. Thus, with the choice of Participatory Action Research (PAR) as the project's research design, young political party supporters are

empowered to be 'architects of their own destiny'. The choice of PAR is further premised on its holistic and practical conformation. It is an approach that is in keeping with Johnson's (2017: 4) approach to the action and transformation of research participants as well as the conditions and contexts that impact their daily lives. Further, it is consistent with the study's envisaged long-term outcome of averting political conflicts among young people from degenerating into violence by questioning their realities and struggles.

Second, to maximise dialogue's potential, Stigant and Murray (2015: 2) emphasise that all key interest groups should be invited to participate. These include traditionally excluded groups such as youth and women. Their non-participation would negatively affect their appreciation of the benefits associated with the dialogue process. For example, scarcely three weeks after the national political and reconciliation dialogue was launched in 2019, parliamentary by-elections in the Sesheke District of Western Province witnessed unprecedented incidences of election violence. This calls into question whether party stalwarts from the PF and UPND who took centre-stage in the violence were party to and/or appreciated the national political and reconciliation dialogue.

If the Sesheke skirmishes are to be considered, formal engagement between young PF and UPND party loyalists in Kalulushi constituency is essential. This is particularly crucial in light of Zambia's next elections in 2021, as election violence erodes credibility in the rule of law (Zambia Election Information Centre 2016: 31). Further, the general lack of qualitative participation of young people in Zambia's leadership and governance reinforces the undertaking of this project in Kalulushi.

1.5 Research Aim and Questions

While heightened calls for dialogue among political stakeholders dates back to 2013, seldom do such appeals specifically impress upon young party stalwarts given their role in keeping political violence afloat. Therefore, the overall aim of this project is to assess the role of dialogue in transforming political conflicts among young people and avert a degeneration into violence. Consistent with this goal are two key questions which merit answers.

First, from blocking traffic to damaging public properties and the killing of political opponents, young males have become prime agents of political and election-related violence. The current trend noted by observers and election monitoring organisations, such as the Commonwealth (2016) and Zambia Election Information Centre (2016), is that any violent confrontation by youth from one political party is engendered from those from another. Therefore, this project's initial inquiry is *what is the 'nature, extent, causes, and consequences' of politically motivated violence among young people in Zambia and Kalulushi constituency in particular*?

Second, among the stakeholders who dutifully called for national dialogue in 2019 are the three church mother bodies specifically, the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), and the Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB). They have described dialogue as a moment of grace and an opportunity for self-appraisal as a nation and a call for the conversion of hearts, in other words, a national (beyond political parties) and an all-inclusive process seeking the genuine transformation of hearts, governance systems, and procedures so as to promote unity, respect for human rights, and peace for all (Lungu, Kalembo and Mususu 2018). Thus, the second question during this project is *how effective can dialogue be in transforming politically motivated violence and reducing incidences of violence between young people from different political parties in Kalulushi constituency*?

1.6 Scope and Delimitation of the Study

The scope of this study will take into account the views and perspectives of both employed and unemployed youth; youth enrolled in tertiary institutions or who have completed tertiary education; members and non-members of political parties; young business men and women operating from local market spaces; community- and church-based youth; and taxi (cab) and mini bus drivers. To guarantee a well-structured purposeful sampling, Umar and Madugu (2015) argue that the population should be properly identified and defined to include its characteristics and categories to avoid the inclusion of non-relevant elements. Thus, the estimated study population was approximately 15,000 young people aged between 15 and 35 as the country's national youth policy prescribes (Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015).

This study is limited to a small town called Kalulushi and Kalulushi constituency in particular in Zambia's Copperbelt Province. The district which borders Mufulira town to the North-East, Kitwe to the East, Chingola to the North, and Lufwanyama to the West, was previously part of Kitwe before attaining its municipality status in 1992 (Kalulushi District Planning Unit 2019). It was selected not only for its youthfulness in terms of young women at the helm of both local government and parliamentary seats, but it is also not devoid of violence. Some young political party cadres have been arrested and detained for allegedly attacking political opponents prior to the August 2016 general elections (Mweetwa 2016). Others have been reported to be involved in clashes whenever there are public gatherings by their political opponents. This study is further narrowed to seven administrative locations (wards) of Kalulushi central, namely, Dongwe, Kafue, Kalanga, Kalungwishi, Luapula, Lubuto, and Ngweshi.

It is recognised that senior political leaders encourage and motivate political violence by youth. This study is restricted to senior leaders from three earmarked political parties, namely, the PF, UPND, and MMD, and young party supporters from PF and UPND in the seven wards. As key informants, these participants were critical in the preliminary survey data collected prior to the intervention with youth. Bearing in mind these delimitations, the next section outlines the research plan as executed in Kalulushi constituency between May 2019 and January 2020.

1.7 Research Plan

The study was a community-based participatory action research looking at principles, strategies, and other aspects of dialogue that can be utilised in ameliorating political conflicts among young people. Theoretically, it is anchored on Allport's (1954) contact and Lederach's (2003) conflict transformation theories. Allport's theory suggests mutual interdependence, common goals, equal status, informal and interpersonal contact, multiple contact with other group members, and social norms as necessary conditions for the realisation of 'broad based contact' between parties in conflict. On the other hand, Lederach has proposed that transformation is inevitable at four levels – personal, relational, structural, and cultural in order to build peace. While the foregoing frameworks provide theoretical reinforcement to the overall study, as a mixed methods and PAR propelled project, the diagrammatic presentation in Figure 1.1 shows the stages of the

research. PAR is a highly collaborative, reflective, experiential, and participatory mode of inquiry in which Lune and Berg (2017: 137) argue that all individuals involved in the study are deliberate and contributing actors in the research enterprise. Thus, while the diagram presents the execution of the intervention as linear, the actual implementation of this project was iterative and multifaceted.

A research support and advisory team of five young males and one female with varied expertise in youth issues, constituted at the start of the fieldwork, remained valuable throughout the project. The role of this team was to collaboratively work with the researcher in implementing the intervention, overseeing the implementation, and evaluating the immediate outcome through consultations held fortnightly. Consulting and working with young people from the project area are not only an appreciation of their capacity to reflect, learn, and support positive change, but fulfil a key PAR tenet.



Figure 1.1: Research plan diagrammatical presentation (Source: Author, 2020).

1.8 Thesis Overview

This thesis examines the efficacy of dialogue as an intervention in transforming young peoples' involvement in political conflict in Kalulushi constituency of Zambia's Copperbelt province. Despite the polarising and ruinous effects that political conflicts and the ensuing violence carry, very little and often no attention is given to the utility of dialogue, especially by young politicians. This chapter has provided the background to the study, the research problem, the motivation for carrying out this project, as well as the research aim and questions. However, two aspects merit particular reiteration – the problem that necessitated this research and the researcher's motivation to undertake this project. First, while the majority of young unemployed youths tend to take the front line in perpetuating political and electoral violence, they seldom participate qualitatively in the political process and governance. Second, the researcher subscribes to the theory of change that places subjects at the centre of any transformation agenda. Thus, realisation of the research aim, to a very large extent, hinges on the collaborative efforts of the researcher and young people from political parties. This chapter has laid the foundation from which subsequent chapters will further demonstrate how the project, as a PAR-driven initiative, was practically carried out. The remainder of the thesis is split into nine chapters.

Drawing from existing literature, Chapters two, three, and four provide syntheses of relevant literature on the key variables of this study, political conflicts, peace, and dialogue. Globally, evidence suggests that most conflicts are violent, inflicting life-long injuries on their victims apart from the loss of lives. Both state and non-state actors, including young people, employ violence to influence political changes or to consolidate their positions against other competitors (Olaosebikan 2010; Barber 2013; Umar 2016; ACLED Analysis 2017; Ojok and Acol 2017; Okafor 2017; Paalo 2017). There is also recent evidence from Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe of Young people's central role in the politics and violence equation (Adigwe 2013; Mude 2014; Akpan 2015; Mac-Ikemenjima 2017; Paalo 2017).

From the literature, it is also clear that violent elections as an offshoot of political violence have had depressing outcomes. For example, between 2009 and 2018, election-

related fatalities in Africa ranged between five and 3,000, while other related incidences such as displacements were between 75 and 500,000 (Salehyan *et al.* 2012; Adullahi 2013; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2013; Isola 2018). Further, young people's penchant for political violence is associated with four generic factors, namely, unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, leadership and governance challenges, failure to appreciate the complexity of politics, and marginalisation and exclusion (Cillers and Schunemann 2013; Mude 2014; Musinguzi 2014; Akpan 2015; Berckmoes 2015; Abba and Imam 2016; Kanyangara 2016; Umar 2016; Guzura, Dube and Madziwanzira 2017; Namaiko and Etyang 2017).

With regards to approaches to peace, several perspectives have been advanced on its realisation. There are philosophical, sociological, and political precepts that reinforce the cultivation of peaceful relations between individuals, groups, and societies in general (Galtung 1976; Schirch and Campt 2007; Brewer 2013; Zelizer and Oliphant 2013; Institute for Economics and Peace 2014). There is scholarly evidence that shows that since the 1980s, there have been conflicts that have ended through peace agreements including dialogical engagements (Jeong 2010; Fisas 2016). Further, the literature provides that dialogue is not a mere exchange of words, but deep communication aimed at cultivating mutual understanding, trust, and positive power relations. It is a relationship-enhancing mechanism (Freire 1993; Schirch and Campt 2007; Jeong 2010; Feller and Ryan 2012; Svensson and Brouneus 2013; Escobar, Faulkner and Rea 2014; Taylor and Kent 2014).

In addition, extant literature shows that the efficacy of national dialogue processes is anchored on core features: inclusiveness; joint ownership; active listening; empathy and humanity; transparency and public participation; mutuality; convener's credibility; inclusive agenda; structure, rules, and procedures; as well as mechanisms for implementing outcomes. The practice of intergroup dialogue in particular should be affixed on four steps: forming and building relationships, exploring differences and commonalities of experience, exploring and discussing burning subjects, and action planning and alliance building (Dessel, Rogge and Garlington 2006; Nagda, Chesler and

Cytron-Walker 2007; Nagda *et al.* 2012; Siebert 2014; Stigant and Murray 2015; Goswami 2017).

In Chapter five, the focus is on PAR as the overarching research framework. As part of the exploratory phase of this blueprint, participants were asked during the survey for their preferred intervention to assist young people from different political parties to refrain from violence. When asked to select two priority initiatives from a list of five, most (N = 341) of the respondents opted for dialogue as opposed to alternatives to violence training. Further exploratory efforts included checking and sharing with members of the researcher's research support team, results from the survey, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions for their affirmation. Not only did the team proceed along with the findings, but they also collaboratively worked with the researcher in planning dialogue sessions including providing comments on the agenda outline (content and actual timetabling).

Dialogue sessions were run drawing from Freire's (1993) problem posing education and learning based on inquiry, reflection, and analysis from the participants' knowledge, experience, and perspectives. For example, plenary presentations during the three-hour daily sessions were interspersed with small group activities comprising young people from different political parties. These activities also included action planning and alliance planning carried out during the last two days of the intervention. Finally, the evaluation of the short-term outcome was carried out twice. First, there was a meeting (held one week after the sessions) by the participants to consolidate their action plans and the researcher was invited. Observations during the meeting gave the researcher a formative sense of their commitments. Second, the final meeting that the researcher had with the research support team was equally instructive on the appraisal of the immediate results of the intervention.

As explained in Chapter six, methodologically this study utilised a mixed methods research approach. Data was collected both quantitatively (survey) and qualitatively (interviews and focus group discussions – FGDs) during the exploratory phase. This approach not only helped in checking qualitative findings against quantitative results, but as Flick (2015: 217) notes, qualitative data enabled the researcher to interpret the

relationships between variables in the quantitative dataset. For instance, young peoples' susceptibility to being manipulated by senior political leaders, as the interviews and FGDs revealed, explicated the high unemployment levels and their (young people's) proclivity to violence. Further, consistent with the tenets of PAR, during the FGDs, discussion guides were translated into a common local dialect to encourage broader participation, and at the end of each FGD, a summary of key issues and concerns was reviewed for confirmation by all the participants.

In Chapter seven, the PAR process is evaluated as mounted during the project tenure, sharing how the four basic steps were carried out including the benefits that accrued from the proposed intervention. Apprised by the experience of running dialogue sessions, Chapter eight explains the practicability of dialogue, peace, and coexistence in Kalulushi constituency. Chapter nine is a synthesis of the findings, feedback, and lessons from the research support team regarding participants' commitment to action and future plans. The final chapter is a synoptic evaluation of the findings and intervention outcomes, personal reflections following the implementation of the project, and suggestions for future interventions or studies.

Chapter Two:

VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICTS

2.1 Introduction

One of the challenges to internal peace consolidation and conflict prevention in the 21st century are intra-state wars including state-based, non-state-based, and deadly assaults on civilians. These are conflicts that occur within the borders of a state, and the era of intra-state conflicts appears to be ever-present. It involves two or more ethno-cultural or political groups that feel differently to each other. While violence is not an inherent aspect of conflict, it is a potential form that conflict may take. Unfolding events globally suggests that most conflicts are violent, inflicting life-long injuries on their victims apart from the monumental loss of lives (Olaosebikan 2010).

Conversely, political conflicts in Africa and Zambia in particular are no exception. They equally have a greater propensity to turn violent and/or end in violence. Notably, World Bank (2018) studies suggest that violent conflict is now occurring in middle-income countries as well as in both low-income countries and fragile contexts. For other observers of conflict change and escalation, political violence is not limited to countries experiencing civil wars or large-scale insurgencies. They report that a number of countries across the continent experience lower yet sustained rates of armed conflicts, as state and non-state actors employ violence to influence political changes or consolidate their positions against other competitors.

Today, it is an undeniable fact that political parties' contest for power is essentially contentious and the use of violence, especially during electoral campaigns, is predictably common. In short, party politics devoid of violence are correspondingly infrequent. Therefore, this chapter leans more towards violent political conflicts, that is, understanding violence; appreciating the connection between violence and politics, especially in Africa; and a broader reflection on young people's association with political violence. The latter discussion touches on the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of violent political conflicts or, more aptly, political violence vis-à-vis young people.

However, it is imperative to explain the meaning of conflict as well as look at some of the responses to conflict.

2.2 Understanding Conflict

Theories on conflict including its definition abound with varying foci. Allan (2007), citing pioneering sociologists such as German-born Lewis Coser, advances that conflict is a normal, functional part of human society and relationships, and that parties in a conflict are struggling to achieve something but employ different ways of reaching this goal. This struggle may oscillate around a myriad of issues including values, scarce resources, status, and power. He adds that the different avenues that participants employ create opportunities for negotiation and the emergence of different forms and heights of conflict.

Other earlier writers on conflict, such as Hocker and Wilmot (1978: 21), complement this description by noting that conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two independent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others as impediments to achieving their goals. Pruitt and Hee-Kim (2004) define conflict as the perceived divergence of interests, the incompatibility of parties' aspirations, and the belief that if one party obtains that which it wants, the other (or others) should not do so. A significant characteristic brought to the fore that is not illuminated in Allan's description is the perceptual element which is crucial in the change of any given conflict. In other words, if parties in a conflict see their differences as mutually exclusive then it will undoubtedly take a destructive trajectory.

Some of the contemporary definitions uphold the incompatibility and competitive aspects of a conflict. Miller and King (2005: 22), for example, posit that conflict is derived from the Latin word *confligere* which means 'to clash or engage in a fight', a confrontation involving one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Further, conflict is seen as a clash between antithetical ideas or interests within a person or involving two or more persons, groups, or states, according to Berghof Foundation (2012: 10), pursuing mutually incompatible goals and that, as with all social phenomena, conflicts tend to carry a complex outlook and may emerge on different levels

– intra-personal, inter-personal, and run across all layers of society. The latter suggests social, economic, cultural, as well as political tiers that may even culminate into violence.

Using political lenses, for some, conflict is seen as widespread, taking on various forms: inter-political party violence over election results, attempts by politicians to cling to power indefinitely, attempts by political actors to use ethnic and religious divides to harass opposition groups, a means of attaining power, corruption, and mismanagement and discrimination in the allocation of national resources (Boateng 2016: 105). Others see political conflicts as driven by the need to alter the political, economic, or cultural structures that govern life (Barber 2013: 338). Consistent with this endeavour, political violence is an outgrowth of political conflicts as those seeking change politically seldom circumvent it. Thus, Paalo (2017: 4) asserts that political violence is the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation or influenced by political matters. It encompasses, but is not limited to, violence against civilians or political rivals as well as violent demonstrations.

In this study, a conflict is understood as encompassing parties' (individually or as a collective) perception of incompatibilities in terms of goals and the scarcity of resources, and violence as a means of expressing parties' differences. As noted earlier, violence is central in this understanding. As the World Bank (2018: 19) notes, once a country or a society is on a violent path, changing the trajectory becomes difficult and becomes more difficult with time. However, within peace and conflict studies literature, there are suggested responses to violent conflicts. The next section looks at some of these responses.

2.3 Responses to Conflict

The failure to acknowledge that conflict is an inevitable part of the human experience is that which leads some disputing parties to respond with violence. The efficacy of a response to a greater extent hinges on the participation of the primary (directly involved) parties in conflict. In his evaluation of the various responses to conflict with regards to the degree of participation by the parties, (Assefa 1999) argues that on a continuum, one end has force, where participation is low, and the other end has reconciliation, where parties'

involvement is high. In between, there is adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation. Thus, as parties move from force to reconciliation, their level of mutual participation in finding a solution to their differences increases, as depicted in Figure 2.1.

The use of force stifles any hope of making peace as the incompatibilities between the parties is suppressed as opposed to being articulated and allowing for nonviolent strategies to be applied. As a means of conflict management, force is defined by Miller and King (2005: 35) as the application or threat of coercion within the context of international relations, is usually associated with military weapons and personnel, and that a minimum force should only be applied if properly sanctioned through internationally accepted mechanisms.



Figure 2.1: Spectrum of responses to conflict (Source: Assefa 1999).

Force, according to Weeks (1992), in his evaluation of five popular (but ineffective) approaches to conflict resolution, is a conquest approach, where one party pushes its way and controls the outcome. Such a response to a conflict situation suggests that one party should be correct while the other is incorrect, and sets in a power configuration of who is powerful, in short, using power against the other party.

At a microlevel, in the use of force (or more aptly, violence) in the expression of conflict by, for example, young political players, pressure and coercion are necessary. With the win-lose outcome, this in turn creates the yearning for revenge. Therefore, as discussed later in this thesis, the application of force or violence is seeminlgy the norm in responding to political conflicts. In contrast to force, Assefa looks at three other responses – adjudication, arbitration, and negotiation. Drawn together under the goal of *conflict management*, these reactions to conflict slightly increase parties' participation. For example, adjudication is defined as a process where parties have a chance to present their case to be heard and submit their positions for why their desired solution should be the basis upon which the final outcome is based. However, the adjudicator makes the final decision on the outcome of the process, thereby curtailing the parties' increased participation.

Second, arbitration, according to Miller and King (2005: 16), is a mechanism of resolving conflicts where the disputants identify their grievances and demands, fix a procedural process, and willingly submit the decision of outcomes, which are to be final and binding, to an external entity. A third party is presented with arguments and facts from both sides upon which the final decision will be based. The parties' increased participation in finding a solution to their problem lies in their acceptance of the arbitrator as well as the pre-established procedures and ultimately the outcome. Third, negotiation is a response to conflict where the disputing parties agree to solve their problems by talking about their concerns face-to-face and working together to find a solution that is mutually acceptable. It is a structural process of 'dialogue' between disputing parties regarding aspects on which their opinions differ.

Conflict management, as a goal in conflict, is described as a process that tends to focus more on mitigating or controlling the destructive consequences that emanate from a given conflict than on finding solutions to the underlying issues causing it (Assefa 1999). However, according to Kyrabill (2001), managing a conflict implies suppressing a conflict. In other words, it suggests to keep conflict and its expression within acceptable parameters such as regulating people's reactions and expressions of anger, keeping matters pleasant on the surface while deeper issues must be addressed. He argues that

the implication of conflict management is that conflict follows a certain configuration which can be controlled, directed, and manipulated. However, he claims that this assertion is inadequate because human behaviour cannot be predicted and directed.

The other goal in conflict that encompasses mediation and reconciliation in addition to adjudication and negotiation, as advanced by Assefa (1999), is *conflict resolution*. It is an approach that aims at going beyond mitigating the consequences and attempts to resolve substantive and relational root causes such that the conflict comes to an end. However, Kyrabill (2001) argues that resolution may suggest the absence or eradication of conflict as the goal, but that it is rarely possible or desirable to completely close up a conflict even when one resolves specific parts of it. Furthermore, Lederach's informative approach is that, at its core, the language of resolution suggests finding a solution to a problem and directs one's thinking towards bringing some unpleasant set of events to an end (Lederach 2003).

Parties' increased participation occurs through the primary responsibility that they carry for the resolution of their conflict. However, parties can do much more than merely banish their differences. Supposedly, value can be added to these approaches when parties in a conflict scale their resolution up by one notch, reconcile, and start their lives anew. Reconciliation, the final stage from Assefa's spectrum and where the level of parties' involvement in finding a solution is high, is defined as new relationships that emerge as a consequence of all the steps taken from adjudication to mediation (Assefa 1999). Reconciliation not only tries to find solutions to the underlying issues in the conflict but, in Assefa's view, works to alter the adversaries' relationships from that of resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony.

It revolves around efforts to transform intense or protracted malevolence among parties previously engaged in a conflict or dispute, as noted by Miller and King (2005: 66), into feelings of acceptance and even forgiveness of past animosities of detrimental acts. From Assefa's spectrum of responses, while negotiation and mediation may be seen as elements that contribute to conflict resolution, together with reconciliation, they play

critical roles in conflict (violence) prevention and transformation. Conflict transformation, as discussed later in this thesis, is critical for this study.

However, for the current discussion, as a goal in conflict, it is equally essential to have a general appreciation of that which it entails. According to Lederach (2003), it is a conflict goal that is premised on constructive change efforts that include going beyond the resolution of specific problems to personal, relational, structural, and cultural alteration. Its scientific underpinning is twofold; first, that conflict is normal in human relationships, and second, that it is a motor of change (Lederach 2003: 5). He adds that conflict transformation is a motivation towards healthy relationships and communities, locally and globally, a witnessing of real change in people's modes of relating. It is the conflict transformation premise and framework that is steering the overarching focus (dialogue) of this study, with substantial and an in-depth reflection in Chapters three and four, in other words, appreciating a paradigm shift from violent interactions to nonviolent engagements based on a full immersion into the breadth and depth of violence within the social and political realms.

2.4 Understanding Violence

Violence is a noun that evokes several explanations in both social and political spheres. One such definition is that it is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation (World Health Organisation 2002: 5). From this definition, the intentionality component is consistent with standard definitions of aggression and violence, in other words, physical and direct thoughts of the application of force, intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something (Littman and Paluck 2015: 80; Brantly 2017: 73).

In the quest to fully appreciate the question of violence and why it ensues in human communities, Beyer (2014) scans several disciplines. From the anthropologist perspective, humanity is fundamentally a peaceful creature and the propensity to warfare is an invention and is sustained by cultural evolution, and the "environment, the stage of

and form of development of society, perhaps influences humans and makes them either more peaceful or prone to warring" (Beyer 2014: 42). Jeong (2000: 67) agrees that human behaviour is affected by a social environment, augmenting that people can be educated to behave differently, since cultural settings have a bearing on patterns of actions as proved by the experiences of non-warring societies. It is this persuasion that behaviour can be re-oriented that drives this study to seek, through dialogue, to transform youth involvement in political conflicts in Zambia.

Reflecting further on violence, Galtung (1990) views it as involving three forms: *direct*, *structural*, or *cultural*. Direct violence, as the name suggests, is more overt and visible, while structural violence is covert and often embedded in society's systems and structures. It is stated that cultural violence entails a line of thought that justifies the application of both the direct and structural forms of violence. Direct violence may have an offshoot type of violence that Fox and Hoelscher (2012: 433) call *interpersonal* or *social violence*, defined as acts of violence committed by individuals or groups. These are conducts that do not reflect an attempt to contest the authority of a state but include assault, murder, gang violence, and communal violence. In the current study, while some of the manifestations of social violence will be discussed, the overarching focus is on violence driven by groups that may have stakes in checking the authority of a state. In his discussion of hacking state violence and cyber space, Brantly (2017: 75) observes that states have a history of violence, that this violence can manifest in many forms, and that for states, violence has political utility. It is essential therefore to look at violence in politics with particular reference to Africa, and Zambia in particular.

2.5 Violence and Politics

It is quite unfamiliar to speak of politics, especially in Africa, without aligning it with some form of violence, overt or covert. From the direct and structural violence briefly described above, two other categories that may be associated with such forms of violence and that feature prominently in politics include political and electoral violence. Political violence may be seen as an indeterminate phenomenon running along most of the political groupings' lifetimes. As Burchard (2015) observes, it is intended to affect a range of political outcomes from specific policy decisions to complete regime change. A

widespread type of political violence is a *coup d'état* often by actors who have no regard for existing laws and targeting the elite by forcefully ejecting them from political power. The execution of political violence is unpredictable and extrajudicial (Burchard 2015: 12).

On the other hand, electoral violence is a subset of political violence and is periodical, linked to the time of elections (Burchard 2015). Electoral violence is different from other types of politicised violence, according to (Burchard 2015: 12), given that executors work within existing electoral frameworks to achieve their ends. They effect change, such as the acquisition of political power, by working within the current and established timelines and their potential targets of violence include voters rather than the elite (Burchard 2015). Stated differently, for example, according to observers such as ACLED Analysis (2013: 7), four features distinguish electoral violence from other forms of violence – motive, timing, actors or perpetrators, and activities.

Several observers view violent electoral occurrences in Africa as occasioned by both strategic and incidental factors. The former, they argue, is about pre-planning and methodical forms of violence driven by young people or party-affiliated militias to influence the outcome of an election (Burchard 2015; Ojok and Acol 2017). An outgrowth of clashes between protesters (including supporters of opposing candidates) and security forces is incidental violence which requires no planning. For some, incidentally- or strategically-triggered election-related violence should be analysed on the basis of its degree of intensity (Bob-Milliar 2014: 142). Thus, what is the extent of political violence?

2.5.1 The Extent of Political Violence

The coverage, degree, and magnitude of political violence is a paradoxical mix of events across several contexts. First, political violence sets off with *violent rhetoric* and *hate speech* from senior leaders before trickling down to the 'rank and file'. Before and after the Nigerian 2011 elections, leading presidential contenders and their supporters from both the southern and northern regions were accused of trading hate speeches. Ezeibe (2013: 83) claims that some of the alleged hate statements included that "Moslems should not be ruled by non Moslems", the "north should go and rest", "power is not their birth right", "to vote a southerner is to Islamize Nigeria", and "Christians cannot be ruled by a non-Christian".

It is probable that no case illustrates the extent of political violence vis-à-vis maintaining the status quo more than the case of Zimbabwe following the harmonised elections of March 2008. Guzura, Dube and Madziwanzira (2017: 13) claim that the government unleashed violence on citizens in an apparent punishment for the 29 March 2008 vote that disappointed ZANU-PF's "majority in the House of Assembly for the first time since independence". The assertions are that prior to a presidential run-off in June 2008, an operation called *wakavhotera ani* (who did you vote for) was mounted by ZANU-PF youth supporters. The operation, which accounted for an alarming 1,170 incidences of political violence, allegedly included acts such as assaults, abductions, killings, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, and the destruction of property.

2.5.2 The Consequences of Political Violence

Chandhoke (2015: 138) describes violence as possessing the uncanny ability to replicate itself in new semblances, "today in the persona of the colonizer, tomorrow in the persona of the new political elite". Therefore, while the Zimbabwean tactics of executing political and electoral violence have their own set of consequences, there are other contemporary effects as well. In other words, political conflicts and the resultant violence have both short- and long-term effects that deserve particular mention. Mac-Ikemenjima (2017) agrees that the magnitude of such violence is normally short-term and restricted to certain regions within a country, but it can also have an extensive and long-standing impact.

It is suggested that the exact cost of a violent conflict should be assessed not by the number of conflict-related fatalities or how long it lasts, but by its "human, social and economic impact" (World Bank 2018: 14), and that while minor intra-state conflicts may be less evident to external observers, they are just as destructive and carry destructive consequences for the population and economies. Electoral violence, according to Abba and Imam (2016: 22), is a deviation from the fundamental principles of democracy which result in, among other effects, "depriving people a voice in governance and nurtures political apathy and indifference of the citizenry". In short, it is an affront to democracy. Burchard describes electoral violence as being inimical to democratic consolidation. She succinctly adds:

> Individual voters, building blocks of democracy, are adversely affected by electoral violence. Electoral violence results in lower levels of democratic satisfaction at the individual levels and those who fear electoral violence exhibit lower levels of trust in relevant actors and electoral institutions (Burchard 2015: 3).

Further, Koko (2013: 79), for instance, argues that as a consequence, election-related violence "undermines democratic institutions as well as diminishing the credibility of institutions (including political parties) responsible for entrenching democracy", a fact that most political parties probably do not realise, especially the cost on their integrity and standing in society. Ezeibe (2013: 79-80), in reflecting on the enormity of post-electoral violence in Africa, condenses it to a "curse on democratic advancement", and Burchard (2015: 20) maintains that electoral violence has a "serious deleterious effect on democratic development". Possibly an obvious and anticipated consequence of political conflicts and violence is death. For example, Table 2.1 shows the estimated fatalities resulting from presidential and national assembly elections-related violence in certain countries.

Table 2.1: Examples of violent elections, 2009-2018.

	Countries	**Election Dates**	**Fatalities**	**Populations Displaced**
1.	Ivory Coast	October/November 2010	3,000	500,000
2.	Nigeria	April 2011/March 2015	898	15,000
3.	Burundi	July 2015	1,400	350,000
4.	Zimbabwe	July 2013/July 2018	31	1,446
5.	Kenya	March 2013/Aug/Oct 2017	503	493
6.	Central African Republic (CAR)	December 2015	1,699	2,000
7.	Mali	July/August 2013	639	75
8.	Liberia	October/November 2011	5	150
9.	Gambia	December 2016	50	200
10.	Gabon	August 2016	50	180

Source: Compiled from Salehyan et al. (2012); ACLED Analysis (2013); Adullahi (2013); Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2013); Sterck (2015); ACLED Analysis (2017); Isola (2018).

In other contexts, studies show that such losses are combined with displacements and the destruction of social networks. Isola (2018) and Sterck (2015), in their respective analyses, show that incidences in Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Burundi occasioned displacements of between 200,000 and 500,000 people fleeing their homes. In the Burundian case, they mostly fled to neighbouring Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The coverage of fatalities and other election-related incidences include pre- and post-election episodes. Other related incidences include, but are not limited to, election-induced displacements of populations (for example, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Burundi); riots, protests, and violent demonstrations; voters and political opponents' intimidations and attacks; and intercommunity clashes. The numbers presented in Table 2.1 are estimates since there are often variances between official (government) figures of fatalities, for instance, and non-state actors' statistics gathered in the field. However, Table 2.1 highlights the prevalence of election violence and the intensity of election-related incidences. The disruption of social networks, for example, is laid on the same 'wavelength' with economic, health, and social welfare costs, as some observers claim.

The World Bank (2018), for example, notes that violent conflicts can undermine confidence in an economy by altering investors' expectations and bringing about possible political risks in carrying out business in a post-conflict context. On the other hand, the World Health Organisation (WHO) contends that violence involving young people increases the "cost of health and welfare services and disrupts a range of essential services in turn weakening the foundation of society" (World Health Organisation 2002: 25). From the foregoing cases, it may be stated that factors that sustain electoral violence at the meso-level in some of Africa's more stable democracies are not explicit. However, election-related violations or troubles that record a death toll of ten or less with no large-scale displacement and dispossession, as Bob-Milliar (2014) argues, would constitute a case of low-intensity electoral violence.

Additionally, the trend of election-related violence has been on an increase since the third wave of democratisation hit the continent of Africa in the 1990s. Along with it,

there has been a growing *culture of political intolerance and violence* among political players. Previously, political and electoral violence by young party loyalists would be associated with incumbents but lately, even opposition parties have quasi-militarised youth members. That which is evident then is that a culture of intolerance and violence has set in, with an emergent trend of 'violent elections' as discussed thus far. This intolerance is manifest in, among other ways, obstructing people from casting their vote as well as blocking probable candidates from taking part in the election.

Höglund and Jarstad (2010) argue that electoral violence can have enduring effects of bringing about disillusionment and frustration with politics among the populace. This would ultimately result in citizens disengaging from politics and civic participation, which in turn has a bearing on the growth and consolidation of democracy. Notably, reflections on electoral violence vis-à-vis the consolidation of democracy also hinge on the agency. Bob-Milliar (2014: 129), for instance, argues that electoral violence is driven by the interaction of three principal agents – political parties, elite groups, and youth groups (or party youth wings). Of the three agents, the third is significant for the current study, hence the need to delve into its connection to political violence.

2.6 Youth and Political Violence

Defining youth conjures social, psychological, as well as age factors. In Mac-Ikemenjima (2017: 216) view, an example of a social definition includes a period of transition, while the psychological description entails "patterns of consumption that distinguishes diverse groups". However, it is the age definition of youth that entails considerable utility. For example, the United Nations places youth between the ages of 15 and 24; the African Youth Charter places youth between 15 and 35 years; and Zambia's Ministry of Youth and Sport, through its National Youth Policy, positions youth between 15 and 35 years of age (Musinguzi 2014; Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015; Mac-Ikemenjima 2017).

Consistent with the Ministry of Youth and Sport, youth is defined in this study as young people between the ages of 15 and 35. Zambia's Central Statistics Office (CSO) projects that the country's population of young people aged between 15 and 34 will be about 5.8 million, representing 33.7% of the national population (Central Statistical Office

2013). With an annual growth rate at 2.8%, the proportion of young people is expected to increase. Thus, with such a sizable share of the country's population, the youth carry the ability that could have a bearing on Zambia's political landscape. In addition, their numerical strength might also be catalytic in advancing matters that affect their welfare.

The association of young people with political violence has been a subject of many scholarly endeavours. Among other aspects highlighted is the indispensability of young people in politics, and their vulnerabilities and manipulation by well-resourced personalities within political circles (Bob-Milliar 2014: 130; Abba and Imam 2016; Dodo, Nsenduluka and Kasanda 2016: 211; Umar 2016: 147). It is stated that throughout the continent of Africa, young people have made valuable contributions to the pre-independence struggles when they served mostly as foot soldiers (Dodo, Nsenduluka and Kasanda 2016). Today, the prevalence of violence among young people is also seen as one of the hallmarks of the African political landscape, and no political violence has ever taken place in Africa without its facilitation on the ground by the youth.

In Okafor's (2017: 2) view, this appears in the form of political thuggery which is seen as the criminalisation of politics. Okafor synthesises political violence in Africa as taking different forms in diverse contexts in the quest to lure youth into such conduct either as hired thugs or mere party members. With this being stated, others place positive accolades on the indispensability of young people in bringing about change. For instance, they have cited the Pan African Movement; the 1945 landmark Manchester Conference; the Veranda boys who assisted in mobilising support for Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah Convention People's Party (CPP); the 1976 Soweto uprising against the apartheid regime in South Africa; and university students protests in Zambia and Malawi, contributing to the emergence of multi-party politics, as all being driven by radical and fearless young people (Resnick and Casale 2014: 1175; Sesay 2014: 21).

An appraisal from extant literature on the nature of political violence as steered by young party stalwarts brings three aspects to the fore. First, political violence is mostly a young male's perpetrated phenomenon. However, a study in Zimbabwe's Mbare and Harare cities revealed that young females do join their male folks largely due to

conscription by the latter (Mude 2014). Additionally, these are young people with limited high school or tertiary education and engaging in violent acts engenders very little rationalisation. For example, Azeng and Yogo (2015: 10) assert that the opportunity cost for an unemployed young person with low levels of education and skills is lower than one with higher levels of education and unemployed.

Second, violence is often indicative of a mere disregard of the law. It is manifest and goes as far as political party youths unlawfully seizing and taking control over facilities of public goods such as markets and bus terminals. The aim is to seek out rent money for themselves and the political elite (Paalo 2017: 7). Paalo adds that such activities have a political and democratic destabilisation effect. Bob-Milliar calls these facilities "patronage objects" enjoyed by the incumbent parties' activists. His study of party foot soldiers from two main parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP), in Ghana reveals that they forcibly took over revenue collection jobs at many public toilets. The NPP foot soldiers where in charge of revenue collection in 2001, while the NPP foot soldiers in 2009 (Bob-Milliar 2014: 137).

Additionally, the violence associated with young people extends to meddling in the electoral process, provocations, thuggery, and the sheer disregard for the law that governs elections. Adigwe (2013) study of young party vigilantes in Nigeria reveals their possible involvement in the snatching of ballot boxes and the rigging of elections. The findings further show that they act as thugs and delight in the protection offered from their political sponsors who, as 'god-fathers', even intervene to seek their release once arrested.

Third, political violence has a bearing on the growth of democracy. In Paalo's (2017: 11) view, the violence perpetrated by political youth wings in the past and in contemporary times threaten the development, stability, and consolidation of democracy and political institutions. In the same vein, as off-shoots of political violence, election-related violent actions perpetrated by young party members include *voters and political opponent's intimidation*, *the seizing of voter cards from perceived opponents*, and *the breaking up of opposition party rallies.* Evidence from Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Uganda

demonstrates that unemployed youths are deployed to intimidate both voters and those (candidates) holding views opposed to those of their respective political parties during elections (Bob-Milliar 2014: 140; Mude 2014; Ojok and Acol 2017).

Perhaps both political and electoral violence is widespread among incumbent parties, as Bob-Milliar suggests, because of their wish to safeguard their positions, access to power, benefits, and sources of livelihoods. To their young party members, this protection entails the use of force. Mac-Ikemenjima (2017: 217) observes that it would seem that a generation of young people has emerged who have not known the alternative to violent elections. This, he suggests, has possibly culminated into a culture of violence which in turn may deter some from voting. Notwithstanding discouragement from voting, this culture of intolerance and violence has the potential to nurture a hostile political environment, an atmosphere that runs counter to free expression and the exchange of political orientations and ideologies. In other words, it is a strike on the core of a country's democracy.

Further, Mac-Ikemenjima's (2017: 221) comparative study of 20 countries from sub-Saharan Africa to assess the link between the fear of violence and voter turnout among youth had seemingly predictable but also startling results. Zimbabwe had the highest proportion at 93.9%, with Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria at 82.3%, 73%, and 72.6%, respectively. From the discussion thus far, these countries have had rather illuminative cases of both political and electoral violence. In the case of Zambia, Mac-Ikemenjima's study reveals 59.7% of those indicating the fear of violence, which is not far off from Ghana, another country widely referred to, in this review, in terms of violence being at 55.2%. The lowest proportion of those that indicated the fear of violence at 18.6% is Botswana.

Another feature of political violence in some contexts is that it is disguised as a crime prevention and/or security provision to both the political elite and the community. In Uganda, for example, Ojok and Acol (2017: 103) note that an armed youth group of 1.6 million comprising mostly unemployed youths under the Ugandan Police Force called crime preventers was blamed for instigating low-intensity violence during the 2016

elections. In Nigeria, according to Adigwe (2013: 48), youth vigilante groups, conceived and set up by the community to protect lives and property, were co-opted into electoral campaigns. Adigwe claims that the aim was to manipulate elections, which in turn has violent outcomes.

Their conscription is twofold. In the case of Uganda, they join based on promises of future employment opportunities in the police force by their recruiters (politicians). This would theoretically be noble in terms of ensuring the security of their communities in the future (Ojok and Acol 2017: 103). On the other hand, the Nigerian youth, through community-initiated crime prevention structures, are co-opted by the political elite who are attracted by their success in combating crime in the community. Adigwe (2013: 48) reports that legislation, as part of legal backing and salaries, is provided to these young vigilantes which in turn shifts the oversight from the community to the politicians.

Thus, the preventive and security responsibility by these young vigilantes is tilted more towards the political elite than their respective communities. With the skill of "political foot soldiers", they exert their energies to ensuring that the preferred political leaders assume party or public office (Bob-Milliar 2014: 131). Bob-Milliar adds that this brand of political activism has features of lawlessness, rendering the divide between contentious politics and more civilised participation blurred. In Nigeria and Kenya, in communities where they exist, the locals' perceptions of these youth vigilante groups are mixed. For some, they are seen as gate keepers and security providers (an appropriate response to communities' lack of security). Yet for others, they are strongly linked to political thuggery, especially during electoral campaigns and the predilection for discriminate violence and harassment, intimidation, and even killing (Maina and Forti 2012: 47; Adigwe 2013).

Aside from gatekeeping and security provision, it is stated that young people are confronted with both structural and institutional circumstances that predispose them to several types of disruptions. Ukeje and Lwilade (2012) note that the 'youth question' and its probable destabilising effect is only coming to the fore now in many contemporary African societies, and that it could possibly be a more dominant framework for explicating undercurrents of social change on the continent superseding ethnicity and religion. Thus,

in looking at the youth and the penchant for political violence, four broad factors are envisaged: *unfavourable socioeconomic conditions*, *leadership and governance challenges*, *not appreciating the complexity of politics*, and *marginalisation and exclusion*.

2.6.1 Unfavourable Socioeconomic Conditions

Akpan (2015) describes these conditions as consisting of, but not being limited to, unemployment, poverty, the lack of good education and institutional structures, and the lack of access to modern facilities that make life worth living. In Zimbabwe, some observers claim that unemployment places the youth at the mercy of 'power hungry' politicians who induce them to take part in political violence. Three leading political parties, ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations in Zimbabwe, are cited as leading in the recruitment of unemployed youth (Mude 2014: 110; Namaiko and Etyang 2017). However, according to Salih (2013: 187), a few rich and corrupt elites may not always take advantage of the extremely poor, frustrated, and numerous youth, but that the latter would inevitably rebel against the former, as was the case with the Arab spring.

For others still, a lack of or limited education, as an indicator of unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, intensifies young people's vulnerability and propensity to handle conflicts violently. Instead of serving as a potent instrument for alleviating and abolishing poverty, limited or the lack of education disenfranchises young people to the point of being pawns in the hands of the political elite (Akpan 2015; Umar 2016). Thus, the need to transform negative socioeconomic conditions is prevalent. Otherwise, as Ojok and Acol (2017) observe, political violence, and election-related violence in particular, will never cease as a feature of African politics. Perhaps, education in the equation of unfavourable socioeconomic settings is best synthesised by Azeng and Yogo (2015: 9) economic hypothesis:

> [C]ountries with high educated people are less prone to political violence. The opportunity cost for an unemployed young person with higher levels of education to be involved in a rebellion or a riot is too high; while opportunity cost would be lower if the person is unemployed with low levels of education skills.

2.6.2 Marginalisation and Exclusion

This section discusses the exclusion and marginalisation of the general youth population. In line with Cillers and Schunemann (2013: 5) assertion, "countries with a relatively large youthful population that is affected by extensive marginalisation tend to be more prone to violence", and sometimes this susceptibility to violence is further exacerbated by limited space to voice out and lay bare the needs and aspirations. For example, political environments where basic structures, in Musinguzi's (2014: 362) view, are not favourable in giving attention to young voices give rise to "risk taking in illicit activities ... anti-regime militancy as seen through violent demonstrations by youths prevalent in Kampala city". Such young people, impatient and willing to push for regime change, if needed, may even be open to radicalisation through violence, as demonstrated by Botha (2014) study in Kenya.

Marginalisation and exclusion is seen as internal and external. The former relates to more specific side-lining within political parties, while the latter applies to the general youth population. A case in point of internal marginalisation, for example, is the agitation by foot-soldiers in Ghana, as submitted by Bob-Milliar (2012: 677). Described as 'neglect' in party jargon, according to Bob-Milliar, this means that "members denied access to the pool of state resources that the incumbent government dispenses to party members and sympathisers". There is an inordinate ambition for public office which in turn serves as a cause for young people resorting to violence, against a backdrop of limited opportunities to access political power. It is stated that many youths move towards violence to be accorded a position after their respective political party wins (Akpan 2015; Kanyangara 2016; Okafor 2017).

Inversely, there are youth from communities that mobilise themselves to advocate for change in matters affecting their welfare. However, it is argued that youth generally tend to be apolitical to issues of local or national governance for various reasons. Some observers see the inertia among young people toward 'civil and social initiatives' as attributable to a lack of awareness and possibly interest. In Kenya, for example, Maina and Forti (2012) claim that youth are either unaware of the existence of the National Youth

Policy and other youth development empowerment initiatives or are misinformed of how such initiatives relate to them.

2.6.3 Leadership and Governance Challenges

The third element that steers political violence among young people is that which the researcher calls 'leadership and governance hurdles'. For example, more often than not, election disputes in a number of countries in Africa, including Zambia, have engendered violent outcomes. In his discourse on the sources of political conflicts and violence in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Kanyangara (2016: 10) argues that countries in the region have been struggling to establish a consensual electoral system which would, inter alia, guarantee a peaceful transfer of power. Thus, as soon as the losing party disputes the election results, cohorts of young people, described by Paalo (2017) as blends of uneducated, unemployed/underemployed, and secondary/tertiary/learned citizens, get into a state of high alert to charge against their opponents.

Another hurdle within the realm of leadership and governance is that young party members seem not to have a substantive role in their organisations, aside from being employed as instruments of violence. A study in Zimbabwe's Makokoba revealed that while youths are active participants in their parties during elections (undertaking door-to-door and road-show campaigns, which carry some degree of violence as well), there is no corresponding involvement in governance after elections (Guzura, Dube and Madziwanzira 2017). It was thus inferred that candidates make use of youth to win elections and afterwards the latter do not gain anything.

There is, to some degree, undue influence and/or manipulation on young party members. For instance, in the case of West Africa, the concept of Godfatherism is relatively common. Godfathers, according to Akpan (2015: 152), are influential politicians who command respect in public because of material possessions, wealth, and charisma. Akpan adds that their actions would range from arming their boys, the snatching of ballot boxes, and where there is opposition to their actions, their actions may even result in the killing and maiming of oppositions. Others further claim that Godfathers remain a factor in the perpetuation of political violence through their financial support rendered to young

people (Okafor 2017: 2). Other critics on the governance and leadership sphere vis-à-vis young people's involvement in political violence argue that beyond general incitement, there is also indoctrination (as gullible followers and receivers of hate messages); abduction; and naïve trust in political leaders who, at times, carry ulterior motives (Olaosebikan 2010; Akpan 2015; Berckmoes 2015; Umar 2016).

2.6.4 The Misconception of Politics

Another factor fueling young peoples' involvement in political violence is that which the researcher refers to as the failure to appreciate the complexity of politics, in other words, their erroneous understanding of what politics is about. Researchers and observers of young people's engrossment in political violence argue that many youths do not understand the meaning of politics. Their rudimentary appreciation is dictated by their political masters who arm them to kill and maim when the election pendulum swings against them. This in turn transforms them into agents of destabilisation, transcending official politics into unconscientious political party foot soldiering or political thuggery, and committing crimes against political opponents (Akpan 2015; Paalo 2017: 2).

Elsewhere, in the researcher's formative modest contribution to this discourse, the researcher has maintained that "the involvement of youths in violence and brutish behaviour does not emerge from their communities, rather, they are oriented into violence by self-centred, heartless, and mendacious political leaders" (Mukunto 2006: 1). This, to a greater extent, is about the socialisation that young party members receive from their respective political parties. According to Umar (2016: 150), as a means of maintaining existing power structures, individuals and political bodies expectedly employ strategies of recruiting marginalised young people and socialising them in the 'norms' of violence.

However, for some such as Oosterom and Pswarayi (2014), in their 'being a born-free' study of Zimbabwe, the youth's participation in politics and violence is influenced by their social background, particularly family and friends. They argue that these two social agents have a strong bearing on young people's attitude towards the political atmosphere in general and violence in particular. Still, while family members and friends socialise young people probably unknowingly, political leaders, as the researcher has contended

earlier, carry ulterior motives – including harassing and silencing their opponents, and the only "disposable population is young people" (Mukunto 2006: 2).

Perhaps one fundamental question in the entire young party members and socialisation equation is the ideological foundation. For instance, are young party stalwarts 'walked through' or are they generally aware of their parties' ideologies? Van Gyampo, from a study of Ghana's fourth republic and appraisal of two major political parties – NPP and NDC supporters, argues that "ideology plays little or no role in determining which party to support and vote for among the youth". Most supporters are either unaware of their party's ideology or are uninformed of their exact "meanings and imperatives". This in turn entails that they are like 'pawns' in the party and "party leaders are at liberty to use and dump them" (Van Gyampo 2012: 158).

Political violence that young people are immersed in seems to have an indeterminate political agenda. Given the aggressive nature of their actions, some have questioned the type of political orientation that they receive (Van Gyampo 2012: 155). The undefined political agenda not only makes them potent apparatuses in the hands of the political elite for effecting violence but also other 'anti-social activities'. These may include, but are not limited to, violent and riotous protests or demonstrations, inter- and intra-political party clashes, kidnappings, arson, hostage taking, and cult-related violence.

While it is expected that these young party stalwarts should serve as conduits between their respective parties and the populace to disseminate party ideals and programmes, the attention is different. The obsession, as extensively covered in this section, is more with devising tactics of striking the next political opponent. However, there are also instances when they have undertaken civil and non-violent acts such as putting pressure on their senior executive members as part of internal democracy as well as anti-government protests (Van Gyampo 2012: 154; Bob-Milliar 2014: 132; Abba and Imam 2016: 22).

2.7 Youth and Political Violence in Zambia

The youth remain indispensable actors in Zambia's growing democracy. Their contributions across the political divide has a bearing on the development or stagnation of democracy. Their association with political violence is particularly and scholarly imperative. Historically, during the post-independence era, in the United National Independence Party (UNIP), young people (often militant) served as foot operatives responsible for 'dealing' severely with the political opponents. Their party functionaries and responsibilities then, among others, were to serve as guardians of moral standards by intervening in any aspect of community affairs (Scott 1976; Chiluba 1995).

Beyond community matters, they were also at the helm of that which Phiri (2001) calls the oppressive card checking campaign, where men and women without UNIP cards were denied access to markets, shops, or public bus rides to and from work. They were above reproach particularly under UNIP's one-party state rule, as argued by Phiri. Those accused of disrespecting the party leadership were punished severely by these young party militants. For example, in the 1960s, leaders and supporters of opposition parties, such as the United Party and the Zambian African National Congress in the Copperbelt and North-Western provinces respectively, were occasionally attacked including their properties (houses) being stoned by UNIP youths (Kashimani 1995: 36; Larmer and Macola 2007: 476).

Perhaps the seed of young party cadres' hooliganism, violence, and militancy may have been sowed during the UNIP's reign. UNIP youth leagues in particular have greatly influenced the political outlook to date. As recent as 1990, just before the dawn of the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia, 'brutal and gangster' traits by these young party cadres were still evident. For example, Phiri (2001) notes that UNIP party militants were permitted to punish anyone accused of disrespecting their party leadership. They were seemingly above reproach as people at places of work, bus terminals, markets, and shops were cruelly intimidated. Phiri cites an incident in January 1990, where a University of Zambia (UNZA) human resource administrator was roughed up and intimidated for relieving a junior staff member who constantly left her workstation to attend party

activities. In young party cadres' view, party matters were more important than university work and as such, the senior staff was wrong and his action warranted punishment (Phiri 2001: 237).

While these are political tactics of post-independence parties such as the UNIP, twenty-first century political parties in new democratic dispensations are not devoid of violence-immersed young party stalwarts. During the country's third republic (1991 to date), albeit under a new wave of democratisation, the negative influence of political party youth league members remained unabated. For example, the meddling in grassroots structures (village/ward development committees) under the guise of the 'decentralisation of power' (Sichone 1996), witnessed during the UNIP era, was a dominant phenomenon under the MMD. Between the mid- to late 2000s, marketplaces and bus stations served as epicenters for clashes between different political parties to the point where one claimed oversight of one station and the other party claimed oversight over another. This oversight, as noted by Hansen (2010), extended to different cadres and factions unlawfully collecting or soliciting levies. This resonates with Bob-Milliar (2014) discussion of NDC and NPP party loyalists' revenue collection from public toilets in Ghana.

However, which factors may be aligned with the youth's propensity to engage in political violence in the case of Zambia? The factors identified elsewhere in Africa, and as shared in the preceding section, are not distant from Zambia's case. First, unfavourable socioeconomic conditions have a bearing on the youth's propensity to political violence. Youth susceptibility to crime and violent conflicts including political violence is strongly associated with high rates of unemployment. For example, in Zambia, three provinces, namely, the Copperbelt, Central, and Lusaka provinces, with the highest rates of youth unemployment accounted for the highest incidences of violent conflicts before and after the 2016 general elections.

Further, one of the points that a 2017 study by the United Nations Development Programme in Zambia revealed is that young people's demographic majority, unemployment, and illiteracy makes them susceptible to being used to engage in violent conflicts (Namaiko and Etyang 2017: 28). While it is possible to have positive

socioeconomic conditions, the focus here is on the unfavourable or negative conditions. According to Twambo and Mbetwa (2017: 4), Zambian youth face that which they call socioeconomic hardships encompassing "HIV and AIDS; high levels of unemployment; drug and alcohol abuse; sexual violence; early marriages; forced labour; human trafficking and gender based violence". These, they claim, render young people to lack a sense of self-worth (self-esteem) to be active (nonviolent) citizens.

Second, the failure to appreciate the complexity of politics from evidence adduced among young party cadres is familiar in Zambia. For some youths from political parties, politics, especially during a time of elections, evoke 'taking the law into their own hands'. Observers of Zambia's 2016 general elections, for example, witnessed incidences of mostly young party cadres from the opposition party UPND intercepting a vehicle transporting ballots and other election materials, and the beating up and harassing of Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) officials in three different towns – Chingola, Ndola, and Lusaka (European Union Election Observation Mission 2016: 36; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017: 4).

Beyond the general elections, relations between youth cadres from different political parties remain hostile, as evidenced by cases of low-intensity violence during electoral campaigns. For example, young party cadres from the PF in Kalulushi were arrested in 2016 following an alleged attack on a group of seven members (party cadres) from the MMD. The latter were ambushed on their return from a campaign rally in the adjacent district, Lufwanyama (Mweetwa 2016).

Third, Zambia is equally not devoid of leadership and governance challenges, as discussed in Section 2.5. For instance, the trend of violent youth wings that was synonymous with the former ruling party MMD, has now spread to today's major political parties including the current ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and the opposition, the United Party for National Development (UPND). Their youth sections invariably remain indispensable in so far as electoral canvasses are concerned. In that which Bwalya (2017: 1554) describes as fiercely competitive electoral campaigns that have characterised Zambia's nascent multiparty political terrain, these youth party cadres are a regular

feature. Evidence from other studies suggests that these cadres are known to carry crude weapons, including guns, publicly and the effects from the violence orchestrated include physical assaults, injury, and the loss of life (Namaiko and Etyang 2017; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017).

The PF and the UPND youth cadres are the front-runners in immortalising electoral violence. In addition, some of the political elites bear the culpability for their recruitment and financing of young party cadres' activities. A conflict structural vulnerability assessment (SVA) commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Zambia after the 2016 elections revealed the centrality of party cadres in propagating violent conflict mostly during elections. That which is noteworthy from this study is that cadres are now becoming militarised (Namaiko and Etyang 2017). The militancy is evident in the intensity of election-related skirmishes. For instance, violent clashes between party cadres from the leading political parties, the PF and UPND, during one of the 2018 ward by-elections held in Chilanga, Lusaka Province, resulted in many injuries, the destruction of property, and death.

Last, not only do these young party stalwarts have a misconception about that which party politics entail, they are apathetic to learning the intricacies of politics. However, according to Sesay (2014: 26), this unresponsiveness is driven by "hostile political, economic and social environment, rigid structural barriers to youth mobility in politics and the economy in many African countries". Thus, the youth's lack of interest or motivation and limited opportunities could all be cited in the case of Zambia as a push aspect towards involvement in political violence. Their unemployment status, coupled with indifference or hostile settings, undeniably increases the susceptibility to manipulation by those with ulterior motives including inciting violence.

Similarly, the clientelistic nature of politics, especially during electoral periods, may as well be responsible for exacerbating the propensity to violence. In his discussion of 'clientelism in the Zambian electoral campaigns', Bwalya (2017: 1556) notes that "material rewards to individuals or groups of people as 'donations' during electoral cycles has been

recurrent". Thus, supporters including young people are eager during each round of elections to be incentivised.

2.8 Violence in Kalulushi Constituency

Generally, young people in Kalulushi have seldom made headlines in either print or electronic media vis-à-vis political and electoral violence. However, results from the surveys, interviews, and focus group discussions in Kalulushi were, to a large extent, confirmatory of that which existent literature provides. For example, survey data revealed that unemployment is often seen as the prime driver of young people's association with politically motivated violence. This is augmented by the perception that politics is a means of livelihood which, in the respondents' views, invariably drives young people to participate in violence, as shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Factors influencing youth involvement in violence.

Factors	Never	Rarely	Often	Not sure
Unemployment	3.5%	9.9%	**79.5%**	7.1%
Exclusion from leadership/governance	8.4%	37.5%	41.0%	13.2%
Politics source of livelihood	8.1%	22.0%	**56.7%**	13.2%
Desire to serve fellow youths	16.5%	49.9%	19.2%	14.4%

Source: Survey data, 2019.

From the data collected and analysed, both youth and senior political leaders are seen as the leading agents in facilitating the participation of young people in political violence, as presented in Table 2.3. The respondents were asked to indicate whether any of the following had happened in their respective communities during the previous 12 months: 'accusations of political leaders sponsoring armed/violent youths', 'allegations of political abductions', 'two political youth groups clashing physically', 'political youths harassing the public/media/journalists', or 'political youths pledging to defend their leaders using force'.

As a multiple response measurement, respondents were free to select all that applied in their context. According to survey respondents, two occurrences in the communities stood out: first, physical clashes between youth groups from the PF and

UPND, and second, the same young people pledge to defend their leaders using force and these incidences, as it was reported, are only widespread during electoral campaigns including post-election encounters albeit in isolated contexts. It was evident from both the face-to-face interviews and FGD findings that there is a growing trend of election violence. This is based on participants' experiences during campaigns prior to and after general elections including by-elections held thus far.

Table 2.3: Youth political violence agents.

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Agents	Youth political leaders	322	30.4%	**81.5%**
	Parents or Guardians	26	2.5%	6.6%
	Senior political leaders	341	32.2%	**86.3%**
	Peers or Friends	197	18.6%	49.9%
	College Union leaders	126	11.9%	31.9%
	Police Officers	48	4.5%	12.2%
Total		**1060**	**100.0%**	**268.4%**

Source: Survey data, 2019.

Of the six roots of politically (election) motivated violence among young people, four merit reiterating. First, senior political leaders, predominantly from the ruling PF and UPND, were cited as being responsible for supplying young people with beer, money, food, or simply inciting them to be violent. Second, respondents claimed that young people involved in violence lack both proper political and family socialisation. They asserted that some youths lack family guidance, discipline, and morals, and have limited knowledge about politics, especially with regards to that which multiparty politics entail including party membership duties. Third are negative socioeconomic conditions such as the lack of income, employment, or any form of empowerment; drug and alcohol abuse; high poverty levels; and the absence of recreation facilities. The participants claimed that some have limited civic/community engagement but have more involvement in politics, which is seen as a source of livelihood (it pays to be in politics).

Last, violence is driven by the sheer intimidation and retaliatory attacks of political opponents. For instance, during a FGD, one youth claimed that by simply wearing a party T-Shirt, one is exposed to being attacked. As such, political and electoral violence is characterised by stone throwing and indiscriminate beating, which peaks during electoral campaigns, and the forerunners include PF and UPND youths in the age range from 15 to 35 years. The breadth includes the exchange of abusive language; harassing or intimidating voters; damage to private and public properties; and the use of tasers, knives, screw drivers, pangas, and bottles. Events or activities that create spaces for political clashes, according to participants during interviews and FGDs, include rallies, meetings, visits by high-level national leaders, and electoral campaigns.

Some participants further claimed that there are situations where opposition political parties have had to cancel and postpone their meetings in light of imminent visits by, for example, the republican president or vice-president, and that for every two political events, one is likely to end in clashes or violent exchanges, especially when parties are hosting their senior leaders. This claim was strongly linked to the aftermath of the 2015 presidential by-elections and the 2016 general elections that saw residents of Lufwanyama districts barred by alleged PF cadres from entering Kalulushi town. Cadres were angered supposedly by the fact that the UPND obtained more votes in both elections. In 2015, the PF's Edgar Lungu polled 2,370 votes against the UPND's Hakainde Hichilema who had 3,457, while in 2016, it was 5,051 against 9,273, respectively (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2020). Notably, the UPND parliamentary candidate won the elections and he is the only UPND Member of Parliament (MP) in the Copperbelt region.

In sum, to answer the credibility question, especially in light of accounts of violence from Kalulushi as gathered during the exploratory stage of the project, two principles merit particular mention. First, to ensure the rigour of the enquiry, this study applied mixed methods and data sources: survey, interviews, FGDs, and youth, senior political leaders, and elected councilors as participants. This triangulation, as advanced by Anney (2014: 277), helps the researcher to reduce bias and cross examines the integrity of participants' responses. Second, the researcher's prolonged (exceeding five months) immersion in the

field and research location as a researcher helped to cultivate and improve the trust of the respondents (youth and senior political leaders). Gaining substantial insight into the earmarked wards and Kalulushi constituency as a whole in study contexts, according to Anney, minimises the distortions of information.

2.9 Conclusion

In peacebuilding parlance, conflict in itself is neither bad nor good; it can be constructive if handled properly, and destructive if not treated well. As noted earlier, it is a human and social phenomenon and, as such, inevitable. However, the study's calling is to work towards transforming its violent outlook as well as the foundations of its violent expressions. Thus, the current calling to transform youth involvement in political conflicts in Zambia and Kalulushi in particular is firmly anchored on this conviction.

Evidence from literature suggests that today, the prevalence of violence among young people is seen as characteristic of Africa's current political landscape. The nature of political and electoral violence is that it is mostly a young male perpetrated phenomenon, although in some cases it is masked as crime prevention and/or security service provision to political elites and communities. Additionally, the point that violence is pursued with an indeterminate political agenda and the sluggishness in becoming involved in 'civic and social' (nonviolent) matters is attributed to a lack of awareness and interest. As for the extent of political violence, it covers and is possibly not limited to violent rhetoric and hate speech; the unlawful seizure and control over facilities of public good, such as markets and bus terminals; voters and political opponents' intimidation; the seizure of voter cards from perceived opponents; and the breaking up of opposition party rallies.

All these, as the literature shows, are driven by unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, leadership and governance hurdles, not appreciating the complexity of politics, and marginalisation and exclusion. In turn, the effects of political violence, which may not be exhaustive here, include instilling fear in the electorates and general citizenry, being an affront to democracy, resulting in death and the disruption of social networks, as well as establishing a culture of intolerance and violence. The latter may not merely

be among young party cadres but also all stakeholders in the electoral process, for instance.

Zambia's own account, as far as political and electoral violence is concerned, is not any cleaner. From extant literature, an appraisal of youth and political violence indicates that there are parallels between the activities of then UNIP's militarised youth leagues and today's young party cadres. Unlike UNIP youth party stalwarts who were a sole dominant factor during the one-party state system, currently the front-runners in that which the researcher calls 'immortalising election related violence' include the PF and UPND youth cadres. Enthused by their superior numbers, they have not effectively utilised this grander constituency, as Sesay (2014: 26) advances, to "effect change in their favour consistently and sustainably".

Perhaps the change envisaged here is feasible when young party cadres begin appreciating that their political differences can be handled more constructively by transforming and not suppressing such diversities, a transition from the use of force (violence) towards more understanding, coexistence, and peace. As (Assefa 1999) spectrum reveals, this provides for increased mutual participation in the search for a solution to their conflicts. The current intervention further envisages multi-pronged outcomes: positive transformation and advancement, and empowered and engaged cohorts of young political players playing a constructive role in the governance process. All this underscores the need for young people to remain, as (Ojok and Acol 2017) note, politically engaged beyond elections to ensure that their aspirations are accommodated in the government's and political parties' policy agenda.

As part of the 'intervention package and progression' to transform young people's participation in violent political conflicts, the need for an appreciation of that which peace entails, available peace techniques, the benefits of a third-party participant in a conflict, as well as openings for intervening in Kalulushi constituency, is great. These aspects constitute the foci of the next chapter.

Chapter Three:

APPROACHES TO PEACE

3.1 Introduction

For over 50 years, Zambia has enjoyed relative peace – relative peace in the sense that it has not been afflicted by political conflicts and violence to the magnitude that other countries in the sub-Saharan African region have. Any upsurge in one form of violence or the other impedes social, economic, and political advancement. It is a call on society to think of approaches to counter this deleterious trend, as well as to preserve the foundation of the nation-state. Cultivation of and/or maintaining a peaceful nation carries the greatest premium, and ensuring peace across the country is both a community and national imperative. However, while this is virtuous, the fundamental question is whether there is consensus on that which constitutes 'peace'. Which techniques aid its attainment?

Thus, as a scholarly endeavour, this chapter includes an immersive look at conceptions of peace, examining three peace approaches – peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding; core elements and effects of third-party intervention; and an articulation of public peace processes. It also covers exemplars of Zambia's peacemaking experiences and concludes with lines of reasoning for a 'peace oriented' intervention in Kalulushi constituency.

3.2 Conceptions of Peace

The concept of peace has ancient roots in both English and Greek. In the former, derived from the Latin language, *pax* entails 'freedom from conflict', while in the latter, drawn from the word *eirene*, it is associated with tolerance, harmony, and understanding. It is understood as going beyond peace among different people in society to include individuals' inner peace as well (Miller and King 2005; Baca 2015: 5). Although the notion of peace, as described by Miller and King (2005: 56), is notoriously elusive, historical and contemporary literature is abound with at least three broad specialty conceptions of peace – *philosophical*, *sociological*, and *political.*

The philosophical view of peace is that it is a natural, original, God-given condition of human existence, perfection, and the continued pursuit for happiness and avoidance of pain. Additionally, it is a quest for balance (stability) and tolerance in human relations as well as the cultivation of individual inner peace (Galtung 1967: 12; Ibeanu 2006: 5; Baca 2015: 102). Described as the oldest and rarest view of peace, it is also associated with 'pacifism'. Rengger (2016: 45), while acknowledging that there are several forms of pacifism, notes that it includes, among other beliefs, a rejection of the use of lethal force for political or any other ends. Supposedly, the underpinning rationale here is that human relations are characterised by tranquility, serenity, and no harm. Correspondingly, Assefa (1993: 3) advances a claim (to which the researcher also subscribes) that peace should be seen as "a transformation of conflictual or destructive interactions into more cooperative and constructive relationships".

Other philosophical reinforcing views include Banks (1987: 260) assertion that "peace is a life of harmony from which conflicts are eliminated". However, he admits that this may be a utopian conception of peace, as conflict is inevitable and necessary. On the other hand, some see religions as platforms that equally support the philosophical view of peace by inspiring adherents to be tolerant, reconciling differences, and ridding relationships of harboured bitterness (Reardon 1988: 13; Institute for Economics and Peace 2014). Citing earlier writers, Brewer (2013: 3) adds that this conceptualisation of peace is also underwritten by theology through scriptural foundations that encourage clemency and reconciliation.

Second, Ibeanu (2006) notes that sociologically, peace entails social harmony devoid of social antagonism, a situation where social conflicts are banished and people, individually or collectively, have the ability to meet their needs and aspirations. One of the foundations of this view of peace is structural-functionalism looking at the societal make-up and functions. Ibeanu adds that when structures carry out their functions correctly, there is direction in society which culminates in stability. However, he also contends that "peace is only feasible in societies in which classes are non-existent since society produces sufficient resources to meet each individual member of society according to

his/her needs". Though, as Ibeanu (2006: 8) argues, "in modern times, this view remains an unattainable aspiration".

Bank's (1987) ideas of peace as 'conflict management' and 'peace as justice' may also be firmly explained from the sociological standpoint. Conflict management, as a theory of peace, is anchored on meeting the needs and values of ordinary people, as claimed by Banks. Some of the fundamental questions that oscillate around the management of social conflicts include "what people require of society for survival", "what possessions they aspire to own", "what activities they enjoy", "what groups they belong to", and "which relationships they cherish" (Banks 1987: 269). On the other hand, the alignment of peace to justice, in Bank's view, advocates the "absolute equality of treatment regarding everything that matters to people". Additionally, equal shares are based on a specific principle of proportionality which is deemed to be fair. These descriptions, albeit contentious, resonate with one of Galtung (1967: 12) earlier delineations of peace as a "synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups with less emphasis on the non-existence of violence".

From political perspectives, peace is seen as a state of political order manifest in the institutionalisation of political structures, that is, peace as stability, and life made predictable and comparatively safe for the ordinary citizens by a minimum of political order (Banks 1987: 261; Ibeanu 2006: 8). Both Banks and Ibeanu note that from this understanding, peace is a product of a political system that imbues political values such as tolerance, bargaining, and negotiation. Seemingly using political lenses, Baca (2015: 102) argues that "peace is a dominating element in democracy since it has to do with the respect of liberties and fundamental human rights as well as ensuring the respect of these rights". On the other hand, according to Ibeanu, interpreting peace as order paves the way for "perpetrating and perpetuating oppression" of the disadvantaged by the more fortunate classes (Ibeanu 2006: 9).

Negative and Positive Peace

That which the three notions discussed above distil to is an outlook that peace has both positive and negative aspects. In Reardon's (1988: 12) view, the positive lane carries conditions of good management, the orderly resolution of conflict, harmony linked to mature relationships, gentleness, and love. As for the negative side, the implication is the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war. Therefore, an in-depth reflection on that which can be called here as categories of peace is imperative. Theoretically, Galtung (1967: 12) is credited for conceiving of negative and positive peace. He synthesised the former as the absence of collective violence between classes, and between racial, ethnic, and human groups, while the latter is seen as less clearly defined and not only emphasises the absence of violence but the presence of warm relations and understanding in human relations.

Stated differently, negative peace is linked to the non-existence of physical or direct violence such as war or explicitly violent conflict. In contrast, positive peace is anchored on favourable conditions and relationships, socially, economically, politically, and ecologically (Springs 2015: 151). Positive peace has received considerable attention from contemporary observers and think tanks such as the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The organisation defines positive peace as "attitudes, institutions and structures, an optimal environment for the flourishing of human abilities, creation and sustenance of peaceful societies" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2018: 60).

The IEP empirically derives positive peace through the statistical examination of thousands of cross-country appraises of economic and social developments to establish factors that are statistically noteworthy and linked to the Global Peace Index – GPI (Institute for Economics & Peace 2018: 60). The Positive Peace Index (PPI), with eight domains, is employed to calculate positive peace in 163 countries or independent territories, covering over 99% of the world's population. With three indicators each, these fields include *a well-functioning government*, with the ability to deliver high-quality public and civil services; *a sound business environment*; *acceptance of the rights of others*; *good relations with neighbours*; *the free flow of information*; *high levels of human capital*; *low*

levels of corruption; and *the equitable distribution of resources* (Institute for Economics & Peace 2018: 63).

Not only do these areas provide a baseline of the efficiency of a country to foster and maintain peace, but they can also assist in predicting the likelihood of conflict, violence, and instability (Institute for Economics & Peace 2018: 60). The IEP's 2019 GPI scores of 163 countries carry insightful accounts of countries' positive peace standings. For example, assessed on the basis of "on-going domestic and international conflict domain, from most to least peaceful", Iceland ranks first. For the African countries, Mauritius is at 24 with Zambia at 48, after Botswana (30), Malawi (40), and Ghana (44). Afghanistan is last at 163. As for 'societal safety and security domain', from the most peaceful to the least, no African country falls in the first five, while in the last five, three are African countries, with the DRC at 159, the Central African Republic (161), and South Sudan (162). Iceland leads the militarisation domain as the most peaceful with Israel as the least. No African country falls within the last five.

Last, scores of the economic cost of violence vis-à-vis countries' Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), from the most to the least cost, Syria stands at number one. Six African countries including Somalia (8), Sudan (13), South Sudan (14), Lesotho (16), Mali (17), and the DRC (20) fall in the first 20. Zambia stood at 142, with Malawi and Switzerland being last at 163 as the countries with the least economic cost of violence (Institute for Economics & Peace 2019: 99-101). The four domains covered by the IEP resonates with Assefa (1993) description of peace, reflecting the existence of destructive relationships and raising questions on the need to change the status quo. In sum, peace, with its philosophical emphasis, has 'values and tenets' that offer a four-fold structure, according to Assefa, to appreciate and evaluate all human relationships in order to build a cohesive, all-inclusive, and human social stability.

The four values and principles call for "identifying and dealing with the root causes of conflicts if one has to resolve conflicts and make peace"; "paying attention to the justice and fairness of the process as well as the outcome of the settlement"; and that peoples' deeper needs are not totally incompatible. Fourth, in terms of these guidelines, "conflict

resolution and peacemaking entails a restructuring of relationships" (Assefa 1993: 5-6). These ideals and principles reverberate Miller and King (2005: 55) assertion that peace implies a political condition that guarantees justice and social solidity through recognised as well as informal practices and norms. Among the conditions that should be attained for this to be achieved is an "equilibrium of political power among the different groups within communities, societies, regions and the world at large".

3.3 Peace Practices and Processes

The preceding section concluded with an assertion that peace intimates a political environment that ensures justice and social stability through informal and established practices. These practices or processes can thus be classified into three broad interrelated stratagems that are *peacekeeping*, *peacemaking*, and *peacebuilding.* The utility of such approaches is spread across a wide spectrum of horizontal and vertical interventions, both at the macro and micro levels. In this section, an in-depth reflection is provided for each.

3.3.1 Peacekeeping

One of the earliest participants in the conception of peacekeeping is Johan Galtung. During the 1960s, he advanced that peacekeeping is a dissociative approach which is premised on keeping belligerents held off from each other under the perils of punishment if they transgress into each other's territory (Galtung 1976: 282). He adds that third parties are either called in or call themselves in to practice peacekeeping acts such as patrolling the borderline. From Galtung (1976: 284) proposition, peacekeeping can also be intra-national and intra-regional. He claims that the former is that which states are expected to carry out internally in vertical and horizontal conflicts, while the latter, especially during the 20th century, was driven by countries' exercising monopoly or hegemonic power, which "kept peace among periphery states and clogged periphery states from possible counter attack".

However, the bulk of literature on international peacekeeping is pinnacled around the United Nations (UN) charter. It is central to the international response to complex violent conflicts, and has an unarmed dimension and a derivative enforcement element

(Miller and King 2005). From this perspective, there are five aspects that can be illuminated upon regarding international peacekeeping that is steered under Chapter VI of the UN charter. First, Chapter VI of the UN Charter is the governing framework of peacekeeping. It sets out the objectives of peacekeeping as well as serves as the international mandate. Under the auspices of this framework, UN forces as peacekeepers are deployed in unstable contexts with the consent of warring parties to ensure the effective fulfilment of the peace process. This is done in a coordinated manner in the quest to cultivate relative normalcy in a given context (Miller and King 2005: 62; Alberto dos Santos 2017: 4; Cravo 2017: 48).

Second, peacekeeping is core to the international community's response to complex conflicts. In this sense, the response covers, but is not limited to, the use of military and civilian forces to sustain ceasefires and public security, check violence, and support demobilising armed groups (Schirch 2004; Miller and King 2005; Woodhouse 2015). While these acts of peacekeeping are a direct reply to the pressing crisis and hostilities, the overarching goal is expansive. For example, Zelizer and Oliphant (2013) and Schirch (2004) note that aside from ending the violence and cultivating a calm atmosphere, peacekeeping as an intervention paves the way for the peacebuilding process to happen, and herein rests the inextricable link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Third, peacekeeping, as spelled out in the UN doctrine, as claimed by De Coning (2017: 147), is differentiated by three principles. First, it is consensual as conflicting parties agree to UN peacekeepers assisting with fulfilling ceasefire or peace agreements. Impartiality is the second principle that UN peacekeepers strive to achieve, including treating parties to a conflict equally. Third, the use of force by UN peacekeepers is restricted to a minimum, only used as necessary to protect themselves and others whom they are mandated to protect. Although protection is prioritised and essential steps are put in place, some have concluded that peacekeeping is a precarious activity. Alberto dos Santos (2017: 4), for example, notes that in 2017, the number of fatalities stood at 56, the highest since 1994 and surpasses normal or acceptable levels of risk.

Fourth, another aspect to peacekeeping that merits elucidation is the aspect of "*civilian or unarmed peacekeeping*" (Schirch 2004: 42). Among other roles played by civilian peacekeepers include creating physical obstructions between parties in an effort to reduce the fighting as well as accompanying threatened individuals or groups to avert any form of violence against them. This type of peacekeeping is also known as intercessory, given the intermediary function played by unarmed peacekeepers. Notably, organisations such as Peace Brigades International (PBI) and Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) provide accompaniment for local human rights workers whose lives may be threatened or who may be killed for their work (Schirch 2004). Stated differently, accompanying workers serve as unarmed bodyguards and/or human shields to endangered workers.

Last, peace enforcement is the final element associated with peacekeeping. It is defined as "operations to end military or violent interactions or acts of belligerence with or without the consent from host nations or other parties to the conflict" (Miller and King 2005: 59; De Coning 2017: 147). While 'classical' peacekeeping is fundamentally defensive in nature, De Coning (2017) claims that peace enforcement supports offensive action. Similarly, while the former is governed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the latter is included in Chapter VII, drawing from Articles 39, 41, and 42 (Oliver 2002: 101). Oliver adds that Article 47 stipulates the measures for handling "breaches of peace and acts of aggression".

3.3.2 Peacemaking

Beyond peacekeeping and before the launch of peacebuilding initiatives, is peacemaking. This refers to negotiations that occur between parties be they individuals, groups, or nations, to resolve their differences. It is concerned with dealing with the issues surrounding the dispute. Galtung (1976: 290), in his earlier writing, describes peacemaking as the conflict resolution approach which is a way to transcend irreconcilabilities or disagreements that hold back progress. Thus, when parties come together to agree on specific issues, either through negotiation or dialogue, then this process is known as peacemaking. Such interventions can take the form of formal

national level negotiations and/or community-based efforts of bringing parties to a dispute together (Zelizer and Oliphant 2013).

A study of conflicts carried out between the 1980s and 2015 with attempted global peacemaking efforts has been relatively insightful. For example, from a total of 117 conflicts during this period, although 47.9% are active and remain unresolved, 40.2% ended through a peace agreement with only 8.5% ending due to a military victory by one of the parties. Additionally, 47 conflicts of the total 61 that ended during the last 35 years were concluded through a peace agreement, presumably preceded by negotiations, and those by way of military victory were ten (Fisas 2016: 22). Thus, as argued by Fisas, the vast majority of conflicts are resolved through negotiation, confirming its suitability as a peacemaking tactic for resolving conflicts. However, there is a caveat that this should not blind peace practitioners to the reality of the high number of unresolved conflicts (Fisas 2016).

3.3.3 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding was initially conceived by Galtung (1976: 297) as "the associative approach". It was premised on the understanding that peace has a structural outlook that transcends peacekeeping and peacemaking intervention efforts. As such, mechanisms to bring about peace (positive) should be integral to this structure and serve as a reservoir for any given system to draw upon. Consistent with this assertion, other scholars' synthesis is that "peacebuilding focuses on transforming relationships and structures in society to decrease the likelihood of future conflicts" (Zelizer and Oliphant 2013: 7). However, according to Miller and King (2005: 56), peacebuilding entails "creating and ensuring the conditions for ridding contexts of violent conflict engagements as well as more comprehensive understanding related to the institutionalisation of justice and freedom".

Broadly speaking, from extant literature, three points of reference can be projected as peacebuilding pedestals: first, peacebuilding as a "profession"; second, peacebuilding as a "sector"; and third, peacebuilding as a "lens and set of tools" (Zelizer and Oliphant 2013: 8-9). Professionally, peacebuilding, through portfolios such as "peacebuilding

specialists", utilises several tools including "dialogue, mediation, facilitation, and cooperative planning in policy development" to ensure effective internal organisational and programming processes (Zelizer and Oliphant 2013: 8). Perhaps one crucial aspect of peacebuilding through the lens of professionalism is Schirch's (2004: 10) view that "peacebuilding is not premised on western ideas or activity for post-war societies" only. Instead, Schirch argues that peacebuilding should take place in all societies.

Zelizer and Oliphant's (2013: 9) assertion that thousands of organisations have devoted their time to "transforming conflicts and building peace" validates peacebuilding as a sector, a rather unique sector, where peacebuilding has actors or participants at three levels – lower, middle, and upper – driven by several theories of change. Lederach and Lederach (2014), for example, describe the three levels as approaches to peacebuilding, with a few high-level leaders at the top, followed by slightly more actors in the middle plane, and the vast majority at the base. Efforts towards peacebuilding, as presented by Lederach and Lederach, should respond differently to the needs of each level and the respective leaders.

Further emphasis is on the necessity to link and amalgamate these levels for the all-inclusive and continuous emergence of processes of transformation capable of ending violence and creating healthy relationships (Lederach and Lederach 2014: 41). On the other hand, Schirch (2004: 6) argues that theories of how change is realised include, but are not limited to, the "need for law or order", "spiritual healing", "human rights and social justice", a "return to traditional values of peace", "conflict resolution skills", "development", "education", or "a combination of all these".

Peacebuilding is also associated with a set of tools of conducting programmes across sectors. For example, conflict analysis tools, according to Zelizer and Oliphant (2013: 9), are crucial in examining the root causes of a conflict, appreciating key players, and evaluating possible negative and positive effects of intervening in a conflict context. In speaking of peacebuilding tools and skills, others are fairly categorical about its breadth. Schirch (2004: 10), for instance, stresses that "conflict management, mitigation, resolution and transformation employ related sets of skills and practices to build

relationships and deal with the root of conflict". However, the field of peacebuilding covers a much broader range of processes.

The breadth and complexity of peacebuilding has also given rise to the concept of *strategic peacebuilding*, an approach to building peace that involves "coordinating 'resources, actors and approaches' to accomplish several goals and address multiple issues for the long term" (Schirch 2004: 9). Two fundamental questions that underpin the strategic design of peacebuilding and consistent with Schirch's claims include "*the strategic what (How do peacebuilders decide what to do?)*" and the "*strategic who?*", that peacebuilding is everyone's responsibility, and deciding on who participates in the peacebuilding process calls for strategic decision-making (Schirch 2004: 64-69). Building local capacity for peace is an example of a strategic what and an essential first step. The envisaged intervention in Kalulushi constituency is premised on identifying local young people who can assist, as Schirch (2004) observes, to nurture an architecture of relationships that support peace.

Moving away from that which may be described as 'classical' peacebuilding discourses and practice, there is growing literature on a "critical intellectual framework applied to post-Cold war policies and practices of post-conflict interventions". This is known as "liberal peacebuilding" (Sabaratnam 2011: 13). Despite its dominance, liberal peacebuilding is not devoid of shortcomings, some of which merit illuminating. For instance, it is claimed that there is a "lack of political will and attention on the part of peacebuilding sponsors to complete the tasks they undertake, and insufficient commitment of resources". That, there is "limited knowledge of distinctive local conditions and variations across societies hosting peacebuilding missions leading to failures especially in Africa". Additionally, "insufficient local ownership over the strategic direction and daily activities of each operation". The stress with the latter is the "utility of local actors, resources and practices" (Paris 2011: 40; Cravo 2017: 53; Maiangwa and Suleiman 2017: 1).

3.4 Third Party Intervention

Conflicts often emerge between two parties (individuals or collectives). However, its evolution and escalation will determine whether there is a need for a third party to assist in or ameliorate the situation. The necessity of a third-party intervention may also be voluntary or obligatory given the nature of the conflict. For example, a domestic dispute between a husband and wife may engender either voluntary or compulsory intervention, while a conflict that borders on the breach of the law will certainly call for mandatory intervention. The question is then, what is a third-party intervention?

Fisher (2001: 1) notes that parties in most conflicts at all levels of social interaction, when unable to handle their differences, have access to external parties for support, that is, support in finding solutions to their incompatibilities. Thus, a third-party intervention suggests an independent party acceptable to both parties in a conflict offering or obligated to assist in finding a solution to the parties' differences. Different forms of third-party interventions, as discussed later, are distinguished, according to Fisher (2001), principally by the extent of power that the intervenors exert on the process and conclusion of the conflict.

In Chapter two, a cursory description of some of the third-party methods was provided in explaining responses to conflict using Assefa (1993) model. While there are several terms in literature for third-party interventions, as Fisher (2001: 10) notes, incorporating "conciliation, fact-finding, good offices, peer mediation, arbitration, facilitation, adjudication, mediation-arbitration, policy dialogue and consensus building", this section focuses on the following five terms: adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation. Reconciliation is understood here as more of the end goal of the preceding intervention, mediation.

3.4.1 Adjudication

In adjudication, parties entrust power to steer the process and outcome of their conflict in the hands of an adjudicator. Thus, the ultimate remedy for the settlement of the parties' incompatibilities rests with the third party. In peacebuilding parlance, adjudication is described as an "adversarial process as the outcome invariably reflects a win-lose zero-

sum solution to the problem" (Jeong 2010: 14). The 'imposition' of a third-party decision in adjudication, as argued by Jeong, determines the outcome of the dispute and that direct communication between the parties is not necessary. As a "courtroom-influenced model", leveraging and defensive traditions of interaction, especially through legal representatives (advocates) of the parties, is the norm (Lewis and Umbreit 2015: 8).

3.4.2 Arbitration

Arbitration may be defined as a process that involves the disputing parties mutually agreeing to refer their conflict to an independent third party known as an 'arbitrator'. As noted in Chapter two, parties' involvement in the search for a solution during arbitration increases slightly since the arbitrator provides them with an opportunity to be heard. He/she then considers offered claims with supporting evidence before giving the decision on which should be binding for all parties (Jeong 2010: 137).

Internationally, for both state relations and commercial interactions, arbitration is considered as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. For example, there is empirical evidence that arbitration has proven most popular and effective in producing long-lasting resolutions on contentious issues between states and business partners, particularly in a global context (Gent 2013; Heine and Kerk 2017). However, further evidence suggests that states are reluctant to utilise such mechanisms, as noted by Gent (2013: 66), especially in handling issues of national security. Perhaps the reluctance may be explained by the fact that parties have to assent to accept the outcome and judgement. Though delivered from a point seemingly of impartiality, it may not always satisfy both parties. However, Jeong (2010: 137) stresses that arbitrators must be fair, impartial, and ensure equity, good conscience, and natural justice.

The arbitration practice in Zambia was only incorporated after the enactment of the Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000 (AA 2000), despite the arbitration statute being in place since 1933 (Arbitration Act No. 3 of 1933). Kajimanga (2013: 5) reports that the 2000 Act repealed the 1933 Act which gave courts "wide powers to supervise the arbitral process among other responsibilities", and that Section 6 of AA 2000 provides for any dispute that parties agree to submit to be arbitrated to be determined by arbitration.

However, there are cases that cannot be determined by arbitration, namely "an agreement that is contrary to public policy"; "a dispute which, in terms of any law, may not be determined by arbitration"; "a criminal matter or proceeding except in so far as permitted by written law or unless the court grants leave for the matter or proceeding to be determined by arbitration"; "matrimonial cause"; "a matter incidental to a matrimonial cause, unless the court grants leave for the matter to be determined by arbitration"; "the determination of paternity, maternity or parentage of a person"; or "a matter affecting the interest of a minor or an individual under a legal incapacity, unless the minor or individual is represented by a competent person" (Kajimanga 2013: 5).

3.4.3 Negotiation

A process of negotiation aimed at reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on perceived incompatibilities between parties in a conflict is described by Fisher (2001: 1) as a common response. From literature, negotiation is defined broadly as a 'face to face' discussion or communication aimed at reaching an agreement on transforming a situation that is perceived as problematic. The success of negotiation hinges on the full implementation of the negotiated or settlement terms (Jeong 2010: 38; Berghof Foundation 2012: 49; World Bank 2018: 36).

However, even before getting into the implementation plan of the negotiation outcomes, the process may encounter hurdles. For example, Jeong (2010: 28) argues that if discussions about substantive issues change into disagreements about principles, rendering any concession to seem like defeat, then negotiated settlement becomes difficult. Possibly, this difficulty may be averted through a well-arranged and executed pre-negotiation or exploratory stage. This phase, for negotiation processes that involve a third party (facilitator), is an opportunity to "attune the conviction of the parties, to be part of the process which ultimately entails giving up something" (Fisas 2016: 7). This would, in a way, rid the path of any stumbling blocks in achieving a negotiated settlement.

3.4.4 Mediation

Among several definitions of mediation is one that associates it to a Latin word *mediare* which entails 'coming in between' (Jefimovs 2017). Stated simply, a third person offers to assist parties in conflict to find a mutually acceptable solution to their differences. However, as an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism with growing practice and utility, mediation is subject to different descriptions. For example, Baumann and Clayton (2017) describe mediation as a time-tested approach of managing and resolving conflicts and a common practice of third-party interventions, and that approximately half of all civil and inter-state conflicts between 1946 and 2015 involved a type of mediation intervention.

Other descriptions of mediation stress an "aided negotiation" process by a third party acceptable to both parties in a conflict, who also assists with communication flow to realise amicable resolution (Jeong 2010: 141; Berghof Foundation 2012: 50). It is stated that third parties as mediators are often persons of high standing such as former heads of state or other eminent persons with moral authority in society – religious, traditional, and community leaders. They may act either in their private capacity or delegated by state, intergovernmental, or non-governmental organisations (Baumann and Clayton 2017). In addition, mediators may intervene as individuals or as a team and the process may be face-to-face or shuttle (moving between the parties in different locations).

The concept of working in teams (two or more mediators), also known as 'co-mediators', creates the opportunity to learn beneficial lessons from seasoned mediators. It also creates a reflective space for individual mediators to learn about themselves. Further, it serves the parties well in cases where there are a mix of races, genders, ethnic backgrounds etc. Thus, should mediators seek a balanced team? On the other hand, shuttle mediation, which involves moves between parties, is necessitated by security reasons especially if the context has a history of violence (Keys 2009; Kochanski 2015). However, shuttle mediation has its pitfalls, including slowing the process down as the mediator spends substantial time with each party. In cases of family matters, according to Kochanski (2015: 40), it carries the merit of providing for "parties to hear and acknowledge each other".

Perhaps one evolving practice of mediation that is particularly significant to this study and that merits emphasis is transformative mediation. Pioneered by Folger and Bush, transformative mediation is anchored on the understanding that the practice of mediation should be a "party-driven dialogue" shifting from individualistic to a more relational view of human beings, conflict, and institutional structures (Folger and Bush 2014: 22). In other words, there is a strong focus on effecting change in the parties involved and their interpersonal relationships past resolving the current presenting problems. Parallel to this view of mediation is another approach that is valuable to this study – humanistic mediation. Lewis and Umbreit (2015: 3) claim that the humanistic approach to mediation not only harmonises with transformative mediation but also stresses the "humanising capacities of mediators, parties and communication processes". By encouraging a good mediator presence and an uninterrupted flow of 'hear language', according to Lewis and Umbreit (2015), this approach deepens a dialogue process.

That which the humanistic approach to mediation advocates is a shift from settlement-driven to dialogue-driven mediation. The claim by proponents of this transformation is that the realisation of a satisfactory settlement should be the primary focus. However, given that most conflicts emerge within a greater emotional and relational context typified by feelings of disrespect, loss of trust, deceit, and violation, a different approach is advised (Lewis and Umbreit 2015: 7). Therefore, the call is for the creation of an ideal space for feelings about historical and the current state of relationships to be communicated and received. The creation of an ideal space resonates with the focus on dialogue of the current study, which is motivated by a need to afford young people openings for genuine engagement and empowerment.

Consistent with this dichotomy in the mediation approach, some observers note that generally, third-party facilitation can be distinguished, "one being settlement oriented and the other relationship-leaning" (Berghof Foundation 2012: 50). The practicality of the latter evolves around enabling parties to engage deeply in constructive dialogue. From a humanistic (or humanising) standpoint, as noted by Lewis and Umbreit (2015: 9), mediators or facilitators can nurture this depth in three areas: "communication in listening

and speaking; a connection between the parties and mediators/facilitators own participation".

Last, in the case of Zambia's judicial system, mediation was incepted through the Statutory Instrument No. 17 of 1997. According to Kajimanga (2013: 3), mediation is Court-Annexed and Order 31, rule 4 of the High Court Rules provides that:

> [E]xcept for cases involving constitutional issues or the liberty of an individual or an injunction or where the trial judge considers the case to be unsuitable for referral, every action may, upon being set down for trial, referred by the trial judge for mediation and where the mediation fails the trial judge shall summon the parties to fix a hearing date.

3.4.5 Reconciliation

From existing third party literature, as argued by Fisher (2001: 2), not all conflicts would be amenable to a single technique of intervention. He claims that there is a need to take into account all key aspects of the conflict in question prior to selecting which method of intervention is suitable. Thus, with the choice of mediation (with a humanistic orientation), there is a need to aspire even higher as third-party intervenors. For example, not only can third-party intervenors assist parties in a conflict to reach a settlement through the resolution of their incompatibilities, but they can move their relationship to another level, starting life anew, in short, reconcile the parties.

Reconciliation, as a conflict-handling approach, in addition to seeking solutions to the issues motivating the conflict, also helps to transform adversaries' relationships from that of "resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony". This in turn entails ridding relationships of "emotional and psychological remnants of the conflict such as trauma, fear and hurt", that is, remainders, which if left unattended, may have future negative effects such as revenge motives (Assefa 1999; Jeong 2010: 214). Cultivation of new and mutually inspiring relationships in contexts such as Africa is not only an individual aspiration but a societal one. A study of Bemba-speaking communities in Zambian and Rwandan society reveals the significance of dialogue, community meetings, and the use of indigenous practices. All are tilted towards reconciliation through the amicable resolution of conflicts (Mukunto, Habyarimana and Mwitwa 2012: 164).

The practice of reconciliation is coxswained by several aspects. However, two are crucial and merit particular attention – *acknowledgement* and *forgiveness*. Truth telling and acknowledgement of historical harm, as argued by Jeong (2010: 217), ought to "help societies in restoring the self-worth of those whose rights have been violated". He adds that healing, together with honouring the feelings of survivors, can only be boosted by acknowledging personal, economic, educational, and political injustices. A case that may speak to this type of acknowledgement is Murambadoro's (2015: 53) study of communities in Matebeleland on their preferences for reconciliation. This is after the massacres of over 20,000 people and dehumanising acts, allegedly by government-authourised security forces, over 34 years ago. From her study, community members insisted that governments need to acknowledge gross human rights violations committed from the 1980s to the post-2000 electoral violence.

On the other hand, Jeong (2010: 218) asserts that "forgiveness can effect benevolent recognition with restored mutuality by remedying past power disparities felt in the wrongdoing". Consistent with mediation, forgiveness can be actualised at the interpersonal and intergroup levels. From third-party literature, a forgiveness tripartite model has been conceived to highlight elements that inhibit or facilitate forgiveness, also known as *affective predictors*; intergroup forgiveness processes called *cognitive predictors*; and *constraining predictors* (Van Tongeren *et al.* 2014). Figure 3.1 presents an intergroup forgiveness tripartite model.



Figure 3.1: Intergroup and Forgiveness Tripartite Model, adapted from Van Tongeren *et al.* 2014.

The framework is an ideal tool for parties' contextual analysis and the practicability of forgiveness. In practice, features of each predictor are comparatively examined for each party. The essence, according to Van Tongeren *et al.* (2014), is to *identify* barriers and facilitators of intergroup forgiveness by assessing affective, cognitive, and constraining aspects.

3.5 Public Peace Processes

As Fisher (2001) espouses, third-party activities can be integral to a wider conception of multi-track diplomacy. Multi-track diplomacy was initially conceived by Diamond and McDonald (1993) to explain the interconnected activities by different individuals, organisations, and institutions. The model covers nine tracks from 'governments or peacemaking through diplomacy' to 'communication and the media or peacemaking through information'. The intervention in this study is envisaged under Track II, broadly referred to here as Public Peace Processes. The second track is 'nongovernment/professional or peacemaking through conflict resolution', although in the current study, the focus is elevated to conflict transformation, as subsequent sections attest.

Public peace processes may be clustered as part of unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities anchored on building relationships among community members. Nestled within the conflict transformation paradigm, such processes are concerned with "empowering and connecting people" (Hur 2017: 83). In practice, there is a focus on "engaging all societal levels of all the parties from elite decision makers to grassroots constituents" (Hur 2017: 83). From literature and empirical evidence, cases abound of 'good practices' in mounting peace processes, albeit the need for contextualisation is also great. Lessons from three initiatives would suffice in serving as exemplars.

First, Herbolzheimer's (2015: 7) study of the evolution and lessons from the peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines, reveals some valuable experiences, that negotiations are just one of several paths to peace, other dialogue processes should build or restore relations between polarised sections of society, and the implementation of a

peace agreement can be as challenging as the negotiations. Herbolzheimer reports that in the Philippines, the second was handled through hybrid agreement implementation structures that were incepted, providing joint and synergising contributions of international and national, institutional and civil society, and military and civil actors. Thus, the actualisation of any given peace agreement calls for both horizontal and vertical players' participation.

Second, Paffenholz (2015) reports a multi-year study on 'Broadening participation in political negotiations and implementation' which analyses the practice of inclusion. The study reveals that the quality of participation is important and not merely quantity, and that broader inclusion does not diminish peace negotiations and increased participation is premised on obtaining legitimacy and public buy-in. Further, inclusion occurs in different modalities and how inclusive peace processes are designed is fundamental as they either allow or inhibit the ability of the included participants to exert influence (Paffenholz 2015: 2-4). Although these lessons are seemingly tilted towards Track I peace processes, they remain valuable for Track II peacebuilding efforts and community-based contributions. For example, inclusion at micro-level peace processes is equally essential for marginalised groups such as young people and women.

Third, since 2010, the London-based Conciliation Resources has been empowering a network of 18 locally driven peacebuilding structures known as District Platforms for Dialogue (DPDs) in border areas of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Conciliation Resources 2016: 1). The organisation's community intervention provides eight critical lessons, especially for enhancing the efficacy of community initiatives. Lessons that may also serve as a reference point for mounting community-based peace processes are included in Figure 3.2.

Further, public peace processes can parallel Schirch's (2004: 25-26) four broad sets of peacebuilding approaches – "waging conflict nonviolently; reducing direct violence; transforming relationships and building capacity". By participating in one form of peace process, for example, alternatives to violence or problem-solving workshops, dialogue, or mediation sessions, community members, individually or collectively, will be

poised to handle issues of concern nonviolently. In addition, the fact that peace processes are mounted and launched means that communities' orientation begins to shift from the perpetuation of violence to a more safe space for peacebuilding efforts (Schirch 2004: 25).

EIGHT CRITICAL LESSONS
'For improving the effectiveness of community peace processes'

1) Community trust and confidence.
2) Widen the reach, more participants, quantitatively and qualitatively.
3) Recognising and collaborating with other actors for value addition.
4) Transparency and communication between community actors premised on relationships of mutual respect and trust.
5) Conflict resolution as a continuous process as opposed to once-off activities.
6) Flexibility and adaptability by allowing community actors to attune their activities to their particular context.
7) Ensuring a gender balance.
8) Ensuring long-term sustainability by empowering local actors.

Figure 3.2: Eight critical lessons for effective community peace processes (Source: Conciliation Resources 2016: 16).

Further, public peace processes can parallel Schirch's (2004: 25-26) four broad sets of peacebuilding approaches – "waging conflict nonviolently; reducing direct violence; transforming relationships and building capacity". By participating in one form of peace process, for example, alternatives to violence or problem-solving workshops, dialogue, or mediation sessions, community members, individually or collectively, will be poised to handle issues of concern nonviolently. In addition, the fact that peace processes are mounted and launched means that communities' orientation begins to shift from the perpetuation of violence to a more safe space for peacebuilding efforts (Schirch 2004: 25).

Others describe local peace processes as opportunities for helping communities to realise the value of conflict and distance from violent conflict, negative peace, and to work to address factors responsible for the violent expression of conflict (Anderson and Olson 2003: 12; Maphosa and Keasley 2014: 5). Thus, not only are communities helped

to rid their societies of direct violence but they are also encouraged to begin to unearth sources of structural violence.

As subsequent chapters will attest, relationship building is central in any peace process. Schirch (2004: 26) claims that a move from violence to peace invariably suggests the recreation of relationships using a range of processes that speak to trauma, transform conflict, and ensure justice. Additionally, group encounters reinforced by face-to-face interaction stimulate personal confidence building. This is further bolstered by an exchange of parties' knowledge about the conflict history, underlying needs, values, and fears through dialogical events (Jeong 2010: 207).

The sustainability of any peacebuilding efforts hinge on the availability of necessary primary local capacity to meet societies' needs and rights (Schirch 2004: 26). Schirch adds that such efforts involve, among others, education and training, research, and evaluation and are meant to create just structures that reinforce a sustainable culture of peace. In speaking about the capacity and dynamism of local capacities, Richmond (2013: 275) notes that "such local agency has historically engaged with matters ranging from the dynamics of decolonization to disarmament". As such, building the capacity of local communities is critical to the sustainability of any peace dividends.

Correspondingly, evidence from the Reflecting on Peace Practice project (RPP), which appraised over two hundred international, national, and local peace agencies, suggests four broad indicators of an intervention's effectiveness (Anderson and Olson 2003). A peace initiative is deemed effective and contributes to changes at the broad level of society as a whole if or when it causes participants and communities to develop their own initiatives. That is, programmes for peace aimed at crossing lines of division or influence outside constituencies result in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel conflicts. Further, "a programme for peace that prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence; and results in an increase in people's security" (Anderson and Olson 2003: 16-18).

Although these indicators seem easily attainable, there are challenges associated with evaluating their effectiveness. Anderson and Olson (2003) provide three key challenges. First is the "attribution of complex social effects to any given peace intervention effort". In other words, proving that peace activity A caused social impact B is not easy. Second, there is the reliability of the reported impact. Since outcomes entail intangible changes in people's attitudes, values, relationships, and ideas, the appraisal must rely on skewed reports of agencies and participants which may often be, unintentionally, biased. The significance of the changes at the broad level of society as a whole is another challenge. That is, even though outcomes can be reliably attributed to a particular peace intervention, how can one vouch that a particular initiative's outcome is significant for peace (Anderson and Olson 2003: 14-15). Thus, a crucial point to note here is for peace practitioners to pay particular attention to these challenges and provisions with regards to how they can be overcome during project design and implementation.

3.6 Zambia's Peacemaking Experiences

Aside from enjoying relative peace, as observed at the start of this chapter, Zambia is generally and comparatively speaking seen as a beacon of peace on the African continent. The country prides in its contribution to the several liberation efforts in the Southern African sub-region. Therefore, it is imperative that in appreciating the theoretical and conceptual foundations of peace, Zambia's own peacemaking experiences as a country, albeit modest, are illuminated. In order to have a distinct trajectory of these roles, three episodes are illustrative.

First, during Zambia's first republic and part of the second republic, from the 1960s to late 1980s, the country played a pivotal role in ensuring that neighbouring countries struggling for their freedom were assisted. This was inspired by the first president, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, and other nationalist leaders' philosophy of humanism anchored on, among other principles, "upholding the dignity of the human person" (Kanu 2014: 376). Thus, in line with the idea of humanism, Zambia's doors were opened to several independence movements in the Southern African sub-region with immense economic and security costs to the country. Notwithstanding such costs, Zambia provided a home

and that which Mzumara (2012) calls launching pads for these movements, and the overarching goal was for peace to reign in the region and specifically in the countries affected. In the quest for regional peace and a gesture of good neighbourliness, Zambia accommodated leaders from the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) of then Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia.

Perhaps as a testimony of the appreciation and significance attached to this cooperation is former South African President Jacob Zuma's compliment to Zambia for sheltering ANC leaders and exiled South Africans during the protracted struggle against the apartheid regime. Zuma described Zambia and Kenneth Kaunda's solidarity in particular as commendable and selfless (Mwebantu 2017). Along the same vein, Mapuwei, Moyo and Chivivi (2015: 26) synthesise Kaunda's gesture as a "warm welcome" to high-profile ZANU and ZAPU nationalists who not only sought shelter for political reasons but as an opportunity to study and work.

Zambia's peacemaking enterprise during Kaunda's reign was without glitches. Internally, some of the happenings brought into question the authenticity of his humanism philosophy which, as claimed earlier, partly drove the country's sub-regional support. Some observers, for example, questioned how humanism aligned with the country's poor economic performance, the alleged killing of the Lumpa church members (negation of Kaunda's own nonviolence theory), political intolerance, and the banning of political parties (Kanu 2014: 377). In addition, it would be stated that a 200-strong insurgency spearheaded by a former wildlife game ranger, Adamson Mushala, as Lungu and Ngoma (2005: 322) note, almost derailed the peacemaking endeavour.

Despite being an internal revolt, Mushala's insurgence was propelled by South Africa's apartheid regime. Therefore, this added to other externally driven assaults on Zambia's "peace mission and good friendliness". Incursions by that which is described as "numerically superior and well equipped militaries of Portuguese regimes from Angola

and Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia" made Zambia pay a large price for its commitment to peace and freedom (Lungu and Ngoma 2005: 321; Mzumara 2012: 9).

Zambia's third republic under the late former president, Frederick Chiluba, witnessed peacemaking contributions in the region. Two cases of third-party intermediary roles played by Zambia under Chiluba's reign include the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), the mediation process of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Angolan conflicts, albeit with varying outcomes. The DRC process, supported by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999 and the Peace Agreement in 2002. Mutisi (2016: 30) reports that the ICD and the Lusaka Peace Agreement, alongside former president Chiluba, saw the facilitation efforts of other distinguished personalities, among others, the former presidents of South Africa, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, and the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire.

During the Angolan conflict between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement, Zambia played the host and facilitated peace talks between the two groups. After several years of fighting, the UN supervised elections in September 1992 and UNITA rejected the outcome of these elections after the MPLA was declared the winner (Amupanda 2017). UNITA returned to warfare and in turn, as observed by Amupanda (2017: 61), invited sanctions from the UN leaving its leader, Jonas Savimbi, with no choice but to agree to peace talks. Consequently, a peace agreement known as the Lusaka Protocol, covering provisions for power-sharing and the arrangement of the military settlement before elections, was signed on 21 November 1994 (Amupanda 2017).

Beyond the contributions of Kaunda and Chiluba, Zambia has continued striving to keep its peacemaking vocation afloat, both within and outside Zambia. For example, building upon the former President Chiluba's public declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation on 29 December 1991, the current president, Edgar Chagwa Lungu, went on to set a day aside for National Prayers and Fasting (18 October). Additionally, President Lungu set up a Ministry of National Guidance and Religious Affairs (MNGRA) which was

ratified by Parliament in 2017. Aside from overseeing the observance of this day, the ministry's jurisdiction, according to Kaunda and Kaunda (2018: 5), includes "promoting national values, Christian affairs, interdenominational dialogue, national guidance, principles and ethics, public religious celebrations, preservation of Christian and religious sites and religious affairs".

However, both declarations are not devoid of criticism and controversy. Kaunda and Kaunda (2018: 4) note that the critique against a Christian nation declaration is that it should have been accompanied by laws to assist in curbing vices such as "corruption, nepotism, economic and social injustice and human rights abuses". In 2018, the national day of prayers and fasting, on the other hand, was boycotted by a small coalition of Christians who claimed that prayers would only yield unity if held after political leaders had reconciled and all participated (Lusaka Times 2018).

A more recent case of Zambia's peacemaking contributions includes its role as chair of SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security, assumed in August 2018 until August 2019. Scarcely a month after taking up the position, a delegation from the Conference of Catholic Bishops in the DRC sought the SADC's intervention in their country's political conflicts. The appeal was made to President Edgar Lungu as the current chair for the SADC to specifically assist the DRC to conduct free and fair elections and ensure that peace is restored (Lusaka Times 2018). However, given Zambia's current social and economic challenges including political differences, especially in light of the 2021 general elections, its peacemaking record would be up for a test.

3.7 Local Interventions in Kalulushi Constituency

Richmond (2013: 276) argues that peace formation means "networks and relationships whereby indigenous or local agents of peace in a range of settings, find ways of creating peace processes and sustainable dynamics of peace" and, as noted in Section 3.2, peace should be appreciated as a change in conflictual or destructive interactions into more cooperative and constructive relationships. Additionally, such change, as advanced by Lederach (2003: 38), suggests processes of transformation that respond to the "network

of interrelated needs, relationships and configurations at four levels – personal, relational, cultural and structural".

Similarly, the intervention in Kalulushi not only tapped into local resources such as local youth expertise and existing networks of young people but it is envisaged that both short- and long-term outcomes will have a bearing at all the four levels. Transformation navigates, in Lederach's (2003: 39) view, "both solutions and social change efforts, requiring a capability to understand the situation beyond the presenting issues". Thus, the change foreseen is fourfold, addressing immediate issues at personal and relational levels and, in the longer term, cultural and structural configurations which are continuously evolving aspects.

First, personal transformation is enhanced when "grievances are fully aired and communicated with appropriate expression of strong feelings and emotions" (Jeong 2010: 224). A reduction in hurtful statements has the potential to cultivate an atmosphere that allows amicable solutions to be feasible. Lederach (2003: 27) adds that change at a personal level speaks to "minimising destructive effects of social conflict and increase the potential for individual growth and wellbeing, physically, emotionally, intellectually and spiritually". This is against the negative effects that accompany political differences and violence among political players.

Second, from Lederach's (2003) standpoint, the relational lens of transforming conflict entails reducing poorly functioning communication and scaling up understanding. For example, parties that feel excluded by certain decisions may not shy away, withdraw, or not support those decisions, but bring out their concerns, fears, and hopes. By means of relational lenses, dialogical interventions, as in the case of Kalulushi, may work to "unearth patterns of communication that relates to poor decision making and lay bare people's feelings about such decision-making processes". In terms of social conflicts, as literature provides, the relational lens "makes it clear how close and distant people wish to be, how they will use and share power, how they perceive themselves and others as well as what type of interaction they wish to have" (Lederach 2003: 25).

Issifu (2016: 145) dichotomises approaches to peacebuilding – Western/conventional and indigenous/traditional. While the former leans towards the use of external processes and systems, the latter utilises resources or approaches that originate from Africa to promote sustainable peace. In dealing with cultural patterns that give rise to the violent expression of conflict, Lederach (2003) adds that cultural transformation of conflict is about recognising and building upon resources and processes within a cultural setting.

Correspondingly, as discussed later, the intervention in Kalulushi enabled participants to identify and understand political attitudes, beliefs, and opinions that influence the violent expression of conflicts. Further, the space created through dialogical engagement helped unearth ideal practices and patterns that would have a positive effect on young political party stalwarts within the polity.

Valuable and rich practices with which local communities are endowed will inevitably come to the fore in securely-arranged dialogue spaces, an opportunity that, in Jeong's (2010: 221) view, enables the voice of those who are marginalised to be heard with the involvement of broader social sectors beyond elite (top or Track I) negotiation. He adds that "through attentive listening, participants in dialogue can demonstrate their respect for each other" (Jeong 2010: 224). With regards to community-based resources, others have argued that the resolution or transformation of conflicts in "Africa is embedded in people's cultural practices and systems and that an individual does not exist in a vacuum, conflictual situations are seldom considered an individual affair" (Mukunto, Habyarimana and Mwitwa 2012: 164). Thus, cultural change, as part of community conflict transformation and peacemaking, is undeniably crucial.

Interpersonal and intergroup relations are not immune to conflicts. In other words, people in business partnerships, marriage relationships, and membership to the same organisation or community initiatives have differences over a number of issues. For example, how decisions are made has the potential to trigger conflicts, resentments, frustrations, and feelings of withdrawal by those who are not part of the decision in question. However, whether relationships engender negative outcomes or not, it remains

integral to transforming conflicts and building peace. Folger and Bush (2014: 23), for instance, argue that "transformative practice encourages a relational orientation to conflict, not a relationship orientation". Stated differently, even if parties in conflict decide to end relationships, as Folger and Bush claim, they are able to do so in a relational way.

Last, structural transformation is premised on "understanding and addressing the root causes of social conditions that give rise to violent and other harmful expression of conflicts" (Lederach 2003: 27). Parallel to this is the promotion of nonviolent mechanisms that condense "adversarial confrontation and eliminates violence ultimately". A plausible mechanism that an intervention in Kalulushi may eventually produce is a sustainable local peace structure. The immediate outcome of the dialogical engagement of young people from different political parties is a platform (discussed later) to enable them to reach out to other youth. According to Issifu (2016: 142), these structures are initiated at the district, municipality, town, or village levels to foster and facilitate comprehensive peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. In addition, Richmond (2013: 276) notes that such initiatives place "society, the village, community, and city at the centre of peace, rather than the state".

As locally driven and organised, the outcome of the intervention in Kalulushi not only aligns with Issifu and Richmond's described structures but may serve other purposes. For example, Jeong (2010: 207) articulates parallel forums or structures that run alongside official national dialogue sessions, designed to either supplement or support negotiation processes. Thus, the Kalulushi initiatives by young political party supporters will possibly bring up issues of regional or national significance and present its relevance to state actors. Notably, the inception of peace structures certainly carries local, regional, and national substance as podia for maximising people's participation in matters and decisions that affect their lives.

Based on the evaluation of five local peace initiatives from South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, and Burundi, Issifu (2016: 154) concludes that such community based and driven initiatives have been instrumental in stimulating both local peacebuilding and national infrastructures for peace. An example given is Ghana's local peacebuilding

efforts that culminated in the setting up of the National Peace Council. Therefore, to strengthen such efforts and reinforce their practicability, the call is for "all-inclusive identification, support, strengthening of local peace structures politically, with legal mandate and constant financial assistance" (Issifu 2016: 155).

In sum, qualitative research and especially PAR is iterative, expecting researchers to move back and forth between design and implementation (Morse *et al.* 2002). Thus, consistent with this qualitative requirement of rigour and trustworthiness (Cypress 2017), data collected during the survey, interviews, and focus group discussions was subjected to interpretive validity. In other words, during dialogue sessions in Kalulushi, participants were invited to comment on whether the final issues (themes) that emerged regarding the causes, nature, extent, and consequences of political (election) violence resonated with their experiences.

Not only did the participants' feedback and affirmation bring to the fore the iterative interaction between data collection and analysis but it also spoke to the essence of verification. Morse *et al.* (2002: 18) note that "this iterative interaction is the essence of attaining reliability and validity". As such, the dialogue process and action plans that emerged as immediate outcomes by the participants were all anchored on verified findings.

3.8 Conclusion

Approaches to peacebuilding, as submitted by Lederach and Lederach (2014: 41), should respond in different ways to the needs of three layers of peace practitioners – top, middle, and lower levels – and all three levels must be connected and integrated for more all-inclusive and continuous processes of change that would end violence and contribute to the creation of healthy relationships. In short, work for peace requires both vertical and horizontal interventions. In the same way, the conceptual and theoretical appreciation of peace ought to be holistic and elaborate.

Thus, this chapter sought to lay a firm foundation in appreciating that which underpins approaches to peace. First, it unveiled broad specialty conceptions of peace,

including the philosophical, sociological, and political, followed by a categorisation of peace as positive and negative, as inspired by Galtung (1967). This was augmented by a reflection on the processes of bringing about peace, namely, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The chapter also addressed the significance of third-party interventions in conflicts as another avenue for making peace, highlighting five essential mechanisms: adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation.

Since the intervention in Kalulushi is described as Track II, a discussion of some of the 'good practices' from public peace processes implemented in other contexts was another focus of this chapter. Specifically, valuable lessons learned from projects in Mindanao, the Philippines, and border areas of four West African countries – Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – were shared. Additionally, a project called Reflecting on Peace Practice project (RPP) by the Massachusetts-based Collaborative for Development Action provided broad indicators of an intervention's effectiveness. Subsequently, Zambia's peacemaking experiences were illuminated through the efforts of former presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba, in the sub-region during their respective tenures.

Last, as informed by literature, an introduction to the intervention in Kalulushi was given emphasising a theoretical framework that would enhance such efforts. That is, both short- and long-term change envisaged ought to be inclusive, multilevel, and interconnected – personally, culturally, relationally, and structurally. This, to a large degree, is reinforced by Lederach and Lederach's (2014) earlier call that processes of change should be comprehensive and consistent along with the capability to end violence and build healthy relationships. With regards to relationships, the next chapter not only deepens the reflection on relationship building but delves into the core of this project – dialogue as a peacemaking endeavour to transform young people's involvement in political conflicts.

Chapter Four:

DIALOGUE AND RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

4.1 Introduction

One of the steps towards cultivating constructive and lasting relationships for disputing parties in conflict is a commitment to maintain exchange, and dialogue is one such channel that supports this type of endeavour. It is more than simply bringing people with divergent views together to iron out their differences. Instead, it is fundamental for creating harmonious relationships and coexistence. The notion that dialogue is essential, as claimed by Svensson and Brouneus (2013: 563), underpins many efforts to create and maintain positive relations between different sections of society. A cursory look at literature on how dialogue intertwines with political conflicts and transformation touches on a number of elements.

Thus, this chapter begins with a conceptual appreciation of dialogue highlighting various perspectives. It also looks at different forms of dialogue explaining different participants' foci. Additionally, parallels and complementarities between dialogue and contact theory (Allport 1954) and dialogue and conflict transformation (Lederach 2003) form part of this chapter. The final part brings to the fore some cases from the international and national practices of dialogue.

4.2 Dialogue: Conceptual Appreciation

The word *dialogue* is derived from a Greek word *dialogos* which can be split into *dia*, or 'through', and *logos*, or 'word'. Thus, dialogue suggests a deeper meaning – movement of the word (Berghof Foundation 2012; Goswami 2017: 20). Bohm and Nichol (1996) advance that a dialogue can be among any number of parties and not just two, and that even an individual can have a dialogue within himself/herself, if the intellect of dialogue is present. With extant literature on dialogue, four elements may be stated to keep it afloat.

First, dialogue is more often than not immersed in 'deep communication' which is not a mere exchange of words. Communication is viewed by some as the most ethical

form of exchange since it carries several critical attributes, aspects such as valuing individual dignity and self-worth as well as involving parties in conversations, mutual understanding, and decision-making (Jeong 2010: 201; Taylor and Kent 2014: 388). However, with some degree of skepticism, Maddison (2015: 1016) claims that there is a lack of conceptual precision as several meetings of all types may be labeled as 'dialogue', almost rendering it meaningless. However, her earlier association of dialogue with other forms of communication such as deliberation, debate, and discussion are instructive not only to this study but consistent with other observers as well.

Escobar, Faulkner and Rea (2014: 93), for example, contrast a "divergent flow of communication", which dialogue stimulates, with a "convergent flow of communication". The former suggests that in dialogue, conversations can assume several directions but conclude with that which is called a 'polyphonic' demonstration of different voices, issues, and perspectives. On the other hand, the latter includes conversations leaning towards a type of resolution premised on open reasoning. Stated differently, this dichotomy points to the fact that dialogue is not about one party winning, convincing the other, or indeed coming to a consensus over an issue but increasing understanding and empathy (Jeong 2010: 201; Ungerleider 2012: 385).

In the quest to unearth aspects of common understanding, Jeong (2010: 201) adds that dialogue utilises a listening, reflection, and deliberation format. Thus, as a communication process, dialogue is a call to parties to be understood as well as understanding the other. In Taylor and Kent's (2014: 390) view, while a "dialogic communicator" carries his/her own beliefs, values, and attitudes to an interaction, he/she should be willing to be transformed by the encounter. In other words, dialogue has a positive effect, as Svensson and Brouneus (2013: 573) argue, on participants' attitudes as well as an increase in their trust or decrease in their mistrust. As a process of speaking about tension-filled subjects, dialogue is also oriented towards creating an atmosphere for understanding between people with divergent views. According to Schirch and Campt (2007), dialogue is useful for families, small groups, businesses, communities, and organisations, and for national and international conflicts.

Second, dialogue brings to the fore parties' power relationships. In his critical reflective discussion, Freire (1993) synthesises dialogue as being closely related to power and efforts to engage, reveal, and liberate. Consistent with Freire's assertion, some commentators argue that in addition to power differences between parties as a barrier to dialogue, there are "inner barriers that people place on their own belief that they are equal to the other" (Atkinson 2013: 71). However, Freire's discourse on dialogue presents immense optimism that these barriers can be eliminated by "an act of love and commitment to their cause; humility as opposed to an act of arrogance; and faith in parties themselves" (Freire 1993: 90) . Freire concludes that:

> [F]aith in people is a priori requirement for dialogue, and that the dialogical person believes in others even before he/she meets them face to face, without which dialogue may remain a farce with the potential to reprobate into paternalistic manipulation (Freire 1993: 91).

Thus, by mitigating power relationships, dialogue also contributes to forging a new and broader understanding of the situation (Schirch and Campt 2007: 6; Taylor and Kent 2014: 388). The practicability of this intervention hinge to a greater extent on the parties' full involvement. The challenge that dialogue in Kelly's (2013: 55) view exerts on parties, is to "enhance their understanding of themselves and others by sharing and reflecting on deeply held views and ideals". Kelly (2013: 58) adds that all this suggests that for dialogue to be meaningful, it ought to be genuine or authentic through parties laying bare that which underpins their individual assumptions and views.

Dialogue is also associated with that which may be described as a 'safe space', both physically and psychologically, for participants to have constructive conversations. It is a type of space that is enabling for parties in divided and post-violent conflict communities, as Maddison (2015: 1015) notes, to "engage across differences with a view to transform their relationships". Correspondingly, Feller and Ryan's (2012) traits of dialogue reinforce the foregoing assertions. For example, Feller and Ryan argue that dialogue provides a space to explore, expose, or suspend assumptions of self, society, and others; a space for creativity and flexibility by both parties and facilitators; and a space to share experiences of violent conflict situations to deconstruct enemy images and

narratives and, in turn, create shared meanings and narratives (Feller and Ryan 2012: 359-361).

Last, dialogue may be conceived as a 'going concern'. In other words, given that the core or primary resource needed are parties' involvement, then human communities ought to embrace dialogue as a relationship-enhancing mechanism more or less indeterminately. Schirch and Campt (2007: 26) observe that dialogue can be applied "interpersonally as a one-time event, within a larger event like a conference, in a series of meetings, or a sustained process over many years". As a one-time event, dialogue may be called, among other reasons, to mobilise a community to explore a specific subject or to address an imminent conflict's crisis point, while large-scale dialogue brings together "hundreds or even thousands of participants centrally arranged with small group conversations providing space for expression of diverse perspectives". This, according to Schirch and Campt (2007: 29), gives "people a more palpable sense of community".

Feller and Ryan (2012) discussion of the traits of dialogue can arguably be advanced as strengthening the 'going concern' argument. For instance, three traits speak firmly to this concept. They claim that the process and external expression of dialogue is a 'movement' by parties to walk onto the bridge that divides communities, and further that dialogue must be "multigenerational and community oriented", building continuing structures that allow people to co-exist in peaceful and turbulent times. Though not all deeply divided societies will invariably be transformed through dialogue, with a commitment to multiple generations, dialogue can avert minor violent conflicts from triggering a cascade of violence. Finally, dialogue ought to be "holistic", meaning "broad based" by reaching out to many sectors of society, networking with many dialogue-oriented organisations, and building the capacity of divided communities (Feller and Ryan 2012: 364).

4.3 Types of Dialogue

As noted in the preceding section, dialogue can be mounted as once-off event, a conference involving interactions, a sequence of meetings, or a process sustained over a period of time often running into years. Conversely, given the multiplicity of focal points

and participants, the practice of dialogue can be mounted in several forms, namely, agonistic dialogue and sustained dialogue. Further, there are examples of the practice of dialogue in human relations conflicts: intercultural engagements, interfaith/interreligious encounters, and inter-political party exchanges.

4.3.1 Agonistic Dialogue

First, agonistic dialogue stresses not only the areas or issues of disagreement between parties, as argued by Maddison and Diprose (2017: 6), but is also concerned with the undercurrents of the relationships motivating the issues. They add that it concerns disputing parties finding ways to live together without "subsuming their multiple and varied experiences of past episodes of violence within a single narrative". The ideal focus is relational transformation, a change that goes beyond power relations and one that occurs at the level of self and values. The call here is for participants to let go of their own assumptions and instead look at other people's opinions without making judgements and then appreciating the benefit of collective opinions (Obelleiro 2013: 45; Maddison 2015: 1018; Suransky and Alma 2018: 29).

Based on the agonistic orientation to dialogue work in Poso, Indonesia, Maddison and Diprose (2017: 11) note that a process that is "sustained, focuses on the relational aspects and is intensive". It also creates space for the emergence of various narratives of violence, culminating in points of divergence, connection, and convergence among enemies which has transformative effects. This transformative potency, as Maddison and Diprose (2017: 13) agree, is derived from the creation of a political space which, as a consequence, capacitates parties to engage their differences by actively foregrounding their multiple narratives and experiences of violence.

Thus, such a process with an agonistic orientation has three key requirements in Maddison's (2015) view. First, it is "sustained over time", with intentions to change conflictual relationships, focusing on both the problems and relational aspects. Second, it requires an "intensive level of engagement" with the process and content, taking conflict issues not as stumbling blocks but issues calling for further exploration through collaborative scrutiny. Third, it is undeniably "relational in focus" and as such,

"relationships between parties remain crucial as points of analysis and change" (Maddison 2015: 1025). Perhaps Suransky and Alma's (2018: 36) observations aptly synthesise the agonism orientation to dialogue: that it calls for the creation of "dialogical environments that are not primarily geared to achieving harmonious consensus, but strive instead to improve the quality of conversations, including challenging confrontations".

4.3.2 Sustained Dialogue

In the previous discussion of dialogue, two aspects highlighted as key for agonism were relationships and sustainability. The current approach elaborates on sustainability with more specific traits on relationships. Svensson and Brouneus (2013: 565) view sustained dialogue as anchored on the principles of contact theory (discussed in detail later), through a series of meetings over a period of time. These are dialogue processes that have no defined ending which Schirch and Campt (2007: 28) describe as "learning communities or support groups that purposely employ dialogue in their meetings". The approach is helpful in cases where issues are deeply entrenched in "people's perceptions of their identity, religion or culture and where conflict is complex concerning many stakeholders".

There are two distinct and significant features regarding sustained dialogue that merit illumination. First, it focuses on 'relationships' that may have set a community apart. These may be dysfunctional given their evolution over time or may seem amiable but carry destructive interactions beneath. For analytical and operational reasons, Saunders (2011: 24-25) delineates relationships into five integral components – "identity" (including life experience); "interests, substantive and psychological"; "power" (including people's capacity to act together); "perceptions, misperceptions, and stereotypes about the other"; and "patterns of interaction" of those involved.

The second feature of sustained dialogue is that it employs a defined process. Sustained dialogue, as claimed by Saunders (2011), offers a sense of purpose, direction, and destination for parties willing to become involved in an open-ended process, a process that also creates openings to develop a "cumulative agenda; a common body of knowledge such as understanding each side's experiences, concerns and interests; new

ways of talking and relating that facilitates cooperation and opportunities to work together" (Saunders 2011: 26). However, Svensson and Brouneus (2013: 567) explain the practice of sustained dialogue as comprising "a series of repeated dialogue meetings run with a small group of people (around ten) in which several defined steps are addressed (identification of problem, cost/benefit, scenario building, action etc.) in a discussion led by trained moderators". Beyond agonistic and sustained dialogue, there are other areas in which dialogue is practiced and these are briefly discussed in the following section.

4.4 Four Examples of Dialogue Practice

4.4.1 Human Resource and Labour Conflicts

A familiar approach among human resources and labour relations practitioners is social dialogue. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) presents social dialogue as "all types of negotiation, consultation and exchange of issues of common interest relating to economic or social policy" (International Labour Office 2013: 39). As far as the practice is concerned, it is stated that social dialogue can be mounted as a "tripartite process with the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may be a bipartite relations between labour and management, with or without indirect government involvement" (International Labour Office 2013: 39). For others, social dialogue is about the interaction of "social groups representing different interests shared by their respective members" and not necessarily between individuals (Lucia 2014: 129).

While sustained dialogue has a defined process, it is not possible to determine the outputs. Social dialogue, on the other hand, does culminate in defined results and prescribes how to achieve such. For example, Hermans, Huyse and Ongevalle (2017: 7) note that "social dialogue creates tangible outputs, such as collective bargaining agreements, social pacts, co-determination of policies or tripartite governance of certain policy areas, e.g. human resource development and employment policies". Additionally, the International Labour Office (2013: 39) notes that such dialogue can be "informal or institutionalised or a combination of the two and mounted at the national, trans-national, regional or at enterprise level". Further, it can be "inter-professional, sectoral or both".

4.4.2 Intercultural Dialogue

Although it may be assumed that a dialogue process can be mounted in any context, there are unique cultural factors that necessitate particular intercultural conversations. Perhaps thoughts that speak to the significance of such dialogue cultivate intercultural competence. Abu-Nimer and Smith (2016: 397), for instance, argue that this competence entails an "individual's ability to shift his/her point of view from an ethnocentric viewpoint to one that acknowledges cultural differences. That is allowing for the individual to successfully interact with people of different cultures". This resonates with Suransky and Alma (2018: 31) who claim that "to understand others in an intercultural context, calls for a recognition that there are many different 'home truths', and that one's own viewpoints may lose their taken for granted status".

In 2015, during the World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue (WFID) held in Baku, Azerbaijan, discussions around intercultural dialogue were illuminative. Hardy and Hussain (2017: 69), for example, report that the forum stressed the importance of intercultural dialogue, that "it enables long-term and intensive engagement with people from another culture, helping communities to see their own culture from different perspectives, and helping all to re-evaluate views and ideas". It is imperative to add that new perspectives are best appreciated from an empathetic position. Suransky and Alma (2018: 31) claim that "in a culturally plural dialogical context, empathy is seen as a crucial quality for those who engage in reasonable arguments".

From the experiences of the Naga Land dialogue, Goswami (2017: 27) contends that empathy, alongside humanity, are paramount in any dialogue. In particular, in circumstances "where violence between communities and tribes is a regular phenomenon and the structures of the state administrative systems are indifferent to the affected societies" adds (Goswami 2017: 27). Comparably, Suransky and Alma (2018: 33) argue that the success of intercultural interchanges hinges on understanding how global disparities, inequalities, and injustices between people can render such dialogue psychologically challenging and as politically charged efforts.

4.4.3 Interfaith Dialogue

Abu-Nimer and Smith (2016: 393) counsel that "constructive contact with those who are different from 'us' entails possession of intercultural and interreligious competencies as central life skills in this increasingly interconnected world". Herein lies the significance of interfaith or interreligious dialogue. The King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) conceptualises interreligious dialogue as "dialogue between people of different religious identities that stresses self-expression and reciprocal listening without passing judgment. Further, seeking and reaching a mutual understanding (learning) and respect that allows for coexistence despite their differences" (Abu-Nimer 2015: 1).

As such, dialogue between "people identifying with diverse religions has often been endorsed as a progressive approach of constructing more unified communities". This is in response to the perceived threat and conflicts that may arise from such divisions (Orton 2016: 350). In addition, from his cumulative research experience in Europe, Orton (2016) has developed a theoretical framework of appraising interfaith dialogue with seven fundamental questions for theory, policy, and practice. While this framework is conceived from a European context, it is possible that it can be adapted and applied in other contexts. These questions, as Orton stresses, ought to be asked distinctly to realise a more nuanced enquiry while acknowledging their interconnectedness. However, for the purposes of this section, these are presented as one set of guidelines for analysis.

First, it is "who is involved" in this dialogue that highlights the diversity of worldviews and cultures brought to the process. Second, it regards "who is missing", paying particular attention to the level of participation from marginalised groups in particular. Third, the question is "what is the dialogue for?" The claim here is that several people may have different motivations and aims to achieve from their involvement in the process. Fourth, one must answer "how is the complexity of diversity understood to affect interfaith dialogue?" This diversity focuses on individual participants' shared and different characteristics. The fifth question asks "what conditions (process oriented) enable effective interfaith dialogue". Subsequently, the question is "how are the dynamics of participation and representation by different individuals and groups handled?", and finally,

"what dilemmas may arise within interfaith dialogue, and how might these be handled by those involved?" (Orton 2016: 353-361).

4.4.4 Inter-Political Party Dialogue

One of the leading organisations pioneering this approach to dialogue is the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). These dialogue processes are delivered under a framework known as Inter-Party Dialogue platforms (IPDs) which is one of its key strategies since inception in 2002. The purpose of such interventions is to "bring together the leadership of both the ruling and opposition parties in order to facilitate and promote accommodative politics and consensus-oriented inter-party debate between parties on concrete policy and political reform challenges" (De Jong and Boutylkova 2014: 6). Other proponents of this type of dialogue provide further justification for its advance.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International-IDEA), for example, believes that political dialogue can "build trust and the political will for change and enhance cooperation between political parties thereby ensuring democracy is entrenched beyond electoral competition" (Kemp *et al.* 2013: 12). Inter-party dialogue, as delivered through NIMD, purposely encourages local ownership, inclusiveness, and equality from all parliamentary parties. This is achieved by parties assigning their senior members to serve on joint/focal point structures responsible for coordination. Thus, broadly speaking, political dialogue, as Kemp *et al.* (2013: 24) suggest, is "any sort of dialogue that happens between political parties in already existing structures such as national and local parliaments, parliamentary commissions and caucuses". The involvement of political leadership in an even and inclusive form, as contended by De Jong and Boutylkova (2014: 6), assists "parties to avert political conflicts that might otherwise degenerate into violence".

Three fundamental aspects can be advanced regarding political dialogues, as espoused and pioneered by NIMD. First, beyond regular elitist political debates, it also provides space for women, men, and minorities in political decision-making. Second, while there is some degree of unanimity in terms of the "process, procedures, structures, need for impartiality and inclusivity", its popularity within the political spectrum is evident

in applied terms – "democratic dialogue", "multistakeholder dialogue", "political dialogue", and "inter-party dialogue". Third, inter-party dialogue is often integral to the wider democratic transformation agenda with specific efforts toward peace-building, political and economic reform processes (Kemp *et al.* 2013: 24).

Of the four examples, not only is social dialogue pre-set with known outputs or results, it also exhibits very little flexibility and may be susceptible to the whims of neoliberalism. This would in turn entail relegating perspectives and views of participants (such as labour unions) in the dialogue processes. On the other hand, in inter-party dialogue, despite some orientation towards coexistence, the commitment to relationship building is not as explicit as in the case of agonistic and sustained forms of dialogue. However, in practice, the results of national inter-party dialogues are diverse, as discussed in subsequent sections.

4.5 Dialogue and Contact Hypothesis

The hypothesis that underpins intergroup contact posits that positive effects of intergroup contact are realised only in situations driven by six conditions. These include mutual interdependence, where two or more groups need each other to accomplish a goal; a common goal important to both groups; equal status of group members; having informal and interpersonal contact; and multiple contact with members of the 'outgroup'; and 'social norms' put in place to promote equality (Allport 1954). It is therefore imperative to briefly delve into various perspectives that encase each of these aspects.

First, the cultivation of coexistence, enhanced relationships, cooperation, and bringing dialogue to fruition are mutual undertakings necessitating the involvement of all parties. In addition, as noted by Schirch and Campt (2007: 28), as people engage through, for example, dialogue "around challenging subjects with people unlike themselves, they are likely to galvanise new support for community transformation". For example, through such engagements, "organisations and publics can make decisions that contribute to social capital" (Taylor and Kent 2014: 384). Social capital is a resource derived from relationships and it is a tangible outcome that benefits those involved and even those not directly involved.

Second, implicitly or overtly, parties commit to dialogue and/or make contact with the 'other' because they share a common goal, creating a new trajectory and relationship. The feasibility of this goal hinges on parties' willingness to learn and change (Schirch and Campt 2007: 10). As extant literature provides, the new path and relationship does not happen as an isolated event but as a progression from contact to cohesion. Sarwari (2017) contact and cohesion theory suggests that "contact initiation" should be followed by "negotiation", "cognition", and finally "cohesion". However, seven essential conditions aid this theory, namely, coherent competence, self-knowledge, respecting differences, flexibility, shared interests, purposefulness, and a coherent heart (Sarwari 2017: 7).

With particular reference to a study of Eastern Asians' context of communication, Sarwari maintains that "to have successful interaction with people from different nationalities, people should consider the cognition, flexibility, and purposefulness as critical elements that could influence their contact and they must respect diversities during their interactions" (Sarwari 2017: 8).

Sønderskov and Thomsen (2015: 51) argue that contact situations should symbolise equal status between the parties, and that "a strong zero-sum based competition between outgroup and in-group members may perhaps 'pollute' the mutual relationships due to high personal stakes". In other words, as indicated earlier, equal status of group members is important for contact. Members from both in-groups and outgroups should be able to enjoy equal status for effective and cohesive intergroup contact. Sønderskov and Thomsen's synthesis is again useful here:

> [I]ntergroup contact should be seen as a potential extension of interpersonal contact. Intergroup contact occurs when the outgroup individual is consciously seen as a prototypical member of the outgroup rather than a unique individual ... Intergroup contact entails social identities (us-and-them), whereas interpersonal contact is confined to personal social identities (you and me) (Sønderskov and Thomsen 2015: 52).

In peacebuilding parlance, parties leaning towards resolving, or more aptly, transforming their conflict are acting more as problem solvers working collaboratively. Thus, equal status as one of the prerequisites for contact is inevitably significant.

Fourth, having informal interpersonal contacts between members of the in-group and outgroup has a bearing on the overall outlook of the contact. Informal interpersonal contact has the potential to lessen prejudices. Allport (1954: 7) defines prejudice as "an aversive and hostile attitude toward an individual who belongs to a group, simply because he/she belongs to that group, and is assumed to carry objectionable qualities ascribed to the group". However, Allport (1954) conversely contends that "prejudgments precede prejudices", that the latter lingers if the former is not reversed when exposed to new knowledge. Thus, informal interpersonal contact would invariably provide new evidence which would, in turn, possibly unseat the prejudice.

However, some empirical studies show that interpersonal contact may not always have a bearing on intergroup prejudice. For example, a study to examine whether sustained contact in an education setting can improve communal relations in conflict contexts in Nigeria is a case in point. Scacco and Warren (2018) randomly sampled Christian and Muslim young men from disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Their study revealed that populace-level interventions that encourage contact between members of religious groups in conflict have little effect on intergroup prejudice. Instead, they bring about increased kindness towards outgroups and a diminution in discriminatory conduct.

Similarly, while the contact hypothesis holds that sustained contact between diverse groups would culminate into some form of cordiality, it is not so in some contexts. Isike (2017: 3231) study of South Africans' perception of Nigerian immigration using contact theory revealed that "intergroup contact between South Africans and Nigerian migrants had a paradoxical effect on the nature of their relationships". She adds that "in most cases, conviviality was fostered as well as entanglement of relations and to a lesser degree latent xenophobic sentiments and hostility were revived through contact".

Beyond informal interpersonal contact, the contact hypothesis also calls for multiple contact with members of the 'outgroup'. This, in keeping with Vezzali and Stathi (2017: 1), entails that "contact between individuals from different groups can promote the development of more positive outgroup attitudes". Scacco and Warren (2016: 3) support this assertion but add that "if structured within a cooperative and egalitarian framework,

should reduce prejudice, promote friendships across a social divide and, as a result, improve intergroup relations". From Allport's (1954) standpoint, the contact described here has positive outcomes, such as increased awareness about outgroups, and reveals any stereotypes to be untrue. Additionally, this interaction may scale down any anxieties regarding future encounters with outgroups as well as result in more empathy and standpoint shift.

Above all, the overarching benefit of multiple contact with members of the outgroup is that four processes of change are evident and add to in-group members' transformation. The following text summarises these four inevitable changes:

> [C]on tact can, and does, work through cognitive (i.e. learning about outgroup) behavioural (changing one's behaviour to open oneself to potential positive contact experiences), affective (generating affective ties and friendships, and reducing negative emotions) and in-group appraisal reappraising how one thinks about one's own in-group. (Everett 2013: 3).

Perhaps the reason why such changes are inevitable is because there is thick insulation of in-group traits from any external forces or change. Interestingly, this insulation is not easily perceived or noticed by in-group members until there is some form of contact with the outgroup. In Allport's (1954: 46) view, "in-groups are psychologically primary, we live them, by them and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward outgroups helps strengthen our sense of belonging but it is not required".

In sum, literature on intergroup contact reveals that there are two dominant approaches to intergroup contact. The 'coexistence approach' encourages mutual understanding and tolerance to reduce stereotypes and outgroup discrimination, as well as identify and stress the commonalities and diversities between the opposing groups. On the other hand, the 'confrontational approach' "emphasises conflict issues and power relations of the two parties. It does not aim at cultivating harmony instead attempts to allow participating groups to engage in direct confrontation" (Weinberg-Kurnik, Nadan and Ari 2014: 70; Hammack and Pilecki 2015: 373). Of the two approaches, the former is preferred and recommended, given its orientation to promote partnership and cooperation between parties.

Further, it is imperative to state that contact between in-groups and outgroups may not always be direct (face-to-face). Everett (2013), for instance, claims that intergroup contact aimed at reducing prejudice has moved away from being face-to-face between group members. The idea now is that indirect contact (e.g. imagined contact, or knowledge of contact) could also have a positive result. Along the same line, a study was carried out on non-Muslim Americans' attitude towards Muslims using the 'parasocial contact hypothesis', which focuses on how media can offer an indirect form of intergroup contact, thus examining how news consumption (as a parasocial contact) with Muslims relates to attitudes towards Muslims. The study revealed that "contact with Muslims and closeness to Muslims, regardless of relationship type is related to more positive attitude toward Muslims" (Abrams, McGaughey and Haghighat 2018: 12).

Last, it is stated that every minority group is often amidst a larger society where many customs, standards, and practices are prescribed. According to Allport (1954: 38):

> [A] minority group member takes the dominant majority as his/her reference group in respect to language, manners, morals, and law. He/she may be totally loyal to his smaller in-group, but at the same time should be relating to the values and expectations of the majority.

Thus, there is a need for social norms that may be brought into play to promote equality thereby enhancing contact between groups. Notably, the prejudice reduction model, as advanced by McKeown and Dixon (2017: 6), "encourages dominant group extremists to like others more, based on the assumption that this process gradually reduces wider patterns of discrimination", further reducing the prominence of group boundaries, differences, and identities, thereby cultivating social harmony.

Some of the specific social norms that may be encouraged to foster contact include 'reducing outgroup infrahumanisation', 'intergroup forgiveness', 'intergroup empathy', and 'reduced intergroup anxiety'. Capozza *et al.* (2013) describe infrahumanisation as the propensity to see the in-group as more human than outgroups and intergroup forgiveness as clemency for past wrongdoings committed by in-group members, while intergroup empathy and anxiety entail emotional reactions to the emotion(s) lived through by

members of the outgroup and "feelings of apprehension and discomfort in anticipation of interacting with the outgroup", respectively (Capozza *et al.* 2013: 530). Two studies of intergroup relations between Italians and immigrants and Northern Italians versus Southern Italians are quite instructive in this respect. The studies revealed that "contact is associated with greater outgroup humanisation through the mediation of group representations which, in turn are related to emotions felt toward the outgroup" (Capozza *et al.* 2013: 536). The studies also highlighted the significant role that intergroup emotions, such as anxiety and empathy, play in ameliorating intergroup relations.

While the six conditions for the enhancement of contact between in-groups and outgroups are noteworthy, there are communication styles from contexts such as Asia and Africa that merit mention even parenthetically. The Asian or Eastern part of the world practises a high-context style of communication that Sarwari (2017) argues stresses politeness and indirectness. On the other hand, a Kiswahili saying, '*Mtu ni Utu*' (a person is humanness) signifies the value in humanness. *Utu* highlights forgiveness, showing compassion and sharing with others. Njogu (2013: 6) adds that it "encourages going beyond the 'self' to the 'other' in turn obtaining fulfilment". As language is shaped through interaction, so is one's humanity and one's relationships are always dialogic. The further one moves away from this interactivity, the more one is separated from one's humanity.

The essence of the last two examples is to illustrate the fact that different people and societies have their own diverse cultural communication patterns that may have a bearing on intergroup or interpersonal contact. In addition to contact, in order to realise the full potential of dialogue, there are also other underlining frameworks such as the 'conflict transformation theory'. The following section draws some parallels between dialogue and conflict transformation.

4.6 Dialogue and Conflict Transformation

Lederach (2003) conflict transformation perspective is premised on two profound bases: first, the capacity to appreciate conflict as a natural phenomenon that creates potential for constructive development, and second, a willingness on the part of those in conflict to respond in a manner that maximises the potential for positive transformation (Lederach

2003: 15). Therefore, herein lies the parallel between dialogue and conflict transformation which is mutually reinforcing and merits elaboration. Additionally, it is critical even before an intervention, such as a dialogue process, is prescribed to be cognisant of changes that differences between parties engender.

For example, as mentioned in Chapters one and three, Lederach (2003) advances that conflict has a fourfold level effect on parties – personal, relational, structural, and cultural. Not only are these changes integral aspects of the theory of conflict transformation, they also remain essential in the delivery of a dialogue process in the quest to transform hostile and destructive situations. The personal, relational, structural, and cultural elements prescriptively advance specific fundamental aims that are crucial in exploring dialogue as a mechanism for ameliorating social and political conflicts, among others. This section will therefore devote considerable attention to sharing various perspectives on the four levels of changes vis-à-vis the dialogue process. However, a justification for why conflict transformation is crucial is needed.

The Berghof Foundation (2012: 23), for example, describes conflict transformation as "the most deep-reaching and holistic conceptualisation of constructive changes that are needed to build a just peace". Additionally, it is stated that conflict transformation goes beyond finding solutions to the presenting issues and seeks to address the bigger picture of the conflict, that is, addressing underlying "structural, cultural and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict" (Lederach 2003; Berghof Foundation 2012: 23). Others see a typical peacebuilding dialogue as having a five-step trajectory:

1) from exploring similarities and differences,
2) to unpacking stereotypes about the other,
3) to comparing perspectives on political history,
4) to sharing personal stories about how conflict has impacted participants' lives,
5) to assessing challenges of reentry into a community still in conflict, planning reunions with new friends from other communities, and, if it is safe, designing peacebuilding projects (Ungerleider 2012: 385).

In addition, based on earlier discussions and this trajectory, *a dialogue conflict transformation nexus* is conceived, as depicted in Figure 4.1. From this relationship, the researcher contends that the dialogue process represented by the left pyramid sets off with parties' common goal of, for example, building and enhancing relationships and ultimately agreeing to co-exist. From contact initiation, they walk the dialogue pathway up to joint action.



Figure 4.1: Dialogue conflict transformation nexus (Source: Author, 2018).

All the activities that may not happen hierarchically reinforce the transformation process taking place along the inverted pyramid. Both processes function within the realm of the historical and relational context as well as any recent conflict dynamics. In the case of the current study location, Kalulushi, the jurisdiction includes 2015 and 2016 post-election political conflicts, violence, and hostile relations that have a bearing on the dialogue process. As Maddison and Diprose (2017: 4) aptly posit:

> [F]or dialogue processes to contribute to conflict transformation, they must engage rather than avoid past conflict dynamics and episodes of violence. This

includes engaging the political aspects of the conflict and providing space for varied individual and collective experiences of conflict to be explored in order to 'rehumanise the other'.

Further, all dialogue process activities not only reinforce the personal, relational, and cultural level changes, they should also culminate in joint action which should yield the apex. At this level, that which is envisaged is that collaboratively, the conversations between in-groups and outgroups should lead to policy or legislative recommendations, or alternatively, an initiation of an infrastructure for peace based on the context. As the summit of the dialogue process, with these outputs, the long-term impact is great since it has a direct impetus towards structural transformation (Inverted Pyramid). Structural changes seek to rid a context of negative social conditions that allow for the violent expression of both social and political conflicts. Lederach (2003: 21) concludes that "people must have access and voices in decisions that affect their lives and patterns that create injustice must be addressed and changed at both relational and structural levels".

In sum, the essence of the dialogue conflict transformation nexus is that of simultaneity and stressing the fact that a seemingly 'minor' output should climax major improved structural conditions. To have a broader appreciation of the intertwining of these four levels of changes and the dialogue process, it is imperative to share some corresponding perspectives by others. First, 'personal transformation', as advanced by Lederach (2003) and as briefly shared in Section 3.7, hinges on reducing the negative impact of social (even political) conflicts and increasing the prospects for individual development and welfare. From a dialogic standpoint, there are aspects that have a transformative aptitude for participating individuals. For example, the Berghof Foundation (2012: 30) advances five such elements which merit reiterating:

a) "Demonstrating respect for and acknowledging the equality of all dialogue participants"
b) "Developing active listening skills and empathy for the contributions from dialogue partners"
c) "Suspension of own assumptions, ideas, emotions and opinions"
d) "Speaking from the heart and expressing one's own truth in a genuine manner"

e) "Slowing down the process of communication and interaction – opening up to new insights and exploring opportunities for joint learning."

As explained by Schirch and Campt (2007), dialogue affects three distinct but related parts of humanity – the intellect, emotions, and spirit – and the effectiveness (success) of a dialogue process should be tied to addressing each of these factors. Thus, in transforming the personal dimension of the conflict, dialogue exposes participants to different ways of seeing the world. Vezzali and Stathi (2017) add that it does stimulate greater emotional understanding of the other and the self and fosters the growth of positive outgroup attitudes.

The significance of this transformation in the case of Zambia is that it responds to studies that show that older party members regard young colleagues as lacking the necessary competence and having poorly-developed leadership skills (Yezi 2013: 56). Consequently, transformation, as integral to dialogue, will assist in minimising young people's predisposition to violence and maximise their potential for growth as individuals. Consistent with this view, Ungerleider (2012: 401) argues that an appropriately focused dialogue process stimulates self-disclosure and reflective analysis among diverse participants: understanding and being understood, and that youth-to-youth dialogue facilitates the beginning of an array of individual and shared capacities for emerging leaders for peace and change.

Second, 'relational transformation' is anchored on maximising understanding by ridding relationships of that which Lederach (2003: 27) calls "poorly functioning communication". Poor communication and decision-making processes run counter to the dictates of dialogue. Literature on dialogue and relationships demonstrates that relationship building is enhanced through the sharing of experiences of prior unhealthy social relations characterised by antagonism, repression, or violence and information about parties' concerns. A key point advanced is the historical embeddedness of the relational dimension of conflict (Maddison 2015; Maddison and Diprose 2017: 6).

In addition, relational transformation, as reiterated by Lederach (2003: 25), addresses patterns of how people perceive, what they desire, what they pursue, and how they structure their relationships – interpersonal, intra-group, and intergroup. Studies about young people reveal that youth-serving, youth-led, and youth-advocacy groups are not included in mainstream interventions of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and are often overlooked (International Youth Foundation 2014). Therefore, structured dialogue creates an enclosed (but open for free expression) space for young politicians to relate effectively with their peers, for sharing and listening in an inclusive process that solicits participants' attention to needs different from their own (Ungerleider 2012: 388).

For young politicians, in realising relational change, it may be useful to also pay attention to insightful theoretical prescriptions by Bramsen and Poder (2018) regarding how negative and positive emotions fuel agency. Positive Emotional Energy/Expression (EE) contribute to agency through "solidarity, enthusiasm, confidence in comparatively equal measure among the participants, while negative emotional energy such as anger, rage, resentment, hostility, skepticism and suspicion sponsor conflictual agency and presents the affective nature of enmity" (Bramsen and Poder 2018: 7). In the same vein, Bramsen and Poder claim that there are four types of relations that are key to conflict and conflict transformation:

> the "*cooperative interaction*", which produce positive EE in individuals and solidarity among them; the "*dominating interaction*", with unequal power relations resulting in the dominating parties gaining more emotional energy than the subordinated parties – while the dominating parties are affirmed, the minor is subjugated in the interaction; the "*conflictual interaction*", which generates negative EE through antagonistic tension, anger, rage and in turn facilitates agency and pulls the opponents together in hatred; and finally, the "*disengaged interaction*" which, as the names suggests, drains energies and pushes participants to experience boredom, disinterest or fatigue (Bramsen and Poder 2018: 7-9).

Not only are these exchanges prevalent in social conflicts, they also characterise relations between leading political groups in Zambia (Namaiko and Etyang 2017). Therefore, it is important as part of the relational dimension transformation to examine how interactional tendencies stimulate solidarity and emotional energies or exacerbate existing polarities.

Perhaps Bramsen and Poder (2018: 13) observation is fitting here, "that one of the most promising aspects of understanding emotional and interactional dynamics is how it can inform mediation and peacebuilding practices, and be of direct value for practitioners in the field".

As explained in Section 3.7, the third level of transformation is cultural which Lederach (2003) associates with identifying and appreciating cultural patterns that aid the increased violent expression of conflict. Conversely recognising and building upon positive resources and processes with a given setting, it seeks to understand how conflict affects and changes the cultural pattern of a group and further, how those accumulated and shared patterns affect the way people in that setting understand and respond to conflict (Lederach 2003: 26). As Schirch and Campt (2007: 14) note, in harvesting from the cultural pool, dialogue reignites parties' sense of empathy for others and prompts them to act to change the situation.

Those who have applied dialogue among young people elsewhere speak about participants' increase in cross-cultural awareness, deepening the understanding of cultural identity as well as processing the meaning of intercultural interactions. They assert that cultural clarification speaks to the ills of miscommunication and participants' increased awareness of cross-cultural variation and cultural appropriateness in communication practices (Ungerleider 2012). In addition, one of the pre-conditions for a successful dialogue, as argued by Schirch and Campt (2007: 24), is when there is a "diversity of experiences" among the parties, and when "the degree of transformation in a dialogue process is fundamentally linked to the degree of diversity in the group, as participants see that diverse experiences lead to different views on the same subject".

The final and crucial level of transformation is 'structural'. It is a change process that seeks to appreciate and deal with sources and social conditions that trigger the violent expression of conflict. The significance of this dimension is that not only does it call for nonviolent approaches to reduce antagonistic confrontations and exclude violence, it also supports the development of structures that respond to peoples' basic human needs and scaling up their participation in decisions that affect their welfare

(Lederach 2003). Thus, through dialogic interactions, parties would be made aware that what they believe about an issue is shaped to some degree by existing social or political structures. As such, some see structural transformation as encompassing "change from asymmetric to symmetric relations, change in power structures, and changes of markets of violence" (Miall 2004: 10).

In addition, the simultaneity of dialogue and conflict transformation processes, as proposed in this project, has a fivefold positive bearing according to (Schirch and Campt 2007). Initially, it would assist participants to deal with their deeper historical differences and reflections on a shared humanity and common ground. Second, a sense of community and cohesion would be ignited such that even where no recognised precedence of relationships existed, this will come to the fore. Improved communication patterns between different parties, from violence to nonviolence, may perhaps be another aspect that dialogue will engender. Fourth, it would create space for participants to collectively and collaboratively identify critical issues separating the parties. Lastly, stimulated by collective analysis, dialogue should ultimately move participants into generating options for collective or joint action. It is about communities harnessing their diversity for constructive change (Schirch and Campt 2007: 21).

Change envisaged here transcends all levels of relationships and interpersonal, intergroup, and social structures (Lederach 2003). There is some degree of unanimity among scholars on the suitability of 'dialogue' to effect constructive transformation at all these levels. As shown earlier in Figure 4.1, change ignited at the individual level and contact at the base of the dialogue process has the potential to culminate into a sustainable and transformative peace process (Lederach 2003; Hur 2017).

Lederach (2003: 21) argues that dialogue is important to justice and peace "both at interpersonal and structural levels". Further, in addition to the diversity of experiences discussed earlier as a pre-condition for successful dialogue, there are three other aspects that ought to be mentioned in closing. First, while dialogue can assist in cultivating conditions for joint action, this is effective when there is "no pressure for immediate action or decision to be made". Second, parties to a dialogue process should have relatively

equal levels of power. Power imbalances between participants have the propensity to weaken the group's capacity to dialogue. Third, "similarity in perceived language capacity or similar abilities to articulate their thoughts, emotions and spirit through words is equally crucial" (Schirch and Campt 2007: 24-26).

4.7 International and National Practice: Some Examples

The practice of dialogue is an integral component of peacebuilding that is not only mounted at the interpersonal or intergroup levels but transcends borders. In other words, as the literature on dialogue grows, so too does the practice. To have a fuller appreciation of dialogue and relationship building, it is essential to mention the exercise of dialogue at the international and national levels.

4.7.1 Dialogue at the International Level

Jeong (2010) asserts that dialogue is a diplomatic tool as well as a mechanism to bring communal violence to an end. Thus, at the international level, dialogue has become institutionalised as countries strive to inaugurate communication between communities and even political players. Dialogue at this level may be "large scale, drawing in thousands of people ... giving all participants a chance to express their perspectives" (Schirch and Campt 2007: 29). While cases of dialogue at the international level abound, only a few are mentioned here.

First, although issues between them are not settled, the Israeli and Palestinian conflict has walked the dialogical aisle several times, therefore it qualifies as an example of international dialogue. Commentators on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have described participants in the dialogue as comprising professionals and academics who are familiar with the past and present issues. These are also representatives of their respective Israelis and Palestinians societies and the large majority were born and live into these societies (Scham, Pogrund and Ghanem 2013: 2). The significance of this configuration is that the vast majority of the population are well acquainted with the historical, relational, and conflict dynamics and should be able to contribute to the dialogue process.

Second, as noted by Jeong (2010: 200), dialogue has been adopted as "part of strategic meetings to exchange different perspectives about economic and trade issues between China and the United States particularly during the Bush administration". Additionally, "in addressing concerns with China's environmental pollution, Germany has held bilateral meetings in order to explore technical assistance"(Jeong 2010: 200). While these are international cases of dialogical relations between state actors, there are interventions called international dialogues pioneered by non-state actors. One case in point is the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), officially set up in 2008, following the effectiveness of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid. Its mandate is "to develop a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives and an action plan for effective engagement in fragile states" (International Dialogue 2018: 1).

Consultations and exchanges that have characterised the sharing of the Nile waters serves as the third case of international dialogue. These discussions are realised through an initiative known as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) established in 1999, although negotiations around the Nile waters goes as far back as the 1920s (Onencan and Van de Walle 2018). It is an inclusive regional platform for riparian states to engage in dialogue, information sharing, and joint planning and management of water and related resources in the Nile Basin. The basin is shared by eleven riparian states including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Onencan and Van de Walle 2018: 4). Since its inception, the NBI has lived up to its organisational mission through that which Woldetsadik (2017: 222) condenses as "building an atmosphere of trust and dialogue among riparian states and for embedding a sense of growing conviction in a common destiny".

Last, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) is another case of efforts towards international level dialogue. Established in 1988 and based in the Philippines, IID is an "advocacy organisation aimed at promoting human security, democratisation and people to people solidarity. Some of the works include policy advocacy and campaign programmes on Burma, Mindanao, Southern Thailand, West Papua and East Timor" (International Dialogue 2018: 1)

Beyond these international dialogue interventions, there are a myriad of examples of national dialogue interventions in regions such as Africa that merit illustrating.

4.7.2 National Level Dialogue

The inevitability of national dialogue may be anchored on the view that there are growing misunderstandings, suspicions, and conflicts between nationalities and communities globally. Thus, small groups or entire communities come together in dialogue sessions to converse on a series of issues from "specific local resource conflicts to racial and ethnic tensions. As part of grassroots peacebuilding, dialogue's long-standing aim is the promotion of peace from below by encouraging collaboration among people who share an interdependent future" (Jeong 2010: 201). Invariably, at the national level, dialogue initiatives can be delivered in several forms such as inter-religious, intercultural, and inter-party (political) engagements transcending the societal spectrum. However, from extant literature, substantial work is exerted on national dialogues which is the core focus of this section.

National dialogues are internally developed and owned tools for addressing issues of national relevance such as political transformation (power-sharing, preparations for national elections, or the drafting of new constitutions). It is an inclusive and holistic national project that also helps national state and non-state actors to transform their social and political conflicts (Siebert, Kumar and Tasala 2014; Stigant and Murray 2015; Odigie 2017). Aside from reasons advanced here, some have also outlined other crucial objects for mounting national dialogues that deserve particular mention. For example, national dialogues serve as a mechanism for achieving a new political settlement during a transition phase, crisis management, and consensus-building; and strengthening state, constitutional, and political reform processes. This further helps to address the root causes of conflict and issues driven by the failure of the previous constitutions (Siebert 2014: 44; Siebert, Kumar and Tasala 2014: 35; Hartmann 2017: 4). Figure 4.2 illustrates the core principles of a national dialogue process.

Suggested Core PRINCIPLES of a National Dialogue Process…

a) *'Inclusiveness'* – providing space for all stakeholders with divergent or common interests and perceptions to attend in order to maximise dialogue's potential to deal with the root causes of the conflict.

b) *'Joint ownership'* – all concerned parties must own the process and not to allow a few powerful actors to dominate.

c) *'Listening, learning and adapting'* – ensures greater understanding of issues at hand or in a conflict.

d) *'Empathy and humanity'* – a need to not only understand one's own opinions but empathise with the other disputing parties' point of view.

e) *'Transparency and public participation'* – these hinge on the need to reach out to the public or the broader population to be kept informed even if they are not part of conversations. Local dialogue processes should be linked to national dialogue by way of regular outreach and public consultations.

f) *'Notions of 'self' and the 'other''* – aspects that should be bridged during dialogue processes.

g) *'A credible convener'* – to avoid perceptions of bias and secure the participation of a wider spectrum of stakeholders. Taking the form of an individual, a group of people, an organisation, or a coalition of organisations, the convener ought to be respected by the majority of citizens.

h) *'Agenda that addresses the root causes of conflict'* – since national dialogue seeks to reach an agreement on crucial issues, it is important that participants in the dialogue process fully understand the historical context driving the conflict.

i) *'Clear mandate and appropriately tailored structure, rules and procedures'* – it is stated that these elements lend purpose and authority to national dialogue. This also entails management and support structures including public participation mechanisms as noted in 'e' above.

j) *'Agreed mechanism for implementation of outcomes'* – this includes a vision for the future, ensuring that emerging recommendations are realised through, for example, a new constitution, law, policy or other programmes.

Figure 4.2: The core principles of a national dialogue process (adapted from (Siebert 2014: 44; Stigant and Murray 2015: 2-3; Goswami 2017: 22).

The practice and delivery of dialogue requires numerous core components or principles espoused by some scholars in order to, among other aspects, contribute to political transformation and peace. The list in Figure 4.2 may not be exhaustive but provides an overview of which aspects are fundamental. National dialogues have been held in different regions and some may still be emerging.

In sum, it is imperative to mention a few of the formally mandated national dialogue processes as exemplars. First, Tunisia held its national dialogue from 25 June 2013 to 26 January 2014 which was aimed at breaking a political deadlock between the Islamist-led government and the left wing and secular opposition (Haugbølle *et al.* 2017: 7). Focused on ending the impasse, the dialogue left out several key issues that had a bearing on the country's future. For example, according to Haugbølle *et al.* (2017: 7), pressing issues "such as fundamental changes in the state-society relations, reforms and far-reaching institutional changes, the economy and un-employment, and broader national reconciliation".

These were the basic demands in the popular uprising of 2010-2011. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Tunisian national dialogue stood true to one of the conditions for a successful process – joint ownership. Hamidi (2015: 19) observation is that "participants shared a sense of belonging to their country and a commitment to their society". It was seen as an opening to peacefully restore order to the country that was once known as being among the Arab Spring countries. The pre-dialogue situation is described as tense and Tunisians at all levels of society were fearful that the country might slide into chaos. Thus, the national dialogue, summarised as an "instrument for crisis management, was implemented while the crisis was still unfolding" (Haugbølle *et al.* 2017: 28). However, Hamidi (2015) considers that the primary push towards dialogue were economic factors (e.g. poor performance of the economy) that led participants to come together and resolve their political quagmire.

On the other hand, from a study of the Tunisian national dialogue, there are three concerns, among others, that Haugbølle *et al.* (2017: 40) point out as lessons learned, albeit negative, but useful for similar processes of dialogue:

a) "The dialogue process was based less on formal sessions than on informal talks, not only among the formal delegates but also by actors behind the scenes".

b) "The Tunisian national dialogue took place among actors who have been used to a non-dialogic culture... due to their past repressive, authoritarian regimes". As such, participants "had weak dialogue competences, and skills of listening, understanding and accepting others' views were learned while the process was unfolding".

c) The process "was highly centralised at a politically high level and not open to the public. It lacked public consultation and the wider population felt excluded suggesting that their demands from the 2010-2011 popular uprising were hijacked by an older political and intellectual elite".

It is evident from these observations that there is a mismatch between the core components of a successful national dialogue process discussed earlier and that which transpired in Tunisia.

Another example of national dialogue involves Yemen. Its national dialogue occurred from 18 March 2013 to 24 January 2014. The process is described as one that had no independent mediator to oversee the proceedings. Hamidi (2015: 31) notes that the "dialogue process was organised and run by the transitional government which problematically was not endorsed by all factions of the Yemeni society". In addition, Hamidi (2015: 23) notes earlier that "one of the biggest flaws of the national dialogue was to neglect 'bread and butter' issues which confronted regular citizens while the dialogue was taking place". From the initiation of the Yemen national dialogue, it is irrefutably clear that most of the elements for mounting a successful national dialogue were violated.

For example, it was not inclusive, ownership was skewed, transparency and public participation were equally doubtful, and given that socioeconomic concerns were not tabled, the agenda raised questions as well. Above all and perhaps the core reason why the national dialogue would be questionable, including its outcome, is the credibility of the convener. However, from an appraisal of both Tunisian and Yemeni national dialogues,

Hamidi (2015: 33) shares that which is referred to as 'key lessons learned' and which are worth paying attention to by countries in transition phases:

a) The grievances of secessionist movements should, in some cases, be addressed separately prior to engaging in a national dialogue, as their demands can hijack national dialogues which are meant to cover all of society's woes.
b) The economy should be revitalised at the same time as the dialogue is taking place (or at least efforts in this direction made).
c) Spoilers, whose participation in national dialogue can hide ulterior motives, should be minded.
d) National dialogue should assuage the fears of all participants and their constituencies by fostering tolerance for diversity within a society.
e) National dialogue should be overseen by an authority which is deemed legitimate by all participants.

Third, though not based on a single country's national dialogue, NIMD's work in several countries, through the establishing of dialogue forums – Inter-party Dialogue Platforms – as models, carries some lessons as well. For instance, fourteen countries have witnessed enhanced trust and growing mutual cooperation between political leaders and political parties. There has been advancement and alignment of democratic transformation agendas into national policy and budget processes in Ghana and Guatemala. Further, political education initiatives in Georgia, Indonesia, and Tunisia, among other countries, have seen a cohort of well-trained young political practitioners (De Jong and Boutylkova 2014: 7).

Kenya is another case of national dialogue. Following the widespread 2007 post-election violence, the country had political negotiations as part of the national dialogues and a reconciliation process held between 29 January 2008 and 28 February 2008. Under the tutelage of the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities (PEAP), chaired by the late former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement was signed on 28 February 2008 (Njogu 2013: 4). The process which drew in representatives of the two key competing parties, the Party of

National Unity (PNU)/Government, led by Mwai Kibaki, and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), represented by Raila Odinga, gave birth to a Coalition Government and a pathway to a new constitution.

National dialogues are, in essence, nationally driven and held processes. However, Hartmann (2017: 13) notes that "that there is a significant degree of influence from external actors, known as parties without direct participation in the dialogue or stake in the outcomes". It is possible that the Kenyan process, devoid of an eminent face as a facilitator, such as the former UN chief, would have assumed a protracted trajectory. Even a recurrence of the violence would have been possible. However, some commentators place a caveat on the choice of a process mediator. Siebert, Kumar and Tasala (2014: 38), for example, emphasise that "insider mediators are often able to convene actors and facilitate conversations due to their intimate knowledge of the situation as well as their personal relationships which the external mediators often lack".

According to others, it is beyond intimate knowledge of the situation or personal relationships but rather which process and how that process is mounted. International and external actors should be careful, as argued by Haugbølle *et al.* (2017: 41), not to "impose the design of a Western style process", but rather to support a national design which reflects the actual conflicts and actors. External players should act with least visibility and be cautious not to be biased as this will destabilise the dialogue processes. On the other hand, Siebert, Kumar and Tasala (2014: 39) maintain that national dialogue processes should predominantly be internally led, with national participants taking the lead in all aspects of it. NIMD sees this differently. They, for example, contend that while deciding on a national or international facilitator should be contextual, "a rule of thumb is to find someone who carries at least three characteristics – impartiality, political sensitivity, and the ability to create party ownership" (Kemp *et al.* 2013: 38).

In conclusion, it is essential to bring to the fore two aspects that may not have been covered or mentioned earlier but which are interrelated and are core instructions. First, based on their vast experience mounting several inter-party dialogue platforms, NIMD makes recommendations on who should be part of national dialogue processes:

> [O]ffice of the head of state; national and regional legislatures; the executive arm of government and government ministries; electoral management bodies (EMBs); civil society organisations (CSOs); political party registrars; women's, youth or minority groups; national development planning agencies; sub-national or local government bodies; social-economic councils; peace-building or reform committees; academic think tanks; and citizens' movements (Kemp *et al.* 2013: 30).

Second, as argued in Section 4.5, a successfully delivered dialogue process should culminate in one form of peace dividend or the other. One such dividend is 'Infrastructure for Peace'. Hartmann (2017: 19) notes that such infrastructures "refer to domestic governmental or non-governmental structures and financial systems whose aim is to support national dialogues and other forms of peace and dialogue processes". Among the potential roles that these configurations can play, the following are included: "capacity-building and advisory services, communication and facilitation between conflict parties and stakeholders, and the execution, monitoring and coordination of activities". An example given is the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in Nepal incepted as the peace infrastructure beyond the national dialogue (Hartmann 2017: 19).

4.7.3 Zambia National Dialogue Experiences

During Zambia's third republic, at least three cases of 'national political dialogue' can be cropped. First, at the summit of the return to multi-party politics in 1991, leaders from Christian churches successfully organised a dialogue session which brought together leading figures from the then ruling party, UNIP, President Kenneth Kaunda, and Frederick Chiluba from the newly formed MMD. Held on 23 July 1991, the meeting helped break the deadlock over the contents of the new constitution. Andreassen, Geisler and Tostensen (1992: 24) note that "during the meeting held at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka, it was agreed that the proposed constitution needed to allow for consultations with parties outside parliament". Thus, constitutional proposals were substantially amended a week later on 31 July 1991.

Second, national political dialogue efforts coincided with the launch of the Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue (ZCID) in 2007, an initiative pioneered by NIMD. Leading

the engagement were the then third republican President, Levy Mwanawasa, and the opposition leader, Michael Sata, who had competed in the 2006 presidential elections with the former garnering 43% while the latter 29% of the national vote. As in the Kaunda-Chiluba case, the contention was concerned with constitutional reform. Hoping to have been the initial contact, Sata pulled out of the event, alleging that he was denied space to speak as a stakeholder in the national dialogue. He also objected the appointment of a fellow politician from the MMD as chair who was described as an interested party. Instead, he demanded a repeat of the 1991 dialogue where a neutral person chaired the dialogue process (Phiri and Saluseki 2007).

However, a month later, all political parties with parliamentary representation held a ZCID-led meeting. The meeting "resolved that instead of a constituent assembly, a national constitutional conference would adopt a draft constitution from the previous constitution review body". The move was criticised by some civil society organisations claiming that a national conference would easily be manipulated by government (Simutanyi 2013: 9).

Third, under the current PF regime, the first form of national political dialogue was a process led by three church mother bodies, namely, the CCZ, EFZ, and ZCCB. Held at the Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Cross on 29 March 2016 to respond to several electoral and human rights concerns during electoral campaigns, it culminated in a peace accord by all participating political parties. However, actors across the political spectrum could not stand by their peace commitments particularly to end political violence as violent electoral campaigns continued.

As such, there were fresh calls for a national political dialogue especially in light of the August 2016 Presidential and General elections which witnessed unprecedented levels of electoral violence. Attempts to mount a national dialogue have involved a turbulent trajectory especially in 2018. One key area of contention that has stood out for a long time is agreeing on an acceptable convener of the dialogue process. As in previous national political dialogue processes, there are two leading parties – the ruling PF and the opposition UPND through their respective leaders, Edgar Chagwa Lungu and Hakainde

Hichilema. While the PF and their supporters were open to have either or both the ZCID and three church mother bodies lead the process, the UPND opted for the latter.

The UPND was categorical about participating in the dialogue process under the tutelage of the three church mother bodies claiming that the ZCID was partisan and aligned to the PF, and that the international community should only monitor the deliberations (Zambian Observer 2018). Others were against the international community's involvement claiming that a dialogue process led by either the ZCID or the Commonwealth was not objective and that the ZCID was supported by a foreign political agent, NIMD. Being indifferent, the ZCID decided to go ahead with the political dialogue without the church mother bodies by holding a National Democracy Stakeholders Summit (NDSS). Attended by civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, academia, and political party representatives (UPND boycotted), the summit looked at four thematic areas: Constitutional and Institutional Reforms; Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence; Tolerance, Freedom of Assembly, and Civility in Politics and Electoral Reforms; and Integrity of Processes.

It was the first event under a roadmap that the ZCID unveiled in early 2018, with a 'Political' Parties meeting', a 'Secretary Generals of Political Parties meeting', and a 'Summit of Presidents' as other activities that were lined up. However, in a turn of events, perhaps due to the continuing disagreements on the convener of the dialogue process, the ZCID presented a committee of 'eminent' persons comprising the House of Chiefs Chair, another senior chief, a veteran politician/business person, and another senior politician and former Vice President from the opposition, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD).

Ironically, a further turn of events is that in late 2018, President Edgar Lungu and opposition UPND leader, Hakainde Hichilema, met at an undisclosed location facilitated by the three church mother bodies. It was reported that the two leaders expressed unconditional support towards an inclusive and church-led "national dialogue and reconciliation process"(Kayombo 2018: 1). The church mother bodies were further assured of the leaders' availability and a commitment to future direct engagements. In

turn, representatives of the church mother bodies assured the nation of a quick and effective national dialogue process (Jere 2018).

The clearest observation from Zambia's national dialogue attempts is the credibility question of the convener which continues to be controversial. Although, if historical experiences are to be considered, the church has always been at hand to assist the country surmount its political crises. Additionally, in all the cases cited, three aspects seem unclear: the degree of inclusivity, including public participation; joint ownership, from the top leadership to ordinary members and citizens; and how comprehensive agenda items are to assist in dealing with all areas of concern.

Hopeful that the national political dialogue will finally take off, some observers had higher expectations. For example, it was envisaged that the process would be inclusive and nationally owned, with a view to assist addressing issues of concern to political stakeholders, reducing political tension and violence, creating an environment that would promote and uphold tolerance and civility, and enhancing political and social cohesion in the country ahead of future elections (Yezi 2013: 32; Gambari 2017).

However, in early 2019, the Minister of Justice presented a national dialogue bill to parliament which went through (with 92 parliamentarians for and 52 against the bill). The President assented to it on 9 April 2019. As part of the new law, a national dialogue forum was inaugurated with over 300 delegates including politicians, CSOs, traditional and church leaders, professional bodies, and select government line ministries and churches. The national dialogue Act provided in Section 5 for all Members of Parliament (MPs) to attend. However, 38 of 61 MPs from the opposition, UPND, and some representatives of the three church mother bodies did not attend the forum.

The Act further spells out a ten-day national dialogue forum, but by the time it concluded business, an extension of six days was granted. The forum concluded with three bills on the table: the draft Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill 10, 2019; the draft Electoral Process (Amendment) Bill 11, 2019; and the draft Public Order (Amendment) Bill 12, 2019. Of the three, Bill 10 is heavily contested by the Law

Association of Zambia (LAZ), student bodies, and several CSOs advocating for its complete withdrawal. In December 2019, the parliament unanimously resolved to defer the controversial enactment to February 2020.

4.8 Conclusion

Every dialogue process without exemption is exemplified by power relationships. This is attributed to "historic and political circumstances of the dialogue itself, and to the baggage of personal and systemic privileges and hindrances participants bring with them" (Suransky and Alma 2018: 37). Therefore, a generic discussion of dialogue and relationship building is unavoidably essential, and this is precisely that which was discussed in this chapter. From a conceptual appreciation of dialogue, the chapter looked at several approaches to dialogue highlighting the fact that practitioners and communities utilise different avenues in promoting societal cohesion and coexistence.

An indispensable constituent in bringing dialogue to fruition as well as building relationships is contact. As part of this chapter, the contact hypothesis was articulated within the realm of Allport's (1954) formulation, presenting ideal conditions that anchor contact, that is, mutual interdependence, two or more parties need each other to accomplish a goal, common goal significant to both parties, equal status of group members, informal and interpersonal contacts. Others are multiple contacts with members of outgroups and social norms prescribed to promote equality.

A process that may be considered complementary to dialogue is conflict transformation and the chapter has devoted considerable effort sharing the link between the two. As Miall (2004: 2) observes, conflict transformation is anchored on "engaging with and changing the relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary the constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict". Therefore, the simultaneity of dialogue and conflict transformation processes was demonstrated. Most importantly, it is clear that dialogue and conflict transformation are inextricably linked, given the mutual focus on personal, relational, and cultural aspects of conflict.

A reference to cases of both international and national dialogue processes was made, premised on the contention that dialogue is not merely mounted at interpersonal or intergroup levels but transcends borders. That which is evident is that international and national dialogues happen in a wide array of circumstances and assume many different trajectories. Additionally, national dialogues more often than not, as cited examples show, engage in constitutional issues which seldom yield final constitutions. However, once the national dialogue channels out a new or revised constitution as the case in Kenya, then that direct output is a marker of the process' success.

The case of Zambia's national dialogue endeavours which closed the chapter brought to the fore useful lessons as well. The issue of a credible convener had, for months, held back the process with contending parties not agreeing on who the suitable convener was. On the other hand, there are still some areas that seemed unclear, namely the degree of inclusiveness, public participation, and ownership of the process. For example, is it a politician's privilege or are ordinary members and citizens also a part of it, and is the agenda comprehensive enough?

However, before these questions are answered, Zambia's national dialogue course is legislated and a national forum convened with three bills as part of its output. One of the bills, the draft Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill 10, 2019, remains contested.

Chapter Five:

PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

The success of any third-party intervention in transforming a given conflict hinges, to a large extent, on the full immersion of the parties in the process as problem solvers. Conversely, from a peacebuilder's standpoint, any inquiry that seeks to contribute solutions to society's challenges would be an effort in futility if those affected are not aboard, involved not just as recipients of the study output but as active contributors to the entire investigation. Thus, this study was driven by Participatory Action Research (PAR) that incorporated the understanding of the problem under consideration and designing and carrying out an intervention and evaluating the immediate outcomes.

It was the overarching philosophy of engagement throughout the research process. PAR is a derivative of action research under the transformative paradigm which postulates that research ought to be interwoven with politics and political change to tackle social oppression at whichever level. Further, it is stated that "transformative researchers consciously and explicitly position themselves side by side with the less powerful in a joint effort to bring about social transformation" (Mertens 2015: 70). In keeping with this philosophy, the current study is not only a contribution to social change but a mark of solidarity with young people who are often sidelined.

It is therefore imperative to have an appreciation of this framework that gave structure and direction to this study. First, it is essential to state from the outset that PAR was chosen for its holistic and hands-on conformation. Second, the purpose of this chapter, building upon these two attributes, is to define on which perspectives PAR is based and to describe the basic principles that underpin this type of engagement. It also shares the generic procedure of delivering PAR, exemplars of its practice, the benefits and distinctions, as well as the nexus between PAR and social transformation. The chapter concludes with challenges associated with participatory action research.

5.2 Defining Participatory Action Research (PAR)

The conception of the principles, methodologies, and attributes that underpin PAR extend over many decades. As early as the 1940s, one of the foundational scholars, Lewin (1946: 35), described the research needed for social practice as research for social management or social engineering leading to social action, and that research that produces nothing but books is inadequate. Lewin also noted that this type of research proceeds "in a spiral of steps which includes a circle of fact-finding, planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action" (Lewin 1946: 38). Later, in the 1960s, a Brazilian adult educator and critical theorist, Paulo Freire, contested existing models of research and education. For example, he advanced an education practice that sees a student as part of his or her environment (world), and this 'problem-posing education' considers both teacher and students as mutual participants in the educational process akin to participatory action research (Freire 1993).

From Lewis and Freire, there are several contemporary definitions of PAR. To some, PAR is an orientation to research based on a commitment to egalitarianism, pluralism, interconnectedness, community focus, communication, and participatory space in which community members can be empowered (Amaya and Yeates 2014: 6; Johnson 2017: 11; Thomason 2018: 97). PAR not only helps generate knowledge in an interactive, collaborative, reflective, and dialogical mode on the problems that affect societies but assists in devising mechanisms of answering such problems (International Alert 2015: 29; Dudgeon *et al.* 2017: 2).

Further, PAR is described as an approach undertaken by "participants in social relationships with one another in order to improve some conditions or situation with which they are involved", and that this social relationship includes both the PAR practitioner (researcher) and stakeholders (community members) typically described in nonaction research as subjects (Lune and Berg 2017: 137). On the other hand, Lake and Wendland (2018: 12) synthesise PAR as an attempt to collaboratively generate, act upon, and disseminate knowledge, and that this productive triple relationship of "collaboration,

action and transformation" is critical for community engagement practitioners keen on "socially just responses to complex social problems".

The understanding of PAR is incomplete without a mention of three essential aspects regarding that which may be referred to as the breadth of PAR. First, PAR has been reinforced by the feminist approach to research that highlights "the centrality of male power as a factor in the construction of knowledge" (Maguire 1987: 84). The intention of the feminist mode, according to Maguire (1987: 89), is to "strengthen the creation of knowledge as a force for truly radical social and personal transformation", an initiative that includes and benefits both women and men.

Second, Youth-Led Participatory Action Research (YPAR) is an emergent approach that stresses a transition from research about youths to research with youths. Aldana, Richards-Schuster and Checkoway (2016: 2) describe YPAR as a "process that involves young people in the documentation and critical assessment of the social conditions affecting their lives". It is also designed, in the view of Anyon *et al.* (2018: 11), to "support participants' self-determination and increase power-sharing between youth and adults". In other words, YPAR provides space for young people to be conscientised on real and/or perceived inequities within their contexts and nurtures practical steps towards social transformation. Though this study may not strictly be considered as YPAR, aside from being imbued with tenets of the conventional PAR, the hub of its implementation are young people.

Third is Critical Participatory Action Research (CPAR), which emerged as a result of the critique of numerous nascent approaches to the theory and practice of action research. Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon (2014: 18) describe CPAR as a "disciplined way of making change because many of the kinds of changes that occur in our lives are imposed, apparently random, or ill considered". Further, they contend that:

> [P]articipants in social and educational life can do research for themselves ... we believe that insiders have special advantages when it comes to doing research in their own sites and to investigating practices that hold their work and lives together in those sites – the practices are enmeshed with those sites (Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon 2014: 4-5).

In sum, PAR is an approach to research that creates an enabling environment for both practitioners and participants to collaboratively generate knowledge around particular issues of concern, and further, on the basis of this information, to design action plans with a transformative agenda.

5.3 Basic Elements of PAR

There are core elements that are specific to the PAR approach and which generally inform the practice. These are aspects that merit particular mention as a way of reinforcing one's understanding of PAR. While there may be various features that different researchers and/or observers highlight, for the purposes of this section, the researcher has identified four.

First, PAR is *participatory.* It is an approach that is premised on maximising the participation of all those affected by the inquiry. But what does participation entail practically? Participation means that research is done with the people and not on them. Further, as a co-learning process, it is the quality of the contribution that people participate in, not necessarily the proportion of that involvement (McIntyre 2008: 15; Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* 2018: 1). According to Mertens (2015: 83), it is also participation encompassing "the planning, conduct, analysis, interpretation and use of the research". Peoples' participation is essential because, as Freire (1993: 101) argues, "humans in their permanent relations with reality, produce not only material goods, but also social institutions, ideas and concepts". Thus, an inquiry based on a transformative approach such as PAR should earnestly consider the full immersion of the participants.

Second, PAR is *collaborative.* PAR, as a philosophy of engagement, dispels the notion that academics should be the sole creators of knowledge. Zeller-Berkman (2014: 518) justifies that "PAR in the twenty-first century asserts a democratization of who has the right to create knowledge". As such, PAR is a collaborative commitment by both the researchers and participants who have the right to investigate an issue or problem. Amaya and Yeates (2014: 8) posit a perspective that is practical and which merits reiteration here:

> In participatory research, local people are involved at all stages of the research process, from problem identification to analysis, whereas in non-participatory research the researcher sets and controls the research process, remains firmly rooted within his/her disciplinary boundaries, agendas and priorities located within the institutional-academy nexus.

Further, the inevitability of collaboration in PAR hinges on the fact that communities bear the greatest brunt of most social problems and essentially their voices matter. Alongside participation, Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* (2018: 8) note that "collaboration of community members with the research process is a central tenet of PAR". The extent of their involvement can also reflect collaboration.

Third, PAR is *collegial.* PAR practitioners and communities work together as colleagues in bringing various skills to the research table. As indicated earlier, PAR supports an atmosphere where researchers undertake research with community members as partners (or co-researchers) and not research subjects. Collegiality is illuminated by practitioners "getting out of the way and allowing people to proceed in ways that make sense to and for them – not necessarily to and for the practitioner", as noted by McIntyre (2008: 27). Based on her PAR projects in the US with young people and women from Belfast, in the north of Ireland, McIntyre shares that which can be described as a mark of collegiality: "I was a co-participant in the project. I brought a particular set of skills, knowledge and resources to the groups that needed to be used in practical ways so as to contribute to the overall research process" (McIntyre 2008: 27).

Last, PAR is *action oriented.* Action is the common thread that permeates all participatory and transformative inquires in order to ultimately benefit all the participants involved. The salience of action in PAR is that it is an effort to resolve specific problems, highly contextual, and usually leans towards dealing with immediate or short-term goals. It also runs through a cyclic process of "planning, action, observation, reflection, re-planning etc." which provides for co-learning of the practitioners and participants (Lune and Berg 2017: 138; Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* 2018). However, carrying out action within the context of PAR is stated to have challenges, which Guy *et al.* (2020: 147) assert "not

only involve barriers preventing action, but also obstacles that come with actually reaching the action".

Guy *et al.* identify four challenges that merit restating. First, there are ethical issues on the part of the research participants that may discourage them from taking part in the earmarked action. Second, the progression towards action, if not as fast as anticipated, may be a source of conflict between the PAR practitioner and participants. Keeping participants involved and invested in the conceived action is another challenge highlighted by Guy and others, which they claim may be an aggregation from the previous contest. Last is the idealism-reality mismatch, which involves the envisaged ideal outcome in terms of the action and that which is practically implemented (Guy *et al.* 2020: 148-150).

In sum, Merten explains the two-pronged approach to participatory research. First, cooperative participatory action research "involves participation of all people in the research process but does not explicitly address power relations and the potential transformative effects of the research". Second, transformative participatory action research involves "community members in the process in varying roles but does so with explicit recognition of power issues and a goal of transforming society" (Mertens 2015: 311). Thus, the latter approach brings to the fore and reaffirms the signficance of action within the realm of PAR. It also emphasises the role of the researcher (as a PAR practitioner) which is to assist and create an opportunity for all participants in PAR to embrace the act to see change.

5.4 PAR Cycle

One of the characteristics of PAR is that it is cyclical. With its recursive and adaptable nature, PAR carries several phases from three to six or more. Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 12) present three recurring stages – "inquiry, action and reflection" – while a more traditional and generic cycle includes "plan, act, observe and reflect". Comparably, some see PAR as a spiral process covering "questioning, reflecting, dialoguing and decision making" which resists linearity (McIntyre 2008: 6). Informed by practice, others have conceived a

fifth element, "share" stressing the need to communicate "observations, lessons, practice developments with stakeholders and the broader public" (Crane and O'Regan 2010: 11).

Proponents of Critical Participatory Action Research (CPAR) suggest a spiral of self-reflective cycles, not a major departure from the traditional stages, but highlight the recursive outlook. For example, they propose "planning a change; acting and observing the process and consequences of the change; reflecting on two aspects of change; re-planning; acting and observing; reflecting etc." (Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon 2014: 18). However, the purpose of this section is to explain the four 'conventional' stages of the PAR cycle, as shown in Figure 5.1. First, the contribution of *observation* in a PAR cycle may be taken as twofold, that is, questioning an issue within a particular discipline or practice, in other words, identifying and exploring a matter further by collecting and analysing relevant data (McIntyre 2008; Kaye and Harris 2018).

Some practitioners consider observation as the ideal starting point for action research, given the fundamental questions asked at this stage. For instance, what is happening or not happening? How does one describe what is happening using available or new information involving other people to describe what they think is going on? (Crane and O'Regan 2010: 12). The other element of observation is when practitioners observe how their plan was implemented, looking out for that which went well and that which was unsuccessful. One of the key concerns here is to observe and evaluate the effectiveness of a plan(s) executed as well as exploring opportunities for improvements.



Figure 5.1: The PAR cycle, adapted from Crane and O'Regan (2010: 1).

Second, *planning* is about designing a strategy that the PAR practitioner and the community deem appropriate to respond to their issues. The development of an action plan engenders fundamental questions such as what needs to be changed, and how this change should be realised and by whom (McIntyre 2008; Janssen *et al.* 2013). One of the attributes of PAR is its contextual underpinning and so should be the plan of action. In other words, practical information from a given context ought to inform the design of an action plan. In Mackenzie's (2012: 12) view, the development of the plan is based on the best available contextual evidence, and that "research is used to provide accurate empirical knowledge of the nature of the problem, its causes and consequences".

Another aspect that merits particular mention when designing an action plan is the endorsement and participation of the affected communities. A Swedish organisation, the Life and Peace Institute (LPI), from its Somali project 'PAR in local peacebuilding contexts' carried out in 2015, shares its strategy in keeping the community's participation afloat:

> LPI and Zamzam Foundation ensured community buy-in at every stage of the process, ensuring that a clear line of communication was established and sustained between the staff and stakeholders. At no point did local communities withdraw consent for the project, either disagree to the common action plan or show reluctance to continue to participate (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 25).

The *act* phase is about putting the plan into action. Stated differently, this stage entails implementing prescribed changes that are aimed at improving a situation. Thus, through the execution of this intervention, PAR illuminates its ethical and critical focus on the impact of research on individuals and communities (Van Katwyk and Ashcroft 2016). While action remains integral to PAR, it is stated that not all the issues from the process may be acted upon. McIntyre (2008: 46) argues that "there are times when people are energized and feel a deep need to act on a particular issue". However, other times, they are less keen about a particular action. McIntyre adds that the reason for this is that perhaps participants may not possess or choose not to apply the degree of energy that a particular action demands.

In other situations, participants' inability to act on a subject may be necessitated by the uncertainty of the consequences that their action might provoke on individual members and the community as a whole (McIntyre 2008). Thus, to deal with both scenarios, participants and PAR practitioners may consider ascertaining which resources and skill sets are available, and prioritise which actions to mount and how and when to mount them, in other words, striving to collaboratively leave nothing to chance.

The final *reflection* phase revolves around evaluating the outcomes from a particular action and weighing the options for a re-plan. It is also about developing an understanding of the process and the effects of the changes that may have been made. Reflecting on the intervention and the outcomes, according to Kaye and Harris (2018: 63), "may result in new understanding of the problem and may result in a further iteration of action research". As noted earlier, as a branch of PAR, the reflection stage continues on a collaborative path. In other words, the partnership between the PAR practitioner and participants remains 'intact' during the reflection. Crane and O'Regan (2010: 12) note that during this stage, researchers spend time thinking about the findings of the observations, negotiating meaning with stakeholders, and building a shared understanding. Crane and O'Regan (2010: 12) suggest three questions that may assist in guiding the reflection phase:

1. Standing back even more and reflecting on what happened.
2. Developing ideas or 'theories' about what happened.
3. Sharing ideas with others such that a range of interpretations and meanings can be considered.

In sum, there are two crucial points that deserve mention regarding the PAR cycle. First, although PAR is systematic and carries the potential to yield results that its practitioners anticipate, the role of stakeholders remains critical. The cyclical nature, in Amaya and Yeates' (2014: 15) view, "requires a stable group of stakeholders, preferably who are involved throughout the span of the research project". Second, PAR's recursive quality is just as essential for practitioners who ought to embrace its elasticity. Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon (2014: 18) argue that action research is rarely as neat as a spiral of self-

contained cycles of planning, acting, observing, and reflecting. The stages overlap and initial plans quickly become obsolete in the light of learning from experience. Further, the process is likely to be more fluid, open, and responsive.

5.5 PAR Practice

Action research has a broad range of applications from a classroom setting to community contexts (Lune and Berg 2017). As indicated earlier, those affected by the issues under investigation are drawn in as active contributors. Notwithstanding the active participation of affected communities in PAR, the overall implementation is not a one-size-fits-all one. Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 13) advance three reasons why activities under PAR cannot be standardised: PAR is context-specific, fluid, and context-centred, aiming to answer real-life problems. In addition, it should be broadly inclusive of a range of skills and abilities among participants. An addition to these reasons is that communities are absorbed in different social and economic circumstances that may inform the practice differently.

To have a sense of the dynamics of PAR practice, this section shares synopses of four cases in which PAR was the principal mode of engagement. The first is a PAR project conducted with Tanzanian child domestic workers between 2005 and 2007. The second is the Australian National Empowerment Project (NEP), an Aboriginal-led community-based PAR project aimed at helping communities identify factors negatively affecting their lives and strategies to promote wellbeing. The NEP was implemented from approximately 2012 to 2015. Led by International Alert, the third project was conducted between 2013 and June 2015, in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and was aimed at developing community capacity in conflict management and promoting peace. The PAR project was further focused on strengthening inter- and intra-community reconciliation as well as improving local governance in eight villages. Last, a Somali project led by LPI and a local partner, Zamzam Foundation, applied PAR as a tool for conflict transformation from March 2012 to September 2015 (International Alert 2015; Klocker 2015; Life and Peace Institute 2016; Dudgeon *et al.* 2017).

It is evident from the Tanzanian and Australian projects that working with groups that carry certain peculiarities, such as indigenous communities or child domestic workers, illuminates crucial realities. For example, with regards to collaborating with child domestic workers, Klocker (2015) notes that there are emotional pitfalls of research projects that seek to tangibly intervene in traumatised people's lives. One illustrative point is that "when PAR projects are conceived with intent of producing long-lasting structural changes that benefit marginalised people, failure can become a source of great distress" (Klocker 2015: 41).

On the other hand, Dudgeon *et al.* (2017: 10) claim that it is essential that indigenous communities lead the course, growth, execution, and accountability of community-based PAR strategies to enhance outcomes in their communities, and that the success and effectiveness of the PAR processes lie in the support, training, and continuing mentoring and capacity building of the local people. This collaboration between PAR practitioners and 'local experts', in Amaya and Yeates' (2014: 15) view, enhances "research outcomes beyond what can be achieved by an individual or team or professional researcher".

Some of the realities of peacebuilding-related PAR projects, including the DRC and Somalia initiatives, are that researchers should not only be ethics-compliant but make broad-based participation a prerequisite. International Alert in DRC, for example, identified co-researchers through community peace organisations ensuring balanced representations in terms of ethnicity, professions, knowledge of conflict, and acceptance in the community etc. (International Alert 2015: 15). Conversely, the Somali intervention reveals that broader inclusion and buy-in at the community level in dialogical processes culminates in: (1) maximised bottom-up potential for such local peacebuilding efforts, namely, the transfer of knowledge from local to regional and national processes; and (2) fundamentally transforming the ways in which community actors approach the prevention and resolution of conflict (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 42).

In general, there are realities from PAR practice that, though specifically drawn from Klocker's (2015: 39) experience in Tanzania, serve as lessons for other practitioners.

First, if teams are exposed to traumatic narratives, it should be the researcher's obligation to care for the emotional health of a research team. Second, since research teams may not vouch for the impact of PAR projects' outcomes, it is imperative to be aware that change processes may engender more harm than good. Last, the failure to make that which may be perceived as a large and significant transformation in the lives of traumatised people or post-conflict communities can be upsetting for research teams.

5.6 Benefits and Distinctions of PAR

Beyond the realism that comes with PAR practice, as discussed in the preceding section, there are gains from successfully mounting a PAR process. The discussion in this section is about some of these advantages. The later part of the discussion mentions selected peculiarities of PAR in comparison with other non-action inquiries. The initial benefit of employing PAR as a methodological approach is the efficiency that is associated with data collection and the understanding of the topic being investigated. In other words, the researcher's immersion within the study context and having first-hand contact with the community creates this efficacy. With the active engagement of individual community members as participants in the research enterprise, Lune and Berg (2017: 137) describe PAR "as a highly rigorous, yet reflective or interpretive, approach to empirical research".

Second, PAR yields practical outcomes that are related to the lives of the participants (Lune and Berg 2017). The Life and Peace Institute's intervention in Somalia, for example, revealed that the PAR approach created "space for conflict stakeholders to reflect on and elicit their own understanding of the conflict". Further, dialogue enhanced interaction and collaboration aimed at addressing divisive factors that sustained conflict within and between communities (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 5). Evidence that speaks to this value of PAR is included in Shamrova and Cummings' (2017) review of forty-five articles of PAR methodology and outcomes for participants (children and youth), organisations, and communities. The review reinforces Lune and Berg's assertion that PAR results have a bearing on the lives of participants:

- "Child and youth involvement in PAR encouraged an increased social justice awareness and knowledge about the topic of research".

- "Child and youth learning the process of taking responsibility and taking leadership".
- "Child and youth participation helped to challenge existing power imbalances between children and adults".
- "Community-based PAR with youth and children creates a ground for developing and strengthening a sense of connectedness and belonging to the community".
- "Children and youth are given an opportunity to become agents of change within their own communities" (Shamrova and Cummings 2017: 5-6).

One fundamental lesson from this review is that PAR not only contributes to redressing power imbalances between children and adults but creates a new terrain for community transformation. The outcomes for communities, from Shamrova and Cummings' review, attests this assertion. For instance, they report that several researchers note that PAR methodology offers space for intergenerational dialogue on a community level between children and adults premised on respectful relationships, and that PAR facilitates the formation or strengthening of outlets for children and youth's voices. The other results for the communities from the review include the involvement of children and youth in community awareness and educational campaigns, participation in advocacy efforts and promotion of policy changes, and improvement of community infrastructure (Shamrova and Cummings 2017: 406-407).

While these benefits associated with PAR may, in a way, explain its distinctiveness, four other features can be advanced as positing exceptionality. First, unlike other enquiries, PAR places a great premium on participants and participation. As noted earlier, community research stakeholders possess knowledge that is valuable to a scientific study. Participants, as noted by Van Katwyk and Ashcroft (2016: 196), are "experts whose contributions are crucial to the knowledge that can be gained through research explorations". Participation is stated to be a distinguishing feature of PAR that unlocks the opportunity to bring other elements of the research process, such as evaluation, to fruition (Mackenzie *et al.* 2012). To fully appreciate the significance of participation within PAR, a comparative representation is essential, as shown in Figure 5.2.



Figure 5.2: A comparison of participation in research, adapted from Biggs (1989: 3).

A crucial aspect characterising the different types of local communities' participation is the attitude of researchers (Biggs 1989). Both contractual and consultative modes of engaging the local communities diminish the latter's status as stakeholders by researching 'about' and not 'with' them. The engagement is predominantly a 'top-down' approach with researchers controlling the process. On the other hand, at the collaborative and collegial levels, there is much mutuality and empowerment of the local community to own the process. In other words, as shown by the pyramidal bar, the degree of participation on the top is diminished while the base is increased. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the broadened basis entails that PAR draws in and engages diverse

constituencies such as youth, women, and ordinary community members, beyond researchers.

The second distinguishing feature of PAR is that it generates a vast array of research outcomes. Its products are not restricted to research reports and articles, according to Johnson (2017: 6), but might also include "curricula, public service announcements, action plan, and advocacy efforts and/or media campaigns". In addition, the results of PAR invariably increase opportunities of local communities to take on new knowledge, practices, or mechanisms to view and handle their situation differently. Further, PAR findings not only assist participants to design new programmes or transform existing community services to better meet local needs, but also for conflict contexts, change is engendered in two ways. First, it "transforms mistrusts between stakeholders into constructive, cooperative inquiry and second, enables a collaborative design of action plans to ameliorate issues identified by the community as problematic" (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 14; Johnson 2017).

Prolonged engagement in the field or research site is another feature that sets PAR apart from other modes of inquiry. While some studies may be 'desktop or library' centred with limited contact with the research context, PAR requires full immersion in the participants' world. This, as claimed by Anney (2014: 276), "helps the researcher to gain an insight into the context of the study, which minimizes the distortions of information that might arise due to the presence of the researcher in the field". The PAR practitioner's immersion in the research context may also enhance his/her relations with the local communities in turn heightening the sustainability of the project. Stated differently, through the researcher's experience of the community's lifestyle and general circumstances, he/she is not perceived as a stranger or intruder. Last, PAR is distinguished from other scientific inquiries by its emphasis on capacity building. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in its quest to empower, PAR as a philosophy of engagement enables local communities to be aware of the social injustices that, if not addressed, remain obscure. The following extract offers a holistic view of that which capacity building, within the realm of PAR as part of community-based research, involves:

> [T]he researcher and practitioner organize, facilitate, motivate, train, educate, and foster community members, groups, and organisations to become architects, leaders and authors of their own histories ... the principle of capacity building requires that researchers not only "do no harm" but that they also leave communities empowered and strengthened as a result of the research project. Participants co-learn research and advocacy skills, communication and group working skills, and about participatory democracy (Boyd 2014: 507).

The building of local communities' capacity is enhanced by the fact that the PAR practitioner "stands with and alongside the community or group under study, not outsider as an observer or consultant" (Lune and Berg 2017: 141). In PAR projects involving young people, the exposure goes beyond helping them challenge social exclusion to building their capacity to analyse and transform their own lives and communities (Cahill 2016: 158). As noted earlier, this fosters community (young people's) ownership of the transformation agenda.

5.7 PAR and Social Transformation

The justification for PAR association with social transformation is the transformative paradigm which reinforces the former. One key characteristic of the transformative worldview is its emphasis on the "lives and experiences of the diverse groups that traditionally have been marginalized: women, minorities, and persons with disabilities" (Mertens 2015: 70). However, the study should not be limited to the lives and experiences of marginalised people, as argued by Mertens, but also consider the way oppression is structured and reproduced, and further appreciate how the lives of these oppressed groups "are constrained by the actions of oppressors, individually and collectively and strategies that oppressed groups employ to resist, challenge and subvert" (Mertens 2015: 70).

Thus, social transformation is a fundamental principle of PAR that Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* (2018: 10) argue researchers are expected to embrace given its long-term goal. Beyond unearthing injustices, the process includes taking steps towards addressing such injustices. In other words, PAR as a scientific tool seeks to understand and enhance a situation through transformation. Applied in local peacebuilding efforts, some

practitioners have claimed the changes that the PAR approach stimulates enhance social cohesion through increased communication between local participants. There is also trust built between communities and authorities (Life and Peace Institute 2016).

Second, PAR-stirred social changes are extensive, for example, "changing public policy; making recommendations to government agencies; making informal changes in the community that benefit people living there or raising awareness about an issue in a particular community" (McIntyre 2008: 5). The lesson here is that the PAR process has the capacity to engage a myriad of voices and invariably trigger changes in multiple settings and/or organisations. For practitioners and researchers on 'youths and children', the PAR approach is trusted to initiate positive transformation towards fighting adult centrism and challenging adults' status quo, further spurring the acquisition of knowledge, documentation, and critical assessment of social conditions that affect young people; raising consciousness about oppression; and organising for social change (Aldana, Richards-Schuster and Checkoway 2016: 2; Shamrova and Cummings 2017: 400).

In sum, one tenet that perhaps stands out in the PAR-social transformation equation is PAR's social change and social justice orientation. As indicated earlier in this chapter, PAR offers the possibility to produce changes in society that conventional inquiries may fail to accomplish, as the following extract illustrates:

> The commitment to social change and social justice work within community based research (CBR) projects is often multidimensional and multilayered; there is an expectation that participation in the project will lead to personal transformation, community empowerment, and macro-structural changes. Involving those most affected by issues and problems within their own communities in the research process is an act of social justice (Boyd 2014: 507).

5.8 Challenges of PAR

As the preceding section shows, two of PAR's illuminative aspects are the conduct of research with and not on people and its orientation to act upon the findings. Although these attributes set it apart from other modes of inquiry, it is not devoid of challenges. Whereas there may be innumerable challenges, only five are shared in this section,

informed by practice. First, even though PAR is context specific, settings do carry *uncertainties* that may prove challenging to practitioners and researchers alike. Amaya and Yeates (2014) argue that PAR researchers have to contend with external forces related to the professional and institutional agendas of those involved. Such a situation may be activated by a multiplicity of stakeholders.

Lake and Wendland (2018: 27) claim that the participation of several stakeholders with varying levels of authority within a particular setting "can inhibit the ability to design a project that minimizes the potential for conflict and social or psychological risks". The interventions by LPI in Somalia offer another illustration of context uncertainties. The application of PAR and the conflict transformation approach in the Somalian context was a fundamental departure from traditional clan-based systems of conflict resolution. A distinctive feature of the clan-based system is the "importance of elders in decision-making and the focus on quick-impact resolution" (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 8). In addition, it may not just be different degrees of authority but also that which the LPI calls a "fractured authority structure". Within the Somalian context, there was a "lack of community trust in public institutions, regional administration or the national state and high level of clan mistrust" (Life and Peace Institute 2016: 9).

The *emotional burdens from traumatic subjects* that PAR engenders is the second challenge. From the project in Tanzania, Klocker (2015) notes that when PAR is conducted on traumatic issues, there are emotional burdens which affect every member of the research team. Thus, PAR interventions that seek to work on delicate or painful topics should provide for mechanisms of handling the emotional drain that such engagements may create. For example, when recruiting members of the research support team, PAR practitioners may consider including individuals or organisations with expertise in counselling. This should obviously be after fulfilling and adhering to the Institutional Review Board's (IRB) ethical prescriptions. As Klocker argues, it is possible that there may be a gap in some universities' ethics procedures and support structures for researchers undertaking PAR especially concerning sensitive or traumatic topics. Perhaps the golden rule is that "researchers engaged in PAR need to look well beyond

the immediate and direct forms of harm that may be associated with their work" (Klocker 2015: 42).

Third, the *IRB approval against stakeholders' consent* is another cited challenge. IRBs are set up in universities to ensure that ethical principles are applied especially for the protection of human subjects (Leavy 2017: 32). It is stated that "IRBs usually want to approve research questions and protocols prior to the commencement of the project but this may contradict the participatory and emergent nature of the PAR process" (Lake and Wendland 2018: 26). Stated differently, data collection instruments approved by IRBs will require local participants' (co-researchers) input and/or endorsement as a matter of principle. It is therefore imperative for the researcher to clearly state in the research proposal that as a PAR intervention, instruments will be reviewed with stakeholders in the field before data collection begins.

The *incongruity of expectations* is the fourth challenge. This basically means that the interpretations of the outcomes by PAR practitioners and local stakeholders are unrelated. For example, that which constitutes 'success' in the implementation of a project from the stakeholders' standpoint may be different from PAR practitioners' perspective. According to Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 19):

> Success for 'insiders' (local community) may be gauged by the extent that material improvements result from the work. By contrast, successful project outcomes from a researcher's perspective is more likely to be measured against the extent to which the work allows for an original contribution to a peer-reviewed body of scholarship.

To balance between the hopes of the research team and possible consumers of the research results, 'a water project in Northern Australia' created a Knowledge and Adoption (K&A) strategy. Developed prior to the start of the project, the approach "identified preferred communication techniques and products tailored for the different target audiences, including water planning agencies, community stakeholders and the academic community" (Mackenzie *et al.* 2012: 19). The strategy was not only a mark of attention to the research teams and stakeholders' needs but also ensured that all partners in the project fall in with the outcomes.

Perhaps an aspect that may notably negatively influence stakeholders' expectations is PAR practitioners' institutional (funding source) affiliation or social background (gender, ethnicity, nationality etc.). Amaya and Yeates (2014: 17), for example, argue that such attributes may drive stakeholders into believing that there are *a priori* anticipations regarding which outcomes are acceptable. As such, even with data collection, some participants may have pre-meditated responses, for example, during interviews which, in their view, would be acceptable to PAR practitioners. However, this can be overcome by demonstrating the validation of information through the use of multiple data-gathering techniques (triangulation). A comprehensive discussion of these and other methodological aspects is covered in Chapter six.

Last, another challenge with PAR application is that which the researcher calls *co-researchers practical hurdles* which may have a negative bearing on the process. Some PAR projects have to handle competing demands with which co-researchers are faced. For example, facilitators of the Australian NEP project had to grapple with co-researchers' formal employment, family, community demands, and financial obligations to families (Dudgeon *et al.* 2017: 8). The reality of this challenge is that local stakeholders, in addition to being marginalised sections of society, are also enmeshed in socioeconomic pressures. These stresses would undoubtedly impede their contribution towards the PAR implementation, even if they are crucial participants.

The cyclic nature of PAR necessitates a stable group of stakeholders who, in Amaya and Yeates' (2014: 15) view, ought to be involved throughout the length of the research project. Amaya and Yeates further argue that while ensuring commitment and drive is essential, maintaining group cohesiveness over time can be challenging. However, it is the practitioner's obligation to ensure that co-researchers or stakeholders alike appreciate the breadth of PAR processes. Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 19) claim that PAR is "time and resource intensive, and involves a high degree of personal investment on behalf of the researcher", and that it entails researchers cultivating close working relationships with participants.

5.9 Conclusion

Some of the most persistent social difficulties, it is argued, "often require inclusive, coordinated efforts across institutional, regional and political boundaries" (Lake and Wendland 2018: 13). Additionally, Leavy (2017: 232) notes that PAR, as a community-based practice, "emerges out of a social justice and action oriented transformative paradigm", and herein lies the inescapable nexus between PAR and peacebuilding. Therefore, an entire chapter on PAR in the current study was unquestionably necessary. An attempt was made to define PAR, its basic elements, and its cycle, and four cases of PAR practice from Tanzania, Australia, the DRC, and Somalia were shared.

Assigning great premium on participants and participation, the generation of a range of outcomes, extended field engagement, and stakeholders' capacity building constitute some of PAR's distinctions. One of its fundamental principles is the social transformation orientation which also sets it apart from other modes of inquiry. However, as explained in this chapter, PAR is not devoid of challenges, some of which include uncertainties from research settings, emotional burdens from sensitive subjects, mismatches between *IRB* approval and stakeholders' consent, researchers and participants' incongruity of expectations, and co-researchers' practical hurdles.

Chapter Six:

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

In its design and methods, a PAR-inspired project should reflect the underlying tenets. Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* (2018: 7), for example, argue that such projects ought to "reflect the commitment of PAR to equitable participation and social transformation and be coherent with theoretical and philosophical location". Thus, during the current study, efforts were made to ensure that the research methods employed were participatory and accommodating. This is consistent with Benjamin-Thomas *et al.*'s (2018) call on researchers to constantly work towards tackling power differentials and ensuring mutuality in the research process. It is about going beyond labeling research approaches as participatory but living the practice in a participatory manner.

Clearly articulating a project's research design and methodologies is critical given the principal aim. The purpose is to provide a gradual approach to the entire research plan thereby lessening the ambiguities of the research results and the prospects of inaccuracies. In other words, these serve as logical blueprints that draw together crucial components of a research such as the population and sample to work with, data collection, and analysis. With such plans in place, as Yin (2016: 83) argues, a study's "findings will address the intended research questions and help boost its accuracy". Therefore, this chapter shares the structure that methodologically informed and directed the study with young people in Kalulushi constituency, Zambia.

6.2 Research Design

The study used a transformative participatory mixed methods design. The transformative aspect was premised on the need to take action against young people's current involvement in political conflicts and emergent violence in Kalulushi. This action is the change process that started with young people participating in determining the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of political violence. As mentioned in Chapter five, for

transformative research that originates from the PAR tradition, as argued by Mertens (2015: 83), it is "essential to involve the people who are the research participants in the planning, conduct, analysis, interpretation and use of the research".

Boyd (2014) contends that community-based research is adaptable to the mixed methods design and mirrors a transdisciplinary research paradigm that includes community scholars outside academia. Thus, during the current study, not only were youths from different wards of Kalulushi constituency drawn in, but data was collected both quantitatively (survey) and qualitatively (interviews and FGDs). This approach helped deepen the understanding of the research problem since interviews and FGD findings were used to validate the results from the survey. On the other end, there was both triangulation and complementarity in terms of quantitative and qualitative data collection (Barnes 2019: 310).

6.3 Justification for Action Research

The yielding of practical outcomes in the lives of the participants, as observed in Chapter five, not only distinguishes PAR from other inquiries, but is the substratum of the Kalulushi project. In other words, the application of PAR with young people is justifiable in four interrelated ways. First, the study was empowering and emancipating for the young women and men of Kalulushi. For example, they ascertained the factors that steer politically motivated violence, acquired knowledge of dialogical engagement, and agreed to act collectively to address the negative aspects. A community-based research project, such as the current study, as claimed by Boyd (2014: 501), is "intended to educate, empower and transform at the individual, community and structural level to challenge inequality and oppression".

Second, PAR ensures local ownership of the research process and eventually the outcome. In other words, the approach in Lune and Berg's (2017: 138) view "endorses consensual, democratic, and participatory strategies to encourage people to examine reflectively the problems or issues affecting their community". Thus, from the analysis of the study results to the dialogue sessions, young people showed much commitment, individually and collectively, to changing the direction of their destiny. Consistent with the

tenet of PAR, the direction of the process was realised within the spirit of collegiality that the researcher, as the lead researcher from academia, assisted to cultivate. Boyd (2014: 501) suggests that a community-based study aims to "link academic researchers with individuals, groups and community organisations to collaborate on a research project".

Another reason is PAR's all-inclusive transformation. As noted in Chapter five, PAR focuses on the action and transformation of research participants as well as the circumstances and contexts that impact their daily lives (Johnson 2017: 4). In addition, as will be discussed in Chapter seven, even if no major transformation occurs in Kalulushi constituency in the mid- to long-term, there was a slight change in the interim. For example, robust yet candid exchanges that characterised dialogue sessions were indicative of this difference, individually and collectively. In sum, that which may be stated as the overarching justification for PAR's use is the belief that social research has an ethical order to serve community welfare. To achieve this, the study needs to be problem centred or driven and engaging the participants not merely as information providers but as co-researchers, in turn giving a place for their concerns (Leavy 2017: 232;237; Barnes 2019: 306).

6.4 Study Population and Sampling Framework

The estimated study population in 2019 was 14,779 young people (male and female) aged between 18 and 35, as prescribed in the country's national youth policy (Central Statistical Office 2013; Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015). These are young people drawn from seven administration locations (Dongwe, Kafue, Kalungwishi, Kalanga, Luapula, Lubuto, and Ngweshi) of Kalulushi central in Kalulushi town of the Copperbelt region in Zambia. A population is a group of elements regarding which a researcher might make claims, inferences, or conclusions (Leavy 2017: 76; Lune and Berg 2017: 38). A study population or sampling frame, on the other hand, is a particular group of interest to the researcher from which a sample is actually drawn. It is described as a theoretically specified collection of elements that include individual items or variables that constitute the population and that are observable and physically countable (Hassan Sa'id and

Madugu 2015: 50; Leavy 2017; Majid 2018). Thus, a population is not restricted to people but can be anything that researchers wish to investigate.

Further, a "finite part or subset of participants drawn from the study population is defined as a sample" (Martínez-Mesa *et al.* 2016: 326). In other words, it is a subsection of the population of interest from which data is collected. The process of selecting a representative sample of individual elements from this population is known as sampling (Leavy 2017: 76; Majid 2018: 3). Convenience and purposive sampling were used in the study and it is important to explain why and how each of these procedures was applied.

First, youths were conveniently accessed based on their daily pursuits. For example, unemployed young people were met during church meetings and informal gatherings in the communities, while those who were self-employed were sought from their trading places (shops and market stores). Those in more or less 'formal' employment who were accessed included primary school teachers, bus and taxi drivers, and bus station helpers commonly known as 'call boys' from private schools and public transport stations, respectively. Convenience sampling, according to Etikan, Musa and Alkassim (2016: 2), is a non-probability and non-random sampling technique where members of the target population that fulfil certain practical criteria are included for the purpose of the study. The measures include accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time, or willingness to participate.

The second technique used for sampling the study population was purposive. Purposive, as the name suggests, is a technique which involves the selection of study elements in a deliberate way. This is due to the qualities that they possess, their proficiency, and how well-informed they are with a phenomenon of interest or issue at hand. In short, participants are judged on the basis of their ability to provide the most relevant and that which is referred to as information-rich input (Hassan Sa'id and Madugu 2015; Etikan, Musa and Alkassim 2016; Martínez-Mesa *et al.* 2016; Yin 2016).

During the current study, 40 participants (eight senior political party leaders and 32 young people) were purposely sampled for the semi-structured interviews and FGDs.

As discussed in Section 6.5, the distribution of participants, both senior party leaders and youth party members, was not as envisaged. For example, not all three political parties granted access to all three senior political leaders and young party supporters. However, consistent with Creswell's (2015: 79) guide on mixed-methods, to guarantee a sample for FGDs, the survey questionnaires included an invitation for follow-up discussions. To a large extent, this initiative yielded positive results with 80 respondents confirming their participation, although only 12 were affiliated to political parties and consequently participated in the FGDs.

6.5 Data Collection Framework

Researchers' quest for a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation necessitates the collection and integration of quantitative and qualitative data in a single study (Leavy 2017: 164). Similarly, during the current study, the mixed-methods principle was applied in data collection to ensure a complete appreciation of the intricacies around young peoples' involvement in political conflicts in Kalulushi. Thus, the framework applied was threefold: surveys using questionnaires with closed questions, individual in-depth semi-structured interviews using interview protocol, and FGDs using FGD discussion guides. The implementation was sequential; the survey was first, followed by interviews, and lastly the FGDs, with integration happening after the analysis and interpretation. It is thus imperative to share the practical execution of this framework.

First, a survey may be described as a process of obtaining data by means of questionnaires from a subset of participants drawn from a study population. This procedure includes statistically analysing the data collected with the aim of drawing inferences or conclusions. The choice of survey questionnaires is premised, first on the large number of participants and second, allows the researcher to formulate a sufficient number of questions in an unambiguous way (Flick 2015: 139). Additionally, questionnaires are flexible, go along effectively with complimentary more intensive forms of qualitative research such as interviews and focus groups, and provide insights into social trends, processes, values, attitudes, and interpretations (Flick 2015: 139; McGuirk and O'Neill 2016: 195).

Since the researcher developed data collection instruments together with the research proposal in order to obtain the approval of the DUT Faculty Research Committee, the survey questionnaire was reviewed prior to the start of data collection. Consistent with PAR tenets, the review was carried out with the first co-researcher (a youth leader from a local Seventh Day Adventist Church) whom the researcher recruited to assist in administering the instrument. The purpose of the review was twofold: first, to allow the co-researcher to become familiar with the contents of the questionnaire and the project as a whole; and second, to seek the co-researcher's comments on the suitability of questions and/or how 'user friendly' the entire instrument was. In addition to seeking clarification on some questions, one was removed entirely which, in the co-researcher's view, would have been difficult for most young people to answer.

Thereafter, 400 questionnaires were distributed, providing an allowance of eleven copies in case of losses or unreciprocated questionnaires. As mentioned in Section 6.4, the questionnaires were spread across unemployed, self-employed, and employed youths in all the seven earmarked wards of Kalulushi central. Perhaps due to the easy access to all the participants, 395 questionnaires were returned, giving a very positive response rate. This not only provided an opportunity to obtain a rich numeric description of participants' experiences and opinions regarding political conflicts but a new impetus for qualitative data collection.

Second, prior to conducting face-to-face semi-structured interviews, interview and FGD protocols were appraised by the research support team (co-researchers) that the researcher recruited upon relocating to the study location. Eight senior political party leaders were interviewed during discussions that lasted between 60 and 80 minutes. The interviewees included two male ward councilors from the PF; and three – a ward councilor, constituency coordinator, and a women's chairperson – from the UPND. From the MMD, three male officials were interviewed, a constituency chair, constituency secretary, and a district executive committee member. Interviews, according to Flick (2015: 148), are aimed at collecting individuals' views on the issue who are also expected to respond as freely and as extensively as they wish.

Therefore, data collection through semi-structured interviews during the current study was based on the fact that participants (senior party officials) were well-poised to assist the researchers to ably understand the problem and answer the research questions (Creswell 2014: 239). Further, parties' diversity created space for the exploration of emergent issues with some contextualisation. For example, each party had its own reasons for why young people engross themselves in violence. All the interviews were conducted in an atmosphere devoid of that which Mertens (2015: 453) calls "undue pressure from the interviewer". Participants had the latitude to project their voices without interference, such as some declining to answer certain follow-up questions and/or being audio recorded.

The final data collection tool was FGDs. Participants drawn from the PF and UPND supporters only averaged four to seven participants per group in each ward. The complete distribution was PF, thirteen (seven males and six females), and UPND, nineteen (ten males and nine females). As key informants of the current study, young people's participation in FGDs enabled co-researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the subject under investigation. In particular, in Omar's (2018: 2) view, this involves appreciating the motivation, behaviour, feelings, decision-making strategy, or opinion of a particular person on an issue or topic. In other words, participants' experiences and individualised views on political conflict and violence were elicited during the FGDs. All the participants agreed to have the discussions, which lasted between 60 minutes and 90 minutes, audio recorded as well as reading and signing the consent form (providing informed consent).

As a PAR-inspired study, the FGDs did not depart from the principles of PAR. For example, questions from the discussion guide were translated into a common local dialect after reading the original English version. This was aimed at encouraging the broader involvement of all the participants as well as enhanced interactions. Mertens (2015: 450) argues that focus groups are essentially group interviews anchored on interaction between participants designed to stimulate their perspectives in a way that would be more than would be experienced in researcher-dominated interviewing. In sum, consistent with Lune and Berg's (2017: 139) claim, participants (as stakeholders and more than just

research subjects) were invited at the close of each FGD to affirm a synthesis of emergent key issues and concerns.

6.6 Data Analysis

The analysis of the data collected during the current study was carried out both statistically (quantitative) and thematically (qualitative), as shown earlier in Figure 1.1 in Chapter one. Sharma (2018: 4) defines data analysis as the "process of systematically applying statistical and/or logical techniques to describe and illustrate, condense and recap, and evaluate data". In other words, analysis may be seen as the epicentre of research and no matter the type of data collected, it is the analysis that provides the results of a study. On the other hand, Flick (2014: 5) synthesises qualitative data analysis as the classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) materials. The purpose, as Flick adds, is to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the materials and that which is represented in them. However, given that the current study is a mixed-methods design, quantitative and qualitative databases were analysed separately.

First, the statistical analysis of the quantitative survey results was carried out with the help of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, version 26, to show descriptive and inferential statistics. The survey questionnaire explored the driving factors, agency, occurrences, and interventions of political conflicts involving young people (Appendix 3 gives the complete questionnaire). While the researcher carried out the analysis of survey data, on account that co-researchers had limited skills, the results were nevertheless shared with everyone for comments. Their interpretation of the survey findings gave the data some degree of credence. Of the five co-researchers, four accepted the findings as reflective of some of their experiences, while one claimed that Kalulushi was not as violent as other towns in the Copperbelt region.

In line with Creswell's (2014: 274) claim, the results reinforced the qualitative data collection – interviews and FGDs. For example, some of the illuminative statistics such as "more violence in 2019 than 2011 at 60%; PF and UPND youths as front runners at

52.9% and; youth/senior political leaders' culpability at 81.5% and 86.3%" were added to the interview protocols and FGD guides as footnotes. These notes not only served as a reference in probing some questions but were also validated by participants during both data collection exercises. Aside from the co-researchers check, this was done as a way of extending data analysis to the stakeholders in relation to the study questions. As Lune and Berg (2017: 140) note, "data analysis from the action research perspective involves examination of the data in relation to potential resolutions to the questions or problem identified".

Second, data from interviews and FGDs was analysed thematically. Maguire and Delahunt (2017: 3353) describe thematic analysis as the "process of identifying patterns of themes within qualitative data". The aim is to identify themes, for example, patterns in the data that are important or interesting and use these themes to address the research questions or, for example, something about a phenomenon. It is also seen as a systematic aggregation through identifying, sorting, making sense of the findings, or offering insights into the patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset (Braun and Clarke 2012: 57; Johnson 2017: 120).

In accordance with the tenets of PAR, the researcher, together with the first co-researcher, collaborated in preparing transcripts from both interviews and FGDs since they jointly facilitated the two activities. Thereafter, they had a meeting with the rest of the co-researchers to elicit comments from the other members of the research team. One crucial observation/feedback provided during this review was the limited number of leaders from party youth leagues that participated in the FGDs. In total, 40 (eight senior political leaders and 32 young people) were considered as key informants and the analysis was largely deductive (Creswell 2014: 234). Based on the study questions, answers from 40 participants were coded and grouped according to themes and thereafter explanations were extracted.

In sum, as noted in Chapter one, key issues and concerns that emerged from the interviews and FGDs were supported by the survey data. The integration of two datasets was not only corroborative but was complementary. The latter integration arrangement is

essentially the meshing of quantitative and qualitative data such that each data analysis enhances the other. Stated differently, findings from the surveys and interviews/FGDs are juxtaposed to produce complementary insights and generate a broader understanding of the phenomenon under study (Brannen and O'Connell 2015: 260; Johnson 2017). The merged results constituted the agenda for dialogue sessions held later in the course of the current study.

6.7 Ethical Considerations

A core premise for ethical considerations by PAR practitioners is that their work, to a large extent, enquires into the lives and social conditions of other people. The ethical aspects of PAR projects are of utmost significance in McIntyre's (2008: 67) view if practitioners and participants are to effectively work together for change. Further, given the longevity of many PAR projects, as McIntyre adds, the relationship that is cultivated between the two co-researchers brings about a different set of ethical challenges. These are encounters unalike those that arise in traditional social science research projects. Thus, the current study was anchored on five ethical elements and virtues that were conceived as PAR-related.

First, the study, from the onset, embraced the 'do no harm' ethic. Adapted from the biomedical practitioners, this is a primary principle that refers to avoiding physical and psychological harm to research participants (or stakeholders) and their settings in which the research happens (Leavy 2017: 32; Lune and Berg 2017: 44). Therefore, during the current study, participants during the interviews and FGDs were informed of their right to withdraw without any penalty since the participation was voluntary. In addition, the purpose, the type (PAR) of study, methods, and envisaged outcomes were all made known to the participants including the political party leadership. Further, in the commitment to 'do no harm', participants, during dialogue sessions, were assured that no outcome would be disseminated without their explicit consent.

McIntyre (2008: 12) notes that "practitioners make a distinction between professional ethical considerations and contextually specific ethical considerations, which can be negotiated and modified to best serve the participants". Similarly, one of the critical

discussions held prior to the start of dialogue sessions was the role of the participants. This culminated into the second ethical consideration of the study being "with and not about the participants – youths" (Boyd 2014: 503). This raised the question of who a youth was. Consistent with the initial planning, all the participants during the dialogue sessions were above the national youth age threshold of 15 years. This principle of 'with and not about' not only inculcated a sense of ownership of the project among participants, but also spoke to some of the ethical considerations in PAR:

- participants engage in all aspects of the project;
- practitioners have an appreciation of the capacity for individuals to work together to effect change;
- practitioners participate with participants in the overall PAR process, contributing resources and knowledge when necessary; and
- participants are encouraged to learn about research methods that are appropriate to the project (McIntyre 2008: 12).

Third, as with any other scientific enquiry, 'informed consent' was another ethical consideration during the current study. This was elicited through the reading and signing of a consent form prior to the start of interviews, FGDs, and dialogue sessions by all the participants. This is important since, as Johnson (2017: 51) observes, human subjects (participants) who participate in a research project must provide informed consent prior to their participation. Informed consent is described by Lune and Berg (2017: 46) as "the knowing consent of individuals to participate as exercise of their choice, free from any element of fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement or manipulation". Further, one of the reasons for obtaining signed informed consent was to systematically ensure that potential participants are knowingly participating in a research and are doing so of their own choice (Lune and Berg 2017).

Fourth, to protect participants' dignity and privacy, confidentiality and anonymity was assured during the interviews, FGDs, and dialogue sessions. Participants were guaranteed that all personal data, photographs, and audio/video recordings of these activities would remain confidential throughout the study. Although not all sessions were

audio recorded, whenever this was done, consent was sought from the participants. During two interview sessions, senior party leaders declined to be audio recorded but signed the informed consent form. As a PAR project, the essence of this ethical consideration was to take every "precaution to protect the confidentiality, privacy and identity of participants" (McIntyre 2008: 12).

The confidentiality and anonymity ethical consideration during the current study was, to a large extent, influenced by Merten's (2015: 420) clarity of the two terms. First, participants were informed that their privacy would be protected by ensuring that the data provided would be handled and shared in a way that no participant would be associated with the data. Second, with anonymity, "no uniquely identifying information is attached to the data, and thus no one, not even the researchers can trace the data back to the individual providing".

Although for some who have ethical concerns to research 'with' rather than 'on' people (young people especially), anonymity is questioned. For example, Yanar *et al.* (2016: 124) claim that anonymity in PAR raises issues around voice and ownership when participants are also practitioners, and that PAR routinely blurs the lines between research "subjects" and "researcher" – the role of a practitioner and participant becomes mixed.

Participants' capacities and engagement criteria was the last ethic considered. Given that a number of young people in Zambia, especially those involved in politics in communities, have low education levels (Yezi 2013; International Youth Foundation 2014), the current study ensured language flexibility. In other words, during FGDs and dialogue sessions, whenever some participants encountered difficulties using the English language, it was permissible for them to use a familiar local language (Icibemba). McIntyre (2008: 12) suggests that ethical consideration in PAR should reduce barriers between participants and practitioners and ensure that the language used in the project is understood by participants.

6.8 Validity and Reliability

In any scientific study, a researcher's wish is for the assessments to be valid and reliable. These aspects assist in ensuring that there is transparency in a research project and researcher bias is averted. In that which is referred to as conventional usage, Babbie (2016) unpacks each of these terms. First, validity entails "the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration" (Babbie 2016: 149), and that it is about 'actually' assessing that which one states that one is assessing. Second, reliability is a "matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, yields the same result each time" (Babbie 2016: 146). During the current study, the two aspects of research design and methodology were actualised during data collection, data analysis, and dialogue sessions as part of PAR.

First, through the use of various modes of methods (survey, interviews, and FGDs) to collect data, the study enhanced the validity of data collected. Known as data or finding triangulation (using multiple ways of verifying data), this approach, according to Yin (2016: 87), strengthens the credibility of a study. For example, by examining evidence from different data sources, it helped to have a comprehensible justification for emerging themes. Another piece that enhanced the validity of this study during data collection was the use of different respondents for quantitative and qualitative data. Creswell (2014) discourages the use of the same individuals answering quantitative and qualitative instruments to avoid undue duplication of responses.

Further, in order to ensure reliability or trustworthiness during data collection, the research team ensured that the respondents were appropriate vis-à-vis the phenomenon under study. These were young people from Kalulushi constituency including members of youth leagues of earmarked political parties and senior political leaders. To build reliability, Yin (2016: 86) recommends ensuring the soundness of data sources, that is, participants making accurate representations of themselves. As a PAR-inspired project, trustworthiness was promoted by subjecting the findings to reviews by co-researchers. This is akin to that which Creswell (2014: 252) calls "peer debriefing".

Second, during data analysis, validity was considered from the quantitative data collected. For example, the use of SPSS 26 was appropriate in assisting to generate custom tables, multiple response tables, cross tabulations, and charts representing different variables. Leavy (2017: 114) notes that statistical validity "refers to whether statistical analysis selected was appropriate and whether the conclusions drawn are consistent with the statistical analysis and the rules of statistical laws". In addition, Yin (2016: 88) argues that "a valid study is one that had properly interpreted its data so that the conclusions accurately reflect and represent the real world that was studied".

As noted above with data collection, analysed data from both the survey and interviews/FGDs was appraised by co-researchers, since the researcher took a lead in all the analyses to avert any possible bias. Researcher bias, in Cypress' (2017: 259) view, "results from selective recording of information and allowing one's personal views and perspectives to affect how data are interpreted and how the research is conducted".

Last, dialogue sessions also provided an opportunity to enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of the current study. One of the sessions provided space for reflecting on and validating findings (refined key issues/themes) to ascertain their accuracy. Again, this is similar to that which is referred to as "member checking" (Creswell 2014: 252). Social researchers, as argued by Babbie (2016: 151), should look both to their co-researchers and participants as sources of agreement on the most valuable meanings and breadth of the concepts that they study. Therefore, validity and reliability were continuously promoted even during the dialogue sessions to ensure that multiple strategies were employed to "demonstrate the accuracy of information collected" (Creswell 2014: 237).

Ensuring credibility and rigour should be held by researchers, in Cypress' (2017) view, during the study and they should not wait for external assessors of the completed investigation. Correspondingly, the immersion in the study location and the active engagement of co-researchers and participants in data analysis and verification enhanced validity. From Maxwell's (2013: 167-168) eight-point checklist to use in combating the threats to validity, two speak to the foregoing:

- *Intensive long-term field involvement* – enables a researcher to check and confirm observations and inferences and provides more complete data about specific situations and events than any other method … "sustained presence of researcher in the setting studied can help rule out spurious associations and premature concepts".

- *Respondents validation* – a significant way of excluding the possibility of misinterpreting the meaning of what participants say and do and the perspective they have on what is going on. An important technique of recognizing researchers' biases and misunderstandings of what is observed.

6.9 Schedule of Activities

One of the challenges when implementing a PAR project is aligning timeframes in a dynamic context, as it may create delays in planning schedules (Mackenzie *et al.* 2012). In order to enhance the execution of various PAR activities, it is essential to have face-to-face meetings, discussions, and phone/email follow-ups with local stakeholders. Consistent with International Alert (2015: 14), this helps "provide them with information about the participatory action research process" after which a work plan is adopted. Similarly, during the Kalulushi intervention, recognising the significance of advance planning in PAR, before implementing specific activities, several consultations, scheduling, and re-scheduling of meetings were held. In turn, this process culminated in a practical schedule of activities, as shown in Table 6.1. A detailed presentation of the implementation of PAR methodology is shared in Chapter seven in Table 7.1.

Table 6.1: Synoptic view of PAR activities.

Method	Stakeholder	Number	Location	Dates
Semi-Structured Interviews	UPND Constituency Coordinator	01	UPND Constituency Office	5/08/2019
	UPND Constituency Chair/Councillor	01	UPND Constituency Office	9/08/2019
	UPND Constituency Women's Chair	01	Residence	14/08/2019

	PF Kalulushi District Secretary/Councillor	01	Residence	16/08/2019
	MMD National Executive Member	01	Residence	22/08/2019
	MMD District Chair	01	Business Premises	24/08/2019
	PF Councillor/Deputy Mayor	01	Business Premises	26/08/2019
	MMD Constituency Chair	01	Business Premises	31/08/2019
Focus Group Discussions	UPND/PF Young Supporters	05	KAFUE WARD (UPND Women's Chair Residence)	09/09/2019
	UPND/PF Young Supporters	04	LUBUTO WARD (UPND Const. Off.)	10/09/2019
	UPND Young Supporters	04	KALANGA WARD (Research Team Member's Resid.)	11/09/2019
	UPND/PF Young Supporters	04	NGWESHI WARD (Private School)	13/09/2019
	UPND/PF Young Supporters	07	KALUNGWISHI WARD (UPND Const. Off.)	16/09/2019
	UPND Young Supporters	04	LUAPULA WARD (N/Assembly Off.)	18/09/2019
	PF Young Supporters	04	DONGWE WARD (Dongwe Centre)	20/09/2019
Dialogue Sessions (9 Sessions)	DP/PF/UPND Young Supporters/YWCA Observer	21	DONGWE Youth Training Centre	07/10/2019 - 15/10/2019
Follow Up/ Evaluation	DP/PF/UPND Young Supporters/	12	Research Team Member's Resid.	23/10/2019
Final Evalu. Meeting	Research Team Members	06	Lead Researcher's Residence	06/11/2019

Source: Field Notes, 2019.

6.10 Conclusion

Participatory Action Research (PAR) is context specific and aims to transform real-life social issues. Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 13) add that PAR needs "to be widely inclusive of the diversity of experiences and capacities amongst participants in the research". The aim is to draw in probable outlier input and ensure acceptance and ownership of both the process and the outcomes. It is consistent with this understanding that the design of the current study was a transformative mixed methods design, to take action against young peoples' current engrossment in political conflicts and emergent violence. As the articulation of the research design and methodology in this chapter shows, the current study, as a PAR intervention, is oriented towards empowering and emancipating young women and men in Kalulushi.

As such, the overarching thrust that underpins this study's methodological approach is the PAR philosophy of engagement, an ethical order to serve community (young people's) welfare. In Lake and Wendland's (2018: 13) view, "community-engaged practitioners and researchers can both seek to become and help to train resilient agents of change". They argue that traditional research approaches are frequently deficient for community-engaged research endeavours since such methods are rarely inclusive and often fail to yield sustained change. Thus, further methodological impetus was drawn from the centrality of participants as 'resilient' agents of change ensuring that they exert greater control over the direction of the study. For example, their voice remained critical in the analysis and interpretation of the data collected from the survey, interviews, and FGDs.

However, it is stated that a community-based research project is difficult to assess in terms of successful outcomes – collaboration, empowerment, or building participants' capacity and to what extent (Boyd 2014: 514). As an ethical and methodological consideration, during the current study, the researcher and other co-researchers endeavoured to remain trustworthy and scrupulous. As McIntyre (2008: 12) notes, this entails "being responsible for the well-being of all involved; fair, just and willing to relinquish one's own agenda if it's in conflict with participants' desires". Thus, not only

were participants' wishes accommodated but the latitude created and cooperation cultivated was empowering and capacity enhancing.

Chapter Seven:

THE APPLICATION OF PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH IN KALULUSHI

7.1 Introduction

One of the positive aspects of PAR as a philosophy of engagement is that it creates space for participants to take collective action to deal with their social problems. In the case of young people, PAR is an approach and intervention that empowers them to challenge and voice out against marginalisation and other deprivations (Yanar *et al.* 2016: 123). Further, as a mode of inquiry, it remains a valuable tool that enables practitioners to appreciate youth issues from the latter's own perspective and experiences. The realisation of sustainable social transformation, to a large extent, hinges on the collegial, reciprocal, and collaborative relationship between practitioners and young people.

Therefore, while the focus of the current study is the application of dialogue in transforming youth involvement in political conflict, an appraisal of PAR, as the vehicle that drove this intervention, is imperative. Stated differently, a review aimed at bringing to the fore 'the nuts and bolts' of mounting a PAR project with young people remains imperative, correspondingly illuminating youths' contributions and commitment to social change before, during, and after the intervention. Thus, this chapter discusses the PAR process as executed in Kalulushi during the project tenure, sharing how the basic steps were actualised. Further, that which may be described as the 'symbiosis of Dialogue and PAR', including the short-term gains that accrued from this intervention, are also discussed.

7.2 Overview of the PAR Procedure

The standard of success in the implementation of PAR, according to Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon (2014: 18), is not whether participants have gone along with the steps faithfully. On the contrary, it is whether they have a robust and accurate sense of progress in their practices and an appreciation of the practices and the contexts. Therefore, the current study applied the PAR cycle flexibly chiefly for two reasons. First, the research topic was

initially conceived before the active involvement of participants from the study location. Second and most importantly, as noted earlier, the PAR process is fluid and context-specific, and given the evolution of the research problem, adjusting to the Kalulushi specifics was inescapable, although adherence to the principle of participation was however inflexible. Thus, as summarised in Table 7.1, the PAR cycle started with 'observation' followed by 'reflection', then 'planning', 'action', and lastly 'sharing/evaluation'.

Table 7.1: Implementation of PAR methodology in Kalulushi constituency.

PAR Stage	Action	Explanation
Observation & Reflection	1. Affirmation of Issues	Findings from the survey affirmed during interviews and FGD by key informants, and later by research support team/co-researchers.
	2. Identify issues & concerns	Generic list of issues and concerns were extracted from survey results, interviews, and FGD transcripts by the lead and co-researchers.
	3. Sort and prioritise issues & concerns	After collaboratively reviewing the issues, the lead and co-researchers sort, categorise, and prioritise key concerns.
Planning & Action	4. Negotiate meeting space	As a politically connected project, formal consent from the local municipal council was necessary to use a local training centre for dialogue sessions.
	5. Notify dialogue participants	All earmarked participants were invited through their senior PF and UPND party officials.
	6. Hold dialogue sessions	With the issues prioritised forming the core agenda items, dialogue sessions were held. Prior to the start of serious engagements, participants validated the issues.
	7. Review dialogue sessions	As a way of providing immediate feedback following the conclusion of dialogue sessions, the research team reflected on how the sessions progressed.

Sharing & Evaluation	8. Present communique	One of the outcomes from the dialogue sessions – a communique – was shared with different radio stations.
	9. Share findings and Dialogue outcomes	A preliminary report of the research and dialogue outcome was prepared by the lead researcher and co-researcher and shared with all participating parties and stakeholders.
	10. Evaluation/review Meetings	A final review, evaluation, feedback, and 'next steps' meetings were held by co-researchers and selected participants that were part of a follow-up initiative – platform for youth empowerment and dialogue.

Source: Adapted from Mackenzie et al. (2012: 16).

Perhaps that which merits mention here is that beyond the four traditional PAR cycle steps, during the Kalulushi project, a fifth stage – 'sharing and evaluation' – was added to the Kalulushi project. While Crane and O'Regan's recommendation is to share observations, lessons, and practice developments both throughout the cycle and at the conclusion of the research, the current study went for the latter. However, given the iterative nature of PAR, the lines between 'observation and reflection' and 'planning and action' were thinned, culminating in three predominating phases, as shown in Table 7.1. It is therefore imperative to unpack a little further how each of these broad phases was rolled out.

7.2.1 Observation and Reflection

With the survey carried out before participants were actively involved in the study, the observe and reflect stages included the reviewing and analysis of the findings from the survey, interviews, and FGDs. Further, a review of key issues was done during the dialogue sessions. As such, even though participants were not part of the initial data analysis, they actively participated during this phase. In short, the two stages were primarily exploratory, delving into answers to the research questions and thereafter unearthing meanings from the findings. This exercise from the action research standpoint,

as argued by Lune and Berg (2017: 13), "involves examination of the data in relation to potential resolutions to the questions or problems identified".

Given that the PAR is nonlinear, another aspect that merits mention during this phase is that participants endorsed the data collection instruments during interviews and FGDs. For instance, at the start of each exercise, co-researchers explained the foci of each instrument and invited any additions from participants and thereafter elicited their approval. In sum, the observation and reflection stage during the current study was iteratively realised during data analysis and interpretation.

7.2.2 Planning and Action

The plan and act stages put the observations and reflections into a plan of action. However, prior to implementing the plan, the co-researchers fully understood and responded to the requisites of the research context. For example, preparations for the main action (dialogue sessions) needed the support of local gatekeepers (municipal council authorities). As the summit of the current study, dialogue sessions were held in order to generate agreements on divisive issues and explore possibilities of joint follow-up actions to address causes of political conflicts. During the nine-day dialogical engagement, an intergroup dialogue framework, as shown in Table 7.2, was employed given its all-inclusive structure.

Table 7.2: Kalulushi youth intergroup/inter-party dialogue activities.

Stage	Activities
Stage One: Group Formation & Relationship Building	o Team building – identity and party affiliation ice breaker o Generating expectations and guiding rules o Understanding Dialogue – Bohm's conception o Dialogue versus debate and discussion o Intergroup dialogue framework
Stage Two: Exploring Differences & Commonalities	o Conceptual Appreciation o Group reflections: ✓ Prejudices in politics ✓ Discrimination in communities ✓ Stereotypes in politics

	✓ Oppression in communities o Plenary – Consensus and mutual understanding
Stage Three: Discussing key issues and concerns	o Party Buddies Engagements: ✓ Curbing agents of political conflict/violence ✓ Transforming the nature of political conflict/violence ✓ Critical examination of extent of political conflict/violence ✓ Review of the effects of political conflict/violence o Open reflection and dialogue o Critical dyad reflections on follow-up interventions
Stage Four: Action planning and Alliance building	o Identification of working group o Action planning: ✓ Identification and prioritisation of actions ✓ Development of timeline versus activities ✓ Presentation of plan of action o Dialogue-Reflection on the plan of action o Endorsement, way forward and Closing

Source: Adapted from Zúñiga et al. (2007: 27-28).

The theory that underpins this form of dialogue asserts that "social change involves working in concert with others and consequently also attends to building collaborations across social identity groups" (Aldana, Richards-Schuster and Checkoway 2016: 15). The framework not only enables the participants to constructively deal with differences that divide them, but facilitates the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to engage in meaningful conversations. This interaction, in the view of Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014: 9), "challenges participants to be mindful, involved, responsive, and willing to explore contentious issues in a collaborative way". In addition, the framework served as a tool that helped organise, sequence, and foster learning during the dialogue process. Thus, it is imperative to look at how each of the four stages were implemented during the sessions in Kalulushi.

a. Stage One

This stage was aimed at setting the environment for dialogue by forming and building relationships, orienting the participants to the theory and practice of dialogue. The phase, which lasted two days, allowed participants to discuss their expectations and identified appropriate ground rules and their overall involvement in the dialogue process. The purpose of the dialogue guides in sustaining constructive dialogue sessions and a comparative view of dialogue and other communication modes was also discussed during this stage. This stage, as noted by Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 26), is focused at cultivating an atmosphere conducive to honest and meaningful exchange and a safe space for participants to share their thoughts and experiences.

During this stage, two aspects merit particular mention. First, three participants, in their expression of hopes, bluntly stated that they expected jobs at the close of the dialogue sessions. While this may seem misdirected, it illuminated the reality of young people's pitiable socioeconomic circumstances. Second, adjusting to the problem posed for education and learning proved difficult for some participants who have been immensely schooled through 'banking' approaches. It was not until the end of day two that most of them opened up and actively participated in small group exchanges. Johnson (2017: 16) claims that by "depositing" information into learners, "banking" education approaches mould learners into passive objects. Thus, the beginning of the dialogue process was also the inauguration of a transformation of young people from passive to more reflective and active agents.

b. Stage Two

Prior to confronting 'real and hot' issues at the core of the current study, the second stage addressed participants' commonalities and differences of experiences. Thus, the opening was an appreciation of key concepts, specifically prejudices, discrimination, stereotypes, and oppression that contribute to the essence of intergroup dialogue. While it is essential to explore issues and experiences that participants have in common and those that differentiate them, it is especially crucial

to be aware of these four social ills. In particular, as Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 29) observe, representatives of both the privileged and disadvantaged groups understand their roles in maintaining systems of social discrimination and oppression. The focus here was raising consciousness regarding their relationships.

Whereas no incidences of prejudice and oppression per se were shared after group engagements, discrimination and stereotype were illuminative. First, discrimination oscillated around access to socioeconomic opportunities. For example, both female and male supporters of the UPND claimed that their opportunities to becoming employed, acquiring plots, or even participating in youth empowerment projects, is extremely limited. On the contrary, those from the PF, given their party's incumbency, are preferentially treated and have access to several opportunities. Even though young supporters from the PF remained indifferent, both groups appreciated the fact that as supporters of an opposition and ruling party, they are less advantaged and more privileged, respectively (Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford 2014: 7).

Second, a more perceptive case of stereotype from group engagement involved a young woman who narrated how she was labeled as belonging to UPND because of her name. A PF supporter, as the young woman claimed, was made to wait at a local clinic after an official learned from her name that she hailed from another region. During this stage, that which was evident was that young people from both parties encountered concepts such as discrimination, stereotypes, and prejudices for the first time. That which was crucial, however, was that, consistent with Miles and Kivlighan (2012), the stage enabled participants to understand the meaning of these concepts on the individual, institutional, and societal levels.

c. Stage Three

This stage of intergroup dialogue may be synthesised as the summit of the process. It involves, according to Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 29), "dialogue about controversial topics or hot-button issues that cause tension between people of different social identity groups". Although not being hot-button issues per se, the topics during the dialogue

sessions of the current study included concerns in relation to the causes, nature, extent, and consequences of political violence. Lasting three days, the phase allowed young people to engage in party buddies (of the same party) reflections, to explore possible solutions to curbing agents of political conflicts and violence. The small groups also analysed the type, magnitude, and effects of political conflicts and violence aimed at prescribing transformation strategies.

Thus, the call, as Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 5) observe, "is to take action to change these societal ills as a necessary condition for the improvement of relationships among social groups and individuals". While Zúñiga *et al.* (2007) suggest one session per hot topic, during the current study, in one session, working in their small groups, the participants reflected on several issues. However, in the next open session, party buddies shared their responses which were subjected to questions and sought for clarity. The final (open) session of this stage was devoted to eliciting a consensus on the proposals submitted in the previous session as the process transitioned into the fourth stage.

d. Stage Four

As the final stage of intergroup dialogue, the focus was on taking action for social transformation, that is, moving from dialogue to action individually and collectively anchored on that which Miles and Kivlighan (2012: 196) call the "social action plan". During the current study, prior to outlining this plan, which included identifying, prioritising, and developing timelines, and open sharing, strategies conceived in phase three were synthesised into a guiding framework, as presented in Table 7.3. In a way, this was the slate on which mostly collective actions were to be anchored.

Table 7.3: Guiding framework for action development/planning.

#	Issues/Concerns Intervention	Mode of Delivery	Focus Group
1.	Choosing credible leaders	Voter education	Voters/Youths
2.	Job creation	Lobbying and Advocacy	Government

3.	Social media regulation and restriction	Lobbying and Advocacy	Government
4.	Benefits of Political Pluralism, Peace and Nonviolence	Workshops/Public meetings Dialogue sessions	Ordinary citizens Youths
5.	Political party regulation	Lobbying and Advocacy	Government
6.	Banning political activities in markets/bus stations	Lobbying and Advocacy	Government
7.	Creation of recreation facilities	Lobbying and Advocacy	Government
8.	Practical skills development – bricklaying, tailoring, catering, carpentry etc.	Short (2-3 weeks) Intensive training	Youths
9.	UPND – PF coexistence	Mediation-Dialogue	Youths/Ward Leaders
10.	Cultivating/developing trust and suspending judgements	Dialogue/Lobbying and advocacy	Youths/Political Leaders
11.	Creation of recreation centres	Community service/projects	Youths
12.	Cultivation of positive minds (Not to be used as tools of violence)	Peer Education	Youths
13.	Curbing voters' harassment	New Legislation/Advocacy Voter education	Youths/ordinary citizens
14.	Curbing destruction of public and private properties	Workshops/Voter education	Youths/ordinary citizens
15.	Curbing violent electoral campaigns	Law enforcement/voter education/lobbying and advocacy/election process monitoring	Youths/ordinary citizens/candidates
16.	Increased community interactions/exchanges	Community service – drainage clearing/workshops/public meetings	Leaders/youths organisations and members
17.	Importance and benefits of voting and electing selfless	Sensitisation: families, neighbourhoods/communities	Family members/

	leaders/disadvantages of violence	Social media – Facebook/ Twitter/blogs/WhatsApp	Youths/community members, ordinary citizens
18.	Make materials on peace, dialogue, nonviolence easily accessible	Translation into local languages	Ordinary citizens/ Youths

Source: Field notes, 2019.

This stage is not only cumulative but, as Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 29) argue, it "shifts the discussion from reflection and dialogue to taking individual and group action with others". Correspondingly, the plan and actions were collaboratively mooted by young supporters from the PF and UPND to make change happen. This cooperation, as the guiding framework shows, generated interventions that would challenge some of the social, political, and economic hurdles that young men and women cope with. Stated differently, while the envisaged actions will contribute to personal transformation, structural change in the long term is equally predicted. Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 31) suggest that "in intergroup dialogue, attention must be given to both the personal and structural aspects of social group distinctions".

The closure of stage four included specific outputs and commitments by the participants. First, three implementation mechanisms were agreed on. In order of priority, these were: the creation of a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), holding public meetings/popular theatre educational-entertainment events, and regular peace talks in schools. However, in settling for an NGO, the consensus was that it would be called the 'Kalulushi Alliance for Youth Empowerment and Dialogue – KAYED'. By the close of the current study in January 2020, the process of registering the NGO with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDS) had just begun.

Second, extracting from the issues discussed during the party buddies engagements, a communique, as part of the outcomes from the dialogue process, was prepared and signed by 13 participants (seven PF and six UPND supporters). Third, to maintain the alliance, the participants agreed to create a WhatsApp group – KAYED.

7.2.3 Sharing and Evaluation

Sharing the outcomes from the PAR project beyond the participants involved is imperative. Sharing can be fairly informal or relatively formal and, in Crane and O'Regan's (2010: 34) view, it is not about celebrating or showcasing. Instead, "it means genuinely inviting others to look at what you have done and provide them with a meaningful opportunity to agree or disagree with your conclusions and strategies". Thus, during the current project, aside from sharing a communique with media organisations, a report of the entire research and dialogue outcomes was prepared and shared. The recipients of the report included the area MP; the deputy mayor of Kalulushi (one of the interviewees); all senior party officials interviewed from UPND, PF, and MMD; and all participants of the dialogue sessions.

On the other hand, the evaluation of the short-term outcomes and possible impact was done in two forms. First, a week after the dialogue sessions, the participants arranged a meeting to consolidate their action plans and the researcher was invited. From their discussions during the meeting, the level of commitment was evident. For instance, they shared various responsibilities in order to expedite the registration process of KAYED. Second, the researcher had a final meeting with the co-researchers/support team and the engagement was equally helpful on the immediate result of the intervention. Part of the feedback from this meeting is discussed in Section 7.4.

As envisaged during the planning of the current intervention, evaluating changes that may have taken place in the lives of participants, their political parties, or even communities may be premature. However, participants' individual capacities for positive transformation is undeniably enhanced. For example, from the oral feedback provided at the completion of the dialogue sessions, it was shown that they were able to distinguish dialogue from other forms of communication such as debate or discussion. Additionally, if the vigour demonstrated in developing follow-up actions such as a youth platform is to be considered, they are equal to the task and motivated to act.

In sum, the sharing of the outcomes and evaluation of the PAR process, in a way, adds to the study's validity and reliability. For example, Crane and O'Regan (2010: 34)

claim that sharing and "inviting disagreement is one way PAR is able to establish its trustworthiness". During the current study, a senior party official called one of the researchers, upon receiving the preliminary report, to seek clarity on a statement in the report. Another senior leader called to ask whether the area MP was sent a copy of the report. On the other hand, involvement of participants in the evaluation is equally crucial. Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 13), for instance, note that this creates an "opportunity, collectively, for active and critical engagement, where alternative voices are indispensable to any consideration of research validity".

7.3 Level and Quality of Participation

Twenty-one participants aged between 18 and 34 years attended nine dialogue sessions held in October 2019. Drawn from seven different wards of Kalulushi constituency, ten (two males and eight females) were supporters of PF and nine (five males and four females) came from UPND. Two other people attended the sessions as observers from a newly formed Democratic Party (DP) and a young women's Christian Association (YWCA) staff. Of the 21, only five (four males and one female) were in formal employment, five females were self-employed, and two (one male and one female) were retrenched. From the rest, three (one male and two females) had university and college certificates and seven (one male and six females) were high school graduates.

In terms of their level of engagement, during the first two sessions, some participants seemed unenthusiastic but later and until the end, everyone was active. Participation was elicited and reinforced through the problem posing approach and the small group/party buddy interactions. Comparatively speaking, participants became more engaged as the sessions progressed. For example, many questions and thought-provoking statements were raised and exchanged midway until the close of the sessions. In particular, four areas of unanimity were evident during group reports and plenary discussions. First, participants from both parties agreed that the need for young people's inclusion in local, regional, and national leadership is great. As one UPND supporter questioned, "how long should they (young people) wait before space is provided for them to participate in national matters".

This resolve and critical mentality is indicative of Aldana, Richards-Schuster and Checkoway's (2016: 7) claim that intergroup dialogue not only raises critical consciousness but strengthens young people's capacity for civic engagement. Second, young party members were in agreement that they needed to be pro-active and contribute to shaping their future. Further, it was unanimous that young people, as part of the marginalised sections of society, should speak out on matters that affect their wellbeing. Third, it was agreed that there was a need to confront poverty and a sense of hopelessness head on by engaging in skills development (see, for example, item 8 in Table 7.3). As another UPND supporter phrased it during her presentation, "young people have the potential that can be harnessed".

To some extent, this immediate enthusiasm by young people is not only a direct sprout from intergroup dialogue, but an upshot of PAR with young people. The participatory and action orientation, as argued by Yanar *et al.* (2016: 122), is "driven by a concern to maximize young people's voice and influence", a fundamental shift from being subjects of research to participants and later stakeholders. Last, all stood by a view from one of the PF supporters that young people should not accept being relegated to slogan chanting and perpetrating political violence. Overall, although some of the participants were not part of the study including data collection, they all collaborated very well in identifying appropriate interventions to the issues of concern. In Dutta's (2017: 480) view, for a PAR project to be effective, it is essential that participants (youths) become involved in defining the focus and purpose of the project.

7.4 Lessons from the Dialogue Process

Along with tangible outcomes from dialogue sessions, as explained in Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, there are 'intangible' commentaries that merit mention. These include extracts from participants' oral responses to a closing question on the usefulness of dialogical engagements as well as co-researchers' feedback. There were both positive and negative observations about the sessions. First, the positive comments included the idea to initiate a local youth implementation platform (KAYED) and provide young people from different political parties with an opportunity to engage in dialogue. Regarding the latter, one of the

participants remarked that "our politicians have taunted us that we are future leaders but have not supported initiatives such as dialogue". With this thirst for dialogical interactions, KAYED can assist in facilitating continuing conversations across party differences. One of the design features of intergroup dialogue, according to Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014: 10), is "intimate engagement in small groups that is sustained over a period of weeks or months".

Despite being dialogue participants, young party supporters saw themselves as being in charge of the process as much as the facilitators. From the facilitator's standpoint, this was made possible by the style of facilitation which was not only flexible but consistently employed the problem-posing approach. It is stated that regardless of the form it takes, intergroup dialogue fosters dialogue rather than debate and discussion (Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford 2014). The introduction to key concepts, including the defining of dialogue, was another positive aspect regarding the dialogue sessions. As a precursor to core exchanges, this allowed participants to become more comfortably involved especially from the third day onwards. At the close of the seventh session, one young female participant expressed how she felt enthusiastic about moving on to engage fellow youths from other political parties.

With the adversarial forms of communication such as discussion and debate that most young people may have been socialised through and exposed to, dialogue was notably an enthusiasm-generating experience. Dessel, Rogge and Garlington (2006: 305) argue that intergroup dialogue is meant to be a least antagonistic form of interaction. They associate discussion with the back-and-forth passing of ideas with the aim of the pursuit of truth by one party, while debate is an exchange of opinions in an argumentative form that includes attack, defense, and the potential of destructive outcomes.

The final positive observation regarding the dialogue process was the fact that it helped to conceive a framework of action. Since the close of dialogue sessions did not mark the end of engagements between PF and UPND youths in Kalulushi, a framework of action would serve to continue intergroup interactions. As noted earlier, sustaining intimate group engagement enables participants, in Aldana, Richards-Schuster and

Checkoway's (2016: 6) view, to "move from intergroup contact to meaningful interaction". In other words, notwithstanding any new differences between the two parties, the cooperation can still be kept afloat. In addition, it is suggested that "communicating about and, if possible working through conflict are both positive and necessary parts of the intergroup encounter" (Zúñiga *et al.* 2007: 13). Devising a framework of action has not only empowered them to coexist as an alliance of stakeholders but to continue to engage and collaborate. One of the operational principles of action research, according to Lune and Berg (2017: 140), is "to inform and empower people to work collectively to produce some beneficial change".

Second, dialogue sessions were not devoid of some observations that, in some participants' opinions, were uncertainties. For example, some participants initially associated dialogue with an opportunity to derive tangible social and economic benefits, that is, in their expectations, not only did they doubt the efficacy of the process, but they hoped for some form of employment (economic benefit) at the end of all the sessions. However, as the dialogue progressed, it dawned on the participants that by collaborating as supporters of two different groups, they could, as a combined voice, contribute to a more socially and economically just society.

Another seemingly unsettling observation during the sessions was that some participants, at times, displayed attitudes that reflected their loyalty to senior political leaders. This was evident in the contributions as they failed to detach themselves from their party structures or even speak from the standpoint of the general youth populace. This, at times, tended to bring to the fore that which Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 15) call "dysfunctional patterns of conversation and interaction" in which privileged group members express a sense of innocence. On the other hand, disadvantaged group members fail to acknowledge problems in their own communities or likely advantages of group membership.

Last, despite being oriented to the problem-posing approach, a few participants still felt shy to fully contribute to the dialogue process. While the expectation may have been that facilitators would step in to provide information about issues that individual

participants had experienced, this was not so. Instead, consistent with the intergroup dialogue process, the facilitators ensured that everyone was actively engaged through guided small group tasks and open question-and-answer exercises. Nagda *et al.* (2012: 211) stress that facilitative guidance helps support maximal participation and boosts the communication process among the participants.

7.5 Dialogue and PAR: Some Key Connections

One of the elements that steers dialogical engagements, as noted in the preceding section, is Freire's (1993) problem-posing pedagogical approach. Correspondingly, this is also an essential component of PAR, and herein lies that which may be described as an inescapable and symbiotic link between dialogue and PAR. Thus, the focus in this section is a brief reflection on some parallels and reinforcements relating dialogue and PAR. There are four overlying perspectives that may be advanced to explain this nexus.

First, and most importantly, Freire's approach, embedded within the critical pedagogy theoretical underpinning, remains central to both dialogue and PAR. Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* (2018: 2) note that "critical pedagogy emphasises the need for critical dialogue and reflection by community members undergoing oppression as a way to raise critical consciousness and inform social change". Freire (1993: 35) defines critical consciousness as "learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality". Perhaps an illustrative case of the link between PAR and dialogue is the LPI's interventions in Somalia. The organisation built up inclusive dialogue processes within and between conflicting clans/sub-clans through a multi-staged process of research and action. This has, in turn, helped to build trust, improve community relations, and encourage nonaggressive modes of communication, among other positive outcomes (Life and Peace Institute 2016).

Second, as noted in Section 5.7, just as social transformation is one of the tenets of PAR, so too is the medium- to long-term goal of dialogue, given its social justice orientation. Social justice may be defined as the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in meeting their social, economic, and political needs. Among the four assumptions that intergroup dialogue makes about conflict, as noted by Nagda *et al.*

(2012: 12), is that it "approaches conflict as embedded in social structures, systems of power and privilege that affect individuals, groups, and interpersonal relationships". Thus, PAR, in its operative approach, involves community members in identifying issues and participating in a recurrent process of shared reflection and dialogue (Benjamin-Thomas *et al.* 2018). The dialogue process, as integral to the PAR in Kalulushi, provided an opportunity to young supporters of PF as the dominant party (given their incumbency) to collaborate with UPND (an opposition party) supporters.

This cooperation is not only tilted towards transforming their involvement in political conflicts and violence but ensures that members of both parties, as social entities, contribute to social justice. Aldana, Richards-Schuster and Checkoway (2016: 3) claim that PAR "has the potential to engage individuals from privileged backgrounds in critical self-reflection and development of skills needed to be social justice allies". This reflection is akin to the strategies in intergroup dialogue that challenge participants to consider how "relationships between social identity groups continue to be reinforced and reproduced by social institutions and institutional barriers" (Zúñiga *et al.* 2007: 12). Social institutions include families, government agencies and departments, and business corporations, while institutional barriers may incorporate procedures, rules, or policies that disadvantage some people in society.

Third, while PAR enhances social cohesion through increased communication between local participants, dialogue likewise creates space for the contact of individuals and groups from diverse backgrounds and experiences. This exchange involves that which Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014: 8) call "difficult conversations that critically examine how differences in perspectives, values and access to cultural and material resources impact social identities and relationships". Such arduous engagements are inevitable to pave the way for social cohesion to dawn. The emergence of social cohesion brings to the fore other relationship seasonings such as the re-establishment of trust, solidarity, and above all, a sense of community among participating individuals. Schirch and Campt (2007: 19) aptly synthesise the advent of a sense of community, stating that "building relationships where no established patterns of relationships existed – A palpable sense

of togetherness or unity develops when people find similarities between their own experiences and stories of others".

Last, as noted in Section 5.7, PAR has the potential to engage numerous voices and invariably prompt changes in multiple settings. Similarly, dialogue, by bridging differences, as noted by Zúñiga *et al.* (2007), can also positively affect participants' motivation and confidence to take part in social justice and transformation efforts. From a transformative standpoint, several observers support the inclusion of societies' many voices such as the most oppressed, and practitioners and young people on the social change and justice agenda (McIntyre 2008; Feller and Ryan 2012; Mertens 2015).

Perhaps in sum, the approach of dynamically embedding dialogue within the PAR adopted by International Alert and their local partners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) would provide additional insight. For example, the philosophy of engagement employed was aimed at:

> [E]ncouraging peacebuilding efforts by strengthening the capacity of individual communities, enabling them to close deeply-rooted internal divides and manage conflicts without resorting to violence or coercion. The approach is underpinned by the belief that peace and social cohesion processes should not be imposed by external actors, but should be fostered from within, thus placing the development of mutual trust at the core of this approach (International Alert 2015: 8).

7.6 Credibility and Trustworthiness

Adherence to a set of ethical guidelines only by practitioners of PAR may not suffice in instilling confidence in the stakeholders. McIntyre (2008: 12) argues that practitioners ought to be "ethical, honest and forthright people", or their interventions may be construed as an intrusion in the lives of stakeholders. Thus, consistent with this call and in ensuring the accuracy, truthfulness, and consistency of the current project, the dialogue sessions were tested for credibility and trustworthiness. There are three ways in which this was accomplished. First, there was that which is known as *member checking* (Creswell 2014), or taking back the final findings to the participants to determine their accuracy. During the

current study, this was done during one of the sessions and at the close of the entire dialogue process.

The initial check, as explained in Section 6.8, was validating key issues that emerged from the data collected and proposed as part of agenda items for the dialogue sessions, while the final check included inviting participants at the end of the dialogue process to share their views on the value of the dialogical engagement. In addition to contributing to the credibility of the current study, this exercise presented one dimension (motivation) for assessing dialogue as all the participants expressed the willingness to be part of follow-up actions. Motivation, as Schirch and Campt (2007: 72) note, "concerns the degree to which participants feel inclined to take action whether by themselves or with others to address a problem", and that motivation can be assessed by ascertaining the number that took individual or collective action after the dialogue engagement.

The second approach through which trustworthiness was achieved during dialogical engagements was through a *constant call to all the participants to be aboard.* In other words, facilitators ensured that participants were reminded of the mutual responsibility to act upon all the issues and concerns tabled. In Crane and O'Regan's (2010: 44) view, trustworthiness is attained in PAR through the participation of those most affected by, and closest to, the topic being studied in ways that develop mutual trust and open communication. In the current study, as noted several times in this thesis, at the core of political conflict and violence are young supporters of the UPND and PF.

Perhaps that which merits particular mention here is that the researcher, by immersing himself in the study location for a long time, engendered trust from both PF and UPND youth supporters. As Anney (2014: 277) observes, the extended interaction with the context and participants was an advantage, as it enabled the researcher and the research team to have an appreciation of the crucial characteristics of the setting. Cypress (2017: 257) adds that "prolonged engagement to learn the context of the phenomenon on which it is embedded minimizes distortions that might creep into the data".

Third, the *use of quasi peer debriefing* was another mode applied to ensure the credibility of the study, being *quasi* because the debriefing was not carried out with professionals or members of the academic community but 'peers' who constituted the research/support team. Anney (2014) posits that feedback from peers helps the researcher to improve the quality of the inquiry and findings, and that even final reports of findings from qualitative studies should be presented to peers for comments. During the dialogue sessions of the current study, mini debriefings were held after each session, while a main 'post-dialogue' debriefing happened after the completion of all sessions.

Establishing the rigour of the inquiry with the last method was anchored on being *transparent*, *allowing for ongoing critical reflection*, *seeking review*, and *disagreement* (Crane and O'Regan 2010: 44). The research team that participated in the reflection and reviews and, at times, disagreeing, included young people who were not only supporters of political parties but who were also community leaders. Their vast experience irrefutably qualified them to be part of the Kalulushi Community Intellectual Space (CIS). The "aim of communities as intellectual space is to bring people from all walks of life together to develop critical, socially engaged intelligence which enables individuals to understand and participate effectively in the affairs of their community" (Johnson 2017: 23). For PAR practitioners, the CIS concept, as argued by Johnson, instructs researchers to "recognize the capacity of communities to participate in collaborative and critical inquiry toward the amelioration of issues and conditions impacting their lives".

7.7 Conclusion

A peacemaking-oriented intervention such as dialogue invariably engenders one form of appraisal or another. Schirch and Campt (2007: 71) argue that it is essential to carry out "evaluations, even relatively simple ones that demonstrate the impact of dialogue on people, groups and structure". During the current study, while an assessment of the dialogue sessions was conducted almost immediately upon conclusion, it was imperative to take an overall appraisal, hence this chapter. Participants in a dialogical engagement are expected to develop a critical analytic perspective on the intricacies of their

sociopolitical environment (Zúñiga *et al.* 2007). Thus, a review of their level and quality of participation was inevitable.

While there are plausible lessons from the dialogue process, the development of a guiding framework of action carries some hope vis-à-vis the transformative agenda of the current study. For example, as young party supporters and their respective constituencies steer this framework, they will garner a greater voice in how their parties engage political opponents. Additionally, the inter-party synergies cultivated during dialogue sessions should continue to serve as a basis to deconstruct "enemy images and narratives and conversely construction of shared meanings and narratives" (Feller and Ryan 2012: 363). Overall, intergroup dialogue was chosen, first, given its parallels with PAR as discussed in this chapter, and second, the intervention's focus groups were PF and UPND party supporters only. Most importantly however, at each stage of the intergroup dialogue, as contended by Nagda *et al.* (2012: 215), "relationship-building processes are intensified". Additionally, "critical processes of understanding how power often undergirds intergroup conflicts as well as understanding the possibilities of enacting social change" are achieved.

Chapter Eight:

DIALOGUE, PEACE, AND POLITICAL PLURALISM

8.1 Introduction

Dialogue has the potency to nurture an atmosphere ideal for building positive peace and fostering coexistence among political actors. It is one of the most ethical forms of contact, because in Taylor and Kent's (2014: 388) view, "it serves to mitigate power relationships, values individual dignity and self-worth and tries to involve participants in conversations and decision making". The environment envisaged here calls for parties' cognisance of extant differences, power, and other inequalities as well a commitment to transform such. It is stated that "dialogue may not always be possible or productive if power is unbalanced and awareness of conflict is low" (Schirch and Campt 2007: 67). Thus, it remains an opportunity for participants on both sides of the political divide to commit to engage and change.

Additionally, the full immersion in the dialogue process not only enhances relationship building but also helps to unearth the issues that may impede pluralism in emerging democracies such as Zambia. In sharing the practicability of dialogue, peace, and political pluralism, this chapter also demonstrates how associated aspects are weaved together to realise this feasibility. This chapter is inspired by the experiences of running dialogue sessions with young supporters of the PF and UPND in the Kalulushi constituency of Zambia. Specifically, it expands on the dialogue conflict transformation nexus introduced in Chapter four, discusses positive peace with respect to youths' aspirations, and identifies young people's niche in plural politics. The final part is a brief reflection on a local 'infrastructure for peace' conceived as part of the dialogue outputs.

8.2 Dialogue Conflict Transformation Nexus

The connection between dialogue and conflict transformation is anchored on their mutual foci – personal, relational, cultural, and structural aspects of conflict. As noted in Figure 4.1 in Chapter four, the substance of this nexus is the simultaneity of change processes.

Further, there is the argument that seemingly 'minor' outputs such as policy changes, new legislation and infrastructure for peace can culminate in improved structural conditions. Overall, in order for an expansive consideration of this relationship, the dialogue pathway and transformation process are broadly grouped into three parts.

First, there is a common goal, and contact and personal conversion. As noted in Chapter four, parties' dialogue route begins with a common goal, significant to both parties, which may be 'building and enhancing relationships', ultimately mounting a joint action. While there are several steps between a common goal and joint action, a crucial first step that paves the way for other activities is contact. Contact between groups would not only be informal, multilevel, interpersonal, intergroup, or negative or positive, it would also contribute to reducing prejudice and improve intergroup relations (Allport 1954). In addition, realised within the framework of dialogue, as Atkinson (2013: 45) argues, contact can serve "to ameliorate monolithic representation (as a conflict thrusting factor) of out groups". Thus, robust interactions that characterised the dialogue sessions during the current project between young supporters of the two parties enthused critical consciousness. For example, participants discussed how political conflicts and violence affected their relationships including political polarisation and the exclusive victimisation of some UPND supporters.

Further, young people's commitment to contribute to discouraging other youths from being perpetrators of violence is illustrative of this critical awareness. This, in turn, stimulated, to some extent, personal transformation among these young party supporters. Some participants, for instance, stated that while contact across political-parties-based differences can surface strains or altercations, they however maintained calm. This transformation, albeit impulsively, is akin to one of Schirch and Campt's (2007: 69) approaches to setting off social change. They argue that the individual level mode "seeks to change the attitudes, values, perceptions or circumstances of individuals as an important first step to bring about real and lasting social change". Unlike the negative effects such as violence that are associated with political differences among young political party stalwarts, conversion at a personal level, as Lederach (2003: 27) argues,

minimises the destructive effects of social conflict, and in the context of the current study, it is the negative consequences of political conflict.

Second, embedded within the dialogue conflict transformation nexus is relational and cultural transformation. Relational change heralds intergroup understanding, empathy, familiarity, and improved perceptions. All this is anchored on ridding relationships of poorly-functioning communication including sharing experiences of unhealthy prior relations, exemplified by violence, hostilities, and antagonism (Lederach 2003). The process of relational transformation is further boosted by the expression of experiences, perspectives, and active listening and standpoint-taking of experiences different from one's own (Schirch and Campt 2007; Zúñiga *et al.* 2007). During the dialogue sessions of the current study, participants were individually and collectively cognisant of some of the socialisations, beliefs, and attitudes that influence the violent expression of political conflict.

Conversely, this recognition offered an opening for young party supporters to identify and reflect on more positive attitudes to respond to political conflict. For example, there was unanimity that a shift from a culture of hooliganism, hatred, and intolerance to one that embraces diversities, equality, tolerance, and respect was inevitable. Hardy and Hussain (2017: 66) summarise culture as an explanation of "who we are, how we see the world and how we relate to those around us". Thus, in accepting this new culture, young party supporters from the PF and UPND committed to UPND-PF coexistence, increased community interactions and exchange, lobbying for the banning of political activities in markets and bus stations, and curbing the destruction of public and private properties (see Table 7.3 in Chapter seven).

While these commitments may yield results in the longer term, the immediate effect is that, as Lederach (2003) notes, cultural patterns that give rise to the violent expression of conflict are acknowledged. In turn, a commitment to change is offered. The reflection and commitments to a cultural shift are made within the realm of historical and relational contexts, such as the 2015 and 2016 post-election political conflicts, violence, and hostile relations between the PF and UPND. Thus, by engaging rather than avoiding past

conflicts and incidents of violence, as Maddison and Diprose (2017: 4) observe, young party stalwarts' actions aptly underscore the essence of the dialogue conflict transformation nexus.

Third, policy, legislation, and infrastructure for peace can result from efforts that began with the initial contact between two opposing parties. The claim here is that with policy changes, or new legislation, or indeed the inception of infrastructures for peace, there will be improved structural conditions (see the inverted pyramid in Figure 4.1 in Chapter four). Structural changes, as espoused within the conflict transformation theory, posit a need to rid a context of negative conditions that necessitate the violent expression of social and political conflicts. Lederach (2003), for example, argues that structural level change is imperative to ensure that people have access and a say in decisions that affect their lives. Therefore, the implementation of strategies for youth and governance within the current national youth policy and promotion of platforms for citizens' engagement and participation, in the seventh national development plan, may be augmented (Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015: 13; Ministry of National Development Planning 2017: 103).

On the other hand, given the breadth of political conflict and violence especially during electoral campaigns, perhaps there is a need to formulate and enact a law to regulate political party youths. With the vigour and commitment that has seen the enactment of the Anti-gender-based violence Act. No.1 of 2011 and National Dialogue Act. No.1 of 2019, an 'Anti-political and electoral violence Act' can equally be endorsed. Further, youth policy adjustments and enactment of anti-violence legislation may be complemented by a sustainable peace structure, known in peacebuilding parlance as an Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Consistent with Giessmann (2016: 9), an I4P is "a dynamic networking of skills, capacities, resources, tools and institutions that help build constructive social and political relationships and enhance sustainable resilience of societies against relapse into violence".

The initiative is seen by others as a mechanism that fosters and facilitates comprehensive peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, in turn placing the society, the village, community, and city at the centre of peace before the state (Richmond 2013: 276;

Issifu 2016: 142). In the case of the current study, young party supporters from different political parties envisage similar local platforms (discussed in Section 8.5) to allow them to cast their net wide.

8.3 Positive Peace and Youth Aspirations

At the start of Chapter three, a claim was made that Zambia is relatively peaceful in comparison to other countries in the sub-Saharan African region. Perhaps that which ought to be added here now is that the country enjoys negative peace (or the absence of armed conflict or protracted physical violence), but not much has been achieved to realise positive peace. The Institute for Economics & Peace (2018: 60) defines positive peace as "attitudes, institutions and structures, an optimal environment for the flourishing of human abilities, creation and sustenance of peaceful societies". Correspondingly, several observers speak to governance (constitutional), socioeconomic, political, and state CSOs' relational issues that may be considered impediments to the attainment of positive peace (Kaliba 2014; Namaiko and Etyang 2017; Phiri 2020).

Whereas negative peace involves ridding a context of physical violence, positive peace stresses doing away with structural violence which, to a very large extent, is manifest in the hurdles mentioned above. As discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter two, structural violence is covert and often embedded in society's systems and structures. It is also synthesised as the "deprivation of identity and well-being" needs and some of its outcomes, as argued by Springs (2015: 159), include the "marginalization and voicelessness; diminished agency; disempowerment, and isolation through exclusion, segregation and partition".

Young people remain crucial actors in Zambia's nascent democracy, as noted in Section 2.7 in Chapter two, however their aspirations are not fully realised, perhaps due to limited agency. Giddens (1984: 9) defines agency as peoples' capability of doing something which, in turn, suggests power. This potential among young party loyalists may be misapplied by those higher in the political hierarchy (see Table 2.3 in Chapter two) through manipulation. This is because agency relates to actions of which an individual is the perpetrator and the individual could have acted differently in the course of his or her

conduct (Giddens 1984). However, some young people may also turn violent, as Jeong (2000: 70) notes, "when their desires and wants grow far away from what they obtain". Therefore, three possibilities may be considered in the endeavour to contribute to satisfying youth aspirations from a positive peace standpoint.

First, the need for a concerted voice by young people is great. In other words, by acting against incessant marginalisation, exclusion, and manipulation, youth can marshal their energies to promote improved welfare and stop being indifferent to issues of local or national significance. Such inspiration reverberates the commitment to social justice that participants during dialogue sessions of the current study demonstrated. Social justice is not only about full and equal involvement of individuals and groups in fulfilling their social, economic, and political desires. According to the United Nations (2006), it is concerned with unjust, deplorable, and alarming income inequality; increased poverty; and an overall poor standard of living.

Thus, there was unanimity among young party supporters that they are part of the marginalised sections of society and the need to speak out on matters that affect their well-being is evident. Consistent with Schirch (2004: 22), "when systems, institutions or policies meet some people's needs and rights at the expense of others, then structural violence is sustained". For instance, some of the supporters of the UPND claimed that obstacles that foster disparity and satisfy the needs of followers of the PF are abundant. Second, young peoples' proclivity to political and election-related violence may be attributed to, among other factors, limited access to social amenities. For example, one of the joint commitments by young party supporters is to advocate for the creation of recreation facilities (see item 7 in Table 7.3 in Chapter seven). Admittedly, a lack of social facilities, such as pastime and sports centres, increases their susceptibility to being manipulated for ulterior motives by those with financial resources. Figure 8.1 is a photo of the dialogue session, depicting a group discussion.



Figure 8.1: Photo of dialogue session – group discussion (Source: Author, 2019).

When people cannot satisfy their material, social, or cultural needs, they often feel a sense of injustice and can justify the use of violence (Schirch 2004). Thus, while some young people may be at the 'disposal' of those with resources, others see the use of violence as an appropriate response to those perceived as obstructing their access. The call in both situations is that young peoples' needs, be they social or cultural, remains crucial in the attainment of positive peace, locally or nationally. Approximately two decades have passed since Jeong (2000: 70) argued that needs provide "factual, objective and national criteria for evaluating an emergent situation that may contain in its womb the potential for generating conflict". The claim is still valid today, if the experiences in Kalulushi are considered.

Third, moving a step up, young people's aspirations are curbed by unfavourable socioeconomic conditions. It is apparent that young party supporters' commitment (see Table 7.3 in Chapter seven) to advocate for job creation and the acquisition of practical skills is indicative of their dire socioeconomic state. As a contribution to cultivating positive peace, they would not only propagate alternatives to political and electoral violence, but push for improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of young people. The unfavourable socioeconomic situation includes high unemployment, limited or a lack of tertiary education, and irregular household income especially if both parents are out of

employment. This gloomy state of affairs is consistent with survey results (see Table 2.2 in Chapter two) which associate unemployment with young peoples' predisposition to politically motivated violence.

In addition, the negative socioeconomic environment thrusts young people into accepting politics as a means of livelihood thereby sinking further into manipulation and the perpetuation of violence. As noted in Section 2.8 of Chapter two, young people can also be entangled in auxiliary vices such as drug and alcohol abuse. Although this illuminates overt physical violence as the end result, it also elucidates the dichotomous sides of structural violence – that which young people are able to do versus available opportunities. Springs (2015: 152) synthesises structural violence as a "gap in human functioning and flourishing between the potential and the realized or actual".

8.4 Youth's niche in Political Pluralism

As observed in Chapter two, hostilities continue to characterise relations between youth supporters from different political parties especially during electoral campaigns. To a large extent, it may be stated that there is little appreciation of the tenets of plural politics. Thus, political and electoral violence perpetrated by youth is irrefutably one of the threats to political pluralism. Political pluralism is explained by some as an understanding of social life that encompasses multiple sources of authority, or a plurality of relatively autonomous subsystems within the domain of the state (Dahl 1982: 5; Galston 2009: 96).

To others, pluralism is a principle of socio-political democratisation and an "aggregation of citizens' interests through diverse political parties and interest groups, so that democracy features multiple centres of power and counters authoritarianism" (Eisfeld 2012: 71; Escobar 2017: 419). Thus, tolerance of diverse and contending opinions and philosophies is crucial and all stakeholders within the polity ought to embrace this tenet. In particular, young party supporters can and do have a role to play in keeping political pluralism afloat. Four potential ways of bringing this to fruition are suggested.

8.4.1 Sustaining Inter-Party Synergies

Inspired by socialisations such as the Kalulushi intergroup dialogue, young people can sustain inter-party synergies. In other words, positive political party contact effected from the lower strata of society can have a meaningful transformative effect across party hierarchies if nurtured. Further, the cooperation demonstrated during and after the dialogue sessions in Kalulushi allowed young party members to amalgamate into a team that can undoubtedly contribute to the promotion of pluralism. By committing to support inter-party synergies, they can create space for conversations around structural impediments to pluralism including that which Eisfeld (2012: 71) calls unequal positions of socioeconomic power or unequal distribution of political resources. Aside from unearthing such imbalances, inter-party exchanges may also provide an opportunity for political party stalwarts to have a comprehensive appreciation of political pluralism, as espoused by Galston (2009: 121):

> [P]olitical pluralism is the thesis that human life, individual and associational, consists in a heterogeneous variety of activities, each of which generates a distinctive ensemble with claims to respect and authority. Politics is but one of these activities. While it possesses distinctive competences and advances distinctive claim, its authority does not dominate every other type of activity.

Thus, appreciating the heterogeneity of activities, individuals, associations, and accompanying claims would contribute to reorienting followers within the polity, especially young people who are often tied to political conflicts and violence. However, some of the commitments made following the dialogue sessions speak to a new mindset. For example, in their implementation framework of follow-up activities, the participants pledged to promote coexistence between the UPND and PF members through mediation and dialogue, and further, to contribute to increased community interactions and exchanges through community service and a call on authorities to ban political activities in markets and bus stations (see Table 7.3 in Chapter seven). The latter appeal is made from two perspectives. First, it is concerned with violent inter-party clashes that emanate from such events. Second, there is the disruption to economic activities in these spaces which has a bearing not only on political party stalwarts but non-partisan young people trying to barely earn a living as well.

Young people have a perfect understanding of the structural circumstances that "hinder their ability to obtain a good education and acquire skills that can guarantee them long-term employment and stable livelihoods" (Honwana 2012: 39). Thus, any interference in their current means of survival (for those fortunate to work in the informal sector), is certainly unacceptable. Van Gyampo and Anyidoho (2019) claim that irrespective of the type of political system, whether democracy or dictatorship, youth politics can be confrontational or peaceful. However, while this is true, the political aspiration of young people from Kalulushi is that politics ought to be civil and hence opting to go with the latter.

8.4.2 A Commitment to Plural Politics

Along with sustaining inter-party synergies, youth from political parties ought to commit to embracing plural politics. The obligation that young party supporters from the PF and UPND set upon themselves of propagating the benefits of political pluralism, peace, and nonviolence should, for example, be fulfilled for the latter. This should in turn rid party politics of exaggerated views of certain characteristics such as the UPND being a 'tribal party'. In Hardy and Hussein's (2017: 69) view, this becomes a problem when such generalisations become prejudices that affect the way people act towards others. Thus, young party loyalists should realise that pluralism is the normative of social interest groups and of individual participation through associations in the political process (Eisfeld 2012).

However, this awareness would only be expressive when they fully access the political space and voice out their concerns. Based on a study of everyday activities of youths older than eighteen years in South Africa, Senegal, Tunisia, and Mozambique, Honwana (2012) synthesises their view of the political space. For example, "young people's perception is that politics offers them no space for real participation. The state and party politics do not allow for dissenting voices or alternative interventions" (Honwana 2012: 118). However, the resolve by young party supporters in Kalulushi is not to be disenchanted or discouraged but operate within the mainstream political process. In other words, it is choosing nonviolent conflict engagement over violent confrontation. In politics, violence is very effective in the short term, as argued by Thomson (2010: 120), "but over

longer periods of time, coercion only stimulates opposition and counter-violence". Figure 8.2 depicts a group photo of a dialogue session participants



Figure 8.2: Photo of dialogue session – group photo (Source: Author, 2019).

8.4.3 Intra-Party Pluralism

An extension of young people's commitment to pluralism should be a pledge to support and/or call for intra-party pluralistic structures. In other words, the call here is for young party loyalists to ensure that there is intra-party democracy and that their voices have a space. There are examples from the Kalulushi post-dialogue session implementation framework that may contribute to this commitment, for example, their call to choose credible and selfless leaders, the cultivation of positive minds, and desisting from being manipulated to perpetuate violence can have positive effects on their respective parties. While it is expected that non-state actors should keep an eye on state actors or the ruling class, the theory of pluralism should be entrenched in all political parties. The failure to accept diversity, coexistence, and agreeing to calmly disagree within political parties has often culminated in violence especially during primary elections or ascension to leadership portfolios.

Intra-party violence, as Seeberg, Wahman and Skaaning (2018: 963) affirm, "occurs between supporters, members, or candidates of the same party and relates to

the party's internal policies". Thus, young people, as both supporters and members of political parties, have a duty to contribute to averting intra-party hostilities and promoting plurality. Such interventions would not only strengthen intra-party coherence but consolidate the country's emerging democracy. Pluralism, as noted by Thomson (2010: 260), requires a political culture where democrats wear victory or defeat gracefully. A political culture is understood here as "shared political ideas, attitudes and beliefs that underlie a society which in cases entail general political principles held in common" (Thomson 2010: 259). In addition, Heywood (2003: 32) stresses that pluralism suggests that "diversity is healthy and desirable, usually because it safeguards individual liberty and promotes debate, argument and understanding", and that it is about power being broadly and evenly dispersed in society, and not concentrated in the hands of the ruling class or those with financial resources. In peacebuilding parlance, this would be synthesised as 'power with' and not 'power over'.

While pluralism encourages competition within and between political parties, this should not be at the expense of peace (negative and positive). As noted earlier, young people, in particular, can act as a counterweight to older party players' proclivity for political violence. Political or election-related violence in Seeberg, Wahman and Skaaning's (2018: 972) view "jeopardizes the quality of democracy within party institutions that are expected to help to consolidate democracy in the longer term". However, notwithstanding their marginalisation of intra-party structures, as observed earlier, young people as a coalition, as argued by Van Gyampo and Anyidoho (2019: 9), "can be pressure groups within their own party to move it toward greater democracy".

8.4.4 A Commitment to Checks and Balances

As noted earlier, young party supporters from the Kalulushi intervention committed to promulgating the significance of political pluralism, peace, nonviolence, and electing selfless leaders. Correspondingly, they should commit to contributing to ensuring checks and balances as opposed to taking a front line in executing political violence. Checks and balances, which are understood here as a separation of powers and functions of government (legislation, judicial, and administration), not only prevent the abuse of authority but ensure political accountability. However, as Kapur (2011: 452) succinctly

explains, the governed (people, including young people) have a crucial stake in this undertaking:

> [I]t is essential to temper leadership by imposing limitations upon it. The real limitations are those which make the government responsible to the people, that is, it must answer to the people for its policies and if its answers are not satisfactory to the people, they should have the means to replace it. It can be ensured further by the presence of an independent and impartial judiciary, the guardian of the rights of the people. Thus, the separation of powers is a living force in all democratic countries as a check to irresponsible power.

The commitment to ensure checks and balances by young people should counteract, as noted in Section 2.6 in Chapter two, their rudimentary and erroneous appreciation of party politics, that is, the predisposition to more violent or physical engagement rather than civil interactions amongst themselves or with elected leaders. The fact that they are "disenchanted with the politicians and government institutions that fail to respond to their aspirations and acknowledge their basic needs", as Honwana (2012: 112) notes, should be further motivation. In other words, they should not allow real or perceived marginalisation to push them out of the mainstream political process but take initial steps from the lower strata of society.

A study in 2012 in the Central and Copperbelt regions of Zambia by a youth organisation revealed that 91% of young people had not engaged their local leaders and decision-makers in the community concerning health and other youth-related issues (Nyimbili 2012: 5). Thus, the new mentality should be engaging leaders at various levels of the polity, and the engagement should evidently be dialogical, enabling participants to interact, promoting, in Taylor and Kent's (2014: 391) view, "understanding, goodwill, and a shared view of reality". Stated differently, with all due recognition, young people should be fully involved in contributing to enforcing accountability among all elected officials who invariably fall into the clientelistic iniquity. Thomson (2010: 121) defines clientelism as:

> [A] mutually beneficial association between the powerful and the weak. A patron extends public office (a salary and access to the state), security (freedom from violence), and resources (such as wells, roads and medical centres) to his or her clients. In return, the client offers support and deference that helps legitimise the patron's elevated position.

The call to speak out against clientelism by young people is not only a concern on behalf of the weak (citizens or voters) but because such practices permeate most societies and Zambia is no exception. In any case, the youth bear the biggest brunt of this practice since their aspirations, as noted earlier, are individual and long-term while clientelistic goods are often communal or social infrastructures. For example, it is not guaranteed that when a borehole is sunk, a school is built, or indeed if a road is constructed, young people would get employed immediately. Therefore, rather than rejecting formal party politics and the associated corruption, the absence of role models, and the absence of spaces for critical involvement, as Honwana (2012) argues, young people should remain steadfast. Unwavering commitment to ensuring checks and balances should illuminate their agency in leading the growth and/or consolidating democracy. Consistent with Honwana (2012: 111), they should "not be apathetic but remain politically engaged in different ways, moving away from hegemonic ideologies and structures and creating new spaces for intervention". From the current study, one such space is KAYED, discussed in the next section.

8.5 Kalulushi Alliance for Youth Empowerment and Dialogue

A community-based peacebuilding intervention with young people, such as the dialogue sessions in Kalulushi in the current study, call for a dynamic and lasting follow-up programme. The reason for this is twofold: first, young people's susceptibility to manipulation by those who are senior in the hierarchy can easily thwart all commitments by the former if not anchored in a formal structure, and second, youths' other competing social and economic needs can also reverse peace gains and promises, if the intervention is just a once-off activity. Thus, a more enduring programme in peacebuilding vocabulary, referred to earlier in Section 4.7.2 in Chapter four, would be an 'infrastructure for peace'. Irene (2018: 1) provides a fitting justification for the infrastructure for peace:

> Infrastructure for peace has become even more imperative in contemporary times in view of the increasing need to transcend the small scale approach to peacebuilding, peace trainings and peace activities into a large scale more effective and long term approach that involves a sustainable architecture for peace.

During the current study, the initiative, akin to this infrastructure, is a local youth-led platform called the Kalulushi Alliance for Youth Empowerment and Dialogue, or KAYED. It is an initiative that would involve Schirch and Campt's (2007: 69) structural level approach to bring about social change. The approach, according to Schirch and Campt, seeks to transform socio-political or institutional structures by tackling grievances that trigger conflict and institutionalise nonviolent ways of handling differences within society.

Further, as provided in the group's draft constitution, young party supporters envision pro-active youths who embrace mutual trust and coexistence and who engage politically and civilly to contribute to the development of Zambia. All things being equal, these young people are seemingly determined to promote understanding, peace, and friendship through dialogue and youth empowerment ventures and encouraging youth participation in national development. Specifically, as their provisional constitution stipulates, they hope to contribute "to reducing political and electoral violence in Zambia", "to work for the cultivation of mutual trust and co-existence among political parties", "to assist in initiating and scaling up youth empowerment projects in Zambia", "to promote social media sanity and responsibility", and "to contribute to social research and publication of young people's issues and concerns" (Kalulushi alliance for youth empowerment and dialogue 2019: 4). Figure 8.3 is a photo of a dialogue session, depicting the individual presentations.

Figure 8.3: Photo of dialogue session – individual presentations (Source: Author, 2019).

Through advancing alternatives to political and electoral violence and empowering other youths and engaging in media outreach, these young people will bring to the fore issues of regional and national significance.

Such interventions would also have valuable effects, especially countering low civic literacy levels among young people including low participation in decision-making. In Nyimbili's (2012: 7) study of the Central and Copperbelt provinces referred to in Section 8.4, low public literacy has several ramifications. For example, the study shows that:

> [Y]oung people are not able to take up the challenge of involving themselves in taking up any role in the communities, especially speaking out on what is not right, because they lack knowledge and skills to effectively get involved. This shows that many young people do not understand what role they can play in resolving community development issues.

Overall, opportunities abound for this new initiative to boost the youth's involvement in community initiatives in Kalulushi and the Copperbelt province as a whole. There are, for example, networks of young people that can be tapped into, applying Schirch and Campt's (2007: 69) two other approaches of stimulating social change – more people and key people strategies. As the names suggest, the aim is to engage large numbers of people as well as particular individuals or groups seen as opinion leaders and capable of effecting change in a context. The broad participation of people, as noted by Schirch and Campt, is necessary for social change. Thus, in the current context, while young party supporters draw upon other young people in Kalulushi, they can also reach out to youthful leaders such as the City Mayor and her deputy.

In spite of their membership to the PF, as civic leaders, they can be inspired to buy into the vision and mission of the UPND and PF youth supporters who constitute KAYED. As a community based and driven initiative, it parallels Issifu's (2016: 147) Local Peace Committees (LPCs), which is anchored on encouraging "active community participation by bringing the conflicting parties together", and additionally, stimulating community-level peace initiative ownership to foster the sustainability of peace projects. In the same way, support from the Kalulushi civic leadership to an initiative that brings two 'conflicting parties' together would undoubtedly have a peace strengthening effect.

8.6 Conclusion

Jeong (2010: 142) posits that "dialogue is designed to improve relationships among adversaries through increased contact", and that by overcoming differences in opinions, opponents will be able to delve into the shared accommodation of different needs. Herein lies the essence of this chapter, that is, the contact between young PF and UPND supporters, set in motion through dialogue, signaled the dawn of some semblance of peace and coexistence. Nestled within the spirit of dialogical exchange, the connection established allowed for individual interests to be in harmony with the interests of the larger group. In a way, as shared in this chapter, dialogue, as mounted in Kalulushi with young people, illuminated relational interactions more than just communicative interactions (Taylor and Kent 2014).

It is envisaged that sustained relational contact between young supporters from Zambia's leading political parties would contribute meaningfully to structural transformation within the realm of the dialogue conflict transformation nexus. As with national dialogue, the practicability of this change would also call for the participation of state institutions such as the national assembly to assist, for example, with legislation enactment. While the call for new legislation might climax young people's envisaged interventions, there should be an ongoing call for positive peace to, in turn, contribute to fulfilling their aspirations. One of the pillars of positive peace is the "equitable distribution of resources such as education, health, and to a lesser degree, equity in income distribution" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2019: 16).

In addition, whereas young party supporters have a role to play in bringing political pluralism to fruition, the context and conditions must be permitting. It is stated that pluralism considers human life as involving a multiplicity of spheres with distinct natures and that coexistence is feasible only through the recognition of inviolable human conditions for survival and well-being (Galston 2009: 107; Jeong 2010: 133). Last, localised peace architectures, according to Richmond (2013: 279), "link grassroots organisations, local peace councils and committees with local and national governmental institutions". Equally, KAYED (albeit not strictly a peace architecture) would, premised on the bottom-up approach, steer interventions in youth issues including some discussed here from the community to the national level.

Chapter Nine:

APPRAISING THE KALULUSHI INTERVENTION

9.1 Introduction

It is stated that "for engaged scholars ethical research demands working *with* and *for* individuals and groups, not doing research *on* or *about* subjects" (Boyd 2014: 503), and that cooperation with several participants provides an opportunity to re-conceptualise issues and produce innovative solutions. Correspondingly, since the project in Kalulushi involved working with young people and not about them, it is imperative to have a synopsis of their contributions including feedback as key stakeholders. This chapter is particularly crucial as it demonstrates one of PAR's strengths. Among other strengths, Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 20) argue that PAR has the "capacity to provide robust real world applications and testing of in-principle research findings". Similarly, as noted in Section 6.3 in Chapter six, the action research in Kalulushi was empowering, emancipating, and fostered ownership.

Further, PAR ensures that the research activity answers directly to the desires of participating stakeholders. Thus, in this chapter, the initial findings that later constituted the agenda of the dialogue sessions are discussed. The challenges and hurdles encountered during the implementation of the current study, the lessons learned working with young people, their feedback, and a brief reflection on their commitments and future plans are also discussed. The chapter concludes with a look at the credibility of the study. The next section starts by looking at how the idea of dialogue was received by young people in Kalulushi.

9.2 The Idea of Dialogue

One of the things sought through the survey questionnaires was whether the respondents had witnessed any activity, within the last 12 months, aimed at transforming young people's involvement in politics. Of all the responses (n=377) from those that responded to this question, 24 (or 6.1%) stated 'Yes', while 371 (or 93.9%) indicated 'No'. Some of

the actions cited by 6.1% of the respondents include NGOs' advocacy against violence by young people in politics and statements from both political and church leaders aired through different media platforms. Other examples include the government's promise of job creation and empowerment through, for example, forming cooperative firms in order to benefit from the government-prescribed 20% allocation of national projects, such as road construction and other social infrastructure developments, to young people. Thus, no activities or interventions are designed to practically equip young people with skills to transform their participation in party politics. Table 9.1 presents the results from the youth political violence intervention.

Table 9.1: Youth political violence intervention.

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Proposals	Alternatives to violence training	181	23.6%	45.8%
	Dialogue *(Space to talk about their differences)*	**341**	**44.5%**	**86.3%**
	Open forum *(To share party manifestos)*	113	14.7%	28.6%
	Television Debates with party leaders	58	7.6%	14.7%
	Party Exchanges to get to know each other better	74	9.6%	18.7%

Source: Survey data, 2019. Multiple choices possible

However, as shown in the multiple responses in Table 9.1, the survey results also revealed that of the sampled population (n=395), 86.3% preferred 'dialogue – space to talk about their differences'. This was in response to a question regarding which intervention programme was suitable to assist young people from political parties in Kalulushi constituency to refrain from violence. Five options were suggested to pick two in order of priority.

Thus, in keeping with this choice, it was necessary to check with the research team about the idea of dialogue. From the exchanges that the researcher had with these young

community leaders during the implementation of this project, three perspectives became evident regarding dialogue in Kalulushi and Zambia as a whole.

First, there was a feeling that dialogue should be embraced as a medium for handling serious national matters. For example, one of the team members claimed that "some political leaders spend time discussing petty personal issues, often through the media at the expense of important national subjects". She cited issues such as fighting poverty, good governance, unemployment, and early marriages as meriting dialogical engagement. Justly, citizens' social, political, and economic concerns call for constructive conversations between leaders from both sides of the political divide, especially leading political parties. Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014) associate intergroup dialogue with democratic engagement that supports critical understanding, communication, and collaborative action across social group boundaries regarding contentious issues. The persuasion is that meaningful dialogue can cultivate an atmosphere suitable for responding to the country's economic, social, and political problems. In a way, these problems are exacerbated by disunity and a continued state of political tensions and polarisation.

Beyond intergroup dialogue, national dialogue provides a perfect space for political players to tackle national challenges collaboratively. A national dialogue seeks to reach an agreement on a country's key conflict-fueling issues including, but not limited to, national identity, political rights, basic freedoms, institutional reforms, or election procedures (Stigant and Murray 2015: 3), and the agenda for a national dialogue ought to provide for substantive conversations around major grievances and expectations of all key interest groups. Hartmann (2017: 12) posits that an "important long term aspect for the acceptance of national dialogue and their subsequent development outcomes is managing the wider public's expectations".

Second, young community leaders see dialogical engagements within the Zambian polity as an ideal precursor to the 2021 elections. Their conviction is that dialogue can contribute to narrowing political polarisation. One of the team members argued that leaders across the political divide have failed to adhere to most of the

agreements that they have made since 2011, such as a commitment to ending political violence. Thus, from the lower structures to the top leadership of their parties, dialogue is unescapable. Observers elsewhere maintain that national dialogues represent ways to inaugurate a new political resolution during a phase of transition, and that "political settlements are essentially agreements forged between the major stakeholders within a society on the organisation of political and economic power and the allocation of resources" (Hartmann 2017: 4).

Similarly, as some of the pre-election concerns may hinge on the use/abuse of power, access to resources, or political space, dialogue would certainly be valuable. Above all, there is a need for transparency regarding the "issues at stake, the problem areas and candid expression of one's position is important for dialogue", as noted by Goswami (2017: 21). The local platform conceived by young party supporters after the dialogue sessions in Kalulushi, if fully supported, would not only encourage transparency but free and fair elections. Notably, the latter is now a growing responsibility that young people are assuming globally. An online consultation of 140 young peacebuilders in 2019 under the framework of the 'Youth, Peace and Security' (YPS) agenda revealed that "young people view their role as promoting nonviolence and preventing violence before, during and after political elections" (Peace Direct 2019: 18).

Third, while young party supporters greatly appreciated their orientation to dialogical engagement, they felt a need for a comprehensive understanding of that which dialogue entails by others within the polity. For example, one claim advanced is that the success of dialogue requires political leaders to subordinate personal to national interests. They claimed that this would also contribute to transforming the current political hostility and polarisation if every stakeholder is fully immersed in the process. With particular reference to the protracted attempts in 2018 and 2019, young people feel that Zambia's dialogue efforts have been sluggish due to 'power politics' of who is who.

Consistent with the claim in Section 4.7.3 of Chapter four, young leaders added that the question of an 'independent facilitator' in particular belated the entire dialogue process. Zambia's turbulent national dialogue trajectory, though not exactly, reverberates

the shaded side of national dialogue if not implemented well or transparently. Stigant and Murray (2015: 4), for example, accurately claim that in some contexts:

> [National dialogues] have been used to stall democratic process and postpone elections, bolster political elites' efforts to maintain the status quo, and assuage the citizenry's grievances without any real intention to act on concerns expressed. In several instances, the international community has been complicit in the misuse of national dialogue, offering support or approval to national dialogues that were essentially tools intended to delay real change and buy more support for repressive regimes.

Perhaps to dissuade political elites in the case of Zambia from maintaining the status quo and circumventing genuine national dialogue, community-based efforts such as KAYED should be nurtured. Once fully settled, such initiatives would not only reinforce local or regional consultations that precede national dialogues, but they can call attention to some of the aptitudes that political elites take for granted. For instance, young party supporters commit to accept improved communication patterns by developing an array of skills that include "active listening; speaking honestly and assertively about experiences and opinions while remaining sensitive to others" (Schirch and Campt 2007: 19). Schirch and Campt (2007) add that the attitudes and skills needed in dialogue are expedient for enhancing communication in many contexts and serve as the basis of all conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes. Figure 9.1 is a photo of a dialogue session depicting a group exercise.

Figure 9.1: Photo of dialogue session – group exercise (Source: Author, 2019).

Additionally, as discussed in Section 7.2.2 in Chapter seven, the intergroup/inter-party contact mounted in Kalulushi was an auspicious opportunity for young party supporters to engage in constructive interactions. Jeong (2010: 192) argues that "inter-group contact is designed to create favorable circumstances for dialogue with the promotion of an ability to develop processes for transformation". This change, as discussed in this thesis in several places, permeates social and political spheres, and dialogue remains a crucial medium even within the polity. By empowering people to think better together, Schirch and Campt (2007) claim that dialogue is the heart of democracy, and that the "spirit of communal attention and civic action at the core of healthy democracy requires that people participate in learning, understanding and shaping decisions that affect their families, communities and nations" (Schirch and Campt 2007: 78).

In sum, dialogue as a new phenomenon and as a research requirement was seen as imperative to contact the gatekeepers for their consent to undertake the study in Kalulushi. Negotiating access to the research setting was done at two levels. First, permission was sought through the office of the MP. Consistent with Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 15), the communication to the MP, cognisant of the political sensitivity of the subject of study, clearly stated the age threshold of participants and their respective party affiliations. Further, the MP's office was provided with details regarding the objects of the study and approval from DUT's Institutional Research Ethics Committee (IREC). Second, in order to run dialogue sessions, 'permission' was sought from the municipal council authorities as the local gatekeepers. While local authorities may not have direct political party oversight, they can "stymie the researcher's ability to gain access" (Lune and Berg 2017: 112). In the case of Kalulushi constituency, the municipality's oversight included meeting spaces such as community halls and a youth training centre, one of which was made available for the dialogue sessions.

9.3 Content and Process

During the dialogue sessions, the agenda items were catalogued based on the findings from the survey, FGDs, and interviews. The list included issues and concerns regarding the causes, nature, extent, and consequence of political violence. As shown in Table 7.2

in Chapter seven, tasks during party buddies engagements included suggestions on how to curb agents of political violence, and transforming the nature of and a critical examination of the extent and review of the effects of political conflict/violence. Thus, this section shares findings (mentioned briefly in Chapter two) that provided the foundation of the themes of the dialogical engagement.

9.3.1 The Causes of Electoral Violence

The causes of politically (election) motivated violence among young people were sixfold. First, some senior political leaders from both the PF and UPND carry the culpability for inflaming violence by young people. Participants during FGDs and interviews confirmed leaders' responsibility for providing young people with beer, money, food, and simply encouraging them to be violent especially in dealing with political opponents. The summit of this inter-party belligerence is often prior to, during, and after elections at ward, constituency, and even national levels. This is due to the fact that elections often heighten stakes and political leaders are ready to reach greater lengths in the quest to win. As such, determining whether elections are spotless or muddy would hinge on, among other aspects, the conduct of political leaders.

Both the ruling and opposition elite in any society, as argued by Koko (2013: 81), are the "primary stakeholders in an electoral process and hold the key to the success or failure of the election". During the current study, the participants claimed that some leaders' differences easily trickle down to young party loyalists who unfortunately turn physical. Thus, young people remain as pawns in the hands of political leaders. As party 'foot-soldiers', the actions of these young people is analogous to that which Bob-Milliar (2012: 681) describes as "tied to the apron strings of 'Big Men' (party leaders and candidates for elective office)". This, as Bob-Milliar notes, renders the Ghanaian electoral landscape increasingly unpredictable. Correspondingly, Zambia's own electoral setting is inconsistent, as discussed above.

Furthermore, from the FGDs, some participants claimed that young peoples' propensity to be violent is triggered by the failure of some senior leaders to fulfil promises such as job creation. With Zambia's political pluralism that, as stated in Chapter eight,

theoretically allows for the aggregation of citizens' interests through diverse parties and interest groups, transforming the youth's activism should be concerted. In other words, both the opposition and ruling parties should commit to socialising their 'rank and file' to make meaningful contributions to the country's emerging democracy. One way to realise this, in Koko's (2013: 82) view, is by "maintaining lines of communication and establishing permanent consultation platforms as a way of defusing tensions and dispelling adversarial perceptions among their supporters", and this is that which lies at the core of this project.

Second, unethical journalism and social media pollution was cited by participants during FGDs as a growing source of political (election) violence. It is undeniable that the contours of political processes are influenced to a large extent by the media. Some observers have argued that negative media reporting is an immediate trigger of election violence especially where a thin line exists between political parties and news platforms. Consistent with Koko (2013: 75), "in competitive electoral processes the media can serve as an extended arm of the propaganda machinery of particular parties and/or candidates seeking to maximise their chances of success".

In addition, the findings from the current study revealed that some online news platforms have been inciting and exhibiting unethical journalism. Participants, for example, claimed that some platforms shared election results and accompanying events from polling stations before an official announcement by the ECZ. Perhaps evidence of the media's blameworthiness is aptly captured in a 2017 conflict Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) as the following excerpt shows:

> Media houses were highlighted as spreading hate speech that trigger conflict especially during elections ... The public media was especially singled out and perceived to be overly supporting the ruling party and then that this does not give an enabling environment for peaceful and credible elections. Participants also expressed worry at the rate the media is practicing conflict-insensitive journalism which dangerously drives conflict (Namaiko and Etyang 2017: 27).

Thus, perceived unethical or biased reporting by media organisations enrages some young party supporters who, when opportunities permit, turn physical on media personnel. In a study of youth involvement in political violence and its impact on the electorates in Luanshya District, Chapa (2017: 19) illustrates young party members'

insincerity. For example, while they delight in being covered and show off, any media platform "deemed not reporting their party activities impartially are always threatened and beaten", as added by Chapa. Against such and other media-related encounters, a call by some observers is for governments and civil societies in Africa to significantly monitor media organisations that carry inflammatory messages (Ezeibe 2013).

Third, peer pressure exerted in both schools and communities has a bearing on young people's proclivity to political and election violence. Peer pressure, according to Lebedina-Manzoni and Ricijaš (2013: 40), is "the influence of a group on individuals through positive reinforcement for those who conform to group norms and/or sanctions for those who resist the conforming". During the FGDs, some participants alleged that young people decide to join gangs because, in addition to their peers being members, there is some degree of coercion. In addition, the lure and pressure from friends is amplified by humiliation. The claim during the FGDs was that young people who deviate from specific peer-endorsed conduct are disparaged and segregated.

With such treatment against would-be deviants, recruitment is rendered very likely in schools and communities as young males would not want to be left out. Lebedina-Manzoni and Ricijaš (2013: 40) tie in and synthesise that peer pressure includes "expectations peers have from an individual to behave in a certain way, regardless of his or her wishes". Essentially, through such gangs, either within schools or communities as a whole, young people are susceptible as well as appealing to being manipulated by some leaders with ulterior motives, and provided that youths "who are more exposed to peer pressure are often more inclined to yield to it" (Lebedina-Manzoni and Ricijaš 2013: 44), it is very unlikely that enticements from these leaders would be repelled. This is irrespective of whether young people are members of a political party or not.

Fourth, political socialisation was deemed as an additional aspect that drives young people into perpetrating political and electoral violence. Political socialisation at the individual level, as argued by Botha (2014: 896-897), is "a lifelong process through which a person develops a unique frame of reference that guides individual choices with respect to politics". During the FGDs and interviews, for instance, participants alleged that some

youths lacked family guidance, discipline, and values and above all had limited knowledge about politics, especially plural politics. Thus, these facets have a bearing, either negative or positive, on young people's frame of reference which, in Botha's (2014) view, are the glasses through which they perceive the world around them. On the other hand, other participants claimed that young people lacked principles as far as their party affiliation was concerned, and that to some, party membership is fluid and seems to be very malleable. As one senior party leader argued:

> [I]f you talk about the pre-independence era, if you talk of the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and so forth ... when you are a member of UNIP youth brigade, you cannot be ANC youth brigade member. It would never happen ... But the vigilance that is expected from young people is not there today ... this morning they say they are members of MMD, next morning there with UPND ... the next morning there in PF ... as long as they are supported financially.

Young peoples' perceived lack of understanding of the benefits of peace and nonviolence in party politics was also attributed to political socialisation, and in all the political socialisation claims, participants mentioned families and friends as being insistent aids. Similarly, Botha (2014) notes that political socialisation has primary agents including family, school, peers, and groups, while the media and political experience are secondary socialisation agents.

Fifth, unfavourable socioeconomic conditions including a lack of regular income, employment, or any form of empowerment drive young people into committing violent acts. Their predicament is further compounded by the rising unemployment rate estimated at 18.2% in the first quarter of 2019, far beyond the sub-Saharan Africa rate of 8.7% (Zambia Statistics Agency 2019: 19; International Labour Organization 2020: 33).

The survey, FGD, and interview findings showed that drug and alcohol abuse, high poverty levels, and the absence of recreation facilities reinforce young peoples' negative socio-economic conditions, consequently keeping their susceptibility to being drawn into political violence afloat.

It is such circumstances that elsewhere have strongly associated young people with post-election violence. Kenya's 2007-2008 post-election violence, for example, was linked to, among other factors, a "growing population of poor, unemployed youth who joined militia and organised gangs due to the lack of social opportunities" (Njogu 2013: 26). The proliferation of these militia and gangs, as noted by Njogu (2013: 26), led to "institutionalized violence and sell of services of violence on a willing buyer willing seller basis". With all the social and economic deprivations, not only does the option to join militias and gangs pay but their limited educational status also impedes quality contributions to political processes. It is stated that individuals with good education feel well-poised to influence political processes more than less educated persons, since an educated individual is also able to articulate opinions better (Botha 2014).

Last, political and electoral violence is sparked by the sheer intimidation and retaliatory attacks of political opponents. Some participants reported during the FGDs that sometimes violence is not triggered by significant issues or differences but simply "if one is seen in a party regalia such as T-shirt". During the Dongwe ward FGD, one young man (UPND supporter) remarked "*Nga uli weka, elo wakumanya ba PF abengi, ninshi kanofye bakumfwemo...kukuumaa, pakuti bamone nga walikosa. Elo kabili naiwe nga uli naba nobe ba UPND mwakumanya PF supporter kumuuma*" ('When you are alone and meet your political opponents PF, they will surely have a feel of your strength, by beating you. Similarly, in retaliation, if we are many as UPND would do the same to our political opponents we meet'). In some cases, such savagery is orchestrated with leaders' approval in the name of security, as Chapa (2017: 19) study in Luanshya demonstrates:

> [P]olitical violence was viewed as a component of personal security in which leaders asked their youths to protect themselves from provocation from other political parties by fighting back and show off their strength and muscle to fight. In reinforcing their security, there was a system of importing youths from other areas mainly to ensure that their strong holds are not by any means infiltrated by other political parties.

During the aftermath of elections, victimisation supersedes intimidation targets, not only supporters but voters as well. A case in point is the example shared in Section 2.8 in Chapter two, where residents of Lufwanyama (supposed supporters of the UPND) were

barred by alleged PF supporters from entering Kalulushi town. PF supporters' infuriation was caused by their party's poor results in the 2015 and 2016 elections from Lufwanyama district. The announcement of the results and the disappointment it brings, as Koko (2013: 65) claims, "can lead supporters of the losing side to target neighbours and neighbourhoods believed to be sympathetic to the winning camp". Koko adds that victimisation of those alleged to have voted for the opposing side characterised Kenya's 2007-2008 post-election violence.

9.3.2 The Nature of Electoral Violence

As far as the nature of political or electoral violence in Kalulushi is concerned, participants reported physical confrontations involving fighting, stone throwing, and indiscriminate beating especially during electoral campaigns, with young people being paid to cause confusion and/or fight political opponents, and politics are no longer issue-based (for example, regarding debates about party manifestos/policies) but about who has the money. Further, the pinnacle of violent clashes occurs during electoral campaigns with UPND and PF supporters aged between 15 and 35 years as the forerunners. When there are clashes, markets or trading places (affecting marketers), and bus stations and streets all become engulfed. This is consistent with Koko's (2013: 76) claim that political mobilisation and campaigning in some countries in Africa still involve threats, direct incitement to violence, and violent confrontation.

9.3.3 The Extent of Electoral Violence

However, there seems to be a thin line between the nature and extent of political violence, and from the participants' responses during the interviews and FGDs, four dimensions of the extent were evident. The scope encompasses, but is not rigidly limited to, the exchange of abusive language; harassing or intimidating voters; damage to public and private property and infrastructure; and the use of weapons such as tasers, knives, screw drivers, pangas etc. The damage to properties extends to market stalls, bus station shelters, voting areas, private premises, and vehicles, some belonging to political opponents. Infrastructure is targeted arbitrarily by unrestrained mobs using destruction as a strategy to express their discontent (Koko 2013: 78).

9.3.4 Consequences

Notwithstanding the intentions, such ruin not only affects political opponents supposedly targeted, but it is also disruptive to economies of contexts involved. For example, Koko (2013) notes that during Kenya's 2007-2008 post-election violence, mobs uprooted part of the railway line connecting the country with Uganda, which affected the sector in both countries. While the case of Kenya reveals the effects of such uncontrolled destruction, the current study brought to the fore the consequences of politically (election) motivated violence.

First, ordinary and non-partisan citizens' freedom of movement and expression is hindered. During the FGDs, one participant stated that "every time there are elections people live in fear and cannot participate fully in deciding on their preferred candidates". Likewise, Chapa (2017: 15) notes that "when electorates are living in fear, then they cannot exercise their right to vote freely". Second, violence, especially during electoral campaigns, jeopardises community stability and peace in general. For example, not only do community members live in fear, but for young people that may end up being arrested, their families are affected as well. Third, the future of young people in respect of party politics is uncertain. Participants during the interviews and FGDs described young peoples' future as seemingly bleak as communities are deprived of productive future leaders.

A sense of hopelessness is evident in their attitude towards politics. Some, it was mentioned, are shunning politics either as party members or participating in voting, while others claimed that they had lost confidence in some senior political leaders. Last, while deaths are rare occurrences, injuries are prevalent particularly during electoral canvassing. The frequency of injuries is boosted by the fact that from every two political altercations, one is expected to end in physical clashes, violence, and injuries. For some youths, it seems that there is a thin line between elections-related violence and criminal acts. Chapa's (2017) study in Luanshya, for example, reveals that among other results of the youth's involvement in political violence is the destruction of public and private property as well as an increase in crime.

Finally, in terms of the process, dialogue sessions adapted the intergroup dialogue framework (see Table 7.2 in Chapter seven). The researcher was assisted by the first member of the research support team who facilitated the sessions. While Miles and Kivlighan (2012) recommend that co-facilitators of intergroup dialogue identify with the target and agent social identity groups, facilitators of the current intervention were neither members of the PF nor UPND. As noted earlier, the facilitation of dialogue sessions was anchored on Freire's (1993) problem posing education and learning approach. Consistent with this approach, facilitating intergroup dialogue is synthesised by Zúñiga *et al.* (2007: 39) as "active responsive guidance, not instruction ... enabling group members to develop their own processes and gaining knowledge".

Furthermore, "rather than simply presenting data, concepts and theories, facilitators engage individual participants and the group in reflecting and dialoguing about perspectives, feelings, and desires that are both personally intimate and socially relevant" (Zúñiga *et al.* 2007: 39). Thus, facilitating intergroup dialogue depends on the active involvement of all parties concerned and ensures that both the agenda and the process foster relationship building across differences. Additionally, it cultivates an environment that, in Dessel, Rogge and Garlington's (2006: 304) view, "enables participants to speak and listen in the present while understanding the contribution of the past and the unfolding of the future".

9.4 Challenges and Hurdles

While there may be several challenges in undertaking a PAR project including running dialogue sessions, during the current study, four deserve mention: appreciating the idea of participation, participants' competing socioeconomic demands, the recruitment of research/support team members, and the timeframe of various activities. Initially, the idea of participation was met with some degree of hesitancy. Unlike the research assistant who helped with the survey, who had prior orientation on PAR and who was more receptive, other members who were co-opted as co-researchers seemed uncertain. It is as though the idea of participation conveyed a 'particular' way of interaction between the

lead researcher and co-opted assistants. For example, these young community leaders were not sure of which type of contribution they would make to a doctoral project.

Thorough enlightenment on the tenets of PAR and the essence of such a research technique or mode of engagement greatly assisted in re-orienting the research team members' appreciation of participation. In particular, clarity was made on the fact that action research "embraces principles of participation, reflections, empowerment, and emancipation of people and groups interested in improving their social situation or condition" (Lune and Berg 2017: 137). Thus, while that which participation entailed and how it would actually happen during the interaction for the team members seemed challenging, this clarification was beneficial. Some members, for instance, immediately expressed interest in participating all the way to realise the earmarked activities and later were able to provide valuable feedback and perspectives regarding the intervention.

During the final meeting and review of the research team's work together, the research team members all expressed appreciation that their participation in the project was a very good opportunity, and that it created space for them to reflect upon their community well-being, challenges, individual and collective aspirations, and how to accomplish such. Notwithstanding their numerical configuration, they notably made valuable contributions to the project. That which is significant to and in a PAR project, as stated by McIntyre (2008: 15), is the "quality of the participation that people engage in, not the proportionality of that participation". On the other hand, beyond the research team, participation was also, to some extent, a challenge during both the FGDs and dialogue sessions. For example, as mentioned earlier, some participants were reserved and seemingly unreceptive at the start of each FGD. It is possible that the focus group setting was new to most of the young people.

However, the use of the local language, Icibemba, was an icebreaker that drew in most of the participants to speak as the FGDs unfolded. Though the dialogue sessions and FGDs were facilitated activities, time was spent mostly at the beginning to enlighten participants on that which each entailed regarding the depth of their involvement. McIntyre's (2008: 15) counsel is that "when researchers and participants work together

to define the most practical and doable ways for them to participate, there is less pressure on individuals to conform to a way of participating", and that participation is then taken as a choice and not as an inconvenience.

Thus, despite different levels of participation, young people were generally involved as most of them took advantage of the orientation provided and expressed themselves freely in the local language. In a way, this was indicative of the rekindled confidence to start adding their voice to issues affecting their well-being. The centrality of participation in action research, as argued by Lune and Berg (2017: 143), is "giving voice to people who otherwise might lack channels for having their voices heard".

Young peoples' competing socioeconomic needs was another challenge that affected their involvement in the project. For example, there are those that missed participating in FGDs and dialogue sessions due to commitments from work or domestic chores. One young man had to close his roadside shop to attend the first dialogue session and could not attend the rest. While these may be individual or exceptional cases, they are nonetheless suggestive of the broader social and economic predicaments that overwhelm young people. This is part of the overall poverty levels and household vulnerabilities in which society as a whole is wedged. It is stated that following the privatisation of the mines (as major employers then), people suffered mass retrenchments which had adverse effects on the disposable incomes for the majority. This, in turn, reduced the household capacity to meet basic needs, culminating in high levels of poverty (Kalulushi District Planning Unit 2019).

The poverty levels are exacerbated by the fact that there are many vulnerable families, with the majority being either orphans or aged. According to the Kalulushi Municipal Council planning unit (2019: 11), though "the causes of this vulnerability can only be ascertained after poverty assessment studies, it is almost obvious that AIDS and unemployment has greatly contributed". Thus, young peoples' socioeconomic circumstances are a factor that PAR practitioners ought to consider. This means not merely being vigilant, but ensuring that steps are taken to guarantee a good turnout by making appropriate reminders and follow-ups prior to mounting PAR activities.

Third, the recruitment of research/support team members was not as anticipated. Initially, the hope was that cooperation during the project would be sought from local organisations involved in youth work but that was not possible. As several of them have no established offices, it was difficult to locate them. However, with the help of the researcher's initial contact (first research assistant recruited) in Kalulushi, the researcher managed to assemble a team who was equal to the task. In Leavy's (2017: 241) view, "recruitment and retention of appropriate people to participate for the duration of the project often proves challenging in community based participatory research". Thus, to circumvent such, it is suggested that this should be included in the grant proposal for funded projects since this requires funds and time.

Further, recruiting and retaining interested participants, as Leavy (2017) contends, is associated with how successfully research teams have integrated and team up with appropriate stakeholders within the community. Hence, the mobilisation of a research team in Kalulushi through the initial contact was characterised by consultations, discussions, and assurance about probable costs and benefits of the project. However, the question of returns extended to remuneration which unfortunately was unavailable save for the first assistant. Despite their modest education, the prospective research team members had not fully appreciated this type of research (PAR) prior to consulting with the researcher regarding the same. In other words, along with the recruitment challenge is making stakeholders understand community-based participatory action research which some argue is not easily accepted due to past experiences. Leavy (2017: 241), for instance, argues that "research may be poorly received by members of some communities, particularly disenfranchised or marginalized populations, or those with histories of exploitative research conducted on them".

Last, a rather slight challenge was managing time of the various project activities. For example, much time was spent on arranging appointments with party officials, despite official invitations in writing and making several phone calls. As this also affected mobilising participants for the FGDs, it ultimately had a bearing on the attendance during both activities. Further, the time allotted for dialogue sessions, albeit in consultation with the research team, was similarly not sufficient, as noted by some participants. Although

nine days of three-hour long dialogue sessions seemed sufficient at first, later the participants felt a need for an additional five days. The claim was to have time to go back to their respective parties (check with senior political leaders) and then later debrief as part of the PAR process. Figure 9.2 is a photo of a dialogue session depicting the party buddy exercise.

Figure 9.2: Photo of dialogue session – party buddy exercise (Source: Author, 2019).

While a way out would have been to extend the number of dialogue sessions, the agreement with the local municipality was nine days. Thus, it was practically difficult to go back and renegotiate the consent especially since it was done in writing through the Director of Housing and Community Services. The suggestion from participants was nonetheless valuable as it would have indeed created more time to solidify the synergies cultivated during the sessions.

9.5 Lessons Learned

One of the unique values of PAR is that the approach has inherent validity checks. For example, Lune and Berg (2017: 144) contend that "with help from stakeholders, researchers know that data is meaningful in the context from its source and the latter's interpretations are recognizable by the people who live or work there". Thus, insights and themes that have emerged during the current study as an amalgamation of data collected from surveys, interviews, FGDs, and dialogue sessions (integral to PAR), were validated

by all stakeholders. This endorsement emanates from PAR's "ethical and critical concern for the impact of research on individuals and communities" (Van Katwyk and Ashcroft 2016: 197). Therefore, five lessons discussed below as learned from the implementation of a PAR project in Kalulushi, all had the 'blessing' of participants and stakeholders.

First, Kalulushi constituency, though relatively peaceful as compared to other constituencies in the Copperbelt, is not immune to violence by young people especially during elections. From the engagements with political leaders and young people, it was evident that notwithstanding the constituency's peaceful accounts, there is a growing trend of election-related violence. For example, as mentioned earlier, from any two altercations between members from two different political parties, for example the PF and UPND, one would end in violence. The responses provided by the participants during the interviews and FGDs were informed by their experiences during campaigns prior to and after the general elections held thus far. As such, that which is prevalent in Kalulushi constituency is election-related violence or simply electoral violence.

Second, senior political leaders are involved in instigating violence among young people. This politically (election) allied violence may be summarised as culminating in that which was noted earlier as ordinary citizens' freedoms of movement and expression being stifled and community peace being jeopardised particularly during electoral campaigns. It is imperative to mention that despite the incitement, young people receive no sustainable rewards that would secure their future. For example, from a study of the Ghanaian polity, Bob-Milliar (2012: 680) notes that party stalwarts' activism is weighed against receiving personal rewards such as, among others, business contracts or employment. Participants during the current study claimed that youths who are drawn into political or electoral violence do not receive justifiable incentives save for, for example, small cash handouts, beer, or party regalia.

Young people's unfavourable socioeconomic situation is another lesson that was evident during the current study. The harsh reality among young people was repeatedly illuminative in comments and/or examples shared during the FGDs, interviews, and even dialogue sessions. As noted in Section 9.4, the status quo is aggravated by increased

vulnerable families headed by orphans, the aged, and the out-of-work, attributed to AIDS and unemployment (due to retrenchments). Overwhelmed by this hopelessness, young people end up falling prey to some political leaders who have ulterior motives, often to advance their own political ambitions. On the other hand, some who would want to remain ethical, as noted in Section 9.3, withdraw their involvement in party politics.

Fourth, there are several networks of young people into which future projects can tap. For example, the young people with whom the researcher worked, aside from political party affiliations, had different linkages within the community as well as church-based connections. Additionally, the researcher learned in the course of the project that in Kalulushi, as with other municipalities, there was a junior mayor initiative. One of the participants during the Kalanga ward FGD was a contender for the Kalulushi mayoral elections. The junior mayor project is an initiative of the Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) aimed at replicating the local government system that permits the identification of young peoples' needs as well as challenges faced in communities.

The significance of this initiative within the realm of the current project is that young party supporters should actively participate in such nonviolent socialisation interventions. Early exposure of young people to decision-making opportunities would undoubtedly have a bearing on future community and political leadership, and given that local networks and partners are critical to transforming young peoples' participation in social and political matters, the current Kalulushi mayor and her deputy can be resourceful allies.

Fifth, young party supporters embraced the idea of dialogue and mounting similar dialogue sessions in future would certainly see more youths participate. In other words, the potential for more young people to take part in inter-party dialogue processes in future is great. If the enthusiasm exhibited during the dialogue sessions is considered, then young people can effectively be socialised for local and national agency. In other words, they remain relevant stakeholders in both inter-party/intergroup and national dialogue processes. In stressing the need for its further study and consideration, Stigant and Murray (2015: 5) note that "national dialogues will continue to be a prevalent tool in the coming years". On the other hand, intergroup dialogue for burgeoning young party

stalwarts should continue as a space that "brings into focus the possibilities for genuine openness, listening and transformation" (Dessel, Rogge and Garlington 2006: 304).

For young people that participated in the dialogue sessions in Kalulushi, it was valuable time that gave them an increased voice and critical consciousness of issues that affect their lives and well-being. Collective analysis and the reflection of concerns not only reminded them of their agency but of possibilities that lie ahead in re-orienting their destiny. Through collective analysis, Schirch and Campt (2007: 21) claim that "dialogue allows people to collaboratively identify the most important issues affecting a group including understanding how and why some people feel excluded from community decision making". It is clear that these lessons are pertinent to community and political leaders, principally those that commit to harnessing young peoples' potential as well as improving their welfare. Figure 9.3 depicts the closing photo of a dialogue session.

Figure 9.3: Photo of dialogue session – closing photo (Source: Author, 2019).

9.6 Participants' Feedback

As a transformative-oriented project, the current study placed great premium on allowing the voices of young party supporters (often exploited) to be heard. Consistent with Mertens (2015: 312), this also entails creating space for "oppressed people to tell their own stories, to reflect on their communities, and to generate ideas for change". Thus, as their final voice, comments from the participants on the entire PAR project remain crucial

in evaluating the immediate overall outcomes. Feedback received through the interaction that the researcher and research team members had with participants during and after the dialogue sessions is synthesised into four noteworthy observations.

First, the study was very significant, especially the dialogue sessions. One of the research team members reported that participants considered dialogue as a space that was created to avoid perpetuating political polarisation and unjustified rantings that set the stage ripe for political violence. Another member described the study as important, given that most youths in Kalulushi are not in school or college or are still unemployed. She added that "If the recommendations presented in the study's preliminary report are implemented, then change is possible". Such thoughts reverberate Leavy's (2017: 237) take that "community based participatory research is problem-centered or problem driven and methods, strategies and approaches are identified for their ability to address the research problem". Similarly, the recommendation of dialogue for the Kalulushi intervention was fitting given the need to constructively confront political conflict and violence by young party stalwarts. Some participants claimed that dialogical engagement helped them to understand why some youths from political parties have different views and avoid establishing a common ground.

The study was seen as significant through the dialogue sessions since not only were young party supporters' politics-awareness raised, but they had an opportunity to interact as a community, a community that had one common commitment and goal, to identify or design pertinent solutions to its concerns. In illuminating the importance of action research, Lune and Berg (2017: 144) argue that it is "more directly geared toward producing results than most academic research and has social change strategies built into it".

Second, the participants hoped that dialogue could be made an ongoing community intervention in Kalulushi constituency. For example, a participant from Dongwe ward stated that there should be ongoing dialogue sessions at Kalulushi Municipal Council's Dongwe vocational training centre, and that both youth and senior political party leaders should be given an opportunity to take part in such sessions. In

agreement, another participant noted that holding such engagements would assist in ensuring that Zambian politics revert to being a service to the nation and not to individuals' selfish interests. The proposal to consider dialogue as a continuing community activity would probably rekindle Kalulushi's old peace times. A senior political leader remarked during an interview that historically, the area has known no conflicts but peace, and that while there may be skirmishes or differences, friendship always reigns. This, in a way, parallels Maphosa and Keasley's (2014: 2) assertion that:

> Though the skills of peacemaking and peacebuilding may not be part of everyone's formal or informal education, most humans find the means for sustaining peace within their daily lives. It is this intuitive sense of peace from within that is called upon for peacemaking and peacebuilding in local communities as a regular course of life.

If nurtured, dialogical engagements, as a regular activity, would not only create a platform for exchanging views through community-based structures such as political youth wings, but remain lasting grassroots peacebuilding initiatives. Such innovations, as argued by Jeong (2010: 206), "shed light on interacting constructively with one another". The interaction, especially among young party supporters, should culminate in the acquisition of new and nonviolent communication skills. As noted by Schirch and Campt (2007: 73), participants in a dialogue process "may improve their communication skills as they practice respectful and careful listening, learn empathy, and speak diplomatically, honestly and assertively". With these skills, young people would have their agency appreciated as political actors in peacebuilding efforts and the development of their respective communities.

Third, participants reiterated the need for more time and increased participation or balance in terms of gender. As noted in Chapter seven, for example, one can increase the daily hours of engagement from three to five or alternatively incorporate more days, and further, by ensuring that participation includes equal numbers of women and men. This, as argued by one of the participants, should be pressed upon the political parties to ensure that more young people are included. While this is a valid observation, future interventions would need to extract maximum cooperation from political parties. During

the current study, the PF was not as helpful as other parties leading to an average turnout during the FGDs and dialogue sessions.

The call for more time was premised on the need to have participants exhaust sharing their experiences relating to stereotypes. One participant specifically recalled an incident where a young man was mistreated on the basis of his ethnic group at a public library. However, during the dialogue sessions, the participant in question was not given sufficient time to share. Overall, increasing the time of dialogue sessions, as noted earlier, would not only be used for sharing during the sessions but provide time for participants to engage their respective party leadership. Notwithstanding more time or more participants, that which is crucial is the active engagement of all stakeholders.

Last, the project created an opportunity for the acquisition of new knowledge and skills. Interestingly, this was achieved more experientially than the conventional instructive approach. For example, one participant stated that there was no taking of defensive positions during the dialogue process which provided an opportunity for young party supporters to address contentious issues that affect not only political parties but society as a whole. Given that the attitude of young people in society has an influence on their leadership aptitude, these skills were unquestionably useful. Through such empowerment and their youthful vitality, young party supporters, in addition to their party responsibilities, may be able to function as dialogue facilitators, mediators, or indeed community mobilisers.

9.7 Commitments and Future Plans

Any dialogue process ought to have a long-term vision for the future propelled, in Goswami's (2017: 22) view, by the "recognition that changed relationships hold the key to conflict resolution (transformation)". Thus, young party supporters from the PF and UPND not only embraced new relationships but, drawing from the synergies inaugurated during the dialogue sessions, committed to several ideas for the future, and three merit reiteration.

The launch of the Kalulushi Alliance for Youth Empowerment and Dialogue is one idea that is reassuring and deserves to be supported. From inception, young people exhibited much commitment to ensuring that their initiative materialised. Along with the guiding framework (see Chapter seven), the new platform guarantees, to a large extent, to live up to the transformative agenda of the current study. Additionally, as noted in Chapter seven, the successful ascendance of this project will certainly assist young party supporters to bring in a greater voice in improving inter-party relations. Besides enhancing inter-party contacts, this new say provides new impetus for young people to also engage policymakers on matters affecting their welfare.

One of the calls from an online consultation referred to earlier is for the "policymakers to open political spaces for young people to fully participate in both the formulation of decision-making structures and actual decision-making processes" (Peace Direct 2019: 5). This appeal is not ill-timed in contexts such as Zambia but reinforces one of young people's day-to-day aspirations. The outcome of the consultation is also accurate by underscoring the fact that "open dialogue is key to building trust between youth peacebuilders and policymakers" (Peace Direct 2019: 5). Engagements with authorities at either local or national levels will not only assist in developing their communication skills but increase their self-esteem, in turn widening their influence in the community.

Further, with one of the envisaged mandates of the platform, 'advocating for alternatives to political and electoral violence', the feasibility of their inclusion in pre- and post-election stakeholders' meetings is large. Chapa's (2017) study in Luanshya reveals that, as a measure to deal with election-related violence, stakeholder consultations are held prior to elections to agree on leveling the playing field. Along with eliciting a consensus on the electoral preparedness, stakeholders are availed an opportunity to inspect election materials and agreeing on how to handle such transparently. Advocating for free, fair, and transparent elections should irrefutably fall under the ambit of the Kalulushi platform, thereby strengthening their mandate to become fully immersed in the electoral process. This involvement should also grant young people space to encourage the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts within the Zambian polity.

Second, in an apparent effort to ensure that the new synergies are kept afloat, young people created a WhatsApp communication platform of all founding members of KAYED. This networking initiative will enhance communication as well as enable young party supporters to easily draw in other young people who are willing to be part of the organisation. With active administrators, it will also allow young people to easily initiate activities or convene meetings to strategise on how to achieve their mandate. On the other hand, the platform will supplement dialogue spaces in which, consistent with Peace Direct (2019: 14), "young people (as peacebuilders) learn from each other and foster networks". As an offshoot of a PAR project, the initiative is well-conceived, as Lune and Berg's (2017: 157) synthesis affirms:

> One of the operative principles of action research is to inform and empower people to work collectively to produce some beneficial change ... Technology provides additional means of communicating with a large number of people in an interesting, engaging and accessible manner.

Young people's ability to navigate new information technologies will provide additional impetus to sustain this networking platform and enhance their contributions to social change. In addition, ethical conduct of PAR dictates the application of clear communication, transparency, and practices that instill confidence in the participating stakeholders. This mode of networking by young party supporters will certainly speak to these aspects. Others posit that within the realm of PAR, the creation of such structures is crucial to "ensure there is rich communication ... a mechanism for flexible planning, implementation, feedback, discussion of findings, recommendations and sharing of learning" (Crane and O'Regan 2010: 66). The WhatsApp communication platform remains a valuable tool to aid young party supporters' coordination and facilitation of their projects, further strengthening effective consultations amongst themselves and other young people in Kalulushi and beyond.

Last, a strategic and well-intentioned step by young party supporters to ensure national recognition is aligning KAYED to the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS). The ministry's mission is to facilitate the provision of equitable basic social protection services for inclusive and sustainable human and community development. The move is positive not only for the purposes of legal recognition, but also

for young peoples' commitment to youth empowerment and broadly, social justice parallels the ministry's focus on human and community development. As a non-governmental association, it will, without doubt, as the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (2018: 1) notes, "play a critical role in national development by complementing government's efforts in the development agenda".

Through this cooperation and engagement, KAYED members should be able to also participate in other peace-related activities and bring to the fore novel ideas that can spur dialogue between polarised groups. In other words, there ought to be sufficient latitude for them to take leadership in contributing to ameliorating relations, for example, between students and authorities. Peace Direct's consultation underscored the importance of young people's peacebuilding leadership to be considered as a service to their communities (Peace Direct 2019: 39). In sum, commitments and future strategies by young party supporters in Kalulushi should also embrace collaboration which Leavy (2017: 238) notes is at the core of community-based participatory research, that is, cooperation "between all research partners – academic researchers and nonacademic stakeholders".

9.8 The Credibility of the Study

Yin (2016: 85) notes that a credible study is "one that provides assurance that you have properly collected and interpreted the data, so that the findings and conclusions accurately reflect and represent the world that was studied". In other words, the concern with credibility regards the validity of the conclusions drawn from the data collected and whether these correspond to the actuality represented. It is also the validity of findings from the standpoint of those interviewed or observed in a given context. Additionally, this accuracy flows alongside reliability (or consistency in the testimony) of the interviewees (Mertens 2015). The researcher can uncover inconsistencies and accuracy, in Mertens' (2015: 361) view, by asking for clarification from the narrator and consulting other sources and comparing accounts. As noted in Chapter two (Section 2.8), Chapter six (Section 6.8), and Chapter seven (Section 7.6), four strategies were employed in ensuring the credibility of the study.

First, triangulation was utilised through mixed sources of data collection, consistent with Creswell (2014: 251), to "triangulate different data sources of information by examining evidence from the sources and using it to building a coherent justification for themes". Conversely, during the current study, parallels were drawn between survey data and findings from interviews and FGDs before eliciting appropriate themes. Creswell (2014: 251) notes that "if themes are established based on converging several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study".

Triangulation can and does help to check for the consistency of evidence from different sources or methods. For example, Mertens (2015: 333) argues that "multiple methods such as interviews, observation, and document review can be used, and information can be sought from multiple sources using the same method (e.g., interviews with different groups)". During the current study, while interviews were intended for senior party leaders, the composition was mixed including party officials (constituency secretary/coordinators) and elected leaders (ward councilors) who experience political conflicts or violence differently. For example, party officials have more regular (almost daily) contact with young people in communities, whereas councilors have their time divided between council duties and party activities.

Second, prolonged engagement with young people from Kalulushi is another aspect that contributed to the credibility of this study. The researcher, as the lead researcher, had continued engagement with young party supporters during the data collection process as well as the non-research-related meetings. The latter provided an opportunity to fully appreciate some of the issues that emerged from the data collected. For example, young peoples' high unemployment levels, which makes them susceptible to being manipulated by senior political leaders, was very evident each time the researcher visited community trading places (markets). Several young men and even women who supposedly should be in college or university are involved in hawking and selling mobile phone recharge cards, mineral water, and soft drinks etc. Prolonged and persistent observation in simplistic terms, as advanced by Mertens (2015: 331), "means

how long did the researcher stay on site and how many observations were made in what types of settings".

While the current study did not necessarily involve observation as a component of inquiry, the researcher's immersion in the context for approximately six months provided an opportunity for incidental observations. Additionally, Yin (2016: 86) notes that such "an investment in time increases the researcher's understanding of the contextual conditions that prevail", further enabling the detection and observation of distortions that could, if not detected, slither into the data. An example of distortion that may arise inadvertently is when participants initially misconstrue the researcher's field queries or the researcher's field role, and that "only after prolonged exposure might more accurate communication emerge" (Yin 2016: 87). In the same way, during the initial phases of the current study, when asked about projects for young people in Kalulushi, an official from the MCDSS thought that the information sought was to assist in launching a youth employment scheme.

Checking emerging issues with the informants, also known as member checks, was third among the strategies employed to ensure that the study is credible. Member checking during the current study was carried out in two ways. First, the interview findings were shared during FGDs for participants to validate the information. In addition to collecting primary data, the participants were given a chance to also comment on these findings. Second, issues that emerged from both interviews and FGDs were also verified during dialogue sessions. In other words, participants were invited, before participating in dialogue, to validate key themes or concerns. According to Creswell (2014: 251), member checking enables researchers to determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings by taking the themes back to the participants to determine whether the results are accurate. The key here is participants' word in ascertaining that that which has been extracted from the data reflects the situation on the ground.

During the interviews and FGDs of the current study, to consolidate the answers from participants, each concluded with a restatement of the key responses. Mertens (2015: 331) asserts that "member checks can be formal and informal. For example, at the

end of an interview, the researcher can summarize what has been said and ask if the notes accurately reflect the person's position". The practice of restating key responses may be summarised as an informal member check and equally contributed to increasing the credibility of the data collected and the study in general.

The final approach aimed at ensuring the current study was credible was peer debriefing. The purpose of peer debriefing is to "enhance the accuracy of the account by involving a peer debriefer who reviews and asks questions about the qualitative study so that the account will resonate with people other than the researcher" (Creswell 2014: 252). While peer debriefing may be done with a mentor or supervisor, during the current study, as noted earlier, the debriefing was done with members of the research/support team. It was therefore synthesised as quasi peer debriefing. As a PAR project, it is imperative to add that members of the research team were asked at different points to reflect and share their views on the survey results and key issues from the interviews and FGDs.

The line between member checking and peer debriefing seems obscure, as revealed by Mertens (2015), who considers both aspects together in stressing the responsibilities of the researcher and peer debriefer. For example, Mertens stresses that:

> The researcher should engage in an extended discussion with a peer of findings, conclusions, analysis, and hypotheses. The peer should pose searching questions to help the researcher confront his or her own values and to guide the next steps in the study. Also, the researcher may encounter contradictions or denials in the process of member checks and peer debriefings, so they need to give additional thought as to how to handle such situations (Mertens 2015: 331).

While the peers (research team members) posed probing questions, not many contradictions or denials emerged in the process. Perhaps, in sum, that which ought to be mentioned is that "the most desirable approach in strengthening credibility is to consider dealing with the credibility choices during the design of the study" (Yin 2016: 85). Correspondingly, the provision for validity and reliability in the design of the current study had three specific stipulations. First, it was necessary to examine evidence from different data sources and by using such, to provide a comprehensible justification for emerging

themes. Second, a provision was needed to subject major findings to scrutiny by the research team to enhance the accuracy of the account. Third, as a PAR project, the enhancement of reliability was designed to be realised through regular communication among research team members.

9.9 Conclusion

While further studies on the plight of young people, in particular those involved in party politics in Zambia and Kalulushi, should be encouraged, the findings demonstrate the potential of PAR. In particular, accomplishments from data collection to the successful hosting of dialogue sessions between young party supporters from the PF and UPND is indicative of PAR's viability to facilitate transformation at different levels of society. The findings also resonate with realities about young people that non-state and state actors have acknowledged, such as high youth unemployment which leads to, among other ills, youth delinquency (Ministry of National Development Planning 2017). Their susceptibility engenders externally driven wrongdoing especially within the polity, in turn taking away their agency to make informed decisions about their future.

However, as the evidence in this chapter shows, the value of dialogical engagement is as a transformational seed sown to contribute to sterilising the Zambian polity. As long as the challenges, issues, or hurdles identified are not insurmountable, young peoples' own words (shared as participants' feedback), render this cleansing practicable. Additionally, bridging differences, reducing prejudices, and promoting diversity remains essential not only to this cause but for all players within the polity. The attitudinal transformation witnessed that during the dialogical engagement, commitments and steps taken for the future offer optimism of a changed cohort of political youths who embrace plurality, young party supporters capable of regaining their agency to altruistically implement projects that are beneficial to other youths and the broader polity.

In particular, the overarching commitment to put into action alternatives to political and electoral violence is not only commendable but another ray of hope for the future of Zambian politics. Aspirations such as inculcating an ethos that underpins dialogue, coexistence, tolerance, and mutual trust, given the outlook of the current polity, is equally noble and inspiring.

Chapter Ten:

CONCLUSION

10.1 Introduction

Societies that provide more opportunities for young peoples' participation in the political and economic spheres and offer ways for social mobility, as observed by the World Bank (2018: xii), tend to experience less violence. The vast majority of young people that take the front row in perpetrating political or electoral violence are absorbed in precarious socio-economic conditions. Even before setting the stage for dialogical engagement between young party supporters from the PF and UPND, the current study was confronted with the blunt reality of the youth's vulnerabilities. For example, from the study, it is evident that there is a connection between unemployment and political hooliganism. Other earlier studies notably validate this assertion. Namaiko and Etyang (2017: vi-vii), for instance, demonstrate that the majority of party cadres who engage in violent conflict are unemployed, and further that while young people continue to be the "main perpetrators, their demographic majority, poverty and unemployment makes them susceptible to conflict".

However, while the situation may seem despairing, the implementation of the current project brings back hope that a turnaround of young peoples' future politically is feasible. The use of PAR as mode of engagement where the supposed researched (young people) individuals become the researchers is the initial spark of this hope. In other words, they have the knowledge and energy that can be harnessed for the collaborative planning and execution of action research. Nestled within Freire's (1993) critical pedagogy, as witnessed during the current study, PAR created space for education, creating knowledge, empowerment, and mobilisation for action. In addition, through the dialogue process, a platform was provided that not only helped realise these goals but that stimulated young party supporters to commit to transformation individually and collectively, a commitment that should overshadow the pitiful social, political, and even economic conditions and instead support change in the lives of young people.

Therefore, this final chapter is a synoptic view of the current project in terms of the immediate results and outputs, a closing appraisal, personal reflections based on the implementation of the project, and suggestions for future interventions or studies.

10.2 Intervention Outputs and Outcomes

Reflecting on the intervention in Kalulushi, two perspectives are evident. On the one hand, there are immediate outputs and tangible commitments including the implementation platform, guiding framework, and inter-party synergies by young party supporters from the PF and UPND. On the other hand, there are immediate outcomes that suggest a commitment to social change orientation. They include critical consciousness, personal transformation, a commitment to social justice, and the feasibility of political pluralism. It is therefore imperative to briefly discuss each of these aspects.

10.2.1 Local Implementation Platform

This is a mechanism envisaged to assist young party supporters to put alternatives to political and electoral violence into action. Conceived under a provisional name, KAYED, the platform hopes to fundamentally encourage active community participation by drawing together young party members from both sides of the political divide. As a locally driven peace initiative, it will certainly promote youth empowerment, capacity building, and community level peacebuilding. Akin to the Local Peace Committee (LPC), the organisation should, as Issifu (2016: 147) notes, contribute to calming, managing, and completely resolving (transforming) not just political but community conflicts. Further, as a youth-led initiative and as noted in Chapter eight, it should pursue the buy-in of youthful leaders such as the current Kalulushi mayor and her deputy.

Youth-led organisations should be an integral component of the local community, creating space for many community members to constructively engage in order to improve the social, economic, and political conditions. Given that in the interim, membership of such initiatives is often comprised of volunteers with the desire to see peace in their community, drawing in civic leaders is politically imperative. Unlike national and senior political leaders, local civic leaders can easily appreciate the creativity and

commitment from young people. In their early stages, they may lack the clout, as Issifu (2016) claims, to engage government and political leaders, per se, as they are willingly disregarded by leaders who exercise political powers. However, in the long run, they will firmly establish themselves and illuminate their niche.

10.2.2 The Guiding Framework for Action

The guiding framework for action is a blueprint that young PF and UPND party supporters conceived as a tangible output following the conclusion of dialogue engagement. Assuming all the earmarked activities are implemented as envisaged, it will provide an opportunity to sustain contact between the two young party supporters. The framework is an ideal vision for a shared future not only between these two parties but all players on both sides of the political divide. Undoubtedly, changed relationships between UPND and PF supporters in Kalulushi should provide the inspiration. As noted in Chapter seven, this framework infuses hope as far as the transformation agenda of the current study. In other words, the implementation of various earmarked actions will be another opportunity for young party supporters and their respective constituencies to bring in more voices and improve contact with political opponents.

10.2.3 Inter-Party Synergies

The cooperation displayed during and after the dialogue sessions merit particular mention. In the quest of, and as a commitment to, bringing their aspirations to fruition, young supporters of the PF and UPND have constituted themselves into an auspicious team. Such synergy will undoubtedly provide additional impetus to generate new ideas of the collaborative handling of polarising issues within the polity. As a bottom-up effort, it is envisaged that this cooperation will be another stimulus for better future relationships between the ruling and opposition parties in Zambia. Stated differently, the hope is that the synergy by young party supporters in Kalulushi will contribute to cultivating harmonious intergroup-interparty relations. This in turn may perhaps produce optimism about the prospects of a sterilised polity devoid of violent conflicts.

10.2.4 Critical Consciousness

Intergroup dialogue has several goals including "critical co-inquiry, consciousness-raising about the causes and effects of social group inequalities, conflict transformation, and civic engagement in activities that foster learning and social change" (Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford 2014: 2). Thus, one of the accomplishments from the effective interactions between young supporters of the PF and UPND is the stimulation of critical consciousness. Participants, for example, bluntly discussed how political conflict and violence affect their relationships leading to political polarisation, and for some supporters of the UPND, they also freely mentioned how their party has been exclusively victimised. The dialogical intervention in Kalulushi created an enabling environment for young people who, by supporting different political parties, shared accounts of tension but were brought together to raise consciousness of existing differences.

In addition to raising awareness about current differences, by reflecting on various issues that emerged from the data collected earlier, young peoples' knowledge of the ills within the polity was certainly enhanced. Awareness of their personal and parties' obligations towards sanitising the larger political landscape was also, without a doubt, raised. For example, participants during the dialogue sessions expressed commitment to collectively speak out against political and electoral violence. An immediate action in this respect was the release of a communique which, among other aspects, called on political party stalwarts to be immersed in the theory and practice of dialogue.

From a pedagogical standpoint, as noted by Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014: 8), educators hope that "critical consciousness helps participants (in intergroup dialogue) develop a clearer understanding of socially constructed social group differences", and that they begin to position their lived practices as social actors who have agency. This agency, it may be argued, should assist young people to build an appreciation of and empathy for 'others'' opinions, values, and needs in order to maintain nonviolent inter-party relations.

10.2.5 Personal Transformation

Critical consciousness, to some degree, stimulated personal transformation among young party supporters following the engagement in Kalulushi. For example, while contact across social-group-based differences can surface strains and severe altercations, some participants remained calm during the dialogue sessions. It may be stated that the sharing of historical experiences, hostile relations, and accompanying effects between the ruling PF and opposition UPND created the space of individual transformation. In other words, during dialogical engagement, participants identified and analysed several aspects that impacted their lives as political party supporters and even as residents of Kalulushi.

The design of intergroup dialogue (see stages two and three of Table 7.2 in Chapter seven), to a great extent, sets the stage for personal change among the participants when they fully immerse themselves in the process. Intergroup dialogue does not only create communal space to express anger and outrage about injustice. In Dessel, Rogge and Garlington's (2006: 303) view, it has the "potential to harness extraordinary power toward the goal of achieving personal and community transformation, conflict resolution (transformation), advocacy and social change".

10.2.6 Commitment to Social Justice

Social justice is concerned with unjust, deplorable, and alarming income inequality; increased poverty; and an overall poor standard of living (United Nations 2006). Thus, during the dialogue sessions, participants demonstrated a commitment to social justice. For example, there was unanimity that young people are part of the marginalised section of society and the need to speak out on matters that affect their well-being is great. They were also in agreement on the need to confront poverty and a sense of hopelessness head-on by advocating for job creation, a call that should be reciprocated not on the basis of political party affiliation but across the constituency, district, and nation at large, since in the contemporary context, as contended by the (United Nations 2006: 13), "social justice is taken to mean distributive justice".

Young peoples' resolve and commitment to social justice is plausible because some, along with unemployment, may not also have the same means to access the available resources. Unlike rural youths who may be involved in subsistence agriculture, urban male youths, especially as grade nine (school dropouts) or twelve graduates, lack access to productive resources and employment. In need of employment or at the risk of economic exclusion, intergroup dialogue provided a space for them to speak their minds on various social injustice issues aside from political differences. As the current study shows, young peoples' susceptibility to political violence is accentuated by unemployment, a low level of or lack of education, and generally hurdles to social and economic opportunities.

With the envisaged local platform, young party supporters will enhance their access to (and inclusion in) social, economic, and even political institutions, in turn assisting to realise their aspirations, although the feasibility of such an endeavour hinges to a large extent on legal recognition from the MCDSS and buy-in from the local community and leaders. In short, to ensure support for the idea of a local platform to remain afloat, they need key and more people on board.

10.2.7 A move towards Pluralism

The synergy nurtured during the dialogue sessions heralded the feasibility of pluralism or coexistence within the polity, that is, a "belief in or commitment to diversity or multiplicity or existence of party competition (political pluralism)" (Heywood 2003: 32). However, sustaining this plurality would hinge to a very large extent on "allowing this cooperation to practically permeate all political party hierarchies". From an intergroup standpoint, this essentially entails a willingness to engage in that which Zúñiga, Lopez and Ford (2014) synthesise as difficult conversations. Given Zambia's nascent democracy, such exchanges are inevitable to ensure that parties on both sides of the political divide embrace coexistence and tolerance. Diversity is healthy and desirable generally because, in Heywood's (2003: 32) view, "it safeguards individual liberty and promotes debate, argument and understanding".

The current study shows that a lack of tolerance and coexistence is responsible for political violence. For example, some political party supporters intentionally attack their opponents for simply belonging to another political organisation. While some are not merely driven into such acts by senior political leaders, as evidenced in the current study (see, for example, Section 9.3.1), they also fail to appreciate the plurality of independent organisations within the polity. Political pluralism is anchored on the pluralistic view of political power where power is broadly and evenly distributed in society and not a preserve of the ruling or elite class (Heywood 2003). Thus, Heywood (2003: 32) adds that pluralism is seen as a "theory of 'group politics', implying that group access to government ensures broad democratic responsiveness".

10.3 Final Appraisal

One of the crucial components of a PAR study is undertaking evaluation to identify changes that may have happened in the lives of participants, their parties, and communities, and further and perhaps most importantly, an appraisal of individual participants' capacities for positive change is necessary. Consistent with Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 12), "effective monitoring and evaluation procedures supply the PAR process with rigour, for assessing the effectiveness, appropriateness and relevance of the action research intervention". Summative evaluations of the dialogue process in Kalulushi were carried out during the follow-up meetings with some participants and the research team, with respect to the implemented intervention. However, a final overall appraisal of the study, specifically slicing up salient aspects that overtly or implicitly speak to participants' acquired skills and knowledge, is essential. In addition, an awareness of their role in effecting change, the motivation to act, and the significance of new relationships cultivated are equally crucial.

First, the intervention in Kalulushi has demonstrated that transformation among young PF and UPND party supporters is feasible. Having been socialised through intergroup dialogue, revealing personal change (discussed in the preceding section) and the nurturing of new relationships set the transformation course in motion. As an intentional process, dialogue created a space that, in spite of some participants meeting

for the first time, the participants were open to explore how their views, opinions, and accounts differ. This dialogical engagement also provided a structure for young people to construct a collective sense of community. Dessel, Rogge and Garlington (2006: 304) argue that "intergroup dialogue among those who do not know each other, on topics about which opinions may differ, brings into focus the possibilities for genuine openness, listening and transformation".

The feasibility of transformation does not merely lie in the fact that it is between two 'rival' political parties, but that parties at the transformation table are youthful and dynamic party stalwarts. As noted in Chapter one, the two parties share a conflictual relationship that permeates all party structures. However, notwithstanding this, young party supporters' engagement transcends party allegiances, well-being, or centeredness. Transformation from a conflict perspective, as Miall (2004: 4) notes, entails "engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests and constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict". In the current study, the latter includes party youth leagues and young people in general whose change may have longstanding value to the Zambian polity. While young people within party politics are enmeshed in violent conflicts, constructive conflict, as claimed by Miall (2004), can be a dynamic agent or catalyst for transformation.

Second, to appreciate how and if an intervention is working, as Mayne (2015: 121) argues, "we need to understand how the activities of the intervention are expected to lead to the desired results". In other words, an intervention should be anchored on a particular 'theory of change' that would explain how the desired results would be achieved. Correspondingly, the theory of change that motivates this study is that the transformation of young people's involvement in political conflict and violence cannot be realised through externally prescribed solutions. As a PAR, their active participation and contributions in re-orienting their circumstances and destiny are crucial. This is a bottom-up approach that focuses specifically on young people before other players within the polity are considered.

In other words, young peoples' awareness of their responsibility to contribute to civilising party politics serves as a springboard for effective agency. Further, their

collaborative commitment to halt the manipulation of other youths by senior political leaders not only inspires hope but reinforces the prescribed theory of change. A component of a basic generic theory of change is behavioural changes. Mayne (2015: 123) describes these changes as transformation "in actual practices that occur, that is those in the target reach group do things differently or use the intervention products". Thus, with young party supporters at the front row, following their participation in the dialogue process, the assumed behavioural change should extend to the entire political youth fraternity.

Third, the facilitated meeting of young supporters from two leading political parties not only created space for exchange but an opportunity for dialogue to be empowered. In other words, the issues (and alternatives proposed) during the dialogical engagement inspires them to confront political and electoral violence head on. While continued immersion in this form of violence was/is a barrier to meaningful participation in governance, this empowerment therefore remains crucial for conflict transformation and peacebuilding endeavours. It is apparent, as the World Bank (2018: 120) observes, that "the disenfranchisement of young people from formal political systems leaves them not only frustrated but also mistrustful of political systems and institutions".

The enfranchisement during dialogical engagement was a new impetus to begin to challenge the public perception of young people as either violence-inclined, unprepared to assume leadership responsibilities, or politically apathetic. In other words, through the current project, young party supporters in particular are well-poised to analyse the sociopolitical conditions of their communities and identify challenges and appropriate solutions to address them. Further, given the current inter-party synergy, making their voice heard or alternatively mounting collective action would unquestionably be attainable.

From a change standpoint, this empowerment should also translate into well-being transformation among young people in Kalulushi constituency and the district as a whole. Well-being changes, in Mayne's (2015: 125) view, result in "longer-term cumulative improvement in overall well-being of individual beneficiaries, such as better health,

reduced poverty and better food security". In the current intervention, increased lobbying and advocacy would contribute to the development of skills such as bricklaying, tailoring, catering, or carpentry and the creation of recreation facilities. Additionally, trading places would be rendered peaceful when political activities are banned in markets and bus stations. Thus, if as a result of this empowerment, young people begin to benefit and enjoy some of these aspirations, then the intervention would be deemed successful. This is in addition to contributing to the predicted overall change (transforming youth involvement in political conflict).

While participating in the dialogue process, as Schirch and Campt (2007) note, enhances communication and problem-solving skills apt for relational transformation, young party supporters also became enlightened on more structural level issues. For example, through robust interactions during the dialogue sessions, it dawned on participants that action and change is necessary at the intra- and intergroup/party levels that tackle injustices and institutional persuasions that engender violence. Capacitating young party stalwarts can certainly bring about change in political parties' modus operandi if the former's peacebuilding efforts are supported.

Last, another aspect that the Kalulushi intervention brought to the fore is young people's appreciation of plural politics. Some observers contend that unlike today, during Zambia's struggle for political independence, the values of plural politics were well-ingrained. For example, Bwalya (2017: 1553) argues that "within the first decade after independence from colonial rule, the fledgling democratic state gravitated towards ethnic cleavages which threatened national cohesion". A more contemporary threat to national cohesion that parallels ethnic divisions is political polarisation and intolerance heightened by political and electoral violence. Thus, inter-party exchanges in Kalulushi, as discussed in Chapter eight, enlightened young party supporters on the significance of political pluralism often inhibited by violence. Young people acknowledged that, as opposed to being politically tolerant and accepting diversity, they are more disposed to violence.

It was therefore imperative that they are empowered to not only contribute to their respective communities' development but to assist in increasing the quality of

engagement within the polity. Regular, enhanced, and civil interactions can be seen as characteristic of political pluralism, synthesised by Escobar (2017: 433) as:

> [A] way of organising society by building enough common ground – social norms and institutional rules – to enable the respect of differences and their role in articulating, contesting and rearticulating competing ideas of the common good.

Young party supporters have an obligation and role to play in lobbying other stakeholders within the polity, especially senior party leaders, to live by the ideals, as espoused by Escobar. With critical consciousness and personal transformation discussed earlier, young party supporters are poised to keep political pluralism afloat. A measurable impact of a dialogue, as Schirch and Campt (2007: 72) argue, involves "increasing participants' awareness of their role in an issue, and their sense that they can affect change either individually or collectively". Further, Schirch and Campt claim that changes in awareness can be assessed by asking participants to ascertain their own responsibility in the issue before and after the dialogue. During the current study, young party supporters' role in transforming political or election-related violence was unintelligible at first, but after robust engagements, they were able to articulate it clearly.

10.4 Personal Reflections

While the researcher has often made mention of some aspects suggestive of the success of the current intervention, at least in the interim, it is imperative to reflect on the researcher's personal efforts towards this 'success'. Thus, in this section, the researcher shares the ethical obligations that he has endeavoured to uphold; PAR preparedness, planning, and organisation that enhanced the researcher's steering of the project; and PAR's resource requirements. The final part is an in-depth thought on the welfare of young people as the core focus group of this study.

10.4.1 Ethical Obligations

Ethical aspects of PAR projects are of the utmost significance, as argued by McIntyre (2008: 65), "if practitioners and participants are to effectively work together for change". From the outset, the researcher committed to executing the project cautiously and

avoided causing any emotional harm to the participants in his expressions or communication. Being ethical in human services or community-based work is stated to be essentially moral in nature rather than a technical or scientific vocation, and that "the provision of support and care to those who are in difficulty or marginalised is fundamentally a moral concern and practitioners are in positions of trust with more power in the practice than stakeholders" (Crane and O'Regan 2010: 40). The researcher therefore did not allow his professional standing to influence his relations with young people, most of whom were twelfth-grade graduates.

Along with doing no harm, the researcher learned to be patient, tolerant, and calm during data collection and other engagements with stakeholders. For example, prior to the start of one of the FGDs, a UPND ward chairperson confronted the researcher demanding to know what young people from his party were doing with the researcher. He contended that he or his party president was against extracting information from party members in the ward and then relaying that to the media and presenting their organisation in a bad light. However, despite his hostile approach, the researcher calmly explained to him the essence of the FGD and the entire study including the expected benefits to the constituency, Kalulushi district, and the country as a whole. Such an encounter is a reminder that being ethical is not an optional practice but should be an ongoing practice in a PAR project.

Consistent with McIntyre's (2008) ethical prescription as a practitioner, the researcher took the responsibility for the participants' well-being and free will during their involvement in the research project, for example, as noted earlier, by ensuring that they freely expressed themselves and the researcher accepting the use of a familiar local language whenever the use of English proved challenging. Further, as noted by other practitioners, in implementing a PAR project, there are several ethical perspectives on which to draw which assist in identifying ethical dimensions and appropriate strategies (McIntyre 2008; Crane and O'Regan 2010). Thus, one other ethical aspect from extant literature and practice that the researcher swore to uphold was not to disseminate the outcomes from the project without the consent of the participants. A case in point is the

sharing of the preliminary research report which was distributed to stakeholders with the explicit consent of interviewees and dialogue participants.

10.4.2 PAR preparedness

Being his first PAR project, the researcher strengthened his PAR knowledge and proficiencies as the study unfolded. This entailed continuous and steady reference to literature on the theory and practice of PAR. As the researcher immersed himself in literature, he realised and agreed that PAR should be "holistic and pulling together encompassing a broad combination of social, economic and political aspects of relationships and interactions between the researcher and the stakeholders" (Lune and Berg 2017: 141). In hindsight, the researcher noted voids in his PAR preparedness before coming to the study context. For example, the researcher realised that he needed to have regular (not just a once-off) interaction with young people in Kalulushi to obtain both their buy-in and fuller appreciation of the context.

Increased contact not only helped the researcher to gain a better understanding of the issues in which young people are entangled but facilitated the development of rapport that lasted until the close of the project. As researchers initiate and develop projects, Johnson (2017: 68-69) notes that:

> [I]t is important for academic researchers to engage in activities and interactions that can build rapport with community members and potential members of the research team ... rapport meaning to carry something back; refers to building close relationship of mutual understanding with others and to developing understanding of others' belief and values, finding areas of community whenever possible.

A rather final PAR preparedness question is whether the researcher was prepared for the ramifications of the actions that he was advocating (Klocker 2015). While the researcher was prepared for any eventualities associated with PAR, some experiences were unforeseen. For example, the change that the researcher envisaged was not only refraining from using violence when handling political differences but also empowering young people to have a greater voice in advocating for improved socioeconomic conditions. However, some youths' hopes hinged on an immediate change in terms of

economic status such as obtaining employment opportunities. On the other hand, the UPND ward chairperson's confrontation referred to earlier is another unpredicted, though not unusual, experience in party politics.

10.4.3 Planning and Coordination

Another aspect that merits reflection is how the researcher handled the planning and organisation dimension of the project in Kalulushi. First, the researcher relied on continuous reference to available literature and learning from experts in participatory action research. One of the aspects that stood out for a number of practitioners was regular communication with stakeholders and other practitioners (McIntyre 2008; Crane and O'Regan 2010). Therefore, while the researcher planned most of the activities with his assistant, often when taking final decisions, five more members of the research team were consulted. The consultation, notwithstanding the number of those consulted, engendered multiple perspectives, rendering the planning process prone to hurdles. Thus, PAR practitioners should take into account that the dynamics of 'collective planning' and 'consultation' as having the propensity to generate differences is high.

The reality is that if the lead researcher or practitioner does not facilitate the planning process well, the progress of the PAR project can be held up. In addition, stakeholders' trust in the practitioner may also wane. By obtaining different stakeholders together to collaborate, as Lune and Berg (2017: 145) argue, one might "simply be creating conflict and worse accused of taking sides in disagreements". However, while this might negatively affect the project, as a PAR initiative, the stakeholders ought to be reminded that it is a participatory, collaborative, collegial, and action-oriented endeavour that requires their full cooperation. By continually working with research team members and consulting literature, the researcher learned how to listen to young people not just as party supporters but as community leaders with vast experience.

On the other hand, coordinating activities during the current study was, at times, frustrating and dispiriting but not insurmountable. For example, some senior political leaders (interviewees) proved difficult when scheduling meetings with several deferments. Similarly, FGD participants were seldom punctual, leading to the delayed and

late conclusion of discussions. In addition, there were some who did not even attend despite several follow-up phone calls. Thus, organising PAR activities required exercising patience and flexibility. McIntyre (2008: 27) guides that practitioners should "get out of their way and allow people to proceed in a way that make sense to and for them – not necessarily to and for the practitioner", although this does not mean that participants do not require an irregular push or calm prodding now and then.

To summarise, the planning and organising of activities during the current project would not have been possible without the participation of stakeholders, notwithstanding their various shortcomings. Notably, the researcher and his assistant's reminders and/or pushes were efforts that also contributed to the attitudinal transformation among stakeholders to be sensitive to the needs of others. The researcher believes that premised on PAR tenets, the actions that the research team took were both capacity-enhancing and indicative of the value of collaborative effort when the team carried out each activity. This experience also demonstrates the significance of remaining passionate in pursuing the change that one envisages.

10.4.4 PAR Resource Requirements

In addition to the PAR preparedness, which was more concerned with the lead researcher, there are PAR resource requirements from the study context. The PAR method, as Mackenzie *et al.* (2012: 19) claim, is "time and resource intensive, and involve a high degree of personal investment on behalf of the researcher". Therefore, consistent with Mackenzie *et al.*, the researcher's first necessity was ensuring that he cultivated a relationship with the participants that included meeting some even on weekends, reaching them by phone or email. Further, it was also necessary for the researcher to develop good working relations with personnel from the MP's office as well as staff from the Kalulushi Municipal Council. These are stakeholder offices that, for instance, helped by hosting one of the FGDs and authourising the space for dialogue sessions.

The other requirement that the researcher, as the lead researcher and PAR practitioner, had to fulfill was ensuring that participants had the necessary knowledge regarding the entire concept of PAR, and as mentioned earlier, to start with the research

team members. Since participants are not researchers, as Lune and Berg (2017) note, a lead researcher spends time trying to train people. Participants "may not line up well with the purpose of the work and can't be predicted or controlled well enough for you to guarantee that your research will succeed" (Lune and Berg 2017: 145). While this is synthesised as a PAR risk factor, a PAR practitioner may perhaps consider putting strategies in place when designing the study to enlighten participants and/or stakeholders. For example, during the current study, the researcher continuously shared with participants additional insights on PAR practice aimed at increasing their appreciation of the approach and enhancing the project implementation.

It was through this approach that the researcher also became fully immersed in the practice of PAR. The researcher learned and had a practical feel of working with a team and collectively striving towards a common goal of bringing about change. Further, the researcher realised that as a PAR project, the researcher carried the onus to enthuse both the research team members and other participants (young party supporters). In Boyd's (2014: 507) view:

> [Community-based research practitioners] seek to build capacity within the communities they work with. This means that the researcher and practitioner organize, facilitate, motivate, train, educate, and foster community members, groups, and organizations to become architects, leaders, and others of their own histories.

An array of objectives assumed by practitioners and researchers, as Boyd advances, is certainly suggestive of PAR's time and resource intensiveness. In other words, while mounting a PAR project requires financial resources, technical know-how is equally essential. The researcher noted during the current study that a practitioner's knowledge remains crucial in responding to PAR's resource requirements because attempts to transform young people's lives have unexpected developments that are difficult to predict. For example, as shared earlier, some youths' expectations at face value runs counter to the intervention's aim and objectives. Hence, still reinforcing resourcefulness, researchers should leave communities empowered and strengthened through robust engagements. Participants ought to be equipped with "advocacy skills, communication

and group working skills, about participatory democracy, which can be transferred and applied to other projects or personal experiences" (Boyd 2014: 507).

10.4.5 Welfare of Young People

As noted in Chapter nine, with young peoples' predicament compounded by the rising unemployment far beyond the sub-Saharan Africa rate, their plight and welfare stand as another cause for reflection. The experience of working with young party supporters in Kalulushi revealed salient realities about them. For example, within the Zambian polity, youth are viewed as vulnerable, malleable, powerless, and at the disposal of elderly political players (Chapa 2017; Namaiko and Etyang 2017; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017). Additional dimensions from Kalulushi are that young people, especially when nestled within electoral politics, are violent, dangerous, and a threat to community peace and stability. The young party supporters who participated in the FGDs expressed their unhappiness by blaming senior leaders in political parties.

However, a complete reflection on the dilemmas that encircle young people ought to extend to delving into their socioeconomic conditions. For example, limited education and civic awareness impede quality participation in political discourses. Of the 21 young party supporters who participated in the dialogue sessions, only two who had university and college certificates were serving in formal youth decision-making structures. Thus, the majority with less education are not close to leadership structures and wield very little influence especially as individuals within party structures. The more educated individual, as argued by Botha (2014: 907), "is also more likely to express confidence in the political process and is more likely to be an active member of a legitimate political organization". Young peoples' agency is not only constrained by limited education but, as explained in Chapter nine, high poverty levels which amplify their vulnerability to an array of manipulations.

The researcher's experience in Kalulushi is that poverty may not only be a lack of regular income but also limited access to social services including clean water, security, healthcare, and land (or shelter). As an illustrative case, during the FGD in Kafue ward, young people complained about the lack of services such as water supply as most of the

boreholes were drying up. Other concerns included the absence of a police post to assist in curbing rising crime levels and the lack of a health facility, as the nearest is not easily accessible. As a structural condition that renders young people in an unfortunate position is that they bear a disproportionate burden of deprivation, and even state interventions seem not to assist in ameliorating the situation, especially if done along partisan lines.

A discussion that the researcher had with a taxi (cab) driver, two days before he left the study location, speaks to this failure. The taxi driver for example, claimed that even when leaders ask them to develop project proposals for funding, not everyone is supported and those that receive funding are mostly from the ruling party (Nalumino 2019). Further, in an apparent show of despondency and frustration and to allow the researcher to appreciate their situation, some participants, during the FGD in Lubuto ward, played a YouTube musical video by a local artist. Titled *Tamutusakamana*, the song lays bare some of the excruciating circumstances that affect the youth in communities (Rite Media Inc 2019). Some of the issues that the artist advances reverberate Nalumino's (2019) thoughts, as there are no big industries to offer employment to young people and called on leaders to consider setting up new firms. He further attributed the increase in gangs to such as Niggers 70 and Mbwambwa to increased unemployment and limited college opportunities.

In sum, Honwana (2012: 4) argues that young Africans are living in 'waithood', a combination of 'wait and hood' suggesting "a prolonged period of suspension between childhood and adulthood". Following the researcher's time in Kalulushi, the researcher observed three categories of Zambian youths in waithood. First is a group that the researcher calls 'youth claimants', mostly from the informal sector, associated with political parties, who are quite pronounced and fondly known as party cadres. Some of these are taxi or private bus drivers, hawkers or street vendors, marketers, and a good number of them are well over 35 years of age. During the Lubuto ward FGD, one participant referred to them as *imbazali*, literally translated as 'muscular men'. Sadly, this category is seen as the most violent category especially during electoral politics, and both the PF and UPND have such cohorts within their ranks. Thus, the call for civil interactions should extend to both parties (Yezi 2013; Kaoma 2019).

A second category is not seen to be associated with political parties per se, but are found in communities and are relatively vocal about their poor socioeconomic situation. Some may be connected to political parties (just as card-carrying members) but may not be as much involved in the depths of party hooliganism as the first group. It is a group that the researcher was privileged to work with, although during the FGDs, the researcher had a few from the first category (taxi drivers and marketers) who later withdrew from the dialogue sessions. This group includes young men and women who have been to college but who are still unemployed; grade 12 graduates with good results but who cannot obtain university or college admission; and some who were employed after college, worked for less than five years, and who were then laid off. The researcher's research assistant and approximately 80% of those who participated in the dialogue sessions were from this group.

The third category included a good number of those who have only achieved a ninth and twelfth grade education and who have either received poor results or failed completely. During the FGDs, the participants linked this group to the gangs that Nalumino referred to earlier. They have resorted to forming gangs as a means of extorting possessions and cash from innocent citizens at night. During the FGD in Kafue ward, it was alleged that these youths are also targeted by some senior political leaders to join in fueling political and electoral violence. The lines separating these categories are blurred to some degree as the second group can easily climb up hoping for some opportunity in group one. Similarly, those from category three find themselves aiding youth claimants. However, the researcher contends that true youths in waithood would be in categories two and three.

10.4.6 Personal Development

Implementing the PAR project in Kalulushi has benefited the researcher in terms of the enhancement in the researcher's skills set and/or professional growth. It provided the researcher with the opportunity to be a field worker, a well-versed PAR researcher (through enriched PAR understanding), and a community agent of change. It was also a privilege to have a good understanding of the intricacies that surround young people. However, if strides made thus far regarding increased contact and interaction among

young people from different political parties is to be considered, then sustainable future transformation is feasible. The researcher feels that his facilitation skills of both pedagogical processes and team efforts have also been enhanced. For example, the researcher supported participants in a collective research process and successfully coordinated several participants and stakeholders' perspectives. In turn, the researcher learned that concerted efforts have the potential to culminate in positive change beyond the scope of the current interventions.

Working with a team for approximately six months was also capacity-enhancing for the researcher as far as team management was concerned especially since the research team steered the project in the correct direction. The researcher remains hopeful that young party supporters will implement change not only in their respective communities but in political parties as well. Further, the researcher feels confident that he has helped young party supporters who, in the current political configuration, feel marginalised to share their predicaments and collectively devise ways of turning matters around. In other words, the researcher's growth as a scholar and practitioner parallels young party supporters' new trajectory that will see them take actions that will improve their current conditions. The enthusiasm and motivation demonstrated throughout the entire project renders this commitment attainable.

Finally, these reflections are carried out while cognisant of McIntyre's (2008) counsel that judging projects' successes or failures should be done cautiously by PAR practitioners and participants. Thus, that which has been shared (and considered successful) is particularly based on the immediate outcomes of the Kalulushi intervention. In addition, the success and impact of this project in the long-term will also be evident when the awareness among young party supporters move beyond their group. That is, benefiting other youth in the communities who may perhaps be unaware that the current violent ways of politics can effectively be transformed.

10.5 Recommendations

While at the core of a PAR project are those most affected by and close to the issues to be studied and/or transformed, other key stakeholders are correspondingly important. For example, the success of community (youth) led interventions may not ride on the sole efforts of young people but all players whose jurisdictions indirectly or directly affect the former. For the Kalulushi PAR project, alongside young people, political parties, and the government are crucial stakeholders in transforming youth involvement in political conflict who would certainly appreciate the suggestions advanced here. However, the complete schedule of proposals includes a set for PAR researchers in the event of similar future interventions.

10.5.1 Young People

The following recommendations are aimed at inspiring young people to take up their space in promoting nonviolent political engagements and inter-party cooperation, further emphasising the critical role that young people ought to play in steering the transformational agenda:

- Through KAYED, the youth can advocate for increased youth participation in decision-making structures of political parties. Likewise, other youth from communities should be encouraged and mobilised to register and vote in large numbers to have an impact on the electoral process.

- Given the positive dialogical engagements, there is a need to ensure that more young political party stalwarts are immersed in the theory and practice of dialogue. This should in turn assist young people to develop critical analytical perspectives of their sociopolitical circumstances.

- To enhance national cohesion, the youth can advocate that inter-party dialogue, with particular emphasis on political and electoral violence, remains an ongoing process, and further lobby that this practice permeates all political party levels.

- The youth should remain steadfast in ensuring that the guiding framework conceived during dialogue sessions has the buy-in of other youths in order to garner a greater voice in engaging political opponents. Additionally, on the basis of the inter-party synergy cultivated, they can assist in 'deconstructing' enemy images and narratives and build a shared meaning.

- In order for community buy-in and ensuring that the current intervention remains an effective community peace initiative, the youth can work hard to win community trust and confidence by being transparent, accountable, and widening the reach, and further recognising and collaborating with other community actors for increased synergies.

- The youth can advocate for initiatives to sensitise political parties especially young people, party cadres, and key party officials on the need for nonviolent political engagements, coexistence, and peace. This may also include common activities such as inter-party capacity building (introduction to peacebuilding) which would provide space for contact between political opponents.

10.5.2 Political Parties

Political parties are "agents of political socialization or deepening democratic principles and wooing electorates for power" (Paalo 2017: 3). Consistent with this goal, political parties in Zambia have a responsibility to integrate young party supporters into mainstream politics. Thus, the following proposals seek to reinforce this role and perhaps illuminate salient aspects in this direction:

- Enhance the capacity of young men and women through increased participation in decision-making party activities and programmes. This will, in one way or another, instill a sense of responsibility and civil leadership.

- Support the transformational seeds sown through the KAYED initiative and other youth interventions by seconding such to the District Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) and political party liaison committee. The latter, as argued by

Namaiko and Etyang (2017), when reactivated, can serve as a critical trust and confidence-building mechanism on electoral matters among political parties.

- In complementing efforts by young party supporters, ensure the call for civil interactions and coexistence between members of the UPND and PF as major political players in the country spread through all respective party structures. Sustained relational contact between the two parties should contribute to a sterilised polity.

- Support young party supporters' commitment to curb violent electoral campaigns and the destruction of public and private properties, and a call for dialogue, coexistence, tolerance, and mutual trust among political players.

- Ensure disciplinary measures are included in the party statutes to deter senior party leaders involved in inciting political and electoral violence by young people, and to guarantee that these laws remain effective, enforcement mechanisms should also be provided.

- To contribute to sterilising the polity, commit and demonstrate the will to discourage violent political activities by party cadres in markets and bus stations. In addition, to let all party structures, including young men and women, appreciate the significance of political pluralism, peace, and nonviolent engagement.

- To promote a free and peaceful electoral environment and process, firmly reprimand party stalwarts that harass voters and the general citizenry during electoral campaigns.

10.5.3 Government

The following recommendations seek the government's increased intervention in the transformation of young peoples' socioeconomic predicaments. The government remains a critical stakeholder in creating an environment that would allow youth to navigate social, political, and economic dynamics. It also has an important responsibility of ensuring the

well-being of its citizens, including young people who often lack or have limited access to basic necessities and opportunities.

- Scale up efforts to increase skills (bricklaying, tailoring, catering, carpentry etc.) development among ordinary young people in the Kalulushi communities. This will, in a way, improve their socioeconomic situation that disposes them to manipulation.

- As part of efforts to institutionalise and build national capacities for dialogue, the Ministry of National Guidance and Religious Affairs (MNGRA) should consider working with peacebuilding organisations. The long-term purpose of this cooperation may not only be for peacebuilding NGOs and CSOs to propagate messages of peace, coexistence, and nonviolence, but to explore possibilities of a national peace policy.

- Through close collaboration of the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Child Development (MYSCD), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), and the Zambia National Services (ZNS), consider revitalising and/or relaunching national agriculture youth services for high school graduates. This intervention would not only assist young people who fail to join colleges and universities but boost agriculture production as well as create employment.

- Strengthen social and online media regulation by ensuring that 'fake news' and 'hate speech' disseminators are firmly disciplined. It is imperative that the electoral environment is rendered peaceful and devoid of social or online media triggered conflicts between contending party supporters. During electoral campaigns, it is also important that both public and private media accord equal coverage to all political players.

- Through the MYSCD and local authorities, such as the Kalulushi Municipal Council, consider rehabilitating existing and/or creating new youth recreation centres. This will assist young people to rekindle the various talents and skills and

above all keep them away from delinquency or possible manipulation by elders with ulterior motives.

- As another dimension to institutionalising dialogical engagements and peacebuilding in general, consider strengthening civic education in schools and teacher educational colleges by adding a large peace component. Experts from the Ministry of General Education and the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) in Lusaka should collaborate in bringing this to fruition. Such interventions will augment other efforts by CSOs and NGOs in ensuring effective community-based peacebuilding efforts.

10.5.4 PAR Researchers

In a PAR project, the researcher provides the expertise when desired and the community or stakeholders contribute the contextual aspects (issues and space). However, in practice, PAR dictates that the researcher works side-by-side with the community not as an external consultant or observer but as a co-participant. Given that this rapport varies from one context (or topic of study) to another, the following suggestions are informed by the experience of implementing the PAR project in Kalulushi and provided as optional ideas for other PAR practitioners' consideration:

- A researcher in a PAR project should consider his or her role as that of a coordinator of several activities, and in initiatives that have an intervention, such as a dialogue process, the researcher can also facilitate this event.

- With community members and/or stakeholders having expectations at variance with the researcher, it is important that there is clarity in terms of the role and responsibilities. In other words, both the researcher and the community should be clear about the parameters of participation and contributions to the project.

- As a qualitative researcher, consistent with Mertens (2015: 322), it is critical to be clear about which values, assumptions, beliefs, or biases a researcher brings to the study. For example, as in the case of the Kalulushi intervention, if a researcher

takes young people as disgruntled, problematic, or violent, then the execution of the project will be affected.

- The inclusion of intergroup dialogue in a PAR project calls for the researcher to have a conceptual appreciation of prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination, and oppression, which are key terms in this type of engagement. In addition, one of the aspects that exacerbate political and electoral violence is a lack of trust and harbouring prejudices.

- As a tenet of PAR, the participation of local partners is critical to the initiative's success and, as a researcher, the need to pull or work with all key people during the project tenure is paramount. Some of the partners such as 'secondary gatekeepers' may not have been considered initially but as the project unfolds, it becomes inevitable. In the case of the Kalulushi intervention, the municipal council was a crucial secondary gatekeeper.

10.6 Conclusion

The PAR project in Kalulushi may be described as a matchstick that lit the transformation fire by stimulating immediate actions among young party supporters from the PF and UPND. PAR is understood as an emancipatory research practice that, as argued by Van Katwyk and Ashcroft (2016: 197), is "developed out of an ethical and critical concern for the impact of research on individuals and communities". For the current project, PAR not only offered an opportunity for immediate individual and collective transformation but also in laying several platforms to assist in sustaining this change. These outputs and outcomes were conceived as outgrowths of dialogical engagements between young party supporters of the PF and UPND. Dialogue sessions, as Ungerleider (2012: 398) notes, constitute "a participatory and democratic approach to building a sense of social empowerment in young people to feel they have the capacity to act in response to the issues facing their generation".

A cursory assessment of the current intervention suggests that given the applied theory of change, transformation among young PF and UPND party supporters is feasible

and that dialogical exchanges were empowering. Further, this empowerment should, in the long run, translate into well-being transformation as well as an appreciation of plural politics among young people in Kalulushi constituency. On the other hand, as McIntyre (2008) shares from the experiences of PAR projects with women in Belfast and youth in Bridgeport, PAR provides both personal and professional development. Correspondingly, in the researcher's work in Kalulushi, aside from a practical experience of PAR, the researcher has seen personal and professional growth in one aspect or the other. Lastly, to reinforce the call for the transformation of the current hostile relations within the Zambian polity, including young people's susceptibility, proposals are rendered to youths, political parties, and the government on their respective contributions.

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Appendix 1: Researcher's Letter of Introduction

27th July, 2019

Mr/Mrs/Ms.....

.....

.....

.....

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

I am a doctoral student at Durban University of Technology (DUT) in South Africa. As part of my studies I will be carrying out a research on 'using dialogue to transform youth involvement in political conflicts' in Luanshya's roan constituency. My supervisor is Prof. Geoff Harris, Professor, Peacebuilding Programme, International Centre of Nonviolence (ICON) under the faculty of Management Sciences.

I write to invite you to participate in my study with no remuneration and you may withdraw at any time. Your participation is entirely voluntary and information collected in the course of the study is purely for academic purposes. Further, note that there are no individual risks in this research.

Further information may be sought from my supervisor, at International Centre of Nonviolence, Durban University of Technology, Box 1334, Durban 4000, South Africa, Phone: +27 31 373 5609, Email: geoffreyh@dut.ac.za

Yours Sincerely,

Kabale Ignatius Mukunto

Appendix 2: DUT Letter of Introduction



10 May 2019

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I write to introduce **Kabale Ignatius Mukunto**, a doctoral student in Peacebuilding at Durban University of Technology under my supervision.

He is researching practical ways to reduce the involvement of youth in electoral violence. I would be very grateful for any assistance you can provide him.

By all means contact me for any further information geoffreyh@dut.ac.za tel +2731 373 5609.

Geoffrey Harris

Professor & Head

Peacebuilding Programme

PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME
DURBAN UNIVERSITY
OF TECHNOLOGY

Appendix 3: Survey Questionnaire

Transformation of Youth Involvement in Political Conflict

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Participant,

My name is Kabale Ignatius Mukunto. I am a PhD student in Public Management (Peacebuilding) in the Faculty of Management Sciences at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa. The purpose of this survey is to learn more about politically motivated violence among young people in Kalulushi constituency and identifying appropriate mechanism(s) to change the situation. Your views and opinions on this subject are essential to the success of this study. Kindly note that the information collected through this survey is purely for academic purposes and there are no individual risks. I recognise the importance of your time, and sincerely appreciate your willingness to participate in this survey. Please take 10 minutes to complete this survey.

Section A:

Please fill in the following information about your self by marking [**X**] in the space provided

1) You are.... [ ] Female [ ] Male

2) Your Age: [ ] 15 – 24 years [ ] 25 – 34 years [ ] Above 35 years

3) What is your level of education?

   [ ] Primary (Grade 9)

   [ ] Secondary (Grade 12)

   [ ] College Certificate or Diploma

   [ ] University Degree

4) Your employment status:

   [ ] Unemployed [ ] Employed [ ] Self-employed (state business activity)

   .....

5) Are you a member of any political party? [ ] Yes [ ] No.
   If yes, state the name of the party (optional). If no, move to question 6.

6) How long have you been a resident of Kalulushi constituency?

[ ] Less than 12 months [ ] 1- 2 years [ ] 3-5 years [ ] Over 5 years

Section B: Political Conflicts and Violence

Mark **X** or √ tick your preferred response under each statement or question in the appropriate box. Where you are asked for further comments, use the spaces provided.

7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about political conflicts involving young people.

	Strongly disagree	Mostly disgree	Neither agree nor disagree	Mostly agree	Strongly agree
a) Political conflicts involves voters and political opponents/members intimidation and disruption of political rallies					
b) Political conflicts and violence affects activities in markets and bus stations.					
c) Young people involved in political conflicts and violence at times have no regard for the police					
d) Political conflicts and violence by young people extend to vandalizing public property, rioting and violent protests					
e) Political party conflicts and violence involves young people from two parties (Patriotic Front – PF and United Party for National Development – UPND) only					
f) Today (2019) political conflicts are more violent than before (say 2011)					

8) How often do the following factors (reasons) lead young people to participate in violence by political parties?

	Never	Rarely	Often	Not Sure
a) Unemployment (Lack of means of livelihood)				
b) Exclusion from Leadership and Governance				
c) Understanding that politics is a source of livelihood (Need to be paid for participating in political activities)				
d) Desire to serve their constituency(youths)				

9) Indicate in your view, who among the following is responsible for young people's use of and involvement in violence in politics (select all that apply):

[ ] Youth Political Leaders
[ ] Parents and Guardians
[ ] Senior Political Leaders
[ ] Peers/Friends
[ ] College/Schools Student Unions
[ ] Police Officers

If you have any additional comments about **what** or **who** influences young people to use violence in politics, feel free to comment below:

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

10) During the last 12 months have you witnessed any of the following happen in your area - ward or constituency? (select all that apply):

[ ] Accusations of political leaders sponsoring armed/violent youths
[ ] Allegations of political abductions
[ ] Two political youth groups clashing physically
[ ] Political youths harassing the public/media-journalists
[ ] Political youths pledging to defend their leaders using force
[ ] None of the above, other, state:.....

From the answers you have selected in question 10, explain how any of one these affected you personally:

.....

.....

.....

.....

Section C: Interventions

11) During the last 12 months have you witnessed any activity aimed at changing young people's involvement in politics?

[ ] Yes [ ] No.

If yes, how was the intervention? Explain below. If no move to question 12

.....

.....

.....

.....

12) If a programme was to be designed to assist young people from political parties in Kalulushi constituency to refrain (avoid) from violence, what type should it take? From the list below tick two (2) most important in your view.

a) Dialogue (space to talk about their difference) [ ]

b) Alternatives to Violence Training [ ]

c) Open Forum to share their parties' manifestos [ ]

d) Television Debates with Party leaders [ ]

e) Party Exchanges to get to know each other better [ ]

13) Can we contact you if we are looking for participants for a discussion on matters affecting young people from political parties? Share your email address ONLY.

[ ] Yes [ ] No

THANK YOU

Thank you very much for your time in completing this questionnaire.

Appendix 4: Senior Political Leaders Interview Guide

Transformation of Youth Involvement in Political Conflict

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SENIOR POLITICAL LEADERS

Introduction/Opening

My name is Kabale Ignatius Mukunto, I am a PhD student in Public Management (Peacebuilding) in the Faculty of Management Sciences at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa. This interview is part of my doctoral project aimed at transforming youth involvement in political conflicts. The purpose is to elicit views and opinions about politically motivated violence among young people in roan constituency. Further, identifying appropriate mechanisms to change the current situation. I am especially interested in hearing your thoughts and insights regarding this subject based on your experiences as senior political leaders in this constituency.

I am so grateful for your time and willingness to grant this interview. If its okay with you, I would like to go through some preliminary aspects that will govern our discussion, to seek your consent.

a) I request that I record our conversation. This is in order for me to get all the details but also to allow me to be attentive during the conversation with you. If you agree to have our interview recorded please SIGN the consent form.

b) Please note that your views shall remain confidential and will only be used for the academic project mentioned above. I will compile a report in which no comment will be attributed to individuals directly.

c) I would like start by taking note of personal details including your responsibilities.

Section A: Participant's BIO Data

1) Name (optional):.....

2) Sex:.....

3) Location/Date of Interview:.....

4) Name of Organisation.....

5) Title/Position:.....

6) Responsibilities in the Organisation:.....

.....

Section B: Political Conflicts and Violence

1) How would you describe young people's involvement in party politics in roan constituency?
   - When faced with conflicts how do young people respond?
   - In cases of violent engagement, is it done collectively of individually?

2) What is the intensity of political conflicts (violence) among young people in roan constituency?
   - Share your experiences of political conflicts and violence during the last 5 years.
   - Who is targeted when this violence erupts?

3) What, in your view, drives young people to get involved in political conflicts and violence?
   - Are there social, economic or political factors? Can you mention some of these?

4) In your political career what would you say are some of problems brought about as a result of political violence?

5) What would be the result to the community of not helping young people to refrain from this violence?

Section C: Interventions

6) From your experience, the last five (5) years has there been any intervention to reduce or stop political violence among young people?
   - For example, some intervention by the churches, NGOs, the government or local authorities to stop this violence?

7) What would be more helpful between organising **meetings** for young people from political parties to meet and discuss their differences and explore ways of working together OR organising **a training** for them to be trained in alternative skills to violence.

Section D: Recommendations - Hopes for the Future

8) What do you think should be done to reduce or stop political violence by and among young people in roan constituency, Kalulushi or Zambia as a whole?

9) Is there any other information regarding young people and their involvement in political conflicts and violence that you think would be useful for my study, which I should know? OR any concluding remarks?

END

Thank you for your time and participation

Appendix 5: Focus Group Discussion Guide

Transformation of Youth Involvement in Political Conflict

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

Opening

Hello, my name is Kabale Ignatius Mukunto, I am a PhD student in Public Management (Peacebuilding) in the Faculty of Management Sciences at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa. Thank you for accepting to participate in this discussion today. This activity is part of a doctoral project (participatory action research) aimed at transforming youth involvement in political conflicts. Thus, its purpose, is to create space for deeper reflection and sharing of our opinions about politically motivated violence among young people in Kalulushi constituency. Further, identifying appropriate ways to change the current situation. Thus, we are interested in hearing your thoughts and insights regarding the subject matter based on your experience living in this constituency. We really appreciate your time, views and opinions. Before we start, it is essential that we go through some preliminary aspects that will govern our discussion, to seek your consent.

a) Please note that the information recorded from these discussions is purely for academic purposes (But, to ensure your consent is sought, kindly sign the consent form).

b) Our discussion will last between 45 and 60 minutes.

c) Note that during discussions there are no right or wrong answers. Feel free to share your views both negative and positive.

d) Do you **mind** if we audio record of our session, so that we can ensure our notes are truthful? We will delete/erase once we complete our notes. (Note the response and/or get consensus before moving on. If some or all participants feel uncomfortable, we do without it)

e) No names or political parties represented here will be connected to anything that anyone person said in the discussion. In short there are no individual risks attached.

f) When the final report of the project is done, any quotes therein from this discussion will be presented anonymously. And, nothing sensitive that can be connected to any political party will be discussed in the report.

g) Are there any questions before we start? For mobile phones, either switch them off or put on vibrate mode. **Let's start by getting to know one another. On a sign-in-sheet write your name and organisation (optional) and then share your name with the rest of the group.**

Content Questions

SECTION A: POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE/CONFLICTS

1) What type of political conflicts/violence have you witnessed in the last 12 months in your area or Kalulushi constituency?

   Possible PROBEs:

   - Are young people involved? If so, what are their ages (estimate)?
   - How is the violence done, in groups or individually?
   - What does this violence involve – fighting, throwing stones, exchange of insults, hitting using clubs or machetes etc.?

2) Describe from your experience, how violence by young people from political parties in your area happens?

   Possible PROBEs:

   - Who is often targeted when this violence erupts?
   - Does this violence extend to public (bus stations, government vehicles, markets, schools etc.) or private (people's houses, shops, vehicles etc.) properties?
   - Is the violence between young people from different political parties or young people and the general community members?

3) In your view what causes this violence by young people in your area?

   Possible PROBEs:

   - Are **parents or guardians, senior political party leaders, peers/friends, college student unions or police officers** in any way responsible for this violence by young people?
   - If one of the above is the cause, how, explain.
   - Does any of the following issues in your view cause young people to use violence – **lack of employment or means of livelihood; exclusion from leadership and governance at community level; seeing politics as a source of livelihood or their desire to serve their fellow young people?**

4) What problems are brought about by political violence by young people?

   Possible PROBEs:

   - In which way are community members, elderly men and women or even children affected by this violence?
   - Are young people, affected by this violence in any way? Share...
   - What would be the result to the community of not helping young people refrain from this violence?

SECTION B: INTERVENTIONS TO TRANSFORM THE STATUS QUO

5) What programmes or services exists in your area to stop or reduce political violence among young people?
   Possible PROBE:
   - Are you aware of any projects by the churches, NGOs, the government or local authorities to stop this violence?

6) In your view, would organising meetings for young people from political parties to meet and discuss their differences and explore ways of working together be helpful?
   Possible PROBEs:
   - And, can this idea be welcome in your area
   - How can such an initiative be arranged in your area?
   - Do you think many young people would attend such a meeting?

7) In your view, would organising a training for young people from political parties to be trained in alternative skills to violence be helpful?
   Possible PROBEs
   - And, can this idea be welcome in your area
   - How can such an initiative be arranged in your area?
   - Do you think many young people would attend such a meeting?

SECTION C: VISIONS OF THE COMMUNITY-THE HOPE

8) Thinking about the future of your area or roan constituency as a whole, if you could do one thing to change political relations, what would it be?
   Possible PROBEs:
   - Would your organisation be willing to support you in this endeavour?
   - OR, who would you approach to assist and/or be part of this initiative?

Closing

On behalf of the team, I want to thank you so much for your time and sharing your thoughts and views. Your opinions are greatly valued in assisting transform the role that young people play in politics, in your area/ward, Kalulushi constituency, Kalulushi town and the country as whole. As we close, is there anything that anyone of you wanted to add that you may not have had a chance to share during the session.

Notes:
- Questions are meant to serve as a guide and not sacrosanct script.
- Probing questions can be modified and/or adapted as the situation dictates.
- Keep within the allotted time (Or roughly 20 mins for section 1 & 2 and 15 mins for section 3)
- Note takers should ensure they take detailed notes on response/key points.

Appendix 6: Participants' Letter of Consent

LETTER OF CONSENT

'Using dialogue to transform youth involvement in political conflict'

I understand the nature of the research project of Mr. Kabale Ignatius Mukunto and agree to participate. I understand I can withdraw at any time and that there are no obvious individual risks on me as a participant.

Name: .....

.....

Date: .....

KALULUSHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

All correspondence to be addressed to the Town Clerk

P. O. Box 260400
KALULUSHI
Zambia

Your ref:

Our ref:

Tel/fax: +260 2 733593/731759

1st October, 2019

Mr Kabale Ignitius Mukunto
c/o Out Durban University of Technology
SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Sir

RE: REQUEST FOR MEETING SPACE – DONGWE CENTRE

The above subject matter refers.

I would like to acknowledge receipt of your letter requesting use of a Classroom at Dongwe Centre from 8th to 15th October. 2019 to conduct a Participatory Action Research (PAR) on Youths in Kalulushi Constituency with respect for Youth involvement in Political (Election Conflict (Ngweshi, Kafue, Luapula, Dongwe, Lubuto, Kalungwishi and Kalanga Wards).

I am pleased to inform you that your request has been granted. You are further advised to maintain the classroom clean and ensure there is no vandalism to Council property. For further information and guidance, do not hesitate to contact the Office of the Director of Housing and Social Services.

Yours faithfully
KALULUSHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

MOSES MWELWA
TOWN CLERK

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
OFFICE OF THE TOWN CLERK
KALULUSHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
02 OCT 2019
PRESIDENT AVENUE
P. O. BOX 260400
KALULUSHI

cc. Her Worship the Mayor
cc. Councillor – Dongwe Ward
cc. Councillor- Ngweshi Ward
cc. Councillor- Kafue Ward
cc. Councillor – Luapula Ward
cc. Councillor – Kalungwishi Ward
cc. Councillor – Lubuto Ward
cc. Councillor – Kalanga Ward

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