



## **Reducing intertribal conflict and violence: A mediation project with the Bukusu and Nandi micro-nations, Kenya**

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies in the Faculty of Management Sciences at Durban University of Technology

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### **Declaration**

I declare that the thesis herewith submitted for the PhD in Public Administration – Peace Studies at the Durban University of Technology (DUT) is my original work and has not been previously submitted for a degree at any other university.

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## **Abstract**

Tribal clashes in Africa continue to be an hinderance to peaceful coexistence between ethnic communities in proximity. In Kenya the leadership has been in denial of this reality, or at times key leaders abet the vice for selfish political expediency. This is a dangerous trajectory unless proper interventions are adopted in order to transform cultures of violence into a culture of peace. The thesis takes a critical look at the relations of the Bukusu and Nandi residing in Trans Nzoia County of Kenya. It is a mediation strategy to minimize ethnic tensions that usually to explode into violence with slight stimulation. It reiterates the verity that there are alternatives to violence, which is nonviolence.

conflict transformation is the best route to take as communities are sensitized to embrace justice for all and live in an atmosphere of positive peace. This calls for creativity, sacrifice, patience and financial investment. The communities are called upon to reach out to each other as they work for positive peace.

The thesis developed a dialogue project that involved 24 participants taking part in eight dialogue sessions that aimed at reducing prejudice and creating new friendships between members of the Bukusu and Nandi communities. By the end of the dialogue sessions, friendships and new networks had been formed. Group members endeavor to work together in doing peacebuilding throughout the county. This proofed that Dialogue is as a great tool for conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

The thesis champions for dialogue opportunities to be encouraged throughout the country and continent. This will enable communities to have conversations over pertinent issues that split them and most times lead to animosity. Dialogues will open up room for contact, clarification of ideals, reduction of chauvinism and enhancement stronger uniting bonds.

### **Dedication**


The thesis is dedicated to my parents, Rev Henry Cleophas Makokha Wanjala (1942 – 2020) and Mrs. Mary Mulago Wanjala for their love of education and peace.

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## Acronyms

ACCORD	: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ADC	: Agricultural Development Corporation
AU:	: African Union
ANC	: African National Congress
AR	: Action Research 
AVP	: Alternative to Violence Program
CIPEV	: Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence
CJPC	: Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CCZ	: Council of Churches in Zambia
CORD	: Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
CSO	: Civil Society Organizations
DRC	: Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUT	: Durban University of Technology
EAC	: East African Community
FBO	: Faith-Based Organizations
FGD	: Focus Group Discussion
FORD	: Forum for Restoration of Democracy
GoK	: Government of Kenya
ICRC	: International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP:	: Internally Displaced Population
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ICC	: International Criminal Court of Justice
IEP	: Institute for Economics and Peace
KADU	: Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	: Kenya African National Union
KNBS	: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNHRC	: Kenya National Human Rights Commission
LPC	: Local Peace Committee
NARC	: National Rainbow Coalition
NASA	: National Super Alliance
NCCK	: National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	: Nongovernmental Organization
ODM	: Orange Democratic Movement

SSA	: Sub-Saharan Africa
TCEPP	: Trans Nzoia Community Empowerment Peacebuilding Partnership
TJRC	: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
TNA	: The National Alliance
TOT	: Training of Trainers
UN	: United Nations
UNDP	: United Nations Development Program
USAID :	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	: World Health Organization?
ZANU-PF	: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front



## Table of Contents

Declaration.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
List of Acronyms.....	vi
Table of Contents.....	viii

### **PART ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

#### **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .....1**

1.1	Introduction.....	1
1.2	Definition of Key Terms.....	2
1.3	Background and Context.....	3
1.4	The Research Problem.....	6
1.5	Research Aim and Objectives.....	7
1.6	Research Methods.....	7
1.7	Dialogue as a tool for Conflict Resolution and Transformation.....	9
1.8	Thesis Chapters.....	10

### **PART TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **CHAPTER TWO: INTERETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA .....12**

2.1	Introduction.....	12
2.2	The Nature of Interethnic Conflict.....	14
2.3	The Extent of Interethnic Conflicts.....	18
2.3.1	Rwanda.....	20
2.3.2	Nigeria.....	23
2.3.3	Zimbabwe.....	26
2.3.4	Democratic Republic of Congo.....	28
2.3.5	South Sudan.....	31
2.3.6	Tanzania.....	35
2.4	Causes of Interethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.....	36
2.4.1	Masculinity.....	37
2.4.2	Ethnically Grounded Economic Disparity.....	37
2.4.3	Elite Competition.....	39

2.4.4	Incompetent Leadership.....	37
2.4.5	Land Productivity.....	40
2.4.6	Colonial Heritage and Past Conflict.....	41
2.5	Consequences of Interethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa .....	43
2.5.1	Physical Effects.....	44
2.5.2	Economic Effects.....	44
2.5.3	Psychosocial.....	46
2.5.4	Sociopolitical.....	47
2.6	2.6 Cultural Traditions of Conflict Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa.....	49
2.7	Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa....	50
2.7.1	Government-Led Initiatives.....	51
2.7.2	Regional Peace Forums.....	52
2.7.3	United Nations and Multinational Organizations.....	52
2.6.4	Civil Societies.....	53
2.6.5	Educational Institutions and the Media.....	54
2.8	Conclusion.....	54
<b>CHAPTER THREE: INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN KENYA .....</b>		<b>57</b>
3.1	Introduction to Kenya.....	57
3.2	Causes of Interethnic Violence in Kenya.....	62
3.3	Consequences of Interethnic Conflict in Kenya.....	69
3.4	Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflicts in Kenya.....	74
3.5	Conclusion .....	77
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN TRANS NZOIA COUNTY</b>		<b>78</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	78
4.2	Nature of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia.....	82
4.3	Extent and Trends of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia.....	83
4.4	Causes of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia.....	86
4.5	Consequences of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia.....	90
4.6	Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia.....	95
4.7	Conclusion .....	97

<b>CHAPTER FIVE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION .....</b>	<b>99</b>
5.1    Introduction .....	99
5.2    Conflict Management.....	101
5.3    Conflict Resolution.....	102
5.3.1    Formative Years (1914–1945) .....	103
5.3.2    Foundational Years (1946–1969) .....	104
5.3.3    Growth and Spread (1970–1989) .....	105
5.3.4    Diffusion (1989 onwards) .....	105
5.4    Conflict Transformation.....	105
5.5    Prevention Versus Treatment.....	112
5.6    Conclusion .....	113
 <b>CHAPTER SIX: DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION.....</b>	 <b>114</b>
6.1    Introduction .....	114
6.2    Interventions.....	115
6.2.1    Some Common Interventions.....	115
6.2.2    Violent Interventions.....	115
6.3    Dialogue.....	117
6.3.1    Intergroup Contact Theory in Reducing Prejudice.....	118
6.3.2    Dialogue as a Theory.....	123
6.3.3    Dialogue in Practice.....	127
6.3.4    Empirical Evidence.....	130
6.4    Local Peace Committees.....	143
6.4.1    Theory.....	143
6.4.2    Local Peace Committees in Practice.....	144
6.4.3    Empirical Evidence of Local Peace Committees.....	147
6.5    Conclusion .....	151
 <b>PART THREE: RESEARCH METHODS</b>	
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....</b>	<b>152</b>
7.1    Research Methodology .....	152
7.2    Research Design.....	153
7.3    Action Research.....	157
7.3.1    Introduction.....	157
7.3.2    Origin and Development of Action Research.....	159

7.3.3	Nature and Characteristics of Action Research.....	160
7.4	Population.....	164
7.5	Sampling Method.....	168
7.6	Data Collection Methods.....	169
7.6.1	Dialogue Sessions.....	171
7.6.2	Focus Group Discussions.....	173
7.6.3	Personal Interviews.....	173
7.6.4	Structured and Unstructured Observations.....	174
7.7	Data Analysis.....	175
7.8	Pretesting.....	176
7.9	Delimitations/Scope.....	176
7.10	Validity and Reliability/Trustworthiness (Qualitative Research) .....	177
7.10.1	Reliability.....	177
7.10.2	Validity.....	178
7.11	Anonymity and Confidentiality.....	180
7.12	Ethical Considerations .....	180

## **PART FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **CHAPTER EIGHT: DIALOGUE AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND**

<b>TRANSFORMATION .....</b>		<b>181</b>
8.1	Introduction .....	181
8.1.1	Perception of Conflict and Violence.....	181
8.1.2	Perception of Nonviolence.....	183
8.1.3	Peace.....	185
8.2	Preparation for Dialogue Sessions.....	186
8.3	Preparation.....	186
8.4	Selection of Participants.....	187
8.5	Overview of Dialogue Content and Methodology.....	187
8.6	Contributions from Participants.....	188
8.6.1	Session One: Introduction and familiarization.....	188
8.6.2	Session Two: Tribal discrimination.....	192
8.6.3	Session Three: cultural differences .....	184
8.6.4	Session Four: the presence other tribe.....	196
8.6.5	Session Five: major causes of conflict between the Bukusu and Nandi.....	198

8.6.6	Session Six: interventions to resolve conflicts and the impact.....	203
8.6.7	Session Seven: interventions to be put in place to achieve positive peace.....	206
8.6.8	Session Eight: Evaluation and the way forward.....	208
8.6.9	General Observation .....	209
8.7	Participants' Perception of Major Players.....	209
8.7.1	Civil Society Organizations.....	209
8.7.2	Perception of Government (County & National) .....	211
8.8	Reflections: Post-Dialogue Assessment.....	211
8.9	Conclusion .....	212
<b>CHAPTER NINE: EVALUATING THE OUTCOME .....</b>		<b>213</b>
9.1	Introduction .....	213
9.2	Personal Benefits of Dialogue.....	214
9.3	Medium-Term Outcomes.....	216
9.3.1	Outcome 1.....	216
9.3.2	Outcome 2.....	220
9.4	The Most Significant Outcomes.....	224
9.5	Other Outcomes.....	224
9.6	Challenges.....	222
9.7	Sustainability.....	225
9.8	Inspiration and Learning.....	226
<b>PART FIVE: CONCLUSION</b>		
<b>CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION.....</b>		<b>228</b>
10.1	Introduction .....	228
10.2	Research Objectives.....	228
10.3	Challenges encountered.....	230
10.4	A Personal Reflections.....	230
10.5	Key recommendation.....	231
10.6	A Final Word and Conclusion .....	233
References .....		235
Appendix 1: DUT Letter of Introduction .....		264
Appendix 2: Gatekeeper's Letter .....		265
Appendix 3: Letter of Information .....		266

Appendix 4: Letter of Invitation and Consent .....	267
Appendix 5: Dialogue Group Discussion Questions .....	268
Appendix 6: Medium Term Evaluation Questions and Exercise.....	269
Appendix 7: Structured observation guidelines.....	270
Appendix 8: Examples of questions asked in personal interviews.....	271

## List of Tables

Table 2.1: Major episodes of armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1956–2004.....	20
Table 2.2: South Sudan refugee Population in neighboring African countries as of end of 2021.....	34
Table 2.3: African refugees by origin, 2006.....	47
Table 3.1: Cabinet positions 1966 – 1978 Jomo Kenyatta’s regime.....	63
Table 3.2: Cabinet positions 1966 – 1978 Daniel Moi presidency.....	63
Table 3.3: Role of provincial administration in peacebuilding (in percentages) .....	73
Table 3.4: The perception of residents in the following regions on the Role of the church in peacebuilding.....	75
Table 4.2 Voter registration and displacement by district (1992)	
Table 4.3 : Perceptions on potential causes of conflict by constituency (in percentages) in Trans Nzoia County	
Table 4.5: Properties destroyed per district during the 2007 – 2008 post-election violence....	92
Table 4.6: The perception of Trans Nzoia County residents on the involvement of the provincial administration in conflict management (in percentages) .....	94
Table 4.7: The perception in percentages of Trans Nzoia County residents on the involvement of the church in peacebuilding.....	95
Table 5.1: Conflict resolution and conflict transformation: A brief comparison of perspective.	105
Table 6.1: Summary of Allport’s Contact theory .....	118
Table 6.2: Approach to conflict management .....	124
Table 7.1: The nature of qualitative and quantitative research .....	154
Table 7.2: Nature and characteristics of action research.....	160
Table 7.3: Gender representation.....	164
Table 7.4: Age Group.....	164
Table 7.1: representation of Trans Nzoia sub counties .....	186
Table 9.2 Date and attendance of evaluation session.....	216
Table 9.1: TCEPP Activities.....	218

## List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Map of part of East Africa.....	56
Figure 4:1 Location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya.....	78
Figure 4.4: Perceptions on causes of conflict by constituency (in percentages) .....	87
Figure 6.1: The hourglass model: conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict transformation.....	144
Figure 6.2: Dialogue Phases.....	126
Figure 6.3: Galtung's ABC triangle.....	127
Figure 6.3: Galtung's ABC triangle.....	133
Figure 7.1: Action research cycle.....	162
Figure 7.2: Map of Kenya, showing the location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya.....	165
Figure 7.3: Map of Trans Nzoia County .....	166
Figure 7.4: Methods of data collection.....	169
Table 7.5: United dialogue sessions.....	171
Figure 9:1 Gibb's reflective cycle.....	214





# **PART ONE: INTRODUCTION**

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Introduction**

This chapter gives an overview of the research project and provides the researcher's motivation for developing a program to build sustainable peace between the Bukusu and Nandi communities of Trans Nzoia County. It gives the background and essential points of the research, giving a justification for why the research was undertaken and the methodologies used to carry out the step-by-step processes in the project that led to the implementation of dialogue sessions.

The chapter summarizes the reviewed literature that was used to ascertain the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of interethnic violent conflicts in the region. It outlines interventions employed to reduce these conflicts and reviews their effectiveness. A dialogue program aimed at transforming interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi ethnic groups in Trans Nzoia County was designed and implemented, and a preliminary evaluation of its outcome was undertaken.

### **1.2 Definition of Key Terms**

It is necessary to clarify some of the key terminology which will be used in the thesis.

Negative Peace: This points to a situation where there is no war or fighting. It is the state where there is a conflict, but it has been suppressed through coercion, force, or otherwise. The presence of either structural or cultural violence, or both, is manifested (Galtung 1969: 183).

Positive Peace: This involves the absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence. In addition, there is the presence of social justice (Galtung 1969: 183).

Direct violence: This involves the participation of an actor to cause harm and inflict pain, destruction, or death to an individual, a people, or a nation (Galtung 1990: 292). This is always the most visible form of violence but not necessarily the most harmful. In direct violence, one can see people engaged in combat and fights using weapons such as machetes, guns, chemical weapons, and drones.

Structural violence: “The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969: 171). These are the structures found in the governance and social fabric of a community or nation. The laws tend to privilege the elite and those in power, while being unjust and oppressive to those living on the margins. The unjust laws might lead to great suffering and death for the marginalized.

Cultural violence: “Is any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural forms” (Galtung 1990: 291). Culture is used to both include and exclude individuals in a group. Usually, those who belong to a specific group and culture enjoy some privileges and values. The excluded are denied these rights by design and default.

conflict management: This involves “interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. Rarely are conflicts completely resolved. More often, they are reduced, downgraded, or contained” (Miller 2005: 23). The emphasis is on containing the conflict or violence.

Conflict resolution: Intends to end the violence, and, at the same time, employs instruments that address the root causes of a conflict. It seeks to change violent behavior and encourages conversation and understanding.

Conflict transformation: This “is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce

violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships” (Lederach 2003: 14).

Nonviolence: This is a school of thought that holds that the best way of resolving conflicts or crisis is through means that are not violent. Walter Wink defines nonviolence as “a nonlethal orientation to life, a variety of strategies and tactics for implementing change without resorting to violence” (Wink 1992: 172). It is a strategy of bringing change without inflicting physical injuries or death or using harmful tools such as weapons. It is action that is nonlethal.

The terms inter-ethnic and inter-tribal are interchangeably used throughout the thesis. For the purpose of this thesis, they carry the same connotation. They mean group identity along certain communal social constructs. The writer considers the two to be the same and therefore uses either one or the other when discussing ethnic or tribal group identities.

### **1.3 Background and Context**

Kenya has salient problems that, if left unaddressed, can instigate conflicts that can easily lead to violence. These disputes have to be positively dealt with, and very tangible measures must be put in place to prevent imminent violence. Though notable efforts, such as the promulgation of the 2013 Constitution, have been employed to avert this crisis, Kenya has not attained positive peace. One of the hallmarks of the 2013 Constitution was the devolution of power and resources through county governments. Currently, there are 47 county governments of which Trans Nzoia is one.

Kenya has acclaimed herself, both within and outside the country, to be an island of peace surrounded by volatile, violent neighbors. This is captured in the country’s Swahili mantra *Kenya kahuna Matata*, meaning that there is no war/violence in Kenya. This is a misconception because Kenya’s history, even the period after the country had attained independence, has recorded otherwise. In addition, the lack of documentation on certain cases of direct violence in the country’s history must not be interpreted to suggest that

the country has had positive peace. This assumption has been exploited to perpetuate injustices and violence, and it must, therefore, be revised. Kenya has many underlying issues that have led to violent conflicts – these need to be considered; otherwise, they will activate more violence. The underlying causes of violence in the country are immense. This is captured by Njogu (2009: 1) who stated that:

Violence was not just about presidential results. To understand it one would need to examine long-standing grievances related to land, access to pasture, political manipulation of ethnic differences, impunity among those identified as having organized political violence in the past, the winner-take-all political system, poverty and unemployment among the youth, the high stakes and closeness of presidential races making it impossible to clearly see the winner, the excessive power of the presidency making the office immensely attractive to individuals and communities interested in controlling national resources, and the structural weakness of the Electoral Commission of Kenya... Politicians ignite mistrust among ethnic groups and encourage violence to reach their goals and maintain or acquire power.

Violent conflict was experienced during the general elections of 8 August 2017. As per the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), there were at least 37 deaths and 126 documented injuries (The Standard Newspaper 2017). Polarized ethnic tensions were prevalent and did lead to violence. Again, the substantial power of the presidency, election malpractices, and ethnicity issues were some of the factors precipitating these conflicts.

However, the abovementioned points must not be an impetus to pamper violence, though these conditions have been incubators for breeding violence. Negative ethnicity continues to be a dark storm to be carefully navigated in Kenya. The country is inhabited by 44 major ethnic groups, which have been socialized to give a sense of identity and support to individuals. On the positive side, tribes are instruments of inculturation where norms and traditions are passed down from one generation to the other. In this sense, tribes are given structures that have to be nurtured within the Kenyan communities. Unfortunately, this identity has been abused to manipulate and mobilize communities to become engaged in violent conflicts. The term *negative ethnicity* is currently being used in the Kenyan parlance denoting the negative manipulation of ethnic identity for personal and

political gains. Warmongers have been promoted. This is the situation in Trans Nzoia County.

Trans Nzoia County is unique because it is among the few counties of Kenya where people from all the 44 ethnic communities have settled, with the dominant micronations being the Bukusu and Nandi. The county is in the western part of Kenya and was part of the former Rift Valley province. As per the Kenyan Government census (2019), the county's population stands at 990,341. It is the breadbasket of Kenya due to its fertile soil and robust agriculture. Despite this, tribalism and violence in this area have led to pain and suffering, including deaths, displacements, and the destruction of property (Waki 2008: 304 - 9). One is forced to ponder on the attainment of positive peace without necessarily deploying violence. The Government of Kenya has been apathetic, and it has lacked the will and desire to promote sustainable peace (Waki 2008: 36). On the other hand, no efforts have been made to promote mediation and reconciliation between the Bukusu and the Nandi in recent years. The researcher specifically chose Trans Nzoia County because he has lived in this region.

Violence cycles in pre-independence Kenya are inclined to have political and tribal undertones. As an example, in the 2007/2008 post-election violence, 105 people were killed and more than 466 were injured in Trans Nzoia County alone (Waki 2008: 22). All the presidents have been tribalists and nepotists in practice, though they have spoken otherwise. Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta openly favored their communities to the detriment of the nation. Their tribes enjoyed a privileged status. Waki (2008) stated:

All of this has led to acquisition of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero-sum game, in which losing is hugely costly and is not accepted. Hence then, there is a tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power.

In August 2017, the security agents of the Kenyan Government used excessive force to suppress protests and riots in opposition zones (Odenyo 2017). People from these tribes were killed and injured, and their properties were destroyed.

The heads of the county governments in Kenya are referred to as *governors*. This is an elective office. The trend seems to be that most governors are members of a dominant tribe or clan in the specific counties. In Trans Nzoia County, the current governor Patrick Khaemba is Bukusu, Jackson Mandago of Uasin Ngishu is Nandi, Wycliff Wangamati of Bungoma is Bukusu, Ndiritu Muriithi of Laikipia is Kikuyu, Lee Kinyanjui of Nakuru is Kikuyu and John Lonyangapuo of West Pokot is Pokot (Kenya County Development News).

The researcher focused in Trans Nzoia County because of the opportunities it afforded in the field of peacebuilding. It has been prone to violent ethnic conflict since the year 1990, and it is the desire of the researcher to break these violent cycles. The county has a sizable population of the Bukusu and Nandi, unlike other counties in the region that are predominantly of one ethnic group. Uasin Ngishu County is primarily inhabited by the Nandi, whereas Bungoma by the Bukusu.

#### **1.4 The Research Problem**

Intertribal cultural violent conflict is prevalent in Kenya. Though once touted as an island of peace in East and Central Africa, interethnic cultural violence and direct violence have been prevalent among most Kenyan communities. This escalates in the election cycles or during times of intense pressures, such as droughts. The Bukusu and Nandi have been living with these tensions for a long time. For example, in the 2007/2008 ethnic violence, 105 people were killed, and thousands were injured and displaced (Waki 2008: 52). Cultural violence, on the other hand, is very pervasive. Though some of these violent conflicts are usually politically instigated, the underlying issues are more concerned with fulfilling basic human needs. Efforts to access resources to meet the essential needs have

encouraged greed and unhealthy competition. The end results have been violence and various forms of injustice (Waki 2008: 36).

Substantial, intentional, and consistent efforts have not been made to promote sustainable interethnic peace in Kenya. This has been observed by the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (Waki 2008: 36). Because of this, persistent intertribal cultural violence and conflicts due to direct violence have been prevalent. Most ethnic communities in Kenya have used their cultural and tribal identities to justify their acts of injustice. This has led to a continuous cycle of violent conflict. The Catholic Church in Kenya wrote:

The main perpetrators of systemic violence have never been prosecuted. Currently Kenya is at a critical juncture. Violence is endemic, out of control, is used routinely to resolve political differences, and threatens the future of the nation. Because of the ethnic nature of the post-election violence, ethnic fears and hatred have been elevated in importance and could turn violent again even more easily than has happened in the past. What is required to address the points discussed above is political will and some basic decisions to change the way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection with other issues related to land, marginalization and inequality, and youth. Kenya needs to decide if it wishes to let violence, corruption and powerless institutions prevail or to introduce fundamental change. Simply put, the individuals and institutions who have benefited in the short term from the chaos and violence need to give up the methods they have used or Kenya could become a failed state.

(CJPC 2013: 22).

## **1.5 Research Aim and Objectives**

The aim of the research was to develop a program to build sustainable peace between the Bukusu and Nandi communities of Trans Nzoia County, Kenya. The specific objectives were:

- To review the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of interethnic violent conflicts in African countries, with reference to Kenya
- To examine interventions that have been used to try to reduce interethnic conflict and assess their effectiveness

- To design and implement a dialogue program aimed at transforming interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi ethnic groups in Trans Nzoia County
- To undertake a preliminary evaluation of the program's outcome

## 1.6 Research Methods

The thesis used qualitative research methodology in the study. Qualitative research emphasizes its own aims, majorly the understanding of phenomena in the social life; its own methods, which majorly is the generating of words, but not overly figures, as its data for proper analysis to be undertaken (Bricki and Green 2007: 2). I had to be keen in verbal and nonverbal communication that included literature, spoken words, facial expressions and other actions to data and analyze data.

The research employed Action research methodology. “Action research is an orientation to knowledge creation that arises in a context of practice and requires researchers to work with practitioners” (Huang 2010: 93). Action and research are combined just as implied in the name. ‘action’: taking action to improve practice, and ‘*research*’: finding things out and coming to new understandings, that is, creating new knowledge. In action research the knowledge is about how and why improvement has happened (McNiff and Whitehead 2011: 8). Action Research joins “action and reflection” besides “theory and practice” in seeking remedies to key challenges affecting communities. It stimulates scholarship through and by actions (Koshy *et al.* 2010: 11). It is practical and participatory in nature. The study did involve active participation of dialogue group member from the Bukusu and Nandi communities. Action research steps include: Exploring of the problem, Designing and implementation of an intervention, and evaluating the outcomes (Kumar 2011: 57). Nelson (2014) suggests that Action Research is cyclical in nature where one starts with Planning, then Acting, Observation and Reflection.

Data collection was part of the exploration process. The researcher investigated on the history and nature of violent ethnic conflict between the Bukusu and Nandi. A detailed literature review on the subject matter was carried out. The history, nature, extent major causes of the conflict in Africa South of Sahara, Kenya and Trans Nzoia were studied. A study of the Thesis theory ‘Conflict Transformation’ and ‘dialogue’ was carried out.



I designed and implemented a dialogue group as part of primary data collection. The study population was Trans Nzoia County. 24 participants as a representative of the Bukusu and Nandi were conscripted to become members of the dialogue group. The 24 were picked through purposive sampling, a non-probability sampling technique used in qualitative research. It is selective and subjective for the researcher objectively identifies people who have relevant information about the research which they will to share (Black 2010: 224). The 24 participants attended eight dialogue sessions in Kitale. Sessions were carried out once monthly. Members talked about their conflicts, they reached out to each other, and possible solutions were explored. The researcher continued with structured and unstructured observation of the targeted group before, during and after the dialogue sessions. Medium term evaluation was carried out. Dialogue group members were invited to take part in two sessions to share on how they implemented the things they said they would do.

I used thematic data analysis to analyze data collected. This is a common method in qualitative research where dominant themes are identified and examined (2016: 11). To ensure reliability and validity I was impartial, was thorough in the data I collected and analysed, and confirmed with group members to ascertain proper interpretation of their contributions. I instructed the research assistant to carefully observe AR participants and also to check whether my findings were correct. Single and uncollaborated analysis is dangerous in any given research (Flick 2014: 142-3).

## **1.7 Dialogue as a tool for Conflict Resolution and Transformation**

Conflict transformation is a more creative and broader way of peacebuilding. It can be done in many approaches, including dialogue. Dialogue was employed in the conflict transformation process between the Bukusu and Nandi. The purpose was to transform the conflict between the two groups. In peacebuilding dialogue is defined as “a spoken or written conversational exchange between two or more people. it can be interpreted as the flow of words or meaning created by more than one-person (Berghof Foundation (ed.) 2012: 29).

Gordon Allport's (1954) Intergroup contact theory posits that contact between outgroups reduces the intolerance between them and also changes attitudes within an ingroup (Tropp and Pettigrew 2006: 766). When people come together to dialogue, there will be potential for change of attitude and less prejudice (Ibid). Contact through dialogue between conflicting groups reduces prejudice while enhancing positive peace.

Scholars have undertaken studies on dialogue in peacebuilding. Norbert Ropers (2004) in his book 'From Resolution to Transformation: The Role of Dialogue Projects'. Johan Galtung (2000) *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend Method)* are notable in the field. In their work they have reviewed how dialogue has successfully been applied to resolve and transform conflicts in different situations and diverse backgrounds. Key scholars posit that proper dialogue incorporate at least four major phases starting with contact, then analyzing issues, followed by explorative problem solving, that lead to joint action (Ropers 2004: 3). The Berghof foundation states:

The essence of a successful dialogue is that it is a face-to-face interaction between members of conflicting parties, in which they respect each other as human beings and are prepared to listen to each other deeply enough to inspire some kind of change of attitudes or learning which can contribute to conflict transformation. In contrast to the term's discussion and debate, which focus primarily on the content of a conversation, the word dialogue places equal emphasis on the relationship between the persons involved.

(Berghof Foundation (ed.).2012: 29).

Dialogue has been used in conflict transformation processes.

## **1.8 Thesis Chapters**

The thesis has five major parts. Part, one deals with the introduction, part two dives into the literature review, part three handles the research methods, part four analyses the results and gives detailed discussions of them, and part five sums provides the conclusion. The parts have been split into the following chapters:

Chapter one: The general introduction of the thesis dealing with the research problem, research motivation, and research aim and objectives.

Chapter two: Addresses interethnic violent conflict in Africa and gives a detailed literature review on the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of interethnic violent conflicts in African countries.

Chapter three: considers interethnic violent conflict in Kenya and its consequence

Chapter four: reviewing the Bukusu and Nandi relationships in Trans Nzoia. It looks at the relationships between these communities during the precolonial, colonial, and independence periods of Kenyan history.

Chapter five: deals with the theory followed in the thesis, namely, conflict transformation, presenting a detailed definition and study of the theory and considering conflict management and conflict resolution.

Chapter six: Is concerned with dialogue and reviews dialogue projects undertaken in various parts of the world, relating this to the situation in Trans Nzoia.

Chapter seven: Focuses on the research methodology. A detailed discussion of action research design and how it works as an approach is presented, and a justification for why it was the best approach for the thesis is given. The methodology justifies why the use of the Dialogue as a tool for CR and CT was befitting for and used in the thesis.

Chapter eight: Deals with the implementation of the dialogue project between the Bukusu and Nandi. The dialogue group discussions transformed the relationship between the two tribes.

Chapter nine: It evaluates the outcome of the intervention employed in the project.

Chapter ten: this chapter gives the summary, reflections, and conclusion of the study undertaken.

## **PART TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **CHAPTER TWO: INTERETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Ethnicity is a group dynamic that has continued to define human beings as inhabitants of the planet Earth. It serves diverse purposes; for example, on school or employment application forms, it helps in providing the demographic statistics that inform inclusiveness. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ethnicity mainly denotes the tribe and culture with which an individual identifies. People of an ethnic group share certain characteristics in common, which include ancestral land and lineage, language, culture, color, body features, and modification. Ashutosh Varshney stated that “ethnicity as a term is used to designate a sense of collective belonging, which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination of these)” (Varshney 2009: 277). These give the people of an ethnic group a sense of uniformity, resemblance, and belonging. Ethnicity binds a group of people. It informs their role and purpose within the tribe and with other ethnicities.

Interethnic conflicts have been witnessed across the African continent. While some of these conflicts have been fueled by socioeconomic and political competition, others have arisen due to deep-rooted ethnicity issues relating to the “divide and rule” policy of colonial administrations (Mamdani 2009). Ethnic interests have led to the conflict between the Nuer and Dinka communities of South Sudan. This has decimated ethnic cohesion and political patriotism (Krause 2019: 487). Another case is that of the Hutu majority perpetrating violence against the designated politically and economically powerful

minority Tutsi in Rwanda (Nikuze 2014: 1090). The monopoly of economic resources and control of political power by one ethnic group to the exclusion of the other could explain the origin of these conflicts (Guariso & Rogall 2017: 7).

Ethnicity has played a large role in the mass exodus of Somalis from their country to Kenya since 1991 (Mkutu 2008). From the 1990s, interethnic-related conflicts took on a regional character, especially in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions (Cukier and Sidel 2006: 39). Interethnic conflicts in East African regions have also been provoked by the predatory exploitation of economic resources by herders and farmers, fanned by the easy accessibility to and acquisition of guns through porous borders (Mohamud and Rutu 2005).

Kenya has had her share of conflicts involving various ethnic groups or clans. The prevailing understanding of interethnic conflicts in Kenya is that these stream from the incompatibility of interest between the conflicting parties inspired by ethno-nationalism (Okoth and Ogot 2000). Ethno-nationalism is a concept that refers to particular communities expressing themselves socioeconomically and politically to the disadvantage of others who compete for similar opportunities (ibid.).

Some of the ethnically motivated conflicts have involved the Sabaot and the Babukusu in Bungoma over land and cattle, occurring more intensely from the 1970s (Kakai 2000). In the Gucha and Migori Districts, interethnic conflicts have involved the Luo and Abagusii. The Mijikenda conflict with noncoastal communities along the coast has led to catastrophic losses of lives and properties just before and during general elections since 1992 (Akiwumi 1999). Devastating interethnic conflicts were witnessed between the Orma and Pokomo in the Tana River Delta (Tana River County) over grazing farms and water between 2012 and 2013 (Mkutu 2008).

Similarly, tragic interethnic conflicts have been erupting between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley over land ownership, with Molo being the epicenter of the clashes (Akiwumi 1999). Over 5,000 people have been killed and approximately 75,000

have been displaced during the clashes (Mkutu 2008). The year 2012 witnessed interethnic clashes among the communities in Samburu County, leading to the death of over 40 people, including police officers sent to quell the violence (???).

Conflicts between pastoralist and agricultural communities continue to exist in Laikipia County (Bond 2014: 121). These conflicts have been directly responsible for increased deaths, the destruction of property, poverty, hunger, starvation, disease, fear, suspicion, mistrust, insecurity, and general hopelessness within the warring communities (Bond 2014: 119). They have been detrimental to public peace, national tranquility, law and order, human rights, and the rule of law, which are pillars of economic and social development.

Ethnicity has been used to discriminate between people/groups when employment and accessing other services are concerned, hence promoting nepotism and tribalism (CJPC 2013: 17). One might assume that people are taking care of one of their own and see no problem in doing so. In this regard, Ross (2001: 163) stated that “Interests and identities are two imperatives that drive ethnic conflict. People are pursuing, or are motivated by, their interests”. This implies that people are taking care of their interests, and they care less that they might be affecting “the other” negatively. The situation involves the survival of the fittest (Darwinian Theory).

## **2.2 The Nature of Interethnic Conflict**

Martin (1982) argued that the phase of colonialism was anchored on economic and political domination in Africa. The colonial administrative policies of the French in Africa were based on assimilation, which was racial in character, since the French and their culture were viewed as better than the Africans and their culture. The system of indirect rule was not better in its categorization of Africans as either collaborators or those who resisted. Neocolonialism adopted the same phase with new political leaders in Africa, advancing the divide-and-rule system and leading to the economic marginalization of some communities.

Harrison contended that corruption by the political elites in managing state affairs and resources had been responsible for interethnic-related conflicts in the East African region (Harrison 2009). Incidents of poor governance and corruption have created untenable political and economic hardships, which has forced communities to fight one another as the feelings of privileged and underprivileged communities have come into existence. Porous borders place pressure on limited socioeconomic resources and increase illegal gun ownership. The prolonged collapse of the East African Community (EAC) between 1977 and 2000 denied the East African people much-needed unity and portrayed the East African political elites as greedy and unfocused. The leadership in East Africa has not enforced firm legislative and judicial regulations on cattle rustlers and bandits from Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda, who frequently commit such crimes in Kenya even after the resumption of the EAC in 2001.

Cultural views on interethnic conflicts tend to accentuate people's perspectives, which are the beliefs on social and political conflicts held by the members of a violence-inflicted society. Village elders recount endearing narratives, which endorse the tradition of fighting villages with enthusiasm. Such conflicts are solved through enhanced group representation and a significant strengthening of the state at all levels of politics. The establishment of regional parties to ameliorate tensions within a particular ethnic group within a framework of a federation and a parliamentary system of governance is a tenable intervention option for interethnic conflicts, as observed by Sheikh (2014). Goodhand (2003) explained interethnic conflicts in terms of motives: rebellions occur when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protests. He argued that the true culprit is economic decline and poverty as well as competition over scarce economic resources (*ibid.*). Poverty, economic inequality, and stagnation, as well as ethnic composition, political decay, and the resource base are necessary ingredients for interethnic conflicts internationally. During interethnic conflicts, the poor and economically marginalized form a pool of recruits for rebel movements. Many current interethnic conflicts originate from and are fought out in regions where the communities have a limited voice and experience persistent poverty (Goodhand 2003: 637).

In the African context, Mamdani (2009) stipulated that plural communities are incompatible because of mistakes made by the state in order to create an environment for economic exploitation. However, the United Nations' (UN) approach to peacekeeping has been adopted by the African Union (AU). Regional organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS), through the latter's military wing of the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), have made tremendous contributions toward conflict interventions in the African continent. These have included strategies to deal with the complexities of globalization in order to manage conflicts.

In their socioeconomic study of interethnic conflicts in Nigeria, Nafziger and Auvinen contended that economic inequality is an important cause of interethnic conflicts. They argued that the concentration of high income for a few increases the perception of relative deprivation held by affected segments of society, thereby increasing the risk of political disintegration. Policies that lead to inequality – for example, land distribution, taxation, and public expenditure – can exacerbate ethnic and regional competition and interethnic conflicts (Nafziger and Auvinen 2002: 156).

Ross (2004) postulated that there is ample evidence of ethnic combatants' extortion of natural resources. However, this does not prove that they are exclusively motivated by greed or that interethnic conflicts are purely governed by greed. Ethnic combatants who are motivated by grievances also need to finance their operations and might do so through extortion. In such situations, the extortion is a consequence rather than a cause of the interethnic conflicts.

In a qualitative study of the interethnic wars that occurred in the 1990s in the gemstone-producing countries of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Ross (2004) found that, in most cases, the trade of stones was causally unrelated to the limitations of conflict and only became salient long after wars had begun. The conflicts helped to make the rebels dependent on gemstone sales for revenue. Two exceptions where rebels may have been motivated by the love of gemstone wealth



involved the countries of Sierra Leone and the DRC. The multinational companies were content with the state of insecurity as they could continue to exploit the country's resources (Brown 2009).

In a sociological approach to interethnic conflicts in Africa, Otite (2001) observed that conflicts occur when the minority, who are in charge of the state and control resource distribution, advance social discrimination based on ethnic parameters. This could be true, but in the case of Rwanda, the conflict involved the majority Hutus against the minority Tutsis who possessed the state privileges. Although the Hutus were farmers and the Tutsis pastoralists, the minority pastoralists were more socio-politically powerful than the majority agriculturalists, leading to the genocide of 1994. Agriculture and food security drastically declined, subjecting the people of Rwanda to humanitarian aid.

Mohamud and Rutu (2005) posited that those conflicts in the East African region, particularly in Kenya and Uganda, revolved around the predatory exploitation of economic resources. Interethnic conflicts abound between herders and farmers. The competition for resources accounts for the largest percentage of conflicts in the East African region and is further fueled by the illegal ownership of guns. This is due to the porous borders within the region. Outcomes such as insecurity, removal from public buildings, and outright violence are the main reasons for the exodus of the Somali nationals to refugee camps in Kenya.

Many ethnic communities have used their culture and tribal identities to justify their acts of prejudice and exclusiveness. This discrimination knows no borders such that ethnic conflict has been experienced in virtually every corner of this world. The assumption is mainly that their tribe and culture are superior to those of others, and it is morally justifiable to oppress and subdue other tribes, even when violence is engaged.

Ethnic conflicts fall under the wider umbrella of identity conflicts. The conflicts are usually due to discordant aspirations. The disagreement may be over basic needs for survival or a clash of ideas, among other factors. Ethnic conflicts in SSA tend to concern access to

resources and basic human needs. These take place within a nation, though there are cases of tribes who cross borders, such as the Pokot and Karamoja of Uganda and Kenya. Ismayilov Gursel (2008: 51) noted that “besides identity conflicts, there are other types of internal conflicts such as ideological conflicts, governance conflicts, racial conflicts, and environmental conflicts”. The focus of the research was ethnicity as an identity conflict, and the researcher explored how this can be reduced.

Ethnic conflict in SSA predated the European colonial period. It is imperative to state that conflict will always exist between communities. The essence here is to focus on violent conflict. In the precolonial periods, African communities often migrated from one region to another in search of water, pastures for their animals, fertile land for agriculture, and security, among other reasons. Sometimes, the movement was compulsorily necessitated through armed invasions. This was the case between, for example, the Luhya, Kalenjins, Maasai, and Luos of Western Kenya. Competition for pastures and cultivation lands consistently forced the subdued tribe to move out of their land (Ogot 1976: 44). These were often carried out through forceful violence.

Most SSA countries have experienced violent ethnic conflicts in the postcolonial period. Countries that have experienced ethnic violence include Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia (Harrison 2009). Varshney commented that ethnic violence is always a collective group phenomenon, which includes “riots, pogroms and civil wars” (Varshney 2009: 279). The violence always pits one ethnic group against the other, with or without the support of the state.

## **2.3 The Extent of Interethnic Conflicts**

There is a general perception that Africa is trapped in a never-ending cycle of ethnic conflict. The Rwandan genocide, Darfur, northern Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and the violent aftermath of the controversial Kenyan elections, among other cases, seemingly substantiate this perception (Aapengnuo 2010: 1).

Almost all SSA countries have been shaken by interethnic violence, especially after attaining sovereignty since the 1950s and 1960s. Countries such as Nigeria, the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan have faced chronic ethnic violence, which has been aimed at exterminating an entire ethnic group (Aapengnuo 2010: 1). This is a worrying trend considering the intentions and magnitude of this violence. As an illustration, in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the aspiration was to wipe out the entire Tutsi race in the country (Zimbardo 2004: 29). This, and many other incidences, reveals a perturbing trend. Table 2.1, based on information from the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom (UK) government entitled “Conflict trends in Africa”, gives a glimpse into some major ethnic conflicts that have ensued in Africa. The figures for the numbers of people killed in these conflicts are the minimums; therefore, the casualties were more than those listed (Marshall 2006: 40).

**Table 2.1:** Major episodes of armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1956–2004

<b>Start date to end date</b>	<b>States</b>	<b>Deaths</b>
1956–1972	Sudan ethnic warfare (Islamic versus African)	500,000
1959–1964	Rwanda PARMEHUTU* overthrowing of Tutsi monarchy; repression of Tutsis	75,000
1965	Burundi ethnic violence (failed coup Hutu/Tutsi)	5,000
1966	Uganda ethnic violence (Buganda)	2,000
1966–1970	Nigeria ethnic warfare (Biafra separatism)	500,000
1971–1978	Uganda ethnic warfare (Idi Amin regime)	250,000
1972	Burundi ethnic violence (Hutu's target Tutsis)	2,000
1972–1979	Zimbabwe ethnic violence (ZANU/ZAPU** versus Whites)	20,000
1974–1991	Ethiopia ethnic warfare (Eritrea, Tigray, and others)	750,000
1976	South Africa ethnic violence	1,000
1977–1979	Ethiopia “Ogden War” ethnic violence (Somalis)	10,000
1980–1985	Nigeria ethnic violence (Islamic groups)	9,000
1981–1987	Zimbabwe ethnic violence (Ndebele versus Shona)	3,000
1983–1996	South Africa ethnic/civil warfare	20,000
1983–2002	Sudan ethnic war (Islamic versus African)	1,000,000
1984	Zaire ethnic/civil warfare	1,000
1986–1993	Nigeria communal violence (Muslim–Christian)	10,000
1986–2004	Uganda ethnic violence (Langi and Acholi); LRA***.	12,000
1988	Burundi ethnic violence (Tutsis against Hutus)	10,000
1990–1994	Rwanda ethnic warfare (Tutsis versus Hutu regime)	15,000
1990–1995	Mali ethnic violence (Tuareg)	1,000
1990–1997	Niger ethnic violence (Azawad and Oubou)	1,000
1991–1993	Kenya ethnic violence (Kalenjin, Maasai, Kikuyu, and Luo)	2,000
1991–2001	Sierra Leone civil/ethnic warfare (RUF****, Mende)	25,000
1992–1996	Zaire ethnic violence	10,000
1993	Congo-Brazzaville ethnic violence	2,000
1993–2004	Burundi ethnic warfare (Tutsis against Hutus)	100,000
1994	Rwanda ethnic violence (Hutu's target Tutsis)	500,000

1994	Ghana ethnic violence	1,000
1994–1995	Rwanda ethnic warfare (Hutus versus Tutsi regime)	15,000
1997–2004	Nigeria communal violence (Delta province; Ijaw, Itsekeri, and others)	1,500
2001–2004	Nigeria ethnic violence (Christian–Muslim; Plateau, Kano regions)	55,000
2003–2004	Sudan communal–separatist violence in Darfur	35,000

Source: Marshall (2006: 41-44)

*Note:* \*PARMEHUTU – Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement; \*\*ZANU/ZAPU – Zimbabwe African National Union/Zimbabwe African People’s Union; \*\*\*LRA – Lord’s Resistance Army; \*\*\*\*RUF – Revolutionary United Front

### 2.3.1 Rwanda

One of the most horrific ethnic conflicts in recent history was the Rwandan genocide. It started in April 1994, ending 3 months later in July. Some people from the Hutu ethnic group, who are the majority comprising 80% of the population of Rwanda, were out on a mission to annihilate the Tutsi group (20% of the population) and their sympathizers. More than 800,000 people were murdered, mostly from the Tutsi community (*The Rwandan Genocide* 2009).

The ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, however tragic they may seem, are notable to analyze because the two ethnic groups have virtually identical cultures, languages, names, religions, and so forth, in addition to having almost the same percentage composition of the two groups in both Rwanda and Burundi, where the Hutus are the majority (84%) and cultivators of land as peasant farmers, while the Tutsis are the minority (14%) and cattle keepers. The Twa form 1% of the population; they are hunter-gatherers and are relatively dormant in the socioeconomic and political arena (U.S.A Department of State 2000).

The reasons why conflicts in Rwanda are more intriguing than other contemporary conflicts on the continent are not only related to the similar ethnic compositions between the two ethnic groups. The current ethnic polarization between the two ethnic groups is historic and habitual. The violence that this polarization engenders has a colonial heritage in addition to recent phenomena perpetuated by vested interests. To cast this conflict in

terms of “tribal warfare” or “ancestral enmities” is to miss its underlying causes. At times, one conflict between the two ethnic groups in one country has often been accompanied by a reaction in the other country. For example, the 1959 Hutu uprising that toppled the Tutsi establishment in Rwanda occurred against the backdrop of “peace and tranquility” in Burundi. Nevertheless, inspired by the events in their northern sisterly neighbor, the unrest in Burundi culminated in the infamous 1972 pogroms against the Hutu majority, in which up to 250,000 of them are believed to have been massacred by their Tutsi overlords.

The seeds of hatred were planted by the colonial Belgians. They created and favored a few Tutsi elements that would help them perpetuate their hegemony. In practice, they had pitted one group against the other, and this division has been very much present to date (Bendix and Stanley 2010: 23). This encouraged the Tutsi superiority that was abhorred by the Hutus.

The agitation for independence in the 1950s led to the emergence of partisan factions along “ethnic” inclinations (Carney 2011). The tensions created from this political rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsi parties led to countrywide violence with casualties among both tribes. A sizeable Tutsi population had to seek refuge outside of Rwanda in countries such as Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the DRC (Chambers 2009).

Historical events of the Rwandan 1994 genocide were mainly propelled by political leaders who incited people to fight against their neighbors (Zimbardo 2004: 28). An aggressor mentioned that “We heard no protests about our murders... The death of our president was the signal for the final chaos. But as with a harvest, the seed was planted before” (Hatzfeld 2005: 56). This set the stage for the genocide that led to the loss of lives.

Marshall (2006) indicated that Rwanda has experienced violence in the years from 1959 to 1964, where at least 75,000 lives were lost; from 1990 to 1994, where 15,000 people were killed; in 1994, where more than 500,000 people were massacred; and from 1994

to 1998, where 15,000 died. During these periods, a total of more than a million people lost their lives because of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic conflicts.

Properties that included homes and businesses were destroyed. This had a large social, psychological, and economic impact. There were displacements of the population that forced Rwandans to become internally displaced persons (IDPs). More had to flee their homes for safety, even moving to other countries, especially Uganda, the DRC, and Tanzania. Some of those who fled returned to their countries, but there are many who are still living in the DRC and Uganda.

### **2.3.2 Nigeria**

Since her independence in 1960, Nigeria has been experiencing one form of violence or another. The pattern and complexity of such violence are indeed worrisome to the extent that it now appears as if the country is teetering on the edge of a precipice (Irene 2014: 14). Nigeria has witnessed a period of unforeseen sociopolitical and economic instability as well as bloodshed. This is partly due to the petty bourgeois origins of Nigerian nationalism and the politicization of ethnicity in the polity. Like the national formations on the Indian subcontinent, the political formation of Nigeria came into being alongside several contextual socioeconomic and political factors: the fear of domination; economic exploitation; and social, and sometimes religious, discrimination (Rahim 2007). These and other factors have not only set the tone for socioeconomic and political underdevelopment but also set the various ethnic groups against each other. Sa'adu (2016) has suggested likely causes of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria as being (i) land and access to arable land, (ii) political influence, (iii) resources and wealth, and (iv) religious factors.

Poverty is the key cause of conflict. Unemployment among the youth and the deterioration of major infrastructure are an indicator of the extent of poverty in the country (Sa'adu 2016). The hardships in the lives of people have given birth to conflicts among people living together, and due to a high level of poverty and unemployment and a lack of infrastructure, people contest for the little available wealth, which is not sufficient.

Land has been a contentious issue in Nigeria and has two dimensions: the indigenous and settler conflicts. An example is an event in the state of Enugu in 1999 and 2000, where most settlers had lost their employment in the state government. The act raised tensions between the settlers and indigenes, which has affected their relationship (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution [IPCR] 2008: 159). The discrimination has pitted those who identify or classify themselves as belonging more and being more entitled to the region against others, due to them having lived there for a longer time compared to recent arrivals.

Another issue has involved pastoralists against farmers. The rearing of cattle is a contentious factor between the Hausa-Fulani (herders) and the Tiv or Tarok (planters) and is often called “herder-farmer clashes”. These activities go beyond being associated with the Hausa-Fulani, Tarok, Igbo, Kataf, Yoruba, and Yugur. The Plateau, Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, and Taraba states are the main conflict zones, specifically because of their locations (Uppsala Conflict Data Program [UCDP] 2012).

Nigeria is prone to religious conflict mainly between the Christians and Muslims. The clashes have consistently been triggered by other factors such as droughts and hardships but have eventually drifted into religious violence. The violence has occurred in various regions and communities, as indicated by Kwaja (2009: 106):

Tiv versus Jukun, Jukun versus Kuteb; Chamba versus Kuteb in Tararba State; Ogoni versus Andon in Rivers State; the Sharia crisis in Kaduna State; the Tiv versus other ethnic groups in Azara of Nasarawa State in 2001; the Hausa/Fulani versus the Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State in 2001; the Tarok versus Hausa/Fulani in Wase Local Government Area in 2004; the Goemai versus the Hausa/Fulani in Shendam Local government Area of Plateau State in 2002; the religious violence of Maidiguri, Borno State in 2005; the Quanvs Pan in Quan’Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State in 2006; the Hausa/Fulani versus the Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State in 2008 and the ‘Boko Haram’ violence that engulfed Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Kano states in July, 2009 respectively.



The violence has involved the Hausa-Fulani (Muslims); the Tarok, Igbo, and Kataf (Christians); the Yoruba (mixed religions); and the Yugur (mixture of Christian and traditional faiths). The Plateau, Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, and Taraba states are the main ethno-religious conflict zones (UCDP 2012). The truth is that most of the ethnic groups in Nigeria (with more than 500 languages) are strongly Christian or Muslim, which can be used to explain the presence of religious clashes in Nigeria, making it easy to label ethnic clashes in Nigeria as being mainly due to religious problems.

Soyemi (2016) wrote that the ethnicity issue in Nigeria is at least one of the reasons that the country has retained and maintained its unusual presidential rotation system. Under the unofficial system, the presidency seat rotates after two tenures between the major political regions – the north, the southeast, and the southwest. It is not coincidental that these three regions coexist with the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria: the Hausa (north), Igbo (southeast), and the Yoruba (southwest). Nigeria, as a nation, has been characterized by ethno-religious clashes. The political system of the nation has been blamed for causing ethno-religious clashes in the country (Nwankwo 2015). This type of governance also plays a part in unifying various ethnic groups.

Figures taken from Table 2.1 show that between 1966 and 1970, during times of the Biafra separatist movement, 500,000 people were killed; between 1980 and 1985, in clashes involving Islamic groups, 9,000 died; between 1986 and 1993, in the communal violence between Muslims and Christians, 10,000 died; between 1997 and 2004, in communal violence in the Delta province among the Ijaw, Itsekeri, and others, 1,500 lost their lives; and between 2001 and 2004, in the Plateau and Kano regions, 55,000 lives were lost. More than a million lives have been lost in Nigeria due to ethnic violent conflicts, putting the above numbers into perspective (Marshall 2006: 41-44).

As mentioned earlier in Section 2.3.1, properties that included homes and businesses were destroyed, and displaced populations were living in camps as IDPs; this had a large social, psychological, and economic impact.

### **2.3.3 Zimbabwe**

Maphosa (2011: 6) stated the following concerning the relations of the two clashing communities of Zimbabwe:

The animosity between the two major ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, the Ndebele, and the Shona, is so real and so strong it can almost choke you to death. Be it at church, at the workplace, in educational institutions, in social and entertainment circles, in the media, in the political arena, in sports and arts, or in the streets, you can feel, touch, and smell it.

The Shona and Ndebele have had times of tensions or relative peace in their interactions as neighboring and coexisting communities. This relationship predates the colonial period starting from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 278). They would collaborate or collide depending on the times while trading in goods and services. They oscillated between living in harmony or violent conflict. They united in the 1960s and 1970s to champion independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 43).

The tribal configuration of Zimbabwe is as follows: a Black African population of 98%, Whites forming 1%, and Mixed and Asian peoples constituting 1%. Of the Black African population, the Shona ethnic group constitutes 82%; the Ndebele, 14%; and others, involving the Tonga, Venda, and Hlengiwe, 2% (Encyclopaedia of Nations 2013). The Shona and the Ndebele are the major ethnic groups, and Shona is the common language of the nation.

Zimbabwe's independence proved to provide short-term tranquility as the young republic faced its first crisis because of the ethnic-motivated civil strife in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. The violence left 20,000 people, mostly of Ndebele origin, dead by 1987 when the two rival nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), signed the Unity Accord (CCJP 1997).

Violence has been rife in Zimbabwe due to ethnicity issues with the fact that the postcolonial government has been hesitant to engage in sustainable cohesion, peacebuilding, and nation building efforts. This has created chaos and been one of the

factors leading to the Gukurahundi violent conflict and massacres (Muchewa 2015: 115). Ethnicity has dictated the country's political affiliation and the sharing of resources. The country has experienced numerous politically motivated violence, which has led to stringent oppressive government policies (Feltoe 2004: 213). The policies have led to politics of violence and intimidations, arrests, and murders of those opposing the ruling regime. The elites of the ruling party, ZANU, have mainly been of Shona origin, whereas the opposition figures have mainly been from the Ndebele group. Therefore, for generations, the Ndebele have perceived that they have been systematically targeted and oppressed by the repressive Shona-dominated government.

Inadequate conflict resolution competencies and unhealed trauma have augmented violence in the country. Suspicion, bigotry, and animosity have been key characteristics of the relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele (Muchewa 2015: 115). In the precolonial period, the communities would attack each other and carry out raids for cattle and animals, with the Ndebele being more vicious (Msindo 2004). This practice was relatively managed during the precolonial period, but the two communities were then oppressed by the colonial powers. The Shona and Ndebele united to fight for independence, and they acted as a team when the country became independent and during the early "honeymoon period" of that time (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 43). In the post-independence period, their differences were revived due to selfish political leadership, nepotism, and corruption (ibid.: 35). Unfortunately, the predicament prevails.

Land and poverty have been contributing factors, especially between the Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwe. Economic inequality and a failing economy due to poor leadership have led to massive poverty. To save face, the government has projected its poor performance onto the Whites, who have owned large farms, and encouraged the poor Blacks to take over the farms and White properties (Stiff 2000). Land and properties have been violently taken from White farmers, with Black farmworkers also being attacked (Reeler 2009). The government has inspired the violent appropriation of White land to placate a restive, frustrated public who have been on the verge of revolt.

Table 2.1 indicates that between 1972 and 1979, Zimbabwe's ethnic violence occurred between ZANU/ZAPU and the White colonialists, where more than 20,000 people were killed. In the 1981 to 1987 Zimbabwe ethnic violence (Ndebele versus Shona), 3,000 were killed (Marshall 2006: 41-44). Properties that included homes and businesses were destroyed, resulting in a large social, psychological, and economic impact. There has been lower agricultural production due to the subdivision of arable land. This has affected food production and has led to occasional shortages in essential food in the country.

#### **2.3.4 Democratic Republic of Congo**

The DRC has experienced many civil wars since its independence in 1960. These wars have shared common features but also differences regarding their causes (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 63).

The DRC is a country endowed with natural resources. Unfortunately, the resources have been a source of conflict rather than wealth and well-being to the majority of its citizens. The country suffers from "the curse of mineral resources" because the desire to loot from the sources has generated negative competition from local, national, and multinational parties. Violence and acts of injustice have been employed to outwit competing cabals.

*The DRC situation is complex compared to other African conflict schemes. Its crisis entangles a complex web of communal, regional, and global players* (Mwangiru 1997). At the core of this are multinational trade and exploitation, regional greed, and interests from neighboring governments, especially those of Uganda and Rwanda; inept and corrupt state leadership; and negative competition and survival tactics between local ethnic communities. Since the post-independence period from 1960, the DRC has experienced one challenge after the other.

The ethnic composition of the DRC is diverse, consisting of approximately 250 tribes with 400 dialects (Heale and Lin 2009: 71). The Bantu people include the Kongo, Mongo, Azande, Luba, and Mangbetu. The Kongo comprise 45% of the population of the DRC (Appiah and Gates 2010). Violent conflict has occurred between communities, and this

has recently escalated with a rise in deaths and rapes in the eastern region of the country. The situation has been intensified with the involvement of Hutu and Tutsi migrants from Rwanda (Stearns and Verweijen 2013: 37-38) who have extensively settled in the region (Stearns and Verweijen 2013: 37-38).

Tribal violence is widespread in the DRC varies in magnitude from one region to another due to the size of the regions and different community interests. This violence includes the conflict in the mining town of Mabanga, involving the Gereges and Hema tribes against other groups living in the region, and the conflict between the Nyakunde and Songololo (Human Rights Watch 2003: 12); the tribal purging of emigrants, especially the Luba in Katanga district (Lemarchand 2001: 22); and the targeted violence toward the Banyarwanda Hutu in the North Kivu district in Masisi because of their nationality (Lemarchand 2001: 27). The violence has encouraged communities to form their own militia who provide protection but who also attack other ethnic groups for plundering purposes. For example, due to the conflict between the Lendu and Hema in the Ituri region, the Hema militia group called the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), led by Lubanga (Human Rights Watch 2012b), has fueled a cycle of conflict between the two communities. The other is the Tutsi militia group named the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), led by Nkunda, which defends Tutsi interests against the MaiMai Yakutumba (Stearns and Verweijen 2013: 32).

Poor governance has led to the DRC not effectively protecting its civilians and promoting civil rights. This has led communities to form vigilante groups to protect themselves against real and perceived enemies. The environment has given birth to insecurity and a corrupt judiciary and government administration (UN 2010). The political class openly undermines or controls the judiciary to safeguard its own interests, hence leading to excessive abuse and an undermined system of civil rights (World Bank 2007: 8). Because of this, corruption and impunity among the ruling elite has spiraled (Davis 2009: 19).

The DRC has fertile soils and minerals, which have attracted greedy, opportunistic global players. Because of this, there has been an unhealthy competition within and outside the

country, which has brought pain rather than gain to the DRC. The control of the DRC's mineral resources is at the center of most of the communal violence, either directly or through proxies (Nest and Grignon and Kisangani 2006: 31).

The Global Peace Index 2021 ranked the DRC as the fifth failed nation out of 177 countries. This implies that the country is among the most economically and politically unstable countries in the world, where most of its citizens do not have access to basic human needs. Though the country is fertile and suitable for agriculture, insecurity has affected production and has led to hunger and malnutrition. In addition, poverty is extensive.

Consequences of tribal violence include the loss of lives, and each period has included casualties: the 1984 Zaire ethnic/civil warfare involved 1,000 deaths, and the 1992 to 1996 Zaire ethnic violence included 10,000 fatalities (Marshall 2006: 41-44):

In eastern Congo, numerous armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, attacked civilians, killing and wounding many. Some of the worst violence took place in Ituri, where ethnic Lendu-led militia have killed hundreds of mostly Hema villagers and forced hundreds of thousands out of their home. The humanitarian situation in the country remained alarming, with 5.5 million people internally displaced. Nearly 930,000 people from Congo were registered as refugees and asylum seekers in at least 20 countries as of November (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Gender-based violence is prevalent, and state actors are often the main perpetrators of sexual violence. There have been reports of the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) FARDC troops committing violence against civilians. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported high numbers of women being sexually assaulted in FARDC camps by the troops themselves (ISS 2016: 7). Many women in the DRC have been subjected to sexual assaults as a result of the conflict. It is estimated that between 1.80 and 1.96 million women have been sexually assaulted (Peterman *et al.* 2011: 3).

There are currently 1.6 million IDPs residing in the DRC, and 90% of them have been displaced as a result of violence and insecurity. North Kivu is the 24th most affected province, hosting 744,000 of the IDPs (United Nations Office for The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] 2015). Zeender and Rothing (2010) have reported that the expulsion of ethnic groups by rebel groups in order to capture land has been dominant in the Kivus.

The exploitation of children has been notably dominant in the DRC. The UN has reported almost 1,000 accounts of child soldier recruits, primarily in the North Kivu province (UN News Centre, 24 October 2013). While many of the children were forced to work for rebel groups, many others believed that joining the groups was a way to ensure their protection and prosperity (Free the Slaves Report 2011: 21). A global report, published by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSCS), stated that an estimated 7,000 child soldiers remained in government forces and armed groups, and even in foreign armed groups. This occurred mainly in the provinces of Equateur, Ituri, Katanga, North and South Kivu, and Maniema in 2008, where these minors were used as combatants, porters, guards, and sexual slaves (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers [CSCS] 2008: 106). The Mai-Mai remains the most notorious recruiters of child soldiers, though other active armed groups, such as the FDLR, also abduct children and use them as soldiers in eastern DRC.

### **2.3.5 South Sudan**

The ethical disparities between the Nuer and Dinka ethnic communities have precipitated conflict in South Sudan, with the main goal being the capture and dominance of state instruments (Gerenge 2015: 87). The deadly conflict that began on 15 December 2013 in the country has killed thousands of people and displaced more than 1,500,000, with significant humanitarian consequences (Gerenge 2015: 86).

A critical analysis of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan reveals that the crisis is similar to the challenges faced by a majority of post-independence states in Africa, challenges characterized by the joining of politicized and militarized identities. For instance, in the

course of the protracted civil war (Anyanya / Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army [SPLM/A] struggles), there have been increased episodes of political alignments and realignments as a result of political interests and actions that have molded interethnic relations (Hutchinson 1996: 9). Subsequently, this has impacted negatively on the traditional animosities between the Dinka, Murle, and Nuer communities, as observed by Rands and Le Rich (2012: 9).

Mamdani (2009) has traced the origins of ethnic conflicts in Africa to the slave trade, colonialism, and Cold War politics. Indirect rule has greatly inhibited free interactions between various ethnic groups. The policy has had a significant bearing on the currently volatile interethnic relations among the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle in Jonglei State because it has only helped in engendering ethnicity as the basis of administration. The practice has been adopted by various administrations that have ruled Sudan; even the autonomous government of Southern Sudan replicated it as the basic principle for establishing counties. Furthermore, the colonial administration in the South created hereditary traditional authorities among the cephalous (stateless) society of the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle in Jonglei State. The appointments of chiefs were based on loyalty to the administration. Those chiefs who collaborated with the colonial administration received an elevated status. This has had significant effects in the current interethnic and intra-ethnic relations among the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle (Hoehne 2008: 15).

In precolonial Southern Sudan, the genesis of ethnic conflicts can be traced back to the rise of the powerful Islamic Kingdom in Central Sudan (the Kingdom of Sennar), which displaced most of the Nilotic communities (particularly the Anyuak, Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk) from Central Sudan southward. As these communities moved southward, they entered into conflicts with the inhabitants of the lands (Beswick 2004: 16-18). Beswick further argued that these conflicts were often as a result of contests over scarce resources, such as grazing lands, water, and areas for settlement, since the Nilotic communities were displaced from their ancient lands in Central Sudan. However, contests for these resources by communities remain unabated due to the absence of a strong authority to distribute and regulate the consumption of these resources. Another landmark



event mentioned by Beswick was the slave raids organized by the Baggara Arab tribe (who crossed over into the Sudan from Chad, West Africa) against the Western Nuer (present-day Unity State), which forced them to cross over to the east of the Nile River (present-day Jonglei and Upper Nile States). As a result, they entered into conflicts with the Anyuak, Dinka, Murle, and the Shilluk in their search for areas of settlement. These processes of settlement led to the assimilation and displacement of the Dinka and Anyuak (Beswick 2004: 169).

The post-independence governments of the Sudan adopted the divide-and-rule policy from the colonial government and used it as the basis for the organization of the modern Sudanese state. The result was skewed patterns of socioeconomic and political development that were characterized by exclusion, marginalization, and violent conflicts (Hutchinson 1996: 3-4). The post-independence government of the Sudan adopted Islam and Arabism as the ideological basis for building the Sudanese state. The Islamization and Arabization of the Sudan were largely opposed in the South because the two policies were alien to the Southern Sudanese (Hutchinson 1996: 5).

The continued use of these divisive policies as the basis for organizing the Sudanese state have constituted the fundamental cause of the protracted Sudanese civil wars. Despite separately administering the South and the North, the two regions were later haphazardly merged into one country, the republic of the Sudan, in 1956. This was largely carried out against the will of the people of Southern Sudan who wanted a federation. This led to the Torit Mutiny in 1955 and the subsequent outbreak of full-scale war against the government by the Anya Nya in 1963 (Battahani 2006: 3), which culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Its later abrogation and the continuous neglect of the South by the regime of Jaffar Nimeiri led to the second civil war (1983–2005) between the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A under John Garang.

After the independence of South Sudan, there have been attempts to restructure traditional systems of governance. As enshrined in the constitution, the chiefs and the paramount chiefs are to be elected. This has challenged the hereditary systems instituted

by the colonial administration in the South and Jonglei State, in particular, because the heirs of the former colonial chiefs have resisted the restructuring of the traditional system of governance. In addition,, after independence, the SPLM-led government perpetuated the old practice by marginalizing the chiefs who had collaborated with Khartoum and favored the ones who had been loyal to it during the liberation struggles (De Waal 2014: 13). This patronage system of rewarding loyalists has greatly fueled intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts at the local levels and has notably prompted the chiefs who had been loyal to Khartoum at that time to maintain their allegiances to Khartoum. They continue to receive material support in terms of finances and arms from Khartoum to assert their authority and continue to destabilize the new nation in the interests of Khartoum.

This policy erected native institutions that were essentially meant to extract tributes from the societies at the expense of promoting unity between the two ethnic groups. Indirect rule notably did make existing divisions less flexible since people were confined to their localities as tribesmen and not as natives because customary laws were defined as rules of the tribes and not as that of the natives (Richens 2000: 5-7). After independence, South Sudan inherited these predatory institutions that continue to hinder national unity.

Violent conflict in South Sudan has led to the loss of lives in various periods: in the 1956 to 1972 Sudan ethnic warfare (Islamic versus African groups), 500,000 were killed; between 1983 and 2002, the Sudan ethnic war (Islamic versus African groups) resulted in 1,000,000 deaths; and during the 2003 to 2004 Sudan communal–separatist violence in Darfur, 35,000 lives were lost (Marshall 2006: 41-44). As such, individuals and families have suffered extreme pain, and the number of widows and orphans has been on the rise. The displacement of the people within and outside the country has been extensive, as indicated in Table 2.2.

**Table 2.2:** South Sudan refugee Population in neighboring African countries as of end of 2021

Country	Refugees
Uganda	948,695

Sudan	803,634
Ethiopia	400,000
Kenya	130,045
DRC	56,341
Total	2,338,715

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2021: 10)

There are many IDPs within the country as well as many Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries being hosted in refugee camps, an example being the Kakuma in Kenya. Others have migrated as far as the United States of America (USA). Table 2.2 indicates that there were 2,338,715 refugees in Sudan (UNHCR 2021).

### 2.3.6 Tanzania

Tanzania has been an island of peace compared to her neighbors who have experienced violent conflict one after another. The country has hosted refugees from neighboring countries, some have lived in the country for generations.

Tanzania was colonized first by Germany, then Britain afterwards. The British extremely employed the tactic of divide and rule in Kenya and Uganda, the same was not applied in Tanzania (Barkan 1994: 12). Besides, their focus and great investments were in Kenya and Uganda, therefore they concentrated in these countries compared to Tanzania (ibid). The colonizers did not create purposeful ethnic divisions to divide the people and encourage animosity. Regional rather than ethnic boundaries were put in place in Tanzania (Jerman 1997: 227).

Tanzania's founding president Julius Nyerere worked towards uniting and strengthening all ethnic groups without favoring one or several groups against others (Nyerere, 1966: 39). The use of Kiswahili as a uniting national language was promoted, against the promotion of ethnic languages with the aim of perpetuating divisions (Barkan 1994: 10). High school students and government employees have been encouraged to study and work in any part of the country but not necessarily in their own ethnic people or region

(Tripp 1999: 45). This has encouraged interethnic interactions as it exposed most people to other communities in the country.

A greater attempt was put to discourage the unequal distribution of resources through Tanzania's socialism, Ujamaa (Barkan 1994: 20). Though Ujamaa impeded economic growth of the country and was later done away with, it helped to unite the country through providing equal opportunities to all ethnic communities (Weber 2009: 15). As such, no ethnic group feel victimized and intentionally marginalized by the government. This therefore has not created a desire to hate.

With the above review, neighboring countries can borrow a leaf from Tanzania. They must invest in promoting unity, equitable distribution of resources, and sense of nationalism rather than ethnicity,

## **2.4 Causes of Interethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa**

There have always been multiple interwoven causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa. The causes have mainly been due to competition for power and resources. Relevant powers and entities have wanted to be in control in the division and distribution of the resources (Sommers 2002). The causes have been the result of several entwined dynamics, such as political, cultural, and tribal settings. They have emerged from individuals' behavior, security apparatus, and governance structures (Hove and Harris 2019: 19).

As mentioned earlier, Mamdani traced the origins of ethnic conflicts in Africa to the slave trade, colonialism, and Cold War politics. He linked the current ethnic conflicts in Africa to the emergence of lucrative slave trading that pitted kingdoms, tribes, and cultures against each other for slave raids and the legacies of the colonial regimes, which erected predatory institutions that continue to subjugate the common man (Mamdani 1996: 190). Indirect rule, with its basic principle, dictated that the local administration of colonial people should be conducted through indigenous structures of authority, employing indigenous laws or customs, insofar as this was consistent with the British idea of good governance and justice (Hoehne 2008: 14-15). Customary laws were evidently different at the local level. In addition, uniformity regarding local laws could not be achieved.

On the individual level, the causes include masculinity, elite competition, incompetent leadership, unemployment, and the lack of education.

#### **2.4.1 Masculinity**

Africa is still a very patriarchal society. Machismo is widely encouraged, and, in the worst-case scenario, it has led to men wanting to prove that they are tough fighters. Elements of these socially constructed behaviors are harmful to the society, to women and men alike. These behaviors that are associated with maleness are referred to as 'toxic masculinity'. The phrase 'toxic masculinity' was coined by mythopoetic men's movement in the 1990s (Hayder 2016: 557). Sociologists use the term toxic masculinity to research on sexism and cultural violence (Jenney and Exner-Cortens 2018). It creates hierarchy and boundaries that promote the interests of toxic men in relation to women and other groups that are deemed to be as outsiders. Ritchie writes that toxic masculinity seeks to justify and sustain "privilege, power, subordination, and oppression" (Ritchie 2019) between socially constructed groups along gender and race line.

Males in SAA, especially at the stage when they have been initiated, marking the transition from childhood to manhood, are motivated to be dominating and even violent toward others (Hore and Harris 2019: 19). This inculcates a culture of violence. In some communities, the young male is required to raid and steal animals from neighboring tribes to prove themselves. They are celebrated when they return the loot to their community. With such customs, these men readily engage in violence.

Most African countries have a large number of small arms in circulation. These weapons have somehow emboldened the would-be fighters who are either the instigators of violence or those taking up arms for community defense and protection. The circulation of these arms has continued to encourage the continuous cycle of violence in countries such as Somalia, the DRC, and Angola (DFID 2001: 13).

#### **2.4.2 Ethnically Grounded Economic Disparity**

The economic inequality between different African ethnic groups has been a major cause of conflicts between communities. The people in government and power tend to be more

economically advantaged. The allocation of state resources, employment opportunities, and government tenders are carried out through nepotism, hence benefiting a specific community (Sigmann 2019: 72). This leads to resentment from others who are the losing parties in such arrangements.

Two factors are relevant here. Firstly, according to an old adage, an idle mind is the devil's workshop. Poverty and unemployment, especially among young people, is a key factor, as in the case in Nigeria (Sa'adu 2016). Idle youths are easily incited to engage in violence because they have nothing else to do. In addition, they need very little incentive to engage in violence (Njogu 2009: 1). Secondly, because of unemployment, which contributes to poverty, young people tend to feel that they have little to lose or that they have nothing worthy to look forward to that would discourage them from engaging in violence.

Corrupt systems and leadership have been a hindrance to peace in Africa. Often, the leadership favors one community over the others in the allocation and distribution of services and resources, and the favored tribe is usually that of people in leadership (Sigmann 2019: 72). The actions of the leadership are dubious, meaning that people are always employed in a manner to ensure that preferential service has been offered to the privileged tribes or individuals. Funds and other resources are misappropriated to favor a specific tribe over other communities, who ultimately become the losers in these circumstances (Mngomezulu 2004: 15).

One of the negative functions of religion has involved the violent conflicts between adherents of different religions or denominations. In Africa, the cases have mainly been between Christians and Muslims. The Boko Haram in Nigeria is a classic example where Muslims persecute Christians under the guise of a holy war. Muslims in African countries such as Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya have waged religious conflicts against non-Muslim communities and individuals (Mngomezulu 2004: 14).

### **2.4.3 Elite Competition**

Societal elites sometimes provoke their people to fight proxy wars on their behalf. They do this to retain or attain power and other privileges. Ethnic conflict is fostered by the elites to win support. It becomes a social construct that aids them to manipulate their community for political support (Horowitz 1998: 9). Political leaders incite communities to fight against each other, as has been the case in Rwanda and Burundi (Zimbardo 2004: 28); the leaders use methods by hook or by crook to stay in power.

Changing political dynamics and alignments dictate relationships between communities. Political powers are transferred from one individual to another through various means that include inheritance, democratic or manipulated elections, and forceful takeovers of the regime. These changes result in smooth transitions or lead to crises. Changes in political power are brought about through elections, the death of an autocrat, coups, and protests (Tomchak 2017: 25-32). Coups have been carried out in countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, Uganda, and the DRC. Most of these coups have led to civil and communal violence.

### **2.4.4 Incompetent Leadership**

Some leaders lack leadership ability and fail in their administration, leading to conflict (Mngomezulu 2004: 15). Not all persons in leadership positions properly execute their mandate. This has been the case not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world. The failure of security apparatus due to incompetent leadership has led to many violent conflicts in Africa.

The failure of state institutions include the collapse of the state and departments that specifically focus on national security. The collapse is usually preceded by the slow degeneration of institutions and infrastructure (DFID 2001: 13). When people feel insecure, they might be tempted to protect themselves by acquiring weaponry in the defense of their community (Horowitz 1998: 10). This would most likely involve the oppressed or the minority ethnic group in each region. Nepotism has been widespread

and continues to be employed by most leaders in rewarding their communities while punishing others (Feltoe 2004: 213).

Unhealed trauma and inadequate conflict resolution abilities also contribute to a violent conflict cycle (Hore and Harris 2019: 21). Poor conflict transformation skills by a government and its agents continue to affect African nations. Some countries have deliberately undermined sustainable cohesion, development, and peacebuilding efforts to perpetuate disharmony. Unhealed trauma and suppressed anger have led to perpetual violence in many countries and communities. This is the case between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, the Nuer and Dinka in South Sudan, and the Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe (Muchewa 2015: 115). Unresolved conflict left unaddressed becomes a trigger for another conflict. The underlying causes of conflicts, when not appropriately handled, potentially erupt into violence after some time (DFID 2001: 14). Longstanding hatred between communities will likely erupt into violent conflict from the slightest trigger (Horowitz 1998: 5). Adequate skills to transform these conflicts are, therefore, necessary for peacebuilding.

#### **2.4.5 Land Productivity**

Access to and the ownership of land form the core of many communal conflicts not only in Africa but also around the world. The control and management of fertile and productive land for sustenance and trade is a “do-or-die” matter in most African agrarian communities. According to Gore (1994), forms of ethnic inequalities arising from exclusions from access to land, production factors (labor and inputs), formal and informal employment, and organizations and representations constitute the root causes of conflict. Numerous examples of ethnic tensions and violence in the African countryside are rooted in severe conflicts over access to scarce resources, including the conflicts between the local Nuni and Mossi immigrants in western Burkina Faso, farmers and Masai herders in Kenya and Tanzania, and local fishermen from Kayar and migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis in Senegal (Plateau 2000); and tensions between the indigenous communities and migrant groups in Nigeria (IPCR 2008: 159).



Population growth and the search for greener pastures have intensified competition. This was captured in Malthus work by the title "An Essay on the Principle of Population" (Malthus 1798). Malthus posited that whereas population grows at a faster rate, land and its produce is not commensurate to this growth, but rather it is lower. Writing from the then experience of 18<sup>th</sup> century England which had experienced high population growth, Malthus came to the conclusion that there was an impending calamity of the land not being able to produce enough to meet the food needs of all the people, and as a consequence, a sizable population would eventually be exterminated by nature. This came to be referred to as the 'Malthian theory'. Later proponents of this theory, the Neo-Malthusians have added to the same. They contend that the increase in population, depletion of environmental resources, unequal distribution of resources, and the resultant pressures will lead to the natural resources not sustaining the demands of the people (Rahman 2018: 19).

Ownership patterns of land have been changing from communal to individual tenure. The migration of people has forced persons and some ethnic communities to move from their ancestral homes to neighboring regions or even other countries, as in the case of the DRC where people from countries such as Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda have inhabited part of the country (Autwserre 2008). Shrinking natural resources, such as water and pastures that come from the land, have triggered environmental degradation and erratic precipitation patterns in the pastoral areas of Kenya over the past few decades and have led to competition over these resources, causing violent ethnic conflicts (Sommers 2002).

Critics of the Neo-Malthunian theory, the Cornucopian school, argue that is not true that land and limited supply of natural resources leads to scarcity of food and basic needs, rather, for them, people become creative and produce even more because of the need they have (Urdal 2008: 590). They hold that an increase in population implies an increase in labor and innovation. They hold that the world has enough natural resources to sustain its population. They posit that technology increases much faster compared to the population hence there will always be an increased production of food and other resources to meet the needs of all the people in the world (Cooper and Block 2019: 36).

Matthew (2002) argues that it is not population growth or lack of it that is the main driver for violent conflicts. he says it is the structural violence and a history of bad political history that is the impetus for violence. Alao (2007) observes that it is not the lack of, neither the abundance of natural resources that is the cause of violent conflict, rather is the lack of proper structures and political goodwill (Alao 2007: 277–84). The Malthian theory and the cornucopian school overlook the role of governance and proper political structures in their position. Land as such is not the cause of conflict by itself. But with unjust social and political structures, people fight over this natural resources.

#### **2.4.6 Colonial Heritage and Past Conflict**

Subnations close to the colonial capital, offices, business hubs, port and rail lines, or ports were advantaged due to the proximity of these services. They accessed services such as education, employment, health, and business (Horowitz 1998) and were better positioned to run the affairs of the postcolonial government since they had some essentials that propelled them to access resources and strategic positions. In some regions, the colonialists had privileged some communities compared to others. Mamdani (2009) observed that this was the case for the Baganda in Uganda, the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi (Bendix and Stanley 2010: 23), and the Lulua in Congo (Mamdani 2009). These tribes had more resources and were fairly educated compared to other groups. The colonial heritage continues to impact the upward social and economic mobilities of some of these communities, and this has angered others who feel disadvantaged by historical events. The anger, when not appropriately handled, explodes into violence, as has been the case in Rwanda, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.

## **2.5 Consequences of Interethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Where violence reigns, peace takes leave. Violence has led to the absence of peace in many African countries. This has led the countries to become vulnerable to all types of ills that include a cycle of violence and diseases.

### **2.5.1 Physical Effects**

The physical effects of violence include high mortality rates, disability, injuries, and trauma. Violence kills people directly and immediately and also destroys properties, disrupts economic activities, and diverts resources from health care. Significant refugee flows place people into crowded conditions without access to clean water and food; refugees become trans-border vectors of infection. Crime and homicide rates rise in wars and may remain high afterward in a culture accustomed to violence. Many of these effects last for years after the fighting has ended. The African Bank stated that:

Violent conflict kills people in different ways—although it is often difficult to estimate how many. Civilians and soldiers are killed in combat; people die because of a higher prevalence of diseases; and people are killed because of an increase in violent crime (African Bank 2009: 11).

Overall, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 269,000 people died and years of healthy life were lost to death and disabilities in 1999 as the direct and immediate effects of all wars – civil and international (WHO 2000). In cases of peace, a larger pool of available financial resources enables greater investments in developing human resources for medical care by training more doctors and health care specialists. However, political unrest and irregular transfers of power reduce growth rates and, hence, the pool of financial resources for health services. It is evident that political leaders wish to retain power, and to achieve this, they must form a winning coalition among those who are politically active. To do so, they distribute private goods to their supporters and provide collective goods widely for the population. All leaders provide both private and collective goods to some degree. By doing this, conflicts erupt, which lead to significantly lower levels of growth than other areas in conflict-affected countries. This inequality can

exacerbate existing tensions between different societal groups (De Vries and Specker 2009).

There has been a massive loss of lives because of these conflicts. From 1960 to January 2018, at least five million were killed because of direct ethnic violence. In 1994, more than one million people died in Rwanda – this was referred to as the “Rwandan massacre because of the intensive deaths” – and in Ghana, one thousand people were killed in the same year (Conflict Trends in Africa 2002: 41-44). The number of people per country and conflict might vary, but people’s lives are lost in these conflicts. These are conservative figures of victims, as inferred from the direct consequences. However, further people die from other connected, but indirect, aftermaths of this violence.

More lives are usually lost through structural and cultural violence as compared to those due to direct violence (Galtung 1969: 173). This means that including the people killed due to ethnic violence would double the figures given above. Further lives are also lost due to hunger and diseases brought about by the effects of violence.

There are increased mortality and disability rates after conflicts, which results in a diminished labor stock (Blattman and Miguel 2010) while also depressing the rate of human capital formation.

### **2.5.2 Economic Effects**

Economic effects include poverty, economic decline, and obstructed development. There are several economic and financial repercussions incurred in a violent conflict. They lead to economic decline and obstructed development due to unemployment, the divergence of resources to military spending, and capital flight. Much energy, time, and resources that would otherwise be directed toward development are redirected to initiate and sustain violence.

Collier and Duponchel (2010) argued that violence impacts firms and employment such that there is a disruption in production because of the flight of employees; the unreliability

of transport; and the fear of looting. Other challenges for business start-ups and survival include infrastructural damage (Collier and Duponchel 2010), market contraction, a lack of formal state protection, extortion, illicit taxation, and theft (Mallett and Slater 2012). For example, in Nigeria, the oil sector accounts for approximately 95% of export earnings and over 80% of federal government revenue, but for nearly two decades, the Niger Delta oil fields have faced insurgency and conflict with unemployment and underemployment rates higher than in any other part of Nigeria. Mallett and Slater (2012) provided a detailed summary of the literature surrounding the processes through which conflict affects the economic lives of individuals – among them are the harmful depletion of physical capital, through infrastructural depletion and asset loss, and human capital.

Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2001) found that civil war can have a profound negative influence on the economic fortunes of a country or its neighbors, owing to a loss of human capital; a destruction of infrastructure; and reductions in investment, trade, and daily market activities. Ethnic polarization has a large and negative effect on economic development because it leads to a reduction of investment and an increase in government consumption and the probability of a civil conflict. In many situations, ethnic polarization generates conflicts that could eventually lead to political instability and civil wars with long-lasting economic effects. In other cases, the potential conflict represented by an ethnically polarized society can negatively affect the rate of investment and induce rent-seeking behavior that increases public consumption.

Ethnic violence has a direct bearing on the economy of the community. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), in its Global Peace Index (GPI) 2017 report, indicated that following regarding the economic decline:

The cumulative GDP [gross domestic product] losses from the two Liberian civil wars amounted to \$39 billion PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), equivalent to ten times the Liberian GDP in 2014. For Sierra Leone, the total losses of forgone GDP over the two decades amounted to \$113 billion PPP, which is equivalent to over seven times its GDP in 2014. Between 1989 and 1994, in the lead up to the genocide, the Rwandan economy contracted 57 percent, fueled in large part by the collapse of the coffee market in 1989. The economic

cost of the Rwandan genocide in terms of GDP losses reached \$120 billion PPP or six times the country's 2014 GDP (Global Peace Index 2017: 67-69).

This obstructs development in these regions. Consequently, poverty increases and increasingly more people cannot afford basic human needs (Mueller and Techasunthornwat 2020: 1). Infrastructure, such as bridges and buildings, are usually destroyed. This hampers the country's developments instead of promoting positive progress.

The rate of unemployment also rises. More young people do not become gainfully employed due to a depressed economy (Njogu 2009: 1). Security is a determinant for investment. Most investors will want to invest where there is proper security that will guarantee their returns (Mueller and Techasunthornwat 2020: 7). Moreover, violence hinders movement and communication. This makes it difficult for goods and services to be transported from one location to another. Small-scale farmers then experience much difficulty in taking their produce to market.

The desire for peace and prosperity usually stimulates people to relocate to places where they will feel secure (Nyukuri 1997: 20). This might be for a brief or prolonged period. Violence pushes the educated, especially professionals and the skilled in diverse fields, to seek greener pastures elsewhere (Chavulimu and Mathews 2021: 47). Their knowledge is then invested in the region to which they move, causing a brain drain.

### **2.5.3 Psychosocial**

Psychologically, the affected experience lower levels of happiness, trauma, and depression. The consequences of war, which include deaths, injuries, the destruction of property, and relocations, greatly affect the psychological well-being of individuals. People affected by violence will be traumatized. Unless they receive help and treatment, the trauma stays with them for a long time. Others will suffer from depression.

A study carried out in northern Uganda suggested that conflict directly caused losses of cattle, homes, and assets and indirectly led to reductions in per capita expenditure due to increased perceptions of risk (Rockmore 2011). Research from the DRC also found a reduction in household asset ownership and worsening living conditions for conflict-affected households (Pellillo 2012). As violence adversely impacts the types of assets on which a household can draw (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006), it also affects the types of strategies that they can employ to manage risk.

The worst effects include those regarding child health outcomes, such as the height-for-age indicator, which are correlated with productivity, wages, and long-run growth (DeLoach and Lamanna 2011) and have a strong negative association with educational outcomes (Justino 2011). There is evidence of even minor shocks to educational access, leading to long-lasting detrimental effects on human capital formation, with girls and secondary education being affected disproportionately (Justino 2011).

#### **2.5.4 Sociopolitical**

People are usually displaced by this type of violence, forcing them to become refugees in other countries or IDPs within their own countries. The African Development Bank indicated that, in 2006, there were 13 million IDPs and 10 million refugees, people seeking asylum, and people planning to return to their countries (African Bank 2008: 15). This figure involves persons displaced due to various types of conflict inclusive of ethnic violence. This population is more vulnerable to hazardous conditions of undernourishment, infections, and violence (African Bank 2008: 16). The same might overflow to the hosting community or country. Table 2.3 is an extension of Table 2.2 showing the displacement of people within and outside African countries.

**Table 2.3:** African refugees by origin, 2006

<b>Country</b>	<b>Refugees</b>
South Sudan	2,189,000
Somalia	815,000
DRC	840,000

Central Africa Republic	642,000
Sudan	788,000
Eritrea	522,000

Source: UNHCR 2020: 18

The negative impacts of conflicts are thought to adversely affect women more (Human Security Centre 2005). They are affected directly, with fatalities and casualties, and indirectly, through the breakdown of family and community structures – one case involves men rejecting their wives if they have been raped; the women may also be cast out of communities and sometimes even be killed to restore honor (Byrne 1996). In particular, women and girls are much more vulnerable to sexual assault and predation than men (HSR 2005). Beyond the immediate effects of sexual violence, armed conflict can also have more indirect and long-term consequences, which persist once the conflict has ended. The prolonged existence of sexual abuse against women and girls is potentially followed by unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion as well as child witnesses to violence becoming more susceptible to the use of violence in their own relationships as adults (Abrahams and Jewkes 2005). There has also been evidence of increased female-headed households in post-war settings, which have been found to comprise 30% or more of all households. Research by the UN has confirmed these findings, providing evidence that the percentage of female-headed households often increases during conflict (UN Women 2012).



## **2.6 Cultural Traditions of Conflict Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa**

African philosophy of Ubuntu 'I am because we are' is the reference point to African cultural peacebuilding processes. Ubuntu emphasized community, socialization, consensus, and valued the part as being a whole in indigenous African communities (Margaret 2014). The pillar of Ubuntu is community. This is in conflict with the western culture that aligned on individualism. Ubuntu nurtures dignity, calls for cooperation, encourages negotiation, understanding, and the need to honor the other (Mangaliso 2001: 32). Conscious awareness of the Ubuntu pillar can be used to enhance conflict transformation as has been promoted by eminent African such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu in South Africa (Tutu 1999). Bangidza posits that Afrocentric theories that are Ubuntu based must be employed to promote positive peace in African countries (Bangidza 2019: 48).

Before the arrival of European explorers in Sub-Sahara Africa, Africans had devised ways to resolve conflict without violence through truces, inter-ethnic marriages, negotiation, withdrawal or migration. Most conflicts between tribes involved land disputes and cattle raiding (Salih and Markakis 1998: 87). This was the case in what is now Western Kenya. The Bukusu, who had come into this area, were frequently attacked by their neighbors the Teso, who forced them to move eastward where it was relatively safe (Osogo 1966: 80 - 83). While moving, the Bukusu attacked other tribes who occupied the region into which they were migrating. One of these tribes was the Nandi. The Bukusu raided the Nandi's cattle, killed their young men and forcing them off of their land (Ibid). Similar situations occurred with other tribes such as the Kikuyu and the Maasai in Central Kenya (Maathai 2006: 7). These activities were circular and mostly continuous. Tribes must have assumed that the more they could conquer militarily through violence, the more they would be feared. Violence must have seemed heroic, especially when inflicted on another tribe.

However, African communities also seemed to have developed nonviolent means of addressing some of these conflicts. Kenyan African tribes needed each other for survival. This promoted inter-ethnic links that helped to promote peace. At times, neighboring tribes carried out barter trade by exchanging food, livestock and land. To

facilitate this, truces were reached that guaranteed the peace and safety of the trading tribes (Salih and Markakis 1998: 87). Ocholla-Ayayo has observed that the higher the economic dependency between tribes, the lower the inter-ethnic conflict (Osogo1966: 83). This seemed to be true with most of the tribes, for each time they realized that they needed to trade and supplement one another, they negotiated for peace and safety.

Inter-ethnic marriages also were used to promote peace and harmony. Wangari Maathai writes that “interethnic links helped cement ties between communities and foster peace (Maathai 2006: 7). Inter-ethnic marriage promoted peace in two ways: first the tribes were connected through blood, hence becoming relatives, and, second, skills and ideas were exchanged between tribes. The payment of bride-price to formalize marriage has been and still is practiced by most Kenyan tribes. Ochola-Ayayo writes that this “woman for cattle” exchange between the Bukusu and the Nandi, or Kikuyu and the Maasai, made it easier for a Bukusu or Maasai to have more wives and children therefore raising his social status within his own tribe. On the other hand, a Maasai could marry a Kikuyu who had agricultural skills, and the Kikuyu would benefit by accessing and cultivating Maasai land. Because of such mutual benefits, inter-marriage helped to resolve conflicts (Osogo1966: 83).

## **2.7 Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa**

There have been efforts to manage and resolve ethnic conflict and violence in Africa. The efforts have been local, regional, and international and have also been widely varied in terms of magnitude and approach. Some have been government-driven, while others have involved nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that include civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and various other religious organizations in addition to FBOs.

According to critical scholars, numerous resolutions or management strategies have been attempted, but none seem sustainable in creating an atmosphere for peace, security, and interethnic as well as intra-ethnic co-existence in Africa. Programs promoting economic recovery and growth should be implemented in countries still experiencing violence

(Hoeffler *et al.* 2010). Both short- and long-term strategies for economic recovery and growth can have stabilizing effects (de Vries and Specker 2009).

### **2.7.1 Government-Led Initiatives**

A large majority of governments/leadership structures have driven SSA countries to ethnic conflict due to corruption, elite competition, and unjust systems (Hove and Harris 2019: 19). Leaders of African countries have responded to conflict mostly by being reactive to ongoing situations of turmoil (Mngomezulu 2004: 15). It is as though they would ask the question, how are we to remain relevant and sustain our dominance in the prevailing situations? Most of their conflict has been a result of their poor leadership, oppression, and corruption (Hove and Harris 2019: 19). They have been selfish and served their own interests. The marginalized communities have attempted to raise their voice through a diverse medium, which has brought some conflict (Tomchak 2017: 35). The existing powers have responded to this by attempting to create inclusive leadership to ameliorate the situation and restore the acceptability of the government.

Measures have been put in place though to ameliorate the situation through conflict management and military intervention. Constitutional amendments that promote integration and cohesion have been made. Power-sharing conflict management requires an effort by the state to build representative ruling coalitions. In conceding to ethnic minority leaders and activists, a proportionate share of the cabinet, civil service, military, and high-party positions, the state voluntarily reaches out to include minority representatives in public affairs, thereby offering the group, as a whole, an important incentive for cooperation. In South Africa, for example, President Nelson Mandela agreed to include power-sharing provisions in the interim constitution in an effort to reconcile the economically dominant local White community as well as to build confidence among mostly White investors abroad. Significantly, this concession was withdrawn in 1996 with the enactment of a new majority-rule constitution. The National Party leader, F. W. de Klerk, was quick to describe the ending of multiparty participation in the cabinet's decision-making as a mistake that would lead to a loss of confidence in the country (SA Will Pay Price for New Constitution, 9 May 1996). Power-sharing can be informal (e.g.,

Kenya, 1960s) or formal (e.g., Nigeria, 1979) and can take place in authoritarian (e.g., Zambia, 1980s) or democratic (e.g., South Africa, mid-1990s) settings.

### **2.7.2 Regional Peace Forums**

Regional bodies that include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and IGAD in East Africa are major bodies that attempt to engage in peace and conflict resolution.

### **2.7.3 United Nations and Multinational Organizations**

International organizations include the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. International agents and countries, such as the USA, Japan, and international organizations, and bilateral actions have also played major roles in peacebuilding.

Importantly, reconciliation, intercommunal bridge building, and confidence building are long-term, deep, and broad processes of relationship re-building (Lederach 2001). As such, this process is very complex and typically involves a myriad of different actors. A study of peacebuilding by Smith (2004) has established that states and other actors understand that reconciliation, or the process of relationship re-building in a post-conflict context, is very important. These states and actors are also willing to take part in those efforts. Notably, for Western donor countries, reconciliation is one of the four main categories of initiatives that receive substantive donor support, after political and socioeconomic development (Lederach 2001). While states have a number of legitimate interests in helping others to overcome the problems related to a specific post-conflict situation, some of these interests are problematic, as are the motivations for their involvement in other countries. Importantly, such interests and motivations can change over time as they are subject to governmental support (noting a changing focus of the USA in Afghanistan, which made it difficult for the partners in the action plan to effectively focus on reconciliation and transitional justice). From a theoretical perspective, international actors (states) play a two-level game, where their behavior at the international level is also closely related to domestic developments – interests, power, norms, and values (Putnam 1988). In other cases, however, the intra-institutional

(political) dynamics can prevent international institutions from acting or acting effectively. For instance, the European Union (EU) is frequently blamed for its ineffectiveness, which is worsened given its normative and political power. In other words, what can be observed with respect to the EU are its economic power and unparalleled normative power (Manners 2002). Local actors (in post-conflict societies) thus value the EU for help in their reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts.

#### **2.7.4 Civil Societies**

NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and FBOs are leading agents of peacebuilding. Local initiatives have been carried out by civil societies and religious organizations to help in mitigating ethnic violence in Africa. These organizations have engaged in direct engagement, activism, training, and capacity building to help in resolving and reducing violent ethnic conflicts. They have been involved in preventive and curative measures, working in active violent regions to mediate between warring communities. They have been a voice for those living on the margins by speaking the truth to power figures and being champions for justice. These organizations include The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Africa Great Lakes Initiatives (AGLI), the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) and Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) of Kenya, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT), and the Institute for Young Women Development (IYWD) of Zimbabwe.

Religion has been a tool for lessening conflict (Hove and Harris 2017: 28). Christianity emphasizes virtues such as peace, love, forgiveness, and reconciliation. The three peace churches – Quakers, Mennonites, and the Brethren – have been active in peacebuilding through their various programs. The Quakers have the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and Friends Church Peace Teams (FCPT), and the Mennonites have the Mennonites Central Mission. The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) has also been active in promoting peace and relief efforts. Many other church institutions have been involved in these efforts through their teaching, preaching, and Diakonia missions.

Peacebuilding is, notably, a very long-term goal that requires a set of carefully planned and executed activities. This, however, appears to be far from the annual budgets of international actors and their slow intra-institutional procedures to approve specific projects. In general, international institutions have been criticized by local stakeholders for the duration of their internal procedures (i.e., between an initiative and a decision by an institution to support the initiative) and the uncertainty of this process (Zammit 2006).

### **2.7.5 Educational Institutions and the Media**

Education is being used as a tool to increase peace. Education can be used to open doors for employment and other opportunities. At the same time, an educated population might be less manipulated to engage in violent ethnic conflict because of the exposure and interactions that they might acquire through studies. Peace curricula and clubs have been introduced in some schools as well. Research and academic institutions with peace and conflict resolution programs can be found in virtually every country in SSA. These include the peacebuilding program at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa, the University for Peace, the Masinde Muliro University, the University of Zimbabwe, ACCORD, and the Department for International Development's local mediation and peacebuilding activities.

Further studies have revealed that the media has the power to influence, reach, and convince conflict management processes through peacebuilding efforts and broadcasts. Evidently, the media plays a significant role in interethnic conflicts. In as much as the role may be positive or negative, the impact is felt by all the parties (Howard *et al.* 2003).

## **2.7 Conclusion**

Intergroup conflicts in postcolonial SSA are attributable to internal and external factors. The internal factors have their roots in inherited precolonial identities, which remain indelible despite the prevalence of nation-states and a representative system of governance inherited from the colonial masters. Intra-ethnic, interethnic, and ethno-

religious conflicts remain a continuous factor in SSA due to the existence of inclinations toward primordial sentiments caused by inequalities fostered by the postcolonial leaders. The prevalence of incompetent leadership has made the peaceful existence of merged multiple ethnic groups difficult due to the presence of inequalities seeded by colonialism and advanced by the postcolonial Sub-Saharan African leaders. The extant disparities, according to the findings of this study, are a potential threat to nation-building and good governance. In addition, they have proven to be a catalyst of conflict in which oppressed groups have assembled against the privileged groups, as observed in the case of Rwanda. Similarly, inequalities account for the emergence of balkanization and threats by the oppressed group to form a new nation, as it has been in the case of Biafra in Nigeria in the 1970s and contemporary times. Inequalities are a significant push factor of primordial sentiments, which threatens the existence of the state and stifles democratic dividends.

The way forward in multicultural societies such as those in Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and other countries is primarily through the goodwill of strongmen, solons, and political and economic elites. Consociationalism may be proffered, but in the absence of political leaders' goodwill, it will yield nothing laudable, as observed in Nigeria. The goodwill of leaders is a threshold that will empower constitutionalism and consociationalism and weaken horizontal inequalities. Sub-Saharan African nations have the most nuanced statutes and policies. Still, the lack of goodwill and the implementation of existing laws have increasingly stifled the excellent intent of the constitutional provisions that would otherwise effectively manage conflicts.

Furthermore, the domestication of policies that will make inequalities die a natural death should be considered. The devolution of power and consociationalism are factors that can equally help bring down the edifice of inequalities. In addition, the rights of minority ethnic or religious groups should be observed in an uninterrupted manner in a bid to deter insurrectionism or the threat of secession.

Lessons can be learned from relatively peaceful countries such as Tanzania whose leaders have emphasized unity and minimized economic inequalities.



# CHAPTER THREE: INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN KENYA

## 3.1 Interethnic Violence in Kenya

### 3.1.1 Introduction to Kenya


Kenya is an East African country with a land area of 580,000 square kilometers and an estimated population of 47,564,296 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS] 2019). It borders the Indian Ocean and Tanzania in the south, Uganda in the west, South Sudan and Ethiopia in the north, and Somalia in the east. It has a diverse climate that is warm and humid along the coastal region and some parts of the western region around Lake Victoria, cool in the central area, temperate in some western regions, and arid and semiarid in the northeastern area. Figure 3.1 depicts a map of part of East Africa.




**Figure 3.1:** Map of part of East Africa.

<https://www.google.co.ke/maps/place/Kenya/@0.1651047,33.4071786,6z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x182780d08350900f:0x403b0eb0a1976dd9!8m2!3d->

[0.023559!4d37.906193?hl=en&authuser=0](https://www.google.com/maps/@0.023559,37.906193,15z) Accessed on 29<sup>th</sup> July 2021. Source:

 Google Map.

Kenya is inhabited by more than 42 native tribes, which can be grouped into three major groups: the Bantu, the Nilotes, and the Cushites. When one includes people from other parts of the world, such as Europe and Asia, who have settled in Kenya, Kenya has 44 major tribes (Biegon 2018: 9). Most of the tribes speak their native languages, with Swahili and English being the national languages (Government of Kenya 2010: 14). The majority of people can speak Swahili, which developed from some Bantu languages and Arabic. English is taught in schools, with most courses being communicated in English. It is expected that after attending high school, Kenyans will be able to communicate well in English.

Kenya is endowed with many resources (National Environment Management Authority [NEMA] 2021: xvii-xxiii). It has fertile agricultural land in the highlands and central and western regions. Most Kenyans are subsistence farmers; because of this, land ownership is critical (Ibid 12). Agriculture is the second largest contributor to the economy, the first being tourism. Maize and dairy products are produced mostly for domestic consumption. Other crops include beans, wheat, rice, sugar cane, coconut, sisal, cashew nuts, pyrethrum, and different types of fruits. The main cash crops are tea and coffee, which are produced for both domestic consumption and export. Floriculture is also practiced purely for export. Agriculture is the backbone of Kenya's economy. The total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from Agriculture, forestry and fishing in 2016 – 2020 was 10,050,019 million, and average of 2,010,003 million per year (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics  2021: 3).

Kenya has several national parks and game reserves, such as the Nairobi National Park, the Maasai Mara, the Tsavo National Park, and the Amboseli National Park. Many forms of wildlife can be found in these parks. These include the Big Five: lions, elephants, buffalos, rhinoceroses, and leopards. The migration of wildebeest has become one of the country's most spectacular events in the past few years. These reserves, together with

the coastal beaches, have contributed to the development of a robust tourism industry. Ecotourism attracts most tourists; the country also boasts of cultural and sports tourism. From 2016 to 2020, the country received 8,084,400 foreign visitors, an average of 1,616,880 tourist per year (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS] 2021: 54). Tourism is currently the main source of Kenya's foreign income. It earned the country Kenya Shillings (Kshs) 696.2 billion between 2016 and 2020, an average of Kshs 139.24 billion per year (Ibid: 55). Efforts are being made to encourage domestic tourism as well.

Other natural resources include soda ash, salt, limestone, gemstones, fluor-spar, zinc, and diatomite. Kenya has harnessed hydropower for electricity generation. Geothermal power is also produced at Olkaria. Compared to other neighboring countries, Kenya can be stated to have limited mineral resources. Several oil-explorations ventures have been conducted, and oil reserves have been found in the northern region of the country (National Environment Management Authority [NEMA] 2021: 82-96).

The first European missionaries arrived in Kenya in the mid-1800s. Sundkler (2000) traced the work of the pioneer missionaries to East Africa, Johann Ludvig Krapf and David Livingstone, from approximately 1844 to 1853. Krapf and Livingstone set the stage for missionaries who followed (Sundkler 2000: 510). After the missionaries had established their stations, they were followed by European settlers in search of exploration ventures and material wealth. The imperial administration from the British Foreign Office followed the missionaries some 17 years later and established a British colony there.

By early 1900, the British imperial administration had managed to build the Kenya–Uganda railway line starting from the coast at Mombasa, Kenya, to Kampala, Uganda. This opened the interior of Kenya to European merchants, explorers, and settlers who invaded the most fertile and productive parts of Kenya that were conducive to agriculture. Apart from the coastal, central and Nairobi regions, the Europeans settled in Nakuru, Uasin Ngishu, Nandi, Bungoma and Trans Nzoia, this region was referred then as the white Highlands. The railway was specifically built to open the interior of East Africa, make these regions attractive to European settlers and promote their interest in them, and

exploit and export raw materials to be used in Europe. Gifford argued that the railway came with the settlers who took over the fertile land, dispossessing the natives who had been living in the regions (Gifford 2009: 7). The most productive and habitable land was already home to Africans, but this was the type of fertile land that interested the colonists the most. The settlers, therefore, had to displace the natives through force and violence. Most natives were pushed onto marginal and unproductive land, and their agricultural and basic livelihood activities and movements were then restricted. The most productive land and places were reserved for and taken over by the colonists.

The imperial administration introduced a “hut tax” that the indigenous people were forced to pay to the colonial government to sustain its operation. The hut tax simply meant that every household was supposed to pay some tax money to fund the colonial government’s activities. Most Kenyans did not have money since they had been operating through barter trade. However, the colonial government required them to pay tax in the colonial currency. To obtain this currency, they were forced to work on European farms to raise the tax money. With such activities, Kenya was transformed into a British colony. The colonial administration favored the interests of the settlers while exploiting and neglecting the welfare of the indigenous people. It was the church that occasionally served the needs of the indigenous people (ibid.).

The outbreak of World War II catalyzed the continuance of the deteriorating relationship between the settlers and Africans. Sabar (2002) postulated that the church found itself in a polarized environment in which the settlers and the colonial administration had become more structured and oppressive and the indigenous African people had become more politically aware and active (Sabar 2002: 48). Many imperial administrators had joined the military to fight for their country. Their positions were taken over by settlers who used the opportunity to create laws that favored their interests much more than before. These interests included awarding more land for themselves and paying low wages to the Africans who were working on their farms. To support the British army fighting in the war, Africans were forced to pay even more taxes. Many Africans were also conscripted to be

servicemen to simply carry tools used by the British army. To realize all the above, the settlers restricted the movement of Africans within the colony and their right to own land.

African leaders emerged and began pushing for the proper treatment of the native people. They wanted the natives to be treated with dignity. The colonial administration responded by detaining most of the leaders who were championing the interests of their people. On the other hand, the European settlers were pushing for legislations that would allow them to take a large share of the arable land and other resources (Sabar 2002: 48). This only worsened the relationship between the Africans and the settlers. The stage was set for confrontations or other interventions.

Kenya attained independence in 1963 after a long, violent struggle and peaceful, nonviolent political negotiations with the imperial government, but the nonviolent effort is not mentioned to a great extent by national leaders and the popular media. The first president after independence, Jomo Kenyatta, set out to promote unity and socioeconomic development. Some thought that acts of retaliation would be involved, in which settlers would be required to give back the land that they had taken from the natives. This had been the agenda of the Mau Highlands. The, who had simply wanted the colonial settlers out of Kenya. With such calls and expectations, the colonial settlers would have lived in fear and might have expected some form of retribution from the new government. However, contrary to all expectations, Kenyatta called for forgiveness and reconciliation, and he invited all to work together in developing and constructing the new nation (Sabar 2002: 66).

Although Kenya has 44 major tribes, Kenyatta eventually started favoring people from his tribe, the Kikuyu. He did this through biased resource distribution, engaging in unequal employment opportunities and political patronage to Kikuyu. Nepotism and corruption were entrenched in the Kenyan government system. Kenyatta and the Kikuyu elite allocated most of the resources to themselves (Waki 2008: 24). The systems that had been biased toward the colonists were maintained. What had changed was merely the color of the people in leadership. Instead of the White imperial British government, Kenya

was under the leadership of a Black African dictator and his corrupt entourage. This planted the seed and led to the genesis of the historic injustices that plunged Kenya into conflict and violence, as described by Waki (2008). This has been the pattern followed by subsequent regimes.

### **3.1.2 Causes of Interethnic Violence in Kenya**

The potential for the 44 tribes to coexist peacefully exists, when they are not being incited to fight each other by politicians (Njogu 2009: 1). Evidently, there are other natural issues, such as droughts, that drive some communities to invade their neighboring tribes. In his book entitled *Healing the Wound: Personal Narratives About the 2007 Post-Election Violence in Kenya*, John Kimani noted the following regarding the interethnic violence in Kenya:

Violence was not just about presidential results. To understand it one would need to examine long-standing grievances related to land, access to pasture, political manipulation of ethnic differences, impunity among those identified as having organized political violence in the past, the winner-take-all political system, poverty and unemployment among the youth, the high stakes and closeness of presidential races making it impossible to see the winner, the excessive power of the presidency making the office immensely attractive to individuals and communities interested in controlling national resources, and the structural weakness of the Electoral Commission of Kenya... Politicians ignite mistrust among ethnic groups and encourage violence to reach their goals and maintain or acquire power (Njogu 2009: 1).

Intergroup conflict affects or involves two or more groups, with typical examples being ethnic conflicts witnessed in 1992 between the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus in Njoro, Molo, Kuresoi, and Nakuru in Kenya; and conflicts over land between the Kikuyus as “foreigners”, the Maasai, the Kalenjin, and the Samburu as “natives” (Yamano and Peininge 2005). The crux of the conflicts was to regain what the natives believed rightfully belonged to them. This was proof enough that politics of malice and insincerity dominated the conflicts and the different, incompatible goals. The marginalization and neglect of communities by the regional governments; poor infrastructure; the lack of social services, such as education and health care; and the resultant poverty and ignorance among the

communities also made the ethnic groups more vulnerable to misuse by politicians who wanted to make use of them to gain political mileage out of conflicts (Fisher 2002).

The approach of the national general elections every 5 years brings back memories of deaths and instability in the former Rift Valley and in many parts of Kenya. According to a study by Gettleman, before the advent of multiparty politics in 1991, no clashes had been witnessed between the local communities in the Rift Valley region. They co-existed peacefully until the seed of hatred was planted among them (Gettleman 2012). He added that, at both the national and local levels, politicians and civic leaders used historical land issues and ethnicity to set communities against each other and raise more votes, and violent clashes between ethnic groups erupted across the country from 1991 to 2008 (Waki 2008).

The ethnic divisions laid bare in the aftermath of the elections have roots that run much deeper than the presidential poll. As yet, no Kenyan government system has made a good-faith effort to address long-simmering grievances over land that have persisted since independence. High-ranking politicians who have been consistently implicated in organizing political violence since the 1990s have never been brought to book and continue to operate with impunity (Waki: 31). Widespread failures of governance are at the core of the explosive anger exposed in the wake of the election fraud.

#### **a. Political Dynamics and Elite Competition**

The immense power wielded by the office and person of the presidency donates to the holder excessive privileges toward the allocation and distribution of state resources (Waki 2008: 28). The presidents, especially Jomo Kenyatta I and Daniel Moi, had absolute powers (and the powers notably corrupted them). They dictated and had their wishes fulfilled in virtually every sphere of the country. Unfortunately, all four presidents have used these powers to favor their ethnic communities against other tribes. Three of the four presidents whom Kenya has had to date come from the same tribe. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the number of cabinet positions given to each community.



**Table 3.1: Cabinet positions 1966 – 1978 Jomo Kenyatta's regime**

Ethnic group	1966		1967		1968		1970		1978	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Kikuyu	6	28.6	6	28.6	8	31.6	6	28.6	6	28.6
Luhya	2	9.5	2	9.5	1	5.3	2	9.5	1	4.8
Luo	3	14.3	3	14.3	3	15.8	2	9.5	3	14.3
Kalenjin	1	4.8	1	4.8	1	5.3	2	9.5	1	4.8
Kamba	1	4.8	2	9.5	2	10.5	2	9.5	2	9.5
Kisii	2	9.2	2	9.5	1	5.3	2	9.5	2	9.5
Meru	1	4.8	1	4.8	1	5.3	1	4.8	1	4.8
Mijikenda	2	9.3	2	9.5	2	10.5	2	9.5	3	14.3
Other	3	14.3	2	9.5	1	10.5	2	9.5	2	9.5

Source: CJPC (2013: 21)

**Table 3.2: Cabinet positions 1966 – 1978 Daniel Moi presidency**

Ethnic group	1979		1982		1985		1987		1994		1998		2001	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Kikuyu	8	30	7	25	5	20	4	14.2	1	4.2	1	4	1	4
Luhya	3	11	3	11	2	8	3	10.7	4	16.7	5	19	4	14
Luo	3	11	3	11	4	16	5	17.8	1	4.2	0	0	2	7
Kalenjin	3	11	3	7.4	3	12	2	7.1	4	17	6	22	5	17
Kamba	2	7.6	2	7.4	2	8	3	10.7	4	16.6	4	14.8	4	14.3
Kisii	2	7.6	2	7.4	1	4	2	7.1	2	8.3	2	7.4	2	7.1
Meru	1	3.8	2	7.4	1	4	1	3.5	2	8.3	1	3.7	1	3.6
Mijikenda	2	7.6	2	7.4	2	8	2	7.1	2	8.3	2	7.4	2	7.1
Other	2	7.6	3	11	5	20	6	21.2	4	16.6	6	22	7	25

Source: CJPC (2013: 22)



Political incitement is the major cause of tribal conflicts. It is the politicians who instigate this violence to attain or retain power (Njogu 2009: 1). They use every means available to win the electoral seats, which can be local, county, or national ones. These methods include “socio-political marginalization and elite manipulation of identities for political mobilization” (Mwamba 2019: 26). They divide people along their ethnic lines. This is supported by a culture of impunity where those who maim and kill for political ends are never brought to justice (CJPC 2013: 18).

***b. Ownership and Access to Land and Pastures***

The constitution of Kenya permits anyone to own land anywhere in the country. However, apart from major cities and a few counties, many counties are inhabited by people of the same ethnic community. This has encouraged them to have an “insider and outsider” view, with the insiders being the dominant tribe in a specific county. The major tribe tends to want a greater say and to have their way (Juma & Iteyo & Simiyu 2018: 4601). This is becoming more pronounced with the introduction of the devolved government system.

There are two major contentions to the land issues: the skewed distribution and allocation of land in the post-independence period; and factors caused by natural calamities, especially drought. During the colonial period, most native communities were compelled to move out of their fertile land to give way to European settlers. The locals were moved into “reserves” or required to work for the colonialists. With the arrival of independence, most communities expected to regain their ancestral lands. This was largely not the case; instead, “Land grabbing and the allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption of this period” (Waki 2008: 31). The apportionment of land has been marred with allegations of corruption and nepotism. The political elites did take advantage of this situation to allocate to themselves and their cronies the last portion of land, to the detriment of native communities (Onyango 2015: 190). This has led to anger that occasionally intensifies and transforms into violent conflict (Waki 2008: 32). It, therefore, means that if the land issues are not addressed appropriately, the violent ethnic conflict cycle will continue to be experienced.

Natural calamities, especially droughts, have been a factor leading to ethnic violence, especially with nomadic communities and their neighbors. The Maasai, Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana are some of the communities that have been involved in these conflicts. During droughts, they search for pastures and water for their animals and, most times, intrude into other people's lands and properties. An illustration of this is the drought experienced by pastoralists since the beginning of 2017, where herders invaded other people's land and ranches in search of pastures in Laikipia. This has also been occurring between the Pokots and Turkana, Pokots and Marakwets, and the Turkana and Karamoja. Droughts and other cultural obligations have also encouraged some communities to raid their neighbors for cattle. The raids are usually violent.

**c. *Poverty and Unemployment Among the Youths***

Poverty exists when basic needs cannot be met and when people cannot access a good life (Barash 2014: 526). The exact meaning of a good life varies depending on the places and countries where one lives in this world. Barash wrote that poverty has physical and psychological effects (ibid.). Mental suffering occurs when the poor are able to see the affluence of others in relation to their own abject poverty. This might lead to a sense of shame, envy, and either anger or despair. On the other hand, poverty leads to physical pain that includes hunger, inadequate health care, poor housing and improper sanitation, diseases, and limited educational opportunities (ibid.). ACTION AID-Kenya believed that "absolute poverty is a denial of basic human rights and should be eradicated" (Mukui 2005: 26). It is estimated that 33.4% of Kenyans live below the poverty line, with most of them living in rural areas (World Bank 2020: 70).

A report by The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) indicated that poverty is on the rise in Kenya due to an increased population, which has led to landlessness, low agricultural productivity, unemployment, low wages for a greater percentage of the employed, gender inequalities, insecurity, and violence (USAID 2006). The trend has exacerbated with the onset and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank 2020: 70). Poverty and social inequality are some of the causes of violence in Kenya (Mwenga 2017: 31). The UN's humanitarian news and analysis publication *Irin*

drives this point home through one of its articles regarding the causes of violence in Kenya. The title plainly states, “Kenya: it is the economy, stupid (not just tribalism)” (UN 2008).

Kenya’s population growth has not been proportional to the resources and opportunities available. There is more pressure on the land than ever before, and, at the same time, increasingly more people, especially young people, are looking for employment to earn an income (National Environment Management Authority [NEMA] 2021:6). On the other hand, most working people earn very low pay that is not adequate to meet their basic needs. In 2019 the unemployment rate stood at 37.4% (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS] 2019: 6). Employment opportunities are scarce and most pay poorly.

Most young people have basic education and additional skills, something that they have sought to make them competitive in the job market. However, even after such achievements and high expectations, many have never been employed and have little hope for employment in the formal sectors. Amid all this, young people still have to be part of the fabric of the Kenyan community. Waki stated that “the need for an identity and a livelihood for the unemployed youths makes them ready recruits for violent gangs” (Waki 2008: 33). Their vulnerability has meant that they can easily be indoctrinated, tapped into, and exploited by politicians.

Many youths are poor and unemployed. Poor and unemployed young people have been exploited to become an instrument of violence. According to an adage, “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop”, and the youths have been enticed to partake in violence. Usually, they are given some money or encouraged to believe that the source of their misery is other communities. Unemployment, poverty, and the need for purpose and identity mean that these youths are cheaply influenced to engage in ethnic violence by some ruthless politicians (Waki 2008: 33).

**d.      *Structural Weakness of the Government and Independent Commissions***

Excessive powers have been concentrated in the office of the president. All the presidents have used this power to weaken independent institutions and other branches of government: the legislature and the judiciary. Without institutions that help to check the excesses of the executive, corruption and nepotism have been prevalent. The elites who have been closer to the government have exploited this situation to pillage from the country's coffers.

Poor conflict resolution skills have affected the country. Unresolved conflicts are a source of further conflicts. Violent conflict always leaves people traumatized. The trauma is supposed to be managed through counseling and other means to bring about healing. When left unaddressed, the trauma usually leads to anger, hatred, death, and a desire for revenge (Hove and Harris 2019: 21).

**e.      *Economic Inequalities and Ethnic Disparities***

Finances dictate what people can or cannot access. The basic desire of human beings is to be in a position of attaining basic human needs. This tends to bring about unhealthy competition, especially when it is obvious that one group is more privileged over others. This seems to be the case in Kenya, where the president's community tends to be more intentionally economically empowered by the government at the expense of other communities (Stiftung 2012: 7). This has been the case with all the presidents: Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta. An article that addresses facts and figures on inequality in Kenya described inequality as follows:

[Inequality is] the degree to which distribution of economic welfare generated in an economy differs from that of equal shares among its inhabitants... Inequality is observed not only in incomes but also in terms of social exclusion and the inability to access social services and social-political rights by different population groups, genders and even races (Society for International Development [SID] 2004: 1).

The above statement implies that inequality has an economic, social, and political dimension. It excludes a certain group of people from accessing certain rights and services.

Most of the challenges being experienced in Kenya have roots in unjust governance, poverty, and inequality. One of the underlying causes of the violence is the unequal distribution of wealth and resources. There has been a biased policy in resource distribution in Kenya. This has been compounded by the corruption that has been prevalent in past years (Development Policy Management Forum 2018).

### **3.1.3 Consequences of Interethnic Conflict in Kenya**

From the information provided by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya (Waki 2008), the major effects of violence were the loss of lives; destruction of properties; and the widespread displacement of people from their properties, which included land, homes, and businesses. Most of the people were forced to be refugees in their county living in IDP camps.

According to Kiliku (1992), the clashes in Kenya resulted in the loss of thousands of families' personal possessions in the form of structures, granaries, land, and enterprises. Lives were lost as a result, and livestock theft and looting took center stage because some people took advantage of the less prepared, weak, physically challenged, sick, and alien. In early 1994, as a result of the clashes, some 10,000 members of the Kikuyu tribe left their farms in Naivasha in the then Rift Valley Province, a move that is believed to have been encouraged by the Maasai backed by armed off-duty rangers. A number of houses in Kengesha, Karima, Nyikinywa, and Lari were set ablaze, and properties of unknown value were destroyed (Daily Nation, 23 January 1994). In Mandera, 30 people were killed and 30,000 were displaced in battles between the Garre and Morole clans over pastures and water (Daily Nation, 18 December 2004). During the skirmishes, a pupil of Rhamu District Education Board School, aged 8, was shot in the leg, which led to an amputation. His mother and a younger brother were stated to have been killed during the fighting that involved a group of clans in the area in the month of December 2004. In

another incident, one person was killed, five were injured, and 30 houses were burnt down in a fight between the Samburu and Turkana over pastures and water points. In renewed clashes in Loiyangalani Division, Marsabit Sub-County, armed bandits shot and killed a 6-year-old boy and stole 800 goats (Daily Nation, 8 August 2007).

The 2007/2008 post-election violence, a clear outcome of ethnic discomfort, had an effect on businesses both within the country and outside; businesses remained closed while other business premises and goods were destroyed by looters and the youths who were engaged in the warfare. It was further noted in the report by Kiliku (1992) that workers in the war-torn areas could not access their places of work or report to work due to cases of tension, leading to their workplaces remaining closed. In terms of infrastructure, roads were closed, leading to a large loss for the economy because it affected local enterprises and the neighboring countries who relied on Kenya's ports: Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda suffered a shortage of fuel and other essential goods because the Mombasa highway and Kampala road were closed (The International Crisis Group 2008: 1).

Conflict threatens Kenya's tourism, and it was noticed that the post-election violence affected the tourism sector, which is a major source of income for Kenya. This time of conflict was the peak season for the service industry and, evidently, hotels and parks remained empty, where the bookings and occupancy, mainly by foreigners, decreased by over 60%. According to Capital News, on 28 January 2008, over 1 billion shillings were lost in the flower industry in the 2 months of post-election violence. The post-election violence of 2007/2008, together with the global financial crisis, reduced the economic growth of Kenya to a GDP growth of 1.7% (Ochieng and Maxon 2012). Conflict causes fear and mistrust, and, hence, in most cases, there is a clear lack of a good environment for economic development.

When the Pokots and the Marakwets have engaged in war, many people from both sides of the tribal divide have been forced to flee their homes to temporarily live in the caves and makeshift shelters without food and essential humanitarian gear for fear of attacks.

Many of the fleeing populations ultimately become exposed to calamities and diseases, such as malaria, Rift Valley fever, pneumonia, and typhoid (The International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 1998). According to the ICRC (1998), people affected by clashes in the then Rift Valley Province alone were in need of 7,200 tons of food in the form of cereals and 1,080 pulses in addition to other food items as emergency aid for that year alone (Daily Nation, 14 and 23 May 1993). As reported in the Daily Nation (19 June 1993), a drop in milk production was also experienced, though without proper statistics to which one can refer.

In the report by Kiliku (1992), the ownership of land patterns has permanently changed because of interethnic conflicts affecting economic growth; hence, farm production has declined as a result of people leaving their farms for fear of being attacked. Insecurity has been a factor that is worthy of consideration, especially when economic activities have been disrupted in such a way that the production of sugar cane, tea, coffee, maize, and other crops have been affected when farmers have abandoned their farms in times of conflict in Nyando, Muhoroni, and Tinderet. A downfall was experienced in the output of wheat and maize as a result of insecurity caused by interethnic conflicts in Nyando, Muhoroni, and Tinderet Sub-Counties.

Many economic problems are generated by conflicts, such as food insecurities, disruptions to manpower and labor on the farms/firms, and the loss of land. In addition,, a breakdown in communication, the diversion of resources, allocation and misallocation (in terms of unexpected expenditures), the destruction of established infrastructure, the unstable pricing of commodities, and environmental degradation become the norm of the time (Oucho 2002). In view of this, one of the far-reaching economic consequences in this area of research was food shortages. This was because production dropped as a result of the failure to obtain an adequate supply of raw materials meant for agro-based firms, such as cereals, coffee, sugar, tea, and other inputs (ibid.). These subjected the victims of clashes to starvation in the wake of famine, which necessitated an appeal for food relief from international organizations. The effects of clashes include, but are not limited to, fertility and mortality, where temporal marital dissolution is realized when the

displacement of people take place in times of intergroup conflict, thus halting reproduction and family formation (ibid.). Interethnic conflicts also affect the foundation of nationhood, render the existing administrative structures disrespectful, and derail the spirit of national cohesion and integration to a large extent.

**a. Physical**

**i. Loss of Lives**

Lives have been lost during ethnic violence in Kenya. The figures given are mostly those of people killed through direct violence. However, many tacit deaths are caused by structural and cultural violence due to ethnicity issues.

The deaths and displacements in the following discussion took place in the period from 1990 to 2018. Between 1991 and 1996, over 1,500 people died due to tribal clashes in the Rift Valley and Western Provinces. In the run-up to the 1997 elections, fresh violence erupted at the coast, killing more than 100 people and displacing more than 100,000 mostly pro-opposition upcountry people (Kenya Human Rights Commission 1998: i).

The mayhem that enveloped Kenya after the 2007/2008 general elections in Kenya had the following effects. A total of 1,133 people died because of the post-election violence. The geographical distribution of the deaths was unequal, with most of the post-election-violence-related deaths being concentrated in the provinces of the Rift Valley (744), Nyanza (134), and Nairobi (125). The districts of Uasin Gishu (230), Nakuru (213), and Trans Nzoia (104) in the Rift Valley Province registered the highest number of deaths related to post-election violence.

The 2017 elections were marred by serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces, who used excessive force to break up protests and carry out house-to-house operations, particularly in opposition strongholds in Nairobi and Western Kenya. At least 12 people were killed by the police in the western counties of Kisumu and Siaya alone, and another 33 were killed in Nairobi during the violence (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2017).



*ii. Injuries and Disability*

The 2007/2008 chaos led to a total of 3,561 people suffering injuries inflicted by or resulting from sharp-pointed objects (1,229), blunt objects (604), soft tissue injuries (360), gunshots (557), arrow shots (267), burns (164), assault (196), etc.

Gunshot wounds accounted for 962 casualties, from whom 405 died. This represented 35.7% of the total deaths, making gunshots the single most frequent cause of deaths during the post-election violence. It was followed by deaths caused by injuries sustained because of sharp-pointed objects at 28.2%. The Commission received no evidence to suggest where the gunshots were recorded as the cause of death or injury, and the reports were made by sources other than the police. This calls into question the contention that the post-election violence was citizen-to-citizen violence, and it validates the view that police action accounted for a significant part of the post-election violence (Waki 2008: 345-346).

*iii. Displacement of Populations*

Between 1991 and 1996, almost 300,000 were displaced in the Rift Valley and Western Provinces (Kenya Human Rights Commission 1998: i). In the 2007/8 violence more than 350,000 people were displaced (Waki 2008: 272).

Given the above scenario, many people are being killed and displaced due to this violence. The cycle of ethnic violence in Kenya tends to recur during elections, as observed above. Elections are not the only triggers though; droughts have also led to violence between communities.

**b. Socioeconomical**

A total of 117,216 private properties (including residential houses, commercial premises, vehicles, and farm produce) were destroyed, while 491 government-owned properties (offices, vehicles, health centers, schools, and trees) were destroyed. The destruction had a negative effect on the economy and livelihoods (Chavulimu & Matthew 2021: 48).

There was loss of Businesses and assets that directly impacted on the economy as by Chavulimu (Chavulimu 2019: 121). The loss increases poverty levels among other issues.

### **c. *Psychological***

The CJPC noted that this violence has fueled suspicion between ethnic communities and deeply undermined cohesiveness and national identity (CJPC 2013: 22). There are cases in Kenya where communities in the coastal and western regions have been speaking about secession. Violence and injustice have widened the gap in the relationship between communities. This is not a positive trend.

## **3.1.4 Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflicts in Kenya**

The Kenyan government, AU, UN, CSOs, FBOs, and international bodies continue to be major players in resolving and minimizing ethnic conflict in Kenya. They do this by supporting peacebuilding efforts through policy formulation and funding the government and civil organizations.

### **a. *Government***

Table 3.3 presents the perception of residents of the following regions on the role of the provincial administration in managing conflict using listed channels.

**Table 3.3:** Role of provincial administration in peacebuilding (in percentages)

<b>Provincial Administration</b>	<b>Kisumu</b>	<b>Kericho</b>	<b>Nakuru</b>	<b>Trans Nzoia</b>	<b>Uasin Gishu</b>	<b>Kisii</b>	<b>Nairobi</b>
Deployed more officers	87.2	84.3	82.2	87.7	82.9	95.8	65.1
Interclan peace forums	87.5	69.7	53.9	80.7	70.8	95.8	61.7
Resolved issues	71.6	77.3	51.9	78.6	61.0	90.3	59.0
Gathered evidence	77.0	64.0	47.0	68.4	36.6	72.2	50.0
Rehabilitated inciters	37.9	32.6	20.9	64.9	26.8	16.7	32.2

Average	72.2	65.6	51.3	76.1	57.1	74.2	53.6
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Source: CJPC (2013: 49).

The government has, however, been involved more in conflict management and peacekeeping rather than conflict transformation. As noted from the above, its role has been reactive rather than proactive in the deployment of more security officers in volatile areas and suppressing violence with the same method. Waki (2008) noted that the government had not been passionate about promoting positive peace. Certain issues were suppressed, or the government used its instruments of power to perpetuate its dominance.

The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation between the political parties provides Kenya's leaders with a historic opportunity to take a step back and reform and establish institutions that can help build long-term stability. The establishment of a commission of inquiry on political violence; an independent review committee on the elections; a truth, justice and reconciliation commission; and the agreement on the general parameters for a constitutional review process – all agreed upon in a very short time frame – represent a significant and positive response to the crisis.

However, challenges remain in ensuring that the institutions created effectively deliver accountability for recent and previous violence, correct injustices ignored by previous administrations, and tackle the systemic failure of governance that has given rise to the recent crisis. A particular challenge will arise because some of those individuals implicated in recent and previous episodes of politically motivated violence currently hold public office positions.

The Kenyan government noticed the work of the Wajir local peace committee (LPC) initiative in peacebuilding. Because of its success, the government used this experience and committed to apply the same in other parts of the country. The National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was established in 2001 and strengthened further in 2010. The efforts are ongoing. It can be noted that:

- Kenyan LPCs have succeeded in some areas, such as Wajir, in mitigating intercommunity conflict and preventing violence.
- Local ownership and external support have been complicated by top-down government initiatives and involvement.

**b. Civil Society**

NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs continue to be active actors in resolving tribal conflicts in Kenya. The existence of militia/unlawful groups is a threat to security. These groups operate in unconventional ways and are sometimes supported by powerful elements from the community. Kenya has had groups such as the Mungiki, Chinkororo, Wakaliwao, Land Defence Force, Baghdad Boys, Jeshi la Mzee, and many others. Previous efforts to manage conflicts and violence due to these groups have entailed incorporated discussions, rehabilitation, and amalgamation in the system as a way of transformation (CJPC 2005).

With regard to FBOs, Table 3.4 presents the role of the church in peacebuilding.

**Table 3.4:** The perception of residents in the following regions on the Role of the church in peacebuilding

<b>Provincial Administration</b>	<b>Kisumu</b>	<b>Kericho</b>	<b>Nakuru</b>	<b>Trans Nzoia</b>	<b>Uasin Gishu</b>	<b>Kisii</b>	<b>Nairobi</b>
Interclan peace forums	73.1	82.1	83.3	80.4	67.6	75.0	61.9
Resolved issues	62.2	85.9	68.9	76.5	56.8	70.3	71.0
Gathered evidence	44.0	46.8	66.9	68.6	64.9	56.3	31.0
Rehabilitated inciters	35.4	36.0	40.2	62.7	48.6	3.1	46.4

Source: CJPC (2013: 50)

Regarding the role of civil society, the Waki Commission (2008) deliberately decided to work closely with Kenyan CSOs and seek their assistance with information, contacts, and

expertise in areas related to post-election violence. A number of these organizations attended the Commission's hearings through lawyers who represented the victims and communities and provided useful feedback to members of the public on the Commission's work. These included Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), the Inter-Religious Forum, the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-K), the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), different chapters of the CJPC, and various religious and faith-based organizations. CSOs and human rights organizations greatly contributed to the Commission's work (Waki 2008: 5-6).

### **3.1.5 Conclusion**

Interethnic conflict is widespread in Kenya, just as in some other Sub-Saharan African countries. The causes of violent conflict are mainly due to land, economic inequality, poor conflict transformation skills, and incitement by political/community elites. Other causes have been changing climatic patterns that have led to prolonged droughts, leading to a shortage of water and pastures. This has been more visible among pastoralist communities, such as those of the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Marakwets, and Maasai.

Violent conflict escalates during election cycles and droughts. Politicians promote negative tribal campaigns to gain or retain power. This has led to deaths, the destruction of properties, displacements of the population, and trauma. Successive governments are in a quandary because of their own identity and the fact that they are politicians themselves. They have sugarcoated their responses to tribal conflicts or, at times, acerbated the violence when this has been in their interest (to retain or gain leadership). Kenyan politicians, therefore, are not reliable agents to promote positive peace, and the civil society and Kenyan citizens must stand out and spearhead this noble task. Generally, efforts have been made by different players to promote peacebuilding; however, more remains to be done.


## **CHAPTER THREE: INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN**

### **TRANS NZOIA COUNTY**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Trans Nzoia County is in the western part of Kenya. It was one of the districts of the former Rift Valley Province. With the proclamation of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the districts were instead designated as counties. Presently, there are 47 counties in Kenya, one being Trans Nzoia. It shares its borders with the counties of West Pokot in the north, Elgeyo Marakwet and Uasin Gishu in the east, and Bungoma in the south. It borders the country of Uganda in the west. It is sandwiched between Mt Elgon and Cherengany Hills, making it one of the most fertile counties in Kenya. It is widely referred to as the “breadbasket” of Kenya.

Trans Nzoia is 2,496 square kilometers in size, with a population of 990,341, as per the 2019 population census (KNBS 2019). Currently, approximately one million people are living in the county. People from all the 44 ethnic groups of Kenya are inhabitants of this county, though to varying degrees. The main ethnic groups are the Luhya and Kalenjin. The Bukusu is a subtribe of the Luhya, and the Nandi a subtribe of the Kalenjin. Figure 4.1 depicts the location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya.



**Figure 4:1** Location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya (Source: Google Maps <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Trans-Nzoia+County/@1.0506212,34.7701989,10.5z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x1781f598453511b1:0xbe187ee80581cef9!8m2!3d1.0566667!4d34.9506625> ).

Trans Nzoia is among the most fertile counties of Kenya. It is the breadbasket of the country because of agriculture, mainly involving maize farming. Other crops produced include beans, wheat, coffee and tea. Dairy farming especially the rearing of cattle, sheep and goat is practiced. The county also boasts of Tourism sites such as Mt Elgon National Park and Saiwa game reserve which attract tourists in the county.

#### **a. Nandi**

The term *Kalenjin* can be loosely translated to mean “I tell you”. It is a conglomeration of subtribes whose dialects are almost similar. They include the Nandi (once called the Chemwal), Kipsigis (Lumbwa), Elgeyo, Tugen (Kamasya), Marakwet, Pokot (Suk), and Sabaot (Kony). The Kipsigis are the largest of these tribes followed by the Nandi, and these two tribes combined account for more than half of the Kalenjin nation (Sutton 1973:

22). These subtribes have much in common, and their languages and cultures are closely related.

The Nandi, also called the Chemwal or Chemngal, migrated into Trans Nzoia County during the colonial period (1900–1963). Before this period, they were concentrated in the Aldai region, in present-day Nandi County (which derives its name from the tribe). Their tradition holds that they had moved here from Mt Elgon, which had been the original home of the Kalenjin nation (Lagat 1995: 21) in approximately the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century (Tanui 2015: 218). Due to population growth and migration, the Kalenjin nation mutated into the various subtribes mentioned earlier. The groups moved to different regions, and only the Sabaot were left behind in the mountainous area. In the late 1800s, Trans Nzoia's grassland was used as pastures by the Sabaot in the west, Pokots in the northwest, and the Marakwet/Cherangany in the east. Meanwhile, the Nandi were mainly in Nandi and part of the Uasin Gishu plateau.

Toward the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Nandi had aggressively moved in and taken over parts of the Uasin Gishu from the Uasin Gishu Maasai (Lagat 1995: 26). Shortly afterward, European settlers invaded the region and annexed most of the fertile land from the Nandi in the Uasin Gishu and Nandi regions from 1901 onwards (Lagat 1995: 46). This introduced them to an entirely new lifestyle where their pastoral culture was curtailed, albeit forcefully. Most of their land was taken, and they were then pressured to work for the settlers to guarantee their survival.

Two requirements were imperative for the European settlers: native land and labor. They, therefore, forced the Nandi out from most of the fertile land in Nandi and Uasin Gishu and moved them to restricted zones known as "African Reserves". The reserves were mostly untenable land. The Nandi in the reserves were congested and did not have enough space and pastures for their cattle. Despite this, they were not willing to be servants for the settlers. The settlers needed their service and labor, and, therefore, rules were created to force the natives to work for them. The reserves were small, and the natives were required to pay taxes to the colonial government. Eventually, the natives were



encouraged to be squatters in the settlers' land. This meant that they could live and graze their cattle in allocated areas and, in return, be employed by the settlers for 180 days per year (Lagat 1995: 68).

Dynamics regarding the ownership of land and cattle drastically changed. Land in the reserves was allocated to individuals and was no longer under communal ownership. Moreover, it was limited. Several Nandi people were squatters on European farms. With time, they were restricted with regard to the amount of cattle that they could keep. They could not return to the Nandi reserves since all the land had been allocated to the people they had left behind. They were forced to stay in the Nandi and Uasin Gishu settlers' farms as squatters (Lagat 1995: 94). Others moved to neighboring regions, such as Trans Nzoia (Nabwere 1987: 163). The years from 1920 to 1954 saw some Nandi coming into Trans Nzoia as workers and squatters. They were looking for pastures for their animals, and a sizable number did stay in the county through to the present day.

**b.     *Bukusu***

There are 17 sub-tribes in the Luyha nation: the Bukusu, Tiriki, Marakoli, Tachoni, Banyala, Banyore, Khayo, Marachi, Samia, Isukha, Idakho, Kisa, Tsotso, Kabaras, Wanga, Marama, and Batura (Barasa 2015: 9). They are mainly found in Western Kenya dominating the Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega, and Vihiga counties. Some of these groups are residents in Uganda as well. The Luhya moved into the area around Mt Elgon approximately in the year 500. With time, they moved into other regions, with some going as far as Lake Victoria in the south and the Nandi Hills in the southeast (Ehret 1976: 16). The Bukusu remained around the Mt Elgon area, and the early European explorers found them in this region in 1883 (Reed 1954: 3). They are closely associated with the Bakisu of Uganda, who are their cousins and neighbors.

The Bukusu, also referred to as the Kitosh, were inhabitants in part of the then Mt Elgon region, in the current Bungoma County, before the European settlements. They migrated eastward, crossing the Kamukuywa and Kisawai rivers, and were residents in the

southwestern regions of Trans Nzoia County by 1880 (Nabwera 1987: 58). For years, this region had been occupied by the Uasin Gishu Maasai.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, several communities were living in Trans Nzoia. The Sabaoths were living in Mt Elgon forest and using the slopes of Western Trans Nzoia for cultivation and grazing (Nabwera 1987: 58). In the eastern region, the Pokots and Cherengany, who were pastoralists, would utilize the whole area as pastures for their cattle (ibid.). The Bukusu inhabited the southwestern part for subsistence farming and pastures (ibid.). However, for the colonialists, Trans Nzoia was an inhabited land (Nabwera 1987: 159). The land was confiscated from native Africans by imperial Britain and distributed to settlers. Most lands in Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Bungoma, and Trans Nzoia were taken by Europeans. Most natives were obliged to become squatters and farmworkers for the settlers.

#### **4.2 Nature of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia**

Direct and cultural violence have always been in existence between neighboring ethnic communities in Kenya. The quest for dominance has consistently led to violent ethnic conflicts between communities. The search for fertile land to cultivate, pastures, and water for cattle meant that one group displaced the other at some point. Some communities would also steal animals from other communities. Stealing animals was a cultural behavior encouraged in some of these tribes.

The movement of members from the Bukusu communities from Bungoma into parts of Trans Nzoia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century seemed to have been caused by population growth and the need for fertile land. There are no records of tribal fights; instead, they seemed to have occupied areas abandoned by the Uasin Gishu Maasai who had moved out of the region (Reed 1954: 4). They settled there and would later claim the area as their native land during the colonial period (ibid.). Their animals were occasionally raided by the Pokot, Cherangany, and Sabaoth (Kakai 2015: 75).

During the colonial period (1900–1963), the Bukusu and Nandi were squatters or workers in settlers' farms. The arrival of the Bukusu preceded that of the Nandi in Trans Nzoia, and the Nandi came in mainly from Uasin Gishu. The squatters were allowed limited land to cultivate and keep a controlled number of animals (Nabwera 1987: 165). This arrangement worked well for the squatters, though, occasionally, the Nandi would steal their neighbors' cattle and sometimes even from the settlers' stock (ibid.: 167).

The period from 1945 to 1963 saw an upsurge in the formation of native political parties to champion for justice and independence, with one such party being the multiethnic Kenya African Union (Kakai 2015: 137). The Luhya and Kalenjin had their parties as well. Masinde Muliro had formed the Kenya African People's Party (KAPP) for the Luhya, and Daniel Moi had the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) for the Kalenjin. Kenya's independence was imminent, and these parties were formed to protect land taken by the settlers from being taken by outsiders (ibid.: 139). Eventually, the two tribes coalesced into the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a party that championed regionalism. The Luhya and Kalenjin each laid claim to Trans Nzoia as being their ancestral home before the arrival of the Europeans. They would then be the natural heirs of the land when the Europeans had left. This became the genesis of most of the conflict that has continued to befall Trans Nzoia County.

Since the independence period (1963) to the present, there has been tension and conflict among these communities, occasionally flaring up into violent confrontations. The political, social, and economic dynamics at the national level have had an effect on Trans Nzoia County.

#### **4.3 Extent and Trends of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia**

The seed of ethnic discord was planted on the eve of Kenya's independence day, and it has continued to flourish to date. The founding president, Jomo Kenyatta, amassed many resources for himself and the people of his tribe. Pius Kakai wrote that:

This skewing in Kenyatta's regime was towards the Agikuyu, his kinsmen, and kinswomen. Several scholars and political commentators have highlighted this

ethnicity in the dishing out of jobs, funds for projects, institutional equipment among many other favors. Similarly, some of the scholars have further argued that Kenyatta used those powers to enable his kinsmen and kinswomen to obtain fertile tracts of land in the now conflict-ridden Rift Valley Province at the expense of the perceived indigenous communities (Kakai 2015: 164).

This was not favorable in the view of some leaders and people from other communities. Unfortunately, any dissenting voice was silenced by hook or by crook. During Kenyatta's time, leaders from opposition parties and other persons who highlighted these injustices were oppressed and suppressed through detentions and killings (Waki 2008: 24). Those who were detained included Jaramogi Odinga and Martin Shikuku. Some of the murders included key figures such as Hon J. M. Kariuki, Hon Tom Mboya, and Pio Gamma Pinto (ibid.). Such horrendous acts divided the country and sowed a seed of hatred. The succeeding presidents have not done any better and have seemed to follow the same trend (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission [TJRC] 2013: 28).

Violent ethnic conflict in Trans Nzoia has escalated since 1990 during the second presidential term of Kenya Daniel Moi. The reintroduction of multiparty democracy was a threat to his hegemony and, hence, the fueling of tribal hatred that had helped him sustain his presidency despite the cacophony. Since 1963, Kenya had been ruled by a single political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). This was Moi's party, which drew its support from the Kalenjins, his tribe. In Trans Nzoia, the Kalenjins were pitted against the Luhyas and Kikuyus who were mainly supporting the opposition party, Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The claim was that Trans Nzoia was a county in the Rift Valley, and, therefore, it belonged to the Kalenjin and, by extension, the Nandi. The Bukusu, among other tribes, were targeted and intimidated through the destruction of their properties, forceful eviction from some areas of the county, and killings to distract them from voting and, therefore, guaranteeing Moi's win during the general election cycles of 1992 and 1997 (Waki 2008: 25). Table 3.5 from the KHRC (showing the voter registration and displacement by district) indicates that, in 1992, 18,525 eligible voters were displaced from Trans Nzoia County alone.

**Table 4:2** Voter registration and displacement by district (1992)

<b>District</b>	<b>Eligible voters</b>	<b>Reg. voters</b>	<b>Displaced Pop.</b>
Elegeyo-Marakwet	102,896	87,089	22,300
Bungoma	270,732	206,549	6,725
Busia	191,121	153,465	1,800
Mt Elgon	51,027	32,607	14,375
Kisumu	324,723	245,970	8,975
Nyamira	144,449	122,658	750
Kisii	340,661	266,250	2,300
Turkana	94,519	57,397	16,625
Trans Nzoia	176,091	133,665	18,525
Uasin Gishu	215,368	181,920	8,200
Nandi	199,387	142,960	17,850
Kericho	228,034	192,880	6,550
Narok	173,369	128,636	900
Nakuru	410,575	386,110	40,700
Laikipia	103,201	101,772	600

Source: KHRM (1998: 20)

During President Mwai Kibaki's presidency in 2007/2008, Kenya experienced another wave of violence. The number of those injured or killed is indicated in the following discussion.

In Trans Nzoia, the most severely affected areas were Gituamba, Timbora Location in Saboti Division, Geta Farm, Kalaa, Makutano, and Wamuini near Kitale town. Trans Nzoia struggled further with security problems throughout the following 2 years. These were mainly related to ongoing confrontations between armed pastoralist groups – the Pokot, Ugandan Toposa, Turkana, etc. – and incidents between these groups and Kenyan civilians, most of whom were Luhyas. According to Waki (2008: 333), the injuries that were reported by the provincial administration during the election skirmishes resulted from burns (36), arrow shots (0), mob justice (0), blunt objects (329), traumatic circumcisions

(0), sharp-pointed objects (137), assaults (0), fractures (0), head injuries (0), soft tissue injuries (0), and gunshot wounds (9).



According to the provincial and district breakdown for the causes of death in Trans Nzoia, the deaths were documented as being due to burns, arrow shots, mob justice, blunt objects, severe wounds, sharp-pointed objects, assaults, drowning, hypothermia, suffocation injuries, stoning, shocks, hanging, gunshot wounds, and unknown causes (Waki 2008: 316). According to the report, burns accounted for the largest percentage, 22%; injuries, 17%; gunshot wounds, 7%; unknown causes, 2%; and arrow-shot wounds, 1% (Waki 2008: 327).

#### 4.4 Causes of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia

In the 2002 general elections, Kenyans voted overwhelmingly for an end to dictatorial government systems, corruption, inequality, political violence, and the systemic abuse of office. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), headed by Mwai Kibaki, promised a new constitution; commissions to address large-scale corruption and arbitrary land grabbing by the elite; and measures to tackle landlessness, unemployment, and police reform. One after the other, those promises were abandoned by the Kibaki regime as the NARC coalition fell apart while impunity and corruption became further entrenched (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission [TJRC] 2013: 29). Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3 present perceptions on the potential causes of conflict by constituency.


**Table 4.3 :** Perceptions on potential causes of conflict by constituency (in percentages) in Trans Nzoia County

Potential causes of conflict	Cherangany	Kwanza	Saboti	County average
Sharing national positions	8.8	35.1	35.1	26.3
Land disputes	10.6	29.9	35.1	25.2
Sharing devolved resources	15.8	26.4	31.6	24.3
Youth unemployment	18.2	25.5	29.1	24.3

Sharing county positions	12.3	28.1	31.6	24.0
Border disputes	12.3	19.3	22.8	18.1
Dominance by group	14.1	15.8	19.3	16.4
County headquarters	10.5	17.6	19.3	15.8
Migration of non-indigenous	10.6	15.8	19.3	15.2
Pasture & water	5.3	19.3	17.5	14.0

Source: CJP (2013: 43)

**Figure 4.4:** Perceptions on causes of conflict by constituency (in percentages).



Source: CJPC (2013: 43).

The above tables and figures provide the interpretations as to what Trans Nzoia residents perceive to be the likely causes violence in the county. This is shared below.

#### a. Sharing National Positions

Those in power, especially the presidents and those in their close circles, practiced corruption and nepotism. In Trans Nzoia, the Nandi who are Kalenjins have been closer to and enjoyed state privilege more compared to the Bukusu who are Luhyas. President Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, was vice president of Kenya for 10 years (1967–1978) and president for 24 years (1978–2002). Hon William Ruto, also a Kalenjin, has been the deputy president for close to 10 years to date (from 2013 to the present day, 2021). On the other hand, Hon Musalia Mudavadi was vice president in 2002 (two months), and Hon Wamalwa Kijana, also a Luhya, was vice president in 2003, then Hon Moody Awori four years (2003 – 2007). Cumulatively, Kalenjins have been presidents for 24 years and vice presidents for 20 years; on the other hand, Luhyas have held the office of the vice presidency for only five years in the history of Kenya’s 60 years of independence since 1963.



Considering that presidents have favored their ethnic community in employment and the distribution of resources, the Kalenjins have been favored more since they have been in positions of power and influence. The president is present for the community, and the community has to stand with the president – supporting and voting for them. Unfortunately, this has led to discrimination against other ethnic communities, including the Bukusu. Because of this, the communities have also resented each other. The Bukusu have championed for just systems, whereas the Nandi have safeguarded their privilege.

**b. *Land Disputes***

Trans Nzoia is among the few cosmopolitan counties in the country. The predominant community is the Luhya, followed by the Kalenjin. It is one of the most fertile areas of the country and is commonly referred to as the breadbasket of Kenya. Because of the fertility of the land, it has encouraged competition for settlement. The region has witnessed population growth from its birth to the establishment of new settlements (KNBS 2019: 5).

**c. *Sharing County Positions and Devolved Resources***

The devolution of power and the creation of county governments have transferred some ills from the national government to the county governments. Just as in the national government, those in power at the county level, especially the governors and other key leaders in the devolved units have shown elements of ethnistic partiality (Waki 2008: 28). In Trans Nzoia County, predominantly comprising the Luhya and Bukusu, the elected governor is Bukusu because people vote along ethnic lines. It is most likely that the next governor will come from the same community due to the voting behavior following tribal lines. The same worrying trend is slowly infiltrating the county.

**d. *Youth Unemployment***

The population growth and limited land have an impact on gainful employment, especially among the youths of Trans Nzoia. Poverty and social inequality are some of the causes of violence in Trans Nzoia. The Kenyan population growth has not been proportional to the resources and opportunities available.

## **4.5 Consequences of Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia**

### **a. *Psychosocial***

Ethnic violent conflict has led to psychosocial consequences in Trans Nzoia County, just as in other affected counties of Kenya. This has escalated cases of separation and family breakdown in the region. Interethnic marriages between the Bukusu and the Nandi, Sababots and Bukusu, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kikuyu and Luo, Luhya and Kikuyu, and others are now surrounded by suspicion and are less common in the county (Nyukuri 1997). The violence has increased mistrust and prejudice among communities living in the region. There are instances where a spouse abandons the family, separates, and eventually divorces because of these conflicts.

Learning was affected as a result of the displacement of students. As a result of the clashes, thousands of school going children were displaced. The forceful displacement meant that families had to move to IDP camps or other places that were relatively safe, and, therefore, the children had to change schools or stop going to school altogether. Others had to discontinue their studies due to economic constraints. It is estimated that more than 100,000 school going children have been displaced in Trans Nzoia County (National Council of Churches of Kenya [NCCCK] 2014). Many schools have been destroyed, looted, burned down, and abandoned in some areas. Teachers and children viewed as outsiders have been attacked and forced to transfer or leave the teaching profession. This has affected other working professionals, such as nurses, community workers, and businessmen, as well.

The conflict has led to a crisis of culture and identity in the area of intermarried ethnic groups and their offspring. Culturally, the children are to identify with the paternal culture. However, there are cases where children have been forced to leave and live with either the paternal or maternal side as an act of communal cleansing (Nyukuri 1997). This is affecting the institution of marriage as ethnic profiling is becoming the norm.

The forceful eviction of the victims and their living in IDP camps have affected the physical and psychological health of the victims. The deplorable condition of IDP camps and other

overcrowded temporary shelters have been a breeding place for communicable diseases. The congestion, inadequate water supply, and poor sanitation have led to many cases of malaria, typhoid, cholera, dysentery, and other related diseases. There have been interventions from NCKK, Action Aid, the Catholic Mission, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Kenyan government, and others to help in the predicament (NCKK 2014). Many have been treated and have healed, but many deaths have occurred due to these diseases as well.

Cases of sexual abuse and exploitation have also been noted during the violence and afterward when the victims were living in camps. Due to their vulnerability, women have been violated and embarrassed by the aggressors in front of their families and children (Waki 2008: 347). Rape has been rampant. Others have taken advantage of the situation to solicit cheap sex from the helpless refugees in the camps or other sheltering places. The immoral practices have led to the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The camps have become a death trap to many (ibid: 348).

All the above have had profound psychological effects on the victims. They have suffered trauma and other mental diseases. There have been cases of people going mad, committing suicide, and dying because of depression (Waki 2008: 350). This has continued to affect the lives of many, and it is difficult to quantify the numbers due to its complicated nature.

#### ***b. Economic***

Economically, the short-term impact has been advantageous to the perpetrators of violence and a large loss to the victims. The conflict has given room for groups of people or individuals to acquire assets by dubious means that have included grabbing, stealing, and purchasing land, animals, and other items at very low prices. The victims who are desperate lose their retention and bargaining power, and they are coerced to let go of their properties (Waki 2008: 50).

Land ownership has been disrupted and altered. Most of the victims have permanently relocated, and merely a minority have retained their land. The patterns have changed where increasingly more perpetrators have encroached on that land and taken over it from the original owners (Waki 2008: 32). The insecurity has affected agricultural production; maize, wheat, beans, coffee, and other crops have either been abandoned or destroyed because of the violence caused by this ethnic conflict.

Food insecurity has been affected despite Trans Nzoia County being the breadbasket of Kenya. Food shortages have been experienced after every ethnic violence in the area usually because of the destruction of crops, animals, and stores. Cattle have intentionally been driven to graze in maize farms, destroying the crops, and granaries have been set ablaze and farm machineries have been wrecked by perpetrators. Furthermore, the insecurity has hampered the movement of goods and services within the county. Industries, public institutions, and markets have become inaccessible, leading to a perceived shortage of products. In most areas, crops and animal products have perished because they could not be transported to the market on time. On the other hand, consumers of the same items could not obtain/buy them because of the hindrances caused by the lack of security and transportation. Disruptions to infrastructure have led to inflation and fluctuations in the prices of goods and services.

The production of maize, wheat, milk, and other yields has been lowering in subsequent years due to insecure environments caused by these conflicts. The farmers have been worried and uncertain and, therefore, invested cautiously in their farms. These have led to the underutilization of potential and available resources in the region. Others have opted to invest elsewhere, leading to capital flight, as has been the case of a Karara poultry farmer who relocated his farm and industry to Nairobi.

The area has experienced an increased unemployment rate; self-employed peasant farmers and other farm workers have lost their main source of livelihood, forcing many to become destitute. The farming industry and trade sectors have been stopped or forced

to lay off some of their workers. Unemployment has led to several social and economic ills, which have included increased crime and diseases.

People have lost most of their personal and household goods. Important documents, such as certificates, title deeds, logbooks, and business records, have been razed by aggressors. Clothes, furniture, electronics, and other goods have been lost. Possessions such as houses, granaries, farms, shops, and business premises have been rapidly lost (Kiliku Report 1992: 85-90). People have been stripped of their dignity and investments because of their tribe. The once vibrant self-supporting farmer and entrepreneur have become destitute.

**c. Physical**

Table 3.7 presents the properties destroyed per district during the post-election violence period.

**Table 4.5:** Properties destroyed per district during the 2007 – 2008 post-election violence period (Waki 2008: 339)

District	Private properties	Government properties
Trans Nzoia West	4,350 houses torched 3 vehicles burned	DO residence
Trans Nzoia East	860 houses burned 3 vehicles burned	Chief's Office 16 government buildings destroyed

Lives have been lost, while others have been inflicted with all forms of injuries, as per Table 4.5. In the period of 2007 to 2008 alone, there were 104 deaths in Trans Nzoia County due to ethnic conflict. In the same period, the bloodshed led to a total of 3,561 people suffering from injuries inflicted by or resulting from sharp-pointed objects and 1,229 from blunt objects. Six hundred and four (604) suffered from soft tissue injuries, 557 people had gunshot wounds, 267 had arrow-shot wounds, 164 had burns, and 196 had been assaulted, among other injuries.

Cases of sexual violence were also experienced. This was carried out through gang rapes and individual rapes. Genital mutilation was carried out on male and female victim forcibly. Other body parts were equally mutilated, and there are survivors today living with gorged eyes, missing hand/s and leg/s, and other body marks as a consequence.

Due to the violence, the government responded with a ban on all public gatherings. Unfortunately, there were cases where the police responded to protests with the unwarranted and forceful killing and injuring of many peaceful protesters with guns. Meanwhile, there were cases of people looting, rioting, and raping.

People were displaced from their normal places of residence and/or businesses. IDPs were concentrated in the Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Central, Nairobi, and Coast Provinces. Approximately 1,916 Kenyans sought refuge in Uganda.

#### **d. Political**

The majority of Kenyans vote and enter politics with ethnic affiliations, which largely leads to competition between ethnic groups instead of promoting political ideals. In 1963, the competition was between KANU (Kikuyu and Luo) and KADU (Luhya, Kalenjin, Mijikenda); in 1992, between KANU (Kalenjins) and both FORD Kenya (Luo) and FORD Asili (Kikuyu); in 2007, between Party of National Unity (PNU) Kikuyu and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) Luo and Kalenjin; in 2013, between The National Alliance (TNA) Kikuyu and Kalenjin and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) Luo and Kamba); and in 2017, between Jubilee Party (JP) Kikuyu and Kalenji) and National Super Alliance (NASA) Luo and Kamba. Campaigns emphasize the ethnicity of competing parties and their candidates while demonizing other candidates and their tribes. Stereotypes are exaggerated and wedges are widened, enhancing the differences between competing ethnic groups.

Irresponsible politics have been incubators for ethnic violence in Trans Nzoia County. Apart from the 1963 elections, when the Bukusu and Nandi were in the same party of KADU, they have been in different groups in other elections. In the 1992 and 1997

elections, the Bukusu were in FORD Kenya and the Nandi in KANU. During the 2002 elections, the Nandi were in KANU and the Bukusu in NARC; in 2007, the Bukusu identified with PNU and the Nandi with ODM; in 2013, the Bukusu were in CORD and the Nandi in TNA; and in 2017, the Bukusu were in NASA and the Nandi in Jubilee. There is usually much incitement by politicians during campaign periods, and politics have been a dividing rather than unifying factor in the ethnic domain.

#### **4.6 Attempts to Manage or Resolve Interethnic Conflict and Violence in Trans Nzoia**

National and international agents have been involved in resolving interethnic violence in Trans Nzoia County. The agents have been the government and civil societies (NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs). They have played a significant role in the political and socioeconomic development of the county. The Kenyan national government, county government of Trans Nzoia, AU, UN, CSOs, and FBOs continue to be major players in resolving and minimizing ethnic conflict in Trans Nzoia County. They do this by supporting peacebuilding efforts through policy formulation, funding government departments, and supporting CSOs.

##### **a. Government**

Table 4.5 presents the perception of Trans Nzoia residents on the role of provincial administration in conflict management.

**Table 4.6:** The perception of Trans Nzoia County residents on the involvement of the provincial administration in conflict management (in percentages)

<b>Provincial Administration</b>	<b>Trans Nzoia</b>
Deployed more officers	87.7
Interclan peace forums	80.7
Resolved issues	78.6
Gathered evidence	68.4
Rehabilitated inciters	64.9
Average	76.1

Source: CJPC (2013: 49), with some modifications from the researcher

**b. Civil Societies**

**i. Faith-Based Organizations**

Table 4.6 presents the role of the church in peacebuilding.

**Table 4.7:** The perception in percentages of Trans Nzoia County residents on the involvement of the church in peacebuilding

Provincial Administration	Trans Nzoia
Interclan peace forums	80.4
Resolved issues	76.5
Gathered evidence	68.6
Rehabilitated inciters	62.7

Source: CJPC (2013: 50)

The church has been involved in peacebuilding activities in Trans Nzoia. The Protestant body of the NCCK and the CJPC have been active in promoting peace and relief efforts in the county.

As indicated above, the church has been involved in interclan peace forums, conflict resolution issues, evidence gathering, and the rehabilitation of inciters. In summary, the specific stakeholders jointly involved in these interventions included the following:

1. The government, through the provincial administration in Trans Nzoia, solely secured the hotspots.
2. The government, with support from CSOs, such as Chanuka, FIDA, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), spearheaded counseling sessions. The Church also played a critical role.
3. Food was distributed mainly by the government, with support from the Red Cross, the Catholic Church, and IOM-Japan, among other NGOs.
4. The government, through provincial administration and with support from the IOM, resettled victims onto their lands.



5. Reconciliation meetings were facilitated by the government through the provincial administration and supported by other stakeholders, such as the Church and CSOs led by the Kitale Aids Programme in collaboration with community leaders.
6. The rebuilding of houses was mainly undertaken by the government with support from the IOM. Less than 10% of the respondents had been involved in the county peace forums. However, the respondents had organized, attended, and addressed various forums on issues of peace. Through the groups and organizations, the respondents indicated that various groupings had emerged, carrying out various peacebuilding activities.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

Trans Nzoia has experienced violent ethnic conflict for a long period. This cannot be explained by referring to a single motive. On the contrary, the motivations underpinning the actions of ethnic violence are all situated within a broad scope that combines, among other factors, mere survival strategies with waged violence and politically instigated ethnic antipathies. Consequently, an analysis of conflict in Trans Nzoia implies not only an investigation into the motives and behavior of ethnic groups but also an assessment of those who act behind the scenes. Local and high-level power figures and other prominent community members are often driving forces behind ethnic violence and destructive raids. They are accused of facilitating, financing, inciting, and organizing violence because of ethnic sensitivities or to safeguard their personal, political, and economic interests. In order to fulfill their agendas, politicians turn to the extremes of identity politics, inciting people to fight against each other through appeals regarding seemingly incompatible cultural identities.

The interethnic conflict has caused a loss of income for the victims of violence. There have also been disruptions to trade during the conflicts. Since historical times, traditional institutions have been important in creating peace, security, law, and order. The role of the council of elders, clan elders, and community policing need to be strengthened as a factor that both supports the interests of the rich and the marginalized as they lead groups in making decisions on the basis of reaching a consensus. The indigenous conflict

resolution institutions operating in the Sabaot, Luhya, and Kalenjin communities need to be recognized and strengthened instead of being ignored as they can be consulted on their views concerning land, culture conservation, and conflict resolution.

The government, NGOs, and civil society groups need to consider offering civic education to the Sabaot, Luhya, and Kalenjin communities on peaceful co-existence and the need to shun ethnic conflict. There is a need to offer vocational skills to the youth, who are mostly used to fighting wars through incitement by political leaders.

# CHAPTER FIVE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

## 5.1 Introduction

*Man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (Martin Luther King, Jr.).*

Conflict is a reality that will always exist in society or the world. The choice lies in how people respond to and resolve conflicts. Conflict transformation goes beyond resolving existing conflicts by creating structures that stop the recurrence of the same conflicts while, at the same time, improving relationships. This is an effort to achieve an optimum situation, which Johan Galtung has referred to as “positive peace”. This is a peace that is devoid of structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1969: 183). It breaks the cycle of conflict and improves relations. Conflict transformation focuses on the relationship between the parties. If this can be improved, outbreaks of violence can be minimized.

Conflicts do exist in the world and communities. They have been in existence from the formation of the world and will always be present. One cannot simply wish them away. Rather, one must acknowledge conflicts as an existing reality and develop meaningful processes to transform them. Conflict transformation through nonviolence is one of the best means to navigate through conflict situations.

Conflict refers to incompatible goals or interests. It is the divergence of needs and ideas between parties or ideals. These include the tensions and clashes between ideas, interests, cultures, and goals. It is a reality to be addressed and is not necessarily negative. Beneficial outcomes would be gained if a conflict is handled constructively as, ultimately, conflicts have a genesis and a prompting stimulator. These are the root causes of conflicts, which lead to tensions brought about by the incompatible goals.

Each generation in diverse communities has devised approaches to solve their conflicting endeavors. On the extreme end of the spectrum, violence has been one way to

accomplish this. In an interview with George Lakey, a peace scholar and activist, Lakey stated that violence is the old manner and way of dealing with violence and that it shows a lack of imagination, rather people should use creative nonviolence means to transform conflict (Wanjala 2012). Nonviolence is to be encouraged as the new paradigm.

Johan Galtung spoke of three types of violence: direct, structural, and cultural violence. In his training manual on violence, he wrote that “the roots of violence are in two human constructions, bad structures, and bad cultures” (Galtung 2000: 2).

Direct violence involves the participation of an actor to cause harm and inflict pain, destruction, or death to an individual, a people, or a nation (Galtung 1990: 292). This is always the most visible form of violence but not necessarily the most harmful. In direct violence, one can see people engaged in combat and fights using weapons such as machetes, guns, chemical weapons, and drones.

In structural violence, Galtung explained that “the violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969: 171). These are the structures found in the governance and social fabric of a community or nation. The structures might be embedded in the constitution or laws of a group or institution. Often, the laws tend to privilege the elite and those in power (ibid.). In contrast, the rules are unjust and oppressive to those living on the margins. The unjust laws might lead to great suffering and deaths for the marginalized. The suffering and deaths caused by this structural violence might be greater than those caused by direct violence. Unfortunately, structural violence is very much embedded in many African countries, including Kenya.

Cultural violence “is any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural forms” (Galtung 1990: 291). A people or community always have a culture that binds them together. Culture is used to both include and exclude individuals in a group. It sets the values and norms that bind the group together. Usually, those who belong to a specific group and culture do enjoy some privileges and values. The excluded

are denied these rights through design and by default. In extreme cases, the excluded are exploited and subjected to suffering, which is always justified. This can be seen through acts involving racism, tribalism, and nationalism. There has been cultural, structural, and direct violence between the Bukusu and the Nandi of Trans Nzoia County.

Peace does not mean the absence of war. Galtung (1969: 183) coined the terms *positive peace* and *negative peace* to explicate this:

- Negative Peace*: This refers to a situation where there is no war or fighting. There will be a conflict, but this has been suppressed through coercion, force, or otherwise. The presence of either structural or cultural violence or both is manifested.
- *Positive Peace*: This is the absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence. In addition, there is the presence of social justice.

Violence is a common way of handling conflicts, but there are nonviolent alternatives. Nonviolent means have been employed to respond to conflicts since time immemorial and can be categorized into three major categories, which the thesis addresses: these are firstly, conflict management; secondly, conflict resolution; and thirdly, conflict transformation.

## **5.2 Conflict Management**

Conflict management is the earliest and dominant school of thought that was embraced to address violent conflict before the arrival of the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Paffenholz 2009: 3). Its emphasis is on bringing a violent conflict to a halt. It focuses on immediate ceasefires and aims at stopping violence or its escalation through a third party. This can be done through diplomacy, coercion, or both. The use of force or another form of armed violence is a possibility. The purpose is to bring the fighting to an end by whatever means possible. The book entitled *A glossary of terms and concepts in peace and conflict studies* observes that conflict management involves “interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. Rarely are conflicts completely resolved. More often,

they are reduced, downgraded, or contained” (Miller 2005: 23). The emphasis is on containing the conflict or violence. Conflict management does not seek to go deeper and address other underlying issues. It is mostly enforced by a powerful and influential third party whose interest would be to end the immediate conflict. Their interest is to contain the situation but not necessarily to resolve the conflict.

Conflict management is concerned more with controlling and limiting violence. Its result is to contain and end a conflict situation. It might encourage a ceasefire in ongoing violence and suppress the escalation of violence. This is the method mostly used in Kenya to suppress violence between micronations (Kimenyi and Ndugu 2005: 152). The Bukusu–Nandi conflict in Trans Nzoia has been treated in the same manner.

### **5.3 Conflict Resolution**

Conflict resolution attempts to delve deeper into the conflict than conflict management. It not only seeks to end a violent situation but also attempts to address underlying issues. Oliver Ramsbotham defined conflict resolution as follows:

Conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behavior is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed (Ramsbotham 2011: 31).

Conflict resolution intends to end the violence, and, at the same time, employs instruments that address the root causes of a conflict. It seeks to change violent behavior and encourages conversation and understanding. Miller wrote that:

Conflict resolution involves recognition by the clashing parties of one another's interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence. The most effective forms identify the underlying causes of the conflict and address them through solutions that are mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and sustaining (Miller 2005: 25).

Conflict resolution, as a theory and field of study, came to the fore after the First and Second World Wars. This occurred from 1944 through to the 1960s. The devastation

caused by these wars – which was followed afterward by the Cold War between the two-power axis of the West, led by the USA (capitalism), versus the East, led by the USSR (communism) – catalyzed the evolution of conflict resolution as a field of research and study (Menkel-Meadow 2013: 36). It borrowed from the fields of philosophy, sociology, and international relations, among other fields.

As a field of study, it continues to evolve and take shape. Research continues to be carried out, and new knowledge is attained. It is being practiced in diverse fields and situations from micro one-on-one personal/family interactions to macro levels with interstate confrontations. Louis Kriesberg wrote:

Contemporary conflict resolution differs in several ways from many traditional conflict resolution methods. The differences include the emphasis put upon conflict processes that generate solutions yielding some mutual gains for the opposing sides. In addition, the contemporary approach builds on academic research and theorizing, as well as traditional and innovative practices. It tends to stress relying minimally, if at all, on violence in waging and settling conflicts. Finally, it tends to emphasize the role of external intermediaries in the ending of conflicts (Kriesberg 2009: 16).

Louis Kriesberg attempted to provide the chronological progress of conflict resolution and peace studies. He proceeded to classify these periods as the formative (1914–1945), foundational (1946–1969), growth and spread (1970–1989), and diffusion from 1989 onwards (Kriesberg 2009: 17). The researcher followed this pattern as a guide in understanding the developments of conflict resolution. The evolution of conflict resolution and conflict transformation is of interest to this study.

### **5.3.1 Formative Years (1914–1945)**

Many societal developments in the period between the outbreak of World War I and the end of World War II were the precursors for contemporary conflict resolution. They include research and social innovations that highlighted alternative ways of thinking about and conducting conflicts and ending them. The variety of sources in the emergence of conflict resolution resulted in diverse perspectives and concerns in the field, which produced continuing tensions and disagreements (Kriesberg 2009: 18).

### 5.3.2 Foundational Years (1946–1969)

Many governmental and nongovernmental actions were undertaken to prevent future wars by building new transnational institutions and fostering reconciliation between former enemies. Globally, this was evident in the establishment of the UN; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Monetary Fund; and the World Bank (Kriesberg 2009: 19). In his work entitled *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Oliver Ramsbotham noted that:

The new field of conflict resolution in the 1950s defined itself in relation to the challenge of understanding and transforming destructive human conflicts of this kind. In contrast to older established fields, such as international relations, conflict resolution was to be:

- Multilevel: analysis and resolution had to embrace all levels of conflict: intrapersonal (inner conflict), interpersonal, intergroup (families, neighborhoods, affiliations), international, regional, global, and the complex interplays between them;
- Multidisciplinary: to learn how to address complex conflict systems adequately, the new field had to draw on many disciplines, including politics, international relations, strategic studies, development studies, individual and social psychology, etc.;
- Multicultural: since human conflict is a worldwide phenomenon within an increasingly intricate and interconnected local/global cultural web, this had to be a truly cooperative international enterprise, in terms of both the geographical locations where conflict is encountered and the conflict resolution initiatives deployed to address them;
- Both analytic and normative: the foundation of the study of conflict was to be systematic analysis and interpretation of the 'statistics of deadly quarrels' (polymology), but this was to be combined from the outset with the normative aim of learning how better thereby to transform potentially violent conflict into non-violent processes of social, political and other forms of change;
- Both theoretical and practical: the conflict resolution field was to be constituted by a constant mutual interplay between theory and practice: only when theoretical understanding and practical experience of what works and what does not work are connected can properly informed experience develop (Ramsbotham 2011: 8).



### **5.3.3 Growth and Spread (1970–1989)**

In the early 1970s, the Cold War became more managed; a variety of arms control agreements between the USA and the USSR were reached and a détente led to more cultural exchanges between the people of the two countries. Furthermore, steps toward the nominalization of the United States (US) relations with the People's Republic of China were taken. However, at the end of the 1970s, US–Soviet antagonism markedly rose, triggered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and intensified during the first administration of Ronald Reagan. Finally, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen to lead the Soviet Union, which accelerated the Soviet transformation that resulted in the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Kriesberg 2009: 21).

### **5.3.4 Diffusion (1989 onwards)**

The world environment was profoundly changed by the ending of the Cold War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the end of the Cold War, the UN was better able to take actions to stop conflicts from escalating destructively, and consequently, wars that had been perpetuated as proxy wars were settled (Kriesberg 2009: 24).

Over time, the field has been widely embraced. Much has been learned and gained. It has grown and expanded in the academic field as well as conflict situations between individuals, groups, and nations, but it has not brought solutions to all conflict situations.

## **5.4 Conflict Transformation**

There has been a recent transition from conflict resolution to conflict transformation by peace scholars such as Paul Lederach. To explain this shift, Lederach has highlighted these differences, as given in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1:** Conflict resolution and conflict transformation: A brief comparison of perspective

<b>Comparison Factor</b>	<b>Conflict Resolution Perspective</b>	<b>Conflict Transformation Perspective</b>
The key question	How do we end something not desired?	How do we end something destructive and build something desired?
The focus	It is content centered.	It is relationship centered.
The purpose	To achieve an agreement and solution to the presenting problem creating the crisis	To promote constructive change processes, inclusive of – but not limited to – immediate solutions
The development of the process	It is embedded and built around the immediacy of the relationship where the presenting problems appear.	It is concerned with responding to symptoms and engaging the systems within which relationships are embedded.
Time frame	The horizon is short term.	The horizon is mid to long range.
View of conflict	It envisions the need to de-escalate conflict processes.	It envisions conflict as a dynamic of ebbs (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive change) and flows (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change).

Source: Lederach (2003: 33)

Conflict transformation **builds** from conflict management and conflict resolution. Conflict transformation delves deeper into conflict situations than conflict resolution. The emphasis of conflict transformation is both short and long term. Whereas parties to a conflict can resolve it and be happy with the outcome but still hate, fear, and mistrust each other, the higher aim in conflict transformation is to transform the relationship into one of love, care and respect, where each party wants the best for each other (Lederach 2012).

John Paul Lederach and Diane Francis are key scholars, peacebuilding practitioners, and promoters of the conflict transformation theory. They have both been influenced by their religious heritage, research backgrounds, and direct involvement in conflict situations. They are affiliates of historic peace churches; Lederach is from the Mennonite church (Lederach 2003: 4), and Diane is a Quaker (<http://www.dianafrancis.info/>). Religion has,

therefore, contributed to shaping peace studies and the conflict transformation theory. Lederach's work on the conflict transformation theory will be a key pillar in this research study.

Francis (2009) posits that conflict transformation emphasizes just relationships, partnership and mutual care. It involves interdependence and acknowledges that all have something positive to give. Conflicts are resolved constructively through nonviolence. Engages players at different levels, values contributions of all with a bottom-up approach. The process as well as the outcome of peacebuilding activity is valued. There is common good and respect that brings dignity for all. Responsibly shared political power and economic privileges where all are involved (Francis 2009: 7).

Miall (2004: 6) wrote that Lederach "sees peacebuilding as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy". Lederach himself defined conflict transformation as follows:

Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships (Lederach 2003: 14).

Lederach proceeded to explain keywords as contained in his definition. According to Lederach, semantics are loaded with meanings that must be considered seriously (Lederach 2003: 3). This is regarding transformation and resolution, where some scholars are of the view that the definition and explanation of conflict transformation are filled with rhetoric that might lack substance to differentiate it from conflict resolution.

Fischer and Ropers (2004: 13) viewed conflict transformation as referring to both the structure of conflicts and the process of moving toward "just peace". This opens a wide range of issues on the notion and definition of peace and the priorities to be set within conflict transformation. The ways in which structures should be transformed may be normatively preconceived: Francis (2004), for example, conceived of conflict transformation as necessarily linked to power asymmetries, gender inequalities, and

cultural differences. The normatively tainted long-term objectives of conflict transformation and its rather abstract content definition make it prone to an inflationary inflow of all types of problem issues, viewed by the respective authors as structural dimensions of conflicts. However, these dimensions are not all necessarily constitutive elements of conflict transformation. From a short- to mid-term perspective, conflict transformation should allow for an absence of, or at least for a reduction in, violence. The envisaged transformation of parties' perspectives and interests occurs with the long-term perspective of fundamental change. However, in reality, this change may be of a far more limited nature than that which an all-encompassing notion of peace would suggest. The latter should be seen as a long-term objective, perhaps even as a regulative idea, the components of which need not all be concretized in real-life conflict transformation.

Conflict transformation is essentially concerned with the understanding of conflicts, dimensions of interventions, and specific objectives: conflicts are seen as catalysts of change. Interventions should focus on the structural dimensions of conflicts with the objective of promoting the constructive impact of conflicts on social change. "conflict transformation is a process of engaging with and transforming relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflicts" (Miall 2004: 70). Transformation should reorient the specific interactions in order to minimize violence and promote the positive outcomes of these human exchanges. It should aim at removing the frequently observed helplessness of conflicting parties (Mitchell 2002: 9).

Mitchell (2002) proposed a list of common criteria with which the effectiveness of conflict transformation can or should be evaluated. His list is based on the distinctions he made between the conflict resolution and conflict transformation schools of thought. According to Mitchell (2002: 9-10), conflict transformation can be seen and evaluated as follows:

- Multi-level involvement where all community members are participants notwithstanding their social and economic status. The needs and concerns have to be heard, not only seen. Nobody is to be excluded.

- Efforts to inspire those living on the margins in the efforts for peace and justice where participation and decision making is reached from equal status.
- Attempts to ensure the affected community are actively involved in the conflict transformation processes to the full. The accord must have their input and approval.
- Focus on immediate as well as underlying deep-rooted triggers of conflict. Looks into past injustices, injuries and trauma with the aim of addressing these issues and bringing healing rather than sugarcoating the grievances.

Mitchell gave his input emphasizing that conflict transformation seeks to transform: there are personal changes, structural changes, and relationship changes. These are similar to Lederach's structure of transformation where he underscored the personal, the relational, the structural, and also the cultural changes that are key to conflict transformation. Lederach contended that the evaluation of conflict transformation processes is key within his structure for tactical and receptive peacebuilding. He wrote, "Evaluation, in other words, is not a neutral external element. It is and should be an intrinsic aspect of peacebuilding" (Lederach 1997: 109).

Lederach was specific that the emphasis in conflict transformation is on the continual reduction of violence in the world. He did not assume that all types of violence would be entirely eliminated in all parts of the universe. On the other hand, there would be an increase in justice. This is also progressive. It would not be attained wholly with one stroke. When this condition has been optimized, there would then be what Johan Galtung referred to as "positive peace" (Galtung 1969: 183). This is peace devoid of cultural, structural, and direct violence (ibid.).

Direct collaboration and social configuration are paramount. The above concerns regarding violence and justice suggest that people need to develop capacities to engage in change processes at the interpersonal, intergroup, and social structural levels (Lederach 2003: 21). Lederach explained that conflict transformation endeavors to transform conflicts through a change in various spheres and phenomena that include:

Personal: Minimize destructive effects of social conflict and maximize the potential for personal growth at physical, emotional, and spiritual levels.

Relational: Minimize poorly functioning communication and maximize understanding.

Structural: Understand and address root causes of violent conflict; promote nonviolent mechanisms; minimize violence; foster structures that meet basic human needs and maximize public participation.

Cultural: Identify and understand the cultural patterns that contribute to the rise of violent expressions of conflict; identify cultural resources for constructively handling conflict.

The essential aim is to improve human relationships through proper social structures that promote justice for all. It welcomes the participation and input of all, both those within and outside of the conflict. Hugh Miall wrote that “Conflict transformation is, therefore, a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall 2004: 4). The conceptualization of the theory emerged from very practical conversations, observation, and analysis (Lederach 2003: 3-4). Lederach (1997) described the activity of third parties in conflict transformation as peacebuilding, which has the long-term objective of transforming a war system into a peace system inspired by a quest for the values of justice, truth, and mercy. In his view, a comprehensive peace process should address complementary changes at all these levels.

This project employed action research methodology in a cyclical fashion. It involved exploration, intervention, and reflection. Lederach observed that conflict transformation involves a continuous process of action that brings change through a circular and continuous progressive line that will lead to positive peace (Lederach 2003: 41). Strategic creativity is paramount. Whereas conflict is the old way of responding to conflict, conflict transformation calls for innovative and creative nonviolent ways in responding to conflict. It approaches conflict from wholistic perspective where conflicts and relations are affected for the better.

Conflict transformation builds on conflict management and conflict resolution. It is a form of evolution that has explored even better ways to accept, confront, address, and

transform conflict using learned new dynamics and skills. Lederach has learned some of his skills from other peace scholars, such as Galtung. According to him, conflict transformation aims at bringing positive peace in a conflict situation, as aspired to by Galtung.

Conflict transformation begins with acknowledging the obvious reality of the existence of conflicts, and it proceeds a little further by not only acknowledging these realities but also inferring that there is good that can be attained when proper tools are used for engagements. Conflicts must be positively viewed as symptoms needing a remedy. The management of the symptoms/conflict brings health and healing to the body and society. Therefore, in conflict transformation, when tensions are positively handled, they bring about healing and give birth to new and better life situations.

Conflict transformation is a long-term endeavor that continually seeks to reduce direct, cultural, and structural violence in society. Instead, it increases prospects for positive peace. The violence must decrease while positive peace increases. The ideal situation is reached when perfect positive peace is attained. As much as this is envisioned, Lederach has not claimed that this is fully achievable or that it is easy. Instead, he has suggested that achieving the ideal is an ongoing endeavor.

Conflict transformation employs means that encourage dialogue to bring both short- and long-term changes. The focus is to end direct, cultural, and structural violence. It looks at addressing all the underlying causes of violence, both personal and communal. From his personal experience, Lederach has implied that he has practically engaged in it and encourages others to do the same. It is realistically doable and practical.

Conflict transformation provides the theoretical foundation of the mediation program between the Bukusu and the Nandi of Trans Nzoia, which was developed in the research project.

## 5.5 Prevention Versus Treatment

The title of William Stafford's (2003) book, *every war has two losers*, highlights the irrationality of violence. The parties involved in violence ultimately invest a substantive number of resources in the war, whether they triumph or are vanquished. The cost involved might vary, but a price will be paid. The party that wins the fight usually does so at a cost, more often involving prohibitive costs. One reason that is supposed to deter would-be confronters to engage in a violent conflict should be counting the costs to be accrued upfront. The costs here include lives, finances, and time, among others.

War or violence has its price. Usually, violence is supposed to injure and harm. This would include the loss of lives, body injuries, displacements, the destruction of properties, and the separation of families. The question one can ask is, why should human beings afflict harm on each other when there are many alternatives through nonviolence dispute resolution means?

The resources funding violence can rather be channeled to meet other basic human needs, such as food and proper nutrition, health, education, and shelter. Peace activists and scholars have observed that it costs less to resolve conflict through nonviolent means compared to war or violence. Dietrich Fischer wrote that "the costs for a peacekeeping operation are therefore about one million times as large as those for an effort at mediation" (Fisher 2006: 13).

Preventing violence is better than mitigating it. Every effort must be put in place to prevent violent situations. These would mediate through dialogue. Engaging and "listening patiently to all parties' grievances, engaging them in constructive dialogues, and helping them find solutions that transcend the contradictions underlying the conflict and meet the basic needs of all parties" is needed (ibid.: 14).



## **5.6 Conclusion**

Conflict transformation addresses the immediate conflict, the underlying causes of which are issues of the past, and it also looks to the future where it envisions a community and world where positive peace thrives. While considering the past, trauma and hurts have to be addressed such those issues are not assumed but positive engagements are employed instead to resolve the conflict. The immediate issues have to be addressed wholly, bringing in the voice and contributions of all participants without undermining the dignity and input of any person or community. They come into conversation as equals with the aim of building a future where peace and justice for all reign.

In the researcher's view, conflict transformation must be embraced and encouraged. This is the only way that will make the world a better place to live in. The energy and resources invested in sustaining conflict and violence are excessive. The cost in terms of material resources and human lives is exorbitant. If only a fraction of the same is invested in conflict transformation, many lives and resources will be saved.

## CHAPTER SIX: DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

*The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue (Dalai Lama 1997).*

### 6.1 Introduction

Various parties have intervened to resolve and transform conflicts in Africa. The interveners have been state, non-state, internal, and external agencies (Miall 2004: 2). These have included governments, international and local NGOs, individuals, and even the UN, among others. Peacekeeping missions led by the UN and other agencies have been carried out in many African countries. Their interventions have mainly concentrated on conflict management and resolution. An innovative approach of conflict transformation through LPCs is gaining traction, though.


Violence has been engaged to manage and resolve conflict in diverse situations and cultures. The consequences of this have been immense in terms of the costs involved and lives lost. Because of this, peace proponents continue to champion nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts. There are many traditional nonviolent means that have been used since time immemorial, and new ones are emerging.

Military interventions or violent uprisings by armed civilians are also promoted to manage conflict. In violent situations, peacekeeping agents have enhanced peace enforcement in efforts to sustain conflict management. Conflict resolution continues to be employed to resolve conflicts. Conflict transformation is a very important tool in peacebuilding.

## 6.2 Interventions

### 6.2.1 Some Common Interventions

Conflict management, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation are some of the main interventions commonly applied in violent situations. In the past, conflict resolution was used, and it is from this that conflict transformation has emerged as an even better means of intervention as visualized by peace scholars such as Lederach (2003) and Francis (2010) when compared to the former. Through various instruments, such as dialogue and LPCs, conflict transformation is a key pillar in peacebuilding. It helps in diffusing conflict and increasing positive peace. Figure 6.1 shows how these interventions work.



**Figure 6.1:** The hourglass model: conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict transformation. Source: Ramsbotham (2011: 14).

### 6.2.2 Violent Interventions

Military or violent interventions have several negative ramifications compared with nonviolence alternatives. The consequences include deaths, injuries, displacements, the destruction of properties, and rape. Writing for the Social Development Department of the World Bank in an article entitled *The cost of organized violence*, Stergios Skaperdas stated that:

[Violence leads to the] destruction of capital, investment, and capital flight. Infrastructure—roads, bridges, railroads, public buildings, hospitals—are often at the center of fighting between rebels and governments. Private capital, such as factories and housing and cattle, are also often subject to significant destruction (World Bank 2009: 7).

Violence, as stated above negatively impacted the economy. The World Bank (2009: 6-11) report gave the following figures on the ramifications of violent conflict:

- The rate of economic growth declines by 50%.
- The GDP decreases by 6% on average.
- The military budget increases always on an average of 4.5% of the GDP.
- 16.2 million have died as a direct consequence of civil wars in the period from 1945 to 1999.
- Refugees and IDPs were 32.9 million in 2006.

Other effects include rape, trauma, and other indirect costs on the economy and people's well-being. In its report entitled *The Economic Value of Peace: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict*, the IEP (2016: 39) observed that:

Spending on peace building and peacekeeping is insignificant compared to total economic losses from conflict. \$8.27 billion was spent on peacekeeping in 2013, only 1.1 per cent of the estimated losses from conflict in 2015 which were estimated at \$739 billion.

This is in accordance with Dietrich Fischer's conclusion that "The costs for a peacekeeping operation are therefore about one million times as large as those for an effort at mediation" (Fischer 2006: 13). The cost of war and violence is exorbitant, yet countries and communities continue investing in them. The IEP (2016: 39), in its Figure 33 entitled "Cost of conflict compared to official development assistance, UN peacekeeping and peace building spending, 2015", showed that the UN's expenditure in peacebuilding was very small in relation to losses incurred from violent conflict:

- US\$739 billion are the overall economic losses incurred because of violent conflicts in 2015.
- The total official development assistance (ODA) disbursed was US\$167 billion (22% of the economic loss of conflict).
- The amount spent by the UN for peacekeeping was US\$8.27 billion (1.1% of the loss).
- The amount spent from the budget allocated to peacebuilding in 31 conflict-affected countries was US\$6.8 billion (0.9% of the loss).

Comparing the above and the costs with such consequences, other alternatives must be explored. Therefore, conflict transformation becomes a better tool to reduce all these losses and suffering. Enhancing democracy and development and building dispute resolution capacity is the best way forward. Greater dialogue and LPCs are the best instruments to spearhead this.

### 6.3 Dialogue

*Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter*  
(Martin Luther King, Jr. 1965).

Talking, listening, and understanding are some of the most important instincts that human beings possess. They are abilities that humans can use to either build or destroy. Positively, their potency must be used for peacebuilding. Dialogue, as a tool for conflict transformation, must be encouraged.

Diverse individuals have expressed their views on and definitions of dialogue in peacebuilding. David Holloway, of the organization named *Community Dialogue*, stated that:

Dialogue is a more effective way of having conversations or discussions about contentious issues. The word dialogue comes from the Greek word dialogos. Logos means 'the word'. Dia means 'through'. Dialogue, therefore, suggests a stream of meaning flowing among, through and between us, out of which may

emerge some new understanding. As such it is a process rather than a result (Holloway 2004: 2).

In the Mediation & Dialogue Guidebook, Quamber (2013: 13) wrote that “Dialogue is an open-ended communication between conflict parties that is facilitated or moderated by a third party, to foster mutual recognition, understanding, empathy and trust”.

Dialogue involves having conversations at a deeper level and processing the issues discussed, issues that will bring about positive peace in this context. It involves reaching out and understanding others as they also understand one. It is an ongoing process that gives birth to questions to be pondered and an effort to bring conflicting parties together to speak about and resolve issues nonviolently.

### **6.3.1 Intergroup Contact Theory in Reducing Prejudice**

In the period directly after the Second World War, an American social scientist, Gordon Allport (1954), proposed the contact theory. The theory explored the impact of conscious efforts by groups when they come into contact with each other to foster better relations. He developed a hypothesis that helps in understanding group dynamics concerning contact and intergroup relations as the groups work toward a goal. The premise is that contact between outgroups reduce the intolerance between them and also changes attitudes within an ingroup (Tropp and Pettigrew 2006: 766). His famous theory posits those positive impacts of intergroup contact ensuing specifically under the following major situations: “equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom” (Pettigrew 1998: 66). Since then, scholars have engaged the hypothesis, appreciating Allport’s contribution and making reflections. His theory can be summarized as in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1:** Summary of Allport's Contact theory

Condition	Meaning	Example	Evidence
Equal Status	Members of the contact situation should not have an unequal, hierarchical relationship.	Members should not have an employer/employee, or instructor/student relationship.	Evidence has documented that equal status is important both <i>prior</i> to (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) and <i>during</i> (Cohen & Lotan, 1995) the contact situation.
Cooperation	Members should work together in a non-competitive environment.	Students working together in a group project.	Aronson's 'jigsaw technique' structures classrooms so that students strive cooperatively (Aronson & Patnoe, 1967), and this technique has led to positive results in a variety of countries
Common Goals	Members must rely on each other to achieve their shared desired goal.	Members of a sports team.	hu and Griffey (1985) have shown the importance of common goals in interracial athletic teams who need to work together to achieve their goal.
Support by Social and Institutional Authorities	There should not be social or institutional authorities that explicitly or implicitly sanction contact, and there should be authorities that support positive contact.	There should not be official laws enforcing segregation.	Landis' (1984) work on the importance of institutional support in reducing prejudice in the military.

Source: Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux (2007)

Essentially, then, the outgroups enter into a dialogue as equals in the specific situation and context (Galtung 2000: 159). No one group should bring in a sense of superiority or inferiority because this will result in a lack of equilibrium (Pettigrew 1998: 66). They have to be of equal status as they engage. Society has been bedeviled by stereotypes that denigrate and justify perceptions of groups or persons. Because of this, people's minds are closed and, therefore, not ready to think beyond their preconditioned knowledge. Ignorance has negatively influenced intergroup relations (Stephan and Stephan 1984). Groups/persons have to consciously engage with an open mind, and no group should come with any form of entitlement. In most cases, status and entitlement have been a cause of conflict. The entitled person will want to have their way and more say, essentially dictating rather than reaching out. On the other hand, the undermined group desires to be heard and given dignity. Dignity is at the core of all human beings.

They must have the same goal: reducing prejudice (Allport 1954). The purpose and focus will be the same, and, therefore, instead of pulling apart, they will be working toward

synchronizing their efforts. The participants have to work together to achieve their anticipated shared objective (Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2007).

The groups must cooperate and work with rather than against each other (Allport 1954). This means that they have to cooperate instead of competing (Pettigrew 1998: 66); that is, there should be cooperation where members work together in a noncompetitive environment, an example being students working together in a class project (Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2007). They will pass or fail together. Therefore, a win-win formula works for the benefit of all, with this being a major component of conflict transformation.

The process should be supported by the law and customs of the community or country (Allport 1954). Support by social and institutional authorities makes the process legitimate, impacting positively on its durability (Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2007). Considering that Allport developed the theory when America was embroiled in racial segregation that was structurally sanctioned, sometimes the laws of a country have worked contrary to positive peace. Nonetheless, there should be an authority that supports positive contact between groups such that the contact takes place with the laws of the country or community.

Thomas F. Pettigrew is among the scholars who have continued to interact and reflect on Allport's theory. While he has affirmed that the above conditions are fertile grounds for successful dialogues, he has added that several current researchers have added a fifth element to be factored in, which is the "friendship potential" (Pettigrew 1998: 80). Pettigrew noted that these conditions sometimes intermingle and overlap in intricate modes (ibid.: 77). They are all present and active in different stages of the dialogue process without necessarily following a specific order.

The purpose of contact is to effect change. The first stage is "learning about the out-group". Acquiring correct knowledge about the respective groups removes stereotypes and negativities (Pettigrew 1998: 70). This will help in modifying the behaviors of the outgroup (ibid.: 71), generate effectiveness and empathy, and lead to ingroup reappraisal



(ibid.: 72). Ingroup members have outgroup friends, which improves their attitudes toward the outgroup (Zhou *et al.* 2019).

#### **a. Improving Relations Between Conservatives and Liberals**

Manbeck *et al.* (2018) implemented a psychotherapeutic approach to improve relations and decrease demonization between conservatives and liberals. The study participants attended a workshop in which they were split into either a group of mixed liberals and conservatives or a group of only liberals. They were then encouraged to disclose vulnerabilities related to personally significant political issues and express their responsiveness to other participants' vulnerabilities. The analysis of the results revealed significant decreases in the demonization of the opposing group as well as increases in positive attitudes (Manbeck *et al.* 2018). Together, these results suggest that exposure to opposing political perspectives can increase both understanding and tolerance of those viewpoints and positive attitudes toward those who express them.

The inclination to employ spontaneous perspective-taking may also be influenced by whether an individual is open to contact with members of the outgroup. A person who is both open to experience and inclined toward perspective-taking will, presumably, be more likely to respond positively to intergroup contact – and experience reduced levels of intergroup prejudice as a result (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008).

With increasing political polarization, however, fewer people are willing, able, and/or interested in genuinely engaging with those in opposing political groups. Thus, even people who are more open to experience and inclined toward perspective-taking will not necessarily have a chance to make use of this as there is less engagement across political lines when political self-segregation is higher.

#### **b. Intergroup Attitudes in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Race has become the dominant concept in explaining and analysing South African society, and this preoccupation with racial divisions can be perceived throughout the historical development of intergroup relations in South Africa. Bornman (2011) aimed to

provide insight into racial attitudes in South Africa after the advent of the new political dispensation since 1994. He provided further insight into evolving patterns of intergroup attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa by comparing the results of studies on intergroup attitudes conducted in 1998, 2001, and 2009 (Bornman 2011: 736). It was noted that the intergroup attitudes of all South African groups had become more positive toward all other groups since 1994.

Three surveys were conducted, and the results give the impression that the main hypothesis can be accepted, namely, that the attitudes of all South African groups toward all other groups have become more positive as democracy has progressed in the new South African dispensation, which is in accordance with other studies (Bornman 2011: 743). The studies indicate that South Africans living in more urbanized and affluent areas hold more positive intergroup attitudes than the population as a whole, and this is explained by enhanced intergroup contact, extended contact effects, as well as higher educational levels. The three studies identified a degree of tension between particular groups, such as Blacks and two White groups, which is explained by factors such as emerging patterns of social identification and increased intergroup competition within the new dispensation and theories on group position and social dominance (Bornman 2011: 746). The results demonstrate that a new political dispensation that ensures social and political equality in a *democracy does not necessarily solve the problems associated with intergroup relations* once and for all. The complex interaction between a number of factors on various levels can enhance current forms of group identification or give rise to new forms of group awareness that can, in turn, lead to intergroup competition, the experience of threats to the ingroup, and relative deprivation (Bornman 2011: 746).

Bornman (2011: 746) concluded that a promising result in the study is the indication that individual characteristics, such as a *higher educational level, may give rise to more positive attitudes toward other groups* and that ongoing social scientific research on the individual, cultural, and political factors that influence intergroup relations also remains important.

### **c. Reducing Prejudice Between the Bukusu and the Nandi in Trans Nzoia**

Intergroup contact between the Bukusu and the Nandi was encouraged in the project. Essentially, the dialogue sessions were an effort to increase contact and sharing between the two communities. Through this sharing, it was expected that they would reach out to each other more, speak about stereotypes, and reduce prejudice. During the dialogue sessions, five conditions were to be considered: “equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; the support of authorities, law, or custom; and that the dialogue should have potential to foster friendship” (Pettigrew 1998: 66). The researcher, therefore, endeavored to ensure that in the dialogue sessions, the Bukusu and the Nandi met as equal participants in status, and the goal was to transform their relationships and they were to cooperate – the support of the relevant authority was sought through the gatekeeper’s letter, and there was room to promote friendship between Bukusu and Nandi participants.

#### **6.3.2 Dialogue as a Theory**

Dialogue, as a theory in conflict transformation, is multifaceted. It is an instrument that can be used during distinct phases of a conflict (Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou 2006: 78). The stages are the periods before a conflict, within it, or after the conflict has taken place. It complements or differs from other processes depending on the nature and phase of conflict. There are no one-size-fits-all solution for every situation. It needs some favorable conditions and should ensure that it complements other diplomatic processes. Dialogue is different from banal conversations because it is not a contest or debate (UNDP 2009: 3) but rather a deeper discussion. Dialogue, therefore, plays diverse roles, the major one being midwifing the transformation of a violent conflict situation through constructive conversations into a peaceful one, with a view of attaining positive peace.

Dialogue complements negotiation processes. During negotiations, parties have dialogues, and the major aim of a negotiation is conflict settlement. On the other hand,, dialogue is an ongoing process that narrows the gap between communities through their

sharing of stories and visions, which, in effect, leads to new insights and innovations (UNDP 2009: 3). It is a cycle of rediscovery that fits well with action research.

Mediation is a tool used more in conflict management, settlement, and resolution. Whereas dialogue does the same, it goes a step further by adding conflict transformation to its tools. The aim of mediation is helping the conflicting parties to explore and address the underlying causes of their conflict, after which the parties should reach an agreeable solution (Quamber 2013: 14). The solution might not necessarily be favorable or meet each of their expectations. Dialogue might be part of the mediation process. The role of dialogue in conflict management, settlement, resolution, and transformation is presented in Table 6.2.

**Table 6.2:** Approach to conflict management

<b>Approach to Conflict Management</b>	<b>Notion of Conflict</b>	<b>Preferred Practical Approach</b>	<b>Measures of Success</b>	<b>Role of Dialogue Projects</b>
Conflict Settlement	Conflict as a problem of the status quo and political order	Track 1: Diplomacy and power politics at official leadership level	Results-oriented: political settlements with stabilizing effect	Organizing pre-negotiations Promoting a political climate of understanding
Conflict Resolution	Conflict as a catalyst of social change	Track 2: Direct civil society conflict management, especially at the middle-ranking leadership level	Process-oriented: improved communication, interaction, and relations between parties; respect for different collective identities	Creating a leadership class with experience in dialoguing Workshops on communication, problem-solving, etc.
Conflict Transformation	Conflict as nonviolent struggle for social justice	Track 3: Strengthening capacities of disadvantaged groups to act/deal with conflict and capacity of divided/war-traumatized societies to integrate	Structure-oriented: elimination of socioeconomic inequalities between identity groups; good governance; power sharing; creation of cross-cutting civil society structure; building conflict management capacities at the grassroots level	Practicing communication and interaction skills  Providing opportunities for encounters and learning among polarized groups  Empowering groups

Source: Ropers (2004: 9)


There is a difference between a dialogue and a debate. This is well illustrated in *the mediation and Dialogue Guide book* (Quamber 2013: 14) and discussed in this section. In dialogue, concerted effort is made toward reaching an understanding of each other. Debates tend to be oppositional. In debates, the purpose is to prove that the other party/parties are incorrect, whereas in dialogue, there is a collaborative effort to understand the other. The aim is to establish a common ground, but in a debate, the goal is to become the winner. In dialogue, there is much listening to the other player(s) to gain a better understanding of their situation and find meaning with the purpose of reaching an agreement. In a debate, the aim is to listen and find faults in order to criticize and argue.

A dialogue enlarges the other party's perspective and, at times, helps them to change their positions. On the contrary, a debate serves to strengthen and confirm one's view. It defends assumptions as being true. Dialogue promotes reflections and the evaluation of given assumptions and opens the prospects for alternative and better solutions than former positions envisaged before the start of the dialogue. Debate is close-minded and not open to alternative views. It is conceited and critical of other people's views. The parties assume that they are correct and unwaveringly defend their positions.

Dialogue involves giving one's best view with the knowledge that, if anything, it will be strengthened by the other persons' input and suggestions. It is receptive and acknowledges others' contributions. On the other hand, in debates, one defends their thoughts to prove that they are correct. They view other peoples' input as hindrances and challenges that must be proven wrong. In a dialogue, it is acknowledged that people have parts of solutions that, when brought together, realize a better workable solution. Dialogue is continuously open to new insights and positive contributions. Debates are closed when the winner has their way (Quamber 2013: 18). The table gives a detailed definition of dialogue, as compared to a debate, which involves more of a competition.

### 6.3.6 Dialogue in Practice

A person or entity usually initiates a dialogue to bring about conflict transformation in a conflict situation. In most cases, the initiator is a third party. The person reaches out to a conflicting party, inviting them to dialogue. Key scholars, including Johan Galtung, Jay Rothman, and Norbert Rogers, are of the view that dialogue involves **four** phases (Ropers 2004: 3), namely, contact, analyzing issues, explorative problem solving, and joint action. McCartney (1986) adds mutual understanding that's part of contact, and pre-negotiation that is part of joint action, making the stages six. The stages can, thus, be summarized as in Figure 6.2.



**Figure 6.2:** Dialogue Phases. Source: McCartney (1986).


#### **a. Phase I**

Phase I involves contact and mutual understanding of the conflict and the peoples involved and an effort to comprehend the problem and touch base with the conflicting parties. Two questions are imperative at this stage: (i) “what is the conflict about?”, and (ii) “how did the conflict occur?”. The goal is to develop an understanding of all actors, their behaviors/strategies and relationships, and the contradictions (Graf, Kramer and

Nicolescou 2006: 78). Every effort must be made to understand what the conflict entails. Assumptions and biases must not be tolerated. Rather, facts and a background on the situation and everyone involved must be gathered, moving *from antagonism to empathy* (ibid.).

### **b. Phase II**

Phase II involves analyzing and reflecting on underlying issues. Conflict analysis must be undertaken. The underlying causes of the conflict include the values held by the involved parties and their fears, needs, experiences, and hopes, considering the entire context and what the situation would become if the conflict is not addressed. Galtung's ABC triangle (Figure 6.3), which considers the "attitude, behavior, and contradictions", is one of the tools that can be used in this phase.



**Figure 6.3:** Galtung's ABC triangle. Source: Galtung (1997: 72).



Taking a critical look at the issues, as presented in the ABC triangle, will help the initiator of the dialogue process to analyze the conflict, hence moving from *empathy to creativity* (Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou 2006: 78).

**c. Phase III**

Phase III involves explorative problem solving. With the analyzed data, the data provides enough information to explore an entry point in finding solutions and embarking on problem solving. This could start with the identification and isolation of common attentions and similar desires and concerns, with the aim of bringing the conflicting parties together to form a team to resolve less contentious issues (Ropers 2004: 4). This is an initial involvement in nonviolent action to alleviate further destruction and embark on handling issues, finding solutions by changing negative aims and notions while assimilating the basic human desires of involved parties (Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou 2006: 79). A detailed action plan is developed, which carefully explains elaborated steps to be undertaken in moving forward.

**d. Phase IV**

Phase IV involves joint action and pre-negotiations that build from the gains achieved in phase III. A process of confidence and trust building for a negotiation environment conducive to cooperation is created. Reconciliation and peacebuilding are the goal. Ideas and methodologies for handling fundamental concerns in disputes are formulated, continuous reflections on the implementations are made, and the dialogue process is developed into practical measures for conflict transformation (Ropers 2004: 4). This is where the dialogue process is effectively tested and where the dialogues are practiced. The conversations must continue until tangible commitments and changes are made. The following is an example of the rules to be adhered to in a dialogue session (Ground Rules and Guidelines for Dialogue: 1997):

1. Everyone is encouraged to speak, but no one should be pressurized to.
2. Dialogue is a reciprocal procedure, which entails equalizing intense listening and candid authentic sharing.

3. Query what you have verbalized and what you ruminate.
4. Share what is comfortable for you; don't go beyond.
5. Don't interrupt participants who are sharing.
6. Don't offer others, let them make their own resolve.
7. Trust participants with your emotions and encounters.
8. All members' inputs and viewpoints have value.
9. Acknowledge the privilege of others who think contrarily from you.
10. Handle others the way you will expect to be handled.
11. Don't plan to represent the viewpoint of a whole group; give own personal viewpoint and emotions.
12. Do not aspire for agreement.
13. You do not need to have a clear position; it is well to be jumbled or even to modify your opinion.
14. Avail yourself in all sessions; absence can lead to detrimental consequences.
15. Be there for each other during all sessions.

### 6.3.7 Empirical Evidence

Four dialogue groups from among many will be used as examples to show how successful dialogue projects have been. The four are the *Community Dialogue* of Northern Ireland;; *The Libby and Len Traubman: Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group* of California, USA; *Dialogue in San Mateo Ixtatán*, Guatemala and *The Dialogue on the Millennium Development Goals*, Mauritania. A summary of their work and involvement in dialogue as a peacebuilding instrument has been outlined in this section.

#### a. **Community Dialogue**

A group formed to enhance and promote peace in the northern part of Ireland refers to itself as *Community Dialogue*. It has been determined to dialogue over issues impacting their future, and it has done this by enabling dialogue sessions and the production of real facts to be processed.

Website and information <https://www.communitydialogue.org/>

(Holloway 2004) observes that the armistice by the Irish Republican Army in approximately 1997 resulted in comprehensive multiparty consultations that brought forth the Belfast Agreement. This involved a period of anxiety in Northern Ireland because the future of the nations was discussed behind closed doors. Citizens across the divide were anxious because of the uncertainty of the outcome. Within this background, diverse groups agreed to do community work across Northern Ireland and came together to take stock of their experiences. There was much division, yet they forged for:

- The cross party to go for a negotiated treaty
- An accord between the Irish and British leaderships and key international partners, which included the EU and the USA administrations
- A consultative activity addressing underlying issues that were causing conflict in the relationships, relationships among Northern Ireland's two societies, the association between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and the association of the United Kingdom of Great Britain with Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

They were conscious of the real possibility of breaking ground with the historic settlement. They had to address one matter though, the involvement of ordinary citizens, because such a sensitive undertaking could not be left only to the political class. The dialogue was to be all-encompassing for ownership and sustainability. They resolved to:

- expand ownership as they processed agreeable future prospects,
- embolden informed decision making about key matters that influence their future,
- promote better perceptions of the broader policies on the key factors influencing their future, and
- nurture communication links between the wider community and the dialogues.

(Holloway 2004).

With the above perspective, Community Dialogue forged ahead to advance an inclusive dialogue process on key issues influencing their future. Essentially, Community Dialogue focuses on dialogue events. They facilitate conversations between various people and

communities concerning their future, motivating individuals to own the responsibility for their future and emerge with a greater understanding of the different, and mostly opposing, positions that they have always held, because without such an understanding, a settled future is impossible. The group, therefore, aimed to:

- cross-examine their thinking and inspire questioning; and
- promote the development of awareness of the self and others, the result of which may be unpredictable.

This was carried out through:

- the printing of deliberation papers on key issues influencing their future, and
- supporting dialogue on matters that are important to their lives and future.

Their dialogues are held in a variety of areas. These include 1-day sessions in homes, churches, hotel schools, and community places. The activities are carried out throughout Northern Ireland. Organized, extended residential sessions are also undertaken in other countries for communities in Northern Ireland where international guests or visitors also occasionally participate.

Diverse people participate in Community Dialogue sessions: the rich and the poor, those from cities and rural people, young and old people, the employed and unemployed, Catholics and Protestants, unionists, minorities, businesspeople, religious leaders, and others (Holloway 2004).


The group is a work in progress and is gaining innovative ideas during their development. Presently, Community Dialogue has generated a leadership team comprised of officials from different spectra that number close to 70 peacebuilding advocates and a workforce of seven, among them being four dialogue experts. They participate passionately in dialogue activities in Northern Ireland while initiating dialogue work internationally in cooperation with Stanford University (USA), the International Peace Research Institute

(Cyprus), Bradford University (England), and the Republic of Ireland, among others (Holloway 2004).

Community Dialogue had carried out more than 500 dialogue activities by 2003. These were conducted in diverse models that included day and evening sessions, conferences, workshops, and think-tanks, including approximately 200 community meetings, close to 100 residential night events, 19 youth activities, and a dialogue involving approximately 100 participants where 6,750 members actively attended. During the same timeline, 24 radio presentations took place and over 30 newspaper items and 23 publications were published. These were efforts to encourage more dialogue through open engagements, where misconceptions were clarified. The dialogues went beyond focusing on the Belfast Agreement. They progressed to explore other current societal issues affecting the community that include wider challenges in the areas of gender conflict, other minorities, alcoholism, and substance abuse, navigating the effects of the EU and the global village world and others (Holloway 2004).

**b.      *Libby and Len Traubman: Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group***

Figure 6.4 depicts the Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group of Libby and Len Traubman.



**Figure 6.4:** Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group. Source: (Traubman and Traubman 2017).

On 6 May 2017, Libby and Len Traubman gave the 2017 Commencement Address at the Notre Dame de Namur University, Belmont, in California, USA. Addressing the graduating class, they shared their experiences, with dialogue as a peacebuilding tool. In their speech entitled *Stories of Change: Creating a Culture of Connection in The Citizens' Century*, one can learn about their dialogue group and experiences.

Figure 5.4 indicates that their dialogue models encourage individuals (Me), reaching out to the other (You), and involving many others (Community), the purpose being to connect,

open channels of communication, cooperate, and create peace. Libby and Len Traubman essentially shared their journey and experiences, with the paramount being the knowledge that conflict resolution helps in connections and getting to know the other: “Who are you? Tell me your story.” They attested that it had worked. They have been successful in bringing together an array of people from diverse demographic groups that have included African Americans and Caucasians, Jews and Palestinians, and Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The Jewish and Palestinians in diaspora leadership had invited them to facilitate dialogue sessions after they had heard about the Russian–United States successful dialogue experiment. The Jewish and Palestinian dialogue was carried out in California since the same was banned and not allowed in Israel.

Two organizations, Stanford University and Beyond War, convened a summit around the theme of “Building a Common Future” in 1991 at Redwoods, Santa Cruz. The Jewish and Palestinian community signed a paper entitled *Framework for a Public Peace Process*. The paper made it clear that “there are some things only governments can do, such as negotiating binding agreements. But there are some things that only citizens outside government can do, such as changing human relationship”. The vision and energy of the Jewish and Palestinian group was an inspiration to Libby and Len Traubman who accompanied them back to Jerusalem, Israel, and Palestine to publicize the trailblazing, groundbreaking affirmation.

For 25 years to date, Libby and Len Traubman have been hosting the Jewish Palestinian Living Room Dialogue sessions in their home in San Mateo County. By 6 May 2017, they had had 293 meetings and are still learning together. The positive impact has been an encouragement to keep them progressing with resilience. Other groups in the region, which have included Christians, Jews, and Muslims, have replicated their actions when the said groups convened a notable *Bay Area Dinner-Dialogue* with 420 Jews and Palestinians attending. This was a large, captivating event, which was broadcasted, and it continues to be an inspiration for emerging trends elsewhere.

Elie Wiesel, a friend of Libby and Len Traubman, shared an insight with them in the 1990s that *people become the stories they hear and the stories they tell*. Communication is power. This led them to develop a family website that made it easy for success stories to be availed, shared, and accessed in order to inspire relationship building among human beings. This was an effort to supplement negative stories of human failures commonly broadcasted in popular electronic and print media with the idea that “if it bleeds it leads”. Instead, the media is encouraged to tell a different story – one can consider the following: *if it succeeds, it leads*.

Considering this century and the devastation caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks, an overwhelming number of requests have been made to Libby and Len Traubman from groups and individuals who want to be guided in the formation and implementation of dialogue groups in the USA. Their website has been discovered by people and media seeking solace and hope. Large and small media organizations, such as CNN, NPR, BBC, and more, are coming to their home for information. “This citizen-driven, face-to-face public peace process had become hard news. They had entered ‘The Citizens’ Century’” (Traubman and Traubman 2017: 3). The work, voice, and actions of the citizens are being heard and seen.

The works of the Living Room Dialogue have become global, people from different parts of the world are reaching out to them, and Libby and Len Traubman are connecting with them. They are creating new partnerships yet continuing to work with the traditional groups. This has led to the creation of the Palestinian–Jewish Family Peacemakers Camp in the Jewish Camp Tawonga, Yosemite. In the past 5 years, the camp has been able to bring together hundreds of people of different ages from 50 diverse cities and regions in Palestine and Israel. Libby and Len Traubman’s experience of witnessing them coming together in a dialogue where they revealed their feelings and traumas resonated with Maya Angelou when she stated, “There is no greater agony than bearing an untold story inside you.” They have been fascinated with how dialogue, through the sharing of stories, brings healing and dignifies both the victims and hearers. Oddly, they have learned and



believe that “the first step to life beyond war is not to harm or humiliate, but to dignify your enemy” (Traubman and Traubman 2017: 4).

Currently, people from a wide spectrum of life circumstances and organizations, both national and international, are tapping into and requesting their resources. They include schools, the military, communities, individuals, the media, and others. Thus far, they have streamed content online, and more than 17,000 compact discs have been distributed to several states and 1,300 towns in 98 nations across the globe. Dialogue group partners are being mentored online throughout the world, thanks to the Internet and new technology.

Libby and Len Traubman received a unique call from Africa in 2010: “Hello. This is Emmanuel Ivorgba calling from West Africa. We’ve seen your films. We need this here in Nigeria. Will you fly here to help us?”. They seriously considered all the implications of their response and the pros and cons of travelling to Africa, which included security and health concerns. After deep reflection, they developed some clarity on the matter and accepted the invitation. They travelled to Nigeria and were able to facilitate a session where 200 Christian and Muslim youths participated in an interfaith dialogue. This took place in the plateau region of central Nigeria. They became aware that the leading cause of death in West Africa was the deficiency in human relationships and not HIV/AIDS. In this trip, they were able to produce the documentary film *Dialogue in Nigeria*, which is being requested and circulated worldwide. The US Department of State has availed the film in all parts of Nigeria. “Today African facilitators use the film’s practices to resolve tribal wars and importantly to know and de-stigmatize persons with disabilities and include them in community life” (Traubman and Traubman 2017: 4).

After the 2016 USA post-election, Libby and Len Traubman facilitated a dialogue in San Mateo under the theme of “Crossing Lines in San Mateo: Sharing Stories, Creating Community”. In January 2017, they booked the Martin Luther King Jr. Community Center in the city, and 115 participants filled the auditorium; the participants included a diverse group of adults, both young and old (aged 18 and above), from different religious

backgrounds, traditions, races, statuses, and neighborhoods. The session provided them with a unique and safe space to dialogue: *being given voices and ears, being heard and hearing, with a new quality of listening-to-learn, listening to everyone* (Traubman and Traubman 2017: 4).

**c. Dialogue in San Mateo Ixtatán, Guatemala**

Source of information: Democratic Dialogue: A Handbook for Practitioners by Bettye Pruitt and Philip Thomas (Thomas and Pruitt 2007: 162-171).

San Mateo Ixtatán, Guatemala, is a volatile region, which has been plagued by persistent civil conflict. The conflict involves the countryside population fighting against city dwellers for political leadership and control of the regions. Because of this violence, an intervention that employed the dialogue technique was put in place by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2001 to help transform this conflict. Negotiations, but more so dialogues, were needed to deal with the triggers for power struggles involving the two groups in San Mateo Ixtatán (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 162).

The San Mateo Ixtatán dialogue, initiated in 2001, proceeded through different steps until 2002. The pace of the dialogue process was largely dictated by activities taking place in the area. The OAS perceived meeting the two groups separately in the initial stages as beneficial and, therefore, formulated a program where the countryside and city leaders were engaged separately. This first step was to sell the concept of dialogue to the representatives as the most appropriate means of conflict transformation in the region. With their ownership, OAS began the dialogue process in May 2001 through the introduction of the concept (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 164).

Key community leaders and representatives of ex-rebel-group political parties were delegates of the countryside population. The rural region only had one NGO participating in the process. The urbanite group had NGOs, urban community leaders, educationists, and the business people. The organizers of the dialogue process had to ensure that the groups were represented.

The second step of the dialogue process took place on October 2001. Thereafter, dialogue sessions were held after every 15 days. Every session lasted 2 days, and the agenda and day for the subsequent meetings were set at the end of each session. Reminders and information for the meetings were regularly given through email, text messages, and phone calls. All meetings took place in Huehuetenango, the headquarters of San Mateo Ixtatán Municipality. The venue and city were appropriate because of their proximity, accessibility, safety, and neutrality. All the members were socially and politically comfortable with the location (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 165 – 166).

It was imperative for ground rules to be put in place by the members in the first session to ensure the smooth running of the process. The rules ensured reciprocal respect, courtesy, and the expected code of communication. All members were in agreement that the facilitator would insist on rules being followed when there was a violation. The method of reaching a consensus was to be employed for recommendations and decision making. With these rules and the progress of the process, a rapport and trust were built, the communication became more open, and the atmosphere became more friendly and safe. The divergent views were received with mutual understanding and reciprocated in goodwill. Confidence was built over time and a deeper honest dialogue ensued, where they moved beyond multiparty negotiations. Members gave their understanding of the prevailing conflict, and it was clear that favorable interactions were present. It was a fulfilling time when the groups were able to give their account on the effect of the conflict on their lives and the agony and sorrow that they had undergone. The members reflected on the harmful effect of the conflict in their communities and the entire region of San Mateo Ixtatán. The dialogue sessions opened old wounds as these experiences were shared openly, though this did not stop the sessions or cause interruptions. Instead, they were an opportunity to reach out and explore solutions to the conflict. The participants resolved to commit themselves toward *The development of an Agreement of Peaceful Coexistence*, as they then openly affirmed the effect of their protracted conflict (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 167).

From the initial stages of the dialogue process, members were in sync that the agenda included the creation of an *Agreement of Peaceful Coexistence*. The agreement stipulated that the countryside and city inhabitants of San Mateo Ixtatán Municipality were to follow a similar code of conduct and regulations. The *Agreement of Peaceful Coexistence* was developed after the two dialogue representatives were in agreement on two main issues: one was that no member of the judiciary, law enforcer, or government leader was to dictate the proceedings and resolutions of the dialogue group, and the other was that the resolutions and way forward for the dialogue group would be reached from the members' own volition and goodwill, and no intimidation or manipulation was to be employed. The arrangement was an obligation for the two dialoguing sides, where guidelines and mutual friendship were to be sustained throughout the process. Personal indictments, aggressive speeches, and insulting semantics were barred. The agreement stipulated the unrestricted movement of the city and rural dwellers in the municipality. No longer would the residents be required to pay illegal tolls that had existed during the civil war. This was the start of more agreements that followed suit ((Thomas and Pruitt 2007: 167 – 169).

The dialogues of San Mateo Ixtatán were a success. This was manifested in three major agreements that were reached. In addition,, the atmosphere of dependance, transparency, mutual respect, acceptance, and accountability, as initiated and progressively employed during the dialogue processes, contributed to conflict transformation. The conditions were incubators for the agreements to be deliberated upon and realized (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 169 – 171).

**d.     *Dialogue on the Millennium Development Goals, Mauritania***

Source of information: Democratic Dialogue: A Handbook for Practitioners by Bettye Pruitt and Philip Thomas. Titled: '*Chapter 3.3: Dialogue on the Millennium Development Goals, Mauritania*' (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 172-178).

Mauritania, similar to other African countries, includes polarized ethnic identities. This has affected cohesion and weakened national identification. Hence, the initiative by the UNDP

to introduce a dialogue project in 2004/2005 brought together key local and national stakeholders. The dialogue sessions were efforts to specifically deter an eruption of violent ethnic conflict. They also aimed at motivating the country to purposefully engage in multi-stakeholder socioeconomic enterprises rather than ethnic politics that were suffocating the country and bringing it to its knees. Therefore, the theme of the “Millennium Development Goals (MDG)” was an impartial avenue to bring all the stakeholders together to address issues bedeviling the country. The government, opposition parties, and members of the civil societies became partakers of the dialogue, directly and indirectly (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 172- 173).

The dialogue sessions commenced in August 2004 and were carried out continuously until February 2005. As conceived, the plan was to bring in key stakeholders of the nation with the ultimate aim of influencing a majority of the Mauritanian population to embrace peaceful processes and forge toward realizing the MDG. No less than 400 members were involved in the dialogue project, and many more participated and were kept informed through social and electronic media. The group was composed of 10 eminent nationals, people of integrity who were representatives of their constituency. They included the leader of the Federation of Francophone Women, the leader of the Association of Mayors of the country, the leader of the Association of Islamic scholars, representatives of youth organizations, the private sector, and the media. The group ensured the ownership of the dialogue project (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 174).

Approximately 90 members, who were opinion leaders of a given region, attended the sectional events. The conference was of the same format where the plenary introduction was given to experts who dissected the major elements of the MDG and the specific topics to be deliberated upon on a particular day. The members were then given opportunities to share their views and speak about their perspectives. The second step of the conference involved the members forming small groups, with each group being given the task of discussing and developing recommendations on the topic assigned to them. Plenary sessions, or forums for information and debate (essentially dialogue sessions), were carried out in the small groups (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 175).

In the first step, the session brought together 130 members at the national level – this session took place in October 2004 in Nouakchott, the capital city of Mauritania. The membership included diverse participants including political parties, the business community, the labor movement, and civil society groups. Regional dialogue recommendations were amalgamated and harmonized in the national workshop. They centered on visualizing a better Mauritanian people by 2015, then having realized the MDG. They broke down the goals into small phases, which were to be undertaken in a step-by-step manner regarding how they were to be done (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 175).

The second step involved three activities undertaken in November 2004. First, there was a session to evaluate the country's economic capability to realize the MDG. This was held in the capital, Nouakchott, where 100 members, who included the political and civil society representatives, were in attendance. They explored major queries: What economic growth strategies are imperative to realize the MDG? What is the real conversation on the MDG? What is the **SWOT** (Strength, Weakness, opportunities, and timebound) analysis of the country's competitiveness vis-à-vis the world economy? In accordance with earlier dialogue patterns, small groups were put in place to develop recommendations and conclusions (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 176).

The dialogue program on the MDG was a success in Mauritania. Among the achievements was the coming together of key leaders of the country from the government, opposition, and civil society to discuss pertinent issues affecting Mauritania and how to forge a better and prospective future. By the end of the dialogue project, it was clear that the members had shown commitment and faithfulness to the process by opening up to each other. The process was grounded in a platform for inclusive democratic participation by initiating a *critical mass of influential individuals who value dialogue, understand its dynamics, and own the dialogue process* (Pruitt and Thomas 2007: 177 - 178).

## 6.4 Local Peace Committees

### 6.4.1 Theory

Various parties have intervened to resolve and transform conflicts in Africa. The interveners have been state, non-state, internal, and external agencies (Miall 2004: 2). These have included governments, international and local NGOs, individuals, and even the UN, among others. Peacekeeping missions by the UN and other agencies have been carried out in many African countries. Their interventions have mainly concentrated on conflict management and resolution. Other innovative approaches for conflict transformation through LPCs and Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) are gaining traction, though; the two are closely related and intertwined.

An LPC is a working group formed at the grassroots level to champion and facilitate peacebuilding. The level could involve the county, township, or village. It encompasses members from the conflicting groups who are tasked to meet and explore opportunities for peacebuilding within their context. In an LPC, emphasis is placed on dialogue, understanding each other's perspectives, and working together toward a solution and an inclusive way forward that leads to proper reconciliation and peacebuilding (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 9). The purpose is to promote dialogue that leads to conflict transformation. Paul van Tongeren, a prominent figure in I4P, wrote that the main task of an LPC is "to create trust and reconciliation between community leaders, prevent violence and resolve disputes that could lead to public violence" (Tongeren 2013: 4). It is a valuable tool in peacebuilding. On the other hand, Chetan Kumar of the UNDP defined I4P as follows:

[The Infrastructures for Peace are] a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills co-owned by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation, prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society (Kumar 2011: 384).

Van Tongeren noted that I4P must include the following components: competent peace committees and structures, from the local to the national level; a national forum of key

stakeholders in peacebuilding to dialogue and complement one another; effective tools for conflict analysis and response systems; and national capacity building in peacebuilding (Tongerren 2013: 3-4). The main emphasis in LPCs is to encourage dialogue at the local level, though they are free to do this at the national or other levels as well. While I4P are focused on building capacity and connecting LPCs with other peacebuilding agencies at the national and other levels to support and complement them, they are open to implement LPCs at the local level as well.

#### **6.4.2 Local Peace Committees in Practice**

From an article written by Andries Odendaal and Retief Olivier entitled *Local Peace Committees: Some Reflections and Lessons Learned*, the summary of how and when LPCs work best is as follows:

- They are more efficient when there is a shift and change in power and other dynamics.
- Their effectiveness depends on the tenure given to them by interested parties. They should have a national or any other mandate and include the involvement of the conflicting parties and appropriate insiders. *Two main categories of LPCs can be distinguished. The first category is LPCs that receive their mandate from a national structure or process. The second category is LPCs that have been formed by civil society initiatives* (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 10-11).
- They should be limited to the moral potential – ‘power of consensus’.
- LPCs should have support from others (outside backing).
- They must not force or manipulate compliance.

LPCs’ explicit or implicit objectives are to pursue the following:

- Preventing or reducing violence
- Dialogue
- Resolving the problem and community development



- Reconciliation (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 3-6)

In writing a discussion paper for the UNDP entitled *An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace Committees*, Andries Odendaal discussed the structure and methodology of LPCs.

**a. National Mandates and Local Ownership**

Informal LPCs have a limited influence on national deliberations. On the other hand, formal LPCs are intertwined with national agendas. This opens opportunities for cooperation and support. Locally, their peace objectives are supported on the national level. They have the privilege of being legitimate and enjoy the political goodwill from the government. However, some government bureaucracies might suffocate the operation of formal LPCs and hinder their effectiveness. Therefore, the following measures must be adhered to:

- Local stakeholders' contributions must be given prominence, and every effort must be made for the adequate and balanced dissemination of information from the powers that be.
- During dialogue, the part played by involved parties, the methodology, and membership of the LPC must be clearly outlined.
- Every effort must be made to respond to local stakeholders' queries.
- Enlisted members must be instructed to deliberate on the issues of concern with their supporters; this gives them the mandate to be representatives of their group in subsequent deliberations.
- An LPC must not embark on its discussion before the above conditions have been adhered to. All stakeholders must bestow their consent.

An environment to enhance and facilitate the efficient running of these processes must be created by the local, national, regional, or other external supporters.

**b.     *The Composition of Local Peace Committees***

It is the locals, as individuals, who have the final say on who must be part of the LPC. The membership and nature of LPCs are dictated by the context and nature of conflicts. Regarding the LPC composition:

- LPCs should include “Insider-partials”, who are neutral members with peacebuilding skills to help in bridging the extremes from the protagonists. An LPC solely composed of the conflicting parties will be ungovernable. People from CSOs are among those better suited to be insider-partials.
- LPCs should also include the marginalized groups in a specific community, particularly women and youths.

**c.     *The Problem of “teeth”***

In their book entitled *Getting Disputes Resolved*, Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988) explained the three approaches to conflict resolution: the (i) power-based, (ii) rights-based, and (iii) interests-based approaches. These approaches are different and can involve using coercion in one of its many forms (i.e., power-based), applying arbitration or adjudication (rights-based), or seeking to solve the underlying problem to satisfy the interests of all parties to the greatest extent possible (interests-based; Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988).

LPCs employ the third option, which does not use hard bargaining and does not have biting “teeth.” They depend on consultation that brings about truly satisfactory outcomes, and their power is derived from the potency of the agreed consensus.

**d.     *Relationship with Local Government***

LPCs must never compete with or fight the local government. Instead, they should always promote dialogue that leads to peacebuilding. They must enable a consensus that creates an environment for proper governance (Odendaal 2010: 13-23).

### 6.4.3 Empirical Evidence of Local Peace Committees

Four countries have been selected from different continents as case studies: South Africa, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Nepal, and Kenya.

#### **a. South Africa**

The transition from the apartheid White minority to an all-inclusive democratic election, from 1991 through to 1994 in South Africa, was delicate. Peacebuilding processes that encouraged dialogue and reconciliation were put in place to avert violence. LPCs were put in place to prevent violence (Odendaal 2010: 34). It was a product of South Africa's National Peace Accord (NPA) of 1991.

The NPA was deliberated on and signed by 27 South African parties and organizations. The parties included the National Party (NP), which formed the then government; and the African National Congress (ANC), which had long been a liberation movement; among others (Odendaal 2010: 34). The main reason for the NPA was due to the prevailing violence, which was only escalating. It helped pacify aggressive acts from various quarters as political negotiations were ongoing. LPC mandates were specified by the NPA, which were to:

- Generate trust and reconciliation among all stakeholders and institutions in the country
- Reduce violent acts and intimidations respecting the local justice for peace
- Be involved with conflict resolution and keep records of these engagements
- Eliminate all conditions that were a threat to peace and peace agreements
- Encourage citizens to comply with the peace agreements
- Negotiate and draft rules of conduct that govern rallies, demonstrations, and other public engagements
- Give reports and feedback to the regional peace committees (Odendaal 2010: 35-36)

Regarding LPCs' contribution to peace in South Africa:

- LPCs' success has varied per region; however, all have recorded some success.
- LPCs contained the rise in violence, though they never succeeded in ending all forms of violence.
- They were successful in mediating many conflicts between the government and neighborhoods.
- On the other hand, they were accused of promoting negative peace (Odendaal 2010: 36).

***b. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia***

In FYROM, the peacebuilding engagements to address ethnic tensions has been led by the Committees for Inter-Community Relations (CICRs; Odendaal 2010: 50). The conflict has involved the Macedonians, who account for 64% of the population, against the minority Albanians (25%). After its independence in 1991, FYROM's ethnic conflict escalated into violence with the formation of the National Liberation Army in 1999. With the help from international mediators, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was implemented in 2001, which halted the violence.

At the national level, an intercommunity relations committee has been in existence since independence, as per Macedonia's 1991 Constitution. The committee has 19 members comprising seven Macedonians and seven Albanians, with the remainder being stakeholders and from other small communities (Odendaal 2010: 51). The committee handles issues that deal with intercommunity relations on a national level.

Municipal committees for intercommunity relations were formed by the OFA to encourage local dialogue and governance to resolve disputes and promote peacebuilding. All communities are represented in these committees, and they participate in dialogues. They have succeeded in resolving local conflicts that would have otherwise escalated into violence.

### **c. Nepal**

Nepal has been experimenting with democracy since the 1990s. The 1990 Constitution led to the free parliamentary elections of 1991. However, the new dispensation was met with resistance from the populace after it had failed to meet most of their expectations in improving their livelihoods. A prominent group, the Maoist organization, came into play in 1996 and led an armed insurgency to bring about change in the country. The conflict lasted 10 years, and the effects involved the deaths of 16,000 people and the displacement of many (Giessmann 2016: 31). Eventually, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the government and Maoist party in 2006. This brought that violence to an end. Still, after the CPA, some minority groups felt marginalized, and there were many interparty conflicts. Mechanisms to address some of these issues were formulated, and LPCs were formed.

The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was formed in 2007 (Odendaal 2010: 58). It was mandated to promote peacebuilding through the establishment of LPCs throughout the country. This was more a top-down formal process. The national LPC coordinating committee consisted of 23 people who represented diverse groups: the members included 12 political party representatives, one from the business community, four from CSOs, four from conflict-affected communities, and two from minority groups who fell between the gaps (ibid.). The same patterns were replicated in the regional and local LPC groups.

Different stakeholders were involved in these processes, with the government playing a prominent role. This reveals the political goodwill and facilitation from the administration and politicians. On the other hand, control from the executive has meant that they are easily manipulated by the government. Some challenges have included the following:

- The process is prone to political maneuvering and manipulation.
- There is hesitation to invite and seek technical support, which is imperative.
- There has been no proper sensitization and local ownership of the process.

On the other hand, some LPCs have succeeded in preventing violence and mediating agreements.

**d. Kenya**

Kenya has experimented with bottom-up and top-down LPCs. The success of the Wajir Women initiative, which was a bottom-up approach initiated in 1993, attracted much attention from the government and other quarters. The government sought to replicate their approach by initiating LPCs in every district after the 2008 post-election violence. This was intended to promote peacebuilding in the country.

The Wajir Women initiative was an effort to bring peace to Wajir and its environs after a long and protracted violence in the region was brought about by the clan and ethnic rivalry between Kenyans and Somalis. The violence had been occurring for more than 4 years. More than 1,200 lives had been lost, many people had been displaced, and properties had been destroyed (Odendaal 2010: 40). The women sought to mitigate this situation after realizing that men continued to propagate the vicious, violent cycle.

The Wajir Women initiative was spearheaded by a coalition of CSOs. They carried out peace campaigns and later initiated mediation efforts between the warring clans. Eventually, they convinced the elders' representatives, who were the opinion leaders, to sign a commitment for engagements toward peace. This code was referred to as the *Al Fatah Declaration*. Key stakeholders, which included elected political leaders, the government at the district level, and others, were co-opted for these efforts. They appreciated and supported the efforts. This gave the initiative a more formal mandate. It was a success because it brought the violence to an end.

The Kenyan government noticed the work of the Wajir LPC Initiative in peacebuilding. Because of its success, the government used this experience and committed to apply the same in other parts of the country. The National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was established in 2001 and strengthened further in 2010. The efforts are ongoing:

- Kenyan LPCs have succeeded in mitigating intercommunity conflict and preventing violence in some areas, such as Wajir.
- Local ownership and external support have been complicated by top-down government initiatives and involvement.

## 6.5 Conclusion

Dialogue is a very strong tool in peacebuilding. It is evident that when people enter into a dialogue, violence is avoided, reduced, or stopped. This is supported by Allport's intergroup contact theory, which stipulates that contact between two outgroups reduces prejudice. This can be seen from the various dialogue projects and LPC initiatives. Dialogue has an impact. A rapport, bond, and understanding are generated when people make a conscious effort to come together and have a deeper conversation on issues causing conflicts between them. They feel and reach out to the other to find a mutual solution to their problems.

There are no effortless approaches and solutions in dialogue. Just as other means, dialogue needs commitment and investment in terms of time and resources. In virtually all circumstances, the cost of dialogue has, thus far, been much less compared to the resources provided for armed conflict. The consequences in violent conflict are immense, whereas dialogue leads to the restoring of relationships and peacebuilding. Therefore, every effort must be made to promote and equip organizations and people with dialogue skills that will help in conflict transformation.

It is also clear that ownership of this process in the community has a direct impact on its success. From the myriad examples, informal bottom-up initiatives have had more success compared to formal top-down ones. When the government initiates these projects, much bureaucracy and vested interests exist that hinder the smooth running of dialogue projects, although formal dialogue has more mandates and support from the government.

## PART THREE: RESEARCH METHODS

### CHAPTER SEVEN: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

*Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted (Albert Einstein).*

#### 7.1 Research Methodology

A project's research methodology answers the questions of what, who, why, where, when, and how, explaining each step and process accurately. Thus, the research methodology not only concerns the research methods but also considers the logic behind the methods used in the context of the research study. It also explains why the researcher is using a particular method or technique and why they are not using others such that the research results are able to be evaluated either by the researcher themselves or by others (Kothari 2004: 8).

The research methodology of a study is also defined as a systematic method to resolve a research problem through data gathering using various techniques, providing an interpretation of the data gathered, and drawing conclusions about the research data. Essentially, a research methodology is the blueprint of a research or study (Murthy and Bhojanna 2009: 32).

The confusion between *methodology* and *methods* in research is a common occurrence, especially with the terms sometimes being used interchangeably. Methods and methodology in the context of research refer to two related but different matters: a method is a technique used in gathering evidence, but the methodology, on the other hand, "is the underlying theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed" (Kirsch and Sullivan 1992: 2). Similarly, Birks and Mills (2011: 4) defined methodology as "a set of principles and ideas that inform the design of a research study". Meanwhile, methods are "practical procedures used to generate and analyze data" (ibid.).



## 7.2 Research Design

Research designs form the blueprint of a thesis and is the step-by-step plan of action that will bring about the desired end product, as envisioned by the researcher. While the final thesis is the ultimate objective of the research, the actions leading to the thesis are equally important. One must not be separated from the other.

Because of the need to understand the underlying causes of the conflict, and the factors that have prevented its resolution, in African countries, with reference to Kenya, more specifically Trans Nzoia County, the researcher undertook the study to obtain in-depth data from a number of participants. The researcher employed the qualitative research methodology in capturing the facts. The following discussion includes some definitions and descriptions of qualitative research, each with a different emphasis.

“Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3). The emphasis here is on the process of collecting data. The researcher collected the data in Trans Nzoia County, which was the exact location of his focus and the population affected. It is home to people from different communities. The Bukusu and the Nandi have a long history of settling in the region. While living in Trans Nzoia, they have had conflicts as well.

Qualitative research is characterized by its aims, which relate to understanding some aspects of social life; and its methods, which (in general) generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis (Bricki and Green 2007: 2).

The focus is on the purpose, which is to reflect on the words/actions implied. During the dialogue sessions, the researcher focused on the words stated, facial expressions, and other nonverbal expressions to understand the group and their contributions. The researcher’s data, therefore, focused less on numbers.

Qualitative methods provide results that are usually rich and detailed, offering ideas and concepts to inform one's research. Qualitative methods can tell one how people feel and what they think, but they cannot tell one how many members of the target population feel or think a certain way in the manner that quantitative methods can (MacDonald and Headlam 1986: 33).

A negative approach to research would involve one being only concerned with figures. However, the focus of some research studies is on more than merely figures. The researcher's aim was to bring transformation to the community and attempted to explain the roles of qualitative research, that is, to provide data in detail. "Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world" (Merriam 2009: 13). Emphasis is placed on the role of the contributions and experiences of the participants. One will never learn much while doing research when one undermines a people and their experiences. The social constructs that people develop, learn, and live through usually become part of what some communities hold dear. Some of these experiences are positive and some are negative, and the negative ones can outnumber the positive from an outsider's point of view. This would be evident from an outsider's viewpoint yet unnoticeable with insiders. The researcher's role during the dialogue process was largely to listen; understand; and, through the process, bring a transformation.

From the above, qualitative research would be defined as a process of collecting data, which mainly involves words and actions gathered from the contributions and experiences of the participants. The participants contribute to the information gathered.

Research methods lay down the foundation of any research. According to Neil McInroy, the chief executive of the Centre for Local Economic Strategies in the United Kingdom (UK), not using the appropriate research methods and design creates "a shaky foundation to any review, evaluation, or future strategy" (Macdonald *et al.* 2008: 3). In any type of

research, the data gathered can come either in the form of numbers or descriptions, which means that the researcher is either required to count or converse with people (ibid.: 9).

In a research study, two fundamental methods are used for the approaches – quantitative and qualitative research methods. The researcher's purposes are to reflect on the data to generate new knowledge. Table 6.1 presents a comparison of the nature of qualitative and quantitative research.

**Table 6.1:** The nature of qualitative and quantitative research

<b>Qualitative research</b>	<b>Quantitative research</b>
Tends to focus on how people or groups of people can have (somewhat) different ways of looking at reality (usually social or psychological reality)	Tends to focus on ways of describing and understanding reality by the discovery of general "laws"
Takes account of complexity by incorporating the real-world context – can consider different perspectives	Takes account of complexity by precise definition of the focus of interest and techniques that mean that external "noise" can be discounted
Studies behavior in natural settings or uses people's accounts as data; usually no manipulation of variables	Involves manipulation of some variables (independent variables) while other variables (which would be considered to be extraneous and confounding variables) are held constant
Focuses on reports of experience or on data that cannot be adequately numerically expressed	Uses statistical techniques that allow one to talk about how likely it is that something is "true" for a given population in an objective or measurable sense
Focuses on description and interpretation and might lead to development of new concepts or theories or an evaluation of an organizational process	Focuses on cause and effect – for example, uses experiment to test (try to disprove) a hypothesis
Employs a flexible, emergent, but systematic research process	Requires the research process to be defined in advance

Source: Hancock *et al.* (2007: 6)

Qualitative research can also be described by comparing it to quantitative research. Here, qualitative research acknowledges the diverse views and perspectives generated by

individuals or groups as a social reality rather than focusing on conforming to the limits of general laws as in quantitative research. It gives room for flexibility and creativity. The studies are conducted in natural settings and use participants' contributions as data without controlling for variables. Qualitative research is a research method aiming to explore and understand the meaning that some individuals or groups of people ascribe to social or human problems (Creswell 2013).

It is notable, however, to look at the evolving definition by Denzin and Lincoln (2005) in their *Handbook of Qualitative Research* over time. Their definition conveys the ever-changing nature of qualitative inquiry from involving social construction to being interpretivist, and finally, to involving social justice. Their most recent definition is included here:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3).

Although some of the traditional approaches to qualitative research, such as the "interpretive, naturalistic approach" and "meanings", are evident in this definition, the definition also has a strong orientation toward the impact of qualitative research in transforming the world.

It is rather common for qualitative methodology to be used when the research study's aims and objectives are exploratory in nature. For example, qualitative methodology was useful for this study as it was used to understand peoples' perceptions of an event that had taken place. Qualitative research registers experiences or information that cannot be effectively enumerated through numbers. Reflections could lead to the creation of new

ideas or organizational change. It is malleable and ductile when the situation dictates to emerging but systematic research processes.

## **7.3 Action Research**

### **7.3.1 Introduction**

This project employed action research (AR) approach because it was more appropriate in eliciting the active participation of all the people involved in the research. He designed and implemented a dialogue program aimed at transforming interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi ethnic groups. The voices and suggestions of the participants were given priority over that of the researcher. This encouraged the ownership and active involvement of all members that would bring about transformational change to their specific situations.

AR was also useful for this study as it is based on action and the evaluation and critical analysis of practices based on collected data in order to introduce improvements to relevant practices. This type of research is facilitated by the participation and collaboration of a number of individuals with a common purpose. AR is defined as follows:

[Action research is] a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities (Reason and Bradbury 2001: 1).

AR is participatory. It is not a one-man show but rather calls for the involvement of participants. Their involvement is active and not passive (Costello 2003: 6). They are there to be seen and heard, and their participation is key. It is vital for those involved in the dialogue or focus group discussions to regularly attend and be active in group forums (McIntyre 2008: 3). The participation is voluntary, though, and more so for this thesis, the researcher had to adhere to the ethics and policies of the Durban University of

Technology. The researcher had to be creative, which encouraged the consistent presence and active involvement of all.

AR follows democratic processes in its pursuit and purpose. All participants were equals and had to be viewed as such. The role of the researcher was to facilitate, and, therefore, he had to be conscious, at all times, not to dictate and dominate the dialogue sessions in any manner. Consultation between the researcher and all participants on the steps and action processes was a requisite and was an ongoing imperative (Koshy *et al.* 2010: 11).

AR endeavours to join “action and reflection” and “theory and practice” to seek solutions to critical issues that affect the community. It promotes learning through and by actions (Koshy *et al.* 2010: 11). It is action centered and very practical, and it involves the formulation of a theory in the problem to be investigated, developing a possible solution, and then implementing this solution (McIntyre 2008: 4). The collection of secondary data through a literature review in the area of interest is informative in imagining the solution. Reflection is pivotal in AR (McIntyre 2008: 4). Continuous critical thinking has to be engaged after data collection.

AR is a research strategy that combines research with action and participation in the field. AR can be defined as “an approach in which the action researcher and a client collaborate in the diagnosis of the problem and in the development of a solution based on the diagnosis” (Bryman and Bell 2011: 414). In other words, one of the main characteristic traits of AR relates to the collaboration between the researcher and the members of the community in order to solve community problems. An AR study assumes the social world to be constantly changing, with both the researcher and research being one part of that change (Collis and Hussey 2013). Generally, AR studies can be divided into three categories: positivist, interpretive, and critical:

- The positivist approach to AR, also known as *classical action research*, perceives research as a social experiment. Accordingly, AR is accepted as a method to test hypotheses in a real-world environment.

- Interpretive AR, also known as *contemporary action research*, perceives business reality as socially constructed and focuses on specifications of local and organizational factors when conducting the AR.
- Critical AR is a specific type of AR that adopts a critical approach toward business processes and aims for improvements.

In AR, however, people are not merely subjects but also partners in the research process. The research arises not from a question from an external individual but as a shared process of reflection between the researcher and the participants; the latter help gather data in relation to their own questions, and the research results are fed back to them directly to improve the situation that had been the subject of the research.

The learning acquired in such a manner serves not only to answer a research question but also to solve a community problem, or at least to deepen the community's understanding of itself and take it forward.

The definition fitted well with this work since the researcher's purpose was to bring transformation by promoting positive peace through dialogue. Active participation and the involvement of the community was emphasized. The desire was to nurture an ethos of conflict transformation spearheaded by the community itself (McNiff and Whitehead 2011: 8). The AR involved tackling persistent challenges in Trans Nzoia and developing a workable hypothesis to remedy the situation through research. Working within the above framework, the issue that informed this thesis was the existing conflict between the Bukusu and the Nandi. The essence of the project was to transform these conflicts. This was an issue that was of concern to the researcher, and, therefore, he was passionate to help in peacebuilding. The researcher continues to be even more passionate presently, appreciating these preceding efforts.

### **7.3.2 Origin and Development of Action Research**

Dr. Sylvia Kaye has observed that, informally, AR has been in existence for generations, hence it is difficult to ascertain the exact period when it was developed (Kaye and Harris

2017: 11). However, from a formal perspective, AR has emerged as an academic experiment from the 1920s onward. The epicenter of this origin was in the USA where there was a profound interest in discovering scientific remedies for social and educational problems (Carr 2006: 423). The most prominent figure in these efforts was Kurt Lewin who is credited with coining the term *action research*, which was an inquiry to practically investigate theories by social scientists to ascertain their practical efficiency (ibid.). Despite the promotion, AR did not gain much traction due to the dominant positivistic philosophy within the USA's social scientist community of the 1940s. As a result, AR was marginalized, and it declined (ibid.: 423).

Across the sea, AR was gaining prominence in the 1950s in Britain. Interpretive rather than positivistic methodology was given prominence in the social sciences (Carr 2006: 423). It spread and was embraced by scholars throughout the world in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. AR has gained even more acceptance in the current century and continues to be widely employed. The Durban University of Technology's peacebuilding program actively promotes the use of AR in research and peacebuilding efforts across the world.

### **7.3.3 Nature and Characteristics of Action Research**

In AR, action is key in research and practice (Tripp 2005: 4). This is summarized in Table 7.2 outlining the characteristics of AR as compared to routine practice and scientific research.



**Table 7.2:** Nature and characteristics of action research

Row	Routine practice	Action research	Quantitative Scientific research
1	Habitual	Innovative	Original resourced
2	Continuous	Continual	Occasional
3	Responsive contingency driven	Pro-active strategically driven	Methodologically driven
4	Individual	Participatory	Collaborative/collegial
5	Naturalistic	Interventionist	Experimental
6	Unexamined	Problematized	Argued
7	Experienced	Deliberated	Argued
8	Unarticulated	Documented	Peer reviewed
9	Pragmatic	Understood	Explained theorized
10	Context specific		Generalized
11	Private	Disseminated	Published

Source: Tripp (2005: 4)

AR is innovative and seeks to develop new knowledge through pioneering initiatives that do not necessarily rely heavily on other resourced originals, in areas such as scientific research. Continual observation and reflection are always taking place in an endeavour to improve and develop better erudition, which is why it is stated to be cyclical. In addition, it is proactively and strategically driven in that it is not solely or strictly dependent on research methodology steps as in scientific research. The end for scientific research is to justify how every methodology has been adhered to in arriving at a conclusion. AR embraces elements of innovation alongside methodology.

The participatory nature of AR makes it unique. It is a collaboration between the researcher and the participants, unlike the emphasis in other research approaches where the interaction is mainly with scholarly peers and materials. They emphasize experiments that are controlled by variables, while AR is more interventionist in nature, placing more emphasis on reflections observed to address a problem. An intervention is brought forth

after substantive reflections and deliberations. Discussions and contributions are encouraged rather than arguments and debates to prove oneself correct.

Each step has to be documented and reflected upon. The research has to be understood not only by the researcher but also by the participants. The final intervention is shared with the participants with the aim of it being disseminated to the research population. AR involves at least four steps:

- Exploring the problem
- Designing and implementing an intervention
- Evaluating the outcomes
- Continuous reflection


McIntyre (2008) suggested that research is to be carried out on issues about which one is passionate. The first step in AR is to identify and formulate the research problem or the gaps to be addressed (Kumar 2011: 57). It is the foundation of this research, and, therefore, it should be carefully considered and be strong. Every other step to be undertaken was built on the foundation.

Designing and implementing an intervention includes the planning, acting, and developing stages of the research. This is essentially the research design and is the blueprint of the step-by-step action process to be undertaken as the research is operationalized, hypothesizing on its completion (Kumar 2011: 95). The process is outlined in detail in section 7.2 of this thesis. It included the production of data and how it was analysed and reported.

Reflection, evaluation, and monitoring form the next step. Reflection is continuous and necessary in every step, though. A unique aspect of AR is that evaluation is a participatory process undertaken by participants and the researcher, this encourages ownership of the evaluation by all involved (Poplewell and Hayman 2012: 7). The knowledge generated

would more likely be owned and retained by the community, hence impacting them positively at their level.

From the above, it can be derived that AR is cyclical. After implementing an intervention, carrying out an evaluation of the outcome to gauge its success and effectiveness is a necessary component in AR. After the evaluation and review, the process might start anew to make a better and more informed intervention until an optimum action is realized. Diagrammatically, the steps and cycle can be represented as in Figure 7.1.



**Figure 7.1:** Action research cycle. Source: Nelson 2014.

In Chapters 2 - 6 of the thesis, the researcher carried out a preliminary exploration by reviewing the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of interethnic violent conflicts in African countries, regarding Kenya in particular. He examined interventions that had been used to try to reduce interethnic conflict and assessed their effectiveness. He continuously observed the interactions or lack of them between the Bukusu and the Nandi in Trans Nzoia.

Most of what is discussed next relates to the exploratory component of the research. The participation that is imperative in AR meant that the researcher did not know how the research would progress after the exploration process. However, a group dialogue was held involving participants from the two groups.

Dialogue does not involve debating to win an argument. Rather, it is *listening* to understand the other. Viable solutions can be brainstormed and discussed. Eight 1-day dialogue sessions were run in Kitale. The dialogues combined participants from the two groups.

## **7.4 Population**

A population is a distinct group of individuals, whether that group comprises a nation or a group of people with a common characteristic. In statistics “a population is the pool of individuals from which a statistical sample is drawn for a study”. Thus, any selection of individuals grouped together by a common feature can be stated to be a population.

A population is the number of people that a researcher targets to study within a specific region (Majid 2019). This is where the sample is derived. The population for this research involved all the people living in Trans Nzoia County.

Trans Nzoia County has a population of approximately 990,341 persons, according to a 2019 census (KBS 2012). The county has a cosmopolitan setting, with Luhya, Kalenjin, Saboot, and Kikuyu being the main resident communities. Most of the communities living in Trans Nzoia today are a mixture of large- and small-scale farmers, with maize farming being the dominant industry. They also practice dairy and horticultural farming. Other communities work or engage in business and trade in various urban centers. The majority of people living in Trans Nzoia County are Christian. Other faiths, such as Islam and Hinduism, are also practiced, especially in major towns.

The sample population are the Bukusu and the Nandi who live in Trans Nzoia County. For this research study, one dialogue group consisting of 24 participants was formed. Eight dialogue sessions were implemented, they were done monthly. The eight sessions were attended all the 24 participants. The researcher endeavoured to ensure that the sample population was representative of people from diverse ages, genders, and tribes (Bukusu and Nandi). There were equal gender representations of 12 each as shown in the figure below.

**Table 7.3:** Gender representation

Gender	Number of people
Female	12
Male	12

**Table 7.4:** Age Group

Age Bracket	Number	Percentage
18 - 30	04	16.7
31 - 40	06	25
41 - 50	12	50
50+	02	8.3

The researcher endeavoured to have people of diverse age groups and background in the dialogue. The majority were of middle age, married and with family. Youths below the age of 30 were few because most are still in school and college therefore affecting their availability for the sessions. The number of those older than 50 was low. The majority had basic education and were therefore able to communicate well in Kiswahili. They were of diverse profession; farmers, businessmen, religious leaders, community leaders, and politician. Farmers and business people were the majority. The researcher worked in the region before as a priest, and was also involved in peace work.

Figure 6.2 is a map showing the location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya, and Figure 7.3 is a map of Trans Nzoia County.


**Figure 7.2:** Map of Kenya, showing the location of Trans Nzoia County in Kenya. 



Dialogue sessions were carried out in Kitale town, the main administrative and economic town of the county. It is the seat for the county government as well as the county commissioner (central government). It is centrally located and easily accessed by people from all regions of the county. The sessions were held in Kitale Reformed Church, they

provided their space for the project as detailed in section 9:6 of the thesis. The venue was accessible to all and was not a contentious issue.

**Figure 7.3:** Map of Trans Nzoia County



## 7.5 Sampling Method

All participants were adults. The researcher used purposive sampling, sometimes also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling, to obtain participants who most likely had the relevant information. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method and occurs when “elements selected for the sample are chosen by the judgment of the researcher. Researchers often believe that they can obtain a representative sample by using a sound judgment, which will result in saving time and money” (Black 2010: 224). Alternatively, the purposive sampling method may prove to be effective when only limited numbers of people can serve as primary data sources due to the nature of the research design and aims and objectives.

This is a non-random process but is normal in qualitative research. The primary consideration in purposive sampling is one’s judgment as to who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of one’s study. As a researcher, one only approaches those people who, in one’s opinion, are likely to have the required information and be willing to share it with one (Kumar 2011: 189).


The researcher carried out data collection for one group of people in both communities (Bukusu and Nandi) in Trans Nzoia County.



## **7.6 Data Collection Methods**

Data collection is a methodical process of gathering and analysing specific information to proffer solutions to relevant questions and evaluate the results. It focuses on finding out all there is to a particular subject matter. Data is collected to be further subjected to hypothesis testing, which seeks to explain a phenomenon. The qualitative research methods of data collection do not involve the collection of data that involves numbers or a need to be deduced through a mathematical calculation; rather, they are based on non-quantifiable elements, such as the feelings or emotions of the researcher.

Data collection was a major and delicate component of this work. This was the gathering of requisite information and material that were relevant for the thesis. It included gathered data that were both secondary and primary data. Primary data are information gathered for the first time, that is, new, fresh, and original data. Secondary data are information that do exist and have already been gathered (Kothari 2004: 95). True and proper data were key in this work. Figure 7.4 presents methods of data collection.



**Figure 7.4:** Methods of data collection. Source: Kumar (2011: 132).

The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question. This does not necessarily suggest random sampling or the selection of a large number of participants and sites, as is typically found in quantitative research. A discussion of the participants and the site might include four aspects identified by Miles and Huberman (1994): (a) the setting (i.e., where the research will take place), (b) the actors (i.e., who will be observed or interviewed), (c) the events (i.e., what the actors will be doing when observed or interviewed), and (d) the process (i.e., the evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the setting).

New forms of qualitative data continually emerge in the literature (Creswell 2003), but all forms might be grouped into four basic types of information: observations (ranging from nonparticipant to participant), interviews (ranging from close-ended to open-ended), documents (ranging from private to public), and audio-visual materials (including materials such as photographs, compact discs, and videotapes).

The first phase of information gathering was carried out through secondary data collection. This involved a literature review and considering issues of violent conflict and peacebuilding efforts in SSA, Kenya, and Trans Nzoia County. Secondary data collection is referred to as the gathering of second-hand data by an individual who is not the original user. It is the process of collecting data that is already existing, be it already published in books, journals, and/or online portals. In terms of ease, it is much less expensive and easier to collect.

The second phase was essentially the gathering of primary data through the dialogue sessions in Trans Nzoia. This was carried out by observing group interactions as a participant. Because there were leading questions to guide the participants in the dialogue sessions, there was a semi-interview means of gathering data. The researcher interviewed a few people for more information as a follow-up for clarity. Some elements of semi-structured interviews were included in the leading questions for the discussions.

### **7.6.1 Dialogue Sessions**

According to Franco's (2006: 814) definition, dialogue serves to "jointly create meaning and shared understanding" through conversation. Evidently, not all dialogue requires a "method". Dialogue can occur through the normal give-and-take process of talking and listening, especially when two, or a small group of, people are involved. Dialogue refers to the mutual exchange of experiences, ideas, and opinions between two or more parties; that is, it involves a conversation. Dialogue involves two-way or multi-way communication. It presumes the opportunity to reply on several occasions in order to enhance a line of reasoning. The dialogue concept contains a dimension of simultaneity and direct contact, either via physical or technical aids. In order to achieve genuine civic participation, there must be some form of dialogue between citizens and those in positions of power (De Laval 2006: 5).

Eight dialogue sessions were carried out. The dialogue group sessions were heterogeneous with regard to the Bukusu and the Nandi.

The planning and processes for the dialogues followed Johan Galtung’s “transcend method” (Galtung 2000; Galtung *et al.* 2002). After identifying the dialogue participants, the researcher met with each party separately, preparing them for united dialogue sessions, presented in Table 6.3.

**Table 7.5:** United dialogue sessions

June	1 <sup>st</sup> session	24	Introductions and explanations: On the purpose of the project and the involvement of participants.
6 July 2018	2 <sup>nd</sup> session	24	Have you been discriminated against because of your tribe? Do you ever discriminate against people from the other tribe?
4 August 2018	3 <sup>rd</sup> session	24	Which cultural differences exist between the Bukusu and Nandi?
8 September 2018	4 <sup>th</sup> session	24	How do you appreciate the presence of the other tribe?
6 October 2018	5 <sup>th</sup> session	24	In your opinion, what are the major causes of conflict between the Bukusu and Nandi in Trans Nzoia County?
3 November 2018	6 <sup>th</sup> session	24	Are you aware of interventions put in place to resolve these conflicts? What have been their impact?
1 December 2018	7 <sup>th</sup> session	24	As participants in this project, what interventions do you think should be put in place to achieve positive peace between the Bukusu and Nandi?
5 January 2019	8 <sup>th</sup> session	24	Evaluation and way forward

The researcher used an audio recorder, with the permission of the participants. Notes were also taken. The researcher’s draft questions are included in Appendix 1.

### **7.6.2 Focus Group Discussions**

Focus group discussions (FGDs) are a common qualitative data collection method and are considered an important qualitative health research technique (Morgan 1997), owing to their efficient and economical nature (Krueger and Casey 2000). FGDs are defined as “group discussions exploring a set of specific issues that are focused because the process involves some collective activity” (Kitzinger 1994: 104). The key aspect of FGDs is the interactions between participants as a way of collecting qualitative data that would not emerge using other methods (i.e., individual interviews). FGDs yield large amounts of qualitative data and maximize face-to-face (FTF) participant–researcher contact compared to other qualitative methods (Parker and Tritter 2006). The choice of data collection method (i.e., individual interviews versus FGDs) should be determined by the research question and purpose.

FGDs are sometimes seen as being synonymous with interviews, especially the semi-structured “one-to-one” and “group interviews” (Parker and Tritter 2006). Similarities between these techniques relate to the tendency to uncover people’s perceptions and values (Skeggs 1997). Focus groups are a primary format for qualitative research. This is a type of research that seeks open-ended thoughts and feelings from consumers, as opposed to quantitative research, which involves numerical-based data collection. An FGD typically consists of approximately 6 to 12 target market consumer participants engaged in a discussion with a research moderator. FGDs allow for broader and deeper insights into the brand and related topics compared to the very precise and structured data of quantitative research studies.

There was no suggestion for the necessity to have an FGD during and after the dialogue sessions. Therefore, the researcher did not have any.

### **7.6.3 Personal Interviews**

A personal interview survey, also called an FTF survey, is a survey method that is utilized when a specific target population is involved. The purpose of conducting a personal interview survey is to explore the responses of the people to gather more and deeper information.

Personal interview surveys are used to probe the answers of the respondents and, at the same time, to observe the behaviour of the respondents, either individually or as a group. It is a two-way conversation initiated by an interviewer to obtain information from a respondent. The questions, the wording, and their sequence define the structure of the interview, which is conducted in a FTF manner.

The researcher followed up interesting issues from the dialogue sessions with personal interviews. This was carried out until saturation was reached; that is, no new information was evident.

The purpose of the research interview was to explore the views, experiences, beliefs, and/or motivations of individuals on specific matters. Qualitative methods, such as interviews, are believed to provide a *deeper* understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative methods, such as questionnaires (Silverman 2000). Interviews are, therefore, most appropriate where little is already known about the study phenomenon or where detailed insights are required from individual participants. They are also particularly appropriate for exploring sensitive topics, where participants may not want to talk about such issues in a group environment.

#### **7.6.4 Structured and Unstructured Observations**

Observation, as the name implies, is a way of collecting data through observing. The data collection method of observation is classified as a participatory study approach because the researcher has to immerse themselves in the setting where the respondents are, while taking notes and/or recording.

Observation, as a data collection method, can be structured or unstructured. In structured or systematic observation, data collection is conducted using specific variables according to a predefined schedule. Unstructured observation, on the other hand, is conducted in an open and free manner in the sense that there are no predetermined variables or objectives.

Advantages of the data collection method of observation include direct access to research phenomena and high levels of flexibility in terms of application and generating a permanent record of phenomena to be referred to later. At the same time, the method of observation is disadvantaged with longer time requirements, high levels of observer bias, and the impact of the observer on primary data in a way that the presence of the observer may influence the behaviour of the sample group elements.

The data collection method of observation may be associated with certain ethical issues. The fully informed consent of research participant(s) is one of the basic ethical considerations to be adhered to by researchers. At the same time, the behaviour of the sample group members may change with negative implications at the level of research validity if they are notified of the presence of the observer.

The researcher developed a structured observation guide for further data gathering. Alongside this, unstructured observation was also continuously used.

## **7.7 Data Analysis**

Data analysis is depicted as “the most complex and mysterious of all the phases of a qualitative project, and the one that receives the least thoughtful discussion in the literature” (Thorne 2000: 68). Many qualitative research papers lack the explicit description of the methods informing data analysis, or, when included, the terms used to describe the data analytic methods are often used imprecisely or entirely mislabeled (Sandelowski and Barroso 2010). To further complicate matters, certain terms describing qualitative data analysis have either carried a wide range of definitions or lacked clear definitions.

Thematic analysis is a method for analyzing qualitative data that entails searching across a data set to identify, analyze, and report repeated patterns (Braun and Clarke 2006). It is a method for describing data, but it also involves interpretation in the processes of selecting codes and constructing themes. A distinguishing feature of thematic analysis is

its flexibility to be used within a wide range of theoretical frameworks and to be applied to a wide range of study questions, designs, and sample sizes. Thematic analysis is an analytic method and can be seen as foundational for other qualitative research methods. The principles of thematic analysis on how to code data, search for and refine themes, and report findings are applicable to several other qualitative methods. Because of this flexibility, Braun and Clarke (2006) referred to thematic analysis as a method, as opposed to a more tightly prescribed methodology.

The researcher employed thematic data analysis in this project. The Project Planner (2016: 11) stated that “Most methods of qualitative analysis employ a thematic approach in which textual, or other, sources are examined to identify themes”. The dominant themes would be derived from the literature review; the questions explored; and the responses to them from the dialogue sessions, interviews, and observations.

## **7.8 Pretesting**

The researcher pretested the dialogue questions to maximize on the value of the data, which was subsequently collected. This was done before the dialogue. Five people from the Trans Nzoia, one being the research assistant, were selected to participate in the pretesting.

## **7.9 Delimitations/Scope**

The participants in the dialogue sessions and FGDs were strictly from the Bukusu and Nandi communities of Trans Nzoia County, and the study may have had limited relevance to other intergroup conflicts. The researcher was restricted to undertake a study on the short-term effects of the intervention because of the limited period of the study.



## 7.10 Validity and Reliability/Trustworthiness (Qualitative Research)

### 7.10.1 Reliability

Reliability is a concept used for testing or evaluating quantitative and all other forms of research. If one views the idea of testing as a way of information elicitation, then the most important test of any qualitative study is its quality. A good qualitative study can help one “understand a situation that would otherwise be enigmatic or confusing” (Eisner 1991: 58). This relates to the concept of a good quality research study, where reliability is a concept to evaluate quality in a quantitative study, with the “purpose of explaining”, while the quality concept in a qualitative study has the purpose of “generating understanding” (Stenbacka 2001: 551). The difference in the purposes of evaluating the quality of studies in qualitative and quantitative research is one of the reasons that the concept of reliability is irrelevant in qualitative research. According to Stenbacka (2001: 552), “the concept of reliability is even misleading in qualitative research. If a qualitative study is discussed with reliability as a criterion, the consequence is rather that the study is no good”.

On the other hand, Patton (2001) stated that validity and reliability are two factors that any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analysing results, and judging the quality of the study. This corresponds to the question, “How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to?” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 290). To answer this question, Healy and Perry (2000) asserted that the quality of a study in each paradigm should be judged by its own paradigm’s terms. For example, while the terms *reliability* and *validity* are an essential criterion for quality in quantitative paradigms, in qualitative paradigms, the terms *credibility*, *neutrality* or *confirmability*, *consistency* or *dependability*, and *applicability* or *transferability* are to be the essential criteria for quality (Lincoln and Guba 1985). More specifically, Lincoln and Guba (1985: 300) used *dependability* with the term *reliability* in qualitative research, which closely corresponds to the notion of “reliability” in quantitative research. They further emphasized the “inquiry audit” (ibid.: 317) as one measure that might enhance the dependability of qualitative research. This can be used to examine both the process and the product of the research for consistency (Hoepfl 1997). In the

same vein, Clont (1992) and Seale (1999) endorsed the concept of dependability with the concept of consistency or reliability in qualitative research. The consistency of data will be achieved when the steps of the research are verified through the examination of such items as raw data, data reduction products, and process notes (Campbell 1996).

To ensure reliability in qualitative research, the examination of trustworthiness is crucial. Seale (1999) stated that, while establishing good quality studies through reliability and validity in qualitative research, the “trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed as validity and reliability” (Seale 1999: 266). When judging (testing) qualitative work, Strauss and Corbin (1990: 250) suggested that the “usual canons of ‘good science’... require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research”.

In contrast, Stenbacka (2001) argued that since the reliability issue concerns measurements, it has no relevance in qualitative research. She added that the issue of reliability is an irrelevant matter in the judgment of the quality of qualitative research. Therefore, if it is used, the “consequence is rather that the study is no good” (Stenbacka 2001: 552).

To widen the spectrum of the conceptualization of reliability and revealing the congruence of reliability and validity in qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985: 316) stated that “Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former [validity] is sufficient to establish the latter [reliability]”. With regard to the researcher’s ability and skill in any qualitative research, Patton (2001) also stated that reliability is a consequence of the validity in a study.

### **7.10.2 Validity**

The concept of validity is described with a wide range of terms in qualitative studies. This concept is not a single, fixed, or universal concept, but “rather a contingent construct, inescapably grounded in the processes and intentions of particular research methodologies and projects” (Winter 2000: 1). Although some qualitative researchers

have argued that the term *validity* is not applicable to qualitative research, at the same time, they have realized the need for some form of qualifying check or measure for their research. For example, Creswell and Miller (2000) suggested that the validity is affected by the researcher's perception of validity in the study and their choice of paradigm assumption. As a result, many researchers have developed their own concepts of validity and have often generated or adopted what they consider to be more appropriate terms, such as quality, rigor, and trustworthiness (Stenbacka 2001).

The discussion of quality in qualitative research initiated from the concerns about validity and reliability in the quantitative tradition, which "involved substituting a new term for words such as validity and reliability to reflect interpretivist (qualitative) conceptions" (Seale 1999: 465).

The issue of validity in qualitative research has not been disregarded by Stenbacka (2001) as she has done for the issue of reliability in qualitative research. Instead, she has argued that the concept of validity should be redefined for qualitative research studies. Stenbacka (2001) described the notion of reliability as one of the quality concepts in qualitative research, which needs "to be solved in order to claim a study as part of proper research" (Stenbacka 2001: 551).

In searching for the meaning of rigor in research, Davies and Dodd (2002) found that the term *rigor* appears in reference to the discussion on reliability and validity. Davies and Dodd (2002) argued that the application of the notion of *rigor* in qualitative research should differ from those in quantitative research by "accepting that there is a quantitative bias in the concept of rigor, we now move on to develop our reconception of rigor by exploring subjectivity, reflexivity, and the social interaction of interviewing" (Davies and Dodd 2002: 281).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that sustaining the trustworthiness of a research report depends on the issues quantitatively discussed as validity and reliability. The idea of discovering truth through measures of reliability and validity is replaced by the idea of

trustworthiness, which is “defensible” (Johnson 1997: 282) and establishes confidence in the findings (Lincoln and Guba 1985).

If the issues of reliability, validity, trustworthiness, quality, and rigor meant differentiating a “good” from a “bad” research study, then testing and increasing their use would be important to the research in any paradigm. The researcher:

- avoided personal bias;
- was accurate and thorough in the data collection and analysis;
- used several methods of data collection, as mentioned above; and
- continually checked back with the participants to see if he had interpreted their contributions correctly.

### **7.11 Anonymity and Confidentiality**

The researcher maintained complete confidentiality in this research. Pseudonyms are used instead of the real names of persons. From the outset, the participants were informed that the information shared was to be confidential, and every necessary step was taken in order to not disclose the identity of the informants.

### **7.12 Ethical Considerations**

All the Durban University of Technology’s Research Ethics Policy and Guidelines were strictly adhered to. All participants were involved voluntarily and they signed a consent letter. Adequate information was provided about their roles and how the information they shared will be used in the research.

The thesis proposal and data collection methods were reviewed and approved by DUT. raw data collected were to be strictly stored and not accessible to any other person except the researcher and the thesis promoters.

## **PART FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **CHAPTER EIGHT: DIALOGUE AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

##### **8.1.1 Perception of Conflict and Violence**

Conflict seems to be part of the human experience and people's nature. Humans have the ability to do good or evil, create peace or war, or bring order or cause chaos. When people have an alternative view and disagree with others, they have the ability to cause a crisis or resolve the disagreement in an amicable manner. Disagreements and conflicts seem to be normative in the human experience. Conflicts can arise in a relationship between two people, a family setting, a group, and tribal communities, or between countries. Human beings have developed systems and abilities to deal with these conflicts, either through methods of nonviolence or violence.

Conflict and violence exist in Trans Nzoia County, as in other counties of Kenya and in other parts of the world. Differences exist in terms of their severity; some counties in Kenya are more volatile compared to Trans Nzoia, while others experience less violent conflict.

Notably, a culture of violence exists in Kenyan communities. This escalates during election cycles when most counties erupt into violence. Regions of the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and the Western provinces of Kenya have been mainly affected. People are murdered and their properties are stolen or destroyed. Those who are lucky and escape the violence are displaced and become refugees within their own country. Political campaigns, election preparations, and the casting of votes in general elections have usually been prone to violence. This has been the case in Trans Nzoia County. This view was observed during the dialogue sessions. A participant from the Bukusu community shared the following:

The Nandi has a notion that all cattle belong to them, and, therefore, when they steal or raid from the Bukusu, they assume that they are taking back what is rightfully theirs, and, therefore, it is ok. Nandi violently attacks and kill people who are not from their tribe. To them, that is not a bad thing as such so long as they undergo traditional cleansing ceremony afterwards. *Wakati wa sherehe wanatutenga na kuwa wachoyo. Hawatupi pombe na chakula. Pia hawaturuhusu kujua vizuri kinachoendelea.* The initiates *tarusio wana kiburi* (when they have ritual ceremonies such as circumcision, they don't give us food and alcohol. They hide from us most of the activities, and, therefore, we are never certain what is they do. Besides, the initiates are usually rude and violent).

People have entertained the idea of cultural violence showcasing masculinity. Males are taught to be fighters in order to safeguard their families and communities. Their enemies are the “other”; the others can include non-family, community, or tribe members and even include people of different genders. In this way, violence is a given. This is beneficial for the aggressor but extremely harmful to the aggrieved. The following were the sentiments shared by a Nandi participant:

*Tulikua Pamoja lakini wakati mwana siasa alitoa pesa tugawane, nilipigwa na kufukuzwa kwa sababu sikua mbukusu. Niliona vibaya sana kwa sababu walionipiga nimajirani na watu tunajuana. Nilishangaa kumbe pesa kidogo tu inaweza fanya mtu akuuwe* (We had attended a political rally together. Then the politician gave handouts. I was beaten and chased away by the Bukusu because of my tribe. I really felt bad because those who harmed me were my neighbors and people that I know. I was shocked and have learned that one can be killed because of very little amount of money).

Johan Galtung has spoken of three types of violence: direct, structural, and cultural violence. In his training manual on violence, he wrote that “the roots of violence are in two human constructions, bad structures, and bad cultures” (Galtung 2000: 2).

Direct violence involves the participation of an actor to cause harm and inflict pain, destruction, or death to an individual, a people, or a nation (Galtung 1990: 292). This is always the most visible form of violence but not necessarily the most harmful. In direct violence, one can see people engaged in combat and fights using weapons such as machetes, guns, chemical weapons, and drones.

Regarding structural violence, Galtung explained that “the violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969: 171). These are the structures found in the governance and social fabric of a community or nation. The structures might be embedded in the constitution or the laws of a group or institution. Often, the laws tend to privilege the elite and those in power (ibid.). In contrast, the rules are unjust and oppressive to those living on the margins. The unjust laws might lead to great suffering and death for the marginalized. The suffering and death caused by this structural violence might be greater than those caused by direct violence. Unfortunately, structural violence is notably embedded in many African countries, including Kenya.

Cultural violence “is any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural forms” (Galtung 1990: 291). A people or community always have a culture that binds them together. Culture is used to both include and exclude individuals in a group. It sets the values and norms that bind the group together. Usually, those who belong to a specific group and culture enjoy some privileges and values. The excluded are denied these rights by design and default. In extreme cases, the excluded are exploited and subjected to suffering, which is always justified. This can be seen in racism, tribalism, and nationalism. Cultural violence has been present between the Bukusu and Nandi of Trans Nzoia County.

### **8.1.2 Perception of Nonviolence**

Some aspects of nonviolence have been practiced by Kenyan communities, though violence has also been rampant. Before the arrival of European missionaries in Kenya, Africans had devised ways to resolve conflict without violence through truces, interethnic marriages, negotiations, withdrawals, or migration. Most conflicts between tribes involved land disputes and cattle raiding (Salih and Markakis 1998: 87). This was the case in what is now Western Kenya. The Bukusu, who had come into this area, were frequently attacked by their neighbors, the Teso, who forced them to move eastward where it was relatively safe (Osogo 1966: 80-83). While moving, the Bukusu attacked other tribes who

occupied the region into which they were migrating. One of these tribes was the Nandi. The Bukusu raided the Nandi's cattle and killed their young men, forcing them off their land (ibid.). Similar situations occurred with other tribes, such as the Kikuyu and the Maasai in Central Kenya (Maathai 2006: 7). These activities were circular and mostly continuous. Tribes must have assumed that the more they could conquer militarily through violence, the more they would be feared. Violence must have seemed heroic, especially when inflicted on another tribe.

However, African communities also seemed to have developed nonviolent means of addressing some of these conflicts. Kenyan tribes needed each other for survival. This promoted interethnic links that helped to promote peace. At times, neighboring tribes carried out barter trade by exchanging food, livestock, and land. To facilitate this, truces were made that guaranteed the peace and safety of the trading tribes (Salih and Markakis 1998: 87). Ocholla-Ayayo observed that the higher the economic dependency between tribes, the lower the interethnic conflict (Ocholla-Ayayo 1998: 87). This seemed to be true with most of the tribes, for each time they realized that they needed to trade and supplement one another, they negotiated for peace and safety.

Kenya needs to promote nonviolence as a way of conflict transformation. For a long time, Africans have used violence and war to resolve conflicts. However, most of the time, this approach has only increased poverty, pain, suffering, and death on the continent. The only hope that Kenyans have is the use of nonviolent methods to resolve persistent conflicts. This will bring meaningful change to most parts of Kenya. Through nonviolence, conflicts are resolved without using weapons that cause physical harm. Nonviolence must be encouraged at home, in schools, in villages, and in the country as a whole. The researcher employed dialogue as a nonviolent means of mediation in the transformation of the relationship between the Bukusu and Nandi living in Trans Nzoia.

It was clear throughout the dialogue that nonviolence was the better route to follow as compared to violence. The communities were all aware of the impact of violence on them. It has separated them more and caused the loss of both lives and properties. It has



caused tension and sustained enmity between the tribes. The participants were eager to break this cycle and barrier to peace. Their understanding of nonviolence was limited, though; through dialogue, prodding, and considerable reflections, there was more realization that their conflict could best be transformed by using nonviolent methods.

Each generation in diverse communities has devised approaches to solve its conflicts. At the extreme end of the spectrum, violence has been one way to accomplish this. In an interview, George Lakey, a peace scholar and activist, stated that violence is the old manner and way of dealing with violence and that it shows a lack of imagination (Wanjala 2012). Nonviolence is to be encouraged as the new paradigm.

### **8.1.3 Peace**

Peace does not mean the absence of war. Peace is a fluid concept, associated with several types of laudable goals and embedded in visions of a good society, but the specific meaning of *peace*, or its constituent components, is rarely analytically clear. Indeed, peace and conflict studies have tended to devote more attention to conflict than to peace, and peace has long been grossly under-conceptualized (Gleditsch *et al.* 2014). Ever since Galtung introduced the distinction between negative and positive peace to peace and conflict studies, these have constituted the two basic categories of peace employed in the field (Galtung 1969). Galtung coined the terms *positive* and *negative peace* to explicate this:

- Negative Peace: This points to a situation where there is no war or fighting. It is the state where there is a conflict, but it has been suppressed through coercion, force, or otherwise. The presence of either structural or cultural violence, or both, is manifested (Galtung 1969: 183).
- Positive Peace: This involves the absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence. In addition, there is the presence of social justice (Galtung 1969: 183).

Violence is a common way of handling conflicts, but there are nonviolent alternatives. Nonviolent means have been employed to respond to conflicts since time immemorial

and can be categorized as conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation.

## **8.2 Preparation for Dialogue Sessions**

Eight dialogue sessions were planned and implemented. Two hours were spent for the dialogues in each of the seven sessions. Twenty-four (24) dialogue participants were invited and encouraged to attend all the eight sessions. With the researcher and the research assistant, 26 persons were ideally supposed to be present in every session. The participants were people living in Trans Nzoia County and came from the two communities of interest, that is, the Bukusu and the Nandi. They were fairly equally represented in terms of number and demographics.

The dialogue session was implemented as part of a mediation process to transform the relationships between the two communities. Through the dialogue sessions, the participants were expected to constructively share their experiences, better understand the other community, talk about violence, and explore how they could transform their relationships positively and be peacebuilders together.

The researcher had studied dialogue preparation while conducting the literature review. This meant that he had studied how dialogue processes had been carried out in other regions in the world. However, the participants were invited to join the group with no expectations that they were going to have prior knowledge about dialogue and peacebuilding. Apart from being informed about the research and the ground rules, all that was expected of them was that they had to be present and active during the sessions. Therefore, the researcher did not know how the project would end. In addition, the researcher did not ask the participants to develop a way forward as a requirement.

## **8.3 Preparation**

The researcher had to do adequate preparation before embarking on this project not only as an academic requirement but also as a duty owed to himself as the convener of the dialogue sessions. He, therefore, exercised due diligence in carrying out the logistics to

ascertain that everything was in order before, during, and at the end of the project. This included gaining the necessary feedback from the thesis adviser and professor on the steps that he was undertaking, letters from relevant government authorities and a gatekeeper's letter, consent from stakeholders, securing a convenient yet affordable venue for gathering data during the dialogue sessions, engaging a research assistant, and having the proper equipment and necessary resources for facilitation.

## 8.4 Selection of Participants

The dialogue participants were selected through purposeful sampling. A total of 24 were involved from the beginning to the end. In addition to the 24 participants, the researcher and an assistant attended the sessions. The researcher considered several dynamics in the selection of the participants. First, the participants were balanced: 12 members were included from each community; and gender was also a factor, thus in each group of 12 members, half were female and half were male, and, therefore, the whole group had 12 participants from each gender. In Trans Nzoia County, which is expansive with five sub counties, each subcounty was represented by at least four people, two males and two females. Table 7.1 presents number of people represented by Trans Nzoia sub counties.

**Table 7.1:** representation of Trans Nzoia sub counties

Micronation	Bukusu		Nandi	
Number of participants	12		12	
Gender	6 Male	6 Female	6 Male	6 Female

## 8.5 Overview of Dialogue Content and Methodology

Eight dialogue sessions were undertaken. Each session lasted 2 hours, with a 15-minute break in between. The methodology used ranged from brainstorming, questions and answers, and discussions. The researcher modelled the participants to be partakers of the dialogue, encouraged them to share their thoughts, and aided them to observe and take turns in being the sessional chairs. This meant that they were instilled with competencies to replicate the same after the project. The researcher chaired the first, second and the eight sessions.

The researcher endeavored to maximize on the participation of members, whereas at the same time was cognizant of the fact that he was supposed to keenly observe the details of the group's interaction and each contribution. Therefore, he used the first session to share the purpose of the dialogue group, together with members, come out with guidelines how the group was to operate, and to model how the sessions were to be chaired. He also chaired the eighth session; this was to help participants come out with a way forward after the end of the sessions. The role of the researcher was to collect data during dialogue sessions. Occasionally he would ask for clarifications, and also gently redirect participants to the days agenda whenever discussions got out of track.

Schedule for dialogue sessions in chapter six, figure 6.3. titled: United dialogue sessions

## **8.6 Contributions from Participants**

### **8.6.1 Session One: Introduction and familiarization**

Some apprehension was present in the initial stages during the first session that was held on 7 June 2018. Before the start of the meeting, the researcher had observed that the majority of the participants knew each other and that they must have interacted before in other forums. Notably, they stated that the researcher was more of the new acquaintance despite being the convener. This was acceptable to the researcher because it helped with their interaction before the start of the session.

The researcher, with the help of the assistant, organized a circular seating arrangement such that all were able to see each other. The setup was deliberate and was meant to minimize any power struggles within the group as a result of seating arrangements. Nobody was pressurized to sit and maintain these positions. The researcher was glad, though, that there was no audible or noticeable physical resistance to the arrangement. After all were assembled and seated, the researcher invited a volunteer for opening with prayers, with this being a common tradition in the region. Prayers were said. Religious rituals can be strong instruments to promote peace or, alternatively, encourage violence. Positive elements must be upheld and enhanced.

The researcher proceeded to welcome all the participants in the group and the session. He explained their roles in detail and what the research entails, supplying the Durban University of Technology (DUT) Institutional Research Ethics Committee letter of information and also the consent letter that the participants signed. Starting to read this, a participant was of the view that the participants would start by getting to know each other through introductions. The researcher then explained that he had intended to do so after going through the above letters. Perhaps he should have shared this information before reading the letters to help the members understand his intentions as well as predict the proceedings. The participants were satisfied with this explanation, and they allowed him to proceed going through the letters and key information. The letters contained necessary information about the researcher, the nature of the research, the role of the participants, ethical issues, and other basic points. This was read at the outset to help introduce the researcher and the research such that the members would be more informed of the whole project.

The researcher's introduction and icebreaker were derived from lessons learned from the Alternative to Violence Program (AVP) training at DUT. The participants were paired starting with the person on the researcher's left, and this person would be the partner of the person to their left. This pattern was followed until all were paired. The participants were asked to take a minute each to introduce themselves to their partner, then share at least one positive aspect that they could remember about the tribe of which they were not a part – for a Bukusu, this involved something positive that a Nandi had done to them, and for the Nandi, this involved something positive that a Bukusu had done. It was the responsibility of each participant to introduce their partners to the whole group and share one positive aspect that they had experienced from the other tribe.

The introduction was meant to encourage affirmation and bring out the positive aspects from the other tribe. The participants shared experiences of the Bukusu and Nandi relations. It was observed that all the 24 participants had something positive to share about the other tribe. One common aspect that was shared was that there are noticeable intermarriages that have occurred between these tribes. The nature and extent of these

marriages were not explored in detail during the session and research in general. However, among the participants was a Nandi who was glad to share that she was married to a Bukusu and that they had seven children.

Many interactions take place between the two communities. Children mostly go to the same schools. They learn and grow together in these institutions. Here, they have opportunities to play and make friendships. Most times, the tribes also do their shopping and trade in the same trading centers. They buy from and sell to each other.

There were several aspects shared by the Nandi about the Bukusu. A member mentioned that the Bukusu are jovial people; they are easy to get along with, are welcoming, and are peaceful people and good neighbors. The Bukusu talked about the positive aspects of the Nandi: they help in times of need, they work in their farms for income, and they have united and done things together. After the introductions, the researcher suggested to the participants that they have rules to guide them in the dialogue sessions. These were as follows:

1. Everyone is encouraged to speak, but no one should be pressurized to.
2. Dialogue is a two-way process, which involves balancing deep listening and open and honest sharing.
3. Question what you hear and what you think.
4. Share what feels right for you; do not go beyond what you feel comfortable with.
5. When someone shares, do not interrupt.
6. Do not volunteer others.
7. All participants' contributions and ideas have value.
8. Accept the right of others to believe differently from you.
9. Treat others with the respect that you expect for yourself.
10. Do not aim to represent the views of a wider group; share about your own personal views and feelings.
11. Do not aim for agreement.
12. You do not need a clear position; it is okay to be confused or to change your mind.
13. Be present for the full process; absence can have a negative impact.
14. Help and support each other throughout the process.
15. Put your phones on silent mode.

The researcher asked the participants for their input, and they were open to critique, delete, or add other adequate rules that would have been appropriate for this research. All felt comfortable with the above and nothing was added or removed.

#### Dialogue group's understanding of key terms

At the outset, the researcher introduced the dialogue group to key terms in conflict transformation.

- Peace: They described it as a “state of harmony, love, unity among people, where there is no fight or violence”. The participants were able to conceive of and explain what peace is. They used different words to describe this. Common words used were harmony with the absence of conflict.
- Conflict: The participants also understood what conflict was. They explained this as being disagreements between people or groups.
- Positive peace: This was a complex concept for the participants to talk about. It was obvious that they were not conversant with this term. Of the 24, only two were able to give a close description of what positive peace means. Participant A stated that it is “having understanding that brings about development in all aspects of human life, when good actual relations with minimal boundaries and harmony amongst people exists”. Participant B described it as “serenity accompanied by growth, development, respect and general state of undisturbed coexistence”.
- Negative peace: Again, this was not a new term for the participants. However, half of the 24 were able to describe it in a fairly adequate manner according to their understanding. They explained negative peace as “a forced peace on people that have lived with violence for a long time”. Participant F explained that:

It is when people decide not to argue for the sake of getting along with others, but, in reality, when the truth comes out, it can easily lead into serious conflict. Somebody decides either to keep quiet, avoid any discussion or even move away from their original homelands *nimekubali tu yaishe* (I have to agree to end the conflict). It is coexistence under duress, accompanied by breach of rights.

- Violence: All participants knew what violence was: fights caused by strong disagreements among people or different groups of people. It can lead to fights, death, and the destruction of property, among other losses.
- Direct violence: Only three were able to express what this might mean. Most could not describe it, though they thought that they knew what it meant. The closest that they came to the description was by stating that “it [was a] one-on-one attack to somebody”.

- Structural violence: Only one participant managed to state that structural violence is when “a system is set that is oppressive”.
- Cultural violence: All gave incorrect explanations, though the majority perceived that it was concerned with culture.
- Nonviolence: No proper descriptions were given.

The researcher was able to explain these terms to the participants. They were informed that the descriptions of the terms would be continuous throughout the sessions. They were also encouraged to take note of how the above are manifested in the lives and interactions of the Bukusu and Nandi.

#### **8.6.2 Session Two: Have you been discriminated against because of your tribe? Do you ever discriminate against people from the other tribe?**

This was the second meeting. All the participants who had attended the first session were present. The only problem was the arrival time. The meeting was supposed to have started at 10:00 am, but it instead started at 11:00 am because of lateness. The fact that people travel from different locations within the county might have contributed to this. However, it was mainly the negative culture within Kenya of not keeping time that led to the effect. Kenyans have a common joke that states that “Africans have the time, whereas Europeans have the watch”. Rarely do people keep time in public functions and meetings. The researcher endeavored to encourage the participants to keep time in order for meetings to start and end predictably.

To open the dialogue, the participants had two questions to respond to. The first was for members to share experiences of when they had been discriminated against because of their tribe and how they felt about it. They shared about these occurrences extensively. Each had a story to share.

Member N used to work with an organization within the county, and he stated that “*Maisha yalikua mazuri nanilikua nakula poa* (life was good and he was doing well)”. Then, he was suddenly laid off without a justifiable explanation, as per his view. He, therefore, felt discriminated against because of his ethnicity, which is Bukusu. It was most likely that, as



per his view, he was sacked because of tribalism. This negatively affected his livelihood and life, for he has been unable to adequately provide for his family. He felt bitter and he continues to feel the pain. It was explicit to the researcher that the blame was not on the “Nandi boss” only but on the “whole Nandi community”.

Participant A shared about political campaigns in the just-concluded Kenya general elections of 2017. Aspirants usually provide money and other favors to influence voters. In one of these campaigns, the member was in a predominantly Bukusu area where an aspirant gave money to be distributed to those present. The person was not given his share because he was a Nandi. He stated, “*walitenga na kunifukuza kwasababu mimi ni Mkale* (I was discriminated against because of being a Nandi)”. In the same perspective, participant O, a Bukusu who is an opinion leader was in a meeting convened by the area Member of Parliament (MP) who is a Nandi. After the meeting, he noticed that he and other Bukususes were given Kshs 500, whereas their Nandi counterparts had received Kshs 1,000. He stated, “*Nilishangaa sana kwa sababu tulikua pamoja na tumetoka area moja kama hao* (he was perplexed because they had come from the same area just like them)”.

Participant P, a Bukusu who sits on a panel to vet people who apply for national identity cards, shared his experience. There was a case where youths had applied for cards on the same day under the same panel in 2017. Surprisingly, the applications for the Nandi youths went through, and they were given identity cards on that day. The applications and cards for the Bukusu youths were withheld until after the 2017 elections. This discrimination when service was concerned was evidently adverse. This was an effort to influence votes.

The feeling was that the sharing of resources follows the same pattern. There are also biases in the services offered to the public in government offices and organizations, private businesses, and other entities. An example involved a member from the Bukusu who had gone to seek services at the offices of the Kenya Power and Lighting Company. The person shared that he had queued and waited for his turn to be served. Subsequently, a person entered the office, went straight to the counter, and engaged with

the server in their ethnic language, and he was immediately served despite coming late. This irked most of the people waiting in line who felt undermined.

Ethnicity is entrenched in almost every sphere of life from the top echelons in the government and other organizations to the lower levels in the village and neighborhoods. Another member spoke about the distribution of Constituency Development Funds in their region. She specifically highlighted that more money was allocated to institutions associated with the Nandi compared to the Bukusu. Nandi schools have been favored. A point that was singled out was that more money was given to a cattle dip in the Nandi region compared to the less-than-adequate amount given to a school in the Bukusu region.

### **8.6.3 Session Three: Which cultural differences exist between the Bukusu and Nandi?**

The members were on time in this session. They also helped setting the chairs and preparing the room for the meeting. This implied taking responsibility and ownership of the process. During the dialogue session, they looked relaxed and comfortable compared with the previous sessions. More contact seemed to break the barriers between the two. They were becoming comfortable and friendly with each other.

Following from the above, the participants shared about the day's topic while drawing from their experiences. The Bukusu and Nandi would discriminate against each other during initiation/circumcision ceremonies. Member Q stated, "*wakati wa sherehe wanatutenga na kuwa wachoyo. Hawatupi pombe na chakula. Pia hawaturuhusu kujua vizuri kinachoendelea. Na tarusio wana kiburi sana* (they discriminate against us in ceremonies, and they are mean. They don't give us food and alcohol. They are secretive and don't allow us to really know how they do their initializations. Plus, the initiates are always rude and violent)". Though the Bukusu do not have any shares or entitlement during Nandi ceremonies, it is strange that they feel resentment when they are not given food and liquor. It is again interesting that they feel insecure when not updated or involved in Nandi traditional cultural activities that must be secretive. To the Nandi, perhaps the

Bukusu want to be very intrusive. The researcher struggled to understand why the Bukusu feel violated in other people's affairs and why this brings resentment. He made a follow-up on the same and learned that the Bukusu are a curious people who want to know what usually takes place in those ceremonies.

The Bukusu culture of wife inheritance was unusual from the Nandi's outlook. The Bukusu hold that a woman is married to the community, and when the husband dies, she still belongs to the community. Participant B, who is married to a Bukusu, shared that:

*Mimi naomba tu Mungu anisaidie bwana wangu asifariki mapema. nikifikiria tu kwamba masheji wangu watataka uniridhi naanza kuwachukia tu. Sijui hata nikwanini nawaza mambo kama haya wakati mwingine. Nani, nani kweli aridhiwe? Sio mimi* (God forgive me when sometimes I think, what will happen just in case my husband dies and they want to inherit me. When I think about it, I just start hating my in-laws. Who will be inherited? Not me).

Again, the Nandi struggle to understand certain Bukusu cultures, such as wife inheritance. However, it goes even further than understanding because participant B had already proceeded with her thoughts and assumed that if her husband died, her in-laws would want to inherit her through marriage. This was in her thoughts, and merely from thinking about inheritance, she had already prejudged her in-laws and harbors much resentment toward them. Perhaps such resentments are common between communities. A community hates the other just by thinking that they are bad, even though there might not be any justifiable action to support this.

The Nandis have a notion that all cattle belong to them and that, therefore, when they steal from or raid the Bukusu, they assume that they are taking back what is rightfully theirs and that it is, therefore, acceptable. Participant R (a Bukusu) shared that:

We had a Nandi neighbor who used to openly claim that our cows belonged to them. I could not understand since the cows were my parents. Then one day they were stolen, and the neighbor was the main suspect. There were rumors he still told people that he had taken back his cows. Despite the search that was mounted, the cattle were never recovered. This really affected my parents because they had no milk to sale to enable them care for the family. Later, two of my siblings dropped out of school for lack of school fees.

Such cultural practices absolved individuals of their crime and guilt. They were supported by their communities to disenfranchise the other. It was shared that, for the Nandi, it was justifiable to violently attack and kill people from other communities when safeguarding their properties and dignity. As per their culture, this is not a negative action as such so long as they undergo a traditional cleansing ceremony afterward. Violence, therefore, was encouraged because it was deemed to be an act of loyalty and bravery.

As per the above, it was evident that traditional beliefs and customs among the Bukusu and Nandi stimulate conflict between them. There are societal constructs that have to be addressed and transformed to bring peace. Some stereotypes are unjustifiable and redundant, yet they are still believed. Somehow, it is unfortunate that these communities still try to safeguard their cultures and traditions and that some promote hatred and violence.

#### **8.6.4 Session Four: How do you appreciate the presence of the other tribe?**

Participant Q shared that:

The Nandis are more endowed with land and have mostly been providing employment opportunities to the Bukusu who work in their farms. They produce agricultural products, especially milk, that we usually buy for our families.

The interdependence helps to foster good relations between the two. The Bukusu provide services by working in Nandi farms. In this way, the Nandi are able to produce more. On the other hand, the Bukusu buy these products from the Nandi. The Nandis have a ready market for their produce and are able to earn an income that comes from the Bukusu. Therefore, the two communities mutually support each other economically. This relationship must open their eyes and hearts to realize that they need each other. Each contributes value.

Intermarriage is on the increase and helps in promoting kinship and creating positive relationships. This is a reality to be accepted. Participant B stated that “*Nilipoolewa na*

*Bukusu jamii na watu wangu hawakufurahia nakutaka kabisa. Wacha tu waliniambia kila aina yamaneno. Ati sasa Maisha yangu itakua tu kula kumbekumbe* (My family discouraged me from marrying a Bukusu. They were disappointed with my action and did say all kinds of words including that I will be surviving on termites)". While intermarriage could be one of the key ways to foster unity in the world, it has been opposed by most communities. People want to maintain their blood and ethnicity. Despite resistance from some quarters, intermarriage between the Bukusu and Nandi is on the increase; this is a fact that the communities must accept. The offspring of these mixed marriages will be a bridge to enhance peace.

Participant C shared that the presence of the Bukusu had led to the diversification of food products such as *mapwoni* (sweet potatoes), *kuku* (chicken), *kumbekumbe* (termites), and *murere* (vegetables). The Nandi have traditionally been pastoralists who have mainly depended on cattle products for food and subsistence. They have, therefore, enriched their source of food by adopting other items and diets. This has helped much with food security, general health, and the environment. It has also reduced raids, especially during droughts, because they can obtain alternative food products. The Bukusu, who have traditionally been cultivators, have also learned from the Nandi. They have adopted the rearing of cattle, which is a source of milk and other products.

Participant F appreciated the Bukusu's friendliness and free spirit. They are more approachable and easily afford a smile or laugh out loudly as compared to the Nandi. They easily handle difficult matters without necessarily breaking down completely. The Nandis are more reserved as a community and tend to keep to themselves. They are also secretive, as observed earlier. This somehow affects the contact between the two communities. In spite of this, it was good to hear that the friendly and free spirits of the Bukusu are aspects that are admired by the Nandi. This implies that some of these aspects are also being adopted by the Nandi. They are slowly learning to open up and reach out to other communities. The researcher was of the view that sometimes society is suspicious of communities/persons that are reserved and secretive. They assume that they are deviant.

It was observed that the two communities are increasingly sharing public spaces and places such as educational institutions, places of worship, markets, and other facilities. They socialize, interact, teach, learn, and trade in these places. Some attend the same worshipping venues where they are instructed on ethics (for Christians, the need to love one's neighbor as much as one love oneself). Most of the youths are jointly involved in sports activities. These interactions help them appreciate and connect with each other. This has positively enhanced their relationships and promoted love and peace. It is breaking cultural barriers, opening up avenues for communication, enhancing better understanding of each other, and significantly reducing negative stereotypes.

The researcher observed continuous and significant reflections during the session. It was apparent that the participants were sharing from deep within their hearts. Their opening up and the matters that they stated and heard resonated across the board. There was no anger or regret expressed as a result of sharing. Instead, it was obvious that they had more understanding and appreciation of each other. There was a change in the behavior and attitude of the Nandi who had shared more than before; they shared more freely.

#### **8.6.5 Session Five: In your opinion, what are the major causes of conflict between the Bukusu and Nandi in Trans Nzoia County?**

The chairman of the session started the session very well. He was composed and in control. Generally, the members were in a relaxed mood. When prodding the participants regarding the above question, certain factors were identified as being the major causes of conflict in Trans Nzoia, as described in the subsections that follow.

##### **a. Land**

Inequality has an economic, social, and political dimension. It excludes a certain group of people from accessing certain rights and services, one being the sharing of resources: natural, economic, and human resources. From the dialogue discussions, it was clear that the Nandi are more endowed with natural resources (land) compared to the Bukusu. The desire to maintain the status quo as the dynamics are changing is one factor that has precipitated conflict between the two communities. One participant stated:

Land continues to be subdivided and redistributed through inheritance or sale. As the population increases, the subdivisions means that many are getting smaller portions passed down more and more. The fact that some are selling means the acreage is diminishing. Therefore, there is pressure in the ownership of land as Trans Nzoia is a farming community.

The maintenance and control of resources increases the tensions between the communities and who becomes in charge of various offices within the county. This is related to who occupies elective political offices and posts in the national and county government administration. The people occupying these offices influence employment opportunities for the youth. Usually, they employ persons from their own community.

Poverty also exacerbates the situation. It is easy to project one's situation and blame the other for predicaments that somebody encounters. In earlier times, life was good until the Bukusu/Nandi took what was rightfully theirs. The other becomes an easy target for blame and accusations.

**b. Negative Cultural Traditions**

Culture is a social construct that defines a community and gives it an identity. It is common in all human societies. Every culture has aspects that are positive and also those that are negative. The negative traditions tend to promote divisions within society. Participant H stated:

*Kasumbwa ya utamaduni na mazingara inaonekana sana. Unapata hatuheshimiani kwa sababu ya mila na desturi zetu. Sisi tunajua kua walenimaadui wetu nakunavile hatuezi kushirikian kwa mambo muhimu haswa tamadumu. Hakuna vile sisi nisawa* (The cultural heritage and environment is conspicuous. We don't respect each other because of our diverse culture and tradition. We just know that they are our enemies and their things we will never do with them: initiation and other ceremonies. We are different).

Communities always feel superior to and undermine others. This only brings enmity. As stated by participant H above, it has been ingrained in the minds and hearts of the Nandi that the Bukusu are enemies. Usually, anyone who is not from one's ethnic group is an

enemy and has to be treated with suspicion. The aim is usually to encourage pride and solidarity in the community, but then the consequence involves dehumanizing others.

Masculinity is inculcated in most African cultures. The same applies to the Bukusu and Nandi nations of Trans Nzoia. To be strong, men are encouraged to be tough. The culture of violence is impressed upon them early in their childhood. They have to stand up and fight for the community. This encourages domestic violence in families. Minute non-issues easily escalate into violence between people coming from the same community and also opposing communities. Drunkenness and initiation ceremonies have been known to be leading triggers of violence.

**c. *Political Incitement Through Tribal Lines***

The negative desire to control political power for personal gain has led politicians to use mischievous means to fulfil their desires. While tribes are an important part of the Kenyan community, they have also been used to promote violence. The term *negative ethnicity* has come into use in Kenya to denote how the element of ethnicity can be abused. Negative ethnicity involves the use of incitement and hatred along tribal lines for political expediency to acquire power or resources. The incitement involves arousing emotions that act as stimulants for hate and violence.

Politics in Kenya is driven by ethnic alignment rather than specific party policies. Most Kenyan political parties are tribal. For example, the Bukusu identified with National Super Alliance (NASA) through FORD Kenya (FORD-K) whereas the Nandi belonged to the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) during the 2017 elections. This has been the case for a long time. Tension caused by this negative competitive attitude often spirals into violent conflicts because the parties are tribal. The violence experienced in Kenya during the election cycles of 1992, 1997, 2007, 2013, and 2017, though politically motivated, had tribal dimensions.

Politicians take advantage of limited exposure and ignorance. People with no high school or college education have been known to be more easily manipulated by politicians. This



explains the fact that there is less ethnic violence in urban areas compared to rural areas. Politicians supply alcohol to people, especially the young and vulnerable, to carry out some of these acts.

It was observed that modern technology has made it easier for the spread of hatred and incitement. During the 2007/2008 violence, radio and social media were used to mobilize and command groups in various regions. It made it easy for people to communicate and cause havoc. The spreading of propaganda is also on the increase.

**d. Impunity**

Just as has been the case with Kenya, impunity has affected peace in the county. People who have been perpetrators of violence have not been held accountable. The inciters who are known walk freely, or they have benefited from the existing chaos. They incite their community to cause mayhem and protect them from the justice system. In most cases, the inciters have been agents of key political leaders in the country. They are, therefore, already protected by the government. Participant W stated:

*Hawa watu wanajulikana. Ni vile tu wamecoviwa na Serekali. Kama tu recommendation ya TJRC ingeimplementiwa, mambo ingekuwa sawa. Sasa ukweli umefichwa na wakora hawa wanazidi kuishi tu nikama jemadari (The inciters are known. They have protection. If TJRC recommendations were implemented, things would have been different and they would have already been held accountable. Truth has been suppressed and the inciters continue to live as if they are heroes).*

From the dialogue, it was apparent that the prosecution of inciters would deter inciters. However, the lack of the same has only emboldened them. Impunity has encouraged corruption and economic greed. Public resources have been seized by former regimes and their cronies. Unfortunately, this has favored people from one community over the other. Participant W shared that:

They chased our people who were squatters and had paid for shares in Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) lands. Three Bukusu were killed by the police when the community protested against this in ADC Kipsingori. I understand the government claimed that they had to settle the poor and

landless people in these lands. But then they gave this land to key rich politicians and top military leaders. All these are from one community.

Previous regimes abetted nepotism, which continues to affect the lives of many in the county. The perception is that whereas the Nandi were rewarded with ADC land, the Bukusu were punished. Squatters who had organized and raised some funds to buy land were forcefully evicted and influential government personalities were rewarded with the same. The influential persons have land in former government properties across the county. These same people are the ones who were deemed “poor and landless”, and even with the succeeding regimes, they still enjoy protection.

**e. Unequal Distribution of Resources**

Inequality and poverty were also presented as factors contributing to ethnic violence in Trans Nzoia. A pervasive and unequal distribution of resources exists. The distribution of government services, employment opportunities, and land along biased ethnic affiliations have led to a sense of entitlement, on the one hand, and desperation, on the other.

As observed earlier, a participant was laid off because of his ethnicity, another had to wait longer while queuing for public services and prominent landowners are mainly from one community. Those who have an advantage in controlling these resources are better placed to improve their socioeconomic status. There is competition to sustain or upset the status quo, for the privileged to maintain their status, whereas the underprivileged want to improve their predicament. A participant stated:

*Kiona haya mambo ya raslimali inachangia sana. Watu hawataki kufanya kazi lakini wanataka kukaa vizuri na maisha ya kistarehe. Kwa sababu hiyo wanaauza mashamba yao hadi yanaisha, baadaye wanasema watu mamechukua mashamba yao. Juzi tu Wafula alichomwewa nyumaba na duga lake kuporwa eti kwasababu anaringa na mali siyo yake. Mbele ya Mungu mimi sikuona makosa yake hata kidogo. Hiyo ilikua wivu tu. Hawa waliuza kila kitu sasa wanalaumu wengine* (The unequal distribution of resources is a major contributor. People don't want to work yet they desire to live extravagantly. Because of this, they sell their land in bits, sometimes until it's all gone. Afterwards, they claim that their land has been encroached into. Recently, Wafula's house was torched, and his shop was vandalized while being accused of having pride, yet the resources are not his 'but theirs'. I swear

before God that the accusation was false. They were just jealous of his success. They have sold everything, and now they want to blame others for their own mistakes).

The resultant poverty brought about by population growth, corruption, environmental degradation, and pressure on limited arable land is eliciting inequalities. Most of the youth cannot rely on available land because it is too small to comfortably sustain them. Employment opportunities are also limited. Because of unemployment, poverty is on the increase. Idle, unemployed, and poor youths are easily manipulated to engage in violence.

#### **8.6.6 Session Six: Are you aware of interventions put in place to resolve these conflicts? What have been their impact?**

The participants were aware of some interventions. However, they mostly mentioned macro-organizations, and the researcher noted that very little regarding grassroots local organizations was mentioned. The organizations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC); the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK); the Catholic Peace and Justice Committee (CPJC); the African Union (AU); the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC); and the Government of Kenya (GoK) were stated to have played a critical role in peacebuilding.

From their contributions, the participants mentioned that “TJRC commission Bethwel Kiplagat, conflict and reconciliation committee *ilibuniwa lakini bado hawajakubaliwa* (was created but has not been accepted), ‘big fish’ sabotage implementation”. Bethwel Kiplagat was the chairman of the TJRC commission, and, therefore, sometimes the commission was referred to as the “Bethwel Kiplagat commission” by most common people. Though the efforts and recommendations of the commissions were noble, as per the participants’ view, the implementation of the same has not been achieved. The “big fish” are against them and have fought these efforts. The “big fish” refers to the people in power who control the government and some influential politicians. The commission mandate was to review previous injustices, address those issues, and provide probable remedial

measures. Apparently, some are not keen in promoting peace and justice in the county and the nation at large.

The 2008 violence has awakened the consciousness of Kenyans who had been tricked into assuming that they were an island of peace. Due to violence, very many people were killed, injured, and displaced, and properties were destroyed. The country was burning and was headed toward a civil war. It took the efforts of many to restore tranquility, one being the AU, who sent Kofi Annan (former General Secretary of the UN) and his team to spearhead mediation. The AU is, therefore, remembered and appreciated for these efforts. At the same time, six key people were referred to be prosecuted by the ICC. This was a major step because before these, the “big fish” were never prosecuted or held responsible for their incitement and negative actions. As such, Kenyans recognize the AU and ICC’s efforts and positions.

The KHRC has been at the forefront of gathering information on violence and injustices. In a way, they have helped gather the evidence used by the ICC and complement the work of the TJRC. They have protected those living on the margins. The same can be stated for the NCCK and CPJC. A member stated, “*kanisa* (NCCK and CPJC) *imekua mbele* (the church has been in the forefront). The parachurch organizations have been in the forefront, speaking truth to power, carrying out mediation, and promoting peace and justice. Another stated, “*lakini hatujaona SUPKEM* (but we have never seen SUPKEM)”.

Constitutional change through the promulgation of the current Kenyan Constitution in 2010 has addressed some issues of structural violence, one being the system of devolved governance that was brought into the county government. A participant stated, “*ugatuzi imesaidia* (devolution has helped some)”. The participant has seen and enjoyed some of the government resources that have trickled down to the counties. The worry, though, is that some counties are very ethnic, and this might be a potential area of conflict. The dominant community in a county has power over the resources in their region. Trans Nzoia is not immune to this. The Bukusu, who comprise 63% of the population, are in control of the county government.

Power-sharing arrangements by the national and county governments have helped to redistribute political power and the accompanying privileges. A participant shared that “Power sharing *imesaidia sana* (helped a lot)”. Since the 2008 national power-sharing arrangements, when Mwai Kibaki (the president) and Raila Odinga (the prime minister) agreed to share government positions as a way to resolve election-related violence, the same formula has been replicated in some county governments. *Negotiated democracy*, as referred to in counties, is where communities agree to share political positions considering ethnic composition. Here, the concern is not only about the numbers of votes but inclusiveness.

Other unstructured interventions involved the village elders and their vigilante group, *Nyumba kumi*. The council of elders and local village leaders (*Wakasa*) have a say (to improve or destroy). As village leaders, they easily share sensitive information. Activities such as sports, conducive workstations, living in the same villages/estates, and trading together influence the two communities’ relationships. “Merry go round *inasaidia* (helps)”. Life commitments, such as intermarriages, have improved their relations.

The participants were keen and attentive during the dialogue sessions. Some were reflective. Somehow, the Bukusu seemed to offer suggestions more often and more easily compared to the Nandi. The female participants contributed less to the session. A member observed that two people had dominated the dialogue and asked that they give others time to contribute.

Regarding specific groups, there were no known specific/purposeful grassroots peace groups or efforts. It was clear that most had never participated in an organized one. Perhaps they had been concentrated in volatile areas elsewhere. The UN had attempted to establish locational advocacy. There is a need to sensitize the community – they have a voice – but “don’t deal with cartels” was a warning from one member. This implied that there are people and organizations who are not genuine. They pretend to be active in an

activity, but all they want is money. They are found within government and community circles.

#### **8.6.7 Session Seven: As participants in this project, what interventions do you think should be put in place to achieve positive peace between the Bukusu and Nandi?**

Participants were punctual by arriving on time. They remembered where the group had stopped with the discussions in the immediate session. They seemed to be in deep reflection, and they had much to share, with the baseline being that positive peace must be nurtured. From the dialogue, the researcher organized the activities into three categories: the group, administration and governance, and the community.

The dialogue group members stated that they would form a group such that they could become peace ambassadors to spearhead peacebuilding in Trans Nzoia County. They had a feeling that they could do more as a team. The purpose of the team was to carry out peacebuilding. They would do this through carrying out community awareness activities and would teach people about the importance of peace. This would be done in formal and informal ways. Formally, they would encourage and support sports and education – “illiteracy *inachangia sana* (illiteracy contributes a lot)”, educate their children to stand up against tribalism and tribal parties, and sensitize the youth and educate them regarding stereotypes and how these were to be eliminated. They would purposefully talk about peace in their institutions and community gatherings in, for example, churches, schools, and *miganda* (merry-go-round groups). During elections, they would educate people to go beyond tribal affiliations and ethnic leaders. They would promote gender equality and sensitize the community to its importance. Informally, in their interactions, they would share about peace virtues. In addition, they would endeavor to continue with the dialogue sessions even after this project was completed, and more dialogue groups would be formed across the county. They would be role models, brothers’ keepers (and sisters’ protectors), and champions of peacebuilding in Trans Nzoia County.

The group also agreed that, as individuals, they should live a life that exemplifies peace. They supported a member who stated that “let us start with ourselves because peace

starts with me as an individual. *Tubalance mambo yetu kwa family kama wazazi na Watoto* (Let us balance and promote peacebuilding in our families as parents and children in our homes)". Peace is not only to be talked about in public squares but also to be lived and put into practice in the households.

The group encouraged the governance and administrative units that basically touch on the national and county governments, political classes, and village elders to spread the leadership positions and privileges across all communities. "*Uongozi uwespread kwa all tribes* (There should be the equitable distribution of resources and employment opportunities)". They should discourage nepotism, and the leadership must be fair in-service delivery according to the needs of all the communities. No one community should dominate and have an advantage over another. The national government should promote and implement the TJRC report. The members stated that "they must take step to earn truth, do justice before reconciliation. We are only postponing problems."

Public, private, and religious institutions must encourage diversity. There must not be exclusive schools, hospitals, churches, and cooperative societies for Bukusus or Nandis only. A member observed that the "delocalization of principals/headteachers *itasaidia* (will help) [and] other institutions must be delocalized too – for example, hospital, churches." Delocalization is a governmental initiative to post heads of schools outside their counties and communities in order to stimulate exposure to different environments and nationalism instead of tribalism. Learners should be trained in psychosocial techniques to enable them to process emotions and act reflectively.

There is much that the community has to undertake. They must learn to share responsibly. They should appreciate the positive from people and leaders and not only focus on the negatives. Gossip on issues that can spark conflict and violence must be discouraged and stopped. Boundaries should be respected, and people must not be forced to conform to the ideas of other communities. People should be accepted with their culture, and "*nawachana namambo ya kustereotype* (stereotyping must be discouraged)". Intermarriages are to be encouraged. The community has to talk and act on practical

issues, such as the building of hospitals where there is a need instead of only in areas where a specific community is dominant. An example is the establishment of Kipsingori dispensary that would have been built in Sinoko. It is important to think beyond their areas or regions, expand beyond ethnic communal cocoons, and strive for exposure. Christian denominations assemble along tribal lines, thus “churches [are] to supersede tribal lines *ili RCEA iwe pia Yuya* (RCEA should also be in Yuya)”. The feeling was that positions in government offices and facilities are biased, and this is to be discouraged. On the other side, the communities themselves also have a tendency of worshipping along ethnic lines. Perhaps if the churches accommodated diverse communities, then this would contribute to peacebuilding. Working in an area that is dominantly religious and Christian, the members stated that they would also involve prayers, and they quoted Matthew (5: 8-10): “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (New International Version).

#### **8.6.8 Session Eight: Evaluation and the way forward**

All dialogue members participated. Some arrived late, though. They were attentive and participated actively. They seemed to reach out to each other more. They were more informed and knowledgeable about peacebuilding through dialogue compared to when the sessions first started. They unanimously resolved to continue meeting and be involved in peacebuilding. The group was to be intentionally reorganized to become a CBO involved in peacebuilding.

On the same day, they discussed the need of having a committee that would help interim leaders. This was to help them develop agendas that they wanted to undertake and how this would be carried out. All members volunteered to be actively involved. They specified that they would take leadership roles in peacebuilding in their regions and within the county at large.

The members agreed on a coordinating committee and generated the leadership. This was mostly done through reaching a consensus rather than voting. The researcher noted



that the participants were sensitive to the composition of the committee as they considered ethnic and gender balance.

The subsequent dialogue session was to be planned, convened, and run by the new leadership that had been generated by participants. Saidi a Bukusu and Kimeli a Nandi were the leaders to spearhead group activities. The researcher offered to be available to assist whenever they needed his guidance.

#### **8.6.9 General observation**

Session topics were covered and data collected. Contributions in session one was not as generous compared to other sessions. The researcher noted that apprehensions during this first meeting. It was understandable that this was the first sessions and participants had to be clear of what was expected of them. They definitely surveyed the environment and other participants. Information from the researcher helped them to be comfortable with the group.

It was observable that member was reflecting more during the fourth session. The researcher made a follow-up and checked with four participants to ascertain why they seemed to be reflective during the session. The dialogue had focused on the appreciation of people from the other ethnic community (either Nandi or Bukusu) living in Trans Nzoia County. The four participants, a combination of Nandi and Bukusu community, were surprised to learn that they were appreciated, they did hear positive attributes coming from people of the other tribe, something unusual.

The eight session was somehow unique as participants were very involved and participated with vigor on the evaluation and way forward. They desired the group to continue meeting. The passion was there and the energy to make the same a reality. They were active in selecting their leaders and on setting up future meetings.

### **8.7 Participants' Perception of Major Players**

#### **8.7.1 Civil Society Organizations**

The participants were aware of the roles played by CBOs, FBOs, and major NGOs. They had mixed views. While they revered some, they had no kind words for others. The following organizations were specifically mentioned, and their work was acknowledged

as exemplary: the KHRC's movement and activity; the Church, through the NCKK; the CPJC; the AU's mediation; the UN; and the ICC.

It was interesting that the works and efforts of the UN were not strongly emphasized during the sessions. There was no mention of the UN peacebuilding program at the county level. However, the AU footprint was identified mainly due to their successful mediation efforts during the 2007/2008 violence. They brought the violence to an end and helped to address issues of the constitution and impunity. It was through their efforts that key perpetrators of the violence were prosecuted at the ICC. The prosecution was a key milestone because influential people were taken to court; this was historical. It was celebrated because it addressed the issue of impunity.

The KHRC was also celebrated because it has promoted justice despite opposition from key leaders. It has gathered and documented evidence that has been helpful in many ways. It has complemented the work of the AU, ICC, and FBOs and lent a listening ear to the victims. The Kenya Red Cross has been active in providing relief services. FBOs, especially the NCKK and CPJC, have provided relief services to victims. Occasionally, churches have spoken truth to power by speaking against injustices and violence espoused by leading politicians in the country and county. They have to do more.

It was observed there were no intentional peace groups. Efforts for purposeful peace building was also invisible. Participants had to be involved in planned peacebuilding activities. The researcher was of the view that peacebuilding activities are possibly concentrated in the most volatile regions. The UN has led in initiatives to institute locational advocacy groups in the Kenya. The government needed to have LPCs in the counties, but, unfortunately, nothing was mentioned about it. The community has to be prepared and activity involved. Their voice needs to be heard and captured instead of mostly dealing with unscrupulous cartels.


### **8.7.2 Perception of Government (County & National)**

The government, especially the ruling elites carry the blame for being the instigators of violence. They were to blame for sabotaging noble efforts to promote positive peace by undermining the implementation of proposals by commissions such as the TJRC. It was apparent some of the leaders have benefit violence.

Village elders have the potential to do good or bring violence. They are a group

## **8.8 Reflections: Post-Dialogue Assessment**

The dialogue sessions were a process that impacted the lives of both the participants and the researcher. From the beginning to the end, the researcher was captivated by the insight of the participants. While preparing for the project, the researcher was a little apprehensive since he did not know what direction the research would take. The researcher had assumed and prepared for rude encounters, uncooperativeness, blaming, and much projection toward the other participating ethnic group (the Bukusu toward the Nandi, and the Nandi toward the Bukusu). However, the opposite took place. The participants were cordial toward each other and cooperative. They also appreciated the opportunities to be involved and share.

Working with people and exploring issues was unique as the dynamics were unpredictable. Assumptions were dispelled with  time, and new findings were brought forth. Basic terms in the field of peacebuilding were introduced, and there was an awareness of this in the participants. During the initial stages, peace was perceived to be the absence of war; then, progressively, issues of justice that leaned more toward positive peace were explored. Seeing members perceiving and articulating about these issues toward the end of the dialogue sessions was inspiring.

The project opened possibilities for the creative involvement of the members to carry out peacebuilding at home, in the communities, and in the county. The participants were eager to explore and be more involved. The fact that a CBO with the same goal was to be formed means that new possibilities will emanate from this endeavor.

## **8.9 Conclusion**

The dialogue sessions involving representatives from the Bukusu and Nandi were a learning and transformational process. Knowledge was acquired while attitudes were changed. The project was a mediation project between the Bukusu and Nandi. To this end, it was evident that purposeful, regular dialogue sessions are strong tools for mediation and peacebuilding. Allport's contact theory was a strong pillar in grounding the project. The researcher affirmed the strength and practical workability of the theory. In this project, the theory was an important tool that produced positive observable, objective results.

Contact amongst the Bukusu and Nandi participants reduced the intolerance between them and also changed the approaches within these communities. It was important that rules and expectations were defined in the first meeting; this helped members to know the extent of their roles. More so, the members were asked to place greater importance on the ground rules to encourage full participation and ownership. The rules helped to guide every step of the meetings and assured the members of confidentiality and safety. Throughout the meetings, the members adhered to the ground rules.

Contact was initiated, and the rules of engagement were outlined. Beliefs, especially concerning stereotypes and entitlement, were clarified, and the communities met as equal partners; therefore, no party was to be superior or inferior. With this level ground, they strived to work together with the common goal being to improve relations between the communities. Sharing was deep, and all were keenly involved; they alternated between talking about their experiences and listening reflectively on what others were sharing. All this was carried out with the support of communal and national laws. Nothing hinders the members from also participating in peacebuilding activities within the county.

By the end of the project, friendships had been formed, and ideas on how to sustain these had been explored. As a way of continuing with friendships, the participants decided to form a group, visit each other, and to always be in contact. The participants bonded, new friendships were built, and ideas were developed.

## CHAPTER NINE: EVALUATING THE OUTCOME


### 9.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluates the outcome of the intervention employed in this project. The researcher collected data from narrative discussions and body language of dialogue group participants (Crocker 2015: 50). 24 participants took part in dialogue sessions, 12 from the Bukusu and 12 Nandi. Gender balance was observed and adhered to. Dialogue discussions had leading questions that helped group member explore a particular area. This way the conversations were guided. Eight sessions were carried out. The sessions were audiotaped, I and my research assistant also took notes. I identified the major themes from these records.

Evaluation was carried out from participants contribution. Church and Rodgers state that “evaluation is the systematic acquisition and assessment of information gathered on specific questions to provide careful feedback for a program” (2006:93). Critical assessment of data was undertaken and analyzed. It was observable that attitudes were changed and prejudice reduced. Friendships were formed and members were eager to implement lessons learned from dialogue sessions. They specifically agreed to convert the group into a peacebuilding group to spearhead the same in Trans Nzoia County. Though this was outstanding, the issue of durability and sustainability for Short-term evaluations come into play, for it may not be very useful because everyone is enthusiastic at the end of dialogue session (Salomon 2013: 12). But will the enthusiasm last?

This Action research evaluation is in conformity with Gibbs’ (1988) reflective cycle. Gibb’s cycle has six stages as shown in figure 9:1

**Figure 9:1** Gibb’s reflective cycle



(Gibbs 1988: 49).

## **9.2 Personal Benefits of Dialogue**

9:2:1 Capacity building can be enabled through the acquisition of new skills. The researcher followed up with the participants intentionally observing them after the dialogue. Four of the participants monitored indicated that they had built their capacity in handling conflicts. They had been involved in mediation. A participant from Kapsara shared the following:

I benefited from the project and learned a lot. I used the skills gained to help my neighbors who had domestic challenges. They had fought and their conflict was escalating. Things were getting out of hand. I am glad that they let me intervene and have some time with them. Actually, I literally used the skills we

had acquired during dialogue sessions. I asked if they felt ok if we had a dialogue session in their place or my house. They did not have any preference. I suggested that we have the dialogue in their place, outside under a tree shade. I encouraged each one of them to share their thoughts out, with leading questions. There was tension at first. I was even scared. Eventually, they cooled down, especially the husband who was furious and kept on accusing the wife of respect. The main conflict seemed to have emanated from spending of money they got after selling part of their maize produce. Their priorities were at variance. The husband wanted to spend the money impulsively, whereas the wife had suggested that they reinvest the money by buying a cow that was to produce milk for family in the future. Afterwards, the husband agreed to go with the wife's idea. He had assumed that she wanted the cow to be bought so that they give it out as dowry to her family. They were all glad after clarifying their priorities. You see I did very little; mine was to guide and help them dialogue. Besides, they were Bukusu and not even people of my tribe.

Similar sentiments were echoed by a participant who is a religious leader. He informed the researcher that he had improved his counseling skills and felt very empowered. He is much more comfortable reaching out to people from the Bukusu tribe and inviting them to church compared to the times before the dialogue project. In addition, he realized that they were being sinful in not opening up their congregation to people from other tribes.

**9.2.2** New connections, friendships, and networks have been built. Two of the participants specifically appreciated the networks brought about through dialogue. From the dialogues, Saidi made connections and built friendships with several people in the group. They are part of his circle now, and he visits them occasionally. He stated that *“ninapokuwa soko ya Kaplamai sasa nampitia Jack nakumjulia hali, juzi alinitembelea pia* (I visit Jack to touch base whenever in Kaplamai center, [and] the other day, he also visited me)”. These opportunities for friendship across tribal lines is an encouragement. Because of taking part in the project, they started to reach out more to each other, which was a good sign. A barrier was being broken. In addition to the friendship, Juma has a broader network as he was approached by another participant to take part in a children's rights program that was recently launched in the county.

**9.2.3** There was a process of opening up and the ventilation of suppressed anger and thoughts. During the sessions, there were participants who revealed their pain and shared

their injuries. The session turned out to be a healing and therapeutic process for them. The fact that they felt safe to do this was a positive point. In addition, the researcher observed, through verbal and body language, that other participants were receptive and in no manner judgmental when people opened up. Instead, they listened. There was no attempt to justify, defend, or condemn these positions. A Bukusu shared how he had been laid off from employment because of his tribe, and a Nandi spoke of how he had been violently attacked and chased away by people he knew because they had not wanted to give him a share of the handouts from politicians.

### 9.3 Medium-Term Outcomes

Medium-term evaluation was undertaken after 32 months. The final dialogue session was held on 5<sup>th</sup> January 2019, while the first evaluation meeting was held on 28 August 2021. I followed Salomon's advice where he posits that medium-term evaluation is useful and avails realistic results as compared to short-term evaluation (Salomon 2013: 12). The evaluation was based on two questions and 'the river of life' exercise. All involved in the dialogue sessions were invited to attend for two medium-term evaluation sessions, however some did not attend. In the first session 10 Nandi and six Bukusu attended, nine were women and seven men. The second session was attended by 10 Nandi and eight Bukusu, 10 being women and eight men. The venue was Kitale Church and attendance was as shown in table 9:2 below

**Table 9:2** Date and attendance of evaluation session

Evaluation	Date	Number of participants
1	28/08/2021	16
2	25/09/2021	18

#### 9.3.1 Outcome 1

On 28 August 2021, the following question was addressed: "What has happened since you were last here?" (*Ni yapi yametendeka tangu tulipokua hapa Pamoja mara ya mwisho?*).



On 5 January 2019, the 8<sup>th</sup> and final dialogue session focused on evaluation and way forward. The participants resolved to continue meeting even after the project had been completed and to intentionally be part of a peacebuilders' endeavor within Trans Nzoia County. The group metamorphosized from being a thesis project to a CBO that is involved in peacebuilding. The CBO has a coordinating committee that currently helps to plan its activities. The group has taken leadership roles in peacebuilding and endeavors to have a spiral effect within the county. They have not yet convened dialogue sessions, though they have been involved in various peace initiatives.

The participants agreed to formally be a group that was to intentionally spearhead peacebuilding in Trans Nzoia County. After working together in the dialogue sessions, they had bonded and discerned that they had a duty to serve their community. Considering that the participants were from the Bukusu and Nandi tribes, this group was a suitable avenue because it was inclusive and, therefore, had the potential to reach out to the two communities with members who were insiders. They would be easily accepted by the respective communities since they were part of the communities and aware of interaction patterns.

The Trans Nzoia Community Empowerment Peacebuilding Partnership (TCEPP) was formed, though they have not registered formerly with the government. The original members include all those who were involved in the dialogue project. TCEPP has been involved in peacebuilding activities in the county, though some members have not been active. The chairman stated:

We have been active and picking momentum. Already we were involved in three major activities as TCEPP, though not all members have been showing up. Not all of us have been present, although they are active in our WhatsApp group. We are making progress and helping our people to live in harmony. This has only been the beginning.

Table 9.1 presents TCEPP activities

**Table 9.1:** TCEPP Activities

Activity	What	Who	Outcome
Dialogue group members embarked on a peace mission to sensitize the community on the evils of ethnic violence.	They did house visitations to promote peace by talking against ethnic conflict and violence. Communities in the county have had protracted conflict fueled by their ethnic identity.	11 group members visited 59 households in the Cherangany constituency, within Trans Nzoia County.	11 group members intentionally visited households in the constituency to test the water and practice what they intended to do in the long run. They were welcomed in all the homes without hesitation. They talked about the ills of violence brought about by ethnic conflict. The community appreciated their vigor.
Trans Nzoia Peace awareness campaign	They marched in the street of Kitale Town in support of peaceful coexistence between communities living in Trans Nzoia County for unity. They condemned ethnic violence.	14 group members were involved in the march. They walked the streets of Kitale Town saying the words “ <i>Amani Trans Nzoia</i> (Peace in Trans Nzoia)” and “ <i>Hatutaki Ukabila</i> (We are against ethnicity)”. They were joined by other people. More than 100 motorbike riders joined the group. They hooted and joined along proclaiming peace. After covering most of the streets, the group concluded by going to the governor’s office where they were	Their message resonated well with many people in the street. They attracted followers who joined the group in proclaiming the message of peace. A sizeable number of Boda boda riders were excited to join the march and embraced the message of peace. The county secretary expressed the county support for peacebuilding and encouraged the group to continue with its activity and officially plan to visit the governor.

		addressed by the county secretary.	
Prayer and worship to commemorate the International Day of Peace	The International Day of Peace celebration has become a global activity to celebrate peacebuilding efforts.	Eight group members organized an interdenominational church worship in Kitale Town. Other churches were also encouraged to speak about the message of reconciliation as written in the Bible: "And through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross" (Col. 1:20).	The message of reconciliation was preached to more than 200 congregants at the Kitale Friends Church.

Most participants have been involved in community and regional issues touching on community development and peace work. Some have even traveled beyond Trans Nzoia, as shared by N *"Nimeusika na mambo mengine kuhusu amani hata kule Eldoret (I have been involved in other peace activities around Eldoret"*. Others have been engaged in sports, especially soccer, which has brought the youths together. While doing so, they were short of facilities and equipment to enhance the sporting activities. During sports activities, long-lasting friendships are formed, and relations are strengthened. Young people are encouraged to engage in peacebuilding. Participant NW has been engaged in the area's welfare group. Notably, she is the secretary and acknowledged that the skills gained from the dialogue sessions helped her to be competent in her work. The group is involved in education, health, and environmental conservation activities. While working, she has been more aware that *"umoya wao na umuhimu wa Watoto hausingatii ukabila bali upendo (Their unity and the value of their children go beyond tribalism, instead they emphasize love)"*. The members of the group went across the country to encourage

registration and involvement. It was impressive that they had support from all communities. They want to improve the welfare of people, especially the vulnerable, and give them hope. While involved, they recognize that the present leaders belong to them all.

Political leaders have been fluid and unreliable: “We can’t depend on leaders who promise what they cannot fulfil.” There was disappointment with the manner in which the ruling class have engaged with some participants. They do not trust most of the politicians. There was a sense of betrayal as they lacked the necessary support.

Churches were recognized for reaching out to diverse communities. They have spread to other areas. A church was formed in Dagoreti, and it has members from all communities, hence encouraging interactions. A member stated that “it was his hope that they will interact more through interdenominational forums”.

### **9.3.2 Outcome 2**

In 25 September 2021, the following questions were addressed: “To what extent did you carry out what you said you would? If so, to what effect? If not, why not?” (*Unlitimiliza vipi yote uliyosema utayatenda? Iwapo ulitenda, je yamekuwa na matokeo gani? Na kama haukutenda, nikwasababu gani?*).

The plan was for the participants to continue with the dialogue group even after the thesis project. Leaders were generated to coordinate activities that the group proposed to carry out. The vision was to promote peacebuilding in Trans Nzoia County. They have been able to do little relative to their expectations. As per some of their words, “it’s been hard for us to meet regular because we are living in abnormal times”. Most were too busy or involved in various activities in coping with the challenges brought about by COVID-19: “*Tuliexpect kuendelea tuboreshe kukutanisha watu lakini haikuwa rahisi* (We expected to continue with many reconciliation activities, but it has not been easy)”.

Various challenges have had to be navigated, one being the lack of active leadership during the pandemic that would have pushed for the spearheading of group activities. The leaders were supposed to convene meetings regularly, encourage innovative discussions, and properly follow up in the implementation of meeting action items and resolutions. Since there were a few meetings, there were limited actionable items after the final dialogue session convened by the researcher.


A communication breakdown among all stakeholders was evident. The leaders did not inform the members regarding the activities and made few follow-ups. A few members had called the leaders and inquired regarding the progress of the group. The leaders were not certain on how to respond and give proper directions. The researcher did not make prompt follow-ups either with the leaders and group members. He had wanted to give room to the leaders and give them space to exert their influence without him dominating. The leaders, and even some group members, perceived the researcher's action as a disengagement from the group, especially after finalizing the sessions with the dialogue group.

There was no proper detailed and outlined plan after the dialogue sessions. It was most likely that the conclusion of the dialogue group sessions and the transitioning of participants into a peacebuilding group were hurriedly planned. The members lacked sustained strength to navigate various challenges, as outlined above. They felt stranded and were not certain on the steps to be undertaken to make the group strong. The researcher, on the other hand, did not want to suffocate the group leaders with his presence. He had given them room to run the group. However, the leaders felt that they had been abandoned. As per the words of the group leaders and members, "the uncertain COVID-19 time made us inactive".

The leaders shared that they were unable to operate and convene adequate meetings because of facilitation. This seemed to be the major challenge because the participants were available and eager to meet, but there was something holding most of them back. The logistics of running a group involves resources such as time, human resources, and

finances. While time and human resources were available, the leaders did not have money for communication, venues, and registration. They were in a position of responsibility but without adequate resources. This caused the group to, somehow, become dormant and “unable to move with speed”.

The situation was complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It later became difficult to move from one area to another due to containment measures to help contain the pandemic. The government restricted movement from one area to another. People were not supposed to visit and socialize as before. Therefore, the envisioned group activities were hampered by the prevailing situation. It was only reasonable for the members to wait and explore other ways to carry out peacebuilding efforts that would not involve being physically present.

There is a need to have a deliberately active peacebuilding group, especially during the time in which the country is preparing for the 2022 general elections. Elections have severally triggered violent ethnic conflict in the region, hence the apprehension. They desire to continue meeting so as to bring people together, especially during the electioneering period. The stakeholders are aware of the major issues that cultivate conflict. They are not ignorant prey; rather, some factors are beyond their control, but they are aware that they can also exert an influence. 

### Doing the River of Life exercise

I introduced the river of life exercise to stimulate the thinking and actions of TCEPP members. I also wanted them to be motivated and have a positive mindset moving forward. It was an exercise for deeper reflection and evaluation. A true reflection on action research that embraces Gibbs’ (1988) six stages reflective cycle. This was to help participants confront reality, accepts the ups and down that come with projects, embrace both challenges and victories, learn from their predicament and forge ahead with their project.

The exercise involved a picture of a river, from the source to the destination. I provided a big sheet of paper and asked for a volunteer to draw a good picture of a river. This was

done nicely. Again, the idea was for one of them to draw so that they own the picture and gain better understanding when it came to interpreting the different stages of a river. I then asked them to talk about each stage of the river, and relate the same with TCEPP vision and activities, to customize the stages and processes. It worked so well and members were able to contribute in the interpretation very generously. This was their input.

The catchment area of the river involves the two communities and the researcher. The origin is the researcher, though. A group was formed not only for the project but also to bring together the two ethnic groups that have been engaged in cycles of violent conflict. The group started the exercise well.

Many were invited to the session, but not everyone joined the group. The many tributaries signified the participants who had come together from different parts of Trans Nzoia County. They had come together for a cause to make the river. They united and envisioned being one indivisible community that cannot be separated. The bond has no boundaries. The group started on a very positive footing.

The meadows were some of the challenges faced and navigated. At the start, the flow was slow and infrequent. The two ethnic groups were reserved at the beginning. Eventually, they became strong as the participants bonded and opened up.

The participants expected more from the group, not only from the dialogue session but also to turn it into its CBO. These can be considered as big dreams. The journey continues, though they had slowed down due to challenges. The slowing down of group activities was not anticipated.

The exercise worked well. It helped with reality check, reflection, evaluation and generating an action plan moving forward.

## **9.4 The Most Significant Outcomes**

The participants agreed to form a group that will be registered by the government as a CBO. The group will be a tool that they will use as they metamorphosize into becoming agents of peace. They agreed to become an organized group to use the information shared and knowledge gained. In the group, they had identified causes of violence in Trans Nzoia. Since they are conscious of these phenomena, they want to transform the situation. This was also addressed when the group was evaluating efforts made to address these conflicts, and they explored what could be done to transform them. The information gained is to be implemented by the group. They want to put their words into action.

## **9.5 Other Outcomes**

The participants gained basic peacebuilding skills that have helped most of them to become counselors and mediators. Interactions between the participants opened new friendships and networks for many. It gave exposure to some, therefore creating new opportunities where they were engaged in other community activities as leaders.

## **9.6 Challenges**

The researcher had expected cooperation and some support from the national and county government representatives, but this was not the case. The county commissioner did not hesitate in any way in issuing out the gatekeeper's letter. In addition, neither the national nor the county government sabotaged the project in any manner. However, they neither attended nor supported the project.

The county government did not want to be involved in the project explaining that it was a security issue only to be dealt with by the national government. This was a little disturbing to the researcher since issues of conflict, violence, peace, and justice affect them directly. Their disinterest was unnerving.

Planning for the research required more time than the researcher had expected. Visiting various offices and people required much time and financial resources that were limited.



Most governmental and nongovernmental organization officers are mostly out of their stations, perhaps doing fieldwork or engaged in other projects, despite the fact that the research team had mostly booked appointments. The researcher had to conduct several visits to meet most of them.

Funds from DUT to support the project were limited. The researcher had to seek help through the kind contributions from other sources. For example, the venue was provided by a church free of charge, though the researcher and participants had to clean the place before and after every session. The researcher had expected the county government to offer one of the facilities, but none were made available for the project. The researcher's family savings helped to supplement travel and refreshment costs. The fact that the participants traveled from various parts of the county increased the cost for travel reimbursements. Refreshments had to be offered as well because of the traveling time for many and the minimum of 2 hours that were spent in each session.

The dynamics of dealing with the personalities of the 24 participants included the following: some participants would arrive late to meetings, forget their writing materials, miss sessions, and dominate the sessions or become easily distracted while others were dormant; and some were informers due to suspicions from the government and regional political influencers.

Trans Nzoia County has an expansive diverse terrain. The distances from the east to the west and from the north to the east are substantial. Because of this, it takes an investment of time to meet. Time and money are key for people to travel for meetings or the carrying out of other activities. This is even more complicated when adequate infrastructure does not exist and when the people are relatively poor. They will need to be helped.

## **9.7 Sustainability**

Seed money to help with the planning and registration of TCEPP as a CSO is key. This was reinforced by the medium-term evaluation carried out by the researcher. Though shy to speak about it, chosen group leaders were hesitant to convene meetings because of

accompanying financial obligations. These costs included cellphone data bundles, bookings of the venue, transportation costs, and registration costs. It was not clear how the finances were to be raised and who would raise them.

The researcher is of the opinion that the leaders would have shared their predicament with the members. Other avenues would have been explored, and perhaps the members contributed some money to help with the initial running cost of the group. With a formally registered running group, it would be easier to ask for support from the community, government, and civil society, especially when they see the importance of the group. However, without visibility and sharing, it is difficult to attract funding.

Human expertise as a resource is also key to the survival of the group. The researcher had not trained the generated leadership on how to run and sustain the group. The assumption, which is to be dispensed with, was that the elected group leaders would automatically call for a meeting to discuss when and how the peacebuilding activities would be carried out in Trans Nzoia County. The envisioning part was easy, but the planning and implementation were not carried out. This was not deliberate but due to skill inadequacies. Proper preparation through training should have been carried out, the expectations outlined, and a monitoring mechanism designed.

## **9.8 Inspiration and Learning**

Given opportunities for dialogue, communities are willing to reach out/serve. It was inspiring to witness how the group metamorphosized from a place of tension to one of friendship. Through dialogue, the Bukusu and Nandi participants gained a better understanding of each other. They saw the humanity of each other and appreciated the complementarity between the two communities. The dialogue sessions opened safe places for sharing suppressed feelings and even anger. They were not only dialogues but also a form of therapy. The contact has the potential for healing open and suppressed feelings. Therapy brings healing, especially that of a sociopsychological nature.

Cultural issues were explored, and possible solutions were brainstormed in the project. It was apparent to the members that some of their cultural beliefs are destructive to the peaceful coexistence of the two communities. The sessions provided opportunities for the affirmation of positive cultural traditions while highlighting those that harm the other community.

The researcher was motivated by the desire of group members to engage in peacebuilding activities through their own volition. There is potential in human beings to engage in positive or harmful activities when situations dictate. The inert energy within the group is to be channeled toward peacebuilding. If more opportunities for intentional peace dialogue are provided, more peacebuilders will sprout in the county or country. They merely need an environment where this will be encouraged. Warmongers and inciters have been using this potential to provoke communities to engage in violence; peacebuilders have an opportunity to turn the tide.

## **PART FIVE: CONCLUSION**

### **CHAPTER TEN: REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION**

#### **10.1 Introduction**

#### **10.2 Research Objectives**

The main aim of the research was to reduce the interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi residing in Trans Nzoia County. To undertake this:

A review of relevant literature was undertaken to ascertain the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of interethnic violent conflicts in African countries, with reference to Kenya, and Trans Nzoia County. Chapter 2 and 3 of the theses focused on this. Interethnic violent is widespread in many African countries, in Kenya, and Trans Nzoia County. This has ranged from extreme cases like the genocide in Rwanda which involved the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, to lesser occurrences between the Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe. The violent conflicts have been due to due to availability and access to land, poverty and economic inequality, poor leadership skills, incitement by political elites and environmental degradation. The consequences have been loss of lives, physical injuries and incapacitation, destruction of properties, trauma and mental illness, displacements of the people, and economic decline.

The researcher examined various interventions which have been used to try to reduce interethnic conflict in Africa and assess their effectiveness. The interventions are very multifaceted involving a wave of multiple actors (Smith 2004) such as regional bodies like AU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD. International organizations countries including the UN, World Bank, IMF, USA, Japan. NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, Education institutions and the media have been used to encourage positive peace. Interventions used include peacekeeping, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

Chapter 4 dealt with the thesis peace theory of conflict transformation. A detailed study of the theory was undertaken. Conflict transformation goes beyond conflict management and conflict resolution by looking not only into the root causes of conflict, but also delving into long term creative strategies with the aim of not only solving the prevailing conflict,

but changing relations and attitudes. Chapter 5 dealt with dialogue as a tool for used in conflict transformation. Dialogue is more than ordinary conversation; it is not negotiation or mediation. To help understand this Allport (1954) contact theory was incorporated. The theory posits that contact between conflicting groups reduces prejudice. However, under conditions of “equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom” (Pettigrew 1998: 66). A review of four dialogue projects in diverse countries was studied.

Chapter 6 focused on the research methodology. It dealt with the step-by-step processes of the thesis through the research design. This was Qualitative research, which is common when doing AR. AR is participatory and calls for active involvement of participants in the project (Costello 2003: 6). The focus is not only to study a phenomenon, but also to effect positive change in the community.

The third objective was to design and implement a dialogue program aimed at transforming interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi ethnic groups in Trans Nzoia County. This was implemented in chapter 8 of the thesis. Eight dialogue sessions were undertaken by 24 participants, 12 from the Bukusu and 12 Nandi community. The dialogue group discussions transformed the relationship between the two tribes.

The fourth objective was to undertake preliminary and medium-term evaluation of the dialogue program outcomes which was carried out in chapter 9 of the thesis. It was apparent in evaluation that contact between the two communities did reduce prejudice, new friendships and networks were formed. TCEPP was conceived to necessitate members work as a unitary group doing peacebuilding activities. TCEPP was involved community peace sensitization mission and campaign, and worship and peace vigil during the International Peace Day. participants acquired skills in peacebuilding that gave them capacity in counselling and mediation. It opened opportunities for some members to be involved in community activities playing key roles.

### **10.3 Challenges encountered**

The researcher went from county government offices to National government offices seeking for the Gatekeepers' letter. Somehow there was an assumption that this would be an easy task. However, the county government was cautious and advised the researcher to seek for the letter from the offices of the National government at the county. Reason given was that the research is a security issue that has to be handled with the National agency. Though this is partly true, the county government also deals with security matters because they have a law enforcement department and a disaster management one. In addition, it is imperative that they be active in peacebuilding considering that Trans Nzoia is a volatile region. The researcher appreciated the county commissioner who expressly wrote the gatekeepers letter without hesitation and with limited bureaucracy.

The whole project called for proper preparation. It was sometimes interesting that what the researcher assumed would be simple things such as the gatekeeper's letter, become complicated. On the other hand, assumption of bigger issues such as the formation of the dialogue group, were simplified.

The dynamics of human beings can be complex to manage. This was so especially during dialogue sessions. despite ground rules we still had some dominating conversation whereas a few were reserved.

### **10.4 A Personal Reflection**

Trans Nzoia has had a history of violent conflict. This has been triggered by internal and external forces. Incitement and injustices are at the fore of these conflicts. The researcher observed that most people have the ability to be influenced either for good or to do evil. They are vessels ready for use. Somehow forces that we have exploited their ignorance to perpetuate hatred and violence. With this experience, there is need for a creative force and people to influence the same population to do good by promoting friendship, love and justice. This must be intentionally and strategically. Conflict transformation through regular intentional dialogue sessions is one of the key strategies for peacebuilding.

There is inert power when people are brought together for dialogue, potential for bigger things. The contact between the Bukusu and Nandi ignited some inner power, a desire by participants to positively use the former inert ability for peacebuilding. They reckoned that they have a powerful force within themselves and the community to do good. Majority of members did not want to sit with what they had acquired. They desired to share, to do something, to bring change and transformation. This was out of their own aspiration.

The dialogue, talking and listening from a deeper level was therapy, a healing process. By sharing and pouring out their hearts, the good and the bad, participants got relieved. A negative burden they have been carrying with them was dispensed with. Suppressed anger vanished, instead friendships and partnerships emerged. A lot of stereotypes were clarified and new insights that embraced friendship acquired. This on the other hand leads to a feeling of dignity. It is therefore imperative to promote dialogue between communities in conflict. Participants in the dialogue sessions were openly impacted and observable transformation noted. If this will have a ripple effect, Trans Nzoia will be transformed and positive peace realized.

## **10.5 Key recommendation**

### **To Researchers**

Researchers are key influencers in studying through investigation phenomena that impact the society. Their role is not only investigating and providing data but also bringing new information and changing realities. Dialogue is a dynamic of change and transforming harmful violent conflicts in the society. There are still more creative avenues of promoting the same in the world as they engage in peacebuilding in order for positive peace to be reality. Researcher should look into the following areas:

- Developing a Curriculum manual for Training of Trainers in Dialogue as conflict transformation tool. As many people must have the skills to involved in dialogue programs in appropriate ways.
- Explore how Dialogue sessions are therapy for healing and reconciliation. People have been hurt by violent conflict and other issues in the world. Many suffer psychologically and are traumatized. They need to talk over these experiences and ventilate most of their experiences in safe places.

- Explore the effectiveness of dialogue engagements along gender lines. For deep and effective dialogue to be realized, should the group be homogenous or heterogenous?
- Between Government guided funded in relation to community mobilized dialogue groups which is more effective?

### **To Civil society organizations**

The CSOs must consider the following:

- Build trust by vetting and working with genuine trusted people rather brokers who are more interested with personal financial gains rather than community empowerment.
- Reach out to the community and the grassroots more. A higher percentage of people seem not to have felt and seen the impact of many CSOs in Trans Nzoia County.
- There is a lot of trust for major CSOs especially the KHRC, NCKK, CJPC, Red Cross and the AU. They have to maintain and improve their involvements to sustain this trust.

### **To Academic Institutions**

Do the following:

Peace studies at basic institutions in Kenya is being appreciated. They should instill a culture of peace to students and the public. The field is broad and there are many potential areas for studies and research. Peacebuilding programs should be mainstreamed.

### **To the government – National and County**

Consider:

- Promote peacebuilding programs across the country. Enhance positive peace. Fight and stand against impunity with all the attention it deserves.
- County governments are becoming units for promoting tribalism and nepotism. This must be watched out because it is a potential trigger for violence. Dialogue spaces that bring members of all communities must be developed and operationalized in towns and subcounty.
- There is friction between county and national government when it comes to peacebuilding. This must be addressed and harmonized. The National government must give county more clout especially in peacebuilding activities.
- Promote and fund monthly peacebuilding dialogue sessions in all administrative locations in the country units.



## **To Regional & International Community**

Consider:

- Promote a culture of positive peace by making each other accountable when it comes to supporting and funding local governments and organizations.
- Consider touching base with the grassroots because sometimes the resources dispatched are misappropriated by shrewd con people and organization.
- Support dialogue sessions at grassroots to caution resources that are majorly channeled to conflict management and conflict resolution

### **10. 6 A Final Word and Conclusion**

The research confirmed that interethnic conflict violence is pervasive in Trans Nzoia County. The same applies to many parts of Kenya. Ethnic communities compete for resources which makes most prone to manipulations through incitements by the elites. On the other parts ethnic identity promotes corruption, poor leadership and encourages impunity. The community is there for their leader and the leader champions the interest of their ethnic group, each protecting the other when peace and justice is brought to the fore. This is only powder for more violence. Especially when land as a resource is diminishing and there is high population growth.

There have been efforts to promote peace and counter measures to the same. Major CSOs in the country and county have been active especially in conflict management and conflict resolution. Attempts have been made to hold the elites accountable for their incitements. Relief services have been availed by nongovernmental and government organizations. However, successive governments have not been keen on addressing the root cause of these conflicts. They have not been intentional in promoting positive peace, instead they have been espousing negative peace at their best.

Conflict transformation must be activated within the county to remedy the volatile existing situation. More input from the national and county governments is imperative. The civil society must play its role without fear and contradiction. They have to do more especially at the grassroots level. Dialogue is a great instrument that must be employed in Trans Nzoia County as it embraces conflict transformation models.

The thesis affirms that dialogue is a great tool in conflict transformation. A dialogue group was designed and implemented by the researcher. This brought together representatives from the Bukusu and Nandi communities. Contact and conversation between the participants lead to transformation. They addressed pertinent issues affecting their relations that have been root causes of conflict, reached out to understand each other and together agreed to have a common. They agreed to work as a group doing peacebuilding in Trans Nzoia.

Preliminary evaluation has indicated that dialogue group members embraced peacebuilding. They act as peacebuilders in family relations, church activities, community sports activities, carried out house visitations and even did demos to encourage peace. The dialogue changed their lives. More dialogue will affect many people lives positively. Conflict transformation through dialogue groups that meet regularly will greatly reduce interethnic conflict and violence between the Bukusu and Nandi in Trans Nzoia County.

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
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## Appendix 1: DUT Letter of Introduction





## Appendix 2: Gatekeeper's Letter



### THE PRESIDENCY

Telephone: 054 – 30020  
Fax No: 054 – 30030

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR  
AND  
COORDINATION OF  
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE  
TRANS NZOIA COUNTY  
P.O BOX 11 - 30200  
KITALE

E-mail: [cctranszoiacounty@yahoo.com](mailto:cctranszoiacounty@yahoo.com)  
When replying please quote

TNZC/CONF/ED.12/2/VOL.II/205

2<sup>nd</sup> June, 2017

#### TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

#### RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

This is to inform you that **Silas Siboe Wanjala** of **Durban University of Technology, South Africa** has been authorized by National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation to carry out research on **“Reducing Inter-tribal conflict and violence: A mediation project with the Bukusu and Nandi Micro-nations”** in of Trans Nzoia, Kenya for a period ending **31<sup>st</sup> December, 2020**.

Kindly accord him the necessary assistance he may require.

COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
TRANS-NZOIA COUNTY  
P. O. Box 11 - 30200 KITALE

IRENE NDUNDA  
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
TRANS NZOIA COUNTY

## Appendix 3: Letter of Information



### LETTER OF INFORMATION

(In brackets is the translation in Swahili)

**Title of the Research Study:** Reducing inter-tribal conflict and violence: a mediation project with the Bukusu and Nandi micro-nations, Kenya. (Kupunguza mizozo na vita vya kikabila: Mradi wa kuzikutanisha jamii za Wabukusu na Wanandi, Kenya).

**Principal Investigator/s/researcher:** (Silas Siboe Wanjala, PhD student) Mwanafunzi wa PhD.

**Co-Investigator/s/supervisor/s:** (Geoffrey Harris, Professor) Mwalimu, Profesa.

**Brief Introduction and Purpose of the Study:** I am Silas Siboe Wanjala, a resident of Botwa village in Trans Nzoia County. I am currently a student taking a Peacebuilding program at the Durban University of Technology, in South Africa. My research focus population is Trans Nzoia County. The successful completion of the program would lead to the award of a PhD in Public Management: Peacebuilding. (Mimi ni mkaaji wa kijiji cha Botwa, katika Kaunti ya Trans Nzoia. Mwanafunzi wa somo la Amani katika chuo kikuu cha Teknologia cha Durban, Afrika ya Kusini. Ninafanyia research yangu katika Kaunti ya Trans Nzoia. Nikifaulu kumaliza masomo haya, nitatuzwa cheti cha PhD katika maswala ya jamii: Kujenga Amani).

**Outline of the Procedures:** I writing to request you to be part of a focus group discussion session. This would involve meeting once a month. We will have ten meetings taking 1 hour and 30 minutes. The group will consist of 6-8 persons from either gender. Our venue will be in Kitale. Participation is voluntarily. (Nakuomba uwe katika kikundi cha machadiliano. Tutakuwa tukikutana mara moja kwa mwezi kwa muda wa saa moja na nusu. Kikundi kitakuwa cha watu 6-8 wa jinzia zote. Mahala pa mkutano kutakua Kitale. Hautalazimishwa kuhudhuria mikutano hii).

**Risks or Discomforts to the Participant:** The research involves discussions and there are no risks and discomforts anticipated. (Research hii yahuzisha majadiliano na hakuna hatari yoyote ambayo natarajia itakukumba).

**Benefits:** The successful completion of the program by the researcher would lead to the award of a PhD in Public Management: Peacebuilding. The implementation of the intervention will reduce inter-tribal conflict and violence in Trans Nzoia County. (Nikifaulu kumaliza masomo haya, nitatuzwa degree kuu ya PhD katika maswala ya jamii: Kujenga Amani. Mradi huu utachangia kupunguza vita vya kikabila katika Kaunti ya Trans Nzoia).

**Reason/s why the Participant May Be Withdrawn from the Study:** Non-compliance and two conservative absenteeism. Should you choose to withdraw from the discussion, there will be no adverse consequences. Participation is voluntary. As a participant, you will be helping in reducing conflict and promoting peacebuilding. (Usipofuata maagizo na kukosa kuhudhuria mikutano miwili mfuatilio. Ukiamua kutoka katika majadiliano haya, hakuna hatua yoyote itachukuliwa. Haulazimishwi kwa njia yoyote ile kuhudhuria mijadala hii. Kuudhuria kwako kutachangia kupunguza vita vya kikabila katika Kaunti ya Trans Nzoia).

**Remuneration:** There will not be any monetary or other types of remunerations. Your transport cost will be reimbursed and lunch provided. (Hautalipwa kuhudhuria mijadala. Kutakua na chakula na nauli yako italipiwa)

**Costs of the Study:** The participant will not cover any costs towards the study. (Hautagaramia kifedha mijadala na masomo haya).

**Confidentiality:** Full confidentiality will be maintained. Information shared will not be disclosed to non-group members. (Mambo yote yatabaki katika kikundi hiki. Hakuna mtu ataruhusiwa kutoa siri au majadiliano kwa watu wengine).

**Research-related Injury:** No injury is anticipated as stated above. (Hatutarajii mtu yeyote kuhadhiwa na kuumia).

**Persons to Contact in the Event of Any Problems or Queries:**

(Supervisor: Geoffrey Harris, professor) Please contact the researcher (tel no. 0724482221), my supervisor (tel no. 031 373 5609 or [Geoffreyh@dut.ac.za](mailto:Geoffreyh@dut.ac.za)) or the Institutional Research Ethics administrator on 031 373 2900. Complaints can be reported to the DVC: TIP, Prof F. Otieno on 031 373 2382 or [dvctip@dut.ac.za](mailto:dvctip@dut.ac.za).

## Appendix 4: Letter of Invitation and Consent



### CONSENT (KUKUBALI)

**Statement of Agreement to participate in the Research Study (Kukubali kujitolea katika masomo ya research hii):**

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher (ninahakikisha kwamba nimeelezwa kwa upana na mwana reseacher, Silas Siboe Wanjala, about the nature (kuhusu mambo), conduct (kukutana), benefits and risks of this study (faida na hatari ya masomo haya) - Research Ethics Clearance Number: \_\_\_\_\_
- I have also received (nimepata), read and understood the above written information (Nimesoma na kuelewa maandishi na maneno kuhusu masomo haya) - (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study (naelewa kwamba matokeo ya mijadala hii, ikiwemo mambo yanayo niusu kama vile miaka, siku ya kuzaliwa, jinzia na mengine- jina lako halitatumwa katika ripoti ya mwisho ya masomo haya), including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher. (Nakubali kwamba majibu ya mijadala hatahakiliwa na kuchambuliwa katika tarakanishi na mwana researcha)
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study. ( Naweza kujiondoa, bila maoneleo katika mijadala hii)
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study. (Nimekua na muda wa kutosha wakuweza kuuliza maswali na baada ya kuelewa kila jambo, najitolea kuhusika katika masomo haya)
- I understand that significant new findings developed during this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me. (Naelewa kwamba nitaelezwa mambo mapya yatakayopatikana kama matokeo ya masomo haya)

_____	_____	_____	_____
<b>Full Name of Participant</b>	<b>(Majina) Date/Tarehe</b>	<b>Time/Wakati</b>	<b>Signature/Right Thumbprint</b>

I (Mimi), Silas Siboe Wanjala, herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study. (Nahakikisha kwamba mhusika aliye nakiliwa ameelezwa Kwa undani kuhusu kila jambo linalohusu masomo haya)

_____	_____	_____
<b>Full Name of Researcher</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Signature</b>

_____	_____	_____
<b>Full Name of Witness (If applicable)</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Signature</b>

_____	_____	_____
<b>Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable)</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Signature</b>

## Appendix 5: Dialogue Group Discussion Questions



### DIALOGUE GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

(In bracket is the translation of the questions from English to Swahili. Swahili is the national language of Kenya understood by all communities).

1. What do you think are the main causes of inter-ethnic violent conflicts in Africa?  
(Wafikiri nini husababisha vita vya kikabila barani Afrika?)
2. In your own view what are the consequences of inter-ethnic violent conflicts in Kenya?  
(Kwa mtazamo wako ni madhara gani yamepatikana kwa sababu ya vita vya kikabila hapa Kenya?)
3. In your opinion what are the major causes of conflict between the Bukusu and Nandi in Trans Nzoia County?  
(Kwa maoni yako taja mambo ambayo huchangia kuwepo kwa mizozo kati ya Wabukusu na Wanandi katika county hii ya Trans Nzoia?)
4. What have been the consequences of these conflicts?  
(Madhara yapi yamejidhihirisha kwa sababu ya mizozo kati ya jamii hizi?)
5. Are you aware of interventions put in place to resolve these conflicts? What have been their impact?  
(Je unajua mikakati yeyote ambayo imewekwa kusuluhisha mizozo hizi? Kazi yao ilifaulu kwa kiwango kipi?)
6. As participants in this project, what interventions do you think should be put in place to achieve positive peace between the Bukusu and Nandi?  
(Kama wausika katika mradi huu, twaweza kuweka mikakati ipi ili kuchangia Amani iliyo bora baina ya Wabukusu na Wanandi?)

## Appendix 6: Medium Term Evaluation Questions and Exercise



### MEDIUM TERM EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND EXERCISE

**Introduction:** Icebreaking: Each member will volunteer to introduce a participant they want too and talk about one positive memory they have of the person since the last dialogue session.

**Question 1. 28<sup>th</sup> August 2021:** what has happened since you were last here?

(Ni yapi yametendeka tangu tulipokua hapa Pamoja mara ya mwisho?)

Do a river of life exercise

**Question 2. September 2021:** to what extent did you carry out what you said you would?

If so, to what effect? If not, why not?

(Unlitimiliza vipi yote uliyosema utayatenda? Iwapo ulitenda, je yamekuwa na matokeo gani? Na kama haukutenda, nikwasababu gani?)

**Conclusion prompts/self-reflection:** Do a river of life exercise

## Appendix 7: Structured observation guidelines



### Structured observation guidelines

- Attitude and behaviours of participants
- How are participants interacting
- Who is talking/listening?
- What is their body language/non-verbal information?
- How are they undertaking their responsibilities?
- How are they collaborating with other team members?
- How are they participating in decision making?
- Feelings and emotions felt and expressed by the participants
- What is the group dynamic?

## Appendix 8: Examples of questions asked in personal interviews



### Examples of questions asked in personal interviews

- tell me more about what you were reflecting on?  
(Nieleze kwa undani jinzi kuhusu mambo ulikua ukiyatafakari)
- What made you feel so?  
(Nini kilifanya ukahizi vile)
- How did that make you feel?  
(Jinzi gani jambo hilo lilikuletea hizia hizo)
- I want to make sure I understand this. Can you explain it further?  
(Nataka niwe nauhakika kwamba naelewa jambo hili. Tafadhali nielezee zaidi)
- You mentioned that you are excluded from their ceremonies. Can you help me understand that better?  
(Ulisema kwamba wanawatenga wakiwa na sherehe zao. Nieleze kwa undani ili nikuelewe vizuri)
- Why was that important to you?  
(Nikwanini jambo hilo kuwa muhimu kwako)





