# SUSTAINING LOCAL PEACE INFRASTRUCTURES IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

**Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration in the Faculty of Management Sciences at the Durban University of Technology**

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## DECLARATION

I, Jean-Pierre Mfuni Mwanza, hereby make the following declaration:

- The research initiative reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original work.
- This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree for examination at any other university.
- This thesis does not contain any other person's data, pictures, graphs or other information without due acknowledgment of those sources.
- This thesis does not contain any other person's writing unless specifically acknowledged and referenced, and where other sources have been quoted, I certify that their words have been re-written, that any general idea attributable to them has been duly referenced, and where their exact words have been used, these have been placed in quotation marks and equally referenced.

Signed:

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Jean-Pierre Mfuni Mwanza

_____ ____

Date 26.4.

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## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, my beloved children and family members.

## ABSTRACT

For more than two decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has known acute violence which has killed millions of people. The eastern part of the country is considered the most affected region with dire consequences to human security. Despite the numerous efforts that have been made to encourage peace by signing a number of peace agreements, recurrent strife leading to further worsening of the situation has remained high and destabilising. The international community has invested billions of dollars in trying to stabilise and bring peace to the region, however their efforts are not bearing enough fruit.

How to sustain peace in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo? This is the question that many people, and particularly scholars, are trying to answer. With regards to this situation, local and international actors in peacebuilding who are operating in the region, have developed new approaches to provide human security and to foster peace by engaging communities in peacebuilding efforts by establishing 'local infrastructures for peace' to promote a culture of peace. Various communities of the eastern part of the DRC have benefitted from the implementation of these infrastructures for peace at different levels such as villages and other local district structures. Kenya and several other countries have utilised infrastructures for peace – considered as a new peacebuilding approach – which were established to foster social cohesion within local communities.

This study examined the sustainability of these infrastructures for peace established in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo with a focus on North Kivu. The focus was on identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for infrastructures for peace to be effective. The study adopted an exploratory research design, specifically to understand how the local infrastructures for peace can be used as a new approach to re-establishing and sustaining peace in the communities of the eastern DRC. The study utilised a survey by using questionnaires for quantitative data.

With regards to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness and sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC, the main findings of this study reveal that the commitment and integrity of the actors in infrastructures for peace emerge as a necessary condition, and the improvement of human security is demonstrably a sufficient condition. The findings show that most infrastructures where

members are nominated or appointed, instead of being elected on the basis of their standing within their respective communities, which is not sustainable. Conversely, most infrastructures where members are elected, and which operate on a voluntary basis are more likely to be effective and sustainable.

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ADF | Allied Democratic Forces |
| APCLS | Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain |
| CEPGL | Economic Community for the Great Lakes Region |
| CNR | National Commission of Reconciliation |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organisations |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| CRS | Congressional Research Service |
| DBSA | Development Bank of Southern Africa |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EEAS | European Union External Action Support |
| FARDC | Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo |
| FDC | Front de Défence du Congo |
| FDLR | Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Army Forces) |
| FDP | Forces de Défence du Peuple |
| FG | Focus Group |
| FNL | Front National de Libération |
| FOREBU | Forces Républicaines du Burundi |
| FPC | Forces des Patriotes Congolais |
| FRPI | Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Intégration et la Paix |
| GAMIP | Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace |
| I4P | Infrastructures for peace |
| ICCR | Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility |
| IDPs | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IES | Institute for Environmental Security |
| ISSSS | International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy |
| LPC | Local Peace Committee |
| MNURP | Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace |
| MONUC | Mission des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) |
| MONUSCO | Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) |

| | |
|---|---|
| MRC | Mouvement de la Révolution Congolaise |
| MRCCV | Mouvement des Résistants Congolais pour un Changement vital |
| NDC | Nduma Defence Force |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NPC | National Peace Council |
| ONUC | United Nations Operations in Congo |
| OPAPP | Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process |
| RED | Résistance pour un Etat de Droit |
| SID | Society for International Development |
| STAREC | Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| ULPC | Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNRISD | United Nations Research Institute for Social Development |
| WCCD | World Commission on Culture and Development |
| WCED | World Commission on Environment and Development |
| WPDC | Wajir Peace and Development Committee |

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# CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

## 1. Contextual and Spatial Background

### 1.1 Contextual Background

This study was designed to investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness and sustainability of local peace infrastructures in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 2000 to 2016. In particular, the study sought to assess both the commitment of actors in these infrastructures as a necessary condition, and the effectiveness and sustainability of the same infrastructures in terms of improved human security as a sufficient condition.

The background is presented in three sections, namely the conceptual, theoretical and contextual backgrounds. The conceptual background focuses on the key concepts that underpin this study, the theoretical background highlights the major theories that constitute the theoretical framework of the study, and the contextual background focuses on the Congolese context within which the study was conducted.

Perhaps nowhere in the world are the problems and challenges of insecurity as complex and persistent as in the DRC. The DRC, formerly Congo Belge and Zaire consecutively, is the epicentre of insecurity, conflict and development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country's recent history is one of intractable armed conflict, poor governance, pervasive poverty, and massive human suffering, including widespread human rights violations and large-scale population displacement (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 5). However, despite its epic proportions, the war in eastern Congo has received little sustained attention from the rest of the world, although the mortality figures are so high that they become absurd and almost meaningless (Stearns 2012: 5). The country remains in a devastating conflict, threatening the lives, safety, security and moral dignity of more Congolese people. Despite the national elections held in 2006 and 2011, the DRC continues struggling to achieve peace, justice, unity, freedom and sustainable development (Muyingi 2013: 562).

These conflicts do not have a singular logic: they result from multiple local conflicts as well as outside interference (Larmer, Laudti and Clark 2013: 4). The eastern part of the country has witnessed the most persistent fighting and despite numerous peacebuilding efforts and agreements, strife and instability persist. As Bouvy and Lange (2012: 3) state, although the international community has invested billions of dollars in peacebuilding efforts, they know that their efforts are not bearing enough fruit. Indeed, despite national, regional and international efforts to bring peace and stability to the DRC, the country continues to experience conflict and instability. Key peace deals have been signed, including six countries: Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Peace deals include a ceasefire that was signed in July 1999 in Lusaka; the July 2002 peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu militias in eastern DRC; and the January 2008 accord between the DRC government and rebel groups (UNECA 2015: 1).

Kabamba (2011: 145) acknowledges that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement came about in large part because of extensive western, especially US, and South African pressure. This was the moment when the terrible danger of a much vaster war in Central Africa was avoided. It was a triumph of prevention, even though it came after blood had been spilled (and continued to be spilled) in some parts of the Congo.

The Lusaka Peace Accord constituted a very complicated plan for peace, resting on six essential elements notes (Weiss 2000:1):

- that the sovereignty of the DRC within its present frontiers and that of its neighbours is agreed upon;
- that an all-inclusive process will be undertaken by the Congolese in order to establish a new political order;
- that the parties agree to cooperate in addressing the security concerns of each state;
- that the agreement specially calls for the disarming of militia groups in the DRC; that all foreign forces withdraw from the DRC;
- that a peacekeeping force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter be established to ensure implementation of the agreement.

The failure to devise a sustainable peace strategy in eastern DRC ultimately led to a plethora of painstakingly negotiated peace agreements and intensive mediations, each violated with an almost immediate return to the battlefield (Swart 2011: 49). In this connection, Autesserre (2012) cited in Swart 2015: 45) poses two intricate questions: why do so many conflicts that end in negotiated peace agreements lapse back into war within a few years? And why do third-party interventions often fail to secure a sustainable peace?

In response to that situation, some international and local actors operating in the region have developed new approaches to provide security and foster peace by engaging communities in peacebuilding efforts as well as by establishing 'local infrastructures for peace' to promote a culture of peace. Infrastructures for peace consist of the organisational elements and linkages that form domestic mechanisms for co-operation among all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding, by promoting cooperative solutions to local conflicts and institutionalising the response mechanisms to conflicts in order to transform them (Van Tongeren 2011: 400). This is partly because there is a growing recognition of the ubiquity and importance of locally led peacebuilding initiatives in conflict and post-conflict countries (Hayman 2013: 17). As Van Tongeren (2011: 4) argues, there is a growing interest in establishing infrastructures for peace because there is evidence demonstrating that they work. Different communities in eastern DRC have also benefitted from the establishment of these infrastructures for peace at different levels, such as at the levels of villages and other local district structures.

Since the purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness and sustainability of this new approach in promoting peace and development in eastern DRC, it is important to clarify the key concepts involved in the study. Some concepts can be used differently while others can be used interchangeably. Terms can have different connotations or meanings, depending on the context in which they are used. This is why it is important to provide clear definitions and explanations of the main concepts as they are used in this thesis (Mugisa 2010: 19), beginning with the concept of development.

Despite the fact that this study focuses on the eastern region, it is important to note that this portion of the country is not well understood without the overall overview of

the situation of the DRC. Venugopalan (2016: 1) acknowledges that the size of the DRC is nearly that of Western Europe. The population is approximately 70 million, making it the most populous francophone country in the world. Congo's borders were originally laid down by its former coloniser, Belgium, in 1885. Considering the nature of its natural resources and soil, the DRC has been described by Breackman (2004: 7) as a geological scandal because of its amazing mineral wealth. It is a major producer of copper, coltan, cobalt, industrial diamond and other minerals. In addition to this, oil as well as a major quantity of gold, zinc, uranium and iron can be found in the DRC. The country is rich in renewable resources and is also considered by conservation experts from World Wild Fund as a biodiversity scandal (Reed 2015: 4). The country has a complex array of ecosystems which include the world's second largest intact tropical forest. It may contain an abundance of arable land and almost half of Africa's water resources. However, Rufanges and Royo (2016: 6) note that during the 20th century, the country was recurrently plunged into a situation of despotism, the absence and disintegration of the State and the exploitation of its natural resources, such that the Congolese did not benefit from this wealth with the country remaining underdeveloped.

Neethling (2011: 29) acknowledges that the situation in the DRC is often depicted as a state of anarchy and chaos – a state of total disorder resulting from narrow self-interests. The question is: Of what is the conflict in the DRC an expression and how should one view the concept of 'state' and the understanding of this concept in the case of the DRC? In this regard, Thomas Mandrup (2009: 24) brings three dimensions or elements to the fore. International relations experts consider that there is the issue of the (partial) absence of a responsible or effective state which can control its territory, as there are 'ungoverned' or 'unoccupied' spaces where other actors, such as rebels or militias, are taking control.

## 1.2 A Brief History of Conflict in DRC

Bordered by nine countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the size of Western Europe, is the heart of Central Africa. Additionally, with a myriad of ethnic communities (over 250 ethnic groups), as is the case in most of Africa—majority of whom being inherently related in some cultural ways—the DRC therefore remains an

anthropological reservoir of the Great Lakes region and the African continent as a whole in terms of cultural diversity.

The country has been affected by significant economic, political and social upheaval; bloodshed; and human rights violation and abuses for decades. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a particular way, has experienced a vicious circle of tragedy and victimhood, from unlived memories, through constructed narratives, to lived memories and narratives (Shimba 2013:1). With its resources, vast territory and strategic location, DRC has long served as an arena of regional and international competition (Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2019: 2). Namangale (2015: 74) acknowledges that no study of the DRC or any part of the DRC can be completed if it is not anchored within the history of the country, since this is the only way of avoiding the risk of generalisation and oversimplification. The DRC has endured a long, difficult and brutal chapter in its post-colonial period, characterised by chaos, turmoil, instability, violence, conflict and one of the most brutal wars Africa has witnessed to date (Swart 2011: 43). Despite one of Africa's most brutal encounters with colonial exploitation, Congo's abundance of natural resources led to high expectations upon attaining independence in 1960. However, prospects for national development deteriorated quickly and were subsequently ruined by three decades of autocratic and patrimonial rule (Afoaku 2010: 1).

This section seeks to achieve three objectives: firstly, to present a concise and objective summary of the historical, geographical and social aspects of the conflicts in the DRC; secondly, to present an overview of different attempts by the Congolese government and the international community to bring peace to the country; and finally, to explain the failure of all these peacebuilding and peace-keeping efforts. To some extent, the current conflicts in the DRC, and particularly in the eastern part of the country, are mostly reincarnations of those of the past. This is why it is important to understand the history of conflict in this vast country. Figure 1.1 depicts DRC and its provinces.

**Figure 1.1: DRC and its provinces**


(Source: Le Congolais 2018).

### 1.2.1 The Pre-Independence Period

#### a. The Congo Free State

The history of violent conflict started long before the independence of the DRC. With the approval of Germany, the United States of America and the other major powers, King Leopold II of Belgium created the Congo Free State which lasted from 1885 to 1908 (Johnson 2014: 3). Dayle (1909: 5) acknowledges that in the earlier years of his reign, King Leopold II of Belgium began to display interest in Central Africa's ideals which for a long time were ascribed to nobility and philanthropy, until the contrast between such motives and actual unscrupulous commercialism became too glaring to be sustained. During this period, the situation was characterised by large-scale killings, disease, famine and exhaustion, and the population declined from 20 million

to 10 million. This enormous death toll destabilised the Congo completely (Johnson 2014: 5). Regarding this violence, Ewans (2003: 168) notes that King Leopold's exploitation of the territory and its peoples was merciless to the point of genocide. Millions of Congolese people died as a consequence of the colonial abuse during his rule and administration. Weisbord (2003:35) further writes that "So nightmarish was the scenario there that it spawned the first global human rights campaign of the new century. What happened in the heart of Africa was genocidal in scope long before that now familiar term, genocide, was ever coined".

Large tracts of the territory were declared to be 'vacant lands' and the inhabitants were debarred from profiting from them.

**b. The Colonial Period**

Any significant analysis of the present Congolese crisis should be based on a clear understanding of the country's colonial history. Due to the ruthless means the King deployed to acquire the country's riches and resources from the local people, international pressure was mounted against his operations in the country and consequently, the Congo Free State was formally handed over to the Belgian government, rendering it a Belgian colony in 1908 (Prince 2013: 6). Although the Congolese were regarded as Belgian subjects during the colonial period, they were treated as slaves without any rights. The Belgian regime sowed the seeds and cemented the tradition of unchecked personal power, the use of national resources for personal enrichment, brutal repression of people's demands for freedom, and social divisions along ethnic and regional lines (UNECA 2015: 15). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011: 12) notes that the Belgian regime invented the "indigene" versus "non-indigene" dichotomies that have continued to breed intra- and inter-communal violence in the DRC. In this pre-independence period, the Congolese people suffered mostly from human rights violations and abuse as well as physical and structural violence. It was an era of dehumanisation.

When the country almost suddenly acquired its independence in 1960, the socio-political dichotomies invented and promoted by the Belgians did not fade away, and internal strife led to the dismissal of the country's first Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba in the same year as well as his eventual assassination (Prince 2013: 6).

### 1.2.2 The Post-Independence Period

Kisangani (2012), cited in UNECA report 2015: 5) notes that since its independence in 1960, the DRC has experienced conflicts that have marked its difficult transition from colonisation to indigenous leadership. This period of turmoil led to the *coup d'état* and subsequent installation of Mobutu Sese Seko as Head of State from 1965 to 1997, during which time he established himself as one of the most corrupt and vicious dictators on the continent (Prince 2013: 6). Modern conflict in the DRC, adds Williams (2013: 81), is complicated. Competing networks of local rebel groups, insurgents from neighbouring countries, and African states have combined to ravage the DRC since the mid-1990s. This series of interconnected conflicts seems to have an equally confusing array of causes: local disputes over land and resources, the acquisitive goals of rebel groups and predatory neighbouring states, and ethnic and political grievances all help to explain the outbreak and continuation of war in the DRC.

#### A. The First Congo War

According to MONUSCO (2019: 1), following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of a new government there, approximately 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus – including elements who had taken part in the genocide – fled to the neighbouring Kivu regions of eastern DRC, formerly Zaïre, an area inhabited by ethnic Tutsis and others. A rebellion began here in 1996, pitting the forces led by Laurent Desiré Kabila against the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila's forces, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, took the capital city of Kinshasa in 1997 and renamed the country as the DRC. According to Chekhawat (2009: 7), bad governance within the state accompanied by the external dimension, i.e., the Rwandan genocide of 1994 laid the foundation of conflict in the DRC. Some of the militias responsible for killing thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda fled across the border to the DRC. Rwanda wanted the DRC to check these militias and sent its own troops twice to stop preparation of attacks on the country. The Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire, AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu in May 1997.

The AFDL forces, notes Stearns (2011:134), were welcomed as liberators during the First Congo War by the local population. The local population explains this sentiment with examples and the reasoning of the AFDL who, according to Stearns (ibid), during

that period, only hunted the Hutu refugees and left the Congolese on their own. The first Congo war ended when the AFDL reached Kinshasa and virtually conquered the entire country with the help of its regional allies, Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila was made President of the renamed DRC (Prince 2013: 9).

### B. The Second Congo War

According to Prince (2013: 10), the new president Laurent Kabila, insecure about his position and dependency on Rwanda, recruited the enemies of Rwanda Hutu militias-FAR (former Rwandan army during the Hutu-led, Habyarimana regime) and interahamwe into his forces. Leading to the Second Congo War, when Rwanda and Uganda re-invaded the country DRC. The second Congo war broke out in August 1998 when a similar configuration of neighbouring states, some of which had been Kabila's patrons in the first war, broke their allegiance with him and attempted a similar ousting but without their earlier success, partly because Angola switched sides and supported Kabila. This war was branded as the Africa's First World War as nine countries were involved in it (Kabemba 2001: 2).

MONUSCO (2019: 1) notes that in 1998, a rebellion against the Kabila government started in the Kivu regions. Within weeks the rebels had seized large areas of the country. Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe promised President Kabila military support, but the rebels maintained their grip on the eastern regions. Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). After eight months of intense fighting, international pressure led to a halt in the fighting. Negotiations, driven by Africa and facilitated by Zimbabwe, led to the eventual signing of the Lusaka agreement on 10 July 1999 (Venugopalan 2016: 5).

## 1.3 Spatial background

With regards to the spatial context, there are multiple interpretations of what constitutes the eastern DRC, some of which view the region solely as 'the Kivus' while others include the northern Katanga Province and Maniema Province (Collins and Watson 2014: 17). For the purposes of this study, eastern DRC is defined to include the north of Maniema Province, South and North Kivu Provinces and Ituri Province. This study focused specifically on the troubled province of North Kivu – particularly the

territories of Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru – which is considered to be the epicentre of all the conflicts that have occurred in eastern DRC thus far.

According to Ndaywel è Nziem (1998: 211), Kivu is the Congolese region lying between the volcanoes (the active Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira as well as the extinct Mikeno, Karisimbi, Visoke, Sabinio, Gahinga and Muhavura) and the Great Lakes (Albert, Edward, Kivu and Tanganyika). The Province of North Kivu borders Rwanda and Uganda to the east, Maniema Province to the west, Ituri Province to the north-east, Orientale Province to the north-west, and South Kivu Province to the south. It also borders three of the Great Lakes: Lake Kivu to the south, Lake Edward to the east and Lake Albert to the north (MONUSCO 2015: 1). Figure 1.2 shows eastern DRC in its regional and spatial context.

**Figure 1.2 Eastern DRC**




(Adapted from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2008).

North Kivu Province covers an area of 59,483 km$^2$ in total, inhabited by approximately six million people, with a population density of approximately 39 people per km$^2$. Sixty percent (60%) of the population is rural. North Kivu Province consists of six administrative territories: Masisi, Beni, Lubero, Rutshuru, Walikale and Nyiragongo, with 17 collectivities and chiefdoms. Goma is the provincial capital of North Kivu Province. This study targeted the troubled North Kivu Province because it is considered to be the epicentre of all the conflicts that have occurred in eastern DRC, focusing specifically on the territories of Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru. Figure 1.3 shows North Kivu Province and its six administrative territories.

**Figure 1.3: North Kivu Province and its administrative territories**




(Source: Karume Katcho 2019)

North Kivu is one of the most richly endowed provinces in the DRC. It is rich in gold, diamond, coltan, cassiterite, niobium, wolframite, iron, bauxite and timber. In addition,

it hosts one of UNESCO's World Heritage sites, the Virunga National Park, home to the famed mountain gorillas and two active volcanoes, Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira. For over two decades, North Kivu has been the theatre of the different violent conflicts which the DRC has experienced. It has spawned a multitude of armed groups, more numerous than in any other part of the country. According to Enough Project (2013: 1), the complexity of the war in eastern DRC, with its entangled web of actors pursuing a multiplicity of agendas, can be overwhelming and confusing. As the following section demonstrates, the region is a fertile environment for the development and growth of armed groups and warlordism.

## 1.4 Armed Rebel Groups in eastern DRC

There are myriad armed groups in DRC causing anarchy, with some of them continuing to be associated with the illegitimate minerals trade. According to Rodriguez (2011: 176), the proliferation of armed groups is the main source of instability in eastern DRC. According to MONUSCO (2015: 1), North Kivu Province is one of the most volatile provinces due to its complex ethnic composition, porous borders with Rwanda and Uganda, and the continuing presence of foreign and Congolese armed groups. This study has established the existence of numerous groups and sub-groups, originating from at least four countries. The origins, identities, objectives, alliances and metamorphosis of these numerous groups are dynamic and potentially confusing. In spite of their similar modus operandi, the different armed groups in eastern DRC have different origins: Burundian, Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan.

The landscape of eastern DRC is littered with dozens of foreign and Congolese armed groups of varying forms and sizes. The diversity within this multitude is striking: there are large-scale military movements with elaborate political structures, rebel groups without political wings, small-scale local defence and village militias, and factions that amount to little more than bandit gangs. Some of these groups have significant military capabilities and political influence and represent a direct threat to the government in Kinshasa. Others are confined to small, remote areas and are more troubling to the civilian population than to the government (Stearns *et al.* 2013: 13). According to Enough Project (2014: 1), the region provides a fertile environment for the development and growth of armed groups and warlordism.

Stearns *et al.* (2013: 15) note that most of the armed groups currently active in eastern DRC are a direct product of the First (1996-7) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars and the subsequent transition period (2003-6) that led to the elections of 2006. However, many of the groups that formed during those wars have their roots in previous eras.

The Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (2018: 13) acknowledges that a large number of non-state actors, both armed groups and other influencing parties, have formed and operated in the context of DRC's ongoing instability. Information concerning the numerous armed groups, as well as the corresponding alliances and allegiances of these groups, is difficult to trace. According to New York University's Congo Research Group (2015) seventy armed groups are active in North and South Kivu alone.

Given the continuous proliferation of different armed groups in eastern DRC (most of which do not meet the level of organisation required for the application of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) determining the parties to the conflict is not straightforward. Around seventy armed groups have been counted in the eastern region of the DRC. The following sections attempt to identify and describe the most prominent (Marcucci 2018: 4) or major armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

### 1.4.1 Force Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)

The origin of this group can be placed in the aftermath of the Rwandan 1994 genocide. Around two million Rwandan Hutu refugees fled to neighbouring countries fearing reprisal killings by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR). The FDLR was created in 2000 many years after the genocide. The rebel groups that emerged out of troops belonging to the defeated, pre-genocide Rwandan army and various affiliated militia, who merged to cast aside their association with the genocide in which some of its leaders had been implicated. The FDLR is the political wing of the organisation while the armed wing is called *Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi* (FOCA) or *The Saviours Fighting Forces.* Figure 1.4 shows a group from the FDLR.

**Figure 1.4: Photo of a group of FDLR**

(Source: AFP photo, Jean-baptiste Badhera 2017).

Rodriguez (2011: 176) notes that the FDLR is among the worst human violators in eastern DRC and is the source of extreme violence against civilians.

Reaching the peak of its military and economic strength in the early 2000s, the FDLR began to suffer defections, with RUD-*Urunana* and FDLR-Soki breaking away to form separate groups. While the core leadership around the group's military commander, Lieutenant-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, sought an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court since 2012 for alleged war crimes committed in eastern Congo, and the group's political leader, Major-General Victor Byiringiro, remained intact, the FDLR lost many of its senior commanders through a series of surrenders, captures and killings.

In 2016, the FDLR's most important internal split led to the creation of another breakaway faction, the CNRD-*Ubwiyunge*. Since then, the FDLR's activities have largely been limited to the western Rutshuru and northern Masisi territories. While the FDLR was estimated to have around 6,500 fighters in 2008, the group's strength in late 2017 was estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 fighters. The group has also lost control over most of the territory and mining areas which it controlled previously. By late 2017, a shortage of ammunition had significantly constrained the FDLR's operational capacity.

### 1.4.2 The Nyatura

About 14 Nyatura factions are currently active in Masisi and western Rutshuru territories. While the term Nyatura ('those who hit hard' in Kinyarwanda) emerged in association with armed mobilisation in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilisation of the early 1990s, including the *Mutuelle Agricole des Virunga* (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from attack by other Mai-Mai groups or the Congolese army.

depicts individuals from the Nyatura.

**Figure 1.5: Nyatura**

(Source: Le Potentiel 2018).

While many Nyatura groups operate independently, some have entered into coalitions brokered by politicians or the FDLR, or negotiated locally. In late 2017, approximately 15 different Nyatura factions were active. Some Nyatura groups are also part of broader, though ill-defined, coalitions, including the *Alliance des Patriotes pour la Restauration de la Démocratie au Congo* (APRDC), led by a lawyer named Benjamin Ndikuyeze, and the *Coalition des Mouvements pour le Changement* (CMC), led by Jean-Claude Habyarimana, whose alias is Jules Mulumba. Both umbrella movements are suspected to have emerged under the influence of FDLR leaders.

### 1.4.3 Raia Mutomboki

Similar to the Mai-Mai, the name Raia Mutomboki (angry people) is shared by about 35 rebel groups, each qualifying the name with either the name of its leader or another attribute. The name 'Raia Mutomboki' means angry people. The origins of the Raia Mutomboki mobilisation lie in communal self-defence groups led by Jean Musumbu, a local leader from the southern Shabunda territory who mobilised against the FDLR in 2005 and 2006. After some early successes, the movement became dormant and only re-emerged five years later during the FARDC's regimentation process, which created a security void that allowed the FDLR to gain control of much of the Shabunda territory. The Raia Mutomboki re-emerged in northern Shabunda, using a new *dawa* (magical potions and fetishes) purportedly to inoculate its fighters against bullets. The movement spread quickly to other areas threatened by the FDLR, including the Walungu, Kalehe and Walikale territories. Beyond attacking FDLR troops (and later, Rwandophone FARDC units), the Raia Mutomboki have also killed hundreds of FDLR dependents and Rwandan Hutu refugees. Figure 1.6 depicts a group of Raia Mutomboki individuals.

**Figure 1.6: Photo of a group of Raia Mutomboki in the village of Nyambembe**

(Source: @Worldpressphoto 2018).

As the threat of the FDLR declined, the Raia Mutomboki's rhetoric centred increasingly on the abuses of the FARDC while the groups became more involved in illegal taxation and racketeering. Most of the groups have a common belief system, centred on their

use of *dawa* and an ethic of communal self-defence, but for the most part, they do not have a common command structure and fighting among groups is frequent.

### 1.4.4 Front de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI)

The FRPI is based in Ituri province but has links to groups on the border with North Kivu. It is one of eastern Congo's most long-standing armed groups. This militia was created in 2002 by Germain Katanga, who has been convicted by the International Criminal Court and who was claimed to represent Lendu-Ngiti interests against Bosco Ntaganda's *Union des Patriotes Congolais* (UPC). After the end of the supposed Ituri war in 2007, Baudouin Adirodhu and Justin Banaloki (alias Cobra Matata) became leaders of the group. Over the years, the group has repeatedly considered integration into the FARDC while continuing to operate autonomously and engaging in regular clashes with the FARDC and MONUSCO.

**Figure 1.7 depicts a FRPI militia near Ituri.**

(Source AFP 2017)

The FRPI is significantly weakened today. However, under the leadership of 'Colonel' Mbadhu, who took over from Banaloki after his arrest in early 2015, the FRPI continues to resist demobilisation and has managed to maintain control over various parts of the Irumu territory where it is involved in illegal mining and taxation.

### 1.4.5 Mai-Mai Yakutumba (PARC-FAAL)

Created by former FARDC officer, William Amuri (also known as Yakutumba), in 2006, this group has developed into one of the most brutal Congolese armed groups in South Kivu. Capitalising on local grievances, in particular within the Bembe community, Yakutumba created this group in 2007 under the official name *Parti d'Action pour la Reconstruction du Congo-Forces Armées Alleluia* (PARC-FAAL). Yakutumba has been skilful in co-opting numerous smaller Mai-Mai groups, including the Bwasakala and Bavon Mai-Mai groups in Fizi territory, into coalitions under his de facto leadership. The group also maintains support networks in Tanzania and has been known for piracy and smuggling on Lake Tanganyika. Figure 1.8 depicts a group of Mai-Mai Yakutumba near Uvira.

**Figure 1.8 A group of Mai-Mai Yakutumba near Uvira**

(Source: Polele. 2017 newsrdcpolele.blogspot.com/2017/09/la-milice-mai-mai-yakutumba-se.htm).

In late 2016, it revived the *Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo* (CNPSC) alliance, an earlier coalition project designed in 2013 but which had not previously materialised. Then, in the first half of 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its allies successfully launched a series of attacks against the FARDC, leading to a significant expansion of their influence in Fizi, and extending their reach to the Misisi gold hub and to major towns, such as Fizi centre and Baraka.

### 1.4.6 Former March 23 movement (ex-M23)

Emanating from a long tradition of Rwandan-backed rebellions in eastern Congo, including the RCD-Goma and the CNDP, the M23 emerged in early 2012 under the leadership of Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda. Most of its leaders came from the Congolese Tutsi community. While it quickly acquired a significant fighting force, leading to its historic occupation of Goma in November 2012, the M23 was riven by internal fissures from the beginning and never managed to develop the strength of Laurent Nkunda's CNDP.

Following regional diplomacy and significant international pressure, the M23 left Goma after about two weeks and participated in peace talks in Kampala with the Congolese government. However, in February 2013, it split into two factions, led respectively by Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga. When Ntanganda's group fled to Rwanda in March 2013, Makenga's bloc faced increasing pressure by FARDC's commando battalions and an aggressive UN force intervention brigade, eventually leading to its demise in November 2013. In early 2017, remnants of the former M23 attempted a short-lived revival in the Rutshuru territory, and there were reports of continuing ex-M23 activity in the Rutshuru and Masisi territories.

### 1.4.7 Mai-Mai Kifuafua

Mai-Mai Kifuafua is one of the longest-standing Congolese armed groups. Set up in 2002 by self-proclaimed General Delphin Mbaenda, this group has roots in the various armed movements of the Tembo community from the 1990s. According to Stearns (2010: 1), Kifuafua means "those who go into battle chest first". Delphin Mbaenda's older brother, Damiano Mbaenda, was one of the first commanders of a Tembo armed group, probably beginning his career in about 1993. Delphin Mbaenda inherited his brother's armed group, which had traditionally been based in southern Masisi and Walikale, between the villages of Hombo, Busurungi and Remeka.

Despite numerous internal disputes – which produced factions led by leaders known as Shalio, Maachano and Limenzi/Baeni, and subsequent reunifications – Delphin Mbaenda has managed to keep his group together thanks to an efficient taxation system and a reluctance to fight stronger actors, such as the FARDC, FDLR or CNDP. By 2017, Delphin Mbaenda's Kifuafua, together with its satellite factions and allies, controlled large swathes of land in the Waloa-Loanda and Ufamando *groupements* in

the southern Walikale and Masisi territories. The group is estimated to have approximately 300 fighters. Its units are relatively disciplined and collaborate with customary authorities and state police in their area of influence.

### 1.4.8 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

The ADF are an armed group that originally emerged in opposition to the Ugandan government before transforming into an Islamist, Congo-based movement after the merger of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and ADF, under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu. Over the past 15 years, its main military camps have been located in the Rwenzori Mountains and in the Semuliki Valley of Beni territory. The ADF is a highly secretive organisation that follows a strict code of internal discipline. It has strong historical ties to other armed groups in the area, including those led by former members of Mbusa Nyamwisi's *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-K/ML) and local customary chiefs, including those of the Vuba and Pakombe communities.

In 2014, the FARDC launched the Sukola I operation against the ADF, leading to the destruction of many of its camps and the death of hundreds of its combatants and dependants. In 2015, its leader, Jamil Mukulu, was arrested in Tanzania and extradited to Uganda, leaving the group under the command of Seka Musa Baluku. While the group has not suffered substantial splits, its units operate largely independently across different areas. The group has been involved in many of the massacres around Beni since late 2013, often in collaboration with local armed groups and members of the FARDC. Their current strength is unclear, as they have increased recruitment in Uganda but have lost troops in clashes with and arrests by Congolese security forces.

## 1.5 Rationale of the Study

The rationale for carrying out this study was motivated by the researcher's passion to discover how the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC could be effective and sustainable, in other words, what could make the infrastructures for peace sustainable. The researcher's background living and working as a Peacebuilding Officer in the torn region of North Kivu has inspired him to carry out this study. The researcher was stimulated to conduct this research by in order to contribute

with new knowledge in the search for sustainable peace in the eastern DRC through the infrastructures for peace.

I was also motivated by the question asked by many Congolese, particularly those living in the eastern region that is: "How can the established peace infrastructures be effective and sustained to promote peace in eastern DRC?" This is the question that has pushed me to look into the sustainability of this new peacebuilding approach (infrastructures for peace) as a way to promote peace in that part of the country. I have realised that local and international peacebuilding actors have created this new strategy to foster social cohesion and peace in the torn region. It should be noted that the topic on the infrastructure for peace is under-explored, however, some studies have been conducted in the Great Lakes Region and no study has been undertaken on the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC. Thus, the purpose of this study is to learn the necessary and sufficient conditions for their sustainability, their effectiveness in promoting peace and development within the communities.

It is also this situation that motivated me to undertake this study, which sought to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC through an examination of the mechanisms of their implementation as a necessary condition, and of the membership criteria as a sufficient condition for the effectiveness and sustainability of local infrastructures for peace.

## 1.6 Statement of the Research Problem

Local peace infrastructures are a new conflict-resolution strategy emerging across the world: their establishment is a phenomenon growing globally and in eastern DRC. Lederach (2012: 8) acknowledges that he first began to formulate the concept of an infrastructure for peace in the 1980s. During several local and national peace processes, particularly a mediation effort in Nicaragua, the support mechanisms to sustain the changes under negotiation, and which subsequently found their way into signed accords, required both conceptual and practical development. This is because local peace infrastructures are considered to be effective conflict-resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms at the grassroots level. Indeed, many people perceive local infrastructures for peace as an innovative way of dealing with conflict in eastern DRC, especially because these infrastructures are reputed to promote social cohesion

by exploiting traditional structures of dealing with community challenges. Moreover, the same infrastructures may be embedded in existing peace processes, involving governments, donors, and often the United Nations Development Programme (Richmond 2013: 22), thereby boosting their chances of success.

Because they are relatively new, their effectiveness and sustainability are yet to be tested or established. Moreover, just as any other new approach to solving old problems, local infrastructures for peace are most probably experiencing challenges. However, these challenges are yet to be identified or understood. As a result, solutions to such challenges remain in the realm of the unknown, at least as far as the eastern DRC is concerned. This is why this study set out to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC, through an investigation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness and sustainability of these infrastructures. In particular, the investigation sought to assess both the commitment of actors in these infrastructures, as a necessary condition, and effectiveness and sustainability of the same infrastructures in terms of improved human security, as a sufficient condition.

## 1.7 Objectives of the Study

### 1.7.1 Overall Aim

The overall objective of the research was to assess and to learn the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability and effectiveness of peace infrastructures established in eastern DRC from 2000 to 2016.

### 1.7.2 Specific Objectives

The study will seek to meet the following specific objectives:

- Describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015;
- Identify and explain the challenges encountered in establishing peace infrastructures in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015;
- Determine the relationship between local peace infrastructures for peace and other local infrastructures in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015;

- Establish the degree of the effectiveness and sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC;
- Generate proposals for improving the effectiveness and sustainability of local peace infrastructures in eastern DRC.

## 1.8 Overview of the Thesis

This study is presented in seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the study by stating the contextual and spatial background, the rationale and the overall and specific objectives of the study. The same chapter presents a general overview of the study. Chapter Two is a review of the conceptual and theoretical framework. The chapter examines narratives regarding the peacebuilding, sustainability and effectiveness of the established infrastructures for peace. It depicts the biography of the different groups operating in the eastern DRC. Chapter Three examines the theory of infrastructures for peace as being a new approach to promoting social cohesion and peacebuilding within local communities, particularly in countries affected by conflict.

Chapter Four gives a historical overview of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC (protracted proliferation of intrastate and interstate conflicts). The chapter attempts to explain the causes of the conflict and the intervention approaches that were used in reference to different epochs, regimes and events that have characterised present-day DRC. The chapter also explicates the major actors in the DRC conflict and their contribution to conflict in the region. Chapter Five presents a detailed description of the different steps taken by the international community and other local organisations to promote peace in the DRC. It is important to perceive that UN missions have helped the country to reduce violent conflict in some regions, but have failed to end the conflicts sustainably. Finally, the chapter examines the causes and effects of International community's involvement in peacebuilding in the DRC over time.

Chapters Five introduces the different methodologies used to collect data, which are fully described in Chapter Six. The chapter sets the scene for posing and answering the question: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness and sustainability of infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC?

Chapter Six constitute major and critical components of the study. In these chapters, the data gathered from both primary and secondary sources are reported and

analysed. This chapter presents the data and the analysis of the infrastructures for peace. The chapter examines the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in fostering social cohesion and peace within local communities in eastern DRC.

Chapter Seven presents the findings of the study that are qualitatively analysed within the framework of the objectives of the study.

## 1.9 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the study, the contextual background of the study, the spatial context, the research objectives, the type of sampling and the research design underpinning this study. This chapter also highlights the motivation factors which persuaded the researcher to carry out this study and also gives the structure of the study. The following chapter examines the literature related to this study.

# CHAPTER TWO

# CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 Introduction

Throughout this study, some key words and terms are being used and explained. This chapter presents a review of literature on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of the interconnectedness of development, peace, sustainability and infrastructures for peace. The literature reviewed enables one to identify and conceptualise the key dimensions of the concept of sustainability, and to understand the concept of an infrastructure for peace. In addition, the literature review gives useful conceptual links to the methodology adopted for this research. Older references include seminal authors or those who contributed to the evolving understanding of peace.

For several years, internal conflicts have been considered as the main threat to national and regional peace in many developing countries. The recurrence of conflicts in the DRC, with the eastern part as the epicentre, can be considered as a threat in the Great Lakes region as a whole. International and local actors working in peacebuilding are using different approaches to promote peace, and infrastructures for peace have been seen as an effective approach to resolving conflicts within communities and countries. Thus, some peacebuilding researchers and scholars have proposed the establishment of infrastructures for peace as a new strategy to promote social cohesion in conflict-affected regions. However, whether or not these infrastructures for peace are effective and sustainable is yet to be established.

The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the concepts of peace and development, and it discusses the interconnectedness of peace and development while focussing on sustainability as a concept. The second section defines the concept of infrastructure for peace and gives some examples of infrastructures for peace across the world. Finally, the last sections provide an overview on the theoretical framework of the study.

## 2.2 Peace, Development and Sustainability

### 2.2.1 The Concept of Peace

The concept of peace has received considerable attention from researchers and peacebuilding actors. Conca (1994: 4) notes that peace is more than just the absence of war because it also requires the creation and effective use of non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution. In the late 1960s, Galtung (1969: 183), one of the pioneers of Peace Studies, noted that just as a coin has two sides, with one side on its own being only one aspect of the coin and not the complete coin, peace also has two sides: the absence of personal violence and the absence of structural violence. Galtung referred to these two sides of peace as negative peace and positive peace, respectively. In his view, 'peace' should be something attainable and attained, not something as utopian as the absence of both personal violence and of social justice.

Many years later, other scholars became involved in the definition of peace. For example, Smoker (1981: 153) maintains that peace is primarily defined in terms of the absence of violence and the presence of economic welfare, social justice, human rights, and the ecological balance and partnership with nature. Another scholar, Denham (1991: 52), regards peace as the negation of violence in a society where neither direct nor structural violence is exercised. Such a society is evidently also a developed society. Thus 'peace' and 'development' become two ways of stating the same concept, with different emphases rather than different conceptualisations. In other words, peace and development are two sides of the same coin, for neither is conceivable in the absence of the other. As Denham aptly notes, if development is to build, then violence is to destroy; hence violence is anti-development. He adds that if peace is the opposite of violence, then peace must have much in common with development.

Schirch (2004: 10) opines that peace does not just happen: it is built when people take great care in their decision-making to plan for the long-term future, anticipating potential problems, engaging in ongoing analysis of the conflict and the local context, and coordinating different actions and activities in all stages of conflict and at all levels of society. McCandless and Karbo (2011: 3) enrich the analysis by stating that because peace is a universal desideratum, some people are apt to be startled at, or at least to raise eyebrows at, the mention of an African perspective on peace, a

concept that tends to particularise peace by talking of an African perspective. In the opinion of McCandless and Karbo (2011: 3), to conceptualise peace in this narrow way is manifestly absurd.

In her study of eastern DRC, Hellmüller (2015: 5) found that peace is viewed by local community members as being promoted by informing people about social cohabitation, confronting different communities with each other, organising meetings, apologising, dialoguing and forgiving. From this perspective, peace is considered in relational terms as reconciliation. Primarily this means peaceful social cohabitation between ethnic communities, family members, farmers, and herders or concessionaires and surrounding communities. In this perspective, peace means the ability to move freely to go to the fields and markets without fear of attack or rape. In a related study, Mugisa (2010: 2) cites the study of Uvin (2008) conducted among Burundian youth with the aim of understanding, among other things, the meaning of peace after 13 years of war. Though the underlying aim of the study was to arrive at an empirical sense of the positive and negative peace debate, Uvin used the opportunity to ask the question "What does peace mean to you?" Some of the responses Uvin received are as follows:

> Peace is getting up in the morning to go to work, and in the evening being able to enjoy the fruit of your work, whether it is little or much, but in calm (Female farmer in Busiga, younger than 30).
>
> Peace is not hearing gun shots anymore. It is not fleeing one's house. Even if I have to sleep on an empty stomach, I know I will wake up in security (Sexual abuse victim in Musaga, 23-year-old unemployed woman).
>
> If we live in the same place and understand each other, there will be peace (21-year-old female in Busiga).
>
> If there is a good entente between people, no trouble in the community, and we can speak well together (30-year-old male in Busiga).
>
> No troubles among people living in the same area (16-year-old female in Ruhororo camp).

Mugisa (2010: 72) states that from Uvin's study, it can be concluded that good health in terms of the absence of disease, good nutrition, mutual understanding and social

justice are the building blocks of peace. These building blocks form a unity that is whole, and that is the meaning of peace. In other words, as Bond (2014: 2) states, in order to create the conditions for sustainable and positive peace, one must deconstruct the structures, situations and relationships that cause conflict while at the same time building structures, situations and relationships that support peace.

Some scholars have advanced possible approaches to the post-conflict situations in the DRC. For example, Barnett *et al.* (2003: 25) suggest that it is important to establish law and order in post-conflict situations so that it is safe for local people to resume their livelihoods and for international and local agencies to bring in relief services and begin reconstruction. In the same vein, Bonds (2014: 165) notes that the establishment of a strong, long-term, durable and positive peace requires the cooperation of a number of stakeholders attending to a wide range of variables on a number of levels, depending on how complex or entrenched the conflict situation is or might become. In a related report, UNIFEM (2005: 1) acknowledges that the transition from war to peace opens a unique window of opportunity to address the root causes of conflict and to transform institutions, structures and relationships within society. Francis (2010: 24) adds that sustainable, positive peace necessitates finding different solutions to conflict rather than ones which are found in structures of negative peace, because such peacebuilding does not use violence in any form – structurally, culturally or socially – to resolve conflict.

Elsewhere, Sutherland (2005: 46) argues that there is a need to recognise and build on the capacities for peace present in a society, and to avoid creating cultural dissonance by imposing inappropriate mechanisms and processes "disconnected from the fundamental worldview of the people involved". In other words, as Pearce (1997: 442) observes, for sustainable, positive peace to be established and maintained, processes need to be put into place "which foster and strengthen local capacity to deal with the past, to engage with the present, and to shape the future in ways which do not exclude, oppress or divide."

Peace has also been defined in terms of negative and positive peace. As noted above, Galtung, the eminent founder of the concept of peace, conceives negative peace as the absence of violence and war, and positive peace as the integration of human society (Galtung 1964: 2). It would appear that in the DRC, there is neither negative

nor positive peace in spite of numerous efforts by local and international actors. This absence of both negative and positive peace is an impediment to the country's development. Instead, the situation is unstable and vacillates between calm and conflict.

### 2.2.2 The Concept of Development

Barbosa et al. (2014: 4) acknowledge that the development concept is one of the most debated and controversial in the social sciences. The debate intensified especially after World War II, when many countries tried to reduce problems such as poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination policies and economic and social inequalities, and to establish themselves in the global context.

According to Thomas (2004: 2), *development* is a concept which is contested both theoretically and politically and is inherently both complex and ambiguous. Recently, it has taken on the limited meaning of the practice of development agencies, particularly in aiming to reduce poverty and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

For Peet and Hartwick (2009:1), development means making a better life for everyone. In the present context of a highly unequal world, a better life for most essentially means meeting basic needs: sufficient food to maintain good health, a safe and healthy place in which to live, affordable services available to everyone, and being treated with dignity and respect. Beyond meeting these needs that are basic to human survival, the course taken by development is subject to the material and cultural visions of different societies. Therefore, the methods and purposes of development should be subject to popular and democratic decision-making. In this study, I adopted the Society for International Development (SID)'s view and used the term *development* as a process that creates growth, progress, positive change or the addition of physical, economic, environmental, social and demographic components. The purpose of development is a rise in the level and quality of life of the population, and the creation or expansion of local regional income and employment opportunities, without damaging the resources of the environment. Development is visible and useful, not necessarily immediately, and includes an aspect of quality change and the creation of conditions for a continuation of that change (SID: 2018:1).

Estevo (2010: 2) notes that certain authors link the meaning of development to economic development and the term "underdeveloped areas" (later called "Third World Countries"), which United States President Harry Truman introduced in the mid-20th century, signifying areas with a significantly lower standard of living than developed areas.

Classical theories of development consider development within the framework of economic growth and development. According to these theories, development is a synonym for the economic growth that every state in a particular stage has to undergo, driven by the transformation of traditional agriculture into the modern industrialised production of various products and services, i.e. shifting from the traditional society to the stage of maturity and high consumption. According to several neoliberal and modern development theories established over the past 60 years and contemporary understanding, development is a process which aims to improve the quality of life and increase the self-sufficient capacity of economies that are technically more complex and dependent on global integration (Remeny 2004: 22).

The situation in the DRC is characterised by the recurrence of different kinds of conflicts which undermine both the social security and the development of the Congolese people, because human well-being is at the centre of any development. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002: 15) aptly states, people are the real wealth of nations. Therefore, the basic goal of development should be to create an environment which enables people to enjoy a long, healthy and creative life, a fundamental truth that is often forgotten as people focus on the accumulation of goods and money. In the opinion of the UNDP, the preoccupation with economic growth and the creation of wealth and material opulence has obscured the fact that development is ultimately about people. In 2004, Ranis (2004: 1) noted that the then recent literature described human development as the ultimate goal of the development process, with economic growth as an imperfect proxy for more general welfare.

**a. Social Development and Social Protection**

Among the numerous dimensions of the concept of development, there is one that is particularly relevant to this study: social development. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD 2011: 2) defines social development as

development that is concerned with processes of change that lead to improvements in human well-being, social relations and social institutions, and that are equitable, sustainable, and compatible with the principles of democratic governance and social justice. The definition emphasises social relations, institutional arrangements and political processes that are central to efforts to achieve desirable development outcomes. It includes material achievements such as good health and education, and access to the goods and services necessary for a decent living. The same definition also includes social, cultural and political achievements, such as a sense of security, dignity, and the ability to be part of a community through social and cultural recognition as well as political representation.

The UNDP (2009: 9) defines social development as "putting people and their freedom at the centre of development. It is about people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value." Elsewhere, Midgley (2013: 6) relays that the term 'social security' is favoured by social policy scholars while the term 'social protection' has been widely adopted in social development circles. Midgley adds that while 'social protection' is also used in social policy, a number of other terms such as income security, income protection, economic security, income transfers, social insurance, social assistance, cash transfers and tax-funded universal benefits are also in circulation. This is in accordance with the views of Piachaud (2013: 35) who acknowledges that 'social protection' can mean many things: it can help poor people, or it can benefit prosperous people, and it can accelerate economic growth, or it can destroy incentives and discourage growth. It has been argued that social protection can result in very different redistributive effects and that the implementation of social protection can have very different consequences for economic growth.

Midgley (2013: 6) states that although social protection was not previously considered to be an integral part of social development, it has recently become a major topic of interest in development circles. Midgley (2013: 16) further states that the social development process is part of a larger, multifaceted process comprised of economic, social, political, cultural, environmental, gender and other dimensions which are integrated and harmonised. This is particularly pertinent to social development practice where economic, social and other interventions are linked, and where social investments are utilised to promote social well-being. Advocates of social development

believe that a commitment to achieve social well-being for all can best be realised through a dynamic, multifaceted development process that utilises social investments and harnesses the power of economic growth for social ends. In Mallik's (2013: 7) view, local development programmes that are planned, implemented and owned by communities are perceived to be more efficient than development programmes directly executed by government agencies. Mallik's view highlights yet another key factor in human development: participation.

**b. Sustainable Development**

The term 'sustainable development' first appeared in the World Conservation Strategy drafted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1980. According to Eblen and Eblen (1994: 432), sustainable development should be advanced through 'conservation', defined as "the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations." This view is shared by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987: 8) according to which sustainability, or more commonly sustainable development, is commonly defined as development which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs." According to Sutton (2004: 7), this definition describes the desired outcome of pursuing sustainable development. Sutton however does not add, and what should have been added in the researcher's opinion, that the definition does not state what sustainable development is, it only says what sustainable development is expected to produce.

In Seghezzo's (2009: 540) opinion, the notions of sustainable development and sustainability are often related to ideas introduced by economists, philosophers, scientists and writers from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. However, while some scholars regard sustainable development and sustainability as synonymous, others do not. The former includes Soini and Birkeland (2014: 213) who posit that sustainable development, like sustainability, is often considered to consist of ecological, economic and social dimensions or "pillars". In the camp of the latter scholars is Sutton (2004: 7), who differentiates the two concepts on the basis that while sustainability is about continuity, development is about change. In Sutton's view,

there are many things about life that one wants to sustain (maintain) and many that one wants to change. This is why he concludes that it makes sense to create the notion of 'sustainable development' that combines desired change and desired continuity. He cites exploitation, unhappiness, poverty and destructiveness as examples of conditions that one might want to change, and he mentions trust, tolerance, honesty, happiness and health as examples of conditions that one would surely want to sustain or maintain.

Despite these differences of opinion, most scholars agree that sustainable development is a holistic concept. For example, Duxburg *et al.* (2007: 3) note that sustainable development questions consumption-based lifestyles and decision-making processes that are based solely upon economic efficiency, because the ethical underpinnings of sustainable development go beyond obligations to the environment and the economy. In their view, sustainable development is a holistic and creative process towards which one must constantly strive. In this regard, the DRC is considered by many scholars as a unique case due to its political and social situation. Strange and Bayley (2008: 2) point out that while each country's historical, economic, social and political context is unique, the basic principles of sustainable development apply to all. The two authors also argue that although economic growth is essential, growth alone does not reduce poverty in a sustainable manner. They add that at the core of sustainable development is the need to consider "three pillars" together: society, the economy and the environment. No matter the context, the basic idea remains the same: people, habitats and economic systems are inter-related.

Finally, in making a case for sustainable development, Strange and Bayley (2008: 25) note that sustainable development can achieve five desirable outcomes:

- Spreading the benefits of economic growth to all citizens
- Turning brownfields into ecologically-sound urban housing projects
- Increasing educational opportunities for both girls and boys
- Rendering industrial processes more energy-efficient and causing less pollution
- Including citizens and stakeholders in policy-making processes

According to Klarin (2018: 77), from its origins to date, the concept of sustainable development has been faced with different interpretations and criticisms. He gives a chronological overview of the meaning of development in the period from 1987 to 2015 as follows:

1. WCED: Sustainable development is a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development implies a conceptual socio-economic system which ensures the sustainability of goals in the form of real income achievement and improvement of educational standards, health care and the overall quality of life.

2. Harwood, in 1990: Sustainable development is an unlimited developing system where development is focused on achieving greater benefits for humans and more efficient resource use in balance with the environment which is required for all humans and all other species.

3. IUCN, UNDP & WWF, in 1991: Sustainable development is a process of improving the quality of human life within the framework of the carrying capacity of sustainable ecosystems.

4. Lele, in 1991: Sustainable development is a process of targeted changes that can be repeated forever.

5. Meadows, in 1998: Sustainable development is a social construction derived from the long-term evolution of a highly complex system of human populations and economic development being integrated into the ecosystems and biochemical processes of the Earth.

6. PAP/RAC, in 1999: Sustainable development is development given by the carrying capacity of the ecosystem.

7. Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe, in 1999: Sustainable development is a programme that changes the economic development process to ensure the basic quality of life, and protecting valuable ecosystems and other communities at the same time.

8. Beck and Wilms, in 2004: Sustainable development is a powerful global contradiction to the contemporary western culture and lifestyle.

9. Vare and Scott, in 2007: Sustainable development is a process of changes where resources are raised, the direction of investments is determined, the development of technology is focused and the work of different institutions is harmonised, thus increasing the potential for achieving human needs and desires as well.

10. Sterling, in 2010: Sustainable development is a reconciliation of the economy and the environment on a new path of development that will enable the long-term sustainability of humankind.

11. Marin *et al.*, in 2012: Sustainable development gives a possibility of a time-unlimited interaction between society, ecosystems and other living systems without impoverishing the key resources.

12. Duran *et al.*, in 2015: Sustainable development is a development that protects the environment, because a sustainable environment enables sustainable development.

Considering these different interpretations of sustainable development, in the purpose of this research, in the same order as Sterling, development is a reconciliation of the economy and the environment. In the same order, Smith et al. (2015:3) note that Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were formally adopted by UN Member States at a high-level summit in September 2015, include peace as a central and integrated part. The Common African Position (CAP) calls for the SDGs to give adequate attention to peace and security, recognising the inextricable links between peace, security, stability and development.

## 2.3 The Correlation between Peace and Development

As indicated earlier, Hettne (2001: 21) maintains that development and peace are two sides of the same coin, although today the problem is more often formulated in the negative terms of poverty and conflict. Hettne (ibid) adds that the concept of development has been increasingly questioned, while the equally elusive concept of peace (beyond the conventional meaning of 'an end to a war') is being subsumed

under the broader concept of security. Hettne (2001: 21) concludes that without peace, there could be no development, and without development, peace cannot be sustainable.

This is why Sorensen (1985: 70) argues that like development, peace becomes a permanent social process, aiming at developing security and securing development for the individual and for all human beings. Therefore, as Denham observes, it follows that the general comprehension of 'peace' and 'development' has converged over the years. The notions of peace and development as goals for all human communities have noticeably reached a point where they have become what Galtung calls two sides of the same coin. In Denham's view (1991: 54), peace and development are inseparable, both from each other and from other human rights, because they are starting to be seen by the international community as conditions that persons deserve to enjoy because of their humanity.

Sorensen (1985: 70) notes that approaching the notions of peace and development in this manner means that both concepts become structurally interlocked: development (in a broad sense) becomes a condition for peace (in a broad sense) and vice versa. This view is reinforced by Richmond (2005: 437) who argues that for peace to be sustainable, economic opportunity, productivity and capacity must be available to the whole population of a territory or state. Richmond (2005: 438) adds that not only is economic development vital to the sustainability of peace, but that inadequate remedial economic development measures may also exacerbate rather than solve conflict. Richmond further maintains that the roots of conflict must be addressed to avoid aggravating or re-igniting the conflict, and that this self-evident truth leads to a deeper debate about whether it is possible for development to occur without broader conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention.

According to Hettne (1983: 329), a major question seems to be: what patterns of development stimulate direct and structural violence (war and repression) and what patterns tend to create peaceful, symmetric structures? To answer this question, one has to turn to historical studies on the relationship between national patterns of development and various forms of violence in the local, national and world levels. Smoljan (2003: 234) notes that whereas peacebuilding is a short-term political endeavour entered into in response to security problems, development is a long-term

strategy executed under generally peaceful conditions. This is in accordance with the views of David (1999: 27) who concludes that peacebuilding and development are mutually reinforcing procedures capable of operating simultaneously and working towards a common goal. On the other hand, Barnell (2008: 86) opines that peace as freedom suggests that the means and ends of peace and development practices should be to ensure the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency, protective security and freedom from direct violence.

Busomtwi-Sam (2002: 106) suggests that the key to building and sustaining peace in the context of protracted conflict (as in the DRC) lies in the degree of responsiveness of institutional structures of governance to changing circumstances in society. He adds that sustaining peace is not an activity with a precise beginning or end, but an ongoing process of reform and adaptation designed to institutionalise new rules of the game that reproduce and reinforce certain collective identities and interests, that structure choices towards certain behaviours and not others, and that specify acceptable ways of making decisions about the settlement of political disputes and the use of force. Elsewhere, Bruck and Milaute (2014: 220) state that peace can be both a pre-condition for, and a consequence of, sustainable development. They add that when there is economic opportunity and people have a stake in the future, they are more likely to resolve conflict peacefully. On the other hand, they warn that when conflict is violent, the development costs can be devastating, in addition to the loss of lives, property and production on a local level, violence has negative spill overs for neighbours and the global community. The same authors conclude that it is also important to remember that conflict leads to fragility, and fragility can induce conflict.

Unfortunately, as Moli (2003: 40) indicates, peace and sustainability, considered as the indicators of development, are threatened due to a myriad social, economic, political, cultural and environmental conflicts. In Moli's view, these conflicts usually involve multiple and diverse stakeholders such as state institutions, religious organisations, communities, indigenous ethnic groups, local institutions, private development and non-government organisations, international organisations, and many other players.

## 2.4 Sustainability

Researchers have developed conceptual models and frameworks to define sustainability in the context of community coalitions.

Sustainability is a broad concept or construct, the domain of which ranges from biology to business, and it overlaps with corporate social responsibility in its focus on advancing the standard of living while also preserving natural and human resources (Reilly and Weirup 2008: 2). For the purposes of this study, I adopted the very commonly used definition of sustainability which is implied in the definition of sustainable development advanced by the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations (Johnston et al. 2007: 60). Two important elements of this definition should be noted: the imperative of meeting the needs of the present, and the need to guarantee that future generations will be able to meet their own needs. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, a process is sustainable if it contributes to meeting current needs without undermining the ability of future generations of people to meet their own needs.

According to Throsby (1997: 8), the notion of sustainability, wherever it has been applied, has been concerned with the long-term viability of systems, programs and policies. He adds that in the worst-case scenario, it has been invoked indiscriminately to such an extent as to have lost any substantive meaning. In other words, the number of definitions of the concept is large to the degree that a study of this nature has to examine a considerable number of them before deciding on the one to adopt. I posit that, using basic dictionary definitions, something is sustainable if it is capable of being upheld or if it is maintainable. The verb 'to sustain' originates from the French verb '*soutenir*', "to hold up or support" (Brown *et al.* 1987: 714). Appleton (2006: 4) notes that the noun 'sustainability' is a very recent addition to common English vocabulary, and that it is very new such that it had not been defined in the 1987 edition of one of the more comprehensive Standard English dictionaries. By contrast, the verb 'sustain' is of ancient usage, and was found in Middle English from around 1250, coming via Norman French from the Latin '*sustinere*', meaning 'to uphold'. Traditionally, the main noun form of 'sustain' was 'sustenance' – the means of sustaining life. Similarly, Mckenzie (2004: 14) defines sustainability as maintaining well-being over a long, perhaps even an indefinite, period. According to Litman (2011: 1), sustainability is a

condition in which economic, social and environmental factors are optimised, taking into account indirect and long-term impacts. Thus, in order for there to be peace, sustainability is central as otherwise as maintaining the existence of the human species, maintaining intergenerational welfare, and maintaining the productivity and resilience of economic systems. According Costanza (1992) cited by to Abrahamson (1997: 31):

> Sustainability is a relationship between dynamic human economic systems and dynamic, but slower, ecological systems, in which human life can develop indefinitely, human individuals can flourish, human culture can develop and effects of human activities remain within bounds so as not to destroy the diversity, complexity and functioning of the ecological life-support system.

According to Sutton (2004: 6), a careful review of these definitions reveals that they fall into four basic categories, only one of which is a normal dictionary-style definition, the others being "contextual definitions" because they create a greater understanding of the context of a term rather than defining its essence. The four types of definitions are:

- Definitions based on the essence: 'x' is/means 'y', such as 'sustainability' is/means the 'ability to sustain something'; 'sustainable development' is 'development that can be maintained'; or 'sustainable development' is 'development that sustains something'
- Contextual definitions based on strategies for achieving the term being defined: the achievement of 'x' requires 'y', such as "the achievement of sustainability requires the integration of environmental, social and economic issues"
- Contextual definitions based on the outcomes of the term being defined: 'x' results in 'y', such as "sustainable development results in the meeting of needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs"
- Contextual definitions based on what a movement with that label tries to achieve or is interested in: 'x' is what the 'X' movement strives for. For example, "sustainability is what the sustainability movement strives for; and sustainability

encompasses the protection of the environment and people, peace, and ending poverty, the meeting of human needs, enhancement of human wellbeing, promotion of happiness, etc."

According to a broad definition by the United Nations (2012: 25), sustainability should serve as a fundamental principle for all aspects of development and for all societies. The UN adds that sustainability represents the key challenge for a transformative agenda: how to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and achieve more equitable and sustainable management and governance of natural resources while promoting dynamic and inclusive economic and human development.

The recurrence of conflict in the DRC is a major obstacle to the sustainability and development of the country. McChesney (1991: 67) defines a sustainable society as one that is "sustainable in environmental, economic and socio-political terms." Bossel (1999: 4) observes that sustainability is a dynamic concept because societies and their environments change, technologies and cultures change, values and aspirations change, and a sustainable society must allow and sustain such change. In other words, a sustainable society must allow continuous, viable and vigorous development, which is what McChesney terms sustainable development. A more general view of a sustainable society was originally provided by Brown (1981: 43) who viewed a sustainable society as "an enduring one, self-reliant and less vulnerable to external forces", identifying its basis in harvest regulation, renewable and efficient energy use, soil and water conservation, and a stationary, dispersed population with less affluent lifestyles.

A sustainable society has also been referred to as a stable society. According to Samuel (2005: 732), in order to be sustainable, post-conflict peacebuilding requires transformation on three interrelated fronts: transformation of the society from one that resorts to violence to resolve conflict to one that resorts to political means, requiring elite negotiation and widespread social dialogue and reconciliation, in resolving conflicts; reform of the governance framework to ensure that, as far as possible, a negotiated governance arrangement between parties prevents future conflict, and that a democratic governance is adopted; and the creation of institutions that will be sustainable after the peacebuilding mission leaves.

The different programmes undertaken and the infrastructures established in eastern DRC are meant to engender the well-being of the population of this part of the country. Having understood the essence of a sustainable society, it is now logical that one delves into the complexities of sustainability.

### 2.4.1 The Evolution of the 'sustainability' Concept

The term 'sustainable development' was first coined in an environmental context in 1712 by Hans Carl von Carlowitz, a German forester, in his book entitled *Sylvicultura Oeconomica,* which prescribed how forests could be managed on a long-term basis. It was, however, not until the 1980s that 'sustainability' came into much wider currency (Turcu 2013: 626). Sutton (2004: 1) adds that several hundred years ago, the Swiss and Germans invented a form of forestry designed to keep the forests going as productive systems over the very long term, and in the English-speaking world, this was called 'sustainable forestry'.

Since then, the term 'sustainability' has attracted even more attention. From there it was not such a large step for the term to be applied, during the 1960s and 1970s, in the macro context of environmental issues where there was a need to sustain the whole environment and human society. This usage was established by the time of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm (Sutton 2004: 2). The sustainability concept is categorised into three historical periods: the pre-Stockholm period, covering the period until the Stockholm United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (WCDE) (1972); the Treaty System from Stockholm (1972) to Rio de Janeiro 1992); and the Post-WCED (1987-1997) period (Mebratu 1998: 497).

It is therefore evident that the concept is not new and that it has a rather long history, having evolved over time. Kidd (1992: 3) states that significantly, this evolution has been affected by different "intellectual and political streams of thought that have moulded concepts of sustainability." In the same vein, Schimberg (2002: 1) adds that although the concept of "sustainability" has a long history, it did not precede the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled *Our common future*, and commonly referred to as the Brundtland report in which the concept of "sustainable development" was introduced for the first time in order to

establish the linkage between economic development and major environmental problems.

Mckenzie (2004: 1) acknowledges that the concept of sustainability emerged in the 1960s in response to concerns about environmental degradation resulting from poor resource management. As the environment became increasingly important as a world issue, sustainability was adopted as a common political goal. Kiss (2011: 7) states that 20 years earlier, the concept of sustainability was known only by ecologists and environmental economists, and its meaning was quite unambiguous: human population and activity should not surpass the carrying capacity of the biosphere and its renewing, resource, and sink capacities. Currently, sustainability is one of the most frequently used words by economists and politicians.

Furthermore, Mak and Peacock (2011: 2) note that the concept of sustainability has its origins in the environmental movement of the 1960s, particularly in response to concerns about the impact of society consuming natural resources faster that they could be replaced. According to the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 44), the term "sustainability" has its origin in ecological science. It was developed to express the conditions that must be present for the ecosystem to sustain itself over the long term. According to Reilly and Weirup (2010: 2), the term 'sustainability' is a new addition to English vocabulary as its origin is recent. Reilly and Weirup add that the sustainability concept is a broad construct the domain of which ranges from biology to business, overlapping with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its focus on advancing people's standards of living while also preserving natural and human resources.

### 2.4.2 Types of Sustainability: Weak and Strong

Sustainability is a topic of discussion between scholars and researchers. Some have identified two kinds of sustainability: strong sustainability and weak sustainability. According to Ang and Van Passel (2012: 253), the weak sustainability concept originated in the 1970s as a by-product of neoclassical economic theories used in the search for an optimal extraction path for non-renewable natural resources. The weak sustainability paradigm supposes that sufficient technological progress can improve human well-being despite environmental damage. This approach represents the neoclassical concept of sustainability which seeks the optimal extraction of non-

renewable natural resources. It also refers to the use of innovative technologies which have certainly increased the capacity of the environment and which should compensate the negative impact on the environment (Klarin: 2018: 79).

The strong sustainability paradigm originated as a counter-movement to the neoclassical weak sustainability paradigm. Adherents of strong sustainability argue that natural and human-made capital may be regarded as substitutes for each other in an 'empty' world in which human-made capital is limited and natural capital is superabundant.

According to Garmendia *et al.* (2010: 97), the weak sustainability position held by many mainstream neo-classical economists demands that the overall welfare of society should not decline overtime. In contrast, the strong sustainability paradigm holds that many fundamental services provided by nature cannot be replaced at any level by man-made capital. Similarly, Meyer (2009: 4) affirms that while strong sustainability requires natural capital not to diminish, weak sustainability allows natural capital to be reduced but proposes that the aggregate of all capital stocks should at least remain constant. This claim comes from the fact that certain critical natural resources can never be complemented or replaced by other forms of resources because they are irreversible, and consequently their loss reflects on all other forms of capital (Davies 2018: 114).

### 2.4.3 Dimensions of Sustainability

In order to assess the sustainability of any infrastructure for peace, including that of eastern DRC, it is important to begin by establishing whether or to what extent the dimensions of sustainability are all in place in the region. According to Hansmann *et al.* (2012: 451), sustainability is an integrative concept with three fundamental dimensions: the environmental, the social, and the economic dimensions. These three dimensions have also been called the pillars of sustainability, implying that responsible development requires consideration of natural, human and economic capital, or colloquially speaking, the planet, people and profits. However, according to Van Pelt *et al.* (1990: 141), sustainability simultaneously refers to five dimensions: the social, the economic, the ecological, the geographical and the cultural dimensions. The difference between the views of Hansmann and Van Pelt *et al.* is that for the Hansmann, sustainability has three dimensions, while for Van *et al.*, it has five

dimensions, including the geographical and the cultural ones, which Hansmann does not specifically mention, although they could be implied in his natural and human dimensions. Essentially, therefore, the two views are not significantly different.

In the Social Sustainable Resource Guide (SSRG), a broader definition of sustainability includes all practices (social, economic and environmental) that protect and enhance not only the natural resources needed by future generations, but also the human resources that will ensure a quality of life equal to, or greater than, that of the present-day generation (ICCR 2011: 9).

According to Seghezo (2009: 539), sustainability could be better understood in terms of 'place', 'permanence', and 'persons', where 'place' contains the three dimensions of space, 'permanence' is the fourth dimension of time, and 'persons' represents a fifth, human dimension. The five-dimensional sustainability framework is arguably more inclusive, pluralistic and useful as a basis for outlining specific policies towards sustainability. However, Strange and Bayley (2008: 24) note that at the core of sustainable development is the need to consider "three pillars" together: society, the economy and the environment. No matter the context, the basic idea remains the same: people, habitats and economic systems are inter-related. Similarly, though using slightly different but essentially synonymous words, Mebratu (1998: 505) acknowledges that sustainable development is based on the identification of three systems as basic to any process of development: the biological or ecological resource system, the economic system, and the social system.

**a. Environmental Sustainability**

According to the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (1994: 3), societies everywhere are closely and inextricably linked to the natural environment in which they are embedded. UNRISD adds that human productive and social activities, and thus social structures and relations, are shaped to a significant degree by the natural resource mix available: physical geography, weather patterns, the amenability of natural conditions to transformation, and a variety of other characteristics of the environment. The UNEP (2010: 44) reports that the environmental impacts of conflict are of three main types: direct, indirect and institutional. Direct impacts are those with highly visible environmental consequences, such as the destruction of ecosystems or water supplies as a result of fighting. Indirect

impacts, such as those caused by coping and survival strategies, often occur over a longer period, with the effects manifesting more severely over time. Finally, institutional impacts are comprised of the governance and management changes that occur during the time of conflict, and they make dealing with direct and indirect impacts much more difficult in both the short- and long-term.

Virunga National Park, in eastern DRC, is a clear example of how conflict can undermine or threaten environmental sustainability. Kalpers (2001: 23) notes that the Virunga Volcanoes were a very convenient strategic area for both the Rwanda Police Force and the Rwanda Army, as it is the sole wooded area on the border between Uganda and Rwanda. Soldiers benefitted from the forest as it offered them dense cover and secure escape routes. However, the presence of these armed forces in the national park led to the destruction of both flora and fauna, which the Rwandese forces used as sources of food and money. As Van de Giessen (2005: 23) aptly notes, factors directly or indirectly threatening the habitat of the mountain gorillas include those that pose a direct threat to the mountain gorillas and to biodiversity in general.

The most obvious of these factors is poaching. Often, the presence of an army leads to high levels of poaching, as occurred in Akagera National Park. Rebels, poachers and regular soldiers pose a potential threat to wildlife. Crawford and Bernstein (2008: 1) further note that two decades of near-constant conflict have placed this unique ecosystem at risk. Park-based natural resources have been used by belligerents to finance conflict. In addition, hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced by war have relied on the extraction of park-based resources for their livelihoods. Moreover, insecurity has kept tourists away and, in doing so, has significantly reduced park receipts and conservation budgets. As a result of the current situation, conservation has fallen down the list of international priorities as resources are diverted to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

As the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (1994: 16) observes, environmental degradation places stress not only on community-level social structures, but also on societal institutions which function on a broader level. UNRID further states that the social changes brought about by individual responses to environmental damage, modify the balance of rural-urban relations and increase the contact, and sometimes the competition and conflict, between different ethnic

groups or cultural traditions. The UNRID concludes that the state faces new demands and new challenges as a result of these changes.

Sustainability recognises that an environment needs to be created where all people can express their full potential and lead productive lives, and that significant gaps in sufficiency, safety and opportunity endanger the earth (Pope *et al.* 2008: 92). The idea that human activity is detrimental to the natural environment, and that nature should be conserved by keeping areas free from human contact, has been influencing environmental policy since the mid-nineteenth century, when the first national parks were established in the United States. Similar protected areas were subsequently set up in other countries, with a marked growth in the number of national parks and protected areas created since 1950 (UNRISD 1994: 18).

According to Vlek and Steg (2007: 1), environmental sustainability is a key issue for human societies throughout the 21st century world. They add that all countries need to secure a sufficient quality (in the short- and long-term) of natural resources, ecosystems, and diversity of plant and animal species, including the human living environment. In the view of the two authors, an environmentally sustainable system must maintain a stable resource base, avoiding the over-exploitation of renewable resource systems or environmental sink functions, and deplete non-renewable resources only to the extent that investment is made in adequate substitutes. This includes maintenance of biodiversity, atmospheric stability, and other ecosystem functions not ordinarily classed as economic resources.

Many scholars and environmentalists consider environmental sustainability to be synonymous with ecological sustainability. According to Soini *et al.* (2010: 9), ecological sustainability is usually used to refer to the conservation, preservation and sustainable use of ecological systems; and rural residents' perceptions of nature, biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources, like the knowledge and practices related to them, are culturally determined. It requires that natural capital be maintained as a source of economic input and as a sink for wastes. In other words, sustainable production and sustainable consumption are prerequisites for environmental sustainability. Soini (ibid) posit that environmental sustainability means improving human lifestyle in order to maintain natural capital. Keeping natural capital constant means maintaining the two source and sink environmental services

unimpaired. To conclude, environmental sustainability can be achieved when there is a transition in the world to renewable sources of energy: this is turn contributes to stability.

The compound concept of "environmental sustainability" is not widely used, nor is the word "sustainability". However, the core concept "to sustain", the noun "environment" and the adjective "environmental" are widely used. In common usage, "to sustain" means to "keep something going" or to "maintain something", and "environment" means either "the context" or "surroundings" of something, more specifically, "environment" means the physical environment (Sutton 2004: 10). Thus, environmental sustainability is one of the important dimensions of sustainability, and in the DRC, it is adversely affected by violent conflict.

**b. Economic Sustainability**

In its early development, sustainability was seen only in the context of the environment, but later the economic dimension also emerged as one of the pillars of sustainability. Soini *et al.* (2010: 9) acknowledge that economic sustainability is concerned with economic viability and how it is achieved, taking into consideration social and environmental aspects. The same authors state that the key principle of economic sustainability is that economic development should not take place at the cost of nature or social systems. However, according to Seghezzo (2009: 544), a major drawback of the inclusion of an economic dimension in the definition of sustainability is that a purely economic approach is, in some respects, incompatible with the long-term thinking required to attain inter-generational justice. Interestingly, Goodland (1995: 7), has argued that the notion of economic sustainability was already firmly embodied in the writings of J. S. Mill and T. R. Malthus. Mills had already emphasised that the environment (nature) needed to be protected from unfettered growth if people were to preserve human welfare before diminishing returns set in. Malthus highlighted the pressures of exponential population growth on the finite resource base of the earth (the environment). Goodland (ibid: 2) writes that environmental sustainability highlights the need to consider the physical inputs into economic production processes, emphasising the value of environmental life-support systems without which neither production nor humanity could exist. These life-support systems include the atmosphere, water and soil, all of which need to be healthy for

economic production to be sustainable, implying that their environmental service capacity must be maintained. Of interest is that authors such as Goodland presented these arguments years ago and that such views are now validated by the challenges the world is facing with climate change. Basiago (1999: 149) opines that economic sustainability, by way of growth, productivity and development, has guided conventional development science in the past. Market allocation of resources, sustained levels of growth and consumption, an assumption that natural resources are unlimited and a belief that economic growth will 'trickle down' to the poor have been its hallmarks.

According to Kiss (2010: 11), a sustainable economy should be an environment-friendly economy with alternative production and consumption structures, a high share of renewable resources in the energy sector and an ecological tax reform. In the view of Morelli (2011: 20), economic sustainability should involve analysis to minimise the social costs of meeting standards for protecting environmental assets, but not for determining what those standards should be. In the same vein, Harris (2003: 2) points out that economic sustainability requires that the different kinds of capital that make economic production possible must be maintained or augmented. He adds that economic sustainability focuses on that portion of the natural resource base which provides physical inputs, both renewable (e.g. forest) and exhaustible (e.g. minerals) into the production process.

In addition, Baumgartner and Quaas (2010: 447) note that sustainability economics is founded ethically in the idea of efficiency, or non-wastefulness; in the use of scarce resources for achieving the two normative goals of the satisfaction of the needs and wants of individual humans and justice, including justice between humans of present and future generations and justice towards nature; and in the setting of human-nature relationships over the long-term and the inherently uncertain future. It would appear that in the DRC, economic sustainability is currently unattainable due to instability and corruption which cause and aggravate inequalities in Congolese society.

**c. Social Sustainability**

Soini *et al.* (2010: 9) observe that social sustainability is usually understood as equality between or among people with respect to participation and social inclusion, work, education and health. Mckenzie (2004: 17) adds that social sustainability is a positive

condition marked by a strong sense of social cohesion and equity of access to key services including health, education, transport, housing and recreation. One can therefore conclude that social sustainability is achieved when individuals, communities and societies live in such a way that societal provisions and expectations are met for the autonomy of the person, when there is public participation in governance and decision-making, and when the resources that affect the ability of the community to grow and flourish over time are equitably distributed. Spangenberg (2002b) enriches the analysis when he states that while social sustainability focuses on personal assets like education, skills, experience, consumption, income and employment, institutional sustainability aims at interpersonal processes such as democracy and participation (institutional mechanisms), distributional and gender equity (institutional orientations) or independent and pluralistic sources of information (organisations).

In the opinion of ICCR (2011: 9), social sustainability includes, but is not limited to, the right to development; the right to health care; access to water, food and education; the right to take part in cultural life; the rights of indigenous peoples; gender equity and diversity; freedom from discrimination; freedom of association; the continuous improvement of living conditions; and the right to participate in decisions that impact individual and community well-being. According to Basiago (1999: 150), social sustainability encompasses notions of equity, empowerment, accessibility, participation, sharing, cultural identity, and institutional stability. He adds that social sustainability seeks to preserve the environment through economic growth and the alleviation of poverty.

Goodland (2002: 2) maintains that social sustainability lowers the cost of working together, and facilitates cooperation and trust, thereby lowering transaction costs. In his view, only a combination of systematic community participation and a strong civil society and government can achieve this. Community cohesion for mutual benefit, connectedness between or among groups of people, reciprocity, tolerance, compassion, patience, forbearance, fellowship, love, commonly accepted standards of honesty, discipline and ethics are all essential for social sustainability. Furthermore, according to Littig and Grießler (2005: 72), social sustainability is achieved if work within a society and the related institutional arrangements satisfy an extended set of human needs and are shaped in a way that nature and its reproductive capabilities are preserved over a long period of time and the normative claims of social justice,

human dignity and participation are fulfilled. In the same vein, Harris (2003: 1) argues that a socially sustainable system must achieve fairness in distribution and opportunity; adequate provision of social services, including health and education; gender equity; and political accountability and participation.

Similar to Goodland, Davidson and Wilson (2009: 8) note that social sustainability is achieved only by systematic community participation and a strong civil society. However, the latter add that cohesion of community, cultural identity, diversity, solidarity, comity, tolerance, humility, compassion, patience, forbearance, fellowship, fraternity, institutions, love, pluralism, commonly accepted standards of honesty, laws and discipline constitute the part of social capital least amenable to rigorous measurement. This view is supported by Goodland (1995: 3) when he asserts that moral capital, as some call it, requires maintenance and replenishment by shared values and capital rights, and by community, religious and cultural interactions. Furthermore, Davidson and Wilson (2009: 24) argue that social sustainability is a system of cultural relations in which the positive aspects of disparate cultures are valued and promoted. In their opinion, social sustainability presupposes widespread political participation of citizens not only in electoral procedures but also in other areas of political activity, particularly at the local level, and it is regularly interpreted as development-oriented, environment-oriented and people-oriented. Table 2.1 summarises Murphy's (2012: 19) synthesis of social sustainability scholars and their basic ideas.

**Table 2.1: Murphy's synthesis of social sustainability scholars and their basic ideas**

| Author | Social Classification | Description of Policy Objective |
|---|---|---|
| Littig & Griessler (2005) "Social dimensions of sustainability" | Basic needs and quality of life; social justice and social coherence | Satisfaction of basic material needs and self-fulfilment; equality of opportunity; and harmony among different social groups |
| Chan & Lee (2008) "Factors of social sustainability" | Social infrastructure | Physical infrastructure which delivers locally based services and opportunities for social interaction |
| | | Employment; |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Availability of job opportunities accessibility | engaging in essential work and leisure activities should not entail too much travel |
| | Townscape Design | Townscape design that is aesthetically pleasing, functional, and promotes social interaction |
| | Preservation of local characteristics<br>Ability to fulfil psychological needs | Conserving physical and social/community characteristics particular to the locality; and<br>fulfilling the need to feel secure and participate in neighbourhood design |
| Cuthill (2009) *Social Capital*<br>"Key factors of Social Infrastructure sustainability"<br>Social Justice and Equity<br>Engaged Governance | | Promoting social networks and a sense of social responsibility; providing facilities which address need and capacity for participation; providing equitable access to essential welfare services and employment, especially for vulnerable groups; and promoting bottom-up, participatory democracy |
| Dempsey *et al. Social Equity*<br>(2011)<br>"Dimensions of Social Community sustainability" | | Reducing inequality in life chances by ensuring local access to key services; encouraging social interaction/social networks in the community; encouraging participation in collective groups in the community; engendering a sense of pride in the local place; and ensuring safety and security |
| Vavik & Keitsch (2010)<br>"Three goals of social sustainable development" | Poverty<br>Illiteracy<br>Access | Promoting "inclusion" by providing basic needs; promoting access to education; and promoting access to participation in decision making |

A report of the United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) (2010: 3) states that it is generally felt that these dimensions of sustainability cannot, on their own, reflect the complexity of current society. The report adds that many voices, including UNESCO, the World Summit on Sustainable Development and researchers are calling for the inclusion of culture in the sustainable development model, since culture ultimately shapes what is meant by development and determines how people act in the world.

**d. Cultural Sustainability**

The DRC is home to more than 200 ethnic groups, making it one of the most culturally diverse countries in Africa. But is this diversity culturally sustainable? The concept of

cultural sustainability first emerged in 1995, when the World Commission on Culture and Development (WCCD), building on the social development (SD) discourse, defined cultural sustainability as inter- and intra-generational access to cultural resources (WCCD 1995: 64). Soini and Birkeland (2014: 214) have argued that "cultural sustainability" can be viewed as a fourth and parallel dimension to ecological, economic, and social sustainability. A report of the Creative City Network of Canada (2007: 4) and Duxburg *et al.* (2007: 4) both agree that cultural sustainability means that change should occur in a way that respects cultural values, and that discussions of sustainability must include an understanding of culture as well as of the place in which it occurs, so that the community and geographic contexts are not ignored.

Soini and Birkeland (2014: 214) note that their broad understanding of culture suggests that cultural sustainability moves beyond social sustainability and that there can be important issues of sustainable development that can be missed without a further examination of the role of culture. In their opinion, cultural sustainability is linked, but not equal, to issues of social sustainability such as social justice and equity, social infrastructure, participation and engaged governance, social cohesion, social capital, awareness, needs and work, and issues of the distribution of environmental "goods" and "bads".

Although 'infrastructures for peace' have attracted the attention of many scholars and actors, because they are believed to be capable of promoting peace and sustainability in society, Hopp-Nishanka (2012: 3) is not entirely convinced of this. In her view, if peace infrastructures give peace an address, what does this place look like? It could be anything from a rugged shed housing, a local peace council in a remote South American village, or the elegantly designed high-rise office of a national truth and reconciliation commission in the capital of an African country. Section 2.9 focuses on infrastructures for peace and related concepts.

Due to the fertile soil and vast potential of the eastern region of the DRC, land is playing a central role in the Congolese economy, in which the agricultural sector comprises 41% of the country's total GDP. Also, a large part of the Congolese population is dependent on food crop production. For these small-scale farmers, who constitute a majority of the population, access to land is of crucial importance for their livelihood. In some areas of the country, up to 90% of the population is rural, and other

alternatives to agriculture are often non-existent for these peasants. Additionally, there is a vast gap between the relatively wealthy urban population and the impoverished rural communities. As the competition over land has risen, the struggle for the weaker parties and their land rights has worsened. The peasants are competing against capital-rich large-scale actors, hence communities who have used the soil and its resources for thousands of years no longer have the right to access or use the land on which they depend (Ramsbothan 2011: 37).

## 2.5 Effectiveness

The term effectiveness, notes Meharg (2009: 2), is ubiquitous in international humanitarian aid, diplomacy, development, and defence and security, and although it has many technical meanings, it does not remain without an agreed-upon definition, nor a common understanding of its impact related to complex operations.

As far as effectiveness is concerned, this study has used the theory developed by Tandukar et al. (2016: 7) who use the concept of capacity to assess it regarding the local infrastructure for peace. These capabilities are:

1. *The capability to self-organise and act:*

   Here we consider the ability of community members to participate in the established infrastructure for peace through various mechanisms. The inclusion of the different categories of the population in the established infrastructure for peace and their integration mechanisms are taking into consideration.

   Lederach (1997) (cited by Chivasa 2017:8), has demonstrated that what makes peace committees effective is the fact that most if not all are situated in existing networks (involving village heads, local councillors, chiefs and other leaders), particularly those created by community members themselves. Any peace committee that utilises these networks has the potential to build peace at local community levels

2. *The capability to generate development results:*

   The ability of infrastructure for peace to deliver relevant and effective services in other word the capability of the infrastructure for peace to reduce tensions

within communities. The infrastructures for peace are being established to promote the culture for peace within communities.

3. *The capability to establish supportive relationships:*

   The ability of the infrastructure for peace to establish relationships with other to deliver services. In each community, there is existing other infrastructures and the newly established need to collaborate with them.

4. *The capability to adapt and self-renew:*

   The ability to deliver services in the situation of severe resource constraints. In spite of the lack of financial mean, the infrastructure for peace members need to continue providing their service within their communities.

5. *The capability to achieve coherence:*

   The ability to accommodate conflicting interests and priorities. In spite the stressful environment in which they are operating, the infrastructure for peace need to adapt and cope with the situation.

Oghjafor et al. (2012) acknowledge that effectiveness is difficult to define because it means different things to different people depending on perspectives and frames of references. Any definition is a function of who is defining or who is evaluating effectiveness and why he or she is doing so. As there are problems with its meaning, so also there are problems with the measures because each perspective introduces a different dimension as to the meaning. However, McCornick (1980: 299) says that effectiveness is a measure of the success in achieving a clearly stated objective and Schillenger (2010: 2) notes that effectiveness refers to the intervention's ability to do more good than harm for the target population in a real-world setting. In this study, I consider McCornick's (1980: 299) definition when he says that effectiveness can be seen as a measure of the success in achieving a clearly stated objective.

For Kiss et al. (2015: 34), in general, effectiveness can be described as the achievement of the objective set. We can say that something is effective when it has realized the objective set, i.e. achieved the set result. Thus, effectiveness is the measure of the achievement of the planned result or the expression of how much it was successful in transforming objectives into results.

Trying to explain this ubiquity, Meharg (2009:5) says that to some humanitarians, effectiveness is achieved when the total number of kilos of food aid has been delivered in a war-torn environment. To some development experts, effectiveness is achieved when local sustainable livelihoods empower people to feed themselves. In some military and defence organizations, the delivery of food aid in exchange for operational information is an effective activity. For Mandl (2008:3), effectiveness is expressed by the ratio between the result achieved and the programmed one and shows the success acquired by using the resources to accomplish the proposed objectives. Mihaiu et al. (2010: 132) notice that measuring the effectiveness requires: a) estimating the costs, the resources consumed the effort, in general, found in the literature as the input; b) estimating the results, or the outputs; c) comparing the two.

Barnett et al. (2016: 29) say that the Theory of Change (ToC) is an important tool for approaching the question of effectiveness. ToC maps how an organisation, project, network or group of stakeholders understands political, social, economic and/or cultural change to happen and how they see themselves contributing to that change.

When it comes to the evaluation of the effectiveness, Barnett et al. (2016:29) acknowledge that evaluating effectiveness involves looking into which achievements, or outcomes, advocates contributed to through their work. When looking for these outcomes, it is important to remember just how complex the world of advocacy can be.

The effectiveness has as influence factors the outputs, the outcomes and the environmental factors. The latter, the environmental factors (such as lifestyle and various socio-economic influences) exercise a major influence over the effectiveness (Mihaiu 2010: 147).

## 2.6 Peace and Related Concepts

### 2.6.1 The Concept of Peace

Barnett (2008: 79) notes that in Galtung's formulation, peace is the absence of both direct and structural violence, a definition that is negative as it highlights what peace is not instead of stating what it is. Galtung also acknowledges that negative and positive peace are contiguous with each other, and this is clearly the case, as revealed by recent research into the linkages between war (direct violence), absolute poverty,

vertical and horizontal inequalities, famine (structural violence), and famine relief (which affects another form of structural violence).

The concept of direct violence is well explained by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2014: 1), explaining that direct violence is "the most obvious and overt form of violence perpetuated by one or more disputants directly upon those with whom they are in conflict". Direct violence, which includes organised violence and torture, denote the use of physical force and is typified by intimidation, murder, torture, rape, and assault among others. For Cravo (2018: 2), direct violence is the intentional act of aggression with a subject, a visible action and an object.

In contrast to direct violence, Christie (1997: 1) notes that structural violence occurs when economic and political structures systematically deprive need satisfaction for certain segments of society. When economic deprivation occurs, the need for well-being is not satisfied, resulting in deficits in human growth and development.

For Winter & Leighton (2001:1) structural violence is almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic traditions.

In this study, peace is defined as a situation which is at once devoid of war and violence, and characterised by human well-being, based on justice and the equitable distribution of basic resources.

### 2.6.2 The Concept of Conflict Prevention

Craig and Geoge, cited in Ackermann (2003: 340), acknowledge that the idea of preventing war is not new. This statement is corroborated by Craig and George (1995) who state that preventing war was the dominant theme at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which put into effect a number of measures such as mutual consultations, the establishment of neutral states and demilitarised zones, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Further, Ackermann (2003:3) notes that conflict prevention is a central feature of the United Nations Charter, authorising the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, in Chapters VI and VII, to settle disputes peacefully and to prevent the outbreak of war and other forms of armed confrontation. Specifically, Chapter VI of the UN Charter contains a series of preventive devices,

such as fact-finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration, all of which are geared towards peacebuilding.

According to Lund (2002: 117), conflict prevention refers to any structural or intercessory means to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and the use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict to resolve such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes. Conflict prevention is not simply a once-off event as the issue of sustainability needs to be considered: Baly (2004: 474) writes that if conflict prevention is to be sustainable, it should also take account of violence and insecurity, as well as wider human security issues, especially if broader development goals are at stake. He concludes that the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, export controls, security-sector reform, trafficking and HIV/AIDS, are all part of conflict prevention and security, making them central to the development agenda.

Menkhaus (2004: 426) points out that interventions to prevent conflict have increased since the end of the Cold War; that conflict prevention has moved higher on the agendas of the United Nations, the US and the European Union; and that non-governmental organisations and research institutes have become involved. He notes the extant criticism of broad 'conflict prevention terminology' which may define prevention out of existence by equating conflict prevention with the correction of all social inequities and the advancement of broad economic and social development goals. Menkhaus (2004: 433) adds that to operationalise conflict prevention more effectively, six prerequisites must be met:

- The analytical capacity to predict and understand conflicts ('do we know what to look for?')
- The structural capacity to predict and alert ('do we have a functional early warning system or systems in place?')
- The operational capacity to prevent ('do we have a toolbox of preventative methods?')

- A strategic framework to guide coherent preventative action ('do we have an effective strategy for preventing conflicts, to determine which tools of conflict prevention are to be used and when?')
- The structural capacity to respond ('do we have organisations designed, prepared and funded to execute preventative action?')
- The political will to prevent ('does the international community, or a coalition of key players in the international community, have the commitment to undertake and support preventative action?')

### 2.6.3 The Concept of Conflict Transformation

Sheehan (2014: 121) indicates that "the concept of conflict transformation emerged in the mid-1990s as an alternative to overly-prescriptive models of conflict settlement and resolution then used in peace-keeping and peacebuilding activities". He adds that in its original form, John Paul Lederach (1994) defined it as an "*elicitive* approach, one that promotes social empowerment and transformation by respecting people and their knowledge, and getting them to look for answers within themselves and their context."

In the opinion of Wainecke and Franke (2010: 78), sustainable conflict transformation requires a combination of conflict-resolution approaches that account for perceptions, relationships and "conflict attitudes" (peacebuilding), the constructive reconciliation of opposing interests (peace-making) and the prevention of a resurgence of violence (peacekeeping). In this regard, Auvinen and Kivimäki (2001: 68) acknowledge that the philosophy behind the conflict transformation approach is that, in conflicts, there are causes or reasons more fundamental than those expressed at the level of disputes. They add that conflicts are often structurally caused by political, perceptual, and economic structures which give rise to concrete disputes.

### 2.6.4 Peacebuilding according to Agencies, Donors and Actors

Khadiagala (2017: 96) notes that peacebuilding is a key concept in efforts to reconstruct African States emerging from conflicts particularly in the DRC. At heart, it captures the entire array of activities associated with state and nation building in addition to building the foundations for the local ownership of these processes. Popularised by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the early 1990s,

peacebuilding has evolved alongside peace-making and peacekeeping in the reconstruction repertoire. Virtually every practitioner in peacebuilding, operating in Africa in general and in the DRC in particular, prefers a different typology for differentiating among peacebuilding, conflict prevention and other such concepts as conflict resolution, conflict management, crisis prevention, preventative diplomacy, peace maintenance, and peacebuilding. According to Barnett *et al.* (2007: 37), peacebuilding is generically understood as external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into, or return to, war. Yet, as captured by different agencies, a wide variety of terms that are related to, but not necessarily synonymous are used to mean peacebuilding.

Below are some of the concepts and definitions of peacebuilding given by the following agencies and donors – OCED (2004), the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), the DFID (2005) and the United Nations (2000). The definitions help clarify the terms but can add to misunderstandings between agencies and peacebuilding efforts without a common understanding of meaning.

- **Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:** All external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, including all activities and programs designed to support and strengthen these transitions (UN Department of political Affairs [DPA]).
- **Peacekeeping:** Activities to help countries tom by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace, including activities to monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement their peace agreements (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPK]).
- **Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding:** Post-conflict recovery activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations, where peace is more than just the absence of war (Brahimi report, UN Development Program [UNPD]).
- **Post-Conflict Reconstruction:** Activities that support the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country by rebuilding the socio-economic framework of the society (World Bank).
- **Post-Conflict Recovery:** Activities to restore assets and production levels in the disrupted economy (International Monetary Fund [IMF]).
- **Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management:** Activities aiming not only at easing a situation where an outbreak of violence is imminent (conflict

prevention in a narrow sense) but also at preventing the concurrence of such a situation (conflict prevention in a wider sense) (Conflict prevention and crisis management).

- **Reconstruction and Rehabilitation**: Re-establishment of a working economy and the institutional capacities needed to restore social and political stability in developing countries that have suffered significant damage through war, civil disorder, or natural disaster (European Commission [EC]).
- **Reconstruction and Stabilisation:** Competencies identified for reconstruction include humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economy development, rule of law, civil administration, and media, whereas stability operations require sufficient security forces, communication skills, humanitarian capabilities, and area expertise (US Department of Defence [DOD]).
- **Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilisation:** Activities to help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance, and sustainable development (US Department of State).
- **Conflict Reconstruction:** An umbrella term covering a range of activities required in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office).
- **Peacebuilding:** Activities relating to the underlying cause of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people, requiring a commitment to a long-term process (UK Ministry of Defence [UKMOD]).
- **Conflict Reduction and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:** Conflict reduction includes conflict management (activities to prevent the spread of existing conflict); conflict prevention (short-term activities to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict); conflict resolution (short-term activities to end violent conflict); and peacebuilding (medium-and long-term actions to address the factors underlying violent conflict). Essential post-conflict peacebuilding measures include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs, and building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation, and basic social services (UK Department for International Development [DFID]).
- **Civilian Crisis Prevention:** The concept of civilian crisis prevention encompasses conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, and is understood through a number of strategies such as the establishment of stable state structures (rule of law, democracy, human rights, and security), and the creation of the potential for peace within civil society, the media, cultural affairs, and education (German Federal Foreign Office [FFO]).
- **Multi-Dimensional Peace Missions:** Multidimensional peace missions aim to redress the destruction of a country's infrastructure resulting from intra-state

conflict. In addition to their military aspect, they undertake a variety of tasks, ranging from the reform of security forces and the demobilisation of combatants to the rebuilding of the justice system and government structures and preparations for elections (German Federal Ministry of Defence [FMD]).

- **Development and Peacebuilding:** Development policy seeks to improve economic, social, ecological, and political conditions so as to help remove the structural causes of conflict and promote peaceful conflict management. Goals include poverty reduction, pro-poor sustainable economic growth, good governance and democracy. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage development. As conceptualised in the joint Utstein study, peacebuilding activities fall under four main themes: security, socio-economic foundations, political framework of long-term peace, and reconciliation (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation Development BMZ).
- **Crisis Management:** Policy primarily pursued through multilateral organisations: peacekeeping, political and constitutional processes, democratisation, administrative state capacity for public finance and tax policy, and support for independent media (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA]).
- **Peace Consolidation:** Activities in support of peace consolidation include monitoring, compliance with arms embargoes, deployment of peace-keeping troops, DDR, and deployment of police and humanitarian action and development (French Ministry of Defence).
- **Crisis Prevention:** The French government's international solidarity policy is pursued in the areas of humanitarian action and development (*Agence Française de Développement* [AFD]).
- **Conflict Prevention:** Actions to support political, social, and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability, which include mechanisms to identify and support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of confidence and well-being, and that support economic growth (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT]).
- **Peacebuilding:** Efforts to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict in order to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence (Department of National Defence and Canadian forces [DND/CF]).
- **Peacebuilding**: Activities to prevent violent conflict by promoting peace, security and domestic stability, and to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance (Canadian International Development Agency).
- **Conflict Prevention:** Efforts to prevent a regional conflict from recurring after a ceasefire agreement, which include an engagement in relief and

reconstruction activities for victims of conflicts from the viewpoint of stabilising the situation in affected areas (Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA]).

- **Reconstruction Assistance:** A general approach extending from conflict prevention to reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, in which peace is pursued through across-the-board endeavours which include development assistance in addition to traditional efforts within military and political frameworks (Japan Development Agency [JDA]).

## 2.7 The Concept of Human Security

Mugisa (2010: 33), in reviewing a range of authors, regards human security as consisting of recognising the importance of people's security needs alongside those of states, minimising risks, adopting preventive measures to reduce human vulnerabilities, and taking remedial action when preventive measures fail. Hussein *et al.* (2004: 13) identify seven dimensions of human security:

- *Economic security* – this arises from assured basic income as a result of access to employment and resources.

- *Food security* – this is a result from physical and economic access to food for all people at all times. Hundreds of millions of people in the world remain hungry either through local unavailability of food or, more often, through the lack of entitlements or resources to purchase food.***

- *Health security* – this is partly dependent on food security, and partly a product of access to medical treatment and improved health conditions. Poor people in general have less health security, and in developing countries the major causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases.

- *Environmental security* – this is tantamount to living in a healthy physical environment, devoid of desertification, deforestation and other environmental threats, such as water, air and sound pollution, that endanger people's survival.

- *Personal security* – this implies individual freedom from physical violence. Threats can take several forms, including threats from the State, foreign states, other groups of people (inter-ethnic tension) within the State and individuals or gangs. Some threats are directed against specific population categories, such as women or children, based on their vulnerability and dependence. However, other threats may be threats to the self, for example, suicide and drug abuse.

- *Community security* – this is ensured by membership of, or affiliation to, a social group (family, community, organisation, political grouping, ethnic group, etc.). Notably, when such groups within a State compete for limited resources or opportunities, the competition often results in tensions which undermine security.

- *Political security* – this is achieved when an individual or individuals in a society is or are respectively guaranteed basic human rights and freedom of expression.

## 2.8 Infrastructure for Peace

Similar to the concept of sustainability, the infrastructure for peace is a recent concept in the vocabulary of scholars, researchers and actors in peacebuilding. But what is an infrastructure?

### 2.8.1 The Concept of Infrastructure

To support the transformation from fragility to resilience, it is necessary to institutionalise mechanisms and systematically build capabilities to deal with challenges in an inclusive and peaceful manner. Termed 'infrastructures for peace' (I4P), these processes and paradigms help to strengthen the institutional capacities for nations to enhance social resilience and build sustainable peace. Many scholars and researchers have tried to define infrastructure as it is used in a variety of domains. The American Heritage Dictionary (2000: 42) defines "infrastructure" as the basic facilities, services and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices and prisons. Hans *et al.* (2012: 2) define 'infrastructure' as the productive capital structures that underpin the economy and society, and contribute over time to the achievement of its economic and social goals. According to Grimsey *et al.* (2011: 13), 'infrastructure' refers to physical assets which provide a level of amenity or service to users. They add that while the characteristics of assets can vary substantially depending on their purpose and function, technical specifications and commercial attributes, infrastructure assets typically have a long useful life, though the lifespan varies by asset.

I4P appear to make a combination of the two frameworks possible. Richmond describes I4P as the potentially appropriate location for an "encounter between the international liberal peace model and local forms of peace" (Richmond 2012a: 25). In the words of Chetan Kumar and Jos de la Haye, both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and I4P bridge "illiberal and liberal frameworks" (Kumar and De la Haye 2011: 13).

Elsewhere, Heathcote *et al.* (2014: 7) note that an infrastructure is the bedrock of a nation's competitiveness, prosperity and even social well-being. It is perhaps for this reason that Gramlich (1994: 118) observes that while infrastructure spending was historically defined as consumption expenditure by both governments and the private sector, it is now almost universally defined as capital expenditure because infrastructure has been recognised as a capital good. It is in the same spirit that Richmond (2012: 24) states that infrastructure implies an "infrapolitical" connection within society that reaches deeper than formal and public institutions, especially those driven by external actors. According to Lederach (2012: 10), the notion of infrastructure, proposing a longer-term view of change, required a high view and reconsideration of context in order to understand, encourage and support resources from within the setting. At its core, infrastructure suggests that change unfolds over time and requires a quality of presence rooted in the setting, with a capacity for generative responses to emergent crises and a longer-term, shared vision of desired change.

### 2.8.2 Social Infrastructure

Conventionally, infrastructure is broadly divided into two categories: economic and social. This study focused on social infrastructure because peace is essentially a social phenomenon even though economic factors may play a significant part in its achievement or absence. As already noted, economic infrastructure conventionally includes transport, communications, power generation, water supply and sanitation facilities, while social infrastructure includes educational and health-care facilities, though some authors also include cultural and recreational facilities as well (DBSA 1998: 8).

Cleveland (2013: 3) states that infrastructure provides the basic facilities, services, and installations required for a community or society to function. He adds that

infrastructure includes facilities, which he refers to as infrastructure assets, such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and structures to house public institutions, including schools and post offices. Social infrastructure can be defined as physical facilities for different individuals and communities which can be provided by a range of organisations (public, private and voluntary), and which are generally organised by place, age or a defining group, such as children or the disabled (Development Management DPD 2009: 2). UN-HABITAT (2011: 6) maintains that social infrastructure encompasses services such as health, education and recreation, and that it has both a direct and an indirect impact on the quality of life. Directly, it enhances the level of productivity in economic activities; indirectly, it streamlines activities and outcomes such as recreation, education, health and safety.

### 2.8.3 Infrastructure for Peace

The concept of peace infrastructure or infrastructure for peace is relatively new, and little has been published on it. Internationally, discussions among academics, practitioners, policy-makers and others on the concept of the infrastructure for peace are ongoing. There are various definitions for infrastructures for peace. Adel (2014: 2) notes that this concept is a recent development, based on the experience of more than 30 countries that have been able to transition from war to peace (Adel 2014: 2). According to Kumar (2011: 385), an infrastructure for peace is a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society. It is this definition of the term that this study has adopted.

Suurmond and Sharma (2013:3) define infrastructures for peace as the structures, resources and processes through which peace services are delivered at any level of a society. Formal infrastructures for peace have a physical structure, a degree of organisation, stability, a mandate, resources, training, and are recognised as such by their beneficiaries or "users". In contrast, informal infrastructures for peace are those that emerge on an ad hoc basis, do not require a physical structure, and operate without funds. Together, they make up the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) of a society.

According to Van Tongeren (2013: 1), an infrastructure for peace is a comprehensive, inclusive approach in peacebuilding, involving the main stakeholders at all levels: the national, the district and the local levels. In Van Tongeren's opinion, the infrastructure

for peace is a problem-solving approach to conflict, based on dialogue and non-violence, allowing societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally, and promising in that it has already worked several times.

Kumar (2011: 385) defines the infrastructure for peace as a "dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society." However, in the opinion of Reychler (2002: 15), infrastructures for peace, also called 'architectures for peace', describe a structure which links institutions and organisations at all levels of society to optimise the peacebuilding capacity of that society. Reychler (2002: 16) continues, noting that he prefers to use the metaphor 'peace architecture' because (a) it draws attention to the architectural principles/considerations that have to be addressed in sustainable peace building processes; (b) it emphasizes the need to identify the necessary pre-conditions or building blocks for different types of conflicts; (c) it could shorten the learning curve by providing a methodology for comparative analysis and evaluation of conflict transformation; and (d) it could contribute to greater attention paid to the vital role of peace architects. According to Hopp-Nishanka (2012: 4), peace infrastructures consist of diverse domestic and inter-connected forms of engagement between conflict parties and other stakeholders. Their organisational elements can be established at all stages of peace and dialogue processes, at all levels of society, and with varying degrees of inclusion. Suurmond and Sharma (2013: 2) also define infrastructures for peace as the structures, resources and processes through which peace services are delivered at any level of a society.

The European Union External Action Support (EEAS) (2012:1) states that infrastructures for peace (I4P) aim to provide an institutionalised platform for mediation, facilitation and dialogue, with an emphasis on dialogue. The EEAS adds that I4P aim to provide a space for dialogue both horizontally between conflicting parties and vertically between different levels of society, thus connecting the grassroots to the higher political level. This is in agreement with Lederach's (1997: 38) assertion that the 'infrastructure' metaphor conveys the image of extensive networks that connect sections of a society in various ways and enable productive interaction. Lederach notes that infrastructures for peace, when applied to peacebuilding, convey the idea of linking and galvanising a wide array of resources within a society to enable

the prevention of violence and the building of peace. Kotia and Aubyn (2013: 2) state that the creation of a national infrastructure for peace serves to allow societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with local indigenous skills, institutions and resources, without any intervention by external actors, which means resolving conflict without appealing to the judiciary system or other institutions. Adan and Pkalya (2006: 13) outline the following definitions of a local infrastructure for peace:

- A conflict intervention structure that integrates both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent, manage or transform intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts
- A conflict mitigation and peacebuilding structure that integrates traditional and modern conflict interventions to address intra- and inter-tribal tensions and conflicts
- A community-based structure and initiative to prevent, manage and transform intra- and inter-community conflicts

Brand-Jacobsen (2012: 6) argues that the infrastructure for peace refers to standing, trained and prepared capabilities within a community or country in the same way that there are standing armies, standing health systems and standing school systems. Elsewhere, Nishanka (2012: 71) observes that a peace infrastructure can be seen as a network of interdependent actors and their capacities which, through a process of dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Nishanka adds that an infrastructure consists of diverse, domestic, interconnected and organised forms of engagement between conflict parties and other stakeholders. However, according to Verzat (2013: 7), the infrastructure for peace could also constitute a comprehensive alternative framework for state-building with the same logic in reverse: building peace (structures) in order to build a sustainable and legitimate state. From his perspective, Ryan (2012: 14) says that to support the transformation from fragility to resilience, it is necessary to institutionalise mechanisms and systematically build capabilities to deal with challenges in an inclusive and peaceful manner. Termed 'infrastructures for peace' (I4P), these processes and paradigms help to strengthen the institutional capacities for nations to enhance social resilience and build sustainable peace.

## 2.9 Local Infrastructure for Peace as a Peacebuilding Strategy

John Paul Lederach first introduced the concept of "infrastructures for peace" in the 1980s. It was based on his assumption that sustainable peace can only be the result of a deep and structural conflict transformation, including a transformation of the socio-economic root causes and political drivers of the conflict (Lederach 2005: 47). In this way, according to Miall (2001: 6), Lederach's work serves as one of the most comprehensive statements to date of conflict-transformation thought model for practitioners. In Miall's view, Lederach views peacebuilding as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy. Similarly, Fetherston (2000: 204) points out that the work most often cited in any discussion of peacebuilding, at least in the field of peace research, is that of John Paul Lederach. His framework of reconciliation and an elicitive approach provides an important advance in thinking about intervention.

Fetherston (2000: 205) adds that what is most interesting and different about this analysis is its representation as a pyramid where the grassroots represent the largest constituency at the pyramid's base. This inclusion of the grassroots, coupled with an argument for a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, is significantly different from other approaches and represents an important departure and development of the idea of peacebuilding. In thinking about structure, Miall (2001: 6) acknowledges that Lederach contributes the idea of the pyramid with elite leaders and decision-makers at the top; leaders of social organisations, churches and top journalists in the middle level; and grassroots community leaders at the base. A comprehensive peace process should address complementary changes at all these levels.

According to Paffenholz (2013: 5), a core element of Lederach's focus on society's peacebuilding resources is his 'middle-out' approach that divides the conflict society into three tracks of actors (depicted later in Figure 2.1):

- Track I – the top leadership
- Track II – the middle level leadership
- Track III – the grassroots

Although three levels or tracks of leadership are presented in Lederach's theory, Paffenholz argues that it is the middle level leadership (Track II) that holds the

"greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peacebuilding process over the long term", in addition to serving as "a source of practical, immediate action", sustaining "long-term transformation in the setting" (Paffenholz 2013: 5). Van Tongeren (2011: 16) states that creating an infrastructure for peace means developing mechanisms for cooperation among all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding by promoting cooperative problem-solving for conflicts and institutionalising the response mechanisms to conflicts in order to transform them. He concludes that national, district and local peace councils are the cornerstones of such an infrastructure. Moreover, according to Barnes (2006: 11), "local ownership of peacebuilding is likely to result in more legitimate processes and sustainable outcomes."

Barnes provides a model of engagement required between states and domestic and international civil society, potentially mediated by intergovernmental organisations or multilateral agencies where there is mistrust and a lack of cooperation between the national government and civil society organisations (CSOs). In this connection, Alther (2006: 279) provides the example of Colombia's bleak situation which justifies grassroots peace initiatives because such initiatives illustrate other realities, offer models for opposing armed conflict, and propose a human-centred peace. He reports that in Columbia, communities across the country are refusing to support violence by struggling to exercise their legal 'right to peace' and by creating mechanisms of self-protection. In other words, the infrastructure for peace appears to be working in Columbia.

Adell (2013: 50) also affirms that local-level peace infrastructures not only provide opportunities for the management and transformation of conflicts, but can also constitute real peacebuilding efforts in the sense of building the legitimacy of the state from the local level, based on the agency, agendas and desires of local state and non-state actors. However, Lederach's theory has been criticised by some scholars. For example, Fetherston (2000: 34) mentions the lack of power analysis in Lederach's approach, and Miall (2001: 36) highlights the limited attention that Lederach's model gives to the political system of the conflict-affected society and the specific regional and international context of peacebuilding.

Infrastructures for peace have been established in eastern DRC as a new strategy to end conflict. The establishment of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC can

be compared to Level 3 in Lederach's pyramid, as depicted in Figure 2.1. Infrastructures built from a systemic approach to change that includes, but looks consistently beyond, intervention projects and intense investments to end armed conflict have been the main strategy to bringing about durable peace (Lederach 2012: 10). As with other countries, the Congolese people, through local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have developed new structures to foster social cohesion in the eastern part of the country. In eastern DRC, many initiatives, especially those undertaken by international and civil society organisations, are aimed at peacebuilding at the local, community level, although protracted armed conflict within the region generally pervades all levels of society. This limited targeting is in contrast to Odendaal's (2012: 46) perception of peacebuilding as the joint responsibility of a whole society and not the exclusive domain of the political elite. Odendaal (2012: 46) further states that the main resources needed for peacebuilding are located in a society, and not externally, and that conscious efforts are needed to galvanise them.

**Figure 2.1: Lederach's pyramid model of the infrastructure of peace**




Derived from John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 39.

Richmond (2012: 22) adds that although local peace infrastructures have only recently come to the attention of scholars, they are emerging across the world. He adds that peace infrastructures may be embedded in existing peace processes, involving governments, donors, and often the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, he regrets that although peace infrastructures have been credited with significant achievements, they have also often been overlooked because they are normally "local" (meaning context-based) and often partly informal. In Adell's (2013: 50) view, these efforts are crucial to processes of social transformation, based on a democratic logic that promotes peace based on people's everyday lives.

Adell also affirms that peacebuilding logic is driven by local power and agency, and it aims to build a set of social, community, ethnic and institutional structures that promote peace within a framework of rights. Adell further affirms that this new vision of peacebuilding not only generates more effective and legitimate peacebuilding

processes, but also better reflects the reality of how peace is being achieved in the world (Adell 2013: 50). In Adell's view, the concept and practice of the local peace infrastructure can lead to a more legitimate and effective peace, provided that it is not forgotten that the infrastructure must constitute an expression of the critical agencies of grassroots, community, social and ethnic actors as well as the local state, and that it must be based on a concept of peace that does not ignore the everyday dimension of grassroots actors' perceptions of peace (Adell 2013: 50).

Amid the ongoing crisis of liberal peace and neoliberal state-building, Richmond (2005: 32) affirms that infrastructures for peace offer some hope for the development of local legitimacy because they appear to rest on local socio-political processes. According to Hopp-Nishanka (2012), Odendaal (2010) and Van Tongeren (2011) cited by Richmond (2012: 22), this is because they bring together different groups and promote "change agents" and networks of actors interested in peace and conflict transformation. Haider (2009: 4) asserts that the community-based approach to peacebuilding – defined as the range of measures necessary to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes – has been adopted in fragile and conflict-affected societies, and that it can be an effective approach to peacebuilding. In the same vein, the UNRHC (2013: 10) cites the example of Nepal where, in the opinion of the UNRHC, strong, vibrant and diverse local capacities for peace will aid the country in weathering short-term volatility and lower the risks of further violence that might otherwise undermine the peace process. Moreover, the UNRHC adds that the same local capacities for peace will also be the foundation upon which a transformed Nepal and a positive and sustained peace will be determined.

During the last two decades, it has been shown that the infrastructure for peace approach is fruitful. For example, Van Tongeren (2013: 12) reports that South Africa successfully pioneered a peace structure during the years preceding the 1994 elections, building mechanisms at local and regional levels that effectively stopped the escalation of violence. He adds that in Ghana and Kenya, the existence of peace committees has reduced or prevented violence during elections, demonstrating that investing in peace infrastructures is highly cost-effective. Local peace committees often fulfil a useful function in opening a dialogue in a divided community, solving conflicts and protecting their communities from violence. Local peace committees can

fill a void or compensate weakness in local governance and justice (Van Tongeren 2013: 34).

Kotia and Aubyn (2013: 2) opine that the creation of a national infrastructure for peace serves to allow societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with local indigenous skills, institutions and resources, without any intervention by external actors. They add that creating an infrastructure for peace means developing mechanisms for cooperation among all relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding by promoting cooperative conflict resolution and institutionalizing the response mechanisms to conflicts in order to transform them. As Van Tongeren (2011: 14) aptly notes that national, district and local peace councils are the cornerstones of such an infrastructure." In addition, Lederach (1997: 32) notes that such a platform is responsive to the day-to-day issues that arise in the ebb and flow of conflict while sustaining a clear vision of the longer-term change needed in the destructive relational patterns. He submits that the creation of such a platform is one of the fundamental building blocks for supporting constructive social change over time.

However, in eastern DRC, the many peace agreements signed thus far have not resulted in sustainable peace, and the situation remains unchanged. Moreover, although local infrastructures have been established at the different levels of society (villages, localities and territories) as a new strategy for peacebuilding, violent conflict continues.

## 2.10 Evolution of Infrastructures for Peace

Van Tongeren (2013: 9) states that the concept of the infrastructure for peace was formulated in the 1980s by the practitioner and scholar John Paul Lederach, and that it was based on his experiences with local and national peace processes and the use of committees in peace negotiations. In Lederach's own words:

> I first began to formulate the concept of an infrastructure for peace in the 1980s. During several local and national peace processes, particularly a mediation effort in Nicaragua, the support mechanisms to sustain the changes under negotiation, and which subsequently found their way into signed accords, required both conceptual and practical development (Lederach 2012: 8).

As Van Tongeren (2013: 9) relates, South Africa was among the first countries to experiment with such a peace infrastructure. Van Tongeren states that when Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, the country was deeply divided and violence was escalating. He adds that the main protagonists in the conflict (27 parties and institutions) decided to sign a National Peace Accord in 1991. Van Tongeren adds that thereafter they included the government, most political parties, major liberation movements, business, churches and other institutions. The established peace structure consisted of:

- A National Peace Committee, with representatives of all signatories
- Regional Peace Committees in all 11 regions of the country
- A National Peace Secretariat to establish and coordinate regional and local peace committees

The stated goal of the South African National Peace Accord as a whole was to "bring an end to political violence". The Peace Committees were the mechanism through which the occurrence of violence and intimidation "would be actively combated" (Ball 1998: 9). Van Tongeren (2013: 10) concludes that building an infrastructure for peace requires a long timeframe, although most countries currently establishing infrastructures for peace are in the pioneering phase.

## 2.11 Objective of Infrastructures for Peace

Hopp-Nishanka (2012: 4) views the objective of peace infrastructures as assisting the parties (e.g. through capacity-building or advice) with the process (e.g. through mediation between the conflict parties or facilitation of public participation) or the implementation of process results (e.g. through the monitoring and coordination of agreement implementation). In the same vein, Van Tongeren (20011a: 11) notes that the idea of a peace infrastructure is to develop mechanisms for cooperation among all relevant stakeholders, including the government, by promoting cooperative problem-solving and institutionalising a response mechanism to violent conflict. Lederach (2012: 10) states that the infrastructure for peace was originally linked to the principle of increasing strategic capacity by providing responsive mechanisms to undergird and bolster the change processes initiated through political negotiations and agreements

on the one hand, and important grassroots engagements that increased participation of local communities and wider civil society on the other.

Therefore, developing infrastructures for peace constitute a distinctive method of hybrid peace-making. Recent examples show that it is indeed possible to equip national and local actors to resolve conflicts, prevent violence, and build a consensus over contentious issues in an inclusive and credible manner. This approach is cost-effective (De la Haye and Kumar 2011: 18). However, Lederach (2012: 13) writes that an infrastructure must have a long-term vision and assured support that invests in resources emergent in, and close and responsive to, local contexts. In this regard, infrastructures for peace should not be driven by a short-term, external project mentality or agency. In the opinion of Adell (2013: 47), while the objectives and roles of peace infrastructures are fundamental and necessary, the structures can only be effective if the legal and illegal armed actors allow them to operate in the different phases of conflict.

The need to establish local infrastructures for peace in the DRC is sustained by Autesserre's (2010: 5) haunting question: "Why have all of the intense international peacebuilding efforts, including the largest peace-keeping mission in the world... failed to build a sustainable peace in the Congo?" Is it because the infrastructure for peace approach has not been tried, or because it has been tried to no avail?

## 2.12 The Peace Committee: A Component of Infrastructures for Peace

Van Tongeren (2011: 46) states that countries which have experienced conflict and would like to end the recurrence of internal violence have established infrastructures for peace, some at the national level and others at the grassroots level, adopting either a bottom-up or a top-down approach. In other words, depending on the strategy and mechanisms, infrastructures for peace can take many forms, relying on the specific situation. In establishing an infrastructure for peace at the grassroots level, it is always necessary to take into consideration local capacities for mediation and dialogue as an important force, and design the I4P to strengthen the different links between them, this can include making use of 'inside mediators' context analysis. Although there is no unanimous definition of the concept of a peace committee as it relates to local-level peacebuilding activities, it can be defined as a conflict intervention structure that

integrates both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent, manage or transform intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts (Adan and Pkalya 2006: vi).

As stated above, there is an increasing interest in infrastructures for peace, and several countries have recently established Ministries of Peace or infrastructures for peace, with peace structures at different levels of society, involving the main stakeholders. On the ground, these infrastructures for peace almost invariably include local committees. Odendaal and Retief (2010: 2) view the "Local Peace Committee" (LPC) as a generic name for committees or other structures formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village, with the aim of encouraging and facilitating joint, inclusive peace-making and peacebuilding processes within its own context. The same authors state that LPCs are implemented either as part of a national peace process or by civil society organisations in contexts of debilitating conflict. In order to respond to the crisis of the judicial system and the escalation of the conflict, civil society actors have put in place extra-judicial, conflict-management mechanisms. These mechanisms mostly deal with land-related conflict and family feuds and are based on a customary logic of conciliation that corresponds to the legal outlook shared by the population. However, as Morvan and Nzweve (4: 2011) observe, the multiplicity of these structures sometimes spawns clientelist practices. In practise, the specific names of "local infrastructures for peace" vary from country to country and from region to region. For example, Odendaal and Retief (2010: 8) indicate that a variety of names are used, including District Peace Advisory Councils, District Multi-Party Liaison Committees, Village Peace and Development Committees, and Committees for Inter-Ethnic Relations, among others.

According to Hopp-Nishanka (2012: 2), many local infrastructures for peace begin within society, in informal institutions and spaces, because the state has been captured by predatory elites. Therefore, an LPC is by its nature inclusive of the different sections of the community that are in conflict, and it has the task of promoting peace within its own context. Typically, local peace committees have sought to prevent and reduce violence, promote dialogue, solve problems, and build and reconcile communities (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 3).

Boutros-Ghali (1992) and Galtung (1975) identify three phases in conflict resolution processes: peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. On the basis of this

distinction, Odendaal (2012: 42) concludes that peace committees are peacebuilding mechanisms because their primary function is to consolidate a peace that has been agreed upon by the national leadership. Local peace committees are not designed as a substitute for local, elected bodies or local justice systems; they are designed simply as a strategy to create a space for the resolution of conflicts on rational grounds where the weaker sections of society and conflict victims receive justice (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 3.

Odendaal and Retief (2010: 13) further affirm that any LPC has to be inclusive of individuals from different sides of the conflict because an LPC that is composed of a homogeneous group would be a contradiction. The same authors add that even when local peace committees are composed of volunteers, those volunteers must come from different sides of the conflict, and they conclude that such local peace committees should therefore be composed of 'doves', that is, people who regard the achievement of peace as more important than pursuing sectarian interests. Odendaal (2010: 7) identifies two types of LPCs: the formal and the informal. While formal local peace committees receive formal state recognition in that they are established through a national peace accord, legislation or by a statutory body as part of its formal mandate, informal local peace committees are established by civil society participants, and are not formally recognised by the state. In addition, according to Suurmond and Sharma (2012: 81), depending on how the infrastructure for peace (I4P) is understood, community mediation might be considered as an I4P in itself, as a component of it, or as falling outside the scope of the concept. The same authors note that community mediation is one of the informal mechanisms through which disputes are settled in Nepal. This observation is supported by Haider (2009: 4), according to whom the community-based approach has been adopted in fragile and conflict-affected societies because it can be an effective approach to peacebuilding.

Adell (2013: 50) also observes that in recent years, some authors have injected the debate with more constructive criticism, calling for a bottom-up peacebuilding logic, led from the local level, which understands peace as an emancipatory effort of the people who have suffered from war ("everyday" peace). According to him, this peacebuilding logic is driven by local power and agency, and aims to build a set of social, community, ethnic and institutional structures that promote peace within a framework of rights. Odendaal and Olivier (2010: 8) state that a local peace

committee's strategy is characterised by its emphasis on dialogue, the promotion of mutual understanding, trust-building, constructive and inclusive solutions to conflict, and joint action which is inclusive of all sides of the conflict and which is aimed at reconciliation. Perhaps this is why local and international actors in peacebuilding in eastern DRC are considering local peace committees as a new way to help promote social cohesion and harmony within communities.

## 2.13 Peace Club as an Infrastructure for peace

A number of promising activities and practices could be considered to promote social cohesion and reduce community tension within and between communities. These include peace clubs which is seen as an infrastructure for peace.

According to Juma (2019: 166), a peace club is a form of peace infrastructure and a specific practical approach to peace education in schools and communities, to promote the value of peaceful and nonviolent resolution of disputes among children and youth.

In the same point of view, Irene (2016: 183) says that the peace club as an infrastructure for peace is a voluntary organization devoted to empowering its members – in this instance, youths or school pupils - with skills and knowledge in the area of peace and conflict resolution. In this case, the training and discussion was conducted within the school context, but peace clubs can operate in a wide range of contexts.

Irene (2016:183) acknowledges that as architecture for peace, peace clubs in schools can provide platforms or forums for students, and perhaps also teachers, to share their viewpoints and experience, help curb school-based violence and help a culture of peace in schools. The idea of peace clubs in high schools was hatched against the backdrop of the need to curb the rising spate of violence in high schools. On his side, Wa Munywe (2014: 8) asserts that peace clubs are established for the like-minded peace supporters from all walks of life to pursue their interests in and share their views on peace. Furthermore, it provides a platform for peace builders to inspire one another to put words into action and really make a difference in 'bringing hope and changing lives' of the disadvantaged.

On their role, the Peace Clubs are designed to help children and adolescents become agents of peace and change for themselves, their families and their communities.

The Peace Road Curriculum implemented in the Peace Clubs helps targeted children and youth to:

1) protect themselves and make good decisions;

2) treat others with respect, tolerance and peace;

3) foster relationships that result in a safer, more cooperative community for all (World Vision Uganda 2018:8).

Wa Munywe (2014:8) notes that peace clubs journey began with a phased, grassroots education program with the following goals in mind: Run educational programs & activities to stimulate greater cultural awareness and appreciation for peace among the general public. Promote global consciousness through organizing high-profile events & campaigns. Maximize efficiency & provide linkages from local and international organisations by developing a virtual & physical center of convergence to promote the 'Culture of Peace'.

## 2. 14 Theoretical Framework

This thesis uses the peacebuilding theory and the necessary and sufficient conditions theory to help explain the researcher's case study of the sustainability of infrastructures for peace in the eastern DRC region. Both theories are interlinked when considering mechanisms leading to sustainable development and social cohesion within the torn region.

### A. Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding, acknowledges Adams (2008: 28), is a relatively new field of study, with a wide range of emerging literature strengthening and developing existing theories. The depth of literature and involvement of research beyond traditional political studies has helped to develop this truly multidisciplinary field. It is an increased focus on studying the roots of violent conflict rather than simply dealing with overt war that has become central to this growth. Peacebuilding, according to Paffenholz (2009: 3), is essentially about the process of achieving peace. Depending on one's underlying understanding of peace, the practice of peacebuilding differs considerably in terms of

the approaches, scope of activities and time frame. It is therefore not surprising that the term and concept of peacebuilding are currently used in research and practice with varying connotations.

Adams (2008: 17) also says that peacebuilding entered the political science vernacular most notably in the 1992 speech, the 'Agenda for Peace' by former United Nations (UN) secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Born from the growing threat of internal conflicts and the UN's inexperience and inability to tackle intra-state violent, peacebuilding has come to give voice to post-conflict reconstruction.

New objectives began to emerge for the UN's peacekeeping intentions – that preventive diplomacy needed to investigate how conflicts escalate and how conflict can be predicted including;

- Identify any situations that could produce conflict, and the best ways to
- remove the sources.
- Once conflict has occurred, peace efforts must resolve the deeper issues.
- That the UN, through peacebuilding, must preserve the peace when fighting has stalled.
- The UN must assist all contexts of peacebuilding, including institutional rebuilding and physical reconstruction (Rupesinghe 1998: 17-18).

Last (1999:5), acknowledges that in some lexicons, peacekeeping is understood to embrace peacebuilding, peacemaking, peace support, and a multitude of other terms. Fetherston (1994:8) has classified several definitions, which go further to describe the substance of peacebuilding: "Peacebuilding is a positive, continuous co-operative human endeavour to build bridges between conflicting nations and groups. It aims to enhance understanding and communication and dispel the 'wandering rocks' of distrust, fear and hate."

Relevant theory comes from several disciplines, because practical peacekeeping and peacebuilding are inherently multi-disciplinary. International relations theories help us to define the field of conflict between and within states, and provide the framework for intervention. Psychology and sociology provide insights into inter-group and interpersonal conflict and conflict resolution. Strategic thinking gives us tools to plan action. In practice, peacebuilding is a synergy of social and economic development

through multiple organisations. Its aim is to transform conflicts in a constructive way to create an environment conducive to sustainable peace (Reychler, 2001a: 12).

### B. The Concept of Peacebuilding

There is a large quantity of literature on peacebuilding and other related terms such as peace, conflict and nonviolence in the wake of violent conflict, "peacebuilding" becomes a catch phrase in most African countries; this is the case in the DRC where violent conflicts have lasted for more than two decades. The international community and some local actors have put in place some mechanisms to promote peacebuilding in the country. But what is peacebuilding? This is a question that some practitioners and scholars have tried to answer. The term peacebuilding is viewed differently by scholars and researchers. Lilja and Höglund (2018: 417) note that there is no general agreement on what peacebuilding entails in practice. Peacebuilding may not only be the labelling of activities, which may vary significantly among different peacebuilding actors and funders, but also be the very end goal of activities.

Heathershaw (2007: 219) states that 'peacebuilding' is an immense challenge, adding that the question of what 'peacebuilding' is, is not separable from the question of how peacebuilding is practised. This is why he brands it as a 'travelling concept' that finds new meanings wherever it visits. In the same vein, Wainecke and Franke (2010: 76) note that a recent study by the International Peace Academy concluded that "peacebuilding has become a catch concept... [that] is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction". Elsewhere, the Brahimi Report of 2000 defined peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (UN Documents 2000: 3). The UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined and described peacebuilding as:

> A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow

set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives (UN Peacebuilding Fund 2007: 1).

For Holt (2005: 184), peacebuilding is broad, covering a vast array of activities in a conflict setting, and although there is a consensus that these activities are important, there is still confusion as to what exactly these activities should be and when they should be undertaken. In 2007, the United Nations Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peacebuilding as a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 2010: 1). It is this comprehensive definition of the concept that this study has adopted.

Ginty (2015) in Lilja and Höglund 2018: 413) affirms that a critical theory critique of the vertical dimension underpinning many peacebuilding interventions rests on the logic that international notions of peace, and measurements of peace, risk becoming irrelevant to local communities by being excessively aggregated, broad or narrow, or in other ways deficient.

Smith (2004: 10) notes that the term *peacebuilding* entered the international vocabulary in 1992 through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's report to the Security Council, entitled *Agenda for Peace.* Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the conditions, attitudes and behaviours that foster and sustain social and economic development, which is peaceful, stable and prosperous. Smith (2004: 19) adds that peacebuilding was the term for post-war activity, and that it was preferable to "reconstruction" for several reasons. In his view, "reconstruction" emphasises physical and economic reconstruction at the expense of activities such as reconciliation, and the idea of "reconstruction" is to put things back together again the way that they were, which might mean reconstructing the conditions that led to war. Conceptually, therefore, the term "peacebuilding" offered the opportunity to make a new start and not simply return to a dangerous *status quo ante.* Smith (2004: 10) adds that peacebuilding activities are meant to:

1. Provide security
2. Establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace
3. Establish the political framework of long-term peace
4. Generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war, and justice

Barnett *et al.* (2007: 43) note that the popularity of peacebuilding can be attributed to a host of factors. To begin with, there is a strong interest from both international and domestic actors to help states emerging from civil war, societal breakdowns, and a violent past. In the view of Barnett *et al.*, there is notably no shortage of demand from below, as many domestic actors look for international assistance in a variety of areas. Barnett *et al.* add that international actors increasingly view peacebuilding as instrumental to the broader humanitarian and international peace and security agenda. Wainecke and Franke (2010: 72) enrich the description of peacebuilding when they maintain that, depending on the specific conflict context, the spectrum of potential peacebuilding activities comprises the reform of society as a whole and all social institutions in the broadest sense, especially in weak, failing or failed states that have been mired in long-term internal conflict and whose capacity and resources, as a result of the conflict, have been decimated to a point where they are unable to resolve the conflict on their own. According to Barnes (2009: 143), peacebuilding is integrally entwined with social change, so that it is inherently political in the sense that it addresses social relations involving authority or power.

In the opinion of Manning (2003: 27), peacebuilding must go beyond a focus on building central political institutions, such as national elections and legislatures, unified armies and reformed security forces, to addressing questions of local civil administration and local politics. Manning adds that peacebuilding requires the construction of institutions and incentive structures that guarantee the implementation of, at the least, the principles of the political settlement throughout the country which guarantee that the new political dispensation becomes writ throughout the national territory, and that parties stop trying to renegotiate its terms at the local level. Madlala-Routledge and Leibenberg (2004: 129) opine that by rolling the "peacebuilding" and "peace-keeping" components into one, as proposed in terms of developmental peacekeeping, mechanisms are created to reduce the volatility which characterises the early stages of a peace mission whilst speeding up the post-conflict reconstruction process and capacity.

This is perhaps why Miall *et al.* (2003: 187) affirm that peacebuilding reflects an even more comprehensive approach characterised by "the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development". They add that peacebuilding emphasises the long-term and sustainable transformation of causes and patterns of structural conflict in all societal sectors, including the military as well as the political and economic sectors. Paris (2004: 2) supplements this view by stating that, subsumed under the very general mandate of "managing transitions", peacebuilding tasks include the civil and military management of the causes and effects of conflict at the social, economic and political levels in order to "create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies". In eastern DRC, some peace practitioners prefer to use other concepts such as conflict prevention and conflict transformation instead of peacebuilding, although in terms of the activities involved, these other concepts are not significantly different. All the same, conflict prevention and conflict transformation constitute the subject matter of the following two sections.

Peacebuilding can be defined as a wide range of activities aimed at the social, political, and institutional transformation required to create a lasting and self-sustaining peace. A key debate has centred on the rift between liberal peacebuilding and more communitarian visions of peacebuilding. The liberal peace is viewed as efforts to bring war-shattered societies into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance. Peacebuilding should instead aim at being transformative. From this perspective, peace can be achieved when communities begin to move beyond "negative imaginaries", engage in dialogue across social divides, and through everyday interaction shape the form of peace that may be either very much in tune, or out of tune, with elite projections of peace (Bertrams 2008: 388).

The liberal peacebuilding approach is defined as a "multilevel, multidimensional approach ... through which peace is built with twin anchors in international norms, law and institutions, and the liberal democratic and 'marketised' concept of the state" (Richmond 2013: 381). At the other end, the illiberal framework is defined in negative terms as not promoting liberal values of human rights, the rule of law and the liberal state, but grounded in other cultures, values and political orders. The illiberal order is also the informal, local one, neither known nor controlled by the state, auto-organised,

spontaneous, and supposedly more legitimate, as symbolised by "insider mediators" (Verzat 2014: 2).

Chivasa (2015: 12) notes that by definition, peacebuilding signifies the idea that peace is more than just the absence of violence, and rather constitutes a dynamic positive state of affairs that needs to be built and reinforced. One of the frameworks of peacebuilding is the infrastructure for peace. In this framework, peacebuilding is considered as an integrated process requiring strategic designs in order to address all the facts surrounding conflict and the capacity to create an enabling environment that sustains peace (Lederach 1997: 20). In this way, Last (2014: 6) notes that a relevant theory of peacebuilding comes from several disciplines, because peacebuilding is inherently multi-disciplinary. International relations theories help to define the field of conflict between and within states and provide the framework for intervention. Psychology and sociology provide insights into inter-group and interpersonal conflict and conflict resolution.

Lederach (1997, in Chivasa 2017: 3) notes that this framework marked the development of an understanding of conflict as a system. As a system, conflict came to be understood as behavioural and attitudinal and as a systemic phenomenon involving a number of interconnected elements such as context, history and actors, thus placing heavy emphasis on the need for comprehensive and all-encompassing peace architecture to ensure sustainable peace.

In the Agenda for Peace by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, (Boutros-Ghali 1992), peacebuilding is described as a major instrument for securing peace in post-war situations. More generally, as a preventive measure, it can be applied in all stages of conflict and also in relatively peaceful societies. In order to develop options that could be essential for the sustainability of infrastructures for peace in the torn region of eastern DRC, this thesis combines peacebuilding and the necessary and sufficient conditions theories. The establishment for infrastructures for peace is a new way of conceiving peacebuilding processes as they aim to ensure social cohesion and also create the basis of sustainable peace within societies. The infrastructure for peace in eastern DRC is central to this study.

### C. The theory of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Pearson (2012: 1) states that to describe the relationship between the simpler and more complex concepts in a purported analysis, philosophers sometimes use the terminology of necessary and sufficient conditions this is closely related to logicians' use of the material conditional:

1. P is a necessary condition for Q if and only if an instance of Q must also be an instance of P [Q ⊃P].
2. P is a sufficient condition for Q if and only if an instance of P must also be an instance of Q [P ⊃ Q].

Seate et al. (2015: 136) state that a cause is necessary when the causal variable (X) must be present to produce the outcome (Y), but the cause's presence does not ensure the outcome's presence. In other words, if X is absent, Y is absent. On the other hand, a cause is sufficient when X produces Y, but Y can also be produced by other causes.

This study is concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC in promoting sustainable peace. This study aims to answer the question: are the different mechanisms employed in establishing the infrastructures for peace necessary, and are the mechanisms of membership a sufficient condition?

## 2.15 Conclusion

This literature review has examined the interconnectedness of peace, development and sustainability. The concept of sustainability has been analysed with an emphasis on its dimensions.

The literature review has summarised the debate on the meaning of the infrastructure for peace and has cited some examples of infrastructures for peace in the top-down and bottom-up approaches. The review has also established that the concept of the infrastructure for peace is new, dating only from the 1990s. The literature review has also delineated Lederach's pyramidal model of the infrastructure for peace and highlighted the different levels at which peacebuilding operates or should operate in the context of infrastructures for peace. This literature review has also discussed the link between infrastructures for peace and peacebuilding as well as other concepts

such as conflict prevention and conflict transformation. Finally, the review discussed the different uses of the term peacebuilding and related concepts used by various agencies.

# CHAPTER THREE

# INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PEACE

## 3.1 Introduction

Many scholars argue that 'infrastructures for peace', a concept that recently entered the political arena, can help reconcile tensions that may arise from simultaneously addressing the dynamics of political, social and economic transformation, especially in contexts where the capacities to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner are weak. Frazer (2013: 77) notes that the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation is no stranger to jargon. A new term moving into the lexicon is "infrastructures for peace" ("I4P" or "peace infrastructures"). The origin of the term (Frazer 2013: 77) is credited to conflict transformation theorist John Paul Lederach. Many countries have considered "infrastructures for peace" as a new approach to promoting peace and the culture of peace and, as a result, infrastructures for peace have been established at national or local levels in a number of countries including the DRC.

This chapter presents an overview of different forms of infrastructures for peace established in some countries, mainly because the establishment of an infrastructure for peace provides an institutional focal point for implementing the peace policy of a community or a country.

## 3.2 New Approach

John Paul Lederach first introduced the concept of "infrastructures for peace" in the 1980s. It was based on his assumption that sustainable peace can only be the result of a deep and structural conflict transformation, including a transformation of the socio-economic root causes and political drivers of the conflict (Lederach 2005: 47).

Paul van Tongeren, former Secretary-General of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), defined I4P as "cooperative, problem-solving approaches to conflict" *within* societies, based on dialogue and non-violence, and he called for the development of "*institutional mechanisms*, appropriate to each country's

culture, which promote and manage this approach at local, district, and national levels" Van Tongeren (2011:55).

As Kotia (2013: 4) states, the "infrastructure for peace" is a relatively new concept in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, which explains why there are few studies on the concept. However, a general review of relevant literature reveals that existing literature on infrastructures for peace is dominated by conceptual issues, the objectives and the main components of a peace infrastructure, and a number of brief country-specific case studies of infrastructures for peace.

The importance of establishing an infrastructure to sustain and promote a country's progress towards peace has attracted growing attention as a core component of sustainable peacebuilding. The terms "peace infrastructure" and "infrastructure for peace" are synonymously used to describe interconnected structures or mechanisms that span across all levels of society to foster more strategic, sustainable and locally rooted interventions to conflict (Davis 2016: 5). In Davis' view, "A peace infrastructure is made up of a combination of actors and organisations with a formal mandate, as well as the means necessary for peacebuilding."

Kumar (2011 in Kotia 2013: 5) notes that infrastructures for peace are created to allow societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally using local and indigenous skills, institutions and resources, without any intervention by external actors. However, Van Tongeren (2011: 401) observes that some time elapsed before the concept began to be introduced in official arenas. For example, it was not until 2002 at the first *Standing Conference on Stability, Security and Development* in Durban that African leaders signed a resolution committing them to uphold their full responsibility to set up national institutions to manage conflict and work in partnership with their civil societies. Four years later, in 2006, Kofi Annan, now deceased and then Secretary-General of the UN, opined that the essential aim of infrastructures for peace "should be the creation of a sustainable, national infrastructure for peace that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally.

For several years now, researchers and actors in peacebuilding have considered infrastructures for peace as a new, effective approach to promoting peace within communities at the local and national levels. In this regard, Adell (2014: 2) notes that in the field of peacebuilding, the concept of "peace infrastructures" has been

developed in recent years, based on the experience of more than 30 countries that have been able to transition from war to peace. These countries include South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Nicaragua, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines. Frazer (2013: 79) gives selected examples of infrastructures for peace which will be examined later in this chapter. These examples include the peace infrastructure in Kenya which grew out of a grassroots initiative in Wajir District to prevent and respond to local conflicts and which resulted in the creation of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. This model was replicated in other districts, and related structures and policies were also subsequently developed at the national level.

Frazer (2013: 79) adds that in Nepal, a more top-down governmental model was followed, and a Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction was created to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006, which oversaw the creation of other bodies including local peace committees, a peace fund and a truth and reconciliation commission. Van Tongeren (2001: 401) acknowledges the work of the well-known scholar and practitioner John Paul Lederach, who introduced this concept in his book entitled *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, in 1997.

I4P gained wider attention and intellectual interest only following post-election violence in Kenya (2007) and Ghana (2008), when national governments and civil society organisations began pioneering the official implementation of a concept for national I4P in both countries. At the same time, the international discourse on the challenges of peacebuilding focused increasingly focused on the needs for structural transformation to mitigate the risks of crises and State collapse in post-war societies (Giessmann 2016: 9).

Van Tongeren (2011: 401) further notes that paragraph 52 of the UN Secretary-General's report (April 2009) to the Security Council, on enhancing mediation and its support activities, states:

> Given the promise it holds for States to resolve inter-group tension without recourse to violence, the development of national and local mechanisms for addressing grievances and reducing tension through mediation, facilitation and dialogue, has received surprisingly little attention. Recent efforts by the Inter-Agency Framework Team for Conflict Prevention and the joint program of the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs on building national capacity for conflict prevention to place peace and development advisers in UNDP offices to build national and local capacity and mechanisms have begun to redress this. Although this work goes beyond mediation to include other peace processes, one promising approach is the development of a national architecture for dispute resolution through national, regional and district peace councils to provide mediation and prevent local conflicts from escalating and spreading. Given the African Union's call for all its members to establish, by 2004, national institutions or mechanisms for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts at community and national levels, much remains to be done.

According to Irene and Majekodunmi (2017:26), Brand-Jacobsen used a health infrastructure analogy to suggest that just as health infrastructures are established to build and sustain health, infrastructures for peace are needed to build and sustain peace. Table 4.1 summarises Brand-Jacobsen's comparative analysis.

**Table 4.1: Experience in medicine compared to peacebuilding**

| Health infrastructures evolved | Peace infrastructure evolving |
|---|---|
| Health education in Institutions of learning | Education for peace in Institutions of learning |
| Awareness on public health | Awareness of public peace |
| Knowledge of health for guidance in risky activities | Knowledge of peace education for guidance in risky activities |
| Professionals in health services | Professionals in peace services |
| Hospitals and other health Institutions | Centres and Institutes for Peace |
| Units for speedy response e.g. emergency wards<br>Systems for early warning | Units for speedy response e.g. Mediators, civilian peace forces<br>Systems for early warning |
| Governmental health structures e.g. Ministries and Departments for health | Governmental Peace structures, e.g. Ministries and/or department for Peace |
| Capacities for civil society organisations | Capacities for civil society organisations |
| Development of relevance national health policies | Development of relevance national peace policies |
| Mobilises financial and political support | Mobilises financial and political support |
| Promotes a 'culture of health' for healthy living | Promotes a 'culture of peace' for peaceful co-existence |

| | |
|---|---|
| International infrastructures and inter-governmental structures for support, e.g. WHO | International infrastructures and inter-governmental structures for support, e.g. UN Commission for Peacebuilding |
| Promotes systematic research and lesson learned, methods and knowledge sharing. | Promotes systematic research and lesson learned, methods and knowledge sharing. |

*Source: Brand-Jacobson, 2010.*

### 3.3 Types of Infrastructure for Peace

Hopp-Nishanka (2010: 4) identifies the following nine types of infrastructures for peace, corresponding to the different stages of a conflict:

- Secretariats for peace negotiations
- National dialogue platforms
- Peace Department or Peace Ministry
- Peace commission on all tracks
- Party conferences on reconciliation
- National reconciliation commissions
- Peace museums or memorial sites
- Early warning mechanisms
- Local peace councils

According to Pfeiffer (2013: 5), depending on their main objective and on the phase of the conflict in question, the elements of a peace infrastructure serve different functions which include: capacity-building; provision of advisory services and facilitation of internal consultation for the conflict parties; facilitation of communication or mediation between conflict parties or with other stakeholders; contribution to the implementation, monitoring, and coordination of activities agreed upon by the conflict parties and other stakeholders; and advocacy meant to give voice to particular social sectors.

However, Kotia (2013: 6) states that the components of an infrastructure for peace are not universal in scope, and that they are usually determined by a country's socio-political context as the experiences of conflict differ from country to country. Kotia adds that in general terms, many authors have identified the following components of an infrastructure for peace: national, regional and local peace councils; national peace forums; a government unit on peacebuilding; a bill on infrastructures for peace; peace

education; building national capacities for peace; and the promotion of a shared vision of society and a culture of peace.

In the same vein, Frazer (2013: 78) notes that a peace infrastructure can include elements such as early warning and rapid response mechanisms, local peace committees, ministries for peace, national dialogue conferences and truth and reconciliation commissions. One of the challenges of generating a universally acceptable definition or description of peace infrastructures is that they look different in different contexts. In this regard, Suurmond and Sharma (2013: 3) acknowledge that it is helpful to make a distinction between formal and informal infrastructures for peace. In their view, formal infrastructures for peace have a physical structure, a degree of organisation, stability, a mandate, resources, training, and are recognised as such by their beneficiaries or "users". Suurmond and Sharma cite community mediation committees, local peace committees, peace radio stations, peace agreement monitoring mechanisms, religious institutions, and zones of peace as examples of formal infrastructures for peace. By contrast, Suurmond and Sharma maintain that informal infrastructures for peace are those that emerge on an ad hoc basis, do not require a physical structure, and which operate without funds.

Infrastructures for peace are also known to operate at different levels, and Adell (2014: 3) identifies three such levels:

- A peace infrastructure on the national level, which takes the form of a system of governance for peace.
- A peace infrastructure on the regional level, which takes the form of a point of contact between the national and the local. It is an arena for action where national policies and programmes can be put into the context of the local level, including an eventual peace agreement. It must also coordinate between the local and national levels, so that local proposals are taken into account in the dynamics of peacebuilding defined at the national level.
- A peace infrastructure on the local level, which takes the form of formal spaces for citizen participation (Local Peace Committees or similar structures) through which open dialogue can be fostered to nurture and enrich the implementation of the peace agreement. The local level is fundamental as it is where people have

suffered the most violence, and where the success or defeat of peace will be defined.

According to Kotia (2013: 7), the process of creating infrastructures for peace follows three steps. In the first step, a variety of names are used as an umbrella title for infrastructures for peace. These include names such as local peace committees (South Africa), local peace council (Nepal), national peace council (Afghanistan), national peace commission (Kenya and Nicaragua), and high peace council (Afghanistan). Kotia continues that in the second step, while some of the peace infrastructures have formal state recognition through either a national peace accord or legislation, others are established by civil society without formal state recognition, and are thus informal. In the third and final step, while some of the peace infrastructures only exist at the local level, others exist at the local or district, regional or provincial, and national levels, with varying links to formal government structures.

Hopp-Nishanka (2010: 4) identifies five characteristics of the different elements of infrastructures for peace that help to describe them in a less abstract and more concrete way:

- A key characteristic of peace infrastructures is their domestic foundation. The focus is on domestic capacities, not those of the international community and their peacebuilding architecture.

- Peace infrastructures are established during any stage of peace and dialogue processes, from the height of a violent conflict to the implementation and monitoring of peace agreements. They could extend far into the post conflict period if incorporating transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms: truth and reconciliation commissions are a prominent example, but places of memory like memorials and peace museums could also be components of peace infrastructures if they contribute towards creating a common future.

- Elements of peace infrastructure are found at all levels and peacebuilding tracks and show various forms of integration: Vertical integration between different tracks: engaging different societal levels (top, middle, grassroots) and administrative units at local, district, regional and national levels. Horizontal integration within the tracks: by bringing together all local peace council activities, or by establishing a regional platform for consultation, collaboration and coordination among

stakeholders. Consolidation at national government level: providing a legal foundation and appropriate budget for peace infrastructure; establishing a government department or ministry dedicated to peacebuilding and providing guiding policy.

- Peace infrastructures vary in terms of inclusion. Two forms of inclusion can be distinguished: those stakeholders who establish peace infrastructure and decide its mandate and functions will govern and "own" its elements; others might be invited to participate in activities but without a governing role.
- The different elements of peace infrastructure can serve various objectives and functions, which include: Capacity building, advisory services and (internal) consultation for the conflict parties; Communication, facilitation and mediation between conflict parties and with other stakeholders; Implementation, monitoring and coordination of activities agreed by the conflict parties and other stakeholders.

Peace infrastructures are established during any stage of the peace and dialogue process, from the height of a violent conflict to the implementation and monitoring of peace agreements. They could extend far into the post-conflict period if incorporating transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms: truth and reconciliation commissions are a prominent example, but places of memory such as memorials and peace museums could also be components of peace infrastructures if they contribute towards creating a common future.

Elements of peace infrastructures are found at all levels and peacebuilding tracks, and show various forms of integration:

- *Vertical integration between different tracks:* Engaging different societal levels (top, middle, grassroots) and administrative units at local, district, regional and national levels.
- *Horizontal integration within the tracks:* Bringing together all local peace council activities, or by establishing a regional platform for consultation, collaboration and coordination among stakeholders.
- *Consolidation at national government level:* Providing a legal foundation and appropriate budget for peace infrastructures, and establishing a government department or ministry dedicated to peacebuilding and providing guiding policy.

Peace infrastructures vary in terms of inclusion. Two forms of inclusion can be distinguished: those stakeholders who establish peace infrastructures and decide that its mandate and functions will govern and "own" its elements, and others who might be invited to participate in activities but without a governing role.

According to Pfeiffer (2014: 6), the different elements of infrastructures for peace can serve at least three sets of interrelated objectives and functions: capacity-building, advisory services and consultations for the conflict parties; communication, facilitation and mediation between conflict parties and with other stakeholders; and the implementation, monitoring and coordination of activities agreed upon by the conflict parties and other stakeholders.

With reference to Table 4.1 in Section 4.2, Pfeiffer (2014: 6) considers the following five elements of a peace infrastructure on the basis of practical experiences:

- *Peace committees or councils*: Peace committees or councils are entities that coordinate or monitor the implementation of a peace agreement. In some countries, a vertical structure of committees at the national, regional and local levels, mandated by three key actors (government, armed groups, and civil society), has proved very useful. In some cases, a National Peace Committee coordinates a country's entire peace infrastructure.

- *Peace secretariats*: Peace secretariats have been created to support negotiation processes and assist the conflict parties. Their work during the process can also start laying the foundations for a permanent and larger peace infrastructure capable of supporting the implementation of an agreement.

- *National peacebuilding platforms or forums*: These are more informal and multi-sector advisory, consultation or collaboration spaces.

- *Conflict monitoring entities and early warning and response initiatives*: These are mechanisms or entities with very specific tasks and competencies, which are dedicated to the prevention of violence, and usually form part of a larger infrastructure.

- *Truth commissions, memory museums, verification entities etc.*: These are spaces associated with the post-conflict stage, and they serve to enable conflict survivors to achieve reconciliation and closure.

According to Giessmann (2016: 20), infrastructures for peace can also be categorised according to their mode of establishment to arrive at two categories: those established from the top in a top-down framework, and those established from below in a bottom-up setting. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, Giessmann (2016: 17) summarises the advantages and challenges associated with each of the two types of infrastructures for peace (I4P). Table C1 in Appendix C summarises examples of infrastructures for peace according to Giessmann (2016: 18-19).

**Table 4.2: Advantages and challenges of top-down I4P**

| N° | Advantages | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Authorised mandate provided by the government | Political influence of the government and/or ruling actors on the design and implementation of I4P |
| 2 | Political and legal accountability of structures and operations | Risk of bureaucratic procedures and decision-making as well as departmental infighting (mission creep). |
| 3 | Interest and support of the government to make I4P functioning and successful | One-sided dependence on permanent governmental interest and support |
| 4 | Access to funding, staff; premises are provided and budgeted for | Difficulties for CSO actors to receive sufficient funding, staff support and a fair share of support structures |
| 5 | Professional flow and dissemination of essential information | Information may be biased and information flow may be controlled by governmental authorities |
| 6 | Media coverage and interest | Lack of independent and effective public oversight |

*Source: Giessmann (2016: 17).*

**Table 4.3: Advantages and challenges of the bottom-up I4P**

| N° | Advantages | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | High legitimacy, provided by the drivers and participants of I4P | Dependence on local power structures and balances |
| 2 | Sensitivity to cultural conditions due to limited scope and mandate | Marginalisation of minorities and influence of culturally inherited hierarchies |
| 3 | Diminished influence by external actors | Limited outreach and impact |
| 4 | Independence in allotting funds and taking decisions | Lack of sufficient resources and funding |
| 5 | Tailor-made approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding | Lack of appropriate skills and power to implement decisions and recommendations |
| 6 | Effective and direct public oversight | Lack of media coverage and public interest |

Source: Giessmann (2016: 17).

## 3.4 Local Infrastructures for Peace

Odendaal (2010: 7) acknowledges that there are two main categories of local peace committees (LPCs). One type is that of LPCs which receive formal state recognition because they are established through a national peace accord, legislation or by a statutory body as part of their formal mandate. The other type is that of informal LPCs which are established by civil society participants and which are not formally recognised by the state. Odendaal (ibid) argues that there is evidence of the widespread use of informal LPCs though their informal nature is both a strength and a weakness. In Odendaal's view, informal LPCs enjoy the strengths of being less indebted to political and government actors than formal ones, and of often being composed of volunteers with a high level of personal interest in peace. Odendaal concludes that consequently, informal LPCs are often more committed and more creative than formal bodies. However, their weakness is that they sometimes lack the clout to engage with government and political leaders and they are easily ignored by those who wield power (Odendaal, 2010: 7).

Odendaal's view is far different from Suurmond and Sharma (2012: 83) who say that formal infrastructures for peace have a physical structure, a degree of organisation, stability, mandate, resources, training, and are recognised as such by their beneficiaries, or "users". By contrast, informal infrastructures for peace are those that emerge on an ad hoc basis, do not require a physical structure, and operate without funds.

This study has focused mostly on the informal infrastructure for peace as defined by Odendaal.

## 3.5 Advocacy for Infrastructures for Peace

### 3.5.1 The Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP)

The impacts of the established infrastructures for peace in certain countries received a positive echo from a group of people, organisations and businessmen who together developed the idea of creating a Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP). The group deemed it important to sensitise countries at the national and local levels to establish infrastructures for peace as a way to promote peace and social cohesion.

*What is GAMIP?*

The Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace came into existence in October 2005 in the United Kingdom, at the First Global Summit for Ministries and Departments of Peace, which was attended by people from a dozen countries. Thapa (2007: 58), one of the GAMIP members, describes GAMIP as a worldwide *community* comprised of a broad spectrum of people and organisations from civil society, government and business. He adds that the group calls and works for the establishment of ministries and departments of peace in governments around the world, and that it subscribes to principles of non-violence in the members' personal behaviour with one another and the world, and in the resolution of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts by peaceful means.

Thapa (2007: 58) states that the purpose of the Global Alliance is to enable and facilitate the capacity of its network to share and provide resources, encouragement

and support for existing and new national campaigns for ministries and departments of peace that reflect and support the emergence of a global culture of peace and non-violence. The Global Alliance also seeks to increase a global understanding of the need for ministries and departments of peace around the world. Such ministries already exist in two countries: the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in Nepal, and the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace in the Solomon Islands. A principle activity of the Global Alliance, in support of its community, is sponsorship of the annual Global Summit for Ministries and Departments of Peace. The principal purposes of the Global Summit are to build relationships, share and learn from one another's experiences, expand the bank of knowledge and skills of the community by offering training programs, and to inform their respective governments and the world about the need for, and the role and practicality of, ministries and departments of peace.

### 3.5.2 The Rationale for a Ministry or Department of Peace in National Governments

Thapa (2007: 58) advances ten reasons to justify the establishment and existence of a national infrastructure for peace.

Firstly, he argues that a national infrastructure for peace serves the purpose of creating peace as a primary organising principle in society, both domestically and globally.

Secondly, he opines that a national infrastructure for peace serves to direct government policy towards the non-violent resolution of conflict prior to the escalation to violence, and to seek peace by peaceful means in all conflict areas.

Thirdly, Thapa states that a national infrastructure for peace has immense potential for promoting justice and democratic principles, and for expanding human rights and the security of persons and their communities, consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other related UN treaties and conventions, and the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (1999).

Fourthly, Thapa opines that a national infrastructure for peace can promote disarmament and develop and strengthen non-military options of peace-making and peacebuilding. Moreover, Thapa argues that a national infrastructure for peace can

develop new approaches to non-violent intervention and utilise constructive dialogue, mediation, and the peaceful resolution of conflict at home and abroad. In addition, a national infrastructure for peace serves to encourage the involvement in local, national, and global peacebuilding of local communities, faith groups, NGOs, and other civil society and business organisations, including the formation of non-violent civilian peace forces.

Similarly, a national infrastructure for peace can facilitate the development of peace and reconciliation summits to promote non-violent communication and mutually beneficial solutions. Moreover, Thapa argues that a national infrastructure for peace acts as a resource for the creation and gathering of best practices documents, lessons learned, and peace impact assessments. In addition, a national infrastructure for peace can provide for the training of all military and civilian personnel who administer post-war reconstruction and demobilisation in war-torn societies. Finally, Thapa argues that a national infrastructure for peace can fund the development of peace education curriculum materials for use at all educational levels, and can support university-level peace studies.

### 3.6 Examples of Infrastructures for Peace

Different kinds of peace infrastructures have been established and developed in some countries which have experienced conflicts, with the purpose of developing, maintaining and furthering the culture of peace and dialogue. As the following accounts demonstrate, I4P take different shapes and have different names in specific communities and countries.

This section provides selected cases of infrastructures for peace established at the national level (top-down approach) and at the local level (bottom-up approach).

#### 3.6.1 Top-down established I4P

The top-down approach is the strategy of establishing infrastructures for peace at the national level, and it has been applied in the Solomon Islands, Nepal, Costa Rica, Ghana, the Philippines, South Africa and Nicaragua.

**a. Solomon Islands: The Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP)**

An overview of the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) is given on the MNURP website (Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace 2010). MNURP is one of the Government ministries of the Solomon Islands, first established as a department under the Ministry of Provincial Government in 2002, and later under the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Peace and Home Affairs. The Government created the Ministry in response and commitment to restoring peace and stability in the Solomon Islands, following the ethnic conflict which occurred from 1998 to 2000.

According to Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) (Government of the Solomon Islands 2011: 12), the vision of MNURP is A united, peaceful, stable and prosperous Solomon Islands while its mission is to "Promote and foster national unity and sustainable peace through restoration of justice by fostering reconciliation, healing and reintegration of conflict-affected individuals, provinces and sectors strengthened with stakeholders in the process of peacebuilding nationwide. The mandate of MNURP is to promote peace and reconciliation as well as post-conflict rehabilitation, to strengthen and empower traditional governance systems, and to promote national consciousness. In the execution of its mandate, MNURP also facilitates and coordinates research on conflict issues and on policy and programme development. In addition, the Ministry monitors and evaluates peacebuilding and conflict-resolution programmes and provides advisory services to the Solomon Islands' national government. However, the Ministry's planned Traditional Governance Division is yet to be established.

After the conclusion of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in 2000, a Peace Monitoring Council was established to assist in the implementation of this agreement. In 2002, this was changed into the National Peace Council (NPC). The NPC deployed a number of local peace monitors that assisted in local conflict resolution processes. A Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) was also established after the TPA, tasked mainly with a reparation program (Anon 2014: 2).

**b. Nepal: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction**

The *Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction* (MoPR) was formally established and mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Despite having been an integral element of the Nepali government administration, it can be considered part of

an I4P due to its distinct role and tasks with regards to the peace process, including setting up local peace committees and the management of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (Giessmann 2016: 32). He acknowledges the idea of Suurmond and Sharma when they stated that the MoPR played a double role: an infrastructure for peace on the one hand, and a policy-maker in the peace sector on the other. Its success has been hampered by several factors such as insufficient capacity and funds, and a high turnover of staff. In addition, a gradual breakdown in the political consensus and a lack of inclusiveness in the consultation process for establishing the MoPR has eroded its legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness (Giessmann 2016: 32).

When Nepal established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in April 2007, it became the second nation in the world, after the Solomon Islands, to establish such a ministry, placing Nepal at the forefront of the rapidly growing global movement for ministries of peace in countries around the world (Thapa 2007: 56). Elsewhere, Thapa (2013: 59) notes that the Ministry was established in the aftermath of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists.

The vision of the Ministry is a beautiful, peaceful and new Nepal, established through lasting and sustainable peacebuilding. Its mission is to play a catalytic role through its institutional, procedural and technical activities for the end of the present chapter of violence, and towards the enhancement of sustainable peace and development activities.

The main objectives of the Ministry are to:

- Support initiatives for constructive conflict management
- Conduct discussion programs, workshops, interactions and trainings to sustain peace
- Promote the participation and integrity of all spheres of society in the peace process of Nepal
- Environmental development of international support and cooperation to promote peace

- Support GON in formulating and executing policies and strategies to sustain the peace process
- Play a catalytic role in constructing the action plans of conflict management, immediate relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction
- Play a recommendatory and advisory role in formulating policies and strategies required for peace and consensus building

**c. Costa Rica: The Ministry of Justice and Peace**

In September 2009, the Costa Rican legislature passed a law changing the name of the country's justice ministry to the Ministry of Justice and Peace. The new Ministry is working with non-profit organisations to implement a national plan for promoting peace, such as installing mediation programs in schools spanning the entire country and organising peace festivals. Communities are invited to a public place where peace messages are delivered, and where a social network is recovered to help prevent crime and promote social peace. There is a National Council for Security and Social Peace in which all the highest authorities of the government work towards promoting security and peace as a national policy (Infrastructure for Peace 2017: 2009).

The Ministry has five main functions, which are to:

- Promote and coordinate plans and programs aimed at promoting national peace
- Support the Ministry of Public Safety in matters related to firearms in the country, from the perspective of prevention of violence, as a means to promote a culture of peace and nonviolence
- Promote alternative conflict resolution as a means to develop a culture of peace, without a detrimental effect on other functions established in the Law of Alternative Conflict Resolution
- Encourage the best inter-institutional articulation to comply with the Law of Public Performance
- Promote the participation of the civil society through non-governmental organisations and any other organisations devoted to the promotion of peace and

nonviolence, as well as any other function that may be assigned to it by law or decree

**d. Ghana: National Peace Council (NPC)**

The National Peace Council (NPC) of Ghana was set up administratively in August 2006 by a government decision, as part of Ghana's national architecture for peace. However, it was not until 2011 that it was legally recognised under the Constitution of Ghana by an Act of Parliament, the National Peace Council Act 818. Therefore, though the NPC was in existence, it was only provided with constitutional recognition in 2011 (Kotia 2013: 13).

Ghana's national peace architecture, particularly its National Peace Council, has been recognised as an important emerging model for developing state capacity to protect civilians and prevent conflict. The national peace architecture stands on seven pillars (Awindor-Kanyirige 2014: 1):

- Law and order by the National Security Council
- Rule of law by the Judiciary
- Traditional authority and alternative justice by the National House of Chiefs
- Oversight by the legislature and the independent national human rights body
- Electoral oversight and civic education by the independent Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Civic Education, respectively
- Watchdog and advocacy functions by civil society organisations (CSOs)
- Mediation and advocacy by the National Peace Council and supporting CSO bodies.

Van Tongeren (2011: 48) notes that in Africa, Ghana is at the moment one of the few countries with a well-developed national infrastructure for peace, and it was the first to establish an official, national-level architecture for peacebuilding in Africa. Issifu (2014: 3) notes that Ghana is among the few countries in the world to have a well-designed infrastructure for peace, the National Peace Council (NPC). Giessmann (2016: 16) adds that Ghana developed the first coherent national peace architecture at all national and governmental levels, responding to a wide range of challenges, and

mediating or facilitating dialogue on diverse issues. The infrastructure has interconnected vertical and horizontal dimensions, and functioning peace advisory councils exist at the district, regional and national levels. In addition, government-affiliated peace promotion officers are based at the regional and district levels, and a coordinating Peacebuilding Support Unit exists within the Ministry of Interior.

**e. The Structure and Mandate of the National Peace Council**

According to Awindor-Kanyirige (2014: 1), the structure and mandate of the National Peace Council, as established by law, is created in the same three-tier structure as that of the government, the National Security Council and traditional authorities. This structure consists of the national, the regional and the district tiers, as well as the national board which exercises supervisory and coordinating powers over the regional and district levels.

The National Peace Council (NPC) is independent and includes a Board consisting of 13 eminent members appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State. Six of the members of the Board are representatives of religious bodies. There are also regional and district peace councils, with 13 members each, whose activities include, among others, public education, and sensitising and raising awareness of conflict indicators within the region. Executive secretariats operate in each region and district, and they are composed of peace councillors with experience in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Issifu 2014: 4).

Awindor-Kanyirige (2014: 1) adds that in order to facilitate coordination with the government, a peacebuilding support unit was to be established within the Ministry of Interior to interface with the NPC. The Minister for the Interior, responsible for internal security and the police, immigration and prison services, is responsible for NPC matters. He or she serves as a link between the NPC and the National Security Council (NSC), and also liaises with the Minister of Finance to ensure that the resource requirements of the NPC are provided through its regular budget and the peace fund.

Each of the Boards of the NPC, at the national, regional and district levels, is composed of 13 members who must be Ghanaians of high moral standing and professional integrity, drawn from diverse sectors of society. According to Awindor-Kanyirige (2014: 1), Christian, Muslim and traditional African religious bodies are represented on the Boards at each level. Each of the following Christian bodies is

entitled to one representative on the Board: The Catholic Bishops Conference, the Christian Council, the Ghana Pentecostal Council, and the National Council for Christians and Charismatic Churches.

Muslims are represented by one person from each of the following bodies: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, the Al-Sunnah Muslims, and the Tijaaniya Muslim Groups. On the other hand, Traditional African Religions and traditional authorities (the National House of Chiefs) are each represented by one person. Finally, two Board members, one of whom must be female, are nominated by the President of Ghana and two others are nominated by the private sector and professional associations.

**f. Functions of the National Peace Council at the National Level**

The UNDP (2006) reports that on the occasion of the investiture of Ghana's NPC, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas stated that the Council had an ambitious and important mission: "to facilitate the development of mechanisms of cooperation among all stakeholders who work towards peace in Ghana; [to promote] a cooperative resolution of problems or conflicts by institutionalising conflict resolution which will lead to the transformation of social and political conflicts, as well as to religious reconciliation and dialogue." This mission, and the achievements and reputation in carrying it out, has made the National Peace Council the best practice for other countries in Africa to emulate. More specifically, the functions of the NPC are to:

- Harmonise and co-ordinate conflict prevention, management and resolution, and build sustainable peace through networking and co-ordination
- Strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, management, resolution and sustainable peace in the country, including but not limited to chiefs, women, youth groups and community organisations
- Increase awareness of the use of non-violent strategies to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, and build sustainable peace in the country
- Facilitate the amicable resolution of conflict through mediation and other processes, including indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding

- Promote understanding of the values of diversity, trust, tolerance, confidence-building, negotiation, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation
- Co-ordinate and supervise the work of the Regional and District Peace Councils
- Facilitate the implementation of agreements and resolutions reached between parties in conflict
- Make recommendations to the Government and other stakeholders on actions to promote trust and confidence between and among groups, and to perform any other functions which are ancillary to its objectives

**g. Functions of the Peace Council at the Regional Level**

At the regional level, the NPC performs seven functions which are to:

- Offer advice to the Regional Coordinating Council and the Regional Security Council in relation to conflict-prevention, management and resolution, and building sustainable peace in the region
- Mediate in conflict which is likely to erupt in violence, and intervene after law and order is restored by the Regional Security Council
- Engage in public education and create awareness of conflict indicators within the region, and make recommendations to the Regional Co-ordinating Council and the Regional Security Council on how to improve the situation
- Facilitate the organisation of activities that build friendship, promote trust, tolerance, goodwill and reconciliation between communities
- Initiate and support training and capacity-building programmes for relevant stakeholders in the region
- Perform other functions that may be assigned by the Regional Co-ordinating Council
- Perform any other function ancillary to its objectives

**h. Functions of the Peace Council at the District Level**

At the district level, the Council performs six functions which are to:

- Assist the District Assembly and the District Security Council in peace initiatives
- Mediate in inter- and intra-community conflicts or conflicts among groups within the district, except where armed violence has broken out, the invitation of the District Security Council would be required
- Engage in public education and create awareness of conflict indicators within the district and make recommendations to the District Assembly on how to improve the situation
- Facilitate the organisation of activities that build friendship, promote trust, tolerance, goodwill and reconciliation between communities, and prevent the occurrence of conflict
- Initiate and support training and other capacity-building programmes for relevant stakeholders in the district
- Perform any other functions determined by the Regional Security Council and the National Security Co-ordinating Council

**i. Philippines: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (Opapp)**

In 1994, President Fidel Ramos instituted the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process (OPAPP). In doing so, the Philippines drew heavily from the model of the South African peace architecture at that time, becoming the first developing country, and also the first country in Asia, to establish a mechanism of this nature (Kumar 2017: 2).

Kumar (2017: 2) notes that although the Philippines' peace architecture has been able to move several negotiations to successful conclusion, the following needs to be done to better ensure sustainable results:

- The architecture should help bring about political convergence among the wider constituencies of the various parties to the peace processes that it supports, including supporting wider national or regional multi-stakeholder dialogue.
- The architecture should deal more systematically with recurring cycles of local or 'horizontal' violence. Vertical agreements between armed groups and the national government often become eroded due to such violence, especially when it involves

members or constituencies of the parties to the peace processes, or when the parties themselves are impacted, thus eroding trust in the entire peacebuilding enterprise.

- Beyond convening multiple stakeholders for roundtable consultations and discussions, the architecture should link these processes to formal negotiations. Therefore, once peace agreements are signed, they are better placed to obtain buy-in from a much wider group.

**j. South Africa**

The National Peace Accord (NPA) and the National Peace Committee

Ball and Spies (1998: VII) inform us that in South Africa, the National Peace Accords established new structures and new mechanisms to offset those of the apartheid regime. According to the same authors, these mechanisms also prepared the groundwork for an eventual transformation of the political order. The first mechanism was the establishment of a truth commission to document past human rights abuses committed by the government as well as opposition political parties. To confront the pervasive turbulence in South Africa, the peace accords mandated the creation of a second mechanism: local and regional peace committees. These peace committees were employed as a short-term tool to help manage conflict during an interim period while the country's political transition was being negotiated. In the opinion of Ball and Spies, in other countries it may be useful to explore the possibility of using peace committees in a preventive mode, before the outbreak of hostilities, and to support political transitions over the medium term. The National Peace Accord created the National Peace Committee to help "implement the accord and establish the institutions of peace." Each signatory organisation had one or two seats on the committee, with senior politicians predominating (Ball and Spies 1998: 10).

Ball and Spies (1998: 10) further state that the mandate of the Committee is "to monitor and to make recommendations on the implementation of the National Peace Accord as a whole, and to ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations." By the early 1990s, responsible leaders on both sides recognised that political change was inevitable and necessary, and they agreed to work for a new constitutional arrangement in which all South Africans would be equal before the law. In pursuit of that goal, 27 South African organisations committed themselves, on 14

September 1991, to reducing politically motivated violence, by signing a document known as the National Peace Accord (Ball and Spies 1998: V). The accord also established a network of regional and local peace committees because the institutions of state were unable, for a variety of reasons, to find non-violent solutions to intergroup conflicts. Notably, at times the institutions of state contributed to violence. The work of these peace committees was to be overseen by a body called the National Peace Committee (Ball and Spies 1998: 4).

## The Objectives and Content of the National Peace Accord (NPA)

According to Ball and Spies (1998), the National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed to bring about an end to violence in South Africa and to establish a multi-party democracy. They add that it also aimed to bring about peaceful power-sharing in a multi-party democracy, and to assist in social and economic reconstruction. The NPA recognised the following as fundamental rights: the freedoms of conscience and belief, speech and expression, association, movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity. It was premised on fundamental democratic principles of good governance, mutual responsibility and accountability. Moreover, it provided for all signatories to monitor each other's' compliance with codes of conduct for political organisations, security forces and the police in particular. Specifically, the NPA required political parties and organisations, security forces and the police to perform certain functions (Ball and Spies 1998).

First, political parties and organisations were required to publicly condemn violence and encourage an understanding of democracy and tolerance, to prevent any member from killing, injuring, intimidating or threatening violence toward others due to holding different political beliefs, and to help police in investigating violence and arresting the people involved. Secondly, security forces were required to protect all people from criminal acts and taking sides, to try to prevent crimes, to use as little force as possible, and to work together with communities to combat violence in order to rebuild trust. Thirdly and finally, the police were required to protect the people from all criminal acts and acts of political violence without bias against any political belief, to consult regularly with local peace committees and community leaders, to disarm people carrying illegal weapons, and to implement special procedures for investigating political violence.

Infrastructures for Peace in South Africa

According to Odendaal (2014: 75), following the National Peace Accord (NPA), a three-layered I4P was created in 1991, comprising five main components: a national peace committee, a national peace secretariat, regional peace committees, local peace committees, and peace monitors.

The South African case deserves attention because it was among the very first examples of infrastructures for peace. According to Van Tongeren (2013: 9), South Africa was among the first countries that experimented with such a peace infrastructure. When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, the country was deeply divided, and violence was escalating. The main protagonists in the conflict – 27 parties and institutions – decided to sign a National Peace Accord in 1991. They included the government, most political parties, major liberation movements, businesses, churches and other institutions. The established peace structure consisted of:

1. A National Peace Committee with representatives of all signatories
2. Regional Peace Committees in all 11 regions of the country
3. Local Peace Committees (LPCs) in all affected areas, in total about 260
4. A National Peace Secretariat to establish and coordinate regional and local peace committees

**k. Nicaragua: The National Commission of Reconciliation (CNR)**

Mouly (2013: 48) states that the Nicaraguan peace commissions emerged from the grassroots during the war in which the Sandinista regime fought the Contra rebels in the 1980s. He adds that the so-called 'Contra war' began shortly after the Sandinistas came to power in 1979 and lasted until the election of a new government and the signing of peace accords in 1990. While several commissions disappeared in the 1990s, new ones emerged and many continued to mediate local conflict and promote peace in places affected by prevailing violence (Mouly 2013: 48). Mouly also argues that although local peace initiatives are important in ensuring ownership of peacebuilding processes and in contributing to their sustainability, they are often

overlooked. Mouly (2013: 48) adds that among them, grassroots initiatives are significant since they originate from those most affected by direct and structural violence, who have more incentives to resist it, but who also face more challenges.

The first peace commissions in Nicaragua appeared in the second half of the 1980s in some of the areas most affected by the Contra war in northern and central Nicaragua, largely being agricultural regions (Mouly 2013: 50). In tracing the origins of the peace commissions, Mouly (2013: 51-52) cites Chupp (1990) according to whom a few brave individuals affected by the war took the first step to say 'enough'. They joined together to form the first peace commission, committed to not simply dying passively as the war consumed more and more of their communities. This inner shift among the first commission members created a space for peace, where others soon entrusted these peacemakers to engage those directly involved in the conflict.

Initially, peace commissions were informal and shaped differently from one place to another. They became widely known as 'peace commissions' when the National Commission of Reconciliation (CNR), created in compliance with the Central American Esquipulas II Peace Agreement in 1987, engaged with them to foment peace negotiations between the government and the contras (Mouly 2013: 51).

In addition to relationships with their peers, the commissions developed horizontal connections with a variety of local actors, including people who requested their services, and state authorities. Their legitimacy – derived from the religious profile or local leadership of their members, as well as past actions -placed them well to serve as bridges between opposing groups such as local state authorities and Contra leaders during the war, rearmed groups and the state at a later stage, and divided families or neighbours (Mouly 2013: 56).

According to Giessmann (2016: 27), perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the South African process is that any inclusive local peacebuilding mechanism can only work well if the most powerful stakeholders – in this case, the Government and the African National Congress (ANC) – are able to agree on a joint roadmap, remain committed, and provide guarantees which demonstrate commitment. In South Africa, the two main conflict parties did not block one another; instead, they understood that a decentralised, nation-wide, and local approach to structural peacebuilding could transform society as a whole. The peace process in South Africa was coordinated at

all levels, with distinct but complementary roles for each track, and a countrywide network of similar institutional structures, contributing to what is now considered by other countries a success and role model for I4P. It has demonstrated that even a State and a society which was forcefully torn apart, which experienced a cruel past and began its national transition path with the highest level of mistrust and intolerance, can change over time if the process is based on inclusivity, participation and ownership. However, it should be noted that over the next two decades, the peace will not last if the lessons learned from the past are not preserved and continuously applied. This has become even more important following Mandela's death in 2013, because the integrative power that his personality had for the new South African social contract seems to be increasingly fading away and fragmentation is spreading a new.

**k. Turkey Peace Assembly**

Sunca (2016: 22) acknowledge that the Turkey Peace Assembly (TBM – Turkiye Baris Meclisi) was formed on 1 September 2007 following a conference entitled "Turkey in Search of its Peace" (Türkiye Barışını Arıyor) which was called by many well-known Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian and other public figures (including writers Mehmet Uzun, Yaşar Kemal and assassinated Armenian journalist Hrant Dink). After two years of preparations, the TBM was launched, its purpose being to put pressure on the different state institutions, including the parliament, to repair the destruction caused by the conflict, mobilise public opinion in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict and research the impacts of the conflict.

### 3.6.2 Bottom-up established I4P

The bottom-up approach is used in infrastructures for peace that are established at the grassroots level. Some countries are good examples in establishing such infrastructures. Giessmann (2016: 40) cites 15 roles of local infrastructures for peace:

1. Proposing brainstorming, problem-solving, and deadlock-breaking approaches
2. Ensuring legitimacy, community representativeness, and ownership, with processes and outcomes subsequently embedded and driven forward by communities themselves
3. Defusing local tensions and fostering constructive collaboration

4. Creating a space for dialogue and exchange
5. Creating a climate conducive to local security and stability
6. Monitoring and supervision
7. Interpreting early-warning signals
8. Facilitating/convening negotiations over peace agreements and other relevant issues related to disputes and conflict
9. Strengthening local identities and social cohesion
10. Enabling information flow and communication
11. Facilitating efforts towards dealing with the past
12. Preparing elections and empowering people (particularly minority representatives)
13. Cultivating "win-win" situations
14. Establishing unified mechanisms for humanitarian service delivery
15. Ensuring that political and financial support from international parties flows in a transparent and equitable manner

Bottom-up I4P have been established in some countries such as Kenya, Thailand and Burundi and are discussed in the sections that follow.

**a. Kenya: Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC)**

In Kenya, the institutional structures of peace committees vary from district to district. This is mainly because the committees were formed by different actors and at different times, such that there is no standard structure for the committees countrywide. As a result, the committees differ in their membership, roles, responsibilities, accountability and level of engagement with various peace actors. Some are called district peace and development committees, others are district peace committees, and yet others are called constituency peace committees. Some of the committees only exist and operate at the higher (district) level, with no structures or operations at sub-district levels (Adan and Pkalya 2006: 22). The Wajir Peace and Development Committee is perhaps the best known I4P in Kenya.

Wajir is a district located in the north-western province of Kenya (Issifu 2016: 141). It is characterised by high poverty, marginalisation, discrimination, inadequate human capital and scarce resources, including water and vegetation. According to Issifu, the Wajir community is vulnerable to extremisms, the survival-of-the-fittest syndrome and rivalry between different clans over scarce natural resources. Menkhaus notes that it took the efforts of a local peace committee, initially called the Wajir Women for Peace Group before becoming the Wajir Peace Group, with members of all the clans in the district, and finally, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC). An initially small women's civic group helped set in motion a peace process which eventually culminated not only in a relatively durable peace among the three main clans in Wajir, but also helped produce a new type of civic-government partnership for conflict management that went on to become a model for peace committees throughout much of Kenya. Their idea was quickly echoed and supported by a cross-section of people in Wajir, culminating in the formation of the committee in 1995.

**b. Thailand: Infrastructures for Peace in the Deep South**

Giessmann (2016: 34) notes that in 2011, a group of activists working on the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand initiated a network of *insider mediators*, called the "Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP)", which is comprised of academic institutions, civil society organisations and a think-tank attached to the Parliament.

The IPP is engaging committed insider peacebuilders and mediators from across the spectrum of conflict actors and opinions, including Thai-Buddhists, Thai-Chinese, Malay-Muslims and people with different political convictions but who share a common interest in the region of Pattani. Common access to IPP fosters the empowerment of community members in influencing conflict transformation on the ground. Ropers (2012) in Giessmann 2016: 34) acknowledges that the platform is inclusive and participatory, and that by engaging in dialogues and joint initiatives, the members of this network are able to share their knowledge and skills with grassroots communities and leaders. Through mobilising a space for creative dialogue on peace-related challenges, the creation of a culture of peace is being fostered.

**c. Burundi: The Kibimba Peace Committee**

Niyonkuru (2012: 6) notes that Burundi is one of Africa's poorest countries, with over 80% of the population living below the national poverty line. It is also one of the

continent's most densely populated and land-constrained countries. Systematic divide-and-rule strategies under colonial administrations helped to dissolve the unity between Hutus and Tutsis, which existed under Burundi's ancient monarchy. Following independence in 1962, Hutu and Tutsi power struggles degenerated into spasms of ethnic violence, a series of *coups d'état*, authoritarian rule, and the fracturing of the country's politics and institutions, claiming the lives of more than 200,000 Burundians.

Niyonkuru (2012: 7) continues that the first of the peace committees was formed in Kibimba (Gitega Province) in 1996 in response to vicious inter-ethnic massacres three years earlier. The Kibimba Peace Committee drew local citizens together, who became active in stopping attacks and retaliation during the war, rehabilitating surrounding communities, and restoring relations between local Hutus and Tutsis. The impact of the Kibimba Peace Committee helped it to become a model for replication in other places by the Burundian NGO, Ministry for Peace under the Cross (MI-PAREC), and subsequently other NGOs.

For Juma (2019: 139), the reason for working for peace in Kibimba was the need to reconcile Hutu and Tutsi communities. The two communities were divided by a history of violence, more especially the burning of Tutsi pupils in a local school on 21 October 1993 and the subsequent massacres of Hutus by the army.

Niyonkuru (2012: 27) states that the Kibimba Peace Committee is currently reputed to be the most active in the country, having an office and permanent staff. He adds that the committee has been legally recognised as a non-profit organisation, and it has contributed to the creation of more than 26 sub-committees in the surrounding hills and communes. Members of the committee are frequently invited to national and international fora on peacebuilding and truth-seeking, in order for them to share their experiences (Niyonkuru 2012: 27). Niyonkuru adds that one of the most important ways in which the Kibimba Peace Committee helped to expand the peace committee model throughout Burundi was when several of its members formed MI-PAREC in 1998. MI-PAREC has worked closely within Kibimba since then, but has dedicated its efforts to taking the peace committee model and the Kibimba experience around the country (Niyonkuru 2012: 27).

### d. Uganda: Peace Committees in the Karamoja region

Van Tongeren (2013: 110) asserts that in Uganda, Peace Committees exist in the Karamoja and Acholi regions in the North. Their role is to prevent and resolve conflicts, assess the situation in the field and report or respond to an impending outbreak of violent conflict. They also follow up and recover stolen/raided livestock. One insider reported from interviews with the police and community members that cattle raids have reduced, although cattle theft still occurs. However, road ambushes were reported to have ceased and a level of peace is returning to Karamoja.

### e. The DRC: Centre of Conflict Resolution in North Kivu

The Centre of Conflict Resolution in North Kivu was established in 2010 to help reintegrate former child combatants in their communities. It works on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in the northern part of North Kivu. Van Tongeren (2013: 6) notes that the Centre of Conflict Resolution in North Kivu is known for its successful community-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration work in the region. It has persuaded ex-combatants to leave the bush, and persuaded communities to accept them back. In spite of all these efforts and some successes though, peace continues to elude North Kivu Province.

### f. The DRC: Barza Inter-Communautaire in North Kivu

The Barza Inter-Communautaire was created by the Commission de Pacification et de Concorde (CPC), established by the government of former President Laurent Kabila in 1997, initially as a national body with provincial branches. The CPC established peace cells in each region, comprising eminent, local persons who worked at the grassroots level, organising meetings between leaders of antagonistic ethnic groups and convincing small numbers of combatants to lay down their arms and reintegrate into the community. Several observer organisations reported that the CPC was instrumental in generating inter-communal discussions before it created Barza Inter-Communautaire to consolidate peace (Clark 2008: 3).

## 3.7 Conclusion

John Paul Lederach first introduced the concept of "infrastructures for peace" in the 1980s. It was based on his assumption that sustainable peace can only be the result of a deep and structural conflict transformation, including a transformation of the socio-

economic root causes and political drivers of conflict (Lederach 2005: 47). The concept and the practice of infrastructures for peace have received momentum in many countries where they seem to be effective. Many countries which have experienced conflict have established infrastructures for peace at the national, the regional or district, and the grassroots levels. Encouraged by the success of these infrastructures in promoting peace and social cohesion in various countries, the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP) was created to advocate the establishment of these infrastructures within other countries of the world.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN THE DRC

## 4.1 Introduction

The persistence of violent conflicts in the DRC, and particularly in its eastern region, may be seen as a threat to human security in the entire Great Lakes region. N'gambwa (2011: 10) affirms that the quest for peace and stability within the DRC has a long and painful history. Since gaining independence in 1960, a host of conflicts, civil wars and secessionist movements have debilitated national infrastructure, shifted power to foreign-backed militia groups, and killed and displaced millions.

In order to bring peace and foster social cohesion, two approaches are being used: the top-down approach, led by the UN Peacekeeping Mission, diplomatic missions and some international organisations; and the bottom-up approach, adopted by local organisations with the support of some international organisations. Realising the importance of promoting reconciliation within communities, the international community has taken a significant interest in collaborating with local civil society organisations to improve human security and to promote a culture of peace in the turbulent eastern region of the DRC.

This chapter analyses the different interventions of the United Nations Mission and civil society organisations in promoting peace and fostering social cohesion in the DRC.

## 4.2 The Natural Resources of the DRC

The DRC is a large country, the biggest sub-Saharan country in Africa, with vast natural resources. These resources include various minerals such as gold, tantalum, tin and tungsten, amongst others. With its abundance of resources, the country notably has the potential to thrive economically. Eichstaedt (2012: 2) notes that furthermore, the DRC's natural resources include minerals which are needed in manufacturing various electronic devices such as computers, smartphones, tablets and other electronic devices. It is obvious that there is a growing demand for electronic equipment from companies manufacturing these devices such as Apple, Google, Huawei, Nokia, Samsung, Intel and others. This situation may make the global

electronics manufacturers a part of the DRC's conflict as well. Milburn (2014: 871) points out that the DRC is endowed with a wealth of natural resources and the presence of high-value minerals. The country is also endowed with a wealth of biodiversity, although the value of this is overlooked. The country ranks fifth in terms of the most biodiverse countries in the world; it is home to a plethora of endemic species of both flora and fauna and contains the second largest rainforest in the world, smaller only than the Amazon. Looking at the current condition, the country is experiencing an antipodal situation where it has abundant natural resources but where the population is very poor and only a small portion make a profit. One does not need to be a scientist or an academic to understand that the natural resources in the DRC have not improved the quality of life of the Congolese, nor have they promoted the development of the country in the broadest sense of the term. Despite this natural wealth, Burnley (2011: 7) acknowledges that the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with significant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly dependent upon agriculture and forestry. Throughout history, valuable minerals have been associated with conflict, banditry and violence. When managed well, they play an important role in enhancing economic growth and stability.

Unfortunately, in the DRC, the characteristics possessed by these resources also generate the potential to negatively impact peace, security and sustainable development. The vast majority of the Congolese do not profit or benefit from this wealth. Partisan exploitation of its natural resources leads to recurrent violence particularly in the eastern region. The question of natural resources is linked, one way or another, to violent conflict in the DRC. Essentially, the reasons for the fighting in the country stem from local issues such as corruption, land conflict, and local political and social antagonisms (Autesserre 2012: 4). However, Keckman (2015: 4) observes that the country's natural resources have helped maintain the conflict in the country due to the proceeds procured from them. Various rebel groups have financed their activities by pillaging the country's natural resources. Therefore, the country's natural resources play a part in sustaining the conflict. Nguh (2013: 1) also acknowledges that the natural resources have thus far failed to lift the majority out of abject poverty. Unemployment levels are very high, literacy levels are very low and technical capacity is limited.

When discussing the mismanagement of natural resources in the DRC, it is important to comprehend the term 'looting'. The pillage of the DRC's resources is frequently seen

merely in terms of illegal export by foreign armies and militias and limited to the conflict zones, but experts acknowledge that the Congolese government is equally implicated in the fraud and corruption with regards to its natural resources. According to Filipovic (2014: 7), the conflict over natural resources is derived from conflict areas such as the eastern part of the country; funding for the wrong individuals, such as the various rebel groups; and corrupt individuals in the Congolese government and army.

## 4.3 The Dynamics of Conflict

Violent clashes and conflicts have been recurring in the eastern DRC despite consistent efforts at the local, national, regional and international levels to negotiate the end of conflict, consolidate peace, and eliminate the deep insecurity and suffering resulting from the deadliest conflicts.

Scholars and international and local peacebuilding actors consider land as one of the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC. Vlassenroot and Huggins (2004: 1) note that land has been a source of conflict for many years. Before the colonial conquest, large parts of eastern Congo were characterised by markedly stratified patriarchal social structures. Access to land was regulated by a hierarchical administration based on communal territorial ownership.

### 4.3.1 The Land Issue in the DRC

Everywhere in the world, land is considered as a valuable resource with economic and strategic value, as well as political and cultural significance. Individuals, communities, private-sector actors, the State and others use land for different, often opposing, purposes and seek to benefit from land, sometimes to the detriment – real or perceived – of others. While land remains a largely fixed asset, the demands upon land generally increase, accompanied by resulting tensions. The last decade has seen growing recognition of these dynamics and of the major role played by the competition for land in generating conflict. Sub-Saharan Africa has a history of land dispossession and contestation which has resulted in various types of inequalities and a skewed distribution of land resources. Land in Sub-Saharan Africa has been subject to conflict, conquest, expropriation and exploitation, thus resulting in the many discrepancies that exist today (Bruce and Holt 2011: 11).

Büsher (2012: 8) notes that land is a key resource, and its attribution is of vital economic and political concern across societal groups. Crucially therefore, the control of land is a key determinant of power in the Congo. Land is not only important as a material resource, it is also woven into many aspects of social life for Congo's urban residents. Occupation and possession of land are important sources of prestige and self-esteem, and it contributes in no small way to determining people's social, economic, and political positions in society.

However, for Huggins (2005: 2), land use and land access have been significant factors in a number of high-intensity conflicts in Africa, though they are not always the root causes. According to Peters (2004: 8), land reform has been undertaken in almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The complex conflicts in eastern DRC have numerous sources. In addition to various economic and political issues, ranging from the military and economic strategies of Western powers and neighbouring countries, the weak nature of the state in the DRC, and the historical relationship between ethnic groups, these include natural resources of much greater value with a much more 'lootable' character than agricultural or pastoral land.

Looking at the situation in the DRC, land issues are among the main causes of conflict as they are linked to natural resources in the country. They have mainly been analysed as a rural phenomenon associated with customary law, but scholars have shown that land issues are crucially important in urban areas as well (Büscher and Vlassenroot 2010: 14). Cotula (2012) in Maze 2015: 21) maintains that in many areas of eastern DRC however, land is becoming increasingly scarce. A variety of pressures, including demographic growth, migration, and climate change (which will be explored below), have increased the competition for land among multiple land users (farmers, pastoralists, and so on), government municipalities, urban elites, and foreign investors. The scarcity has also increased the value of the land, making its ownership – and clarity therein – all the more desirable. These tensions have major political and social implications, as they involve issues of broader resource control and exploitation and the distribution of wealth and power in society (Cotula *et al.* 2004).

### 4.3.2 Land Tenure

Land tenure defines the relationship between people and land and other natural resources. It determines who has access to land and who can be excluded from it; the

terms and conditions of that access; the rights and obligations that such access gives rise to; how land can be used and controlled; and the means and circumstances by which the rights and obligations can be transferred to others (Rurangwa 2007: 18).

In the DRC, as in other countries, customary, informal and statutory land-tenure systems 'overlap' geographically, in the sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different actors under different systems. Individuals, and sometimes communities, may simultaneously claim land through a variety of systems, resulting in confusion and dispute. The eastern DRC encompasses a vast area and large diversity in terms of geography, forms of local governance, ethnic composition, and other aspects (Huggins 2010: 5).

As mentioned earlier, there are a number of different systems in eastern DRC which hold decision-making powers over land. Unruh (2005) in Erero *et al.* 2013: 4) identifies three types of systems: (i) customary, (ii) informal and (iii) statutory systems. The first, customary systems, are normally administered by local traditional leaders who regulate land use according to clan ownership. They tend to favour the men, while women and children are frequently deprived of their land rights. The second, informal land use systems, derive from circumstances where the government and traditional leaders are unable to regulate land use. A prominent example of informal systems comprises 'squatter' townships which accommodate despondent and displaced people. The last, statutory systems, rely on national laws and regulations, in which land is owned and a title deed is obtained. They provide an adequate basis for the registration of urban land such as national parks, game ranches, commercial farms, production forests, wildlife reserves and other strict nature reserves. Nonetheless, in the DRC, statutory systems may not be administered nationwide due to poor capacity or political will. This results in an uncertain relationship between customary and statutory tenure systems. Moreover, land represents not simply an economic asset or a place of residence but a source of identity, power and social status (Betge 2018: 14).

Cotula (1995) in Maze 2015: 21) notes that in many areas however, land is becoming increasingly scarce. A variety of pressures, including demographic growth, migration and climate change have increased the competition for land among multiple land users, government municipalities, urban elites, and foreign investors. The scarcity has also increased the value of the land, making its ownership – and clarity therein – all

the more desirable. These tensions have major political and social implications, as they involve issues of broader resource control and exploitation, and the distribution of wealth and power in society. While modern national laws exist, access to land is typically granted by powerful local chiefs on the basis of traditional customary law. The latter was made legally void in 1973, when all land was declared state property. As a consequence, two systems of land property rights – the traditional system, based on ethnic citizenship, and the modern system, based on individual property rights – have existed simultaneously and in contradiction to each other, causing confusion and uncertainty over land ownership (Tamm and Lauterbach 2011: 3).

### 4.3.3 Land and Identity

Donge and Pherani (1999) in Mwesigye 2014: 3) note that land is fundamental and that it represents a core value in African society, and that African people are emotionally attached to "their land,' which represents an important source of their identity and is typically seen in a holistic perspective". Questions of identity and migration thus become particularly salient. As observed in many African countries, original inhabitants oppose the transfer of traditionally-owned family and community land to 'strangers' by committing acts of sabotage, looting, burning, and theft of the property and crops of the new landholders. Land is a major economic, political, social and cultural asset in Africa. Controlling land resources, nationally and/or locally, is also a means to accumulate political, economic and social power. Thus, land reform is a highly-politicised process that can be seen as a threat to the interests of certain actors (Ouedraogo *et al.* 2006: 8).

Africa's land questions are a critical factor in defining contemporary social transformation and in shaping the continent's development trajectory. Land scarcity and access constraints are the main source of persistent food insecurity, rural poverty, distorted accumulation and development, as well as the escalating conflicts over land rights (Moyo 2007: 2). According to Bruce and Holt (2011: 11), land is a valuable resource with economic and strategic value, as well as political and cultural significance. Individuals, communities, private sector actors, the State and others use land for different, often opposing, purposes and seek to benefit from land, sometimes to the detriment – real or perceived – of others. While land remains a largely fixed asset, the demands upon land generally increase accompanied by the resulting

tensions. The last decade has seen a growing recognition of these dynamics, and of the major role played by the competition for land in generating conflict.

Furthermore, Kaberry (1959 in Sone 2012: 1), states that competition over landownership can be found in almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa. Where it occurs, power, wealth and survival are measured by the ownership and control of land, which is a vital resource needed for sustenance.

In eastern Congo, land is at once a source of power and identity, a condition for survival and a driver of (violent) conflict. In the context of structural connections between identity and territory, a long history of the use of land as a patronage resource and as a political commodity has gradually intensified. While in most cases these struggles remain limited to the individual level, in many areas they affect entire communities and have become key drivers for violence (Mathys and Vlassenroot 2016: 5).

According to Bruce and Holt (2011: 11), land is a valuable resource and plays a central role in livelihoods in developing countries. As a base for agricultural production, it is the primary source of the food security of rural people and the major source from which countries feed their urban populations. In addition to its economic value in current uses, land has a broader economic role as a capital asset. Land values are leveraged through mortgaging and similar arrangements to obtain funds for investment and development, making land critical for the generation of domestic capital.

### 4.3.5 Land as a Driver of Conflict in Eastern DRC

Vlassenroot (2012: 1) notes that land issues are being increasingly recognised as a key driver and sustaining factor of conflict in eastern DRC. Over the years, scholars and practitioners have identified a number of critical land-related factors contributing to violence and conflict, including a large diversity of land governance forms; the existence of overlapping legal frameworks and the weakness of the statutory land law; competition between indigenous and migrant communities; limited access to arable land in demographically-dense areas; the weak performance of the administration and justice system in the reconciliation and arbitration of land disputes; growing stress on local resources caused by massive displacement; the expansion of artisanal and small-scale mining; and increased competition between elites for the control of land and the consequent land concentration.

In order to understand the dynamics of conflict in eastern DRC, it is relevant to take into consideration land management which is being considered as one of the main causes of the conflict in the region. These dynamics are linked to demographics – the relative population sizes of different ethnic communities in particular areas – as well as the economic fortunes and political aspirations of such communities. In view of this situation, land management is becoming considered as a driver of conflict. Land disputes are considered both key sources and perpetuating factors of conflict in the eastern DRC (Mathys and Vlassenroot 2016: 1).

According to Huggins (2010: 1), the eastern DRC while acknowledging the diversity in land tenure, it is useful to identify two sets of dichotomies or "opposites" which are of great significance across much of the region: the dual system of land access (customary and statutory) and the conceptual contrast between ethnic groups which are "local" or "indigenous" to a particular area, and those which are seen as "migrants" or "foreigners". Huggins continues by stating that land in the eastern DRC can be considered not only as a cause of violent conflict but also as a factor in the continuation of the conflicts. Huggins (2010: 24) notes that the situation has changed from a "source" of conflict to a "resource" of conflict.

During periods of conflict or instability, armed groups and other powerful actors can benefit from the institutional vacuum to gain revenue from transactions over land, carry out other rent-seeking behaviour around land and natural resources, and grab land for speculative purposes.

Today it is widely recognised that in the eastern DRC, land issues are an important source of conflict, but also that conflicts over land can only be understood within the broader context of historical tensions and contradictions inherent in the socio-political fabric and governance context of the country (Antjie 2015: 3).

## 4.4 The Root Causes of Conflict in the DRC

The DRC has a very complex and violent history of conflict. Since the end of colonisation in 1960, the DRC has never experienced lasting peace. The DRC is endowed with a wide variety of natural resources ranging from rich flora and fauna to water. The control of these resources has brought more harm than benefit to the country (Lubunga 2016: 552). For many decades, violent conflict has engulfed the

different regions of the DRC and millions of Congolese have lost their lives. This conflict situation is the result of many varying causes and factors.

Nest (2006) in Lubunga 2016: 351), when analysing the historical causes of the conflict in the DRC, argues that "the pattern of resources dependence established under Belgium colonial rule, combined with the absence of a democratically accountable regime during the independence era, caused the weakening and fragmentation of the Zaïrian state". Apart from the greed for mineral resources, the war in eastern DRC is also maintained by a profound and historical record of ethnic rivalry.

In many parts of the eastern provinces of the DRC, land has been a source of conflict for many years. Changes introduced during the colonial period had a tendency to politicise and exacerbate conflict over disputed access to land. On the one hand, colonialism institutionalised the link between ethnic identity and land access within the political structures of the state, and on the other hand, it intensified local competition for land with the promotion of the migration of labour forces from neighbouring Rwanda (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2004: 1).

The region's main conflict lines are structured around governance and livelihood issues such as customary power struggles over land and conflicts with government and other public authorities (Solhjell and Rosland 2017: 4). Criticisms have been formulated on the intervention of international communities in the DRC.

Donais and McCandless (2017) in Lilja and Höglund 2018: 411) state that in the realm of international peacebuilding, there is a growing realisation that external efforts need to be anchored locally if they are to promote peace: key policy and development actors stress the importance of local ownership, inclusivity, local capacity building, and community-driven initiatives.

### 4.5 The Search for Peace in the DRC

For many years after the outbreak of violent conflict in the DRC, attempts have been made to promote peace. However, the situation remains unchanged in spite of the intervention of the biggest UN peacekeeping force and international non-government organisations. Bouvy and Lange (2012: 3) recognise that the international community has invested billions of dollars in trying to stabilise the DRC and bring peace to the country, but they know their efforts are not bearing enough fruit. In the same vein, Namangale (2015: 76) acknowledges that international, state and non-state actors

have tried to assist, but their efforts have ended as merely tragic twists in the tale. Namangale (ibid) concludes that peace is still elusive because of the deeply-entrenched mistrust among indigenous communities, government actors and international actors. While the DRC hosts the world's largest UN peacekeeping operation and is a major recipient of donor aid, conflict has nonetheless persisted in eastern DRC, prolonging instability and an enduring humanitarian crisis in Africa's Great Lakes region (CRS report 2019: i).

In response to the on-going violence and conflict, some peacebuilding organisations have developed a new generation of the bottom-up approach to foster social cohesion and peace in the country, particularly in the eastern region: local infrastructures for peace. Hayman (2013: 17) notes that there is a growing recognition of the ubiquity and importance of locally-led peacebuilding initiatives in conflict and post-conflict countries including eastern DRC where violent conflict is a threat to human security in the entire Great Lakes Region.

The return to human security and sustainable peace is premised to depend on the effectiveness of the established infrastructures for peace in the region in fostering social cohesion and human security within communities, and infrastructures for peace are considered to be an important entry point for development and other peacebuilding activities at the community level.

The DRC's enormous resource wealth is a driving force in the regional economy and significant in some sectors of the global economy. Research has identified a set of economic distortions linked to natural-resource wealth, including the so-called Dutch disease, where a resource boom causes a nation's currency to appreciate, harming tradable sectors of the economy (Gilpin and Downie 2009: 2). Crawford and Bernstein (2008: 2) state that the causes of conflict in the region are numerous and complex, and that they include the legacies of colonialism; the polarisation of identities; ethicised political violence, particularly between Hutus and Tutsis; disputes over citizenship; and chronic poverty and underdevelopment. Other causes are: regime survival; poorly-defined, conflicting and weakly-enforced resource rights regimes; and the predatory exploitation of natural resources.

Crawford and Bernstein (2008: 7) note that the DRC's vast mineral and forest resources have played a significant and well-documented role in driving the region's

conflicts. With profit made possible for many by the continued state of insecurity, economic gains have often trumped victory as a primary goal of the fighting. Similarly, Stabrawa (2003: 1) states that rich natural-resource endowment can be a curse rather than a blessing for a developing country, engendering corruption and conflict over their exploitation and the realisation of benefits, undermining the development of the country, and causing considerable suffering for the majority of the citizens.

The Institute for Environmental Security (IES) (2008: 9) points out that the combination of civil war, population displacement, ethnic tension and an increasing demand for natural resources (coltan and gold) for financing rebel movements in eastern DRC is putting increasing pressure on the Congo mountain forest and its biodiversity, and has led to a multitude of problems for local people. According to the IES, these problems include social-group (communities and families) dysfunction, mining-related illnesses, human rights violations (which include child labour in the mining industry and the abuse of women), and changes in human, land and resource use which are causing great environmental damage. All these problems constitute a major hindrance to peacebuilding and development efforts in the country.

### 4.6. The paradox situation of the DRC

The DRC is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources. It sits on an estimated $24 trillion worth of natural resources, including 3.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, large deposits of iron ore, platinum, diamonds, gold and uranium, as well as 106270 square kilometres of arable land (Keowen 2017: 1). The paradox is that in spite of its abundance in natural resources the population is among the poorest. His Lee (2016: 1) notes that In the DRC, the vast majority of people live in extreme poverty, earning only around $400 a year. The country is reeling from instability, hunger, and disease. The DRC sits on untapped, raw mineral ores worth $24 trillion — money that isn't directly benefiting the people who live there. It is estimated that up to 80 percent of all Congolese now live below the poverty line of US $1 per person per day, a situation that an independent intellectual interviewed by the evaluation team described as 'infra-human'. The eastern part of the country has seen the two factors combining in the most dramatic form, with the result that the human security deficit is much higher in those regions (UNDP 2006: 11). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2012:2) notes that the DRC is among the poorest countries in the world and is

consistently rated the lowest on the UN Human Development Index. Two recent civil wars and state collapse have claimed over 5 million lives and cost billions of dollars in reconstruction efforts.

For Burnley, the situation in DRC is not an exception while she says that the management of natural resource can be complex and difficult due to incongruent political, social, economic, and environmental goals even in peaceful societies. Conflict prone societies such as the DRC present even more complex challenges given the underlying political and historical reasons for the conflicts (Burnley 2011:7).

There is an important point raised by Burnley (2011: 10) when acknowledges that the theories of natural resources wealth as conflict cause in the DRC is well documented. But what remains unclear, however, is why large-scale armed violence persists in some eastern provinces of the country, while other, equally resource rich provinces, such as Katanga and the hinterlands of the Kivu Provinces, escape such violence.

Indeed, the instability and violence are still present in the east of the country, and the control and plundering of natural resources have contributed to the perpetuation of the DRC war and to the continuous presence of foreign armed forces. In this business have participated the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), local and foreign armed groups, local firms, various neighbouring countries and Western and Asian multinationals, as indicated by the United Nations for the first time in April 2001(Rufanges and Royo Aspa 2016 : 7).

Tshimba (2021: 13) points out that over a period of one and a half decade (1996-2011) during which the DRC experienced downright misfortunes from a chain of armed struggles over control of its peoples as well as its natural riches, both regional and international interventions to end the Congolese conflict, most essentially in the East, have only had very meagre results. While this region indeed requires a sort of political surgery to heal its political and socio-economic tensions, temporary dressing bandages are always provided 14 by the international community at large. On top of this pain-killer approach to conflict resolution and peace-building in eastern DRC, the systematic blame-it-on-victims game had only worsened an already bad situation.

## .4.7 The UN and the peace operations in DRC

Since the independence, the DRC has hosted a series of UN Peacekeeping missions, beginning with the United Nations Organisation in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s. Gambino (2008: 10) notes that Congo became the first newly-independent African state to request and to receive massive assistance from the UN. The UN Security Council authorised the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC), which operated in the country from July 1960 to June 1964, deploying 19,828 military personnel at its height.

According to The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries

ONUC was followed by the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC in the 1990s, and currently the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). According to Adhere (2012: 3), to bring peace in the DRC, the United Nations has deployed its most expensive peace-keeping mission since its inception. Over the years, its mandate has been revised to increase its capacity to protect civilians. At the same time, various international and local organisations have made other efforts to build peace in the country.

### 4.7.1 ONUC

The Democratic Republic of Congo became independent in 1960 and, soon after, it declined into chaos with divisions along ethnic lines. The media was still influenced by the colonial legacy and became a divisive force separating groups along ethnic and regional lines (Kabemba 2005: 1).

Thomas and Falola (2020: 3) report that, liberated into the world with little infrastructure and less preparation, the Congo began to fragment almost immediately. This was to be the turbulent period known as the Congo Crisis, which would take centre stage in the debates on decolonization and in the development of the United

Nations' responses to global crises. Similarly, Larmer and kennes (2014:1) note that eleven days later, the southern province of Katanga declared itself independent from Congo. The Katangese secession is commonly understood, primarily or exclusively, as the result of external machinations by forces hostile to the meaningful independence of the Congolese nation-state. Belgian colonial and military officials, and multinational mining capital, are portrayed as the main protagonists, seeking to maintain their economic and political interests against the potentially radical nationalism of the Congolese central government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.

The extreme character that took this situation compelled the Prime Minister to send a delegation to the UN to negotiate for assistance. The first UN mission in the Congo was referred to as the *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC*). It was the largest contingent the UN had used so far drawn from 28 countries with 20 000 troops, being the largest peacekeeping mission prior to the end of the Cold War. The Congolese crisis was unique in its kind and required peculiar attention outside the previsions of the UN charter being an international crisis created by outsiders within the boundaries of the newly independent country (Dunia 2019: 208).

Paris (2004: 18) points out that the mandates of the ONUC on peace-building were very vague. No mandate was ever adopted that authorized any specific peace-building effort. Instead the General-Secretary's interpretation of the mandates laid down the basis of what some scholars refer to as an un-traditional peacekeeping force. Lefever (1967:193) reports that through ONUC's Civilian Operation, the United Nations undertook functions that involved elements of peace-building. In October 1960 the Security Council determined that to preserve the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, it would be essential for the UN to assist the Central Government of the Congo. The protection and advancement of the welfare of the Congolese people were also included.

### 4.7.2 MONUC

In the 90s, two successive bloody wars which ravaged eastern DRC in a span of two years could no doubt be considered as the worst humanitarian crisis the country has ever had since independence in 1960. First, the war from October 1996 to May 1997 commonly referred to as 'the war of liberation' then, second, from August 1998 to July 1999 commonly known as 'the war of occupation.' During this bloody period the

country was plagued by vicious socio-economic and political crises whose outrageous consequences spared no Congolese community, more so those living in the East.

The United Nations (2021:1) acknowledge that:

> -the first wave began after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of a new government there, some 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus fled to the neighbouring Kivu regions of eastern DRC, formerly from Zaïre. A rebellion began there in 1996, pitting the forces led by Laurent Désiré Kabila against the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila's forces, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, took the capital city of Kinshasa in 1997 and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

-The second wage in 1998 when a rebellion against the Kabila government started in the Kivu regions. Within weeks, the rebels had seized large areas of the country. Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe promised President Kabila military support, but the rebels maintained their grip on the eastern regions. Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). The Security Council called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and urged states not to interfere in the country's internal affairs.

Then following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in July 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by its resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999, initially to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement.

The plea of the Congo to the UN led to the voting of the resolution that saw the deployment of a contingent to with the aim of building peace in the country that was torn by proxy wars fought by Rwandese and Ugandan troops financed by Western powers to mount a war on Congolese soil. The second UN mission, MONUC, in the Congo has been characterized by a large presence of security forces drawn from several countries with a wing of politicians and technicians(Dunia 2019: 209).

. Henriques (2006: 138-139) observes that during the second Congolese war, which had drawn in five other African countries (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda), the six warring countries and the rebel groups realised the need to end the scourge of violence and signed a ceasefire in 1999.

In August 1999, the UN Security Council deployed UN liaison personnel to support the ceasefire. The liaison office became the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (known by its French acronym, MONUC) and its mission was to include appropriate civilian support staff in the areas of humanitarian affairs, child protection, and medical and administrative support. Elsewhere, Reynaert (2011: 8) notes that in 1999, a second UN peace operation, MONUC, was sent to restore peace when a new war was threatening the Great Lakes Region. Originally deployed as a small-scale observation mission, MONUC was ultimately transformed into a Chapter VII mission, with nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak. Worldwide, MONUC is the most extensive UN peace operation, and it is revolutionary in the sense that its mandate goes well beyond any other given mandate in the past.

Given the need for peace and security in the DRC, peacekeepers from the United Nations (UN) have been deployed since 1999 to facilitate the implementation of a number of peace agreements. The tasks of the UN peacekeeping forces have progressed far beyond observing, monitoring and reporting on cease-fire agreements. Mission mandates cover ambitious projects such as disarming and demobilising warring factions; transforming regular and irregular forces into an integrated army; establishing a new police force; re-establishing or reforming the judiciary; and also providing food, medical services and observing national elections (Malan 2001: 1). The Security Council established the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by its 1279 resolution of 30 November 1999. The initial plan of MONUC was to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces, and maintain liaisons with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Later, in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to include the supervision of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and additional related tasks. Ekengard (2009: 19) notes that MONUC was established as a small monitoring force in 1999, and it later became the largest and most expensive active UN peace operation. According to Ekengard, the transformation of MONUC can be divided into six phases:

- **Phase 1:** This phase began in 1999, when the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement called for the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force that lasted until late 2002.
- **Phase 2:** The second phase began in 2002, when the Security Council approved the expansion of MONUC to include 500 military observers and a protection force of 5,037 soldiers.
- **Phase 3:** This phase was marked by MONUC's attempts in 2004 to shift its operations beyond the ceasefire line towards the east of the country.
- **Phase 4:** During this phase, which followed the installation of a transitional government in Kinshasa, MONUC shifted significant resources to Kinshasa to protect the new government.
- **Phase 5:** During this phase, MONUC's major task was the organisation and protection of national elections.
- **Phase 6:** After the elections, MONUC's responsibilities were expanded in the UNSC Resolution 1856 to include the protection of civilians.

Reynaert (2011: 31) notes that since 1999, MONUC has been deployed in a guerrilla conflict with a regional dimension. The mission faces an important capability gap as it is operating under significant human and material resource constraints in a vast area lacking infrastructure, where it is confronted with a plethora of national and foreign armed groups. Similarly, Reynaert notes that MONUC faces an enormous capability gap and typical UN constraints, leading to many frustrations: the heavy UN bureaucracy and hierarchy make it difficult to respond spontaneously and react quickly to threats, and peacekeepers arrive too late on the spot in the worst-case scenario. The effectiveness of MONUC in protecting the civilian population is also limited by the vagueness of its mandate, especially regarding the use of force.

According to Dzinesa and Laker (2016: 1), MONUC's operation as a fully-integrated mission, with a comprehensive mandate, has not been supported by commensurate human, financial, and logistical resources. Concerns about the mission's ineffectiveness in establishing security in eastern DRC have been compounded by allegations of its involvement in plundering resources, exchanging guns for minerals or ivory, and sexual exploitation and abuse. According to Samset (2010: 5), while part

of MONUC's mandate has been to "protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence", thousands of civilians have been exposed to violence during, and in the areas of, MONUC deployment. Overall, the immediate appraisal of MONUC's legacy is arguably laced with a sense of failure to achieve its most salient objective. As Swart (2011: 53) observes, throughout its deployment, the mission displayed low levels of consistency, effectiveness and efficiency, and it has repeatedly failed.

The peace-building efforts undertaken by MONUC have been quite extensive. It can be considered as a peacebuilding effort typical of the post-Cold War era. These efforts did not begin immediately after MONUC had been set up. Initially it started with a 62 general humanitarian assistance project. This mandate was adopted by resolution 1291 back in February 2000, the same resolution that allowed military observers to be deployed. The resolution stated that MONUC should facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring as deemed within its capabilities and under acceptable security conditions (SC Res. 1291, 1999).

### 4.7.3 MONUSCO

Neethling (2011: 24) notes that on 28 May 2010, the UN Security Council reached an agreement with the DRC government on the future of MONUC, and it was decided that MONUC would, as from 1 July 2010, bear the title of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). According to Swart (2011: 54), the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO turned out to be a compromise between the DRC government's request for MONUC to withdraw and the UN's eagerness to pursue its peace consolidation work in the country. MONUSCO was established by UNSC Resolution 1925 on 1 July 2010, taking over from the earlier UN peacekeeping operation known as MONUC. The new mission was

authorised to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence; and the support of the DRC Government in its stabilisation and peace-consolidation efforts, among other aspects (Marcucci 2018: 4). According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, MONUSCO has a dual task the protection of civilians, and the stabilisation and consolidation of peace. To this end, MONUSCO was mandated to the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat

of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any parties engaged in the conflict (United Nations 2010: 1).

MONUSCO is the largest and most expensive United Nations' peacekeeping mission in the world. The mission has already spent years and billions of dollars trying to end conflict in the DRC. Furthermore, the mission has been heavily criticised: critics have said that MONUSCO has been understaffed and overstretched for such a large country (Deibert 2013: 204). However, according to Turner (2013: 179), even though MONUSCO is not very efficient in protecting civilians in the country, it remains the only source of security for them, as the Congolese State is too weak to protect civilians. Despite MONUSCO being criticised, it is still a better provider of security for the Congolese than the Congolese State itself.

### 4.7.5 The International Community's Approach to Peace

The cooperation between the UN Mission and the DRC government to end violence in the country, particularly in the eastern region, led to the establishment of the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for eastern DRC (STAREC), the government stabilisation and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas, in June 2009. STAREC represented an opportunity to establish a strategic framework capable of addressing key obstacles to peace in eastern DRC and consolidating the recent peace initiatives alongside other political and military initiatives.

According to Paddon and Lacaille (2011: 10), the framework for stabilisation in the DRC is composed of two strategies: the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) which, as the name suggests, is the international community's framework, and the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC), which falls under the DRC state. STAREC is a government programme under the Congolese Ministry of Planning initially aiming to restore state authority in eastern DRC, but which also conducts stabilisation efforts more broadly in partnership with the internal Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) of MONUSCO (Solhjell and Rosland 2017: 5).

In Table 5.1, Paddon and Lacaille (2011: 10) summarise the mandates of ISSSS and STAREC.

**Table 5.1: The mandates of ISSSS and STAREC.**

| The International and National Stabilisation Framework and Structures | |
|---|---|
| **International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS)** | **The Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC)** |
| *Improve security*<br>- Reduce threats to life, property and freedom of movements by:<br>-Strengthening security forces<br>Supporting the disbanding of armed groups through either demobilisation or integration into security forces<br>-Improving operational and internal systems for FARDC<br><br>*Support political process*<br>Support national and provincial governments to advance peace process by:<br>-Helping to improve diplomatic relations between the DRC and key neighbouring countries<br>- Identifying and sanctioning spoilers, serious human rights abusers and those involved in sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo<br>- Supporting political leaders to follow through on commitments made under key agreements<br><br>*Strengthen state authority*<br>Restore and strengthen the state in<br>areas where it has been weak or non-existent by:<br>• Ensuring reliable road access<br>• Deploying police, courts and prisons<br>to uphold the rule of law and ensure<br>public order<br>• Re-establishing decentralized<br>administrative services'<br><br>*Facilitate return, reintegration and recovery*<br>Ensure the voluntary and safe returns of refugees and IDPs, and sustainable reintegration by: | *Security*<br>- Consolidation of gains made by security operations and accords with armed groups (reinforce the capacity of the FARDC, avoid the resurgence of armed groups, prevent exactions on civilians, ensure the regular payment of soldiers and their temporary lodging, restore the State through the deployment of police, Judicial and civil administration)<br>-Integration of Armed Groups into FARDC, DDR and community reinsertion<br>-Establishment of control mechanisms for mineral resources and forest to prevent their illegal exploitation by armed groups<br><br>*Humanitarian and social*<br>-Ensure the voluntary return of refugees and IDPS<br>-Socio-economic reintegration of refugees and IDPs<br>-Protection of civilians (all efforts should fully involve of the provincial government and communities)<br><br>*Economic recovery*<br>- Re-establish conditions for sustainable economic activity (rehabilitation of road infrastructure, recovery of key economic |

| | |
|---|---|
| - Addressing priority social needs, restoring basic social services and infrastructures<br>- Promoting employment generation and agriculture<br>- Facilitating local reconciliation and conflict linked to housing, land and property issues<br><br>*Combat sexual violence*<br>Strengthen prevention, prevention, protection and responses to sexual violence by:<br>- Combating impunity and improving access to justice<br>- Preventing, mitigating threats and reducing vulnerability to sexual violence<br>- Addressing access of survivors to multi-sectorial services<br>- Improving data | sectors: agriculture, livestock, small industries...)<br>Establishment of regional projects to harmonise economic relations, notably through the Economic Community for the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL)<br><br>*Combat sexual violence* (objective added in November 2010) |

*Source: Paddon and Lacaille (2011: 10).*

Newsman (2011: 1740) affirms that peacebuilding is part of the UN security agenda in so far as the pathologies of conflict-prone and underdeveloped states have been constructed as international threats. According to Samset (2010: 5), peacekeeping missions operate according to the logic of military deterrence, and they deal more with the effects than with the causes of conflict. This is why he concludes that their pivotal task is to create conditions in which conflicts can be resolved peacefully.

Samset (2010: 5) identifies three main priorities of a short- and medium-term nature:

- Security and restoration of the state
- Humanitarian assistance and social service delivery
- Economic recovery

The STAREC plan is managed by the DRC government and is funded by donors through a multi-donor fund mechanism. A steering committee sets the policy direction, and each agency works within their respective domain (Brusset *et al.* 2011: 64). Unfortunately, according to Mbugua (2013: 25), due to past UN failures in the DRC, most Congolese do not view the UN as a non-partisan global guarantor of peace and security. Newsman (2011: 1751) states that a critical assessment of peacebuilding, from the human security point of view, also reveals a number of practical, problem-solving approaches. In his view, when individuals and communities, instead of institutions, are put at the centre of analysis, there are implications for the assessment,

planning, implementation and evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives. All these require in-depth knowledge of the situation and context-specific solutions, instead of adherence to external models.

Newsman (2011: 1738) adds that international peacebuilding in conflict-prone and post-conflict societies is ostensibly at least aimed at preventing the resumption or escalation of violent conflict, and at establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace. He continues that in recent years, international peacebuilding has developed rapidly in terms of the range of activities conducted, the number of operations carried out, and the number and variety of international actors involved in these missions. Newsman concludes that international peacebuilding and reconstruction activities have been credited with significant successes in promoting stability and containing conflicts.

## 4.8 Local initiatives for Peace in the DRC

It is arguable that UN peace operations in the DRC have failed to restore and sustain peace because they do not deal with the real causes of the internal conflicts in the country. For example, Ishizuka (2016: 1) states that the peace operations in the DRC were a typical example of the pursuit of "negative peace" in accordance with the definition of peace by Johan Galtung in the 1960s. As discussed previously, Galtung had formulated the concept of negative peace as the absence of violence, conflict and war.

Solhjell and Rosland (2017: 4) note that reports on the situation in the DRC found that conflicts in eastern DRC are political, requiring socio-economic and political solutions rather than technical ones. As a result, the construction of a government building or road – without having a deeper understanding of the conflict drivers and accompanying social projects – may in fact lead to an escalation of violence rather than the creation of stability. This is why in spite of the many interventions, there are still ongoing violent conflicts in the country. This is the reason why international and civil society organisations envisioned the new approach of infrastructures for peace to foster social cohesion within communities in eastern DRC. Civil society organisations are also playing a pivotal role in creating conditions in which conflicts can be resolved peacefully. They are key actors at the grassroots level for promoting peacebuilding within communities. The most consistent and prominent initiative is the establishment of the infrastructures for peace (I4P). Since they are embedded in the communities,

these peace committees better understand what needs to be done to promote sustainable peace within communities.

### 4.8.1 Civil Society Initiatives

Solhjell and Rosland note that the complexity of conflict within the DRC requires a response that takes into account all levels of the conflict. This should include addressing issues of poverty, ethnic discrimination and gender relations, an overwhelming task for any one civil organisation. According to Paffenholz (2009: 16), civil society organisations include a wide range of actors from professional associations, clubs, unions, faith-based organisations (such as churches and Islamic charities), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as traditional and clan groups. Morvan and Nzeweve (2010: 13) report that 171 organisations (81 active in North Kivu, 69 active in South Kivu, and 21 operating in both provinces) were identified as operating in the peace, governance and human rights sectors. Paffenholz (2009: 5) has identified seven functions of local peacebuilding initiatives:

- **Protection** of citizens against violence from all parties
- **Monitoring** of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc.
- **Advocacy** for peace and human rights
- **Socialisation** to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalised groups
- **Inter-group social cohesion** by bringing together people from adversarial groups
- **Facilitation** of dialogue at the local and national levels between various actors
- **Service delivery** to create entry points for peacebuilding, i.e. for the six above functions

However, as already indicated, despite the UN having its largest peace-keeping force in the DRC, peace is still elusive. The UN mission in the DRC has not performed to the expectations of the Congolese, especially the expectation of enabling individuals to carry on with their daily activities without the fear of attack or harassment by armed groups. Given the relative ineffectiveness of the UN mission in the DRC, some

international organisations have played a crucial role in fomenting the development of grassroots peace initiatives by providing essential resources. According to Nsengimana *et al.* (2010: 18), local mediation can play a crucial role in resolving local disputes and building trust and peace in eastern DRC, particularly in local land conflicts. However, as Nsengimana *et al.* add, many factors continue to obstruct long-term sustained peace. In their view, the absence of effective, impartial and responsive state institutions means that wider processes to ensure sustained peace are not supported, resourced or implemented in a systematic manner.

A plethora of organisations have initiated peacebuilding activities with the support of external organisations in eastern DRC. Among these initiatives is the establishment of infrastructures for peace, with different designations such as *Village de Paix* (Peace Village), *Paillotes de Paix* (Huts of Peace), and *Noyau de Paix* (Peace Core). However, in spite of different forms of support by external actors, peace and democracy in the DRC continue to be elusive. A number of factors complicate the DRC crisis. Among these is the fact that the DRC crisis is not simply an internal crisis: it is a multi-level crisis, involving both internal and external groups which are interested in the variety of mineral resources found in different parts of the country (Nizigimana 2015: 177). The efforts of international organisations that seek to promote peace in the country have largely focused on promoting human security and stability while local organisations have focused on reconciliation and social cohesion within communities.

In her recent book entitled *The Trouble with the Congo*, Stearns (2014: 159) notes that Severine Autesserre argues that violence has persisted in eastern DRC because international actors have failed to understand its root causes, which boil down to local grievances. According to Severine Autesserre, the main reason that the peacebuilding strategy in the Congo has failed is that the international community has paid too little attention to the root causes of the violence: local disputes over land and power. This view is partly shared by Ryan (2012: 21), according to whom in order to support the development process in fragile settings in a sustainable way, it is necessary to build the internal capacities of societies to manage conflict in a non-violent manner while enhancing their resilience to internal and external shocks. Ryan adds that building resilient states by strengthening I4P is beneficial in many ways, and that equipping national and local actors to resolve conflicts, prevent violence and build consensus in a credible manner saves lives and ensures more inclusive and participatory

development processes. In the same vein, Mbugua (2013: 21) argues that local solutions should precede international interventions, since local actors understand the situation better and are stakeholders in peace and security in the region. Mouly (2013: 57) argues that in places affected by war and with minimal state presence, civil society can be a driving force behind the emergence of peace infrastructures.

While often overlooked, local peace initiatives are important in ensuring ownership of peacebuilding processes and contributing to their sustainability. Among them, grassroots initiatives are significant because they originate from those most affected by direct and structural (Mouly 2013: 48). At his side, Hayman (2013: 17) observes that there is a growing recognition of the ubiquity and importance of locally-led peacebuilding initiatives in conflict and post-conflict countries. In his view, locally-led peacebuilding offers advantages over internationally-led initiatives because locally-led peacebuilding fosters self-help, relevance, and sustainability.

Nevertheless, in the DRC international organisations play a very important role in supporting the establishment of the infrastructures for peace such that civil society organisations find it difficult to coordinate the activities of the international organisations on the ground. These organisations have limited resources and means, and they are widely dispersed over a vast part of eastern DRC. As one would expect under the circumstances, the established infrastructures for peace have limited influence and impact at the provincial and national levels.

### 4.8.2 Infrastructures for Peace in Eastern DRC

The endless security and the prolonged, but thus far unsuccessful, quest for peace in eastern DRC led peacebuilding actors to develop various strategies to bring peace to the region. A myriad of local initiatives is working towards peacebuilding, and the establishment of the infrastructures for peace is being considered as a new approach in this endeavour. Notably, since many local communities felt that the State had failed to provide them with security and protection against violence, they have themselves resorted to establishing infrastructures for peace.

Vogel and Havenith (2013: 3) note that unfortunately most of the significant ones are underfunded and unrecognised or neglected by the international community. Moreover, they are also in danger of being targeted by warlords, politicians,

businessmen or other conflict actors who think that their interests are threatened by these infrastructures for peace. Among the many I4P established in eastern DRC, nine are mentioned below:

- *Baraza la Wazee* (Elders' Forum)
- *Comités Villageois de Paix* (Village Peace Committees)
- *Paillotes de Paix* (Huts for Peace)
- *Noyaux de Paix* (Peace Cores)
- *Cellule de Paix* (Peace Cell)
- *Centre Permanent de Paix* (Permanent Center for Peace)
- *Comité de Paix* (Peace Committee)
- *Cadre de Concertation* (Entente Framework)
- *Cellule de Paix et de Reconciliation* (Peace and Reconciliation Cell)
- *Peace Clubs*

Although eastern DRC is plagued by conflict, infrastructures for peace have played, and continue to play, a key role in promoting social cohesion and conflict transformation at the community level. This is in keeping with Van Tongeren's observation (2011) in Issifu (2016: 142) that in many conflict-affected countries in Africa, local peace committees have had a positive impact on the local communities by keeping the violence levels low, lowering community tensions and empowering local actors to become peace-builders. According to Hellmüller (2015: 3), in all these endeavours, international and local peacebuilding actors have sequenced their programmes differently. While local peacebuilding actors have prioritised reconciliation between communities and aimed at bringing together different ethnic groups by creating networks, direct mediation and sensitisation activities, and involving communities in joint socio-cultural activities, international actors have focused on providing means and training.

According to Newsman (2011: 1750), although peacebuilding activities were gradually concentrated on preventing conflict or conflict transformation over the years, human security was seen as a major aspect for their interventions. Newsman acknowledges

that the human security approach recognises the root causes of conflicts in terms of social and political exclusion, horizontal inequalities or structural violence, in addition to power politics and spoiler activities. This recognition therefore requires root-cause analysis, preventive action, early warning indicators and strategic planning, taking the exercise of peacebuilding beyond a quick-impact project with short-term goals.

## 4.9 Conclusion

Since its independence, the DRC has had a record of internal conflicts which have adversely affected its development. This chapter has analysed the interventions of the international community through different United Nations peacekeeping missions and civil society organisations. The *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (United Nations Operation in Congo) or ONUC was the first mission to be deployed in the 1960s to foster peace in the country shortly after independence. This mission was followed by the *Mission des Nations Unies au Congo* (United Nations Mission in the DRC) in the 1990s, and currently by the *Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization de la RDC* (United Nations Mission for the Stabilisation of the DRC).

The chapter has also examined the collaboration between the international community and the Congolese government through the ISSSS Framework and STAREC, and demonstrated that the international community is involved in promoting peace and social cohesion in the eastern DRC. The support for this new approach is appreciated by civil society organisations. In addition, the chapter has analysed not only the numerous peacebuilding initiatives by international and civil society organisations in the eastern DRC, revealing that peacebuilding initiatives are playing an important, though as yet unsuccessful, role in promoting peace, but also the conflict dynamics in the eastern region of the DRC. This chapter has demonstrated how land is one of the major drivers of the ongoing conflict situation in the region.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

## 5.1 Introduction

This study adopted an exploratory research design, specifically to understand the local infrastructures for peace as a new approach to re-establishing and sustaining peace in the communities of eastern DRC. Exploratory research involves a researcher examining a new interest or studying a relatively new subject (Babbie 2013: 90). Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used in a triangulation framework to address the commitment of actors involved in the peace process as a necessary condition, and the improvement of human security in various communities where peace infrastructures have been established as a sufficient condition for the sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC. Triangulation approach was adopted because neither qualitative nor quantitative methods would alone have sufficed to collect enough data to generate reliable findings. Triangulation method was used to verify different data collected to increase their validity. Thus data collection from interviews, questionnaire, focus group and other secondary data were all triangulated.

This chapter presents on overview of the methods and procedures that were used to conduct the study which culminated into this thesis. The chapter begins with a presentation of the research design that was adopted for the study, followed by a brief description of the study area and the study population. Thereafter, an account of the sampling procedures and the sample size is presented. This is followed by the general research procedures, the data collection methods, reliability and validity considerations, and data analysis and presentation. Finally, the chapter presents the ethical issues taken into consideration in the course of the entire study, from proposal writing to report writing, and the limitations of the study.

## 5.2 Research Design

Research design can be considered as the structure of research – it is the "glue" that holds all of the elements in a research project together; in short, it is a plan of the proposed research work. It is the arrangement of conditions for the collection and

analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy and procedure notes (Aktar 2010: 68).

In this study, I adopted an exploratory research design to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC. An exploratory research design was selected because the main mandate of exploratory research is to gather information about a new phenomenon or event, or to determine the feasibility of undertaking a more detailed study or to develop a methodology in a future study. Exploratory research is also commonly used when new knowledge is sought on certain behaviour and the causes for the presentation symptoms, actions or events need to be discovered (Wisker 2008: 72). The purpose of this study was to explore the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC, one that has not been studied earlier and why the research design is called explanatory.

This present study set out to assess the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of this recent approach in peacebuilding – infrastructures for peace – on which there is limited published information and in a relatively little-known in part of Africa and particularly in eastern region of the DRC. For that reason, the exploratory design was the logical option for this research. The research design enabled me to collect and analyse data relevant to the effectiveness and sustainability of infrastructures for peace in North Kivu Province.

This research employed a mixed method approach drawing from relevant material related to peacebuilding activities, focus groups (FGs) with local authorities and interviews with staff of establishing organisations, community members and infrastructure for peace members.

The infrastructure for peace or peace infrastructure is a new approach in peacebuilding and thus it is an under-researched area. This research aims to contribute with new knowledge on the conditions of the sustainability of infrastructures for peace in fostering social cohesion and human security.

The research particularly finds pertinence in examining the "necessary and sufficient" conditions for the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace. By doing so, the study was intended to address an extant gap by exploring the new peacebuilding approach in eastern DRC. Furthermore, by examining the views and insights of community members and the interests of the establishing organisations, this research is

exploratory adding to other peacebuilding interventions. More practically, this study suggests some mechanisms and recommendations that may help strengthen this new peacebuilding approach in this torn region of the DRC. This study may also be of support as a new lesson for other peacebuilding actors establishing infrastructures for peace in other regions or countries in need of human security and social cohesion.

### 5.3 Methodology

This thesis uses a mixed-methods research approach to understand and to analyse the sustainability and the effectiveness of this new social phenomenon for the search of peace in eastern DRC which is the Infrastructure for peace. combining a qualitative analysis with a quantitative analysis. Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration (Johnson *et al.* 2007: 123). The mixed method helps to address the commitment of community members involved in the peacebuilding process as a necessary condition, and the improvement of social condition and development in various communities where peace infrastructures have been established as a sufficient condition for sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC.

Methodologically, I try to both split and consolidate the qualitative and quantitative approaches. I deliberately separated the quantitative section from the qualitative ones, due to the dilemma of reconciling the two methods. The separation was made in this way to sustain a methodological consistency in both approaches. This attempt is thought to permit a discussion between the two approaches, through what Thaler calls a connected complementarity in his typology of mixed methods (Thaler 2015 :8).

Despite not fully combined, which would necessitate that the findings of the two methodologies be presented at the same time, or completely separated, the joined complementarity brings the results of the two methods in discussion through this study.

One method by itself was not thought to be sufficient and effective to produce reliable results, thus, a mixed methods approach was used provide a better understanding of the research problem through several different types of data. I used survey and statistics to obtain an idea of the number of Local Peace Infrastructures established thus far by local and international actors.

In addition, I used a survey to have an idea on the number of Local Peace Infrastructures established so far by local and international actors or team of researchers to combine elements of qualitative and quantitative research. The survey, using the questionnaires were a useful method for the collection of quantitative data and the interview method was applied to members of the infrastructures for peace and community members, while focus groups were applied to local political and traditional leaders of the villages where infrastructures for peace are being established. The detailed discussion of these data collection methods is explained in further in the chapter. The research was intended to demonstrate factors which maintain the sustainability and the effectiveness of the infrastructures for peace in promoting peace in the eastern region of the DRC.

It was not easy to use the mixed methods in this study as it required from me hard work, more time and expertise to suitably use two qualitative and quantitative methods at the same time. It took time to compare the results after the analysis using data of distinctive forms.

A central and indispensable part of a real-world research project is the collection of data, since without data, there can be no research project (Robson 2011: 407). I used two types of data collection: secondary and primary. With regards to the primary data collection, I collected the data myself using either qualitative or quantitative methods. I used qualitative data instruments such as observation, open-ended questions, semi-structured interview, and field notes. I also used a quantitative research approach that places emphasis on numbers and figures in the collection and analysis of data from participants in their natural settings. Young (2015: 1) observes that survey methodologies, usually using questionnaires, are among the most popular in the social sciences. According to Códo (2008: 158), Survey research thus provides an overview of the language situation of a given population. In the case of the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC, a survey using questionnaires were helpful to get an idea of who, when and where the different languages are spoken and of attitudes towards them. Questionnaires are also useful for collecting biographical information on speakers, and quantifiable data of language abilities, practices, and attitudes.

I used both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods in a methodological triangulation framework. This was meant to enable me to attain breadth and depth of

understanding and corroboration, as according to Johnson *et al.* (2007: 123), neither of the two approaches could, on its own, generate enough data to provide an adequate basis for valid conclusions.

### 5.3.1 Data Collection Method

This section examines the data collection methods used in this research. Data collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest in an established systematic fashion which enables one to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes (Kabir 2016: 202). According to Parveen (2017: 4), the collection of data is the heart of any research design, irrespective of the field of study. Any research begins with certain questions which need to be answered. Data collection is the process of gathering the desirable information carefully, with the least possible distortion, so that the analysis may provide answers that are credible and stand to logic.

In this study, two types of data were used: primary and secondary data. The primary data was collected through interviews and focus group discussions, while secondary data was collected through reports and documents related to the subject.

To conclude, the data collected were triangulated with other various sources of data originating from the different of actors.

#### 5.3.1.1 Primary data

Kabir (2016: 202) acknowledges that data that has been collected from first-hand-experience is known as primary data. Primary data has not been published yet and is more reliable, authentic and objective. Primary data has not been changed or altered by human beings; therefore its validity is greater than secondary data.

Qualitative data, notes again Kabir (2016: 204) are mostly non-numerical and usually descriptive or nominal in nature. This means the data collected are in the form of words and sentences. Often (not always), such data captures feelings, emotions, or subjective perceptions of something. Qualitative approaches aim to address the 'how' and 'why' of a program and tend to use unstructured methods of data collection to fully explore the topic. Quantitative data is numerical in nature and can be mathematically computed. Quantitative data measure uses different scales, which can be classified

as nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval scale and ratio scale. Often (not always), such data includes measurements of something.

Primary sources used were surveys, personal interviews, general participant observation and focus group discussions. Survey method was used to collect quantitative information about items in a population. As a method of data collection, interviews allowed the researchers to study experiences and meanings as accounted for by the participants (Kumar, 2005: 127). Also, by using interviews as a method of data collection, I was able to give each participant an opportunity to narrate his/her views in his/her own words about the sustainability of the infrastructure for peace in DRC.

General 'participation/observation' afforded meaningful, usually first-hand, information to this study. It served as both an approach to enquiry and as a data gathering tool. During interviews and focus group sessions (organized with the help of one key informant), the research observed the behaviours of participants as they interacted.

Focus group discussions were of immense utility in the collection of data during this study. Through focus group discussions, the researcher was able to gain immense information from participants in the course of their interactions with one another to articulate ideas and arguments that might not have emerged during personal interviews.

#### 5.3.1.2 Secondary Sources

According to Ajayi (2017: 4), a secondary source means data collected by someone else earlier. Secondary data are the data collected by a party not related to the research study but collected these data for some other purpose and at different time in the past. If the researcher uses these data then they become secondary data for the current users.

In this study, through the use of secondary sources, I managed to get a grasp of the subject and the provision of extensive bibliographic information for delving further into the research topic. Secondary sources were used to complement primary sources and the data was gathered from various conflict and peacebuilding journals and books, newspapers and magazines, archival material, unpublished theses and the internet as well as seminar papers on the infrastructures for peace.

### 5.3.2 Qualitative Methods

Qualitative research methods seek to elicit answers to questions, collect evidence, and produce findings that are not predetermined and that are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the study (Guest *et al.* 2005: 1). Qualitative methods were used because most of the data relevant to the exploration of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness and sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC which the study sought to explore, was in the form of feelings, values, beliefs and opinions or views, which are non-quantifiable and therefore most appropriately gathered by qualitative methods. The qualitative methods used, which included formal and informal interviews, focus group discussions and observation, helped the researcher to access first-hand, in-depth information, and to understand the complex issues related to the infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC. The interview method was applied to members of the infrastructures for peace, local political and traditional leaders and ordinary community members. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and group work were conducted with ordinary community members.

The following is a more detailed account of each of the qualitative data collection methods that were used.

**a. Interviews**

Interviews formed one of the methods used in this study to collect data from community members and members of infrastructures for peace. Tuner (2010: 757) notes that an individual interview is a conversation between two people which has a structure and a purpose. It is designed to elicit the interviewee's knowledge or perspective on a topic. Individual interviews, which can include key informant interviews, are useful for exploring an individual's beliefs, values, understandings, feelings, experiences and perspectives of an issue. Individual interviews also allow the researcher to inquire regarding a complex issue, learning more about the contextual factors that govern individual experiences.

Babbie (2013: 318) acknowledges that a qualitative interview is an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry, including the topics to be covered, but not a set of questions that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order. Steinar (2009) in Babbie 2013: 322) details

seven stages in the complete interviewing process, and it is these stages that guided the researcher in his work:

- *Thematising*: Clarifying the purpose of the interviews and the concepts to be explored
- *Designing:* Laying out the process through which the interviewer's purpose will be achieved, including a consideration of the ethical dimension
- *Interviewing*: Doing the actual interviews
- *Transcribing*: Creating a written text of the interviews
- *Analysing*: Determining the meaning of gathered materials in relation to the purpose of the study
- *Verifying*: Checking the reliability and validity of the materials
- *Reporting*: Telling others what the interviewer/researcher has learned.

In this study, I used Individual Interviews which allowed me to investigate people's attitudes, beliefs and experiences on the infrastructure for peace. Individual interviews were conducted: those with key respondents (members of the Peace Committee leadership, civil society members and community leaders) and those with people in the community. For the interviews with community members, as was noted earlier in this chapter, the study initially intended to collect quantitative data in addition to the qualitative data

**b. Focus Group Discussions**

The focus group discussion method is an increasingly common research tool used to obtain the opinions, values and beliefs from an identifiable group using a facilitated discussion (Halcomb *et al.* 2007: 1001). The subjects are selected on the basis of relevance to the topic under study (Babbie 2013: 322).

A focus group discussion is an organised discussion between six to eight people. Focus group discussions provide participants with a space to discuss a particular topic in a context where people are allowed to agree or disagree with each other. Focus group discussions allow one to explore how a group thinks about an issue, the range of opinions and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variations that exist in a particular

community in terms of beliefs and their experiences and practices. According to Mishra (2016: 2), a focus group discussion is a form of group interview in which a small group – usually 10 to 12 people – is led by a moderator (interviewer) in a loosely-structured discussion of various topics of interest. The course of the discussion is usually planned in advance and most moderators rely on an outline, or moderator's guide, to ensure that all topics of interest are covered.

In this study, focus groups were mainly conducted with local leaders as they play important within the communities. I used purposive or judgmental sampling as I selected participants for their role either in the infrastructure for peace or in the community. Taherdoost (2016: 23) notes that purposive or judgmental sampling is a strategy in which particular settings persons or events are selected deliberately in order to provide important information that cannot be obtained from other choices. It is where the researcher includes cases or participants in the sample because they believe that they warrant inclusion. I facilitated three focus group discussions with ordinary community members in the selected areas where infrastructures for peace have been established and are operational in Goma town, the city of Sake and Kibati village.

**Table 3.2 Focus Groups distribution**

| Group | Number of Participants | Category |
|---|---|---|
| A and B | 6+6 | Local political leaders |
| C and D | 6+6 | Local traditional leaders |
| **Total** | 24 | |

According to table, two focus groups were held with local political and the other two with the traditional leaders in the city of Sake and Nyirangongo. I had to carry out four focus groups comprising 6 participants each.

**c. Observation**

Observation as a method of data collection was deployed in the interviews, focus group discussions and under other circumstances, for example when the infrastructures for peace were conducting their meetings. During the interviews and

focus group discussions, as a researcher; I keenly observed the body language of the participants and particularly the community members and the local leaders; this observation helped me, through body language, to assess the feeling of the acceptance of this new phenomenon as the necessary condition to foster social cohesion within their communities, their degree of comfort and the veracity of their responses. Notably, while expressing positive aspects of I4P, most participants exuded joy on their faces and in their voices, attesting to the veracity of their responses. Observing meetings of I4P enabled the researcher to learn about their successes and challenges and to assess their degree of cohesion.

Kawulich (2013: 6) summarizes current thought, noting that there are advantages and disadvantages to using observation. On the positive side, observations may enable the researcher to access those aspects of a social setting that may not be visible to the general public – those backstage activities that the public does not generally see. They give one the opportunity to provide rich, detailed descriptions of the social setting in one's field notes and to view unscheduled events, improve interpretation, and develop new questions to be asked of informants. On the negative side, disadvantages can include:

- lack of interest in behind the scenes;
- incorrect interpretation of what was seen;
- when key informants only allow observation of situations that are already familiar to oneself or when key informants are similar to oneself,
- when key informants are marginal participants in the culture, or when key informants are community leaders.

**e. Participant Observation**

This refers to the observation situation where the researcher gained first-hand knowledge by being in or around the social setting that was being investigated. Some interviews with infrastructures for peace members or community members were conducted during observation.

As a researcher, I conducted a direct observation which involves observing, without interacting with the community members and infrastructures for peace members involved in this study in the setting. I observed the following:

- Human action and action of infrastructures for peace members
- Verbal behaviour of local leaders
- Number of committee members.

Observation helped me to understand the dynamic of each village, the structure of the peace committee and the involved community members.

### 5.3.3 Quantitative Method

In this study, I carried out a survey to collect the number of established infrastructures for peace in the region to explain how this new peacebuilding approach is spreading in eastern DRC. Kraemer (1991) cited by Glasow (2005: 1) identified three distinguishing characteristics of survey research: first, survey research is used to quantitatively describe specific aspects of a given population. These aspects often involve examining the relationships among variables; second, the data required for survey research are collected from people and are, therefore, subjective.

Satya and Roopa (2012: 273) note that a questionnaire is the main means of collecting quantitative primary data. A questionnaire enables quantitative data to be collected in a standardized way so that the data are internally consistent and coherent for analysis. later be generalized back to the population. For Kabir (2016: 208), questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. Although they are often designed for statistical analysis of the responses, this is not always the case. The questionnaire was invented by Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911). Questionnaires have advantages over some other types of surveys in that they are cheap, do not require as much effort from the questioner as verbal or telephone surveys, and often have standardised answers that make it simple to compile data. As a type of survey, questionnaires also have many of the same problems relating to question construction and wording that exist in other types of opinion polls.

In this study, I carried out a survey in which 16 key informants were involved. They were selected on the basis of the following criteria: to be actively involved in the Peace Committee activities and to have spent at least 6 months as a member of the infrastructure for peace. The informants included members of infrastructure for peace leadership, local political authorities, traditional leaders and civil society members.

The questionnaire was used to identify the estimated number of established infrastructures for peace (I4P): it is forty-two (42). Questions included:

- How many local and international organisations are involved in the establishment of these infrastructures? The number of these organisations involved in establishing I4P is estimated to be seven organisations.
- How many people formed an infrastructure of peace?
- How many times did they meet?
- How many Peace Committees have been established in your community?

One of the purposes of the survey was to identify the sustainability of these infrastructures in eastern DRC. Quantitative methods examine the effects of specified circumstances on outcomes of interest in ways that can be expressed numerically (Lakshman *et al.* 2000: 369).

Check & Schutt (2012: 160) note that survey research is defined as "the collection of information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions". This type of research allows for a variety of methods to recruit participants, collect data, and utilize various methods of instrumentation. Survey research can use quantitative research strategies (e.g., using questionnaires with numerically rated items), qualitative research strategies (e.g., using open-ended questions), or both strategies (i.e., mixed methods).

The advantages for the researcher while using this method included:

1. A large amount of information was collected from a number of people in a short period of time and in a relatively cost-effective way.
2. The method had a limited effect on the research validity and reliability.
3. The questionnaires were more objectively analysed than other forms of research.

### 5.3.4 Data Analysis

Wium and Loum (2018: 7) notes that in Mixed-Method research, it is essential that one evaluates or assesses which data analyses were employed. Quantitative data analysis is either descriptive and/or inferential, whereas qualitative data analysis is carried out descriptively and through thematic analyses of text or image.

The information I collected from the participants was examined and grouped together to make the focus of the study. Considering the security issue in eastern and the sensitivity of the research, I did not use the name of the participants, but a given name. During the field work, I received information throughout my research endeavour by key informants and other community members.

To analyse the data I collected, I include the typewritten field notes, interview notes and transcriptions. All of these data types were analysed methodically. A big part of the analysis was done while I was still in Goma, and additional work was completed after I had left the eastern DRC and had time to deliberate and attain additional position on the condition.

Therefore, a coding method was used in order to organize and label interview answers to the respective research questions. Coding and categorization helped better construct the result of the study and the relations between the existing literatures on local conflict and my research case study. When quotations are used, they are used to fully present the true voice of the participant, in interviews, as well as informally in conversations. Choosing the case of Eastern DRC in a way solves this bias.

## 5.4 Ethical Considerations

Both law and convention demand that social scientific research be conducted in full observance of a set of established ethical principles. To ensure adherence to these principles, I began by obtaining the necessary permission from Durban University of Technology (DUT), the research regulatory authorities of DRC and the local government authorities of North Kivu Province. Thereafter, the researcher introduced himself and his research topic to the potential participants in the study and requested them to participate in the study. The researcher informed them about the purpose of the study and of their freedom to participate in it or not, and assured them of the utmost

anonymity and confidentiality. Confidentiality and anonymity are related but distinct concepts. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines confidentiality as "spoken or written in confidence; charged with secrets". 'Anonymity' is defined as: "of unknown name, of unknown authorship" (Willes *et al.* 2006: 6). Both these aspects, confidentiality and anonymity, were considered in this study.

Moreover, the researcher used codes for the different participants and where personal names were recorded, correspondences to third parties included only the codes. As an ethical matter, copies of the findings of this study will be provided to all key organisations that participated in the study and will eventually be made accessible to all interested respondents. Finally, in the entire research, report-writing and dissemination process, the researcher endeavoured and will endeavour to observe the principle of *Do No Harm.*

## 5.5 Study Area

As already indicated in Chapter One, North Kivu Province covers an area of 59,483 $km^2$, inhabited by approximately six million people in eastern DRC. It borders Orientale Province to the north, Ituri Province to the northeast, Rwanda and Uganda to the east, South Kivu Province to the south and Maniema Province to the west. It also borders three of the Great Lakes in the region: Lake Kivu to the south, Lake Edward to the east and Lake Albert to the north (MONUSCO 2015). Sixty percent of the population is rural and is engaged in agricultural activities.

Administratively, the province is made up of six administrative *territories:* Masisi, Beni, Lubero, Rutshuru, Walikale and Nyiragongo, with 17 *collectivities* and *chiefdoms.* Goma is the provincial capital and has 5,178 villages (see Figure 1.3 in Chapter One). Although the researcher had planned to conduct the study in the administrative territories of Nyiragongo, Masisi and Rutshuru in North Kivu Province, insecurity in Rutshuru made it impossible for the researcher to access the territory. Consequently, the study was ultimately limited to the city of Goma and the territories of Nyirangongo and Masisi, the latter including the city of Sake.

## 5.6 Study Area and Population

North Kivu (French: Nord Kivu) is an area of 59483 square kilometres located in eastern DRC, bordering Lake Kivu, with about 6 million inhabitants (39 people/km2),

60% live in rural areas. The province is home to Virunga National Park, World Heritage Site containing endangered mountain gorillas. The province comprises three cities (Goma, Butembo and Beni) and six territories (Beni, Lubero, Masisi, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo and Walikale). Goma is the capital. The region is politically unstable and has been one of the starting points for military conflicts in the region since 1998. The population lives mainly from agriculture and small businesses in goods trading and mining (Kapiteni and all 2018:2).

The size of the province and the state of roads made it logistically impossible to cover all the cities and villages of the territories of Masisi and Nyiragongo where infrastructures for peace have been established. As a result, this research targeted two cities, Goma City in Nyiragongo territory and Sake City in Masisi.

Kapiteni and all (2018:2) also note that the city of Goma has a population of 1,100,000 inhabitants, with a population density of 14,527 people per square kilometre. Sake City is located in Masisi territory, about 20 kilometres to the west of Goma City, and has a population of 17,151 people. Nyiragongo territory covers an area of 333 square kilometres to the north of Goma City, and is the smallest territory of North Kivu, inhabited by about 145,748 people. Finally, Masisi territory is situated in the southwest of North Kivu Province, and covers an area of 4,734 square kilometres, inhabited by about 723,350 people.

The table below summarises the names of the organisations that have established I4P in the study area, the number of I4P they have established and the specific areas in which the I4P have been established.

**Table 6.1: I4P-supporting organisations, numbers of established I4P and their areas of operation.6**

| Organisation | Number of infrastructures established | Areas |
|---|---|---|
| Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) | 18 | • Sake City and surroundings in Groupement Kamuronza in Masisi Territory |
| Search for Common Ground (SFCG) | Unavailable | • Bashali Mukoto Chiefdom in Masisi Territory |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Action Solidaire pur la Paix (ASP) | 3 | • Bashali Chiefdom: Nyamitaba, Kitshanga and Mweso City in Bashali Chiefdom in Masisi Territory |
| Collectif Alpha –Ujuvi (CAU) | 10 | • Goma City and surroundings, Kiningi and Kibumba in Nyiragongo Territory<br>• Walikale City surroundings in Walikale Territory<br>• Minova City and surroundings in Kalehe Territory in South Kivu |
| World Relief Congo (WRC) | 93 | • Goma City and surroundings<br>• Sake City and surroundings in Masisi Territory<br>• Minova City in Kalehe Territory and surroundings in South Kivu Province<br>• City of Rusthuru and surroundings in Rutshuru Territory |
| Cellule Provinciale d'Appui à la Pacification (CPAP) | Unavailable | • The entire North Kivu Province |
| Cadre de Paix pour la Reconciliation et la Justice (CPRJ) | 8 | Rutshuru Territory |

*Source: Field data.*

As Babbie (2013: 115) states, the population of a study is that group (usually of people, but sometimes of other items such as animals or plants) on whom or which one wants to draw conclusions. In this research, the population was composed of men and women members of the communities in Goma and the territories of Nyirangongo and Masisi, the latter including the city of Sake, where infrastructures for peace have been established. These men and women represented five categories of people:

- Members of the established infrastructures for peace
- Traditional leaders in the communities where infrastructures for peace have been established
- Political leaders in the communities where infrastructures for peace have been established
- Local actors of the establishing organisation

- International peacebuilding actors of the establishing organisation.

## 5.7 Sampling Method

It would be difficult to conduct this research in all cities, villages and areas where infrastructures for peace have been established due to the number of people to be interviewed, and the factors related to time, means and accessibility. The researcher used purposive or judgmental sampling, which is a type of nonprobability sampling. Regarding this, Babbie (2013: I28) states that sometimes it is appropriate to select a sample on the basis of knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study. For the purpose of this study, the researcher selected subsets of the population and interviewed those who are members of the communities and not any member, but rather those who have an influence in the communities, local political and traditional authorities who are dealing with social issues, the people who have responsibility within the established infrastructures for peace, and staff of local and international NGOs who run peacebuilding activities in the region.

For the purposes of this study, the sampling comprised 92 respondents selected to be representative of five population categories, namely members of established infrastructures for peace, traditional leaders, political leaders, members of local peacebuilding organisations and members in international peacebuilding organisations. Participants were selected purposively because of their position within the communities.

Infrastructures for peace have been established in many communities in eastern DRC at the local level and the interest is growing. This study used an exploratory research method as a way of deepening the knowledge on the issue regarding the sustainability of this new strategy of promoting sustainable peace in eastern DRC. The researcher used the mixed methods, qualitative and quantitative approaches. The mixed method approach has helped to address the commitment of actors involved in the process of the establishment of infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC.

Purposely, population under the age of 18 years were excluded due responsibility, legal and moral issues. Besides that aspect, I included men and women of all ages and cultures who asked to participate. It was of great relevant to accept respondents representing all kinds of participants. Population was selected from staff members of the establishing organisations who were involved in the establishment of the I4P, the

active members of the I4P. Local authority respondents were purposively selected on account of their unique positions and functions. Altogether, I conducted 152 formal interviews, 4 focus groups, 6 participant observations, 68 informal conversation and 3 surveys.

The researcher targeted the city of Sake situated about 30 km from Goma. The reason for that choice is that the access to the city is easy, and the cost of the transport is affordable. The city is also surrounded by more than 40 villages in which infrastructures for peace have been established. Due to those factors, it was easy for the researcher to gain access to these villages and collect data.

I used multi-stage, judgmental sampling to arrive at the final sample. The first stage or phase of the recruitment of the sample population was carried out in Goma where NGOs involved in peacebuilding are based. The second phase took place in Sake City and its environs where infrastructures for peace have been established. It was expected that the infrastructures for peace would have documents and information related to their establishment, staffing and activities. The third and final phase took place in Goma, the political and administrative capital of North Kivu Province, where traditional and political leaders are based. The recruitment process was conducted on the basis of the researcher's general knowledge of and familiarity with the population.

## 5.8 Sample Size

As Halcomb *et al.* (2007: 102) argue, "...with all qualitative enquiries, it is essential that potential participants are selected on the basis of their ability to provide insight into, and information about, the research topic." In this research, the sample was composed of 92 respondents distributed as shown in Table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1: Distribution of respondents by category and location**

| N° | CATEGORY | LOCATION | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Nyiragongo | Masisi/Sake | Goma | Total |
| 1 | **Members of I4P** | 6 | 6 | 8 | 20 |
| 2 | **Local political leaders** | 3 | 3 | 6 | 12 |
| 3 | **Local traditional leaders** | 6 | 6 | N/A | 12 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | **Local NGO staff members** | 4 | 4 | 4 | 12 |
| 5 | **International NGO staff members** | N/A | N/A | 12 | 12 |
| 6 | **Ordinary community members** | 8 | 8 | 8 | 24 |
| **Total** | | 27 | 27 | 38 | 92 |

***Source: Field data***

## 5.9 Inclusion and Exclusion

Inclusion and exclusion are inter-related aspects that determine the characteristics of target groups that should or should not take part in a research project. The following two sub-sections explain which categories of participants were included or excluded in the study and why.

Members of the established infrastructure for peace, local political and traditional leaders, staff members of local and international NGOs and members of the communities where these infrastructures have been established were included in this research, mainly because they are the primary targets of the study and the custodians of much of the information that the study sought.

People who are not members of the infrastructures for peace, local political or traditional leaders, local or international NGOs, or members of the communities where infrastructures for peace are established were left out because, logically, they were not expected to possess information relevant to the study.

## 5.10 Research Procedure

After completing all the compulsory theoretical work at Durban University of Technology (DUT), the researcher submitted a research proposal which was approved by the university authorities of the Department of Peacebuilding. Thereafter, he obtained a letter of introduction from DUT, which enabled him to introduce himself and his proposed research project to local authorities of North Kivu Province and to seek and obtain permission to conduct the proposed study, beginning with a pilot, experimental phase. The pilot study was conducted with five members of an infrastructure for peace established by World Relief Congo in the city of Goma, three local authorities and five ordinary community members in Goma. Aspects of the

research procedures that relate to ethical considerations are described in Section 3.14.

## 5.11 Reliability and Validity

The reliability and validity of research tools or instruments are key elements of any scientific research process since they determine the credibility, transferability and general usefulness of the research findings. Therefore, the researcher sought to ensure the reliability and validity of the data collection instruments before they were used by carrying out the procedures outlined in the following two sub-sections.

### 5.11.1 Reliability

Greenstein and Davis (2013: 64) state that reliability refers to the stability or consistency to which a research instrument measures a given phenomenon at different times but under similar conditions. It is the degree of consistency to which the instrument measures a given variable at different times but under similar conditions. In qualitative research, reliability is the consistency, dependability and stability of data or responses on the given constructs under investigation. In a literal sense, it is the extent to which the source of the data and the data itself can be relied upon. In this study, reliability was enhanced by using high-quality instruments for capturing responses or narratives. The interviews were administrated in person and the questionnaires were dispatched to the respondents. The researcher used a tape recorder to record interviews, transcribed the tape-recorded data, coded the transcribed data, and then integrated the transcribed data before analysing and interpreting it, and finally drew conclusions from the interpretations (Creswell 2014). To establish the reliability of the research instruments, the instruments were pre-tested in a pilot study to ensure that they were reliable and capable of yielding accurate information relevant to the research objectives.

### 5.11.2 Validity

The validity of a data collection instrument is the extent to which the instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Singh 1990). Babbie (1990) regards validity as the extent to which the empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration. Validity, in qualitative research, concerns data credibility (whether the research findings are credible interpretations of participants'

responses) and transferability of data (whether the research findings can also apply to other situations outside the study). Validity in this study was ensured through member-checking and triangulation by using multiple, independent sources of data and data collection methods.

The multiple sources of data included relevant literature and the different categories of respondents summarised in Table 3.1 in Section 3.7. The triangulation technique consisted of using a combination of documentary review, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observation. The data collection instruments were developed under close guidance of the researcher's supervisor and other scholars to help in identifying and improving ambiguous questions. Finally, the validity of the instruments was confirmed through the pilot study which revealed some weaknesses in certain questions, enabling the researcher to rectify the weaknesses.

## 5.12 Delimitation

In any research involving human beings, there are boundaries that the researcher has to set for his or her study. In the case of this study, the researcher limited his research to the members of infrastructures for peace established in the city of Goma, the city of Sake in Masisi territory, Nyiragongo and its environs, and to the local political and traditional leaders, local NGO staff members, international NGO staff members and ordinary community members.

## 5.13 Limitations

This study was not without limitations. The ongoing insecurity in North Kivu Province, particularly in the area of the study, made it difficult for the researcher to reach all the potential participants in the study. Moreover, my inability to speak the local languages, Kinyarwanda and Kihunde, made it difficult for me to communicate directly with participants who did not speak Kiswahili, forcing him to resort to interpreters whose translations the researcher could not always authenticate. In addition, the unfavourable condition of the roads in most rural areas where motorcycles are the only reliable means of motorised transport, made movement slow and hazardous, causing innumerable delays in the data collection exercise. In spite of these limitations, the researcher endeavoured to collect enough reliable data from all the target population categories in order to be able to produce this thesis.

# CHAPTER SIX

# DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

## 6.1 Introduction

This study set out to assess the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in the eastern DRC. More specifically, the study sought to describe and explain the mechanisms for the establishment of the infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC from 2004 to 2015; to identify and explain the challenges encountered in establishing peace infrastructures in eastern DRC from 2008 to 2015; to determine the relationship between local infrastructures for peace and other local infrastructures in eastern DRC; and to generate proposals for improving the effectiveness and sustainability of local peace infrastructures in eastern DRC.

## 6.2 Sample, Study Area and Population

This section describes the study area and population, the sampling methods adopted and the resultant sample size.

Israel (2003: 1) notes that perhaps the most frequently asked question concerning sampling is "what size sample do I need?" The answer to this question is influenced by a number of factors, including the purpose of the study, the population size, the risk of selecting a "bad" sample, and the allowable sampling error. The participants in this study included people who participated in the establishment of infrastructures for peace; influential community members, such as political and traditional leaders; staff of relevant, local and international non-governmental organisations; and ordinary community members. People who had participated in the establishment of infrastructures for peace, political and traditional leaders, and staff of relevant local and international non-governmental organisations were selected by purposive or judgmental sampling on the basis of the unique roles they played in the establishment of the infrastructures for peace or their roles in the functioning of the I4P. The sampling size constituted 92 people as follows:

1. 20 infrastructure for peace members

2. 24 community members
3. 12 local political leaders
4. 12 local traditional leaders
5. 12 locally-establishing organisation staff
6. 12 locally-establishing international organisations

As Babbie (2013: I28) states, at certain times judgmental sampling is appropriate to select a sample on the basis of knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study. In this study, the subsets of the population are people who have responsibilities in the established infrastructures for peace; influential community members, such as political and traditional authorities who deal with social issues; community members who have knowledge of I4P; and staff of establishing local and international NGOs who run peacebuilding activities in the region. Ordinary community members were selected according to the quota sampling method which is a type of non-probability sampling in which units are selected into a sample on the basis of predetermined characteristics, such that the total sample has the same distribution of characteristics assumed to exist in the population being studied (Babbie 2013: 194). It was necessary to select a quota of women, men and youth to be interviewed so as to be able to capture the views and insights of the different categories of community members.

## 6.3 Research Design, Methods and Instruments

This section presents the research design and methods as well as the corresponding data collection instruments that were used in the study.

### 6.3.1 Research Design and Methods

In this study, I adopted a cross-sectional survey design when I used mixed method, both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods. I used five data collection methods which were: documentary review, to collect secondary data, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observation in qualitative method and survey in quantitative method to gather primary data. Apart from relevant books and journal articles, the documents reviewed included reports from local and international

NGOs, provincial publications and MONUSCO documents as secondary data collection.

The analysis was carried out for explorative and analytic purposes, due to the reduced sampling size which aimed at a comprehensive qualitative rather than quantitative study, I made no allegation for overall statistical meaning such on the age, employment, and it is relevant to mention that a highly level of correspondence in data collected in all the sites.

While the questionnaires were administered to members of I4P, staff of the establishing implementing organisations, ordinary community members and local leaders, in-depth interviews were conducted with members of infrastructures for peace, local leaders and staff of implementing organisations. This was in keeping with Kelly's (2006: 297) observation that interviewing is a highly useful technique for collecting data in qualitative research because it gives the researcher an opportunity to get to know people intimately, such that he/she can truly understand how they think and feel. Interviews enabled the respondents to express their views on the effectiveness and sustainability of infrastructures for peace as vehicles of social cohesion in their respective communities.

Focus group discussions were conducted with local political and traditional leaders, and observation was used to note the attitudes of the infrastructures for peace members and the community members toward the I4P.

### 6.3.2 Research Instruments

The study employed five data collection instruments corresponding to the five data collection methods that were used. A reading list was used to facilitate the documentary review method. I compiled the list in advance, and continued updating it as he read more documents and identified additional relevant literature.

To facilitate the questionnaire administration, I prepared a questionnaire, originally drafted in English and then translated into French and Congolese Kiswahili by a translator. The Kiswahili version was evaluated by community members in Goma, who checked it for translation errors. After the data collection, the researcher translated the answers back into English. Given that the Kiswahili spoken in eastern DRC is different from that spoken in the south of the country, particularly in Lubumbashi, and that as a

researcher, I was not fluent in either version, I used an interpreter to facilitate all the interviews.

The questionnaire was divided into five sections, one for each of the five categories of respondents already indicated above, and covered four themes: mechanisms of the establishment of local I4P in eastern DRC, challenges encountered in establishing I4P, and the effectiveness and sustainability of local I4P. The questionnaire was designed to take 25 to 30 minutes per respondent to complete. For the reasons already stated in the introduction to this chapter, despite university authorisation, ethical clearance and my persuasion efforts, some community members refused to complete the questionnaire, but their number was not significant enough to undermine the validity of the data collected.

An interview guide, composed of open-ended questions, was used to conduct the in-depth interviews. The questions were based on the following important themes:

- The duration of the established infrastructures for peace
- The criteria for being a member of an infrastructure for peace
- The selection of the area or communities in which to implement the I4P
- The effectiveness of the I4P in promoting peace in communities

To facilitate the focus group discussions, I prepared a focus group discussion guide which covered the following themes:

- Challenges encountered in establishing infrastructures for peace
- Criteria for being a member of I4P
- Relations between I4P and other local infrastructures
- Effectiveness and sustainability of I4P

Finally, I relied on an observation checklist to guide my observation of the meetings of the infrastructures for peace. The checklist included the following items:

- The levels of safety of the environment where members of the infrastructure for peace meet when resolving a conflict

- The sitting arrangement during I4P meetings, especially regarding where youth, women and old persons sit relative to the rest
- The degree and quality of participation by the different categories of I4P members during meetings.

## 6.4 Challenges discussion

Interviews were conducted in the cities of Goma and Sake and their surroundings, and in Kibumba and its surroundings, all in the territory of Masisi. Both the sampling and data collection exercises were challenging because eastern DRC is a very risky environment for researchers, partly because people are distrustful of foreigners and partly due to the ever-present fear of being kidnapped. My task was further complicated by the fact that many local and international NGOs habitually give stipends to participants in project baseline surveys and evaluations. As a result, potential participants were reluctant to participate in the study if they were not paid for their participation: I did not have enough means to affect such payments. Moreover, because I am not a native of the study area and does not speak the Kiswahili version spoken in the area, in many cases he was obliged to rely on interpreters. All the same, by virtue of persistent and skilful persuasion, I was able to apply the indicated sampling methods and attain a sample of 92 respondents or participants, belonging to the six categories indicated in Section 6.2.2. Ultimately, I gained access to a sufficient number of respondents and was able to collect enough data to arrive at findings that are both valid and replicable.

## 6.5 Personal Experience

My personal experience as a member of the Global Alliance for Ministry and Infrastructure for Peace (GAMIP), as a former peacebuilding officer of World Relief, and as a member of the Goma Town community, helped the researcher to understand the reasons for, and the dynamics of, establishing some interactions that are motivated by cultural and social constructs of Congolese society. The researcher was therefore well-placed to fathom the impact of I4P on the social dynamics of the communities in North Kivu Province. Table 6.1 in Section 6.2.1 shows the organisations that established I4P, the number of I4P established, and the areas in which they are operating.

During the fieldwork, observation was instrumental in enabling me to understand the attitudes and feelings of the members of the infrastructures for peace regarding this new peacebuilding approach. According to Marshall and Rossman (2011: 140), observation is a fundamental and highly important method in all qualitative inquiry. It is used to discover complex interactions in natural social settings. In studies using in-depth interviews, observation plays an important role as well, with the researcher noting the interviewee's body language, tone of voice, and other paralinguistic messages. This is because the human body is a great communicator, capable of communicating in different ways through different conscious and unconscious postures and movements, gestures, facial expressions, and eye movements. Each of these physical movements of the body parts can be seen as a separate word or statement and can be interpreted differently by different people in a given context of communication. My observation of the ways in which I4P members use conflict transformation mechanisms to promote social cohesion within communities was particularly useful.

As a researcher, I also faced several challenges. Due to the fact that the eastern DRC is a conflict environment with an active myriad of armed groups, it was very stressful to collect data under such conditions. Fear was a challenge for me, as it is a recurring event for people to be attacked or kidnapped. As a stranger in the communities, it was not easy to conduct interviews. The second challenge was the accessibility of the location where I conducted focus group discussions and interviews. The condition of the roads was unfavourable and travelling in the remote areas to meet with the participants was very difficult. I often used motorbikes to reach communities living far from Goma. The DRC probably has the most challenging transport infrastructure environment in Africa and this situation is the cause of the following challenge.

Another challenge I faced was the fatigue from using motorbikes for long distances.

The language barrier was another challenge as most interviewees were unable to read and write or to communicate in Swahili, the most commonly-spoken language in the region, and this affected the data gathering process. The researcher relied on the interpreter who helped him to collect the information that was needed.

During the data collection, a number of community members even some local leaders insisted on being paid as a precondition for participating in this research as this is a

habit introduced by local and international organisations operating in the eastern DRC. Due to my ethic as a researcher, I was unable to meet this demand and I didn't have enough money. This situation pushed some prospective participants to decline or to withdraw from participating in the research. However, I can be safely assumed that the non-participation of some members has not substantively undermined the findings of this research. In the same way, even if some participants who consented to be interviewed without being paid, they were unable to guarantee 'fair' answers. To mitigate this concern, I triangulated the findings.

## 6.6 Summary of Findings

As stated earlier, the study set out to assess the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC through the observation and an examination of the mechanisms of their implementation and of the membership criteria. The effectiveness and sustainability of these local infrastructures for peace considered as new peacebuilding approach for promoting security and social cohesion in the conflict-ridden eastern DRC. From the qualitative data analysis collection and analysis, the study established that :

- The legitimisation of the infrastructure for peace by traditional leaders within their community is considered as the necessary condition and the different mechanisms for establishing an I4P such as election, nomination, voluntarism as the sufficient conditions from field data.
- The infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC are relatively effective in promoting social cohesion and human security within communities, although in some villages, these I4P are facing competition from traditional judicial systems.
- The self-established local I4P, such as existing associations and church organisations, are less costly to run as they rely on their existing means.
- Criteria for membership of infrastructures for peace are not uniform, and while some I4P are sensitive to gender and ethnic equity, others are not.

The mechanisms applied in the establishment of infrastructures for peace vary from one establishing organisation to another, and they constitute a key factor for the effectiveness and sustainability of I4P. The following mechanisms are mostly applied when establishing the I4P:

- Members of infrastructures for peace are selected from the community leaders by the establishing organisation
- Members of infrastructures for peace are elected by community members after attending a conflict transformation training program
- Community members volunteer to become members of an infrastructure for peace, and they are accepted by the establishing organisation

Most of the infrastructures for peace where members received stipends did not outlive the projects that established the infrastructures. When the establishing organisation leaves, and there are no more funds to continue paying stipends to the members, the I4P tends to collapse. This is mainly because the communities that own the I4P are too poor to afford stipends for I4P members, and partly because members are not sufficiently committed to work without pay.

Infrastructures owned by the community and recognised by the traditional leaders and other local authorities are likely to be sustainable as they receive support from local political, religious and traditional leaders. This study has established that the recognition by local leaders is the necessary condition for the sustainability of the infrastructure for peace, but it is important to note that the presence of armed groups in the region is big barrier to fostering social cohesion.

Political actors at the provincial and national levels influence local dynamics as many armed conflicts are connected to those actors. Many such political actors either manipulate their ethnic groups or create militias for political purposes. Each politician is linked to his community and many politicians create conflicts to boost their community leadership credentials.

In the meantime, observation method has helped me to find out that the inclusion aspect was considered in the established infrastructure for peace as all categories of the community (youth, women, elders) are represented.

From the quantitative data collection and analysis, the survey was important for me to know the percentage of age, gender, marital status, the level of education of the interviews and the members of infrastructures for peace per location.

From my personal opinion, the quality of the members of infrastructures for peace is a sufficient factor for sustainability. If members of an infrastructure for peace are known for high moral standards and integrity within their community, the community is more likely to believe in, and support, the I4P which is thus more likely to be effective and sustainable. Inversely, if members of an infrastructure for peace are selfish and considered to be immoral, their I4P is not likely to be effective or sustainable.

Infrastructures for peace that exhibit gender and ethnic sensitivity, incorporating gender and ethnic balance in their leadership and membership, are more likely to be effective and sustainable than those that are gender insensitive and ethnocentric.

## 6.7 Discussion of Findings

Research for this study employed a mixed-method approach making full use of relevant interviews and focus groups. In addition to the analysis texts on the DRC and particularly the eastern part of the country, the study focuses heavily on the views and insights of the staff of establishing organisations, local leaders and community members.

Overall, 92 persons were interviewed and 4 focus group discussions with local authorities six participants their depending on availability and willingness. Interviews conducted in the selected sites sought to explore participants' views and insights on the sustainability and effectiveness of the infrastructure for peace within their communities.

This section presents a discussion of the findings of the study, beginning with the profiles of the study participants.

### 6.7.1 Participants' Profiles

In this research, the characteristics of the respondents were very important as they have a significant role in the ability of a respondent to interpret questions correctly and to answer them constructively and honestly. Participants were identified through their roles in the community: ordinary men, youth and women members of the communities; traditional, religious and political leaders of the communities where infrastructures for peace had been established; and local and international actors in the peacebuilding activities in eastern DRC.

### a. Age

The age of the respondents was one of the more important characteristics in determining a respondent's ability to understand the dynamics involved in conflict and peacebuilding in his or her home area. The age of the participants varied between 18 and 60 years. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of the respondents by age group.

**Table 6.2: The mandates of ISSSS and STAREC. The distribution of respondents by category and age group.**

| S/N | CATEGORY | AGE GROUP (YEARS) | | | | | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 18-25 | 26-35 | 36-46 | 47-55 | Over 56 | |
| 1 | Members of I4P | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 20 |
| 2 | Local political leaders | - | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 12 |
| 3 | Local traditional leaders | - | - | 2 | 3 | 7 | 12 |
| 4 | Local NGO staff members | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| 5 | International NGO staff members | - | 4 | 5 | 3 | - | 12 |
| 6 | Ordinary community members | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 24 |
| TOTAL | | 8 | 20 | 25 | 20 | 19 | 92 |

*Source: Field data.*

As shown in Table 6.2, 65 or 70.7% of the respondents were aged between 26 and 55 years, and the 36-46-year age group had the highest number of respondents, while the 18-25-year age group had the least number of respondents.

The category aged between 26 and 55 years is considered as active and mature for dealing with issues concerning the community. This category also has more experience in human security matters than the category aged between 18 to 25 years.

Significantly, only 12.5% of all the respondents who are members of I4P and local NGOs or ordinary community members were in the over-56-year age group. This suggests that the average life span of the local population is not high, which is typical of Sub-Saharan populations. Again, as expected, the only respondent category that was dominated by people over 56 years of age was that of the local traditional leaders, 7 or 58% of whom were in this age group. This is to be expected because, traditionally, African cultural/traditional leaders tend to be elders.

**b. Gender**

Given the disproportionate representation of males in the perpetration of violence and the equally disproportionate suffering and helplessness of women during conflicts, people's perceptions about conflict and peacebuilding are highly likely to be influenced by their gender. It was therefore important to include both males and females in the sample in order to get balanced and representative data. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of respondents by category, gender and location.

**Table 6.3: Distribution of participants by category, gender and location.**

| N° | CATEGORY | LOCATION | | | | | | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Nyiragongo | | Masisi/Sake | | Goma | | |
| | | F | M | F | M | F | M | |
| 1 | Members of I4P | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 20 |
| 2 | Local political leaders | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 12 |
| 3 | Local traditional leaders | 0 | 6 | 0 | 6 | - | - | 12 |
| 4 | Local NGO staff members | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 12 |
| 5 | International NGO staff members | - | - | - | - | 6 | 6 | 12 |
| 6 | Ordinary community members | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 24 |
| Total | | 8 | 18 | 8 | 18 | 18 | 22 | 92 |

*Source: Field data.*

As shown in Table 6.3, the only respondent categories where there was no gender parity and where males dominated were the categories of 'local traditional leaders', all

of whom were male, the 'local political leaders' and the 'local NGO staff', 66.7% of whom were male. Moreover, from the 92 respondents, 58 or 63% were male. This is largely due to Congolese communities being highly patriarchal. In this regard, it is instructive to note that the only respondent category with perfect gender parity was that of the 'international NGO staff members', reflecting the gender sensitivity characteristic of international organisations.

It is equally significant that all the 12 staff of the implementing international organisations are based in Goma, and that there are none in rural areas where the majority of the I4P are located. This is partly attributable to the fact that Goma City is notably more secure than the smaller towns and rural areas, therefore international organisations prefer to be in Goma because they want to avoid exposing their staff to the insecurity associated with small towns and rural areas, this is my personal opinion.

### c. Highest Level of Formal Education of Participants

Similar to the factors of age and gender, the level of formal education of a person partly determines his or her ability to understand issues, especially complex issues related to conflict and peacebuilding, and to participate constructively in conflict resolution processes. Therefore, it was important to not only include respondents of different levels of education but also to know the level of formal education of each respondent so as to better appreciate and interpret the respondents' responses. Table 6.4 summarises the distribution or respondents by category and their highest level of formal education. As Table 6.4 shows, youth have higher levels of formal education, followed by men and women in that order, and women are the least-educated category.

**Table 6.4: The distribution of respondents by gender, age group and highest education level.**

| S/N | Age group and gender | Never went to school | Never completed primary school | Completed only primary school | Completed only secondary school | Completed university degree | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Female youth | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 14 |
| 2 | Male youth | 4 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 31 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Women | 6 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 17 |
| 4 | Men | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 30 |
| Total | | 20 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 9 | 92 |

*Source: Field data.*

Table 6.4 shows that the majority of female youth did not attend school or complete primary school. Female education is neglected particularly in rural areas, and men and male youth are more educated than women.

**d. Marital status**

While marital status is mainly a reflection of age, it also partly influences the magnitude of the problems one experiences as a result of conflict, the ability of a person to cope with the challenges that conflicts spawn, and the degree of commitment to peacebuilding. Table 6.5 shows the distribution of respondents by marital status and location.

Table 6.5: The distribution of participants by marital status and location.

| S/N | Marital Status | Region | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Goma | Masisi/Sake | Nyiragongo | |
| 1 | Single | 16 | 2 | 2 | 20 |
| 2 | Married | 12 | 19 | 17 | 48 |
| 3 | Divorced | 6 | 10 | 8 | 24 |
| | Total | 34 | 31 | 27 | 92 |

*Source: Field data.*

As shown in Table 6.5, half or 50% of the respondents were married, 30% were divorced, and 20% were single. Of all the 20 single respondents, 16 or 80% were in Goma City, while the rest were equally divided between Masisi/Sake and Nyiragongo, partly reflecting the tendency of urban dwellers to marry later than rural ones, and partly attributable to the high level of youth involvement in peacebuilding activities.

Equally significant is the fact that married and divorced respondents were mainly located in the rural areas of Masisi/Sake and Nyiragongo, again reflecting the tendency of rural dwellers to marry earlier than their urban counterparts. The

observation that there were more divorcees than single respondents may be largely attributable to the growing instability of marriage as an institution, especially in conflict-ridden environments like that of eastern DRC.

### e. Employment Status

The employment status of a person, whether employed, self-employed or unemployed, largely determines his or her well-being. For male youth and men in conflict-prone regions, unemployment increases vulnerability to recruitment into armed conflict and crime. When such males have families and children, the children are also highly vulnerable to recruitment as child soldiers. Therefore, the employment status of respondents was an important factor to consider in this study, partly because it also offers insights into the general level of human development and poverty. Table 6.6 shows the employment status of respondents by location and gender.

**Table 6.6: Respondents' employment status by location and gender.**

| S/N | Status | Location | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Goma | | Masis & Sake | | Nyiragongo | | |
| | | F | M | F | M | F | M | |
| 1 | Unemployed | 4 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 27 |
| 2 | Self-employed | 4 | 11 | 6 | 12 | 6 | 10 | 49 |
| 3 | Employed | 2 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 16 |
| Total | | 10 | 22 | 11 | 22 | 10 | 17 | 92 |

As shown in Table 6.6, 49 or 53% of the respondents were self-employed, only 16 or 17.4% were employed, and 27 or 29.3% were unemployed. Together, the unemployed and the self-employed constituted over 82% of the respondents, reflecting the very limited number of industries and other sources of employment in North Kivu Province where humanitarian organisations, and to a lesser extent the UN peacekeeping force, are among the main employers. Similar to the death of industries, the large number of humanitarian organisations is attributable to the unending conflicts in the region, which discourage entrepreneurs from investing there and spawn human suffering, thereby attracting the humanitarian organisations and the largest UN peacekeeping force.

### 6.7.2. Legitimisation of the I4P

In traditional societies in North Kivu where this research was conducted, traditional leadership is usually inherited and the source of legitimacy is historic and its origin is back before the colonial period. Traditional leaders are considered as the fathers or mothers of the communities where they live. With this consideration within the communities, they have greater capacity of mobilisation than other local state institutions due to their special legitimacy in the eyes of their community members. They are considered as embodies in the community history and have special power. Thus, any institution or any activity cannot be implemented in the community without the consent of the local traditional leaders as they represent the community. The core concern for the peacebuilding activities at the local level is the lack of involvement of tradition leaders as they have great consideration by the entire community included the armed groups or members of militias.

For the vast majority of the respondents reflecting the findings reported above, the most important factor or condition is the recognition of the infrastructure by the local leaders and specifically the traditional leaders. During the Focus Group discussions, the acceptance of the I4P by local authorities was considered as the most important condition during due to the fact that traditionally, traditional leaders often settle dispute among individuals. All participants agreed that the legitimisation of the I4P is the necessary condition for its sustainability within communities.

The legitimisation of the I4P is outlined by participants in one FG in Sake in Masisi:

*"Nothing can be done in our communities without the approval of our traditional leaders, if they agree on something, no one can refuse and, in the case, the infrastructure for peace this will be the condition for its sustainability".*

While in Nyiragongo, participants in FG noted:

*"The power of the traditional leaders is considered as sacred. We, as inhabitants of this village, must obey to his instructions and we cannot not accept any institutions within in our community without his approval".*
*A participant B said:*

*"Traditional authorities such as customary chiefs continue to administer land on behalf of local communities in many areas, often in alliance with local government officials; they are the owner of the land".*

In some communities, traditional chiefs themselves manage to deliberately present as customary leaders and considered themselves as state representatives and deserve support accordingly.

### 6.7.3. Mechanisms of the Establishment of Local I4P

The mechanisms of establishing I4P in eastern DRC differed from one establishing organisation to another. When respondents were asked whether there were any standard mechanisms followed in the establishment of I4P, they acknowledged that infrastructures for peace are a new phenomenon in peacebuilding, and each organisation uses its own approach to establish them. The different mechanisms used are: voluntarism, election and nomination.

#### a. Voluntarism

The European Charter on the Rights and Responsibilities of Volunteers (2012: 6) defines a volunteer as a person who carries out activities benefitting society by exercising free will. These activities are undertaken for a non-profit cause, benefitting the personal development of the volunteer, who commits their time and energy for the general good without financial reward. Voluntarism is one of the mechanisms through which infrastructures for peace have been established in eastern DRC. Community members are asked to join I4P and serve their respective communities voluntarily. The study found that 4 or 40% of the infrastructures for peace in the study area were composed of, and managed by, volunteers.

During the interview, a participant in Goma town had this to say:

> *"As there is no salary, there is no need to force people to join the I4P. It is a matter to be join on voluntary basis, any member has to give himself for the community work not expecting any payment".*

Another interviewee noted:

> *"I4P membership is good opportunity for those who have time to work for the community for free"*

**b. Election**

Some I4P are composed of, and managed by, members elected by their respective communities. Such community representatives in the I4P are normally elected on the basis of their perceived integrity, high moral standards and overall standing within their respective communities. In all, 4 or 40% of the infrastructures for peace in the study area were composed of, and managed by, elected members.

**c. Nomination**

In other cases, the implementing organisation nominates community members to constitute and manage infrastructures for peace. Notably, the study established that 2 or 20% of the infrastructures for peace in the study area were managed by members nominated by implementing organisations.

A staff member for one of establishing organisation said that:

"*We have to nominate I4P according to the criteria put in place and in rural area people are sometimes hesitant to join any institution or any structure. We need to push them and that is why we are obligated to nominate".*

Another participant on the importance of nominating members:

*"Nominating members of the I4P will help Invest in community-based conflict mitigation and peacebuilding is fundamental to promote broader human security. There is a strong increase between community members in trust and confidence in conflict mitigation and peacebuilding through I4P as important for more effective working relations with traditional and formal authorities and work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding with other communities".*

### 6.7.3 Comparison of Mechanisms of Local I4P Establishment

Each of the three mechanisms has its supporters and critics. While some people support volunteerism on account of its in-built assurance of commitment to the cause of I4P, others oppose it because people considered to be immoral may join the infrastructure for peace and still be accepted. Similarly, some people are opposed to electing I4P members and managers as, in their view, elections involve politics which is potentially divisive. For example, according to a peace committee member in Nyiragongo territory, some elected members consider themselves as special persons

in the village on account of their membership in the peace committee. Sake respondents were also very critical of elections as a mechanism of establishing I4P because, in the opinion of one respondent, it had enabled an immoral person to join one of the infrastructures for peace in their city.

Generally, while 60% of the respondents favoured voluntarism, largely because it has immense potential for attracting mainly people who are committed to building peace, 30% of the respondents were against this mechanism, arguing that the mechanism was highly vulnerable to abuse by immoral self-seekers who could easily pose as volunteers and join I4P to the detriment of the I4P. In the opinion of these respondents, other factors such as behaviour, morality and income level, which can affect the effectiveness of an I4P, should be considered. Only 10% of the respondents were neither for nor against volunteerism.

In general, 65% of youth, especially in Goma and Sake, preferred the election mechanism to the other two mechanisms, mainly because, in their view, elections confer legitimacy and credibility upon the elected persons. This finding can be attributed to the fact that while urban youth are more exposed to and accustomed to elections as a means of identifying leaders, rural youth are more accustomed to the traditional African practice of consensus as a means of decision-making.

According to Muhindo, a youth member of a peace committee in Goma, in the DRC people are exposed to elections from an early age. In his personal experience, Muhindo was elected as a school representative in Grade 5, and has seen his father being elected as a member of a trade union in one of the compagnies based in Goma due to his skills. In his opinion, one needs to be elected in order to be legitimate.

Youth living in rural areas do not support the election mechanism because rural areas are dominated by culture or tradition which favours consensus to choose or appoint traditional or local leaders. Indeed, for many years now in the DRC, local political leaders have been appointed by the National Government while local traditional leaders inherit their positions. These mechanisms are embedded in their daily life and due to this, 25% of youth do not support the election mechanism, 10% are neutral or undecided, while 40% support volunteerism.

Habimana (not his real name), a youth respondent Masisi, notes:

*I have never elected in my life and I have never seen community members elect local authorities; all of them are appointed.*

Interestingly, 75% of the adults do not have any preference among the mechanisms. In their view, all mechanisms lead to the establishment of the infrastructure for peace. For the adult respondents, the situation of conflict has affected their lives for many years and the region is underdeveloped. Social cohesion and human security are disconnected and there is lack of a culture of peace. The most affected areas are the Masisi and Nyiragongo territories where people are living with the trauma caused by the recurrent conflicts. For adults living in these territories, what is important is establishing infrastructures to promote peace and human security, regardless of the mechanisms used to do so. As Maimuna, a woman respondent from Nyiragongo territory, notes:

*They have different attempts to bring peace in the region through various peace accords and we never experience sustainable peace. Conflict has become a daily phenomenon. We have lost lives in our community and our lives are adversely affected by these recurrent conflicts. We have realised that peace and human security cannot come from outside but from within our community.*

*The Congolese Government has failed to secure sustainable peace in our region, and no outsider can bring us peace: we have to do it ourselves. We realise that this new approach is an effective way for empowering the community to search for sustainable peace regardless of the mechanism used to bring peace.*

Almost 75% of respondents from the Masisi and Nyiragongo territories are keen on having infrastructures for peace regardless of the mechanism by which they are established. In Goma, 25% of respondents are either for the election or the nomination mechanism.

### 6.7.4 Infrastructure for peace as a panacea to local problems

The respondents surveyed and the interviewed acknowledged the importance of the infrastructures for peace in the region and the community members involvement in peacebuilding and conflict transformation as they embrace human security, gender

issues, social and economic justice, and peaceful methods of solving personal and social problems.

The community members want an increase in the number of peace committees, it is being considered as the cornerstone in creating cultures of peace that promote societal healing and reconciliation. Although the goal here is the promotion of the culture of peace. Thus, an important part of peace committees must be educating Congolese to recognize both direct violence and structural violence.

The challenge of increasing peace committees is to understand if there are connections among the recurrence of violent conflicts, local tensions in regard to lands, identity, and resources, and understanding of conflict and to evaluate the effects of not involving community members in local problems and understandings in achieving peace. To make this occurs is the commitment, not only of the international community and international and local organisation, but also of Congolese Government.

Although the different signed peace agreements have identified the root causes of violent conflict in the region, the new peacebuilding approach looks particularly promising with regard to local problems such as land issues and community psycho-social transformation.

### 6.7.4 Challenges encountered in establishing I4P

Respondents who were members of I4P were asked to name the challenges that their infrastructures face. In response, different answers were generated, translating into six main challenges which are summarised in Table 6.7.

**Table 6.7: Challenges of establishing I4P in the eastern DRC.**

| N° | Challenge | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lack of financial assistance | 44 | 47.8 |
| 2 | Duplication of activities | 8 | 8.7 |
| 3 | Lack of government support | 14 | 15.2 |
| 4 | Lack of offices | 8 | 8.7 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Lack of means of transport | 12 | 13 |
| 6 | Insecurity | 6 | 6.5 |
| Total | | 92 | 100 |

*Source: Field data.*

As shown in Table 6.7, the lack of financial assistance appears to be the main challenge that the members of the infrastructures for peace are facing, followed by the lack of government support. While the respondents from the cities of Goma and Sake indicated that they most acutely lack financial assistance, those in the rural areas of Nyiragongo territory highlighted the lack of government support as their main challenge, followed by the lack of transport because villages are separated by long distances, aggravated by deteriorating road conditions, and unreliable means of transport. In addition to the above challenges, and partly because of them, respondents acknowledged that local infrastructures for peace do not have the power nor capacity to deal with armed and political conflicts in their areas of operation.

### 6.7.5 Relations between Local I4P and other Local Infrastructures

Regarding the relations between the established I4P and local government authorities, some the respondents stated that the relations were fine while others expressed the opposite opinion. In all, 70% of the respondents in the rural Masisi and Nyiragongo territories viewed the relations between infrastructures for peace members and local authorities as positive, which, in their opinion, helps to reduce both tensions between communities and the volume of the responsibilities of the I4P. Traditionally, local leaders, such as village chiefs, were in charge of resolving conflicts between community members and it was taking more time without the support of local government authorities.

However, in the cities of Goma and Sake, 80% of the respondents reported that their relations with local government authorities were not positive because the latter view these I4P as competitors in promoting social cohesion. The local authorities, particularly the political authorities, are resentful of the activities of the I4P which deny the local authorities the opportunity to earn extra income by charging a fee each time they help resolve a conflict.

### 6.7.6 Effectiveness and Sustainability of Local I4P in Eastern DRC

*Effectiveness of Local I4P*

When respondents were asked their opinion on whether I4P were effective, their responses varied depending on the category to which they belonged. Table 6.8 summarises the respondents' views on the effectiveness of I4P.

**Table 6. 8: Respondents' views on the effectiveness of I4P by category.**

| Answer to Question: Are the I4P effectively promoting peace? | Respondent Category | | | | | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Implementing organisation staff (%) | Members of the I4P (%) | Local political leaders (%) | Local Traditional leaders (%) | Community members (%) | |
| Yes | 60 | 80 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 70 |
| No | 40 | 20 | 40 | 30 | 20 | 30 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

*Source: Field data.*

As shown in Table 6.8, on average an overwhelming majority (70%) of the respondents agreed that the I4P are effective while the rest (30%) thought that the infrastructures were ineffective. Interestingly, 80% of both ordinary community members and I4P members, and 70% of local traditional leaders, agreed that the I4P were effective in their peacebuilding work. In particular, most ordinary community members averred that I4P do actually promote intra- and inter-community cohesion. This tends to suggest that the I4P are effective, since these three categories represent the vast majority of the population. Not surprisingly, especially in view of the negative attitude of local political leaders towards the I4P, these leaders and the staff of the implementing organisations were the least supportive (only 60% of each category) of the view that I4P are effective. However, given that only 60% of the staff from I4P implementing organisations also thought that the I4P, and that 40% of them regarded the I4P as ineffective, one is bound to conclude that, at best, the I4P are not adequately or ideally effective.

The 40% of the staff of implementing organisations that thought that the I4P were not impactful attributed this ineffectiveness to the lack of funding or financial support. Therefore, their assessment of the effectiveness of the I4P could also be construed as a disguised attempt to appeal for more funding for I4P. For their part, the 40% of the political leaders who judged the I4P as ineffective explained that this was because sustainable peace could only be achieved through state jurisdiction or intervention. This also tends to imply that political leaders have a top-down attitude towards peacebuilding, possibly for selfish purposes.

In addition, the study revealed that the criteria for membership of infrastructures for peace are not uniform, and that they varied from one implementing organisation to another. Implementing organisations used different criteria to establish the I4P, including simple nomination, election and volunteering. Moreover, it was revealed that while some I4P are sensitive to gender and ethnic balance in their membership, others are not. These differences may partly explain the varying degrees of both actual and perceived I4P effectiveness.

*Sustainability of Local I4P*

In regard to sustainability, most of the participants recognised that the infrastructures for peace are part of the community daily life and as it is formed by community members. It is part of community institution. In individual interviews, focus group discussions, and in the responses from the questionnaire, respondents and participants were asked: *Do you think that the established I4P in your community is sustainable?* In response, 75% of the respondents from the community members affirmed that I4P can be sustainable if they are based on existing structures such as associations, churches and cooperatives, such that the I4P become embedded in the daily activities of those structures. Moreover, the same respondents argued that such pre-existing structures are both more effective and sustainable because they provide free peacebuilding services, as opposed to the government judiciary system which charges community members fees that are often unaffordable when resolving their cases, and which is distant and time-consuming.

A member of the infrastructure for peace in Mabanga in Goma city has this to say:

*The peace committee established in our community is part of our life and it is formed by ordinary people regardless like us. We own it and it is part of our life. We consent*

*to promote social cohesion within our community and we know each other, thus relation between members is an assurance of the sustainability of our peace committee.*

In addition, 80% of the respondents maintained that the quality of the members and the ownership of an I4P by the community members are significant factors in the sustainability of the I4P. The more upright, committed and selfless the membership and ownership of an I4P is, the more likely the I4P is to be sustainable. Inversely, the more morally questionable and selfish the members and owners of an I4P are, the less likely it is to be sustainable. A notable 25% of the respondents acknowledged that if members of the I4P focus on financial benefits, it becomes very difficult for the I4P to be sustainable: as soon as funds run out, the infrastructure for peace crumbles. In this connection, only 30% of the members of the I4P stated that the infrastructures for peace would only be sustainable if the members received a monthly stipend. These were opposed by the rest (70%) who held that the I4P would be sustainable because they are owned by the community and supported by volunteers and elected members and officials. This view was supported by the youth, 80% of whom were optimistic that the I4P would be sustainable only if they were composed of well-known, upright and respected community members.

The issue of paying stipends to I4P members came up repeatedly during the individual interviews and focus group discussions. The study found that many I4P-establishing organisations pay stipends to members of infrastructures for peace during the project-implementing phase. However, when the project ends and the I4P are left on their own, they cannot afford to continue paying stipends to their members and, as a result, the I4P collapse because the members put their own interests above the interests of the entire community. On the contrary, infrastructures for peace that have thus far survived are those where stipends are not paid and where membership is based on merit and a sense of community service.

By extension, many respondents pointed out that the mechanisms or approaches used when establishing an infrastructure for peace can have an impact on the sustainability of the I4P. In this regard, 80% of the respondents affirmed that the mechanisms applied in the establishment for peace are among the important factors for the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace. When membership is based on a sense

of sacrifice in the interest of the community, the infrastructure for peace will be sustainable. Infrastructures that were established by the election of members and through volunteerism appeared to last longer than those established by the nomination of or appointment of the members.

Not surprisingly, 80% of local authority respondents were of the view that an I4P could not be sustainable if provincial and national authorities were not involved in its establishment, again highlighting the top-down approach favoured by local government authorities who seek to benefit materially and politically from every initiative in their respective areas of jurisdiction. However, 20% of local authority respondents were opposed to this top-down view. Instead, they were of the opinion that I4P should be informal initiatives, owned and managed by the people without government control.

Significantly, 95% of the respondents belonging to local organisations expressed happiness with the establishment of infrastructures for peace within their communities. They noted that previously, peace initiatives had failed to achieve their objectives because they had been imposed on communities by the provincial or national government. In their view, I4P that have been established in a community-participatory framework have already produced some positive changes, and they stand a better chance of being both successful and sustainable.

In the opinion of 70% of the implementing staff, the established I4P will be sustainable on the condition that volunteers or elected members are committed to their work, for which they would need to receive proper training. Support from local, political, religious and traditional leaders for infrastructures for peace is another factor that was found to influence sustainability. The study found that infrastructures owned by the community and recognised and accepted by the local political, religious and traditional authorities, are likely to be sustainable, largely because they have not only the support of those authorities but also because they take advantage of the structures of those authorities to facilitate their peacebuilding work. However, as the study found, provincial and national political authorities exercise a generally adverse influence on the sustainability of I4P. This is because many political actors are connected to armed rebel groups, and they tend to influence the local dynamics in favour of those groups, thereby undermining the peacebuilding efforts of the I4P. A notable finding from the

study was that many provincial and national political leaders manipulate their ethnic groups or create militias for political and financial gain.

Even though the infrastructure for peace may be sustainable in eastern DRC, there are some limitations raised by participants:

-The presence of armed groups in the region constitutes a big limitation as community members have sometimes to move from one village due to violence by these armed groups;

-Looking to political dynamic in the DRC, the infrastructures for peace are not capable to deal with political conflict in eastern part of the country.

## 6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the insights and opinions of the staff members of the implementing organisations, the members of the infrastructures for peace, community members and local authorities on the established infrastructures for peace within their communities. The discussions held with these various categories of the study population were based on different themes related to infrastructures for peace, with particular emphasis on the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace. Respondents expressed different views on the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace.

Seventy percent (70%) of the respondents, particularly the ordinary community members, members of I4P and traditional leaders, thought that the I4P were effective while the rest of the respondents thought that they were not. Those who thought that the I4P were impactful attributed this effectiveness to four main factors: the I4P are owned by, and composed of, community members who are upright and imbued with a spirit of community service; the I4P are closer to the people than the much more distant government judiciary system; the I4P offer their services free of charge, unlike the government judicial system and local authorities that charge an often unaffordable fee for resolving conflicts in the community; and the relations between I4P on one hand, and local, provincial and national political authorities, and local traditional leaders on the other.

The study found that three main factors influence the sustainability of the I4P: the mechanisms by which the infrastructures for peace are established; the composition

of the membership of the I4P, especially the moral integrity and the degree of commitment to peacebuilding of the members, as well as the extent to which the membership is sensitive to gender and ethnic balance or sensitivity; and whether or not an I4P pays stipends to its members during the initial stages of its operation. It has also been established that the attitudes and activities of politicians at the provincial and national levels have a significant, and often adverse, effect on the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

# SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 7.1 Introduction

This following chapter provides the principles a synopsis of the principal findings from the data analysis collected from both primary and secondary sources. As stated in chapter 4, Local infrastructures for peace or peace committees have become a common mechanism for sustaining peace and social cohesion within communities in eastern DRC. This thesis has analysed the views and insights of the staff of organisations that have established infrastructures for peace, members of I4P, community members and local authorities of communities where I4P have been established in eastern DRC. The main objective of this study was to assess the necessary and sufficient condition for the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC. More specifically, the study sought to:

- Describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015
- Identify and explain the challenges encountered in establishing peace infrastructures in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015;
- Determine the relationship between local peace infrastructures for peace and other local infrastructures in eastern DRC from 2010 to 2015;
- Establish the degree of effectiveness and sustainability of local infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC;
- Generate proposals for improving the effectiveness and sustainability of local peace infrastructures in eastern DRC

The study adopted a combination of research methods, including qualitative and quantitative ones, to collect and analyse data in order to achieve the specific objectives outlined above.

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been used for the study of the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC. For example, I observed the action and verbal behaviour of community members where the infrastructures for peace are established and the number of the participants on this research had applied both quantitative and qualitative approaches to the question of discovering which factors makes the infrastructures for peace more sustainable. It is anticipated that this study Will contribute to the emerging of the new phenomenon in peacebuilding of systematically studying the infrastructure for peace.

## 7.2 Summary of Findings

Chapter One is a general introduction to the study. It presents the rationale of this research, the contextual and spatial background, as well as a brief history of conflict in DRC. The same chapter presents the objectives of the study, largely constituted of the overall aim and specific objectives. Furthermore, Chapter One presents outlines the summary of the study, followed by a brief statement of the research design and research methodology. A section of the chapter is devoted to clarifying the biography of the different groups involved in violent in eastern DRC. The chapter concludes with a description of the structure of the study.

Chapter Two presents the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study, largely constituted of the peacebuilding theory and the concept of sustainability, effectiveness, development and Infrastructure for peace. It also introduces the different methodologies used to collect data, which are fully described in Chapter Five. Chapter Two also reviews relevant literature, outlining the intervening variables in the relationship between peace and development. Crucially, the chapter shows that sustainability is a product of a number of variables, including development. In the same chapter, an analysis of the peacebuilding-development nexus is carried out with a view to advancing a nuanced understanding of the impact of conflict on development. Furthermore, the discussion of sustainability provides a context in which the connections between infrastructures for peace and development could be positioned. It is noted that the relationship between peace and development is direct and logical because peacebuilding and development are essentially two sides of one coin. The

chapter also demonstrates that peace and development are closely linked: without peace, it is difficult if not impossible to achieve development, and development is inconceivable in the absence of peace.

Following the review of literature relevant to the study in Chapter Two, therefore Chapter Three is devoted to an examination of the different infrastructures for peace established in the eastern DRC. This chapter examines the theory of infrastructures for peace as being a new approach to promoting social cohesion and peacebuilding within local communities, particularly in countries affected by conflict. The analysis of the search for sustainable peace in the conflict-ridden eastern DRC provides the background and context for the attempt to find peace. This chapter presents a detailed depiction of the different steps taken by the international community and other organisations to promote peace in the DRC. As noted in the same chapter, the international and local NGOs, with the collaboration of civil society organisations in the DRC, are playing an important role in implementing the new bottom-up approach within the country. Being the most affected region of the country, the eastern DRC is home to different types of infrastructures for peace, established by various international and local organisations.

The discussion in Chapter Four demonstrates that the DRC has attracted the attention of the international community and the Congolese themselves when it comes to the search for peace in the country. However, conflict still persists in the country in spite of the presence of the biggest UN peacekeeping mission in the world. Nevertheless, it is noted that UN missions have helped the country to reduce violent conflict in some regions, but have failed to end the conflicts sustainably All the same, the infrastructures for peace established in eastern DRC have succeeded in reducing violence in some parts of the region.

Chapter Five presents the research design and methodology adopted to collect and analyse the data. The chapter portrays and justifies the methods and techniques used in the study, including the sampling method, data collection and data analysis. Chapter Five also describes and justifies the research design and the methods of data collection and analysis that were employed in the study. By employing methodological triangulation – specifically in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and

observation – the study was able to explore the insights and views of the various categories of respondents or study participants.

In Chapter Six, data on the infrastructures for peace in eastern DRC is presented and analysed. The chapter examines the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in fostering social cohesion and peace within local communities in eastern DRC. The same chapter presents and analyses the views and insights of the staff of establishing organisations, members of established infrastructures for peace, community members and local authorities in areas where infrastructures for peace have been established. Through the opinions of the respondents, the chapter explores the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures of peace in eastern DRC. Also, as stated in Chapters One and Five, the infrastructure for peace is a new approach adopted by peacebuilding actors working in the DRC. Although the Congolese government, through the local authorities, is officially supportive of this new strategy, national, provincial and local political authorities often undermine the work of I4P. This is why it was necessary to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of the infrastructures for peace in promoting peace in eastern DRC.

Chapter Seven also argues that the will of community members and their community members having an infrastructure for peace within their community as the necessary conditions and for their sustainability in eastern DRC. The different mechanisms of their establishment as the sufficient conditions the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace such as the manner in which the membership of I4P is constituted, the moral integrity of the members of I4P and the degree of their commitment to peace, the relations between I4P and local political and traditional leaders, and whether or not I4P members are paid a stipend during the initial stages of their operations. The chapter notes that members of infrastructures for peace receiving stipends from implanting organisations or institutions is fragile and less likely to be sustainable. Overall, as argued by most respondents, infrastructures for peace are a relevant and promising approach to promoting peace within local communities in eastern DRC.

## 7.3 Concluding Remarks

In this study, the pragmatic perspective was used to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of the infrastructures for peace established

in eastern DRC. Given the insights, views and attitudes of its members, the staff of establishing organisations, and members of local communities and local authorities, this study draws certain conclusions, with reference to the effectiveness of local infrastructures for peace, as explained below.

Regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of peace infrastructures in eastern DRC, the recognition by local leaders and particularly by local leaders emerges as a necessary condition, and the mechanisms of their establishment and improvement of human security are demonstrably considered as sufficient conditions. Research findings suggest that most infrastructures where members are nominated or appointed, instead of being elected on the basis of their standing within their respective communities, are neither effective nor sustainable. Conversely, most infrastructures where members are elected and which operate on a voluntary basis, are more likely to be effective and sustainable. This difference arises from the fact that nominated or appointed members tend to be selfish, essentially working for their personal gain rather than for the common good of the community.

As argued in the chapter Five on peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC, the search for peace is a process, and in eastern DRC, it has drawn in the international community and other peacebuilding actors, with the process continuing for many years. However, given the successes that I4P have achieved in other countries and in eastern DRC thus far, it is undeniable that infrastructures for peace remain among the potentially most effective means of promoting human security and social cohesion within communities in eastern DRC. However, as the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, infrastructures for peace are only effective and sustainable when their membership is upright, committed to peace, and working on a voluntary basis; when they are supported by local authorities; and when their activities are not undermined by national and provincial political authorities. In this regard, it can be argued that infrastructures for peace, if well-established, constituted, politically-supported and empowered with skills training in conflict transformation, have the potential to build sustainable peace in eastern DRC.

Whereas the findings of this research may not be universalized to other countries where infrastructures for peace have been established, it is crucial to acknowledge

that some points of the findings especially the point related to the mechanisms of establishment have a general application.

## 7.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations appear to be inevitable.

### 7.4.1 The legitimisation by local leaders

Each infrastructure for peace established within a community must be recognised by the local authorities for it to be legitimised.

### 7.4.2 The Challenges encountered in establishing I4P

In view of the challenges of establishing I4P that have been unearthed in the preceding pages, especially in order to promote the effectiveness and sustainability of I4P, this study proposes that:

- Implementing organisations, or local groups that wish to establish an I4P, should give proper consideration to the criteria for membership of an I4P. In particular, members should either be elected or nominated by their respective, ordinary community members and traditional chiefs. Where people are free to volunteer to be members, the volunteers should be subjected to approval by ordinary community members and traditional chiefs before they are confirmed as members of an I4P.
- Community members who are willing to work as I4P operatives should be prepared to work without pay.
- Each I4P should deliberately try to cultivate cordial working relationships with local political leaders and traditional authorities, such as Councils of Elders which have traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, without however in any way becoming involved in local political wrangles, except as peace-builders.
- Infrastructures for peace should endeavour to work with or under existing structures, such as religious and self-help organisations.

- Each community should take responsibility for its own situation by promoting a culture of peace and taking into consideration the security and well-being of its members.

### 7.4.2 Recommendations for Further Studies

As this study notes, it is in the interest of the international community, including African countries, especially those in the Great Lake region, to re-establish and sustain peace in the DRC. To this end, this study recommends that further studies should be conducted on the following topics:

- The impact of peace committees on local development in eastern DRC
- Trauma healing and peace committees in eastern DRC
- Peace committees and social cohesion in eastern DRC
- Peace committees and reintegration of former combatants in eastern DRC
- Human security and social development in eastern DRC.

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# APPENDIX A

## ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN DRC

**Table A1: Armed rebel groups in eastern DRC.**

| S/N | Name | Main area of origin | Area of operation |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Burundian groups** | | | |
| 1 | Front national de libération (FNL) | Burundi | Southern area of the city of Uvira in South Kivu |
| 2 | FNL-Nzabampeha | Burundi | Uvira Territory |
| 3 | FNL-Nibizi | Burundi | Moyens Plateaux in Uvira Territory in South Kivu |
| 4 | Résistance pour un État de droit (RED)-*Tabara* | Burundi | Uvira Territory |
| 5 | Forces populaires burundaises (FPB, ex-Forces républicaines du Burundi) | Burundi | Uvura Territory |
| 6 | Forces républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU) | Burundi | Moyens Plateaux in Uvira Territory |
| **Congolese (DRC) groups** | | | |
| Groups strongly linked to the former Armée du Peuple Congolais (APC) | | | |
| 7 | Mouvement de la Révolution Congolaise-Léopards (MRC-L Mai-Mai Endaniluhi) | Beni Territory | Muhala Moutain and Graben |
| 8 | Mai-Mai Kithikyolo | Beni Territory | Semuliki Valley |
| 9 | Mai-Mai Sibenda | Beni Territory | Rwenzori Sector |
| 10 | FDC – Guides & Guides – MAC | Masisi and Walikale Territories | Mahanga in Masisi Territory |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | Nduma Defence du Congo (NDC) | Walikale Territory | Mining area of Bisie and Pinga, bordering Masisi Territory |
| 12 | Nduma Defence of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) | Northeastern Walikale and Southwestern Lubero Territory | Northeastern Walikale and Southwestern Lubero Territory |
| **Nyatura groups** | | | |
| 13 | Nyatura John love | Rutshuru Territory | Muriki in Rutshuru Territory |
| 14 | Nyatura Domi/Nyatura – Forces de patriotes congolais (FPC) | Rutshuru Territory | Bwito chefferie in Rutshuru Territory |
| 15 | Nyatura Niyonzimana/Nyatura-Force populaire pour l'unité des communautes congolaises (FDP) | Rutshuru Territory | North of Nyamulagira Volcano in Rutshuru Territory |
| 18 | Nyatura Kasongo/Nyatura –Forces de défense pour les droits de l'homme (FDDH) or *Groupe de Sécurité* | Masisi Territory | Bashali Mokoto Chefferie in Masisi Territory |
| 19 | Nyatura Jean-Marie | Masisi Territory | Mpati and Bisie in Northern Masisi Territory |
| 20 | Nyatura Kavumbi | Masisi Territory | Village of Kahira in Central Masisi |
| 21 | Nyatura Kigingi/Nyatura Mouvement des residents congolais pour un changement vita (MRCCV) or Force populaire pour l'unité des communautes congolaises (FPUCC) | Masisi Territory | Katoyi Sector in Southwestern Masisi Territory |
| 22 | Nyatura Bavakure/Nyatura – Justice et égalité pour la démocratie (JED) | Masisi Territory | Southern Masisi territory |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | Nyatura Gatuza | Masisi Territory | Around Katsiru and Mweso in Masisi Territory. |
| 24 | Nyatura Nzayi | Masisi Territory | Around Katsiru in Central Masisi Territory. |
| 25 | Nyatura Mahanga | Masisi Territory | Around mining town of Rubaya |
| 26 | Nyatura Kalume | Kalehe Territory | Kelehe Highlands around Lumbishi |
| 27 | Nyatura Bizagwira | Kalehe Territory | Kalehe Highlands |
| 28 | Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) | Northwestern Masisi Territory | Kitchanga and Masisi Town in Masisi Territory |
| **Other Mai-Mai groups** | | | |
| 29 | Mai-Mai Charles/Alliance des forces armées de résistants patriotes Mai-Mai (AFARPM) | Rutshuru Territory | Northern Rutshuru |
| 30 | Mai-Mai Jackson | Rutshuru Territory | Northern Rutshuru Territory along the Southern shores |
| 31 | Mai-Mai Kifuafua | Masisi and Walikale Territories | Groupements of Waloaluanda and Ufamando in Southern Walikale and Masisi Territory. |
| 32 | Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano | Masisi and Walikale Territories | Groupement Ufamando |
| 33 | Mai-Mai Kifuafua Baeni-Limenzi | Southern Masisi and Walikale Territories | Groupement Ufamando in Southern Masisi Territory |
| 34 | Mai-Mai Kifuafua Shalio | Masisi and Walikale Territories | Groupement Waloaluanda |
| 35 | Mai-Mai Kilalo Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo (ULPC) | Lubero Territory | Beni and Butembo towns |
| 36 | Mai-Mai Mazembe | Walikale and Lubero Territories | Southern Lubero Territory |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 37 | Mai-Mai Corps du Christ | Beni Territory | Bashu and Rwenzori chefferies |
| 38 | Mai-Mai Kirikicho | Kalehe Territory | Hills surroundings ziralo in kalehe territory |
| 39 | Mai-Mai Nyakiliba (N'Kirhiba) | Mwenga Territory | Luindi chiefdom in Mwenga Territory |
| 40 | Mai-Mai Yakutumba (PARC-FAAL) | Fizi Territory | Fizi Territory particularly Fizi center and Baraka. |
| 41 | Mai-Mai Simba-Manu | Bafwasende Territory in Tshopo Province | Tshopo Territory |
| 42 | Mai-Mai – Luc | Walikale Territory | Walikale Territory |
| 43 | Mai-Mai Réunion | Uvira and Fizi Territories | Moyen Plateau overlooking Lusambo and Swima |
| 44 | Mai-Mai Ebuela | Fizi Territory | Fizi Territory |
| 45 | Mai-Mai Echilo | Fizi Territory | Moyens Plateaux |
| 46 | Mai-Mai Mulumba | Fizi Territory | Western part of Fizi Territory |
| 47 | Mai-Mai malaika-She Assani (also known as Raila Mutomboki Malaika) | Southern Shabunda and Northern Fizi Territories | Southern Shabunda and Northern Fizi Territories |
| 48 | Mai-Mai Kiwis Kalume | | |
| 49 | Mai-Mai Mupekenya | Mwenga Territory | Itombwe Plateau in Mwenga Territory |
| 50 | Fuliiro Mai-Mai groups in the Ruzizi Plain and the *Moyens Plateaux* | Ruzizi Plain | Ruzizi Plain and Moyens Plateaux |
| 51 | Mai-Mai Karakara | Ruzizi Plain | Kamanyola- Uvira Road around Mutarule |
| 52 | Mai-Mai Mweyemali | Ruzizi Plain | Ruzizi Plain |
| 53 | Mai-Mai Mazimano | Ruzizi Plain | Lemera |
| 54 | Mai-Mai Nyerere | Uvira Territory | Moyens Plateaux of Runingu in Uvira Territory |
| 55 | Mai-Mai Makanaki | Uvira Territory | Hills overlooking Uvira Town |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 56 | Mai-Mai Biloze Bishambuke | Fizi Territory | Tanganyika Sector |
| 57 | Mai-Mai Délégués (Mabishe, Musema, Masabo, Mafikiri) | Uvira Territory | Moyens Plateaux |
| 58 | Mai-Mai Mushombe | Uvira Territory | Hauts Plateaux towards Itombwe Forest and Mwenga territory |
| 59 | Mai-Mai Mahoro | Uvira and Mwenga Territories | Uvira and Mwenga Territories |
| 60 | Pakombe militia/'Mai-Mai Mayangose' | Beni Territory | Groupement. Mbonguma |
| 61 | Mai-Mai Dario Syaghuswa | Beni Territory | Virunga National Park |
| 62 | Mai-Mai Nzirunga | East of Beni Territory | Kyavinyonge area |
| 63 | Mai-Mai Lwanga/Mazembe Lwanga | Beni Territory | Rwenzori Sector |
| 64 | Mai-Mai Kyandenga | Beni Territory | Beni Territory |
| 65 | Mai-Mai Muhima | Beni Territory | Around Kyavinyonge |
| 66 | Mai-Mai Vivuya | Beni Territory | Semuliki Valley Bashu/Kikingi |
| 67 | Mai-Mai Kombi | Beni Territory | Beni-MBau |
| 68 | Mai-Mai PAREM | Rutshuru Territory | Northern Rutshuru |
| 69 | Mai-Mai Nguru | Beni Territory | Burusi close to Kyavirimu Mountain |
| 70 | Mai-Mai Muthundo-Léopards | Beni Territory | Kanyihunga in Beni Territory |
| 71 | Mai-Mai Ngumino | Uvira and Fizi Territories | Hauts Hlateaux of Uvira and Fizi Territories. |
| **Raia Mutomboki groups** | | | |
| **Raia Mutomboki FFP (Shabunda factions)** | | | |
| 72 | Raia Mutomboki Donat/Ngandu | Shabunda Territory | Northeast of Shabunda Territory |

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| 73 | Raia Mutomboki Mabala | Shabunda Territory | Northeast of shabunda Territory |
| 74 | Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto | Shabunda Territory | Northern part of Shabunda Territory |
| 75 | Raia Mutomboki Kabazimia | Shabunda Territory | Northern part of Shabunda Territory |
| 76 | Raia Mutomboki Kikwama | Shabunda Territory | Eastern part of Shabunda Territory |
| 77 | Raia Mutomboki Wemba | Shabunda Territory | Kahuzi Biega Park, North of Izeya Northeast of Shabunda Territory |
| 78 | Raia Mutomboki Kimba | Shabunda Territory | Northeast part of Shabunda Territory |
| **Raia Mutomboki Tembo (Kalehe factions)** | | | |
| 79 | Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo | Kalehe Territory | West of Bulambika and Kambeli in North Kalehe |
| 80 | Raia Mutomboki Shukuru | Kalehe Territory | Around the town of Hombo |
| 81 | Raia Mutomboki Musole | Kalehe Territory | Kalehe Territory |
| 82 | Raia Mutomboki Imani Bitaa | Cifunzi in Kalonge Chefferie in Kalehe Territory | Southern Kalehe Territory and Western Kabare Territory |
| 83 | Raia Mutomboki Mungoro | Kalehe Territory | Kalehe Territory |
| 84 | Raia Mutomboki Shabani | Kalehe Territory | Buholo Chiefdom in Kalehe Territory |
| 85 | Raia Mutomboki Watesh Kabanzi | Kalehe Territory | Western Buhavu in Kalehe Territory |
| 86 | Raia Mutomboki Safari | Kalehe Territory | Around Kalonge in Southern Kalehe |
| 87 | Raia Mutomboki Munyilisa | Kalehe Territory | South of Ziralo and East of Bunyakiri on the High Plateau of Kalehe. |
| **Raia Mutomboki (Walikale factions)** | | | |
| 88 | Raia Mutomboki Elenge | Walikale Territory | Southern Walikale |
| 89 | Raia Mutomboki Mirage | Walikale Territory | Southwestern of Walikale Territory |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 90 | Raia Mutomboki Shemakingi | Walikale Territory | Waloa-Uroba Groupement near Ntoto |
| 91 | Raia Mutomboki Shebitembe | Walikale Territory | Waloa-Uroba Groupement near Ntoto |
| 92 | Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa | Shabunda Territory bordering Maniema Province | Border of Maniema Province |
| 93 | Raia Mutomboki Mamba | Shabunda Territory | Bakondjo Groupement in Shabunda Territory |
| 94 | Raia Mutomboki Akilo | Shabunda Territory | |
| 95 | Raia Mutomboki Machite | Shabunda Territory | Waloa-yungu Groupement Shabunda Territory |
| **Raia Mutomboki (Walungu/Kabare factions)** | | | |
| 96 | Raia Mutomboki Masheshe | Walungu Territory | On the border with Shabunda |
| 97 | Raia Mutomboki Ngarumanga | Walungu Territory | Road between Nzibira and Nyalubemba |
| 98 | Raia Mutomboki Chipopa/Bipomba | Walungu Territory | Highlands sliver of the Kahuzi Biega National Park |
| 99 | Raia Mutomboki Blaise | Kabare Territory | Iregabarhonyi Groupement |
| 101 | Raia Mutomboki Lukoba | Kabare Territory | Nindja Chefferie |
| **Local defence groups on the Ruzizi Plain** | | | |
| 102 | The Biyaga group | Ruzizi Plain | Kamanyola-Uvira Road |
| 103 | The Mbulu group | Ruzizi Plain | Kamanyola-Uvira Road |
| 104 | The Ngengwe group | Ruzizi Plain | Mulenge |
| 105 | The Mahinduzi group | Ruzizi Plain | Ndolera |
| 106 | The Kashumba group | Ruzizi Plain | Hauts Plateaux of Uvira |
| 107 | The Zone group | Ruzizi Plain | Katongera |
| **Local 'customary' militias around Beni** | | | |
| 108 | Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix | Beni Territory | West of Lake Edouard |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 109 | Front de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI) | Ituri Province | Various part of Irumu Territory |
| 110 | Twiganeho | Fizi Territory | Bijombo |
| **Other Congolese groups** | | | |
| 111 | Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC) | Fizi and Uvira Territories | Kabambare, Kilembwe, Misisi, Lulimba and Baraka and Uvira |
| **Rwandan groups** | | | |
| 112 | Force démocratique pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) | Rwanda | Northern Masisi and Western Rutshuru Territories |
| 113 | Ralliement pour l'unité et la démocratie (RUD)-Urunana | Rwanda | Rutshuru Territory: Bwisha and Bwito chefferies |
| 114 | Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD) – Ubwiyunge | Rwanda | - Itombwe Mountains and the area around Kilembwe in Western Fizi Territory<br>- North of Mweso in North Kivu |
| 115 | Former March 23 movement (ex-M23) | Rwanda | Rutshuru and Masisi Territories |
| 116 | Kambale (ex-Soki, defunct) | Rwanda | Northern Rutshuru |
| 117 | Ex-M23 Busumba Group | Rwanda | Busumba in Masisi Territory |
| **Ugandan groups** | | | |
| 118 | Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) | Muslim Uganda | Rwenzory mountains and Semuliki Valley |
| 119 | Vuba Militia | Uganda | Beni Territory: Bambuba-Kisiki *groupement* north of Beni |

*Source: Suhulu Biographies 2017.*

# APPENDIX B
# BIOGRAPHIES OF ARMED GROUPS

In an effort to make sense of the multiplicity of armed groups, provided below are short biographies of the groups, compiled by a team of researchers and the Kivu Security Tracker Team (Suhulu biographies, 2017).

### Rebel groups of Burundian origin

There are five armed groups of Burundian origin, three of them sharing the same main name on account of being factions of one original group.

### Front National de Libération (FNL)

The FNL was founded by former Burundian army officer and self-proclaimed general, Aloys Nzabampema, but it later split into two factions when one of its commanders, Shuti Baryanka, broke away and formed his own faction. Following Baryanka's death, he was replaced by one Nibizi. FNL troops used to be the armed branch of the *Front National de Libération* (FNL) that emerged out of parts of the former Burundian *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* (PALIPEHUTU). While it is no longer allied with Agathon Rwasa's FNL party in Burundi, this group represented the main armed opposition against the current Burundian government until 2016. This status is now in question due to the emergence of new Burundian opposition groups, Nzabampema's unclear relationship with the Burundian army, and the breakaway of Shuti Baryanka (who was later killed and replaced by Nibizi).

### FNL-Nzabampema

This is the main faction, led by Aloys Nzabampema, and operates mostly out of the Ruzizi plain and the *Moyens Plateaux* of Uvira territory, with occasional incursions into Burundi. Nzabampema has been regularly accused of child recruitment and his group is accused of theft in the Ruzizi plain.

### FNL-Nibizi

Initially led by Shuti Baryanka, this small faction broke away from Nzabampema. Following Baryanka's death, a certain Nibizi reportedly took command of this group that is also based in the *Moyens Plateaux* of Uvira territory.

### Résistance pour un État de droit (RED)-*Tabara*

Also known as FRONABU-*Tabara*, this was the first Burundian group to set up a rear base in eastern DRC following the re-election of Burundian President Nkurunziza in 2015. Originating from the militant wing of Alexis Sinduhije's *Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie* (MSD) opposition party, RED-*Tabara* recruits benefitted from military training in Rwanda before crossing into the Ruzizi Plain. Increased international scrutiny over their recruitment and training in Rwanda, as well as their involvement in conflicts in the Ruzizi plain, weakened the RED-*Tabara*. Nonetheless, its presence prompted the Burundian army to support local Congolese militias opposing them in the Ruzizi plain. While relations between RED and the FPB were initially strained, they have recently improved.

**Forces Populaires Burundaises (FPB, ex-Forces républicaines du Burundi)**

Created in 2016 as FOREBU (*Forces Républicaines du Burundi*), the FPB currently represents the most significant attempt of armed opposition to the Burundian government of President Pierre Nkurunziza. Congo's small eastern neighbour has descended into political crisis since April 2015, when Nkurunziza announced his bid for a disputed third term, despite the two-term limit set forth in the 2000 Arusha Accords. Senior members of the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD), Burundi's ruling party, defected and, along with opposition members and dissidents from the security forces, launched an armed insurgency with bases in South Kivu. This included FOREBU, which emerged around a group of disgruntled army officers and former allies of Nkurunziza. Its current bases in eastern Congo are in the *Moyens Plateaux* of Uvira and Fizi territories, and the group also operates clandestinely inside Burundi.

In August 2017, the group underwent a change of name and leadership after a struggle within FOREBU. General Jérémie Ntiranyibagira is now the leader of FPB, but it is not clear whether he commands all former FOREBU troops in eastern DRC, given that some troops loyal to Colonel Edouard Nshimirimana are reportedly operating independently. In October 2017, both Ntiranyibagira and Nshimirimana were allegedly detained by Burundian security services in Tanzania.

**Rebel groups of Congolese origin**

**Armed groups with strong links to ex-APC**

- The former armed wing of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*
- *Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-K/ML), the *Armée du Peuple Congolais* (APC), has remained an active, though often secretive, player in the security landscape of Beni and Lubero territories since it was officially dismantled at the end of the Second Congo war in 2003. Key commanders, including Bwambale Kakolele, Samuel Birotsho, Kava wa Seli, David Lusenge and Hilaire Kombi, all of whom at one point had integrated into the FARDC, have attempted to maintain networks within the local civilian administration and among armed groups such as the ADF. While this network is very dynamic and difficult to phase out, there were four recognisable, specific militias led by ex-APC commanders in mid-2017: the Mai-Mai Léopards and the groups led by Sibenda and Kithikyolo.

**Mouvement de la Révolution Congolaise-Léopards (MRC-L Mai-Mai Endaniluhi)**

The MRC-L was created in Muhola (30 km west of Butembo) on 20 December 2016 and is led by Kakule Endaniluhi. It claims to be fighting against the Kabila government and Rwandan infiltration in eastern DRC. It has moved from the Muhola Mountain to the Graben since August 2017.

**Mai-Mai Kithikyolo**

This group is led by Vital Kithikyolo, a former (APC) officer (1999-2003) who later joined the Armed Defence Forces (ADF), led and mainly composed of Ugandan rebels. After his demobilisation from the ADF in 2009, he settled in Kirivatha/Lume in Beni territory where he created a new armed group in collaboration with the ADF, under Hood Lukwago, based in the Semuliki Valley, near the Beni-Kasindi road. The strength of his group is not known.

**Mai-Mai Sibenda**

This group is led by Kambale Sibenda, who is known for having collaborated with ex-APC officers such as Bwambale Kakolele, David Lusenge, and Samuel Birotsho. Between 2002 and 2003, he co-created – with Kakolele – the training center of Bundiguya/Watalinga dedicated to the APC's *Unité spéciale pour l'artillerie*. Years later, former (FARDC) Major Hilaire Kombi, another former APC officer, defected and created his own armed group in Kikingi, in which Kambale Sibenda was active. Shortly thereafter, Kambale collaborated again with David Lusenge when the latter defected

from the FARDC. Lusenge handed control of the group over to Sibenda who then created his own Mai-Mai group in Kikingi. His group currently operates in the Rwenzori sector where Kakule Mukonzo, another ex-APC officer, commands the troops. Mai-Mai Sibenda is currently believed to have up to 160 combatants.

**FDC-Guides & Guides-MAC**

The name of this group stems from the role its fighters played as trackers for Rwandan and Congolese troops in their 2011 offensive against the FDLR. The movement soon transformed into an armed group of its own, taking up the name *Forces de Défense du Congo* (FDC), led by Butu Luanda, Charles Mbura, and Madragul. They operated with relatively few combatants from the Tembo and Hunde communities and were initially based along the border between the Masisi and Walikale territories.

In 2013, some of the Guides fighters split from the FDC and formed the *Mouvement Acquis au Changement* (Guides-MAC) under the leadership of Mbura, allegedly after a row over Luanda's cooperation with Bosco Ntaganda's M23 faction. Both Mbura's and Luanda's factions remain operational today, engaging in mineral exploitation near Mahanga in Masisi territory.

**Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC)**

Created by Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a former mineral trader in Walikale territory, Nduma Defence of Congo was one of the main Mai-Mai groups to emerge from the Nyanga community in recent years. Though its stated objectives include demands for more development and better working conditions for artisanal miners, Sheka's group has become notorious for significant human rights violations. It was initially based around the mining area of Bisie in central Walikale territory, but quickly gravitated eastward establishing its stronghold near Pinga, bordering Masisi territory.

In 2015, Sheka's second-in-command, Guidon Shimiray, a former FARDC officer, defected with most of the group's combatants, citing disagreements with his former superior as the main reason for the split. Since then Sheka's faction has lost influence and military power. The NDC's decline was aggravated by clashes with Guidon's group, eventually leading to Sheka's surrender to MONUSCO in mid-2017. It is not clear whether his group still exists.

### Nduma Defence of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R)

The NDC-R was created by Guidon Shimiray Mwissa in 2015. After consolidating power around Sheka's former strongholds in northeastern Walikale territory, Guidon's faction began attacking the FDLR and managed to gain control over numerous mining sites. In coalition with various Nande and Kobo militias, including the now defunct *Union des Patriotes pour la Défense des Innocents* (UPDI), under the umbrella name Mai-Mai Mazembe, Guidon drove the FDLR out of most of northeastern Walikale. Most of these alliances dissolved by mid-2017, leading to regular skirmishes between Guidon's troops and various Mazembe factions in southwestern Lubero territory. Since 2016, Guidon has extended his zone of influence into southern Lubero where his group became involved in the lucrative gold trade in areas previously controlled by FDLR and Lafontaine's *Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix* (UPCP). The NDC-R is known for its extortive taxation practices and extensive recruitment of children, and the group has repeatedly been accused of receiving FARDC support in its military campaigns.

### Nyatura groups

About 14 Nyatura factions are currently active in the Masisi and western Rutshuru territories. While the term Nyatura ('those who hit hard' in Kinyarwanda) emerged in association with armed mobilisation in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilisation of the early 1990s, including the *Mutuelle Agricole des Virunga* (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from attack by other Mai-Mai groups or the Congolese army.

While many Nyatura groups operate independently, some have entered into coalitions brokered by politicians or the FDLR, or negotiated locally. In late 2017, approximately 15 different Nyatura factions were active. Some Nyatura groups are also part of broader, though ill-defined, coalitions, including the *Alliance des Patriotes pour la Restauration de la Démocratie au Congo* (APRDC), led by a lawyer named Benjamin Ndikuyeze, and the *Coalition des Mouvements pour le Changement* (CMC), led by

Jean-Claude Habyarimana, alias Jules Mulumba. Both umbrella movements are suspected to have emerged under the influence of FDLR leaders.

**Nyatura John Love**

This Nyatura faction was created in 2016 by Muhawenimana Bunombe, also known as John Love. John Love is a Congolese school teacher from the Hutu community who used to run a small computer shop in Nyanzale, western Rutshuru territory. He joined the FDLR and repaired the group's computers while undergoing military training. With the blessing of senior FDLR commanders, he later created his own militia which operates around Muriki in Rutshuru territory, with approximately 100 combatants. John Love's group cooperates with Dominique Ndaruhutse's Nyatura-FPC and is part of the CMC coalition. In 2016 and 2017, it engaged in substantial fighting against the NDC-R and different Mazembe factions in northern Bwito *chefferie*, Rutshuru territory, often with tacit FDLR support.

**Nyatura Domi/Nyatura-Forces de Patriotes Congolais (FPC)**

The Nyatura Domi faction, also known as the Nyatura-*Forces de Patriotes Congolais* (Nyatura-FPC), is led by Dominique Ndaruhutse, also known as Domi. It emerged between 2013 and 2014 due to tensions between Nyatura factions led by Muchoma and Bapfakururimi respectively, both of whom later demobilised. Domi's zone of influence lies in the Bukombo *groupement* in southern Bwito *chefferie* of Rutshuru territory, pushing up against John Love's territory to the north. He commands approximately 150 troops.

**Nyatura Niyonzimana/Nyatura-Force Populaire pour l'Unité des Communautes Congolaises (FDP)**

Known as *Forces de Défense du Peuple* (FPD), the group is led by Jean Niyonzimana and operates mainly to the north of Nyamulagira Volcano in Rutshuru territory. Like the Domi and John Love factions, it is part of the CMC coalition.

**Nyatura Kasongo/Nyatura-Forces de Défense pour les Droits de l'Homme (FDDH) or *Groupe de Sécurité***

FDDH, led by Kasongo Kalamo, is one of the oldest Nyatura groups which Kasongo established in 2011. Initially known as *Forces de Défense pour les Droits de l'Homme* (FDDH), his group later changed its name to *Groupe de Sécurité* and

integrated other Nyatura factions, including the groups formerly led by Ngwiti (based near Busumba) and Noheri (based near Mweso). Kasongo's stronghold extends across the southern side of the Kitchanga-Mweso-Kashuga road in Masisi's Bashali-Mokoto *chefferie*. While Kasongo's troop strength varies, he rarely commands more than 250 combatants. Since 2011, Kasongo has brokered volatile alliances with numerous actors including other Nyatura factions, the FARDC, APCLS, FDLR and CNRD. By early 2017 however, his group was acting mostly alone, fighting CNRD without necessarily allying with FDLR.

**Nyatura Jean-Marie**

This small group, led by Jean-Marie, is located around Mpati and Busihe in northern Masisi territory and is allegedly part of the CMC coalition.

**Nyatura Kavumbi**

Nyatura Kavumbi is based around the village of Kahira in central Masisi territory. It recently joined the *Groupe de Sécurité* led by Kasongo Kalamo.

**Nyatura Kigingi/Nyatura Mouvement des Residents Congolais pour un Changement Vital (MRCCV) or Force Populaire pour l'Unité des Communautes Congolaises (FPUCC)**

The Nyatura *Mouvement des Residents Congolais pour un Changement Vital* (MRCCV) or *Force Populaire pour l'Unité des Communautes Congolaises* (FPUCC), led by Kigingi, was one of the first Nyatura groups to emerge around 2011. The group is based in Katoyi *secteur* in southwestern Masisi territory.

**Nyatura Bavakure/Nyatura-Justice et Égalité pour la Démocratie (JED)**

This group, also known as *Nyatura-Justice et Égalité pour la Démocratie* (JED), is led by Faustin Bavakure, and is based near Luke in southern Masisi territory.

**Nyatura Delta**

This group is commanded by Delta Gashamare, previously a member of the *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO) armed group before he created his own Nyatura group in 2012 in the area south of the Masisi-Nyabiondo road, around the villages of Luke, Katoyi, and Kazinga in Masisi territory.

**Nyatura Gatuza**

This group is based around Katsiru/Mweso and defected from Domi to allegedly join the CNRD.

**Nyatura Nzayi**

Led by Nzayi Kanyange, this group is located near Katsiru in central Masisi territory, and is part of the CMC coalition.

**Nyatura Mahanga**

Based around the mining town of Rubaya, this group is led by Rafiki Mahanga, a defector from FARDC and a former combatant with PARECO.

**Nyatura Kalume**

This group was founded by Matias Kalume Kage in the Kalehe highlands around Lumbishi. Kalume was a PARECO commander until 2009 when he was integrated into the FARDC. He became an operational commander in Uvira and was then sent to an army camp when the 'regimentation' process began in 2011. Failing to obtain a good position, he defected to his home town and began mobilising within the local Hutu community, taking advantage of local customary and communal conflicts.

**Nyatura Bizagwira**

Based in the Kalehe highlands, South Kivu, this group is led by a former PARECO commander known as Bizagwira Muhindi.

**Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS)**

Created in 2010 out of one of the three components of the *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO), the APCLS has emerged as one of the main Mai-Mai groups operating in eastern Congo. Under the command of self-proclaimed General Janvier Karairi, the APCLS maintains strongholds in northwestern Masisi territory, projecting its influence toward Kitchanga and Masisi town. Claiming to defend the interests of the Hunde population, the APCLS has engaged in a wide range of (often short-lived) alliances and confrontations with other armed actors in the area. NDC-Sheka and M23 are the APCLS' principal enemies while relations with the FARDC and various Nyatura groups have been unstable. The APCLS has maintained cordial relations with the FDLR over many years. The group has demonstrated significant resilience, even if its sphere of influence and troop numbers have fluctuated considerably.

### Other Mai-Mai groups

There are approximately 42 rebel groups which share the name *Mai-Mai*, which each group qualifies with either the name of its leader or with some other attribute as the following accounts will demonstrate. The expression Mai-Mai was first used in 1905 when a native prophet, Kinjikitile Ngwale, led about 20 ethnic groups in an armed rebellion against the Germans, having convinced his followers that he had discovered sacred water (mai-mai) which could repel German bullets if the rebels doused themselves in it. Although the rebellion that lasted up to 1907 was unsuccessful, it forced Germany to introduce reforms in its colonial administration (John Iliffe 1967; Gowen 2012: 99).

### Mai-Mai Charles/Alliance des Forces Armées de Résistants Patriotes Mai-Mai (AFARPM)

This group is led by Charles Bokande, who emerged as an important armed actor in northern Rutshuru territory in 2014, drawing support and recruits from the Nande community. A former combatant of Mai-Mai Jackson and later of Mai-Mai Shetani-FPC of Kakule Muhima, Charles managed to develop an efficient extortion racket along the southern shore of Lake Edward, taxing the lucrative fishing camps. His influence extends to the village of Nyamilima and the Ishasha border post with Uganda. Under Charles, the group is also known as *Alliance des Forces Armées de Résistants Patriotes Mai-Mai* (AFARPM). While Charles claims to protect Rutshuru's Nande population from Rwandophone armed groups, the FARDC and rangers from Virunga National Park, his group has also frequently engaged in kidnapping and illegal cross-border trade.

### Mai-Mai Jackson

Another group, Mai-Mai Jackson, is led by Jackson Muhukambuto and has been operating in northern Rutshuru territory along the southern shores of Lake Edward for approximately a decade. The group recruits from the local Nande community and taxes the local fish, charcoal and marijuana trade. In early 2017, this group joined forces with Mai-Mai Charles only to fall out again in late 2017.

### Mai-Mai Kifuafua

Mai-Mai Kifuafua is one of the longest-standing Congolese armed groups. Set up in 2002 by self-proclaimed General Delphin Mbaenda, this group has roots in the various armed movements of the Tembo community from the 1990s. According to Stearns (2010: 1), Kifuafua means "those who go into battle chest first." Delphin Mbaenda's older brother, Damiano Mbaenda, was one of the first commanders of a Tembo armed group, probably beginning his career around 1993. Delphin Mbaenda inherited his brother's armed group, which had traditionally been based in southern Masisi and Walikale, between the villages of Hombo, Busurungi, and Remeka.

Despite numerous internal disputes, which produced factions led by leaders known as Shalio, Maachano and Limenzi/Baeni, and subsequent reunifications, Delphin Mbaenda has managed to keep his group together thanks to an efficient taxation system and a reluctance to fight stronger actors such as the FARDC, FDLR or CNDP. By 2017, Delphin Mbaenda's Kifuafua, together with its satellite factions and allies, controlled large swathes of territory in the Waloa-Loanda and Ufamando *groupements* in the southern Walikale and Masisi territories. The group is estimated to have about 300 fighters. Its units are relatively disciplined and collaborate with customary authorities and state police in their area of influence.

### Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano

This group is a faction that broke away from Mai-Mai Kifuafua Mbaenda and is led by Maachano. It is based in southern Masisi territory in the Ufamando *groupement*. Like the other Kifuafua groups, it recruits mostly from the Tembo community. Other commanders in this group are known as Bahati and Likuda.

### Mai-Mai Kifuafua Baeni-Limenzi

This group is led by Limenzi, also known as Katabilalo (the breaker of bridges) and Baeni. Limenzi was one of Delphin Mbaenda's main commanders until he broke away to form his own group in collaboration with Baeni. Tensions have been reported among the commanders in this new group which is based in Ufamando *groupement* in southern Masisi territory.

### Mai-Mai Kifuafua Shalio

This group is based in the Waloa-Loanda *groupement* and is led by Shabani Shalio. It is the most recent breakaway faction of Delphin Mbaenda's group and operates in the same territory, leading to occasional clashes with the much stronger faction under Mbaenda's command.

**Mai-Mai Kilalo Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo (ULPC)**

Spearheaded by veteran rebels, Katembo Kilalo and Mambari Bini Pélé (alias Saperita), the *Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo* (ULPC) is the latest reincarnation of armed mobilisation around Butembo, where Mai-Mai movements date back to the early 1990s. Kilalo, the nominal head of the group, is a former combatant and healer in Lafontaine and Paul Sadala's armed groups, while Saperita has been a member of local militia groups as well as a FARDC officer. Since its creation in 2016, the group has forged short-lived coalitions with Mai-Mai Mazembe factions in Lubero territory and purportedly defends the Nande community against attacks by the ADF further north.

In 2017, these groups reportedly participated in the attacks around Beni town, probably together with other Mai-Mai groups. A group called the *Mouvement National des Révolutionnaires* (MNR) claimed responsibility for attacks around Beni town in mid-2017, but this name appears to have been propagated only on social media and is not recognised by either the ULPC or other Nande Mai-Mai groups. In December 2016, ULPC combatants also attacked MONUSCO in Butembo and killed a peacekeeper.

**Mai-Mai Mazembe**

Named after the country's most popular football club in Lubumbashi, Mai-Mai Mazembe is a heavily-fragmented self-defense militia group that emerged between mid-2015 and early 2016 in response to long-standing FDLR abuses against the Nande and Kobo communities of the southern Lubero and Walikale territories. Several Nande and Kobo militias emerged (including the *Union des Patriotes pour la Défense des Innocents*, [UPDI]) which began attacking Hutu civilians and combatants, often with the support of the NDC-R.

While the UPDI had already integrated into NDC-R by 2016, many Mai-Mai Mazembe factions remained autonomous in late 2017. There is no clear coordination between

the groups: some occasionally fight among themselves but overall the movement has become increasingly antagonistic towards the NDC-R. Currently, Mazembe factions control much of southern Lubero, with key factions led by Albert Kasheke, Kitete Bushu, Kabido, and another commander known as Safari, a former UPCP-Lafontaine commander.

**Mai-Mai Corps du Christ**

The *Mai-Mai Corps du Christ* armed group was created in 2016 amidst a new wave of armed mobilisation around Butembo town in response to massacres in Beni territory. Claiming the name of a long-standing Christian sect based around Mont Carmel, this Mai-Mai group coalesced under the leadership of David Maranatha, a former member of this hitherto peaceful Christian sect. On 15 October 2016, his group marched into Butembo where it demanded vehicles to take them to Beni to defend the population against massacres in that area. The group attracted considerable attention among several Mai-Mai commanders, including Baraka Lolwako Mumbere, the teenage son of historical Mai-Mai leader Lolwako Pokopoko, who then joined the movement. The *Corps du Christ* clashed on several occasions with the FARDC, including in Butembo in December 2016.

In January 2017, Kakolele Bwambale – a former leader of Mbusa Nyamwisi's RCD-K/ML and army commander under UN sanctions – declared himself the leader of the group on Voice of America. By mid-2017, the *Corps du Christ* had been pushed back to remote areas in Bashu and Rwenzori *chefferies.* It is unclear to what extent the group is still operational, although some militias and armed groups around Beni, including Mai-Mai Nzirunga and Kilalo, claim to be its allies.

**Mai-Mai Kirikicho**

Led by Kirikicho Mirimba Mwanamayi, Mai-Mai Kirikicho is one of the oldest armed groups in the Kivus. Involved in armed group activity since 1992, Kirikicho's current group is based in the hills surrounding Ziralo in Kalehe territory. This area has long been the arena for communal tensions between the Tembo and Hutu communities. The Mai-Mai Kirikicho recruits primarily from the Tembo community which it claims to be defending against Hutu militia and alleged Rwandan invasions, including Rwandophone officers of the FARDC.

Over the past five years, Kirikicho's movement has often described itself as Raia Mutomboki, having adopted Raia Mutomboki's magical rituals to inoculate its fighters against bullets. It has engaged in fluctuating alliances with other Raia Mutomboki factions and the Mai-Mai Kifuafua. The group's former second-in-command, Musole, has broken away to form a Raia Mutomboki faction near Ziralo.

**Mai-Mai Nyakiliba (N'Kirhiba)**

Founded by self-styled general and former primary-school teacher, Daniel Matebura, to fight the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD)-Goma rebellion in 1998, Mai-Mai Nyakiliba operates in the Luindi Chiefdom in Mwenga territory and is rooted in the Nyindu community. The group is best known for an ambush against RCD troops in Kasika, which in turn sparked the August 1998 Kasika massacre perpetrated by RCD forces, killing hundreds, including the then customary chief François Mubeza.

The RCD replaced Mubeza with Nyumba Mubeza in contravention of the chiefdom's lineage rules. However, Mai-Mai N'Kirhiba claims that another member of the family, known as Sholo, was in line to succeed Mubeza. Matebura has also demanded that he be named a general in the FARDC.

**Mai-Mai Yakutumba (PARC-FAAL)**

Created by former FARDC officer, William Amuri (also known as Yakutumba), in 2006, the group has developed into one of the most brutal Congolese armed groups in South Kivu. Capitalising on local grievances, in particular within the Bembe community, Yakutumba created this group in 2007 under the official name *Parti d'Action pour la Reconstruction du Congo-Forces Armées Alleluia* (PARC-FAAL). Yakutumba has been skilful in co-opting numerous smaller Mai-Mai groups, including the Bwasakala and Bavon Mai-Mai groups in Fizi territory, into coalitions under his de facto leadership. The group also maintains support networks in Tanzania and has been known for piracy and smuggling on Lake Tanganyika.

In late 2016, it revived the *Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo* (CNPSC) alliance, an earlier coalition project designed in 2013 but which had not previously materialised. Later, in the first half of 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its allies successfully launched a series of attacks against the FARDC, leading to a

significant expansion of their influence in Fizi and extending their reach to the Misisi gold hub and to major towns such as Fizi centre and Baraka.

**Mai-Mai Simba**

Mai-Mai Simba has been an umbrella term for nationalist armed groups since independence in 1960. Various armed groups, linked by little more than the vague reminiscence of the Mulelist Mai-Mai ideology that challenged the central government in the 1960s, claim this denomination today. By 2017, at least three geographically-discernible groups used the 'Simba' label. One group is in Bafwasende territory, Tshopo Province, and is led by the successor Paul Sadala (also known as Morgan), known as Manu. The second group (the so-called *Forces Divines Simba*) is in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, and is led by General Mando Mazeri and Luc Yabili. The third group is led by Morgan, and it operates in Ituri territory where it has become infamous for poaching and killing okapis. In terms of troop strength and being a threat to FARDC, none of these groups is very significant today.

**Mai-Mai Réunion**

This is a small Mai-Mai group that recruits from the Bembe community and is led by Colonel Réunion wa Rusasa, a former commander in Mayele and Bwasakala's militia. It is active in the *Moyen Plateau* overlooking Lusambo and Swima. It is known for frequent ambushes on the road between Baraka and Uvira, and it joined the CNPSC.

**Mai-Mai Ebuela**

This is another small Mai-Mai group that recruits from the Bembe community. Its commander, Ebu Ela Kitungano, is a former Yakutumba commander who set out on his own after falling out with Yakutumba. Recently however, he joined the CNPSC coalition, led by Yakutumba. More recently, it has engaged in cooperation with another local Mai-Mai outfit led by Ngalyabatu but it is unclear whether this collaboration will persist.

**Mai-Mai Echilo**

This is a small Mai-Mai group that recruits from the Bembe community and is based in the *Moyen Plateau* overlooking the lakeside village of Mboko. In 2017, it was part of the CNPSC coalition. Like Réunion, Echilo used to be part of the Mai-Mai Bwasakala.

### Mai-Mai Mulumba

This Mai-Mai group is led by Mulumba, a long-time ally of Yakutumba, and is based in western Fizi territory. It recruits mostly from the Bembe community and is part of the CNPSC coalition.

### Mai-Mai Malaika-She Assani (also known as Raia Mutomboki Malaika)

This is a relatively new armed group based in the southern Shabunda and northern Fizi territories, spilling over into Maniema Province. It is led by She Assani and reportedly reached out to former Raia Mutomboki leaders, including Jean Musumbu. Locally, it is sometimes referred to as Raia Mutomboki Malaika.

### Mai-Mai Kiwis Kalume

Kalume, also known as Kiwis, led a Mai-Mai group in the Kasongo territory of Maniema province during the Second Congo War (1998-2003). This group, also known as Kaka Sawa, disappeared at the end of the war and has only recently reappeared, led again by Kiwis. It is part of the CNPSC coalition.

### Mai-Mai Mupekenya

This small Mai-Mai group occupies a small area on the Itombwe plateau in Mwenga territory. Most recently, it was believed to operate jointly with another local militia commander called Ngarukiye.

### Fuliiro Mai-Mai groups in the Ruzizi Plain and the Moyens Plateaux

The Ruzizi plain has been a place of intense armed mobilisation for many years. Customary struggles, both within the Fuliiro chiefdom and between the Fuliiro community on one side and the Congolese Rundi and Banyamulenge on the other side, have provided fertile ground for recruitment. The tensions have been aggravated by political manipulation by local and national leaders, and by the presence of foreign armed groups like the FDLR. As a result, a vicious cycle of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation has made the Ruzizi plain one of the most conflictual areas in Congo. The leadership of Fuliiro armed groups has changed considerably between 2015 and 2017, as leaders such as Simusizi, Bédé, Pélican or Intervention have been killed by the FARDC or their local rivals.

### Mai-Mai Karakara

This Mai-Mai group, led by a commander known as Karakara, is based largely on both sides of the Kamanyola-Uvira road around Mutarule. Created around 2013, this group used to control the *Moyen Plateau* south of Lemera before becoming more active in the plain. The 2014 Mutarule massacre – where approximately 30 civilians were killed – is said to have been a reaction to a cattle raid by Karakara's troops.

**Mai-Mai Mwenyemali**

Mwenyemali is the leader of an eponymous Mai-Mai group that operates mostly between Mutarule and Lemera. Like Karakara, it is regularly involved in cattle raids. In early 2017, Mwenyemali killed a well-known arms trader working for Burundian security services and emerged as one of the Ruzizi plain's most powerful Mai-Mai leaders.

**Mai-Mai Mazimano**

This group is led by Mazimano, a local militia commander who benefitted from the disappearance of other Fuliiro commanders. The group operates around Lemera, roughly in an area previously controlled by Molière Mutulanyi's recently-demobilised local defence forces.

**Mai-Mai Nyerere**

This group's troop combatants are based in the *Moyen Plateau* of Runingu, north of Uvira. Together with Karakara and Mwenyemali, this group is considered one of the strongest Mai-Mai groups in Uvira territory. Nyerere has repeatedly been accused of collaborating with the Burundian FNL rebels.

**Mai-Mai Makanaki**

This group is reportedly composed of the majority of former Mai-Mai Fujo combatants that Makanaki took over when their former leader, Fujo Zabuloni, the son and successor of late Mai-Mai leader Zabuloni Rubaruba, joined the national army in 2015. The group is based in the hills overlooking Uvira town.

**Mai-Mai Biloze Bishambuke**

This is one of the few Fizi-based Mai-Mai groups that have not allied with Yakutumba's CNPSC coalition in 2017. Trappedbetween Burundian armed groups and CNPSC

members in the Tanganyika sector, it has not been reported to be very active in late 2017.

**Mai-Mai Délégués (Mabishe, Musema, Masabo, Mafikiri)**

This group is a loose Mai-Mai cluster of concocted groups led by Musema, Mabishe, Mafikiri and Masabo. Roving around in the *Moyen Plateau* of Kabunambo, they emerged out of other splintered Mai-Mai groups.

**Mai-Mai Mushombe**

Mushombe Muganguzi is a militia commander from Uvira territory who has been active in armed groups as far back as the 1990s. He demobilised when his former commander, Rubaruba Zabuloni, integrated into the FARDC at the end of the Second Congo War in 2003. He took up arms again around 2005 to counter the mobilisation around the 'Group of 47' Banyamulenge leaders and later the FRF. In contrast to other Mai-Mai groups in Uvira territory, Mushombe has always been based in the *Hauts Plateaux* towards Itombwe Forest and Mwenga territory, close to certain positions of the FDLR (now CNRD), an occasional ally.

**Mai-Mai Mahoro**

Mahoro is a militia commander whose group is based at the border between the Uvira and Mwenga territories. He has been active in armed groups in this area for decades. After demobilising, when his commander, Baudouin Nakabaka, integrated into the FARDC at the end of the Second Congo War in 2003. Mahoro took up arms again around 2005 to counter the mobilisation around the 'Group of 47' Banyamulenge leaders and later the FRF. Mahoro is related by marriage to Mushombe, the commander of Mai-Mai Mushombe. He has been in an occasional alliance with local CNRD units. In late 2017, Mahoro was killed under unclear circumstances; it is uncertain how this will affect the group.

**Pakombe militia/Mai-Mai Mayangose**

The Mai-Mai Mayangose was initially led by Mwami Mbonguma Kitobi, the local *chef de groupement.* Mbonguma was arrested in November 2014 for his involvement in the massacres around Beni. However, the loosely-organised group continues to operate in the outskirts of Beni, allegedly participating in massacres beyond the arrest of Kitobi.

### Mai-Mai Dario Syaghuswa

Dario Syaghuswa is a previous collaborator of Father Vincent Machozi, a priest and former president of the Kyaghanda Yira, who was killed in Vithungwe in March 2016. This group mobilises support using local grievances linked to the land conflict between Virunga National Park and surrounding populations.

### Mai-Mai Nzirunga

Alphonse Nzirunga was a member of Mai-Mai Lubwe Ruwenzori in 2000 (later known as 'Kasindiens'), led by his cousin Fabien Mudoghu. More recently, he was one of the founders of Mai-Mai Mazembe. In September 2016, his current movement, Mai-Mai Nzirunga, allied with Mai-Mai Corps du Christ, deployed to Kabasha before moving to Kalau (east of Beni) and Nzirunga's native Bashu Chiefdom.

Since June 2017, Mai-Mai Nzirunga is based near Kyavinyonge and has been operating relatively independently from other armed groups, despite earlier collaboration with Mai-Mai Muhima and a Mai-Mai group led by Jackson Muhukambuto. Some of Mai-Mai Nzirunga combatants have recently called themselves Mai-Mai Malaika ('angel' in Swahili). They do not, however, appear to be linked to the Mai-Mai Malaika led by She Assani in the Fizi and Shabunda territories.

### Mai-Mai Lwanga/Mazembe Lwanga

Charles Lwanga is a former Mai-Mai Vurondo (also known as RNL, *Résistants Nationalistes Lumumbistes*) combatant who fought under Lolwako Pokopoko around 2000 to 2003. After his demobilisation, he joined the mining police. In January 2017, a few weeks after a Mai-Mai attack against MONUSCO in Butembo, he was arrested and has since been detained in Beni's Kangbayi prison. After the Kangbayi prison break of June 2017, Lwanga teamed up with Saperita (Mai-Mai ULPC) before creating his own small group in Ruwenzori Sector, not far from Mwalika, in August 2017.

### Mai-Mai Kyandenga

Kyandenga used to be a fisherman in Kyavinyonge. In 2002, as legend claims, he reeled in a package that contained a flower, a diamond, a stick, a dollar bill, a bible and a Quran. This reportedly gave him customary powers and attracted the attention of local armed group commanders and chiefs, including Fabien Mudoghu. Later, his acquaintance with Kilalo Katembo of today's ULPC helped him to become a traditional

doctor with the Mai-Mai Simba branch of Paul Sadala (also known as Morgan). In 2011, he joined the FOLC armed group of Kava wa Seli (a former APC officer) in Beni territory.

After Kilalo left Morgan's group in Ituri province to return to the Butembo area to set up his own Mai-Mai group, Kyandenga joined him and was tasked with developing an ULPC faction near Beni. He collaborated with a priest known as Bernard to recruit local youth west of Mbau. This group of approximately 300 combatants claims to protect the local population and their land. By 2017, it remained unclear to what extent it is still connected to Kilalo or other Mai-Mai in the area.

**Mai-Mai Muhima**

Muhima had the rank of 'colonel' in Lolwako Pokopoko's Mai-Mai Vurondo (also known as RNL). After demobilisation efforts in the frame of the *Programme Amani* in 2009, he took charge of Baraka Lolwako (the son of Lolwako) and his mother. Family members of Lolwako Pokopoko, whose health has recently been deteriorating, are believed to wield the *dawa* powers of the former Mai-Mai Vurondo. Meanwhile, Muhima himself has most recently been operating around Kyavinyonge, commanding at most 60 combatants.

**Mai-Mai Vivuya**

The Mai-Mai Vivuya was allegedly created by ex-APC commander John Tshibangu and ex-CNDP colonel Richard Kiyondo Bisamaza in Kampala in July 2017. Its main objective was to attack Beni town. Kakolele and Bisamaza sent Kakule Sikuli Lafontaine, the former leader of PARECO-Lafontaine, and UPCP to recruit and settle in the Semuliki valley (Bashu/Kikingi). Lafontaine allegedly tried to convince other local armed groups to join but the group has not been very visible thus far.

**Mai-Mai Kombi**

Kambale Kombi is a former member of FOLC and a Mazembe combatant. Under arrest since 2016, he escaped during the Kangbayi prison break in June 2017 and joined former FOLC officer Kyandenga. In August 2017, he decided to settle in the Beni-Mbau sector, where he created his own armed group with around 30 members (locally known as Mai-Mai Kombi but not linked to Hilaire Kombi's former URDC).

**Mai-Mai PAREM**

The PAREM, also known as PRM – *Patriotes Résistants* Mai-Mai – is a local Nande group operating in northern Rutshuru, mostly carrying out kidnappings and ambushes. Its name draws from historic, larger Mai-Mai rebellions, however little of this ideology seems to govern the group's actual behaviour.

**Mai-Mai Nguru**

Nguru was a former member of the Lokwako Pokopoko's Mai-Mai Vurondo (also known as RNL) in 2000. In 2005, he created an armed group based in Burusi, close to the Kyabirimu Mountain, where he already collaborated with Muhima, another ex-RNL commander. In 2007, he was arrested after attacking Virunga National Park rangers. His current group includes only about 10 to 20 combatants and mainly engages in illegal gold exploitation on the Kyavirimu Mountain.

**Mai-Mai Muthundo-Léopards**

Muthundo is a former member of the Mazembe movement who had been arrested and detained at Beni Prison. After he escaped during the Kangbayi prison break in June 2017, he joined Alphonse Nzirunga's Mai-Mai group and began operating in Kanyihunga. In September 2017, he separated from Nzirunga and began calling his group of approximately 40 combatants Mai-Mai Léopards, similar to Endaniluhi's Mai-Mai group based nearby.

**Ngumino**

Ngumino (portmanteaux of *guma ino*, 'stay here' in Kinyamulenge) is an umbrella term for the most recent wave of Banyamulenge armed mobilisation in the *Hauts Plateaux* of the Uvira and Fizi territories. While it builds upon previous Banyamulenge armed groups, including the ex-FRF and a group led by Colonel Tawimbi, only a few Banyamulenge leaders were playing an important role in the group in late 2017. Over the previous two years, the group has mostly been fighting against various Mai-Mai groups in the hills of northern Fizi, often over cattle. The Ngumino group has ambivalent relations with the FARDC and Burundian armed opposition groups that have set up bases in South Kivu. Currently, they are led by Semahurungure and Nyamusharaba Shaka.

**Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC)**

The CNPSC is a broad and unruly coalition of Mai-Mai, recruiting mainly within the Bembe community and which emerged in late 2016 under the leadership of Yakutumba. The CNPSC began by launching a series of attacks near Kabambare, Kilembwe, Misisi, Lulimba and between Baraka and Uvira. Some CNPSC members have also attacked mining companies such as Banro, and have kidnapped foreign mining workers. Retired FARDC general Sikatenda allegedly also supports CNPSC. He was based near Kilembwe until his recent arrest. Moreover, Kalehe Raia Mutomboki factions, including those led by Hamakombo, Shukuru and Butachibera, allegedly joined the CNPSC.

There are some reports that the CNPSC is linked to another movement called *Alliance pour l'Article 64* (AA64), referring to the clause in the Congolese constitution that gives citizens the right to disrupt any attempt to violate the constitutional order. It is unclear, however, to what extent AA64 is linked to the CNPSC. Currently, the CNPSC represents one of the broadest Mai-Mai coalitions in eastern Congo and carried out a serious offensive in Uvira territory in late September 2017. Before taking Uvira town, however, joint FARDC–MONUSCO operations pushed them back into Fizi territory and inflicted considerable losses on the group, including on its navy in Lake Tanganyika.

**Raia Mutomboki**

Similar to the Mai-Mai, the name Raia Mutomboki (angry people) is shared by about 35 rebel groups, each qualifying the name with either the name of its leader or another attribute. The name 'Raia Mutomboki' means angry people. The origins of Raia Mutomboki mobilisation lie in communal self-defence groups led by Jean Musumbu, a local leader from southern Shabunda territory who mobilised against the FDLR in 2005 and 2006. After some early successes, the movement became dormant and only re-emerged five years later during the FARDC's regimentation process, which created a security void that allowed the FDLR to gain control of much of Shabunda territory. The Raia Mutomboki re-emerged in northern Shabunda, using a new *dawa* (magical potions and fetishes) purportedly to inoculate its fighters against bullets. The movement spread quickly to other areas threatened by the FDLR, including the Walungu, Kalehe, and Walikale territories. Beyond attacking FDLR troops (and later,

Rwandophone FARDC units), the Raia Mutomboki have also killed hundreds of FDLR dependents and Rwandan Hutu refugees.

As the threat of the FDLR declined, the Raia Mutomboki's rhetoric centred increasingly on the abuses of the FARDC while the groups became more involved in illegal taxation and racketeering. Most of the groups have a common belief system, centred on their use of *dawa* and an ethic of communal self-defence, but for the most part they do not have a common command structure and fighting among groups is frequent.

**Raia Mutomboki (Source: Great Lakes Voice)**

**Raia Mutomboki FPP (Shabunda factions)**

In 2011, leaders close to Musumbu (including those known as Sisawa, Charlequin and Makombo) and a new branch under Eyadema Mugugu emerged in the northern and eastern Shabunda territory. Over time, the original leaders of Raia Mutomboki lost influence, with other groups emerging, following losses inflicted by the FARDC. In late 2017, a new coalition called Raia Mutomboki *Forces Populaires de Paix* (FPP) emerged, led by FARDC defector Donat Omari Kengwa and Ngandu Lundimu. It has its roots in the second wave of the Raia Mutomboki mobilisation of 2011 and has been based in the mining areas near Nzovu, Shabunda territory. Unlike other, non-Rega factions, the role of the *kimbilikiti* spirit and concomitant initiation rites remain a relevant anchor point for these Raia Mutomboki and their allies.

In recent statements, Donat claimed to represent the original Raia Mutomboki doctrine of communal self-defence, and rejected the practice of ambushing civilians, which is common among other factions. Within the FPP, Donat is reportedly attempting to unify all Shabunda-based Raia Mutomboki.

**Raia Mutomboki Donat/Ngandu**

This group was created in 2012 in northeast Shabunda territory, on the edge of the Kahuzi Biega National Park. It was founded by two FARDC commanders, Major Donat Kengwa Omari and Major Ngandu Lundimu, who defected from the Rega community. Initially, it formed part of the coalition led by Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha. The group has been more cohesive than other Raia Mutomboki groups.

**Raia Mutomboki Mabala**

This Raia Mutomboki faction is located in northeast Shabunda and was created around 2012 by Mabala Mese. Initially, it formed part of the coalition led by Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha, and is part of the FPP.

**Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto**

This Raia Mutomboki faction was originally created by Eyadema Mugugu in 2011, the first such group in northern Shabunda. After Eyadema's arrest in 2012, the group was taken over by Juriste Kikuni who surrendered to the FARDC in 2015. Since this group began using the name Takulengwe, it has been led by a certain Kazimoto and has declined in importance, also due to internal splits, such as those that created the factions led by Kikwama and Kabazimia. Recently, it was reported to have joined the new FPP coalition.

**Raia Mutomboki Kabazimia**

This is a small Raia Mutomboki faction located in northern Shabunda. It used to be part of the former Raia Mutomboki group led by Takulengwe, who succeeded Eyadema and Juriste Kikuni. Recently, it was reported to have joined the new FPP coalition of Raia Mutomboki groups.

**Raia Mutomboki Kikwama**

This Raia Mutomboki group is based near the mining area of Mulungu, in eastern Shabunda territory, but does not appear to be very active. This group used to be part of the Raia Mutomboki group led by Takulengwe who succeeded Eyadema and Juriste Kikuni, respectively. Recently, it was reported to have joined the new FPP coalition.

**Raia Mutomboki Wemba**

This Raia Mutomboki faction is based in the Kahuzi Biega National Park to the north of Isezya in northeast Shabunda territory. Recently, it was reported to have joined the new FPP coalition.

**Raia Mutomboki Kimba**

This Raia Mutomboki Kimba is part of the FPP coalition in northeast Shabunda.

**Raia Mutomboki Tembo (Kalehe factions)**

Between 2012 and 2013, the Raia Mutomboki label was 'exported' to Kalehe territory, where various ex-Mai-Mai leaders and local youth began to form new armed groups, most of them small in size and with limited overall coordination. In their early stages, these Raia Mutomboki factions, based in the Tembo community, were still linked with key commanders in Shabunda, but they became increasingly more autonomous. Some have engaged in short-lived alliances with Mai-Mai Kifuafua. They mostly deploy to the east and west of the Bunyakiri-Hombo road, into Waloa-Loanda (southeastern Walikale territory) and Remeka (southern Masisi territory). Many of their current leaders are demobilised combatants from the former Mai-Mai group led by General Padiri Bulenda who controlled much of Bunyakiri between 1996 and 2003.

**Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo**

Established around 2013, this is one of the best-known Raia Mutomboki groups, led by one of the original commanders of the movement in Bunyakiri, Bwaare Hamakombo. It is based west of Bulambika and Kambali in northern Kalehe territory. Hamakombo currently aims to create a broader coalition with Shukuru and Butachibera, and they have reportedly sent combatants to support Yakutumba in Fizi territory.

**Raia Mutomboki Shukuru**

Led by Shukuru Kawaya, this group emerged near the town on Hombo, on the border between North and South Kivu, around 2013. Kawaya is currently trying to forge a coalition with Hamakombo and Butachibera, and they have reportedly sent combatants to support Yakutumba's operations in Fizi territory. Kawaya has a conflictual relationship with Mai-Mai Kifuafua.

**Raia Mutomboki Butachibera**

This group emerged north of Bunyakiri around 2014, on the border between North and South Kivu, and is led by Butachibera. Shukuru currently aims to create a broader coalition with Hamakombo and Shukuru, and the three factions reportedly sent combatants to support Yakutumba in Fizi territory.

**Raia Mutomboki Musole**

This group has been based near Ziralo, Kalehe territory, since 2014 and its leader is Musole, a former second-in-command of the Mai-Mai Kirikicho. It mainly operates south of Ziralo.

**Raia Mutomboki Imani Bitaa**

This group has been based near Cifunzi in Kalonge *chefferie*, operating between the southern Kalehe and western Kabare territories since 2013. Its area of influence is mostly in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park.

**Raia Mutomboki Mungoro**

This group has been based west of the Bunyakiri-Hombo road since around 2013. In 2017 it clashed several times with the FARDC and reportedly also with other Raia Mutomboki factions operating in Kalehe.

**Raia Mutomboki Shabani**

Based in the eastern Buloho chiefdom, this recently-created faction has absorbed combatants from Mweeke, a former Raia Mutomboki commander.

**Raia Mutomboki Weteshi Kabanzi**

Based in the western Buhavu chiefdom, a few kilometers away from Bunyakiri, this group is led by Weteshi Kabanzi.

**Raia Mutomboki Safari**

This faction is led by Safari and operates around Kalonge in southern Kalehe territory.

**Raia Mutomboki Manyiisa**

Led by a commander known as Mayiisa, this group has been based south of Ziralo and east of Bunyakiri on the High Plateau of Kalehe since 2012.

**Raia Mutomboki (Walikale factions)**

Raia Mutomboki mobilisation in southern Walikale began with a group led by Heritier Elenge Mupenge in 2012 or 2013, under the influence of Shabunda-based groups led by the late Eyadema Mugugu and Juriste Kikuni. There are currently approximately eight identifiable factions. These groups are mostly based in Walikale's Bakano *collectivité*, with some of them active in Waloa-Uroba and Waloa-Yungu. After gaining independence from the Shabunda Raia Mutomboki leaders and engaging in

various attacks and practices not considered 'ideologically correct' – such as ambushing humanitarian workers – some of the older Raia Mutomboki factions began rejecting their use of the Raia Mutomboki label.

**Raia Mutomboki Elenge**

This is the original Walikale Raia Mutomboki group which emerged in 2012 or 2013 in southern Walikale. It is led by Heritier Elenge Mupenge and recruits largely within the Rega community.

**Raia Mutomboki Mirage**

This group is based in southwestern Walikale territory, in the Wasa *groupement*, and is led by Mirage Bitunya. It recruits largely within the Rega community and profits from the local gold trade.

**Raia Mutomboki Shemakingi**

This group is based in the Waloa-Uroba *groupement* near Ntoto, recruits among the Rega community, and is led by a commander known as Shemakingi.

**Raia Mutomboki Shebitembe**

This group is based in the Waloa-Uroba *groupement* near Ntoto, recruits among the Rega community, and is led by a commander known as Shebitembe.

**Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa**

This group is based in the Bakondjo *groupement*, bordering Maniema Province. It recruits among the Rega community and is led by a commander known as Kisekelwa.

**Raia Mutomboki Mamba**

This group is based in the Bakondjo *groupement*, bordering Shabunda territory. It recruits among the Rega community and is led by a commander known as Mamba.

**Raia Mutomboki Akilo**

Based near Biriko, this group mostly operates between the Ufamando and Waloa-Loanda *groupement*s, and is led by a commander known as Akilo.

**Raia Mutomboki Machite**

Led by a commander known as Machite, this group is based in the Waloa-Yungu *groupement*. It recruits among the Rega community.

**Raia Mutomboki (Walungu/Kabare factions)**

Between 2012 and 2013, the Raia Mutomboki label spread from Shabunda and Bunyakiri into the Walungu and Kabare territories. In contrast to other Raia Mutomboki groups, which mostly recruit among the Tembo and Rega communities, with their specific initiation rites and more decentralised customary hierarchy, these groups recruit largely among the Shi community.

**Raia Mutomboki Maheshe**

The group led by a commander known as Maheshe has been based in the Mulambula *groupement*, Walungu territory, on the border with Shabunda, since around 2013. In recent years, this group has become more isolated. In early 2017, the group ambushed park rangers from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and a French conservationist. Maheshe's faction has also been accused of being involved in illegal mining.

**Raia Mutomboki Ndarumanga**

This group is based south of Nzibira and Nyalubemba in western Walungu territory and is led by a commander known as Ndarumanga. Like Maheshe's faction, it has become infamous for frequent ambushes, especially on the road between Nzibira and Nyalubemba.

**Raia Mutomboki Chipopa/Bipompa**

Led by Bipompa (also known as Chipopa), this group is reportedly based in the highlands sliver of the Kahuzi Biega National Park, to the north of Bunyakiri road. It is unclear whether it is still active.

**Raia Mutomboki Blaise**

Raia Mutomboki Blaise is one of the few operational Raia Mutomboki factions left in Kabare territory, and it is led by a commander known as Blaise who represented, alongside Gaston (who was later killed), one of the two armed wings involved in the customary succession struggle in Nindja *chefferie,* involving the two sons of the former chief, Marcel and Freddy. While Blaise supported the former, the faction led by Lukoba

(who joined the Raia Mutomboki FPP movement) used to work for Freddy. Its key bases are in the Iregabarhonyi *groupement*.

**Raia Mutomboki Lukoba**

The Raia Mutomboki Lukoba group is based around the Ciramba village in the Nindja *chefferie*. Like their rivals, Raia Mutomboki Blaise, they have been involved in a local customary succession conflict. This group recently joined the Raia Mutomboki FPP coalition. Most of the former Raia Mutomboki Nyanderema rebels have joined Lukoba's faction.

**Local defence groups in the Ruzizi Plain**

In contrast to more organised Mai-Mai groups that operate in the hills overlooking the Ruzizi plain, these groups are typically smaller and less cohesive. Some call themselves Local Defence, while others are more akin to bandits engaging in ambushes and cattle raids. Many of them occasionally also cooperate with the FARDC or the police. In mid-2017, some of those groups acted as *Balala Rondo*, a term used for neighborhood vigilante groups (for instance, Amuse-Gueule in Sange). Generally, more frequently than Mai-Mai groups, local defence outfits transform repeatedly through leadership changes, splits or local political manipulation.

**The Bigaya group**

Based east of the Kamanyola-Uvira road, this group has been forged by Bigaya, who used to be a commander in the late Bede Rusagara's armed group. Like Mbulu, Bigaya's units are particularly famous for ambushes and cattle theft. Recently, Bigaya has fallen ill and a certain Mahugo allegedly took over his and Mbulu's militia.

**The Mbulu group**

Based east of the Kamanyola-Uvira road, this group has been forged by Mbulu who used to be a commander in the late Bede Rusagara's armed group. Like Bigaya, Mbulu's units are particularly famous for ambushes and cattle theft. Recently, a certain Mahugo allegedly took over his and Bigaya's militia.

**The Ngengwe group**

Based around Mulenge, this is a group that formed only in mid-2017. It is led by Ngengwe and is reported to frequently collaborate with nearby FARDC units for which they allegedly act as outposts.

**The Mahinduzi group**

Based around Ndolera, the group led by Prosper Mahinduzi has been able to benefit from the void left by the killing of former Local Defence leaders Pélican and Intervention.

**The Kashumba group**

Based in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Uvira, this group, led by Kashumba, is one of the so-called Local Defence groups in the Ruzizi Plain of South Kivu.

**The Zone group**

Based around Katonyera, this group, led by a commander called Zone, is one of the so-called Local Defence groups in the Ruzizi Plain.

**Local 'customary' militias around Beni**

Several local militias, often rooted in communal self-defence and protection of land and customary leadership positions, have emerged in response to the violence that has engulfed Beni since early 2014. While their original motivation was linked to the perceived marginalisation of communities such as the Vuba, Pakombe, or Talinga by the Nande community, some of them are now more interested in survival and resource extraction and collude with ex-APC, ADF, and FARDC networks – including involvement in some of the massacres.

**Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix**

The UPCP, previously called Mai-Mai Lafontaine, *Forces d'Autodéfense Populaire* (FAP), and *Coalition des Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO), has been led since around 2000 by Kakule Sikuli Lafontaine, who has remained its leader and dominant figure until today. The group, whose primary constituency and recruits come from the Nande community, traces its lineage back to 1993, during the dying days of the Mobutu regime, when it emerged as a local defence group in southern Lubero territory. It grew in strength as part of President Laurent-Désire Kabila's strategy to tie down and harry his Ugandan and Rwandan enemies during the Second Congo War

(1998-2003). Since then however, the group has cut its ties to the government in Kinshasa and at various points in its history has formed opportunistic alliances with the Rwandan *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) and the M23 rebellion.

In 2016, the group was forced out of its base around Bunyatenge due to the emergence of the Mazembe militia in the area. Lafontaine himself has been reported to be based outside of the country. While some parts of UPCP operate as Mazembe since 2017, a small UCPC group is allegedly still based to the west of Lake Edward, led by Muhambalyaki.

**Front de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI)**

The FRPI is based in Ituri province but has links to groups on the border with North Kivu. It is one of the eastern Congo's most long-standing armed groups. This militia was created 2002 by Germain Katanga who has been convicted by the International Criminal Court, who is claimed to have represented Lendu-Ngiti interests against Bosco Ntaganda's *Union des Patriotes Congolais* (UPC). After the end of the so-called Ituri war in 2007, Baudouin Adirodhu and Justin Banaloki (alias Cobra Matata) became leaders of the group. Over the years, the group has repeatedly considered integration into the FARDC while continuing to operate autonomously and engaging in regular clashes with the FARDC and MONUSCO.

The FRPI is significantly weakened today. However, under the leadership of 'Colonel' Mbadhu who took over from Banaloki after his arrest in early 2015, the FRPI continues to resist demobilisation and has managed to maintain control over various parts of Irumu territory where it is involved in illegal mining and taxation.

**Twiganeho**

The Twiganeho ('those who hit hard') is another Banyamulenge self-defence militia which is more decentralised than the Ngumino, and which has appeared recently in the *Haut Plateaux* of Fizi territory. It mostly operates around Bijombo and maintains ties with the more centralised and better organised Ngumino.

**Rebel groups of Rwandan origin**

**Force Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)**

The FDLR was created in 2000 many years after the Rwandan genocide. The rebel groups that emerged out of troops belonging to the defeated, pre-genocide Rwandan army and various affiliated militia, merged to cast aside their association with the genocide in which some of its leaders had been implicated. The FDLR is the political wing of the organisation while the armed wing is called *Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi* (FOCA) or *The Saviours Fighting Forces.*

Reaching the peak of its military and economic strength in the early 2000s, the FDLR began to suffer defections, with RUD-*Urunana* and FDLR-Soki breaking away to form separate groups. While the core leadership around the group's military commander, Lieutenant-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, sought an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court since 2012 for alleged war crimes committed in eastern Congo, and the group's political leader, Major-General Victor Byiringiro, remains intact, the FDLR lost many of its senior commanders through a series of surrenders, captures and killings.

In 2016, the FDLR's most important internal split led to the creation of another breakaway faction, the CNRD-*Ubwiyunge*. Since then, the FDLR's activities have largely been limited to the western Rutshuru and northern Masisi territories. While the FDLR was estimated to have around 6,500 fighters in 2008, the group's strength in late 2017 was estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 fighters. The group has also lost control over most of the territory and mining areas which it previously controlled. By late 2017, a shortage of ammunition had significantly constrained the FDLR's operational capacity.

**Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)-FOCA (Source: RFI)**
**Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie (RUD)-Urunana**

The RUD-*Urunana* is a splinter faction of the FDLR-FOCA that emerged in 2007 following a leadership quarrel, allegedly over the remuneration of certain units. With a few hundred combatants, Jean-Damascène Ndibabaje, also known as Musare, defected to create the RUD-*Urunana,* which has since been active in the northern parts of Bwisha and Bwito *chefferies* (chiefdoms) in Rutshuru territory.

While the military influence of RUD has gradually declined in recent years, the group has allegedly collaborated with different armed groups, including FDLR-FOCA and Congolese Hutu militias, including several operating under the Nyatura umbrella,

during joint military operations and attacks on civilians. In February 2016, its leader, Musare, was killed under mysterious circumstances. Local sources allege that his murder was linked to the growing rift between Hutu- and Nande-based armed groups. The group still exists but its strength is marginal in the large areas in which it operates.

**Conseil National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie (CNRD)-Ubwiyunge**

Led by Colonel Wilson Irategeka, the CNRD broke off from the FDLR in May 2016 after a long-standing disagreement over political questions, such as the fate of Rwandan refugees in eastern Congo. The CNRD took over all of the FDLR's South Kivu units. In North Kivu, most of the troops remained with the FDLR, although some went to the CNRD. FOCA and CNRD units have regularly clashed since the CNRD was formed.

The CNRD initially took a more moderate stance than the FDLR, supporting negotiations with the Rwandan government and demanding the immediate repatriation of Rwandan refugees. This initially appeared to play in its favour, with various Nyatura groups and the FARDC supporting the CNRD against the FDLR. However, more than a year into its existence, the tide has turned, and support for the CNRD appears to have waned. Congolese authorities arrested several of the CNRD's senior officers, and the group has also lost control of a significant swathe of territory in North Kivu. In late 2017, the CNRD was estimated to have around 500 fighters based in South Kivu between the Itombwe Mountains and the area around Kilembwe in western Fizi territory, and in the north of the Mweso village in North Kivu.

**Former March 23 movement (ex-M23)**

Emanating from a long tradition of Rwandan-supported rebellions in eastern Congo, including the RCD-Goma and the CNDP, the M23 emerged in early 2012 under the leadership of Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda. Most of its leaders came from the Congolese Tutsi community. While it quickly acquired a significant fighting force, leading to its historic occupation of Goma in November 2012, the M23 was riven by internal fissures from the beginning and never managed to develop the strength of Laurent Nkunda's CNDP.

Following regional diplomacy and significant international pressure, the M23 left Goma after about two weeks and participated in peace talks in Kampala with the Congolese

government. However, in February 2013, it split into two factions, led respectively by Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga. When Ntanganda's group fled to Rwanda in March 2013, Makenga's bloc faced increasing pressure from FARDC's commando battalions and an aggressive UN force intervention brigade, eventually leading to its demise in November 2013. In early 2017, remnants of the former M23 attempted a short-lived revival in Rutshuru territory, and there were reports of continued ex-M23 activity in the Rutshuru and Masisi territories.

**Kambale (ex-Soki, defunct)**

In 2006, an FDLR officer called Sangano Mushuke, also known as Soki, broke away from the FDLR to form his own small group in northern Rutshuru. The group never controlled much territory and was known for local banditry. In 2013, M23 fighters killed its leader, and the group was taken over by a leader known as Kambale. Since mid-2017, it was unclear whether the group still existed.

**Ex-M23 Busumba group**

In Busumba, Masisi territory, stronghold of the former CNDP supporter, Erasto Ntibaturana, a local militia allegedly harbours a small number of former M23 combatants and officers, including Justin Gacheri, Pepe Erasto and Samuel Nsabimana. While it has been reported to entertain cordial relations with some nearby Nyatura groups, the Busumba ex-M23 did not appear to be very active in 2017.

**Rebel groups of Ugandan origin**

**Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)**

The ADF is an armed group that originally emerged in opposition to the Ugandan government before transforming into an Islamist, Congo-based movement after the merger of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and ADF under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu. Over the past 15 years, its main military camps have been located in the Rwenzori Mountains and in the Semuliki Valley in Beni territory. The ADF is a highly secretive organisation that follows a strict code of internal discipline. It has strong historical ties with other armed groups in the area, including those led by former members of Mbusa Nyamwisi's *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-K/ML) and local customary chiefs, and including those of the Vuba and Pakombe communities.

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| National peace councils/ committees | National | Formal | Coordination and support to state-building; offering a framework for political transitions, inclusive elections and drafting of a new constitution | -Afghanistan, High Peace Council<br>-Ghana, National Peace Council<br>- Kenya, National Peace Council, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management<br>-Nepal, High Level Peace Committee HLPC<br>- Solomon Islands, National Peace Council<br>-South Africa, National Peace Committee |
| Peace secretariats | National | Formal | Facilitate consensus-building, secretarial tasks such as logistical support, communication, liaison, monitoring and implementation of negotiation results (often temporary structures during peace processes) | -Ghana, National Peace Council Secretariat<br>-Nepal, Nepal Peace Secretariat<br>-Philippines, Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process(OPAPP)<br>-South Africa, National Peace Secretariat<br>- Sri Lanka, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) |
| Government bureaux, departments or Peace ministries | National | Formal | Coordination | -CostaRica, Ministry of Justice and Peace<br>- Ghana<br>- Nepal, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction<br>- Peru, National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS)<br>- Philippines<br>- Solomon Islands, Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP)<br>- South Sudan, Ministry of Peace and Comprehensive |

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| | | | | Peace Agreement implementation<br>-Ghana, National Peace Council 2011<br>- Costa Rica, Law for the Alternative Resolution of Conflicts and Promotion of Peace 1997<br>- Kenya, National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 2011<br>- Philippines, Policy Framework for Peace 2001<br>- Afghanistan, National Consultative Peace Jirga<br>- Bolivia<br>- Columbia<br>- Eastern Europe, *roundtables* |
| Policy and legislative measures creating infrastructures for Peace | National | Formal | Enabler | |
| National Dialogues/ Conferences and multi-party negotiations | National | Formal | Preparatory forum for creating a framework for political transition, drafting a new constitution and election | - Ghana<br>- Iraq, Iraqi National Conference<br>- Lebanon<br>- South Africa, Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP)<br>- Sudan<br>- Tunisia<br>- Yemen, National Dialogue Conference |
| Non-governmental and civil society platforms for peace and dialogue; inter-religious networks, trade-unionist forums, women's movements, councils of the | Regional, National | Informal, sometimes formal | Participation and inclusion, advocacy and public pressure | - Ghana<br>- Malawi<br>- Tunisia<br>- Uganda<br>- Turkey |

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| elderly, wise men etc. | | | | |
| Transitional Justice mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), vetting councils, lustration mechanisms | National, local | Formal | Support to political transitions, dealing with the past and reconciliation | - Afghanistan, Traditional Loya Jirga<br>- South Africa, Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 1995, Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence (Goldstone Commission) 1991<br>- Cambodia<br>- Rwanda, International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations 1990<br>- Guatemala, Commission for Historical Clarification<br>- Peru, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003<br>- El Salvador, Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 1992<br>- Cote d'Ivoire, Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation 2000<br>- Timor-Leste, Commission on Reconciliation |
| Insider mediation | National, regional, local | Informal, sometimes formal | Mediation, capacity-building, Dialogue facilitation | - Burkina Faso<br>- Cameroon<br>- Central Africa Republic<br>- Ghana<br>- Guinea<br>- Lesotho<br>- Philippines<br>- Senegal<br>- Swaziland<br>- Thailand<br>- Togo<br>- Tunisia |

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| Early-warning and response | National | Formal | Early-warning and response | - Kenya, Uwiano Platform, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism CEWARN<br>- Ghana, Ghanawarn |
| Inter-state governmental or non-governmental forums and networks | Continental, sub-continental | Formal | Coordination, capacity-building, advocacy(funds) and advocacy | - EU and OSCE Mediation Support teams<br>- West Africa Network for Peacebuilding<br>- Groups of Friends, a.o |
| UN affiliated peace and mediation support structures | Global | Formal | Technical support, capacity-building, facilitation and mediation | - UNDP-DPA Peace and Development Advisers<br>- Mediation Support Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs<br>- Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, Conflict Prevention Team, UNDP BPPS |
| IGO/GSO based support organisations networks | Global | Informal | Technical support, capacity-building, Advocacy | - Mediation Support Network |

*Source: Giessmann (2016: 18-19).*

# APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

## QUESTIONNAIRE POUR LES ORGANISATIONS

1. Quel est le nom de votre organisation/Institution?
2. Depuis combien de temps votre organisation travaille à l'Est de la RDC?
3. Pourquoi vous intervenez dans le domaine de la paix?
4. Quelle est votre motivation d'établir les infrastructures de paix?
5. Quelle est votre zone d'opération?
6. Quel est le critère de choix du village/localité/groupement ou vous avez établi l'infrastructure de paix?
7. Combien d'infrastructures de paix vous avez déjà établies?
8. Quel est le processus que vous avez utilisé?
9. Quel l'apport des autorités politiques locales concernant l'établissement des infrastructures de paix?
10. Quelle est la structure des infrastructures de paix que vous avez établie?
11. Comment fonctionnent-elles?
12. Comment vous les appuyez dans leur fonctionnement?
13. Selon vous, quel est l'impact des infrastructures de paix dans la promotion de la paix?
14. Quelle est votre opinion sur l'efficacité des infrastructures de paix en ce qui concerne la recherche de la paix et la sécurité humaine ?
15. Qu'est-ce que vous pensez de la durabilité des infrastructures de paix que vous avez établies ?

-Si oui, quels sont les facteurs qui les rendent durables ?

Si non, qu'est-ce qu'il faut pour les rendre durables ?

16. Pensez-vous que ces infrastructures sont une solution pour la paix dans votre communauté ?
17. Quelle est l'attitude de la population vis-à-vis des ces infrastructures de paix ?

**Questions pour les members des Comités de paix**

1. Qu'est-ce qui vous a motive de faire partir du comite de paix ?
2. Depuis quand etes-vous membres du comité de paix ?
3. Quel est le nom de votre comite ?
4. Quelle est la structure de votre comite ?
5. Depuis quand votre comite a été etabli dans votre village ou localité?
6. Quelle est votre motivation pour faire partir du comite de paix ?
7. Quelles sont les difficultés que vous rencontrez dans votre travail ?
8. Quelle est le nom de l'organisation qui vous a soutenu dans l'etablissement de votre comite ?
9. Est-ce que vous recevez une quelconque assistance financiere ?
10. Qu'est-ce qui doit être fait pour votre comite soit durable et efficace ?

## MAULIZO KWA KUNDI YA MANZINGANYO

1. Muna juwa vipi kama mahali mulipo kuna patikana kamati ya amani ?
2. Muna mafikiri gani kuona imeshimikwa kamati ya amani mahali munapo kaa ?
3. Wakati kamati ilishimikwa walishirikiana nanyi?
4. Nilizima kuwa na kamati ya Amani bahali muna pokaa?

A. Kama ndiyo, sababu gani?

B. Kama sivyo, sababu gani?

5. Inaitwa je kamati ya Amani inayo patikana mahili munapo kaa?
6. Munaweza kulinganisha hali ya mbele ya kushimika kamati na ile ya kisha ulishimika wa kamati ?
7. Kulingana nanyi, kamati ya amani niya kudumu ?

A. Kama ndiyo , inayo mafanyikiyo gani ?

B. Kama sivyo, nini ina itajika ili iwe yenye ku dumu?

8. Muna shirikiana pamoja na kamati ya Amani?
9. Munaona je mafanyi kiyo yake ndani ya chama?
10. Kamati yenu inayo eneyo gani ?
11. Mume furahiwa na kazi ya kamati ya amani ?
12. Je, kamati yenu ya amani inajuli wa na viongozi wa jimbo ?