



# **Monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes among civil society organisations in Kenya**

**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies in the Faculty of Management Sciences**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Globally, civil society organisations (CSOs) in this study referred as peacebuilding organisations play a key role in resolving social conflict in many conflicts' prone areas in the world. They depend on external donor funding to support their peacebuilding programmes packaged as projects. They receive funds from donors for peacebuilding projects which they account for as they implement. Though the progress reports sent to donors by peacebuilding organisations suggest effective peacebuilding work, the violent conflict frequently continues, suggesting that the monitoring and evaluation processes have deficiencies and limitations. Accordingly, this research study sought to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes among peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya. The current monitoring and evaluation processes used in the peacebuilding field are based on a rigid, linear, and logical framework, causing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes to be less useful in conflict contexts, which are ever-changing and unpredictable.

Using an action research design, the research study engaged with four peacebuilding organisations in collecting evidence of outcomes for three peacebuilding projects using the outcome harvesting approach. The project teams from four peacebuilding organisations were trained on outcome harvesting approach. Using outcome harvesting process, they engaged the target actors and beneficiaries and collected a total of 35 outcomes for the three peacebuilding projects implemented by four peacebuilding organisations.

From the document outcomes, the study established that the outcome harvesting approach had generated sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work and addressed some of the weaknesses of M&E processes. It also demonstrated the suitability of outcome harvesting approach in complex and rapidly changing environments because of its flexibility and orientation towards capturing both expected and unexpected peacebuilding outcomes. It is recommended that outcome harvesting approach be used concurrently with other M&E processes such that they complement each other. Finally, there is a need for peacebuilding organisations to investigate why the outcome harvesting approach does not always capture negative peacebuilding outcomes.

## DECLARATION

I, Thomas Kimathi Nyagah (student number 21751162) declare that the ideas, synthesis, and reflections contained in this thesis are my original work. Information used in this thesis from other sources has been adequately acknowledged. This thesis has never been submitted for examination at any other university for the award of any degree.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my dear wife, Jennifer (Jenny), and lovely daughters (Peace and Joy) for the enormous support you gave to me throughout the research process.



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project
ACT	Act Change Transform
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
AU	African Union
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CDA	Collaborative for Development Action
CDC	Centre for Disease Prevention
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
COK	Constitution of Kenya
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019
CR	Community Reporters
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUC	Court Users Committee
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUT	Durban University of Technology
EAI	Equal Access International
EC	European Commission
EJK	Extra-Judicial Killings
EU	European Union
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GBV	Gender-Based Violence

GEC	Global Engagement Centre
HRD	Human Rights Defenders
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFI	International Finance Institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Development Agency
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
KES	Kenya Shillings
MCA	Member of County Assembly
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSJC	Mathare Social Justice Centre
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
OCS	Officer in Charge of Station
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OH	Outcome Harvesting
PEACENET	Peace and Development Network Trust
PM	Perspective Media
POTUSA	Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu
PPF	Peace Promotion Fellowship
RPP	Reflective Peace Practice
SABALA	Samburu, Baringo, and Laikipia
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences

SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SVK	Somali Voices Kenya
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TOC	Theory of Change
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPDF	United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VE	Violent Extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organisation
WCAG	Ward Community Action Group

# **PART I – INTRODUCTION**

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

This chapter sets the background to the study by presenting a brief contextual analysis of conflict in different parts of the world. Emphasis has been placed on intrastate conflict occurring in developing countries. The intrastate conflict occurs in different forms, including civil war, intercommunal conflict, resource-based conflict, and rebel insurgency, among other forms. The chapter further highlights peacebuilding efforts undertaken by civil society organisations in this study referred to as peacebuilding organisations. The problem analysis is also carried out, highlighting the weaknesses of the monitoring and evaluation being used by peacebuilding organisations to measure the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. The chapter further outlines the aim, specific objectives, and research question of the study, and a summary of two theoretical frameworks and a literature review are also presented. The literature review focuses on peacebuilding practices and monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field. The chapter also presents a summary description of the research methodology, which includes the research design, target population, sampling methods, measuring instruments, and data analysis. The delimitations of the study, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, and limitations of the study are also described. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis structure and a conclusion.

#### **1.2 Conflict Context Analysis**

Across the globe, several large-scale violent conflict situations have occurred since the 1950s that have required international interventions. They include the collapse of state institutions in Somalia and the overthrow of the existing government in Haiti. Most of large-scale violent situations are intrastate, and most have occurred in the developing world. They have taken place in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Sudan, the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Lesotho, Burundi, Liberia, and Uganda, among other countries. Civil war involving rebel insurgents has taken place in Ethiopia, Malaysia, Senegal, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Cross-border conflict recorded in the past has occurred between Cameroon and Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan, and Ethiopia and Eritrea due to ethnic differences. In Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, cross-border conflict has been due to the migration of fighters and influx of refugees. A long protracted territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine has been active for years, and the conflict is far from being comprehensively addressed (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 536).

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, large-scale interstate conflicts have decreased significantly. In 2014 alone, there were 40 armed conflicts in 27 locations worldwide. From the 40 conflicts, only one large-scale interstate conflict was recorded between India and Pakistan. The remainder were intrastate conflicts, with 13 receiving international support from Western countries such as the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Russia. Intrastate conflict characterised by civil unrest, civil war, and insurgency has continued to occur in regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Galtung 1969: 60; LAMIDI 2019: 60). It is estimated that 70% of the wars in Africa are intrastate in nature and account for 50% of the civil wars worldwide (LAMIDI 2019: 60). Most of these forms of intrastate conflict are as a result of political, economic, and social inequalities manifested through poor and partisan governance, such as in the cases of Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic. They are also caused by the poor management of natural resources – for example, in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, and the DRC – where rebels have financed their activities through the looting of mineral resources, such as diamond and cobalt. Environmental degradation is also increasingly becoming a significant cause of intercommunal conflict, especially in the Sahel and northern African regions. Identities being related along racial and ethnic lines, coupled with historical injustices, have also been witnessed in the Central African Republic (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 61).

In developing countries, many of the intrastate conflicts more often take on cultural dimensions related to ethnicity or religion, but invariably, underlying political and socio-economic inequalities are the root cause. Hostility is channelled through ethnic or religious



lines and makes it easy to mobilise ethnic groups to engage in ethnic war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 783). In most cases, these intrastate conflicts are never resolved. They degenerate into protracted civil war or intercommunal conflict that last several years (Fisher 1993: 248). In some cases, they have escalated into international wars, for instance, the conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan, and the Ivory Coast and Ghana (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 780). Protracted intercommunal conflict leads to political violence and state collapse, as in the case of Somalia (LAMIDI 2019: 56).

Globally, intrastate conflicts are far from being resolved, and with the current trends, they are increasing despite interventions by the United Nations (UN), international and local peacebuilding organisations. A report by the World Bank group entitled *Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century*, which analysed conflicts between 1946 and 2014, indicated that the world is still experiencing violent conflicts, and 90% of the civil wars of the past decade have occurred in those countries that had already engaged in a civil war in the past 30 years (Marc 2016: 10). The report further stated that more than half of all states affected by ongoing conflicts were also affected by protracted armed conflicts persisting for more than 10 years. For instance, in Bosnia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the organisation maintaining peace, while in Kosovo and East Timor, the international community maintains peace and sovereignty (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779).

In 2014 alone, a cost of 14.3 trillion US dollars associated with violent social conflict was inflicted on the global economy. This is approximately 13.4% of the global gross domestic product (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015: 65). The conflicts have also left communities vulnerable due to the destruction of the social fibre and economic turmoil, especially in developing countries (Butchart and Mikton 2014: 17). From these large-scale conflicts, it is estimated that annually, more than 1.3 million people have died worldwide (Butchart and Mikton 2014: 2). In Africa alone, approximately three million have died from resource-based conflict, as witnessed in unstable countries such as the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among others (Ibrahim, Abba and Bibi 2014: 73).

A noteworthy investment has been made by donors to avert or reduce violent conflict in different unstable countries and territories in the world. However, the significant investment has not translated into positive peace among the affected populations. Instead, the violent conflict has become endemic and, in some cases, is escalating where the peacebuilding work is ongoing. This situation has raised a fundamental concern regarding the effectiveness of peacebuilding work and the value of such efforts (Kennedy-Chouane 2011: 100). In an effort to resolve this concern regarding aid effectiveness in peacebuilding work, donors and peacebuilding organisations have adopted the results-based monitoring and evaluation approach to support the generation of evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. This type of monitoring and evaluation considers peacebuilding projects as a form of linear relationship between peacebuilding activities and expected peacebuilding outcomes as in the humanitarian and development sectors where it is predominantly used. It ignores the fact that the conflict transformation process is non-linear, circular, and never following a single direction (Obiekwe 2009: 10). It occurs in a complex, rapidly changing, unpredictable, and unstable conflict context (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 45; Blum 2016: 2). The monitoring and evaluation is also donor-driven as opposed to the one that is locally driven by peacebuilding organisations (Bush and Duggan 2013: 15).

The monitoring and evaluation in all sectors, including peacebuilding, is one of the critical success factors in the delivery of any project (Kamau and Mohamed 2015: 34). It is a practice of articulating the desired change, tracking change from the baseline, and reviewing and reporting the progress for the purposes of regulating implementation to meet the performance target of any project (Kusek 2010: 2). While donors have advocated for results-based monitoring and evaluation for decades, there is a realisation that this type of monitoring and evaluation is not effective for some international development sectors, such as peacebuilding.

The participatory monitoring and evaluation approach, as an alternative to results-based monitoring and evaluation, has been partially used in international development (Zukoski and Luluquisen 2002: 5). It has proven to be a powerful approach because it places the communities and other stakeholders affected by the developmental challenges at the

centre in designing, implementing, and conducting evaluations (Guijt 2014: 1). Due to its nature of engaging different actors at different levels and stages of the project cycle, it carries an element of empowerment and ownership. It also ensures that community voices, concerns, and perspectives become part of collective decisions (Zukoski and Luluquisen 2002: 4). Although there is little evidence on the use of participatory monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field, its principle of participation encourages inclusion, strengthens relationships among actors, and cultivates mutual trust and respect. It also encourages the understanding of the cultures and customs of different actors (Zukoski and Luluquisen 2002: 4; Guijt 2014: 3).

Participatory monitoring and evaluation belong to the family of emergent and adaptive monitoring and evaluation approaches being tested by peacebuilding organisations. These approaches have been referred to as complexity-aware monitoring and evaluation approaches. They include outcome mapping, process tracking, outcome evidencing, impact tracing, and developmental evaluation, among others (Paz-Ybarnegaray and Douthwaite 2017: 276). A common feature among these approaches is that they are participatory in nature. However, most of them subscribe to a linear and logical framework which has been widely criticised for being rigid and lacking the rigour to capture the systemic change from implemented peacebuilding projects to respond to conflict in a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment.

### **1.3 Research Problem Analysis**

Peacebuilding projects are designed to prevent, manage, and transform conflict. They include both short- and long-term activities (Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 46). While monitoring and evaluation is a prominent practice in the humanitarian and development sectors, it has not received enough attention in peacebuilding work. This has led to little evidence being generated on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects in conflict situations. The results-based monitoring and evaluation used by peacebuilding organisations is weak in generating conflict and peace data from the complex, volatile, and unpredictable conflict context. Peacebuilding outcomes, as other social changes, are not generated in a linear and predictable manner as anticipated by the current monitoring

and evaluation process. Social change results from many factors and actors in a complex environment interacting in a non-linear manner (Chigas, Church and Corlazzoli 2014: 6).

Frustrated by the scarcity of evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed guidelines on how to evaluate conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, pretested them for 2 years, and subsequently reviewed them, leading to the revised guidelines (OECD, 2012: 17). The review findings showed that peacebuilding projects were not addressing the core conflict drivers. They lacked strategic targeting and were based on incorrect assumptions (Kennedy-Chouane 2011: 101). These are clear signs of weak monitoring and evaluation processes being applied in peacebuilding work.

This study sought to investigate how the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects was being conducted by peacebuilding organisations. The study also involved developing and implementing a suitable peacebuilding-oriented monitoring and evaluation approach with four peacebuilding organisations in Kenya.

## **1.4 Research Aim and Specific Objectives**

### **1.4.1 Aim of the Study**

This study sought to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation used by peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya to generate sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of this study were:

- To assess peacebuilding practices among peacebuilding organisations in Kenya
- To explore the monitoring and evaluation processes used by peacebuilding organisations in peacebuilding in Kenya
- To use the participatory action research approach and develop and implement actions to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects

- To evaluate the effectiveness of the actions implemented by peacebuilding organisations to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects

### **1.4.3 Research Question**

The research question of the study can be stated as “How do the strengthened monitoring and evaluation processes used by peacebuilding organisations show how effective the peacebuilding projects are in transforming conflict into peace outcomes?”

## **1.5 Summary of the Literature Review**

### **1.5.1 Relevant Peace Theories**

This study was anchored on two theoretical frameworks developed by John Paul Lederach, an author and renowned peacebuilding scholar and practitioner. He developed these frameworks based on his experience in peacebuilding work in Central America, North America, Asia, and Africa. The two theoretical frameworks are the conflict transformation theory – described in his book entitled *Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, which was published in 2003 – and the three-level peacebuilding framework – explained in the book entitled *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, which was first published in 1997 by the United States Institute of Peace – commonly referred to as the peacebuilding pyramid or triangle by peacebuilding scholars and practitioners.

As stated above, the conflict transformation theory was developed in 2003, six years after Lederach had conceptualised the three-level peacebuilding framework. The conflict transformation process has three components that inform the determination of the response to conflict when it occurs. The three components are the analysis of the conflict situation, the development of a desired change by the people in the conflict and designing an effective change process to transform the conflict situation into the desired change. The three dimensions of the conflict transformation process fit well within any effective monitoring and evaluation theoretical framework.

The first component advocates for analysis of the present conflict issues by examining deep-seated relationships, patterns, and history (Mitchell 2002: 7). This provides an

opportunity to examine not only the content of the conflict but also the social, political, economic, and cultural relationships in the conflict context where the dispute is expressed. In the context of monitoring and evaluation, the analysis of the present situation is referred to as the baseline survey of the current situation before project implementation (Görgens and Kusek 2009: 291).

The horizon of the future is the second component. It involves envisioning the positive peace expected without neglecting the current conflict situation. The clear articulation of the desired change in the future of a project by the affected people is the backbone of any monitoring and evaluation process because it is the factor from which performance indicators are derived. The mistake committed by peacebuilding organisations operating in the peacebuilding field is responding to the present conflict situation without analysing the conflict context and envisioning the desired future (Bush and Duggan 2013: 13). Instead, they focus on de-escalating the violent conflict, which does not always yield long-lasting peace.

The third component is developing a change process revolving around personal, relationship, structural, and cultural changes depending on the social conflict. In monitoring and evaluation, the change process is packaged in a theory of change (TOC), which is an articulation of how the desired change will take place in the conflict context (Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 25).

Another reason why the conflict transformation theory was applicable in this study is the acknowledgement by Lederach and Maise (2003) that within the change process and peace structure, there is a need to evaluate and reflect on the change process by looking at the overall direction of social conflict and the change being sought. Although Lederach, in the researcher's opinion, did not give this the attention that it deserves in the conflict transformation theory, he mentioned that monitoring the change process was an important aspect of conflict transformation because it would generate evidence and show whether responses were effective or not. It is this gap that informed this research study to develop and implement an effective monitoring and evaluation process that would effectively generate sufficient evidence on peacebuilding processes and outcomes from peacebuilding projects.

The second theoretical framework is the three-level peacebuilding framework developed by John Paul Lederach in 1997. The Lederach peacebuilding framework is commonly known as the peacebuilding pyramid, as shown in his book entitled *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Lederach 1997: 39). Lederach envisaged society in conflict to be divided into three vertical levels, namely, the top, middle, and grassroots levels. At each of the three levels, there are different leaders playing different roles. Sometimes these levels are referred to as Tracks I, II, and III (Palmiano *et al.* 2019).

There is a common agreement in the peacebuilding field that Lederach's idea regarding the three levels notably still holds. The leaders at the top level include political, military, and religious leaders, and the middle-range leaders include academicians; religious, ethnic, and business leaders; and leaders of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The grassroots level includes leaders such as religious, ethnic, and clan leaders; health workers; refugee-camp leaders; and local indigenous NGOs (Lederach 1997: 39).

Lederach's peacebuilding framework was applicable in this study because it serves both as an intervention model and analytical framework that guide peacebuilders in engagement with social conflict in any society. As an intervention model, Lederach emphasised that peacebuilding processes should take place at all levels and at different times to be effective. However, his earlier emphasis was more on middle-range leadership than the leadership at the top and grassroots levels. He opined that middle-level leadership is instrumental in establishing infrastructure for sustainable peace. Middle-level leaders have connections to the top and grassroots leadership levels. This linkage allows them to be effective in peacebuilding processes (Paffenholz 2014: 12). Although Lederach has strongly advocated for the middle-level approach, as described above, he is now advocating for the engagement of multiple actors taking on different roles at all levels (Paffenholz 2014: 19). This means that the peacebuilders have many options to engage with different leaders in any society experiencing conflict. The engagement of the top-level leadership has resulted in a top-down approach, and those engaging at the grassroots level have also been known to use the bottom-up approach. All these approaches are based on the theory that the changes generated at the top level will trickle down to the

grassroots level, and for those engaging with grassroots leaders, the assumption is that there will be a trickle-up process to the top level.

Lederach's peacebuilding framework also provides a structured analytical framework for measuring whether peacebuilding work has effectively addressed the social conflict and to what extent. This gives peacebuilders direction on the type of change that they are seeking to achieve at each level and the indicators to look for. It also allows peacebuilders to understand how a change from one level can be moved to the next level either downwards (trickle down) or upwards (trickle up) (Obiekwe 2009: 20; Paffenholz 2014: 5). However, there is little evidence on how the engagement of different actors at different levels results in peace outcomes in terms of sustainable peace at the grassroots (Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 6).

### **1.5.2 Empirical Studies**

#### **a. *Peacebuilding practices by peacebuilding organisations***

Both states and peacebuilding organisations have played a critical role in resolving social conflict. However, conflict continues to escalate worldwide (Croft, Felter and Johnston 2014: 1833). In their review of peacebuilding by peacebuilding organisations, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006: 11) pointed out that peacebuilding organisations were reactive in peacebuilding work because they depended entirely on the external funding from donors. This argument is also confirmed by Ginty (2012: 281) in his critical review of peacebuilding organisations and peacebuilding where he stated that they were temporarily effective for certain tasks at certain stages of the peacebuilding process. For lasting peace to come about from protracted or intractable social conflict, time is required to rebuild the broken relationships and address the structural causes (Mitchell 2002: 10).

Peacebuilding organisations have continuously found themselves in this situation due to their dependency on donor funding to conduct their business. Strategically, they can position themselves to be permanently relevant in the peacebuilding process. The billions of funds that have been used by peacebuilding organisations in reactive responses to social conflicts and violence could have been more effectively used if monitoring and



evaluation had directed them in carrying out peacebuilding work (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 11).

The peacebuilding organisations that have embraced the monitoring and evaluation process articulate the peacebuilding outcomes and track the conflict context simultaneously as the project progresses. It is this information that informs the design of the peacebuilding activities that address the core conflict issues in context. Unfortunately, the current monitoring and evaluation processes are weak in most of the peacebuilding organisations conducting peacebuilding work. As reported by Van Leeuwen and Verkoren (2012: 84), peacebuilding organisations focus on the crisis management of the conflict as opposed to the changes in an individual's behaviour and culture, relationships, systems, and structures in the targeted context. Therefore, this study sought to explore the current monitoring and evaluation processes and support the peacebuilding organisations in seeking practical solutions to make monitoring and evaluation processes effective.

***b. Monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field***

In the 2008 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the participants noted that substantial funding given to developing countries had resulted in few changes in people's lives (Bissio 2008: 28-88). The reason for this failure was associated with weak monitoring and evaluation approaches in the development organisations. From early 2000, development organisations, whether international, national, or local, embraced the concept of results-based monitoring and evaluation and adopted it to ensure that the impact of projects were monitored adequately (Menon, Karl and Wignaraja 2009: 10-11). The motivation behind the promotion of results-based monitoring and evaluation was the ability to demonstrate accountability and foster learning for all stakeholders. It was the only existing and prominent approach for monitoring and evaluating projects in the development and humanitarian sectors (Kasule 2016: 35-39). The peacebuilding sector, having no monitoring and evaluation approach of its own, adopted results-based monitoring and evaluation. Little information exists on how it is conducted and its usefulness in enhancing peacebuilding processes. In addition, it does not generate sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects, nor does it demonstrate how the peacebuilding activities transform conflict into peace outcomes. This highlights that the

peacebuilding field requires a special monitoring and evaluation process that will encourage reflection, generate information by the community for the community and not for donors, and encourage participation and local conflict monitoring by the community.

In an article by Porter and Goldman (2013: 6), the authors acknowledged that monitoring and evaluation is a key element in any transformative service delivery process. The general perception among CSOs including peacebuilding organisations of monitoring and evaluation is that it is donor-driven and not meant to benefit the recipient organisations. This perception continues to hinder the effective application of monitoring and evaluation in the development and humanitarian sectors as well as the peacebuilding field (De Coninck *et al.* 2008: 4).

The current monitoring and evaluation processes espoused by results-based monitoring and evaluation extract data from the target communities for the purpose of reporting it to donors as opposed to reflecting on and learning about how the peacebuilding process takes place in the conflict areas. Despite recognition of the weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work, little effort has been made by peacebuilding organisations to develop solutions to improve them. The peacebuilding field has no single monitoring and evaluation approach that has been successful in generating evidence on the impact of peacebuilding work (Chigas, Church and Corlazzoli 2014: 6).

Few and limited actions have been taken by peacebuilding organisations and donors on the use of creative and adaptive monitoring and evaluation approaches, such as outcome mapping and outcome harvesting (Bush and Duggan 2013: 62; Ernstorfer 2019: 62). For instance, an evaluation conducted by Moita (2016: 62) on the peace evaluation framework on a UN mission highlighted that any peacebuilding work must have performance indicators targeting the structural factors in the conflict. In addition, the findings on the evaluations for Guatemala and Haiti showed that the inclusion of structural issues in the negotiations among the parties and inclusion of all the actors in Guatemala brought about long-lasting solutions to political violence as compared to the situation in Haiti.

## **1.6 Summary Research Methodology**

### **1.6.1 Research Design**

The research approach is the overall structure or procedure for conducting an investigation or inquiry. It is broadly categorised into data collection and analysis/reasoning approaches (Leedy and Ormrod 2015: 92). This study was an action research study that employed a mixed methods design (O'Leary 2013: 147). This is because different components of this study generated qualitative and quantitative information depending on the specific objectives. The study was divided into three components:

1. An exploratory survey was conducted among peacebuilding organisations to explore the current monitoring and evaluation processes used in peacebuilding work. Guided by a structured questionnaire, 29 peacebuilding organisations were interviewed.
2. After the exploratory survey, a participatory action research was used with peacebuilding organisations to develop and implement actions to improve the current monitoring and evaluation processes. The outcome harvesting approach was selected as an action, and a workplan was developed and implemented by four peacebuilding organisations.
3. An evaluation of the action was conducted to find out if the outcome harvesting approach had effectively generated evidence on how peacebuilding projects transformed conflict in their target conflict areas.

In the analysis, a deductive approach was used in interpreting the quantitative data from the exploratory survey on monitoring and evaluation. The descriptive analysis was used in the exploratory survey to reason from the generic to specific level or draw a conclusion on the current monitoring and evaluation processes among the peacebuilding organisations. This made the deductive approach suitable for this component of the study.

For the implementation and evaluation of actions, an inductive approach was employed. Thematic analysis was used, which was data driven and took an inductive approach. The

researcher interpreted the experiences and realities of the application of the outcome harvesting approach by the peacebuilding organisations.

In a nutshell, the quantitative data was generated from the exploratory survey, post-training assessment test and evaluation feedback survey. The qualitative data was generated from a desk review, interviews, the post-training assessment test, and the evaluation feedback survey. The generation of both quantitative and qualitative data made this study a mixed methods study.

### **1.6.2 Target Population**

The target population is the entire group of elements or people with similar characteristics of interest to the researcher and to which findings will be generalised (Fox and Bayat 2007: 52). There were 40 peacebuilding organisations involved in peacebuilding work in Kenya during the exploratory survey period. The 40 peacebuilding organisations were based in Nairobi and conducted peacebuilding projects in different parts of Kenya affected by different forms of conflict. They receive funding from donors to support peacebuilding projects.

### **1.6.3 Sampling Method**

A sampling method is a procedure of selecting representative research participants from the target population (Maree 2016: 192). Kenya was conveniently sampled from other countries in Africa because there is a significant number of international and local peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya. For the exploratory survey, the 40 peacebuilding organisations that were implementing peacebuilding projects in conflict areas in Kenya during the study period participated. A list of peacebuilding organisations was sourced from the Peace and Development Network Trust (PEACENET), a membership network of all the peacebuilding organisations implementing peacebuilding projects in Kenya.

### **1.6.4 Measuring Instruments**

A measuring instrument is a data collection tool used during data collection (O'Leary 2013: 202). During the exploratory survey of the peacebuilding organisations, the data was

collected using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire had open- and closed-ended questions. It was structured to cover all the aspects of peacebuilding practices and monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work by peacebuilding organisations. It had a background of the organisations, current peacebuilding projects, and processes of monitoring and evaluation, including their strengths and weaknesses. For the interviews with the peacebuilding staff, an interview schedule was used.

For the training assessment, a post-training assessment test was used. An outcome matrix was used to collect information on the outcomes. For the evaluation of the action to improve the monitoring and evaluation by peacebuilding organisations, a feedback survey questionnaire on the outcome harvesting approach was used.

#### **1.6.5 Data Analysis**

The quantitative data collected from the exploratory survey of the peacebuilding organisations was collated together and a descriptive analysis was carried out. The mean was used to analyse continuous variables, such as the number of peacebuilding project per the organisation and application level of monitoring and evaluation processes. Percentage and frequency distributions were used to analyse categorical variables, such as the type of peacebuilding organisations, project reports generated, the frequency of reporting, and reporting impact. For the qualitative data, thematic analysis was applied, where the research established patterns and trends from the generated qualitative data.

#### **1.6.6 Pretesting of Measuring Instruments**

A pilot study is an inquiry carried out before the actual implementation of the research. It helps in examining the validity and reliability of the research methodology and research instruments such that the findings generated are trustworthy (Maree 2016: 238). The pilot study was conducted with five security organisations working in the security sector using a structured questionnaire. No pilot study was conducted for the action research component of this study. The security context has similar characteristics to the conflict context in that they are unstable, fluid, and unpredictable. The five organisations were selected as sample organisations, and the drafted structured questionnaire was administered. The data generated was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social

Sciences (SPSS), and the findings were used to check the reliability and validity of the questionnaire before the actual study was carried out. This was undertaken in November 2019.

#### **1.6.7 Delimitations**

The study was conducted among the peacebuilding organisations that have national offices located in Nairobi city. They conduct peacebuilding work in the conflict areas of Kenya. The study specifically examined peacebuilding practices and monitoring and evaluation aspects of the peacebuilding work. Other project management operations such as implementation strategies, administration, external relations, fundraising, and programme development were excluded from the study. In the peacebuilding organisations, the study targeted the project teams, which included either field-based or monitoring and evaluation staff.

#### **1.6.8 Validity and Reliability**

Validity refers to the degree to which the research procedures and measuring instruments truly measure what they are intended to measure and the degree to which the results obtained from the analysis of the data actually represent the phenomenon under study and can facilitate accurate and meaningful inferences (Leedy and Ormrod 2015: 103).

Regarding the research process, the researcher ensured that triangulation was carried out by combining different sources of data and data collection methods. This study generated data from the exploratory survey, interviews, post-training assessment, and feedback survey. The combination of these data collection methods confirmed the themes and patterns generated from the data. Detailed data was generated to ensure that adequate data was generated for emerging patterns. For the exploratory survey with the peacebuilding organisations, a pilot study was carried out using a structured questionnaire and an interview schedule. The pilot study findings informed the refining the structured questionnaire and interview schedule.

Reliability is the measure of the degree to which a research tool yields consistent results. It can also mean collecting the same data after repeated trials using the same data collection method. The data collected during the pilot study was analysed and the reliability of the exploratory survey questionnaire was checked accordingly.

#### **1.6.9 Ethical Considerations**

The right to privacy was maintained throughout the research work. The participants were given the freedom to choose the time, place, and circumstances under which to participate in the study. The names of the participants were not written on the questionnaire or on the key interview schedule to ensure anonymity. The information provided was treated with confidentiality.

Official permission was sought from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) for the researcher to conduct the study in Kenya. It is a legal requirement for anyone conducting research in Kenya to have a research permit. The researcher also wrote and sent an email to the executive directors of the peacebuilding organisations seeking their participation in the exploratory survey. Some replied to the email and accepted to participate, while others gave oral consent through a telephone conversation. During the exploratory survey, field-based and monitoring and evaluation staff signed a consent form before they participated in the study. Before signing the consent form, all the research participants were informed of the nature of the study and were allowed to ask questions or seek clarification. For the action research, formal permission was sought from the four organisations, and it was granted.

#### **1.6.10 Limitations of the Study**

The following limitations were experienced in the research process:

- The Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had a negative impact on the research timelines. However, the researcher adapted to the context and conducted most of the activities virtually with the peacebuilding organisations.
- Remote data collection and implementation of the action affected the feedback on the action research. From the 14 project team members, only 11 participated in the evaluation of the action.

## **1.7 Structure of the Thesis**

There are five parts in this thesis. They include introduction, literature review, research methodology, findings and discussion, summary, conclusion and recommendations. The 11 chapters have been distributed among the five parts, as explained below. The content of each of the chapters is also described.

### **PART I – INTRODUCTION**

*Chapter One* contains background information on the conflict context from global to local perspectives. It also contains the research problem analysis, study objectives, research question, summary of the literature review, and research methodology.

### **PART II – LITERATURE REVIEW**

*Chapter Two* presents the two theoretical frameworks: the conflict transformation theory and the three-level peacebuilding framework. Their relevance to the study is described. The critique of the theories is also done, pointing out the research gaps.

*Chapter Three* presents the three peacebuilding approaches. They include international, local/civil, and hybrid peacebuilding approaches used by the peacebuilding organisations. A critique is done on each of the three approaches in peacebuilding work.

*Chapter Four* entails a review of the empirical studies on monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding work. It also presents the strengths and weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field and contains suggestions by peacebuilding organisations on areas of improvement.

### **PART III – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

*Chapter Five* describes the action research design in detail and its application in this study. It also outlines the study population and areas, sampling methods and measuring instruments, data analysis, delimitations, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, and limitations of the study.



## PART IV – FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

*Chapter Six* describes the conflict context in Kenya with a focus on the forms and causes of conflicts. It further describes the work of peacebuilding organisations in Kenya, including the peacebuilding activities and peacebuilding outcomes achieved.

*Chapter Seven* presents and discusses the findings from the exploratory study among the peacebuilding organisations. It outlines the current monitoring and evaluation processes, level of application, and evidence generated. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis was done for the current monitoring and evaluation processes. The chapter also presents the key areas where practical measures need to be taken to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes.

*Chapter Eight* describes how the action research was planned and implemented. It outlines the training of the project teams and implementation of the outcome harvesting. The chapter also describes the findings from the pre-training assessment test carried out after the project teams had been trained on outcome harvesting.

*Chapter Nine* presents the findings from the four peacebuilding organisations. In particular, it presents the outcomes harvested for the organisations and outcome analysis and tests the theory of change per project.

*Chapter Ten* describes how the evaluation was conducted. It also presents the findings on the action implementation process and the effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach in generating evidence for peacebuilding projects. The chapter presents findings on the appropriateness of outcome harvesting approach in addressing the weaknesses of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding work. The chapter also states the validity of the theory of change that guided this research.

## PART V – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

*Chapter Eleven*, the final chapter, highlights the key findings from the analysis and presents a personal reflection on the research process and results. The chapter also presents conclusions based on the findings and recommendations for further research.

## **1.8 Conclusion**

Of key importance to this chapter is the overview of the research study with an emphasis on the analysis of the research problem as the central part of this study. As stated, the study was carried out to address the challenge of insufficient evidence generated by peacebuilding organisations to demonstrate how peacebuilding projects successfully transformed conflict into peace outcomes in the targeted conflict areas. Using the action research design, the peacebuilding organisations were facilitated to implement a peace-oriented monitoring and evaluation approach. In this study, the outcome harvesting approach was selected as an action to improve the current monitoring and evaluation. The following chapter details the theoretical frameworks that informed and guided this study.

## **PART II – LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **CHAPTER TWO**

#### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON PEACEBUILDING**

##### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter starts by giving definitions of conflict, peace, and violence. It continues to describe two theoretical frameworks developed by John Paul Lederach, a renowned author and peacebuilding scholar and practitioner for many years. The conflict transformation theory, developed and published in 2003 in his book entitled *Little book on Conflict Transformation*, is one of the two peacebuilding theories supported in this survey. The second theoretical framework is the three-level peacebuilding framework commonly known as the peacebuilding pyramid or peacebuilding triangle, published in 1997 in his book entitled *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. A critical review is carried out on the two theoretical frameworks, as presented in the subsequent sections. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses is also done. The chapter ends with a conclusion and states the focus areas for the literature review part of this thesis.

##### **2.2 Definitions of Conflict, Violence, and Peace**

To understand the two theoretical frameworks identified for this study, conflict that is transformed and peace that is built must be articulated. Peace, conflict, and violence have different meanings for different people. They are multifaceted and overlap (Eyo and Francis 2017: 138). This clarifies why the meanings are varied for different people. For the purposes of this study, conflict, which sometimes turns into violence if not addressed sufficiently, and peace have been described to enable peacebuilders to accurately measure when they take place.

Conflict is an incompatibility or contradiction between two or more social actors as a result of incompatible goals, interests, values, ideologies, and needs (Arai 2017: 1). For conflict to occur, one social actor must be advancing their interest knowingly or unknowingly

against the will of the other. Conflict may involve denial of the basic needs of one social actor by another, a lack of respect for the values of a social entity by another, competition over resources, and miscommunication between or among the social actors. Depending on the extent of the disagreement, contradictions, and incompatibility, it may become confrontational and turn violent. According to Rahim (2010: 15), conflict can be categorised into the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup forms. This shows the complexity of conflict as the number of social actors involved increases.

Other authors have defined conflict as a social situation where a minimum of two parties have incompatible objectives, interests, values, ideologies, and needs. It occurs when one party uses means that interfere with the will of the other party (Rahim 2010: 17-18; Arai 2017: 2). Lederach (2003: 18) definition of conflict places emphasis on relationships that are built or occur in a social context and asserts that conflict is inevitable where relationships exist. Lederach further states that conflict is normal and natural and that it occurs where humans interact socially. It is the response to conflict that makes the difference. The parties can choose to resolve it peacefully or use violence (Eyo and Francis 2017: 144).

Conflict also occurs in a context, which Renger *et al.* (2015: 118) defined as a set of naturally occurring conditions underlying the conflict. Esser and Vanderkamp (2013: 210), on the other hand, called the conflict context contested space by conflict groups and that what mattered was the sources of the conflict. It is significant to understand that different conflict contexts have unique peculiarities, but patterns and commonalities do exist. For instance, conflict contexts are fluid, volatile, and highly complex in nature, and conflict groups co-exist in an uneasy manner (Cohen 2012: 190). Occasionally, the conflict groups collaborate when faced with a common enemy. Contrary to the volatile, risky, and insecure state of a conflict context, there are also safe spaces, such as religious institutions, health facilities, public markets, cultural sites, and other common local places, where conflicting groups meet and respect the uneasy state of their relationship although under the surveillance of one another (Cohen 2012: 190; Duggan 2012: 200; Bush and Duggan 2013: 7).

Violence is a common feature of the conflict context which draws attention for a response before it deteriorates. It can be characterised by intergroup violence confrontation, state intimidation due to existing structural violence, and sometimes organised and unorganised crime (Bush and Duggan 2013: 7). It is vital to recognise that even after violent conflict, an end to the violence is not ensured because a relapse into violence can occur due to unresolved conflict issues. There is also danger and fear, whether conscious or unconscious, that pervades people's attitudes. The legacy of violence can remain for many generations if the conflict issues are not adequately resolved (Cohen 2012: 191; Bush and Duggan 2013: 210).

Conflict transformation is anchored on the external conflict that Lederach (2003) referred to as social conflict. This type of conflict occurs when two or more social actors have a difference of views, values, or interests and sometimes a rivalry over resources in a social setting (Arai 2017: 14). One unique consideration in conflict transformation is taking social conflict as a natural phenomenon that occurs within the human relationship (Obiekwe 2009: 3; Arai 2017: 14). It is important to recognise that the conflict thread can flow from the intrapersonal level and become visible at the intergroup level. This happens when conflict is triggered by an action of one person with internal issues, but which resonate with social conflict issues. This phenomenon is common in situations where protracted or intractable conflict exists. The protracted conflict is deep-rooted, informed by historical patterns, and violent in most cases (Gawerc 2006: 436).

Although conflict is natural and inevitable, violence that occurs when conflict escalates has often been used as a way of dealing with conflict. The use of violence as a response to conflict has led to a cycle of violence (Harris 2010: 4). To understand violence, Galtung defined *violence* as the negative difference between actual and potential mental or somatic realisations (Galtung 1969: 168). He further categorised violence into the direct, structural, and cultural forms. The three types have generally been accepted by many peacebuilders and scholars as the forms that violence takes when it occurs (Galtung 1990: 294; Arai 2017: 2).

Direct violence is physical harm to an individual or a group (Harris 2010: 2). It is manifested in different forms such as killings, torture, sexual and physical assaults, and

violent extremist attack (Govier 2008: 62; Kaufman 2014: 442). Structural violence, on the other hand, works through the social, political, and economic structures and policies. It gives unequal advantage to one group over another. It takes the form of gender, class, caste, ethnic groups, race, and religion, among other social cleavages. Structural violence causes one group to have more access to services, goods, resources, power, and opportunities than other groups (Harris 2010: 3; Musya, Matanga and Amutabi 2017: 3). As opposed to direct violence, which is visible and where the perpetrator is known, structural violence is built into the social, political, and economic systems, structures, and policies. It is silent and appears to be natural (Kaufman 2014: 442). Examples of structural violence include exploitation, marginalisation, discrimination, and political and social inequalities (Galtung 1990: 294). Cultural violence, on the other hand, involves beliefs and attitudes embedded in language, culture, religion, and ideologies. It is usually taught from childhood. The danger with cultural violence is that it legitimises or justifies both direct and structural violence by one group against another (Galtung 1990: 291; Harris 2010: 3). Some of the examples of cultural violence are religious representations, stars, crosses, crescents, flags, anthems, military parades, portrayals of leaders, inflammatory speeches, war songs, posters, cultural stereotypes, prejudices, and beliefs of superiority (Galtung 1990: 296-302).

The understanding of conflict and violence then helps in the understanding of peace. As with conflict and violence, peace has different meanings and is context specific. There is no consensus on the true meaning of peace (Ogbonna 2018: 69). For this study, the definition by Johan Galtung, a renowned author and scholar, has been adopted. Galtung (1969: 169), in his ground-breaking peace research paper, defined peace as the absence of all forms of violence. He further categorised peace into forms opposite to the three forms of violence stated above. These are negative peace, which is the absence of direct violence; positive peace, which means a reduction of structural violence; and cultural peace, which is derived from a reduction of cultural violence.

Galtung and most peacebuilders and scholars have acknowledged that negative peace comes about when violence stops. It is a relative calm that is achieved after conflicting parties are separated or war resources are withdrawn. In this relative calm, the root

causes of conflict remain and the threat of violence exists. Any trigger mostly leads to the outbreak of violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, encompasses the absence of violence or threats of violence because the root causes have been addressed, and mechanisms have been put in place to address any arising conflict non-violently (ACCORD, 2015: 11).

While peace is the ultimate goal in any peacebuilding process, the journey from violent conflict to sustainable peace is difficult and never straightforward. It is a complex process, and many peacebuilding scholars have developed theories on how the process should be critically analysed and undertaken to achieve sustainable peace. One of the scholars is John Paul Lederach who developed the conflict transformation theory and the three-level peacebuilding framework, as explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

### **2.3 Insights from the Conflict Transformation Theory**

The conflict transformation theory was developed by Lederach (2003: Chap 3-10) after engagement in conflict resolution in many countries across Central America, North America, Asia and Africa. As noted by Paffenholz (2014: 2), the conflict transformation theory has provided theoretical guidance in developing peacebuilding processes at the local level by peacebuilding practitioners. According to Lederach (2003: 16), conflict transformation is “to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.” From this definition, four features of conflict transformation can be identified. One, conflict transformation is applicable at the post-conflict stage. At this stage, the violence has been reduced or stopped, creating an enabling environment for conflicting parties to engage. Two, conflict itself is an opportunity for constructive change to happen after the occurrence of violence. Three, the responses, either short- or long-term, involve direct interactions between conflicting parties to build or strengthen social structures meant to address challenges emanating from human relationships. Four, a framework must be developed to direct change process from short-term change to a long-term desired future.

As mentioned above, the conflict transformation theory was developed by Lederach as an advancement of conflict resolution (Botes 2003: 1; Lederach 2003: 6; Paffenholz 2009: 4). He observed that conflict resolution focused on episodes of conflict within a distinct time frame. It would examine the content of the conflict and settle on immediate solutions to the problem. This would temporarily restore the relationship between conflicting parties, resulting in a peace agreement. This focus of conflict resolution is narrow and superficial because it is aimed at stopping conflict, which cannot be stopped. Conflict resolution does not address structural, cultural, and historical relationships in context; instead, it achieves negative peace conditions. This explains why many peace agreements have failed after a compromise has been reached (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 544). It is from these weaknesses of conflict resolution that Lederach developed the conflict transformation theory.

This theory comprehensively addresses the changes in the characteristics of the conflict. It considers conflict as a dynamic process of ebbs and flows that require adaptable and constructive change processes. It is relationship centred and aimed at making fundamental changes in relationships and structures that conflict resolution cannot do (Botes 2003: 2). From this theory, Lederach made seven assumptions about social conflict. The assumptions were informed by his religious background and practical experience in addressing social conflicts in different cultures:

- *Conflict is good.*

Due to the pain, loss, and anxiety brought about by conflict to the parties involved, especially the powerless and vulnerable communities, conflict is viewed as bad (Lederach 2003: 3). In protracted social conflict, it is even worse because long-lasting cycles of the violent conflict leave people with hurt, the destruction of the social fabric, and physical loss. However, in this theory, Lederach observed conflict as good because it was a life-giving opportunity for social growth.

- *Conflict occurs naturally in human relationships.*

Conflict is normal and naturally occurring in human relationships or social interactions. In other words, the fountain of conflict is human relationships. Lederach (2003: 10) asserted that conflict could not be stopped from occurring or



eliminated because its source was social interactions among social actors that form society. He believed that it could only be transformed positively to bring about positive change in a society (Obiekwe 2009: 7). Unlike conflict resolution that focuses on issues that cause conflict, human relationships are central in conflict transformation. Lederach (2003: 10) asserted that conflict would flow and return in relationships, and if transformation needed to occur, relationships were where it should begin.

- *Conflict flows from life.*

Conflict is a natural human experience. Thus, life produces conflict as part of human development in society (Lederach 2003: 11). By virtue of humans being living, conflict is a part of life. This means, then, that life produces conflict. In essence, conflict also creates life and, therefore, becomes a motor of change. Through conflict, people innovate and change as they respond to the conflicts in life.

- *Conflicts have energy that drive change.*

Lederach (2003: 25) cited episodes of conflict as catalyst that mobilises energy around the issue that needs attention and responses. This energy provides strength for conflict to linger for years, become complicated and even give birth to new forms of social conflict. It should be harnessed to bring about short- and long-term constructive change.

- *Conflict happens for a reason.*

According to Lederach and Maise (2003), conflict is caused by a disruption of natural social relationships, making it difficult for parties to express their perceptions and feelings. In conflict transformation, episodes of the conflict, representing the visible dimension of relationships, should be observed as an indicator of an invisible problem in social, political, economic, and cultural relationships. Rather than focusing on issues, conflict transformation extends to the epicentre of conflict to understand its underlying causes as embedded in the web and system of social relationship patterns.

- *Conflict is a process.*

It flows from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships. It moves along this continuum. At the start, conflict arises due to disagreement, injustice, or other causes. If conflict is not resolved, the social groups respond through violent confrontations. This situation calls for negotiations leading to peaceful relationships. In line with this thought, the conflict stages depict similar features where conflict moves from latency, confrontation, and crisis to outcomes (ACCORD, 2015: 15).

- *Conflict is a point of reflection.*

Though less pronounced in the conflict transformation theory, this study considers reflection as the most critical in peacebuilding work. When conflict occurs, it signals that something is wrong with people's social relationships. It becomes an indicator that change needs to take place. Conflict provides the opportunity to stop and look back at events, relationship patterns, and social structures. It also encourages conflicting parties to assess how basic needs are met, the access to resources, and participation in decision making. While the first reaction to conflict occurring in society is to stop it, Lederach (2003: 11) observed that it gave an opportunity to reflect on the issues and increase understanding of the conflict parties and their relationship.

With this understanding of conflict, it can be seen that conflict transformation involves a change of mindset about social conflict and strategies to address it. This includes accepting that conflict is always being generated and inevitable. It also gives an opportunity for peacebuilders to work with people as they meet their daily basic needs and relate to each other in settings ranging from families to complex social institutions. It also means that conflict transformation is a proactive process that encourages the parties involved to look at conflict as an opportunity to assess how they relate and respond to needs, aspirations, and growth.

### **2.3.1 Three Phases of Conflict Transformation**

The conflict transformation theoretical framework has three distinct and systematic phases to guide the development of a strategy to transform conflict (Lederach and Maiese 2009: 8). Each phase is conducted during the post-conflict stage or after a peace

agreement has been reached by the conflicting parties. For the conflicting parties to navigate the three phases, an external third party, who acts as a mediator, steers the process. Lederach referred to these phases as points of inquiry during the design of responses to conflict (Lederach 2003: 7). However, it is significant that the practical conflict transformation process begins after the three phases have been carried out and the conflict transformation strategy has been produced by the conflicting parties with facilitation from the external mediator (Mitchell 2002: 3).

**a. *Understanding the present situation***

Lederach has emphasised the need to look beyond the immediate conflict situations as opposed to conflict resolution that looks at conflict issues and stops once an agreement has been reached. Conflict transformation goes beyond the current conflict issue and examines the underlying causes (Lederach 2003: 9; Paffenholz 2009: 4). He advised peacebuilders to view visible episodes and look at deep invisible social relationship patterns within the conflict context. The underlying causes of conflict revolve around historical, social, cultural, economic, and political relational patterns in the context of the conflict (Mitchell 2002: 7). Lederach observed that episodes of conflict representing the content of the conflict must be taken as a window to see the ebbs and flows of social connections, which form the epicentre of the conflict. Episodes represent the issues of conflicts, which include disputes between conflicting parties over resources, culture, and religion. For instance, in most cases, the intergroup clashes occur over differences in culture, religion, and traditional practices. The state violence towards rebel-organised groups, insurgency by marginalised groups, gender-based violence, and crime depend on the social context which, in most cases, comes about due to socio-political inequalities. Peacebuilders make mistakes by responding to episodes of conflict with no idea that episodes, in most cases, are a sign of deeper challenges experienced in deep unequal social relationships in the conflict context (Paffenholz 2009: 4). Peacebuilders having an understanding of episodes and the epicentre of the conflict can then develop effective strategies to respond to current conflict issues while producing changes to social, economic, political, and cultural relationship patterns.

***b. Identifying desired future***

Using the understanding of the present situation as a motivation, a vision of positive peace conditions is developed. The vision is the social change to be achieved in the future (Lederach and Maiese 2009: 8). The limit of the desired future depends on the conflicting parties, present situation, and resources needed to achieve it. However, in most cases, peacebuilding organisations narrowly respond to the prevailing conflict situation without any reflection on the expected change in the future (Bush and Duggan 2013: 13). They focus on de-escalating conflict with the assumption that long-lasting peace will be realised eventually. The desired change should be developed around the immediate solutions to the prevailing conflict issues with a focus on the changes occurring in deep social relationships and systems (Paffenholz 2009: 5).

***c. Identifying change processes***

After determining the desired change by the conflicting parties, change processes are developed revolving around the episodes and epicentre of the conflict. Specifically, change processes should produce change at the personal, relational, structural, and cultural levels (Lederach 2003: 6-7). The change processes create platforms to simultaneously address current conflict issues and respond to deep-seated social structures and relationship patterns in the conflict context (Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 25) .

Conflict transformation is a long-term change process. It demands long-term commitment by conflicting parties to build peaceful relationships and structures that facilitate equity and non-violent responses to conflict (Persson 2011: 5). To transform conflict, present incompatibilities must be addressed, and change structures must be established that will identify and facilitate the transformation of emerging conflict in a non-violent way. Change processes are, therefore, designed to address the webs of immediate problems and broader social needs, relationships, and contexts.

To appreciate the transformational change, Lederach and Maiese (2009: 9) asserted that the change process can be both linear and circular. They further identified elements of

transformational change processes as connections of elements in relationships, the growth of something as being inherently self-sustaining, and change as never being unidirectional. With this understanding, they revealed four change-process scenarios within a framework of change as a circular process. They stated that situations can move forward and progress towards the desired change. They can also be at a standstill with nothing happening or in a state of going backwards or completely breaking down. These scenarios represent forms of transformational change and how it is achieved in the natural setting where conflicting parties, mediators, and other social actors have no control. The immediate result of the change process is a transformation platform that must be responsive in the short term and strategic in the long term. Change must also be conceptualised within the framework of immediate conflict issues, social relationships, and broader patterns in the conflict context (Lederach 2003: 14).

### **2.3.2 Strengths of Conflict Transformation**

The conflict transformation theory has been used widely by peacebuilders across the globe due to its inherent features that support effective peacebuilding from local to international levels (Botes 2003: 4; Paffenholz 2014: 7). It is a step-by-step process that enables peacebuilders to effectively respond to current conflict problems and bring about change in broader contexts. In view of conflict being a natural process in society, conflict transformation acknowledges that the success is not about stopping conflict but rather about achieving broader social changes (Mitchell 2002: 9). Conflict transformation broadly has a direct effect on three aspects of a conflict. Firstly, the conflict issues are transformed. The issues concerning the identities, interests, values, and needs of the social actors, which bring incompatibility between conflicting parties, are altered by reducing controversial issues and increasing the common interests (Mitchell 2002: 9; Botes 2003: 8). Secondly, the conflict actors are transformed. The conflict actors experience internal changes by working on their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour to see conflict as a natural experience that, when addressed, creates a constructive change (Persson 2011: 7). Thirdly, the relationships are transformed. The conflict actors have to redefine their relationships and redirect their energy to constructive engagement by either redefining the norms of, or developing new rules for, mutual relations (Mitchell 2002: 9).

While the above three conflict transformation processes touch on the changes that occur with individuals and the relationships between conflict actors, conflict transformation must go beyond this and generate changes at the structural and systemic levels. These changes will result in the fair distribution of power, the just allocation of resources, and the participation of the conflicting groups in decision-making processes that affect their lives (Persson 2011: 7). This transformation process requires restructuring, redefining the roles of social institutions, or building new structures to regulate the patterns of social, economic, cultural, and political relations in the conflict context.

Conflict transformation also calls for the creation of linkages between short-term responses to current conflict issues and long-term social change. The developed change process becomes the linkages between the present conflict situation and the desired future. According to Lederach (2003: 23), conflict transformation can take decades to achieve the desired social change because of changes in relationships. Therefore, peacebuilders and conflicting parties must have the capacity to resolve immediate conflict issues and link them to long-term social change. The understanding derived from analysis of the conflict context and crisis prevention phases can lead to building peaceful relationships and transforming social structures. The linkages between immediate solutions and long-term changes in relationship patterns make conflict transformation effective as a peacebuilding approach (Persson 2011: 7).

The articulation of where the change is expected to happen helps to make conflict transformation an effective process. The peacebuilding activities are, therefore, expected to reverse or reduce the negative impact of the conflict and produce positive or create new changes. According to Lederach (2003: 23), the changes occur at the personal, relational, structural, and cultural levels. At the personal level, the individual conflict actors are changed by being empowered to understand the conflict issues that bring about the incompatibility and be able to recognise new ways of addressing them. Change is also expected between the conflict actors through the creation of safe spaces where interaction is free and safe to discuss the conflict issues. At the structural level, Lederach observed that fundamental changes must happen in social organisations or institutions by reducing

power imbalances, allowing equitable access to social resources, and allowing inclusivity in social processes. Although Lederach expected to see change at the cultural level, he recognised that it was difficult and a long time was required for people's culture to change (ACCORD, 2015: 9).

Conflict transformation is not a time-bound process. It is a long and continuous process. By viewing social conflict as part of the human experience in relationships, conflict transformation becomes a long-term commitment that aims at structural changes. Two factors make conflict transformation a long-term process. One is the nature of social conflict. As noted by many authors who support conflict transformation, conflict will always remain with people because interests, needs, resources, and other causes continue to change. The incompatibility of goals, competition for scarce resources, power struggles, and exclusions constantly occur, both knowingly and unknowingly. Conflict continues to be transformed depending on the time, actors, and issues (Obiekwe 2009: 7; Persson 2011: 4). . The second reason is that the root causes of conflict, especially those embedded in social and cultural institutions and systems, take decades to be transformed. They are slow to change because any change would threaten the safety and lives of the people benefiting from those social arrangements. While acknowledging these challenges, Lederach (2003: 36) recommended that the design of short-term strategies to prevailing conflict problems should have an element addressing how strategies carry forward short-term change into the changes in social systems and institutions.

### **2.3.3 Weaknesses of Conflict Transformation**

While conflict transformation has been accepted as an effective peacebuilding approach across the globe, it has attracted a few criticisms either because it is a new approach, or because it has not been adequately tested. From the onset, conflict transformation is more pronounced at the escalation stage of a conflict when it attracts attention from a third party to the conflict. From Galtung (1969: 168) definition of violence, when conflict escalates, direct violence is manifested in different forms such as killing, torture, and ethnic clashes and cleansing, among other forms. He further noted that physical violence was fed by historical structural and cultural violence that had been taking place. The two other forms of violence namely structural and cultural occur during the pre-conflict stage of the conflict,

commonly referred to as the latent stage. They are hidden from the public, but causes tensions between the conflicting parties (ACCORD, 2015: 38). The limited use of conflict transformation at the latent stage of the conflict makes it less effective in transforming social, economic, political, and cultural patterns, as the latent stage is the best opportunity to discuss and prevent a conflict crisis.

Conflict signals those social relationships are not serving the interests of all parties in the social context. It is a point of reflection for the conflict actors to redefine their social interactions. This aspect of conflict is given little attention by the conflict transformation theoretical framework. Conflict transformation has given significance to the conflict assessment and analysis of the prevailing situation. However, it remains silent on how the change processes can be effectively measured and how evidence can be generated systematically to improve strategies of addressing violent conflict.

Another gap in the conflict transformation theory is the lack of clarity on the desired future as the end state. Conflict transformation is a long-term process that can require decades to produce an effect. This means that there is no designed change after violent conflict has taken place. In developing change processes, Lederach (2003: 33) envisioned a transformation change platform that appreciated the prevailing situation on content, context, and relationship patterns but failed to distinctively show how the future would look like in the abstract sense. This was left for the conflicting parties to unravel. However, since conflict transformation is a process-based endeavour, Lederach (2003: 15) stated that the desired future could be articulated as a change in relationships and social structures such that one could develop strategies to achieve that. Without this clarity, developing a theory of change would remain challenging for peacebuilding practitioners.

## **2.4 Peacebuilding Within Conflict Transformation Processes**


### **2.4.1 Three Levels of Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding has been defined by Organisation for Economic Corporation and Developement (2012: 4) as the actions and policies aimed at preventing the outbreak, recurrence, or continuation of violent conflict that address the structural and proximate causes of violence and promotion of initiatives that create necessary conditions for



sustainable peace and delegitimising violence as a dispute resolution mechanism (Blum 2016: 2). It has special characteristics that need special attention from peacebuilders (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 11). Peacebuilding is a complex and dynamic process with a multitude of actors and activities working simultaneously, with each of them seeking to effect change in the conflict context according to their own perspectives and capacity. Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 2) further explained that peacebuilding was multifaceted and would continuously change to respond to the constantly changing and unpredictable conflict context. The understanding of peacebuilding in the conflict context is important because it creates an understanding for peacebuilders to approach peacebuilding strategically and engage different actors during the peacebuilding process.

Lederach (1997: 39) conceptualised a three-tier peacebuilding framework to guide peacebuilding processes with multiple peacebuilding actors and activities at three vertical levels of society. He advocated for a peacebuilding approach that was multilayered and multifaceted with different actors at three levels acting in different time frames (Lederach 1997: 18; Schirch 2008: 13; LAMIDI 2019: 19). As shown in Figure 2.1, Lederach's peacebuilding approach, incorporating three vertical levels, captures the entire population affected by the conflict.



**Figure 2.1** Three levels of peacebuilding framework( adapted from Lederach 1997: 39).

**a. Top-level leadership**

At the top level, peacebuilding activities, such as formal negotiations facilitated by highly respected, impartial, and expert external mediators, target high-profile top leaders such as political, military, and religious leaders (Coy 2003: 8; Schirch 2008: 8). These leaders enjoy high visibility, constant recognition, and attention by the public and media. They have access to information and have power to make decisions on behalf of their constituents. They are not affected by the effects of violent conflict (Maiese, Burgess and Burgess 2003; LAMIDI 2019: 1).

The peacebuilding activities include official diplomacy, formal negotiations, and political dialogue aimed at achieving a ceasefire and the signing of a peace agreement to end the violent conflict (Obiekwe 2009: 19). This ceasefire is what Galtung (1969) cited in (Gawerc 2006: 438) called negative peace. This is where two conflicting parties stop fighting, but the root causes of the conflict are still present and remain unaddressed. The UN and donors mostly use the top-level leadership to enter in any social conflict. The engagement takes the shape of an international peacebuilding approach, which is mostly top-down and

elite-driven. They encourage formal negotiations between top leaders to sign peace agreements to stop violence. In most cases, the peace agreements bring about immediate social order. However, the violent conflict re-emerges because the peace agreements are superficial and are rushed to end the violence, ignoring the root causes and locking out the local actors (Schirch 2008: 12). Many authors have argued that peacebuilding at the top level brings together the visible leaders in power to negotiate a settlement. However, the grassroots leaders and communities are left out in the negotiations despite being among the implementers of the peace agreement (Persson 2011: 4).

***b. Middle-range leadership***

The peacebuilding activities are crafted around the authoritative leaders who do not belong or represent any party in the conflict. These leaders command respect and have authority in their social settings. Despite being part of society, they enjoy status and influence drawn from acceptance across the conflicting parties as a result of ongoing relationships with top and grassroots leaders. They meet with them as they conduct professional and institutional duties and also during other formal and informal social interactions. They include academicians, business leaders, religious leaders, ethnic leaders, professional leaders, NGO officials, and other sectoral leaders. These leaders do not suffer the survival needs of the masses at the grassroots level, but they understand the conflict context affecting the masses (Lederach 1997: 45; Coy 2003: 8; Maiese, Burgess and Burgess 2003; Paffenholz 2014: 5; LAMIDI 2019: 61).

The advantage of the middle-level leaders is the fact that they have dual connections. They know or are known by the top and grassroots leaders. They are linked to top-level leaders and government officials, but they are not controlled by them or the opposition leadership. They are also linked to the grassroots leaders, but they have no control over the governance of the local leadership. They are tractable to social groups such as ethnic, religious, and other associations or societies where they derive status and have leadership positions. Another advantage of the middle-level leadership is that they enjoy more freedom than the top-level leadership. They can interact freely with the top and grassroots leaders as well as across the conflicting parties because their relationships

extend across social identities (Maiese, Burgess and Burgess 2003; Obiekwe 2009: 20; LAMIDI 2019: 61).

Due to the strategic position of the middle-level leaders, Lederach pointed out that they are best suited to build infrastructure that guarantees sustainable peace. This is because of their connection with top and grassroots leaders and other official processes in those two levels (LAMIDI 2019: 5). The middle-out peacebuilding approach, as Lederach called it, has been known to focus on intermediary reconciliation processes such as problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution skills trainings and the formation of peace commissions. It is also significant to mention that middle-level leaders are mostly identified as culturally sensitive insider mediators. Their partnerships with external mediators are effective in negotiations and mediation, especially at the top level (Schirch 2008: 12; Paffenholz 2009: 5; Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 12). The direct results of peacebuilding activities involve increasing the capacity of different teams to engage with both top and bottom level leaders, the formation of peace commissions for response actions, and the development of peace mechanisms.

### **c. *Grassroots-level leadership***

Peacebuilding activities target the local leaders of communities. They are leaders of rural and cultural groups, clans, and traditional and religious groups in conflict areas. They represent the majority of the population that is negatively and directly affected by the conflict. The grassroots leaders include clan leaders, indigenous NGOs, health officials, and refugee camp leaders, among other indigenous leaders. They are greater in number in society than the top- and middle-level leaders and have contact with local communities on a daily basis (Coy 2003: 9; Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 6-9).

Peacebuilding activities that engage grassroots leaders include non-violence trainings to understand how to deal with conflict without overt violence. They also participate in the community dialogue for conflict communities to understand each party's perspectives and develop local solutions. Other peacebuilding activities include trauma healing of the victims of violence and the formation of local peace commissions to address local incidents of conflict and facilitate local mediations (Obiekwe 2009: 21).

#### **2.4.2 Peacebuilding Approaches at Three Levels of Peacebuilding**

The Lederach peacebuilding framework calls for multiple strategies at the three levels occurring simultaneously. However, depending on the nature of the conflict, different approaches have been used. Some of the peacebuilding actors, such as the UN, engage with top-level leadership. They assume that the change at the top level will trickle down to the grassroots. It is significant to highlight that at the top level, the main peacebuilding actors are the society's elite (Schirch 2008: 12). They are known to have power and influence in society. They are also known to exploit social identities such as ethnic groups, religion, and ideologies to advance their personal interests under the guise of communal interests (Onuoha and Ufomba 2017: 209). This top-down approach is visible in international peacebuilding practices that engage the political elite in the conflict countries. They assume that, somehow, the local actors will find their way to participate in peacebuilding activities at a later stage when the peace agreement is signed.

In his conflict transformation theory, Lederach emphasised the value of local leaders in peacebuilding processes at all levels. This fact has also been recognised by international peacebuilding actors, scholars, and practitioners, that local actors should be at the centre of any peacebuilding process. They experience discrimination, oppression, inequalities, and marginalisation with the local communities. They also witness hatred; the effects of violence; and the daily struggle of local communities for food, water, and other basic needs (Schirch 2008: 12; Obiekwe 2009: 21; LAMIDI 2019: 61). The emphasis on engaging local leaders and affected communities is called the bottom-up approach. Although neglected by the top-level leadership in the formal negotiations, local actors have received massive support from donors and international peacebuilding organisations (Paffenholz 2014: 10). The informal engagement at the grassroots level that goes up the leadership ladder can yield sustainable peace if the process is managed well. For example, in Elsaldo, Ethiopia, and Somaliland, mobilisation of the local communities across the conflict divide produced effects that rose through the middle level to the top level resulting to sustainable peace (Obiekwe 2009: 21).

Over the years, the middle-level leadership has been considered as the most suitable level to steer the building of sustainable peace in society. The middle-out approach is

supported by the hypothesis that the middle-level leadership has connections with both the top and grassroots leaders. They hold the greatest potential to build sustainable peace through engagement of the top and grassroots leadership levels. Although its effectiveness has been cited in many works of literature, this is not truly the case. From a study conducted by Paffenholz (2014), where she assessed the effectiveness and relevance of peacebuilding processes using the pyramid framework, she found out that the top-level leadership has a high potential to generate sustainable peace. She cited that the middle-level leadership peacebuilding processes depended on the top-level leadership's engagement. However, for effective peacebuilding, Lederach (2005), in his most recent book entitled *The moral imagination*, re-emphasised the need for horizontal and vertical linkages within the three tracks of peacebuilding intervention as opposed to relying on the middle-level leadership. This thinking has been observed by Paffenholz to have been derived from overemphasis on the middle-level leadership and neglect of the top- and grassroots-level leaderships in peacebuilding interventions (Paffenholz 2014: 11).

#### **2.4.3 Strengths of Three Level Approach to Peacebuilding**

The Lederach peacebuilding approach is a classical one because it recognises the role of diverse peacebuilding actors. Categorising them into three levels makes it easier for peacebuilders to address the conflict at the level that they consider to be effective. The top, middle, and grassroots levels have their merits in the peacebuilding process, and, therefore, Lederach advocated for an integrated peacebuilding process at all levels within a given time frame (Shirch 2004: 13; LAMIDI 2019: 61). Across the levels, it can be observed that different actors or leaders are involved in peacebuilding processes with specific peacebuilding activities. This ensures that there is inclusivity in addressing social conflict at all levels of society. It can be observed that religious leaders, ethnic leaders, and NGO leaders tend to cut across the three levels. As has been widely documented, religious and ethnic conflict are common causes of identity-related conflict across the world and are known to be very difficult to resolve because they are deep-seated and easily become protracted. Recognising these leadership levels makes it easier to develop strategies to address these types of conflict. NGOs, on the other hand, are considered to

be CSOs or peacebuilding organisations that are neutral to conflicting parties. Notably, the middle-level leadership has contributed significantly in many democratic countries particularly in the development of CSOs (Obiekwe 2009: 20). The NGOs, coupled with the middle-level leadership, are one of the peace resources in any social conflict.

In *The moral imagination*, Lederach (2005: 80) has replaced the middle-out approach with the web approach to peacebuilding. This is because at the foundation of any social conflict, social relationships are at the centre. This web approach has been interpreted as placing emphasis on the vertical and horizontal engagement with actors at the three levels, taking advantage of multiple points where vertical and horizontal relationships intersect as turning points. The vertical capacity calls for leadership dialogue across the three levels, and the horizontal capacity takes advantage of personal relationships and networks across identities, such as ethnic and religious ones (Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 7).

As observed from the peacebuilding pyramid, NGO leaders placed at the middle level and indigenous NGOs at the grassroots level form part of the larger part of leadership in peacebuilding. This has made it easier for donors, mostly international NGOs, to enter any society experiencing conflict. The international NGOs have been instrumental in facilitating peacebuilding at the middle and grassroots levels (Schirch 2008: 13). This can be explained by the fact that middle-level leaders are connected to grassroots leaders and, therefore, act as gatekeepers for local communities. In addition, the middle-level leadership is part of civil society organisations to which NGOs belong. It can also be observed that the local NGOs can be easily accessible to international NGOs because they share the same principles of peacebuilding. Local actors' engagement has also been one of the gaps in the engagement of the top-level leadership; this has been widely recognised and has become an opportunity for NGOs to engage the grassroots level to be part of the larger peacebuilding discourse in society. Paffenholz (2014) discovered that local support by international donors had strengthened the capacity of the grassroots to have an impact on the peace process.

#### **2.4.4 Weaknesses of Three Level Approach to Peacebuilding**

In the peacebuilding pyramid, as shown by Lederach (1997: 39), three sections of society are recognised, but little attention has been given to regional and international levels. In her study to examine how the peacebuilding theory had influenced a shift from international to local efforts in peacebuilding, Paffenholz (2014: 10) found that regional actors had a massive influence over the issues of peace and intrastate conflicts. Sometimes, international and regional policies do affect social relationships at local levels where conflict is always manifested and has a large-scale impact on communities, especially when the government operations are significantly affected. Notably, most of the peacebuilding funding comes from external sources, and they should be considered prominent in the peacebuilding framework.

The multitrack approach has also excluded the general population since the framework is leadership oriented. Some of the effective local peacebuilding initiatives have been developed by the local communities. It is important to note that local communities have their local mechanisms that effectively address conflict, as noted by Lederach in his book entitled *Preparing for peace: conflict transformation across cultures*, where local cultures are important inputs in peacebuilding training programmes. He also recognised local communities as peace resources rather than recipients (Lederach 1995: Chap 9).

The other weakness of the Lederach peacebuilding approach is the lack of empirical evidence on whether and how the three-level peacebuilding approaches have led to better peacebuilding outcomes. Although different claims have been made on the effectiveness of the vertical and horizontal interconnectedness of different actors, it is not clear to the peacebuilders how these approaches have produced peacebuilding outcomes at the personal, relational, structural, and cultural levels. In addition, there is no evidence showing how change by leaders at the three levels translate into structural changes (Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 7). This is where effective monitoring and evaluation processes are useful to generate evidence on the change dynamics by the different actors at the three levels.



## **2.5 Conclusion**

For the purposes of this study, the strategic peacebuilding framework, consisting of the present situation analysis, determination of the desired future, and development of the change process, is the backbone of any peacebuilding project. The three aspects are the cornerstones of the conflict transformation theory by John Paul Lederach. This framework is also central for an effective monitoring and evaluation process that generates evidence to show the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. As conceptualised by Lederach, the four dimensions of change are reference points for peacebuilding organisations to achieve the desired change and collect information as they implement the peacebuilding projects. The changes are at the personal, relational, structural, and cultural levels.

One important observation is that the conflict transformation theory lacks the aspect of continuous evidence-based reflection on the change processes, which is necessary as peacebuilders carrying out conflict transformation work. Meaningful reflection happens when sufficient evidence is generated on the peacebuilding process. The following chapter has empirical evidence on peacebuilding approaches used in peacebuilding work by peacebuilding organisations.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **PEACEBUILDING PRACTICES BY PEACEBUILDING ORGANISATIONS**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

For peacebuilding organisations to have an effective monitoring and evaluation processes, the peacebuilding practices used by them need to be understood. This chapter begins with an explanation of peacebuilding concepts. A comparative analysis of different peacebuilding concepts by the UN, donors, peacebuilding scholars and practitioners is carried out. The chapter further captures a short history of peacebuilding work. It further presents the peacebuilding approaches used by peacebuilding organisations and other peacebuilding actors in detail. These approaches are the liberal, local, and hybrid peacebuilding approaches. The chapter ends with a conclusion based on the three peacebuilding approaches and indicates the content of the subsequent chapter.

#### **3.2 Concept of Peacebuilding**

Before considering how peacebuilding practices address violent conflict worldwide, it is important to have a general understanding of peacebuilding as a concept from different perspectives. This understanding is significant when developing monitoring and evaluation processes to guide measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects at all levels. Peacebuilding is defined in different ways by different peacebuilding practitioners who include scholars, policymakers, and field practitioners (LAMIDI 2019: 54). They have developed definitions based on their understanding, priorities, and experiences in peacebuilding work.

The concepts of peacebuilding came to light and received international recognition in 1992 when Boutros Boutros Ghali's landmark report entitled *Agenda for peace* was published and adopted by the UN Assembly. According to the report, peacebuilding is defined as "a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation"

(Boutros-Ghali 1992: 4). This definition became an international benchmark for the peacebuilding policy framework in the UN and its member states as well as other regional bodies such as the European Union (EU). The definition has been further re-emphasised and expounded by other UN departments such as the UN Peace Operations. According to Brahimi (2000: 8), in a report on UN Peace Operations 2000, peacebuilding involves “schedules taken on the prolonged conflict to reinvigorate the basis of peace and provide the instruments for building on those foundations so as to achieve something that is more than just the absence of war”. For EU, it considers peacebuilding as a multidimensional and comprehensive approach with focus on integrated and long-term conflict prevention activities that deal with root causes of conflict. The activities include dialogue, mediation, justice sector and electoral reforms among others (Natorski 2011: 1 -2).

The EU has not deviated from the original definition by Boutros. Peacebuilding is seen as a process that entails efforts to support a country's transition from conflict to sustainable peace. It is mainly focused on electoral and justice sector reforms creating stable political order and institutions in place that reduces the risk of relapse into the conflict. This further leads to more stable development processes in the country.

International peacebuilding organisations known to help individuals, communities, and societies transform the way they perceive and manage conflicts and have also developed their peacebuilding concepts. In a study conducted by Barnett *et al.* (2007: 37), entitled *Peacebuilding; What is in the name?*, found out that several international organisations have different meanings of peacebuilding. Such organisations include Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) perceives peacebuilding as “efforts to strengthen the prospects of internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict in order to enhance the indigenous capacity of society to manage conflict without violence”. The meanings were informed by their mandate, networks in the peacebuilding field where a consensus on peacebuilding is developed, and the interventions that they were implementing in the fragile context.

According to the study, CIDA's concept of peacebuilding embraces the importance of strengthening the local internal peacebuilding capacity to manage conflict non-violently. According to the Japan International Development Agency (JICA), peacebuilding is “a

general approach extending from conflict prevention to reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction, in which peace is pursued through across the board endeavours that include development assistance in addition to traditional efforts within the military and political frameworks". JICA's framing of peacebuilding concepts has included reconstruction and security measures as well as measures supporting democratic processes with the aim of attaining sustainable peace.

The Department for International Development (DFID), now the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), captures the concept of peacebuilding within the UK peacebuilding strategy as:

Conflict reduction includes conflict management (activities to prevent conflict and post conflict spread of existing conflict); conflict prevention (short-term activities to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict); conflict resolution (short-term activities to end violent conflict); and peacebuilding (medium and long-term actions to address the factors underlying violent conflict) (Lawry-White 2004: 17).

As seen from the definition, FCDO considers peacebuilding as a third approach after conflict reduction and prevention, but, ideally, the conflict reduction and conflict prevention form part of medium- and long-term actions to address factors underlying violent conflict which are included in the definition of peacebuilding. The UK peacebuilding strategy goes further to outline the broad activities to be undertaken by FCDO during post-conflict peacebuilding. They include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs and building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation, and basic social services.

The concept of peacebuilding by prominent scholars in peacebuilding has not deviated from the understanding of peacebuilding by UN departments and international organisations. For instance, Johan Galtung, in his pioneering work entitled *Three approaches to Peace: Peace-keeping, Peace-making and Peace building*, explained peacebuilding as "a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward sustainable, peaceful relationships" (Galtung 1976: 297). John Paul Lederach, another key scholar, viewed peacebuilding from a wider perspective and as a comprehensive

concept within the conflict transformation framework, which, according to him, is a holistic and multifaceted approach to managing violent conflict in all its phases including peacebuilding measures that precede and follow formal peace accords. He also observed peacebuilding as encompassing an integrated approach that accounted for the complex and multidimensional nature of the peacebuilding process. He framed his concept of peacebuilding as “creating processes with peripheral vision, capable of maintaining purpose while constantly adapting to the difficult and shifting sands and tides they must face to survive” (Lederach 2005: 48). As can be observed from Lederach’s statement, peacebuilding should be framed in a manner such that it addresses the current conflict and sets up a change process that is dynamic and adaptable to shifting conflict situations in the future.

From the different concepts, it is significant to note that none of the concepts contradict each other. All the concepts tend to agree that peacebuilding is not restricted to the post-conflict stage. They also cover the period before a conflict through conflict prevention, during a conflict by reducing the violence, and after a conflict using post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. This is pivotal because for many years, there has been a misconception in peacebuilding work that peacebuilding only applies during the post-conflict stage. Peacebuilding has been described as a full array of processes by the UN, which clearly shows that peacebuilding is dynamic, adaptive, and involves organised efforts by different peacebuilding actors that precede or follow a peace agreement (Duckworth 2016: 5; LAMIDI 2019: 62). The peacebuilding efforts are directed at addressing three common factors identified in the stated concepts. They either reduce or stop the violence and deal with the underlying causes of violence through the development and strengthening of structures that solidify peace and prevent the recurrence of the conflict (Bures 2007: 410; Barnett, Fang and Zürcher 2014: 610).

In addition, as seen in the concepts, the aim of peacebuilding is to have sustainable peace and promote security for individuals, communities, and the state in general. It involves addressing the root causes of conflict and developing or strengthening institutions to manage future conflicts, which is inevitable in a pluralistic society. Essentially, peacebuilding is a major instrument for securing peace and can be applied in all the stages

of conflict and relatively peaceful societies (Barnett, Fang and Zürcher 2014: 610; LAMIDI 2019: 54).

Finally, it is significant to note that the concepts consider peacebuilding as being an externally designed intervention (Barnett *et al.* 2007: 36). This is notable because, as will be explained later, international peacebuilding has been termed as an external affair and being mostly driven by donors. On the other hand, local peacebuilding embedded in the local context is also occurring but not visible to policymakers (Haider 2009: 4; Ginty 2012: 770).

A few critical differences can also be observed in the abovementioned peacebuilding concepts. For instance, scholars' concepts are open and broad to accommodate various peacebuilding efforts by peacebuilding actors and to give room to be creative depending on the conflict being experienced. The UN, USAID, CIDA, and JICA definitions tend to be prescriptive. They also tend to concentrate on political and economic transition processes. A few briefly mention social transitions and transformation which are critical for any meaningful long-term sustainable peace (Spence and McLeod 2002: 61).

Recognition of local capacities for peace as a resource is absent in the UN concept but pronounced in the definitions of CIDA, JICA, and USAID. This could be associated with differences in the peacebuilding approaches used in the peacebuilding processes of the USAID, CIDA, and JICA, as will be explained later. They work through local peacebuilding organisations which engage with grassroots leaders and communities, while the UN prefers a top-down engagement of top-level political leaders with little attention being given to local actors.

### **3.3 History of Peacebuilding**

The peacebuilding field has grown significantly and has been informed by various dynamics in both its concepts and practices. It officially became recognised internationally in the 1970s as a result of Johan Galtung championing peacebuilding to ensure that peacebuilding was mainstreamed in governance systems. In the 1980s, John Paul Lederach added his voice to Johan Galtung's input, and from his experience and research

on local community engagement in peacebuilding, especially in South America, he advocated for the involvement of local governance in peacebuilding (Lederach 1997; LAMIDI 2019: 53). As a result of the adoption of the Boutros report by the UN in 1992, peacebuilding gained international momentum. The international recognition drew the attention and involvement of donors and multilateral and regional organisations and further extended the UN peacebuilding framework to countries affected by conflict. It is this model that the UN, NATO, EU, and African Union (AU), among other regional organisations, continue to use to assist countries in crisis to come out of conflict.

It is significant to point out that with the entry of international organisations, international finance institutions (IFIs), and peacebuilding organisations, the scope of the peacebuilding advocated by the UN has broadened. From prevention of outbreak, recurrence, or continuation of violent conflict to include many other aspects such as rehabilitation, disarmament, radicalisation, reintegration, reconstruction, institutional reforms, and other peace-related interventions. The inclusion of different interventions addresses the structural and proximate causes of violence and create sustainable peace.

For many years, post-conflict peacebuilding was the focus of international peacebuilding after peacemaking and peacekeeping had taken place. Although the expansion of the scope of peacebuilding is a favourable development for the peacebuilding sector, it has been observed in the literature that incoordination and ill-informed peacebuilding approaches have become a challenge. It has also made it difficult for peacebuilding workers to meaningfully measure the effectiveness of peacebuilding (De Zeeuw 2001: 8; LAMIDI 2019: 53).

### **3.4 Approaches in Peacebuilding Practices**

Peacebuilding practices have taken different approaches in various conflict situations. However, from the literature, three main approaches have distinctively emerged. Peacebuilding organisations have adopted one or all the peacebuilding approaches in their peacebuilding work. The first approach is international peacebuilding, which is commonly known as the liberal peacebuilding approach and is mostly used by the UN and international peacebuilding organisations (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 454;

Mucha 2016: 51). Local peacebuilding is another emerging approach being advocated by the Global South who have consistently complained of the deficiency of the liberal peacebuilding approach (Ginty 2012: 766). This is a bottom-up approach where consideration for the local context and actors is central (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015: 827). This approach has also been referred to as the emancipatory peacebuilding approach (Randazzo 2016: 1354). The third approach, which is also gaining traction, is the hybrid peacebuilding approach. It advocates for blending both international and local peacebuilding strategies to achieve sustainable peace. It borrows from John Paul Lederach's three-track approach (top, middle, and local leadership), as explained in the theoretical framework. The approach advocates for inclusive involvement by multiple actors at all levels (LAMIDI 2019: 61). It is centred on the principle that peacebuilding strategies should address local sources of hostility, build local capacities of change, and allow some degree of international community commitment to assist the change (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 781).

#### **3.4.1 Liberal Peacebuilding Approach**

The introduction of peacebuilding into the UN in 1992 brought about the birth of the international peacebuilding framework. It is used and supported by the UN; IFIs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank; and donors, such as USAID and FCDO (De Zeeuw 2001: 14; Duckworth 2016: 6). The support of the international peacebuilding framework by the UN and multilateral organisations indicates that this approach bears elements of the top-down approach, being supply-driven and depending on donors' funding (Duckworth 2016: 5).

Peacebuilding at the international level has different meanings for countries affected by internal conflict. The meaning has become even more complex with the broadening of its scope to cover political, social, economic, and military engagement and reconstruction (LAMIDI 2019: 55). The international peacebuilding framework facilitates the work of the UN and other international peacebuilding actors by prescribing the use of a single and uniform approach when intervening in fragile countries. The approach is state centric and more often driven by the interests of the international community and those of the recipient countries' elite at the national level, leaving out the needs of the local actors, civil society,



and other subnational layers of the society in the conflict (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 454). Due to this approach being state oriented, its focus is on building democratic state institutions which include electoral assistance, security sector reform and certain forms of development, the creation of markets, the nurturing of civil society, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the promotion of democracy (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 452; Barnett, Fang and Zürcher 2014: 610). Building the democratic governance institutions to operate in the fragile countries that are experiencing violent conflicts is not a direct and easy task. To achieve this objective, the international peacebuilding actors have adopted and continue to use a linear approach to the peacebuilding process.

As stated by Boutros-Ghali (1992: 822), the international peacebuilding actors apply preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding as a comprehensive and systematic way to address the root causes of violence in the affected countries. Preventive diplomacy tries to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence. Peacemaking brings, and sometimes forces, the hostile parties into an agreement. Peacekeeping has widely been known for the deployment of peacekeeping operations in the field where violence has broken out with consent from all the parties concerned. It is implemented by military forces or police personnel – and sometimes includes civilians – to ensure that the peace agreement is kept and to prevent the recurrence of violence. It is after peacekeeping that the post-conflict peacebuilding process comes in with strategies focused on building democratic governance institutions (Moshe 2001: 14; Bures 2007: 14).

This linear process, from diplomacy to post-conflict peacebuilding, brings out another prominent feature of international peacebuilding, which is the use of force to impose peace on conflicting parties in the fragile countries within internationally agreed blueprints and timelines (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 454). The deployment of military forces to offer a buffer zone between the fighting parties and monitor the situation after the peace treaty is introduced is common in all international peacebuilding interventions in the fragile countries. It is significant to highlight that peacemaking and peacekeeping are more pronounced in the international peacebuilding framework than preventive diplomacy. This

is probably because peacemaking and peacekeeping occur after the violence has broken out, and preventive diplomacy occurs when there is a risk of violence. The peacekeeping operations continue until and when the UN feels that the fragile countries have reached a level where the government institutions have been built and the state appears to be relatively stable (Bures 2007: 410).

To ensure that the four stages of the peacebuilding process are elaborative and clear for the UN and donors, in 2005, after its establishment, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office developed a menu of peacebuilding strategies to be used by the governments of the affected countries. They include the mediation of differences, cross-examination of disputants, negotiation, reconciliation, transitional justice and restoration (communal adjudication), ethnic cooperation, building bridges between different communities (community dialogue), re-integrating former combatants into civilian society, developing rule-of-law systems and local governance systems, the management of post-conflict local environments, and developing pressure and civil society groups as well as community-based organisations that can represent diverse interests and challenge the governments peacefully. This list gives the international peacebuilding framework another features of having a standard inventory of peacebuilding activities applicable in fragile contexts. These standard operational procedures for peacebuilding in fragile countries have little consideration for the local needs and contexts of the recipient fragile countries.

Having been used in different countries in conflict, such as Liberia, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (LAMIDI 2019: 57), the international peacebuilding approach has received both positive and negative criticisms. There is no doubt that the international peacebuilding framework continues to be used in the current countries experiencing ongoing conflict, such as Syria, Iraq, the DRC, and Somalia. This then highlights the benefits of international peacebuilding as stated next.

One of the benefits of the international peacebuilding framework is the fact that it stops the violence temporarily by signing a peace agreement and deploying peacekeeping operations in the conflict-affected countries. After the peace agreement has been put in place, peacekeeping operations are deployed. These operations have been effective in creating buffer zones between the hostile parties. They have also been proven effective

in deterring any defections by the conflicting parties from the peace agreement. Military and civilian observers have also been able to successfully play a role of conflict resolution because they act as third-party mediators in the localities where they are operating (Bures 2007: 410).

The signing of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties has been seen by international peacebuilding actors as a significant step and forms the foundation of the peacebuilding process in the conflict-affected countries. It provides a framework of any form of assistance from the UN, regional organisations, and international organisations. In the recent past, there has been an increase in the number of peace agreements being signed in countries experiencing intrastate conflict (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 536). A multidimensional approach to peacekeeping in implementing comprehensive peace agreements has also been observed to reduce violence if it is carried out in a conflict-sensitive manner. Most of the comprehensive peace agreements have a wide spectrum of peacebuilding interventions. They include peacekeeping, economic reconstruction, institutional reforms, disarmament, development, and reconciliation. The effective coordination and implementation of these strategies ensure the inclusion of conflicting parties and affected people in the peacebuilding process, restore service delivery, promote the rebuilding of social structures, and guarantee restorative and distributive justice in the fragile countries. These achievements significantly address the root causes of violence and guarantee sustainable peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 781).

Despite the abovementioned critical benefits of the international peacebuilding framework, there have been a number of recorded failures. There is sufficient evidence on the poor performance of this top-down, securitised, and state-centric peacebuilding approach. In his research article entitled "Peace Building: Conceptual, Trajectory and Imperative Analyses in the Third World Countries", LAMIDI (2019: 57) noted that 25% of all peace treaties fail in the first 5 years after they are signed, and 50% fail within 10 years. Barnett, Fang and Zürcher (2014: 38) made a controversial comment when they strongly stated that peacebuilding was a waste of resources and seemed to be making a modest difference. They further added that it did more harm than good. Others have also observed

that international peacebuilding does not produce what it is intended to produce. For instance, Barnett *et al.* (2007: 35) observed that out of 19 countries that had received international peacebuilding assistance, two were liberal democracies, 10 were authoritarian, and seven were electoral democracies. This statistic shows that in countries where international peacebuilding has been applied, there is a large chance of those countries becoming worse than they were before the intervention, and the countries tend to bring about authoritarian governments.

Examples of international peacebuilding interventions indeed confirm that the approach is barely effective. The US and UN intervention in Somalia left the country in complete disarray, and the country is still struggling to achieve stability (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779). Countries such as Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Tajikistan that have been recipients of major international support for peacebuilding are not yet free. Other countries where the UN has worked, such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have, however, been ranked as partly free by Freedom House (Ginty 2012: 774).

The poor performance of international peacebuilding work can be explained because it is based on the interests of two key actors: the international community and top-level elite of the recipient countries. In his reflection on the Somali international community intervention, De Coning (2013: 1) argued that the political, economic, and security interests of the international community would drive the international peacebuilding work. Due to the fact that they have financial resources, they ultimately dictate their own liberal norms to the recipient countries. The second reason for the massive failure of international peacebuilding work is that the international actors engage government elites who have their own interests to maintain power and resources in their control. Whenever the elite and international peacebuilding actors negotiate and agree, the elite ensures that the status quo is maintained regarding their own interests as they fulfil the interests of international actors (Barnett, Fang and Zürcher 2014: 613).

Another explanation is the inability of this approach to resolve structural violence. This approach is applicable to horizontal conflict where two conflicting parties have equal

power and are weak. They include militia groups in the Niger Delta in Nigeria fighting for control over oil fields; groups in the Central African Republic, where religious and ethnic militia fight; and groups in the DRC, especially in Eastern Congo, where both local ethnic militia and cross-border militia from Rwanda are in constant confrontation, although there is some aspect of government interference. It is difficult for the international peacebuilding approach to address the vertical conflict between rebel groups and the existing government, such as the fighting occurring in the Darfur region between rebel groups and the Sudanese government, and the case of the insurgents of rebel groups in Angola (Van De and Raubo 2017: 448 - 456). It is also difficult to address protracted conflict between two or more intergroups of different identities, such as religious and ethnic civil wars in Iraq. In the two scenarios, the government is party to the conflict, has more power, and would like to maintain the status quo of structural inequalities perpetuated by the poor and partisan government (Musya, Matanga and Amutabi 2017: 23). This then means that applying this method to vertical conflicts between the state and rebels or intercommunal conflicts where the government favours one group would not work because they occupy unequal positions, and, in most cases, the government would like to maintain the status quo. This shows why most of the peace agreements fail or are partially implemented in the countries affected by the conflicts.

International peacebuilding has also been faulted when the inclusion of the local context and actors in the peacebuilding strategies is concerned. They pay little attention to the needs, interests, and local context situations for which the international assistance is intended. The international peacebuilding strategies aspire to bring the citizens into the peacebuilding process directly, but due to their focus on the macro-level engagement of elites, they assume that the citizens will become informed of the objectives of the institutional building and reforms at some point, and, more often, they are brought on board later (Talentino 2007: 167; Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 545). Since citizens are at the periphery of the international peacebuilding approach, the peacebuilding interventions lack local voices and are ethnically bankrupt, subject to double standards, and lack a cultural basis (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 454). One of the reasons why the local actors are left out of the international peacebuilding framework is the fact that it is tied to the state, institutions, and the elite class who control

those institutions. The elite do not give room for the local context, local organisations, and other deep layers of society to become involved, yet international assistance comes mainly to address the violence affecting local actors (Mucha 2016: 51). In addition, more often, the peacebuilders in international peacebuilding stay in cities where they can easily access and engage the national elites, creating a disconnection between the citizens and international actors (Ginty 2012: 773). In this situation, the chances of international peacebuilders understanding the local context and actors' dynamics are limited.

Recently, there has been an appreciation by international peacebuilders to include local perspectives in international peacebuilding. However, experience shows that the type of engagement of local communities brought about by the international peacebuilding organisations harbours liberal bias. They have limited space to include local context and needs in peacebuilding activities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 776).

International peacebuilding has also been criticised for being donor-driven, linear, top-down, and having standard operation procedures in the conflict-affected countries. This has caused it to take a "quick fix" approach which overlooks the root causes of conflict that require a long time to be addressed in order to achieve true and long-lasting peace (Bures 2007: 415). The "quick fix" mentality of the international peacebuilding donors' culture lacks long-term commitment and a multidimensional approach to peacebuilding. Instead, the international peacebuilding process is packaged into linear, logical, and fixed-budget interventions. This approach undermines the peacebuilding process, which is a dynamic, adaptive, and long-term process where short-term interventions do not offer much assistance.

The donor-driven peacebuilding projects, despite being short-term endeavours, have adverse effects on the local capacity for peace resilience. As noted by De Coning (2013: 2) and Duckworth (2016: 6), the introduction of external resources affect the balance of local power and resources and risk prolonging the violent conflicts at the local level. If the peacebuilding resources are not used in a conflict-sensitive way, they might reinforce intergroup conflicts due to either perceived or real favouritism of one group over another.

International peacebuilding has also been considered to create donor dependency by the recipient government. This means that if there is any lack of international assistance, the conflict is likely to continue unabated by both local and national peacebuilding actors of the recipient countries. This has been seen in the case of South Sudan, Somalia, and the DRC. The external aid has caused these countries to become more dependent on international actors to drive their peacebuilding agenda.

The final criticism of international peacebuilding involves how it has been conceptualised. In their argument, Barnett, Fang and Zürcher (2014: 609) stated that without a clear understanding of what peacebuilding was meant to do, it would remain difficult to measure whether international peacebuilding had made a difference or not. Ideally and practically, international peacebuilding is more inclined to create liberal democratic institutions than reduce violence and ensure that it does not recur. There is no clear process on how to take stock of the causes of violence and seek the means to address them. Instead, international peacebuilding actors rush to the conflict-affected country with already-designed peacebuilding strategies irrelevant to the local context. In most cases, the strategies are oriented towards institution building. This oversight has been brought by the tendency to standardise peacebuilding interventions through the spread of technocracy, professionalism, the promotion of best practices, and the spread of the conflict analysis framework (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 777).

### **3.4.2 Emancipatory Peacebuilding Approach**

There is a growing interest to adopt community-based approaches in addressing conflicts worldwide. This is triggered by a lack of capacity for the international peacebuilding approach to address structural inequalities constructed by the elite, who are the primary recipients of international peacebuilding support (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 766); a lack of legitimacy among local communities as an internationally supported administration causes the local communities to perceive it as imposed on them (Randazzo 2016: 1352); and the exclusion of the local communities by international peacebuilding projects (Schierenbeck 2015: 1028). Over the years, local communities in the fragile conflict countries have shown resilience and survival through conflict. They inherently find local solutions to local conflicts through their own peaceful mechanisms (De Coning 2013: 3).

Since the 1990s, there has been an ongoing debate on how to include the local context and local actors in the peacebuilding process. Different international agencies, such as the EU, and donor organisations, such as USAID and FCDO, have consistently been emphasising local engagement in their peacebuilding policies, although they also support national peacebuilding work. In the 1990s, authors such as John Paul Lederach started advocating for local communities to be part of peacebuilding as peace resources rather than mere recipients of international aid (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015: 826).

The focus of the local peacebuilding approach is to empower the local community groups and institutions to take direct control over peacebuilding initiatives. The local peacebuilding is undertaken by local actors who include individuals, community groups, local institutions, associations, cooperatives, community-based organisations (CBOs), village leadership, and local government officials. They are involved in a range of locally based everyday activities which include community policing; the formation of cooperatives and economic groups across the social divide; the promotion of dialogue and debate in the media; traditional justice and reconciliation, such as ceremonial cleansing; and cultural preservations (Haider 2009: 6; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015: 805; Schierenbeck 2015: 1024). These everyday contacts create bonds between individuals and among different local groups and institutions, demystifying others and building relationships and creating spaces for interaction, communication, and joint decision making (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 773).

The principle behind the local peacebuilding approach is that it is an everyday activity and that peace is occurring daily and freely away from formal engagement, though it can be linked to the institutional and governance structures (Schierenbeck 2015: 1027). It occurs during the community meetings in villages and city neighbourhoods, developing bonds with members of other ethnic or religious groups, demystifying beliefs about others, and promoting acceptance of one another. They meet while conducting everyday economic, cultural, and survival activities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 769-770).

The local peacebuilding approach has been observed to be an effective approach. Engagement of the local actors in the local context ensures that they are at the centre of the peacebuilding process, creating ownership of the process and ensuring that



sustainable solutions are developed (Randazzo 2016: 1354). For instance, in Somaliland, the different clans of Somali ethnic groups have been able to craft their working conflict resolution process without the help of external resources and have managed to have sustainable peace (Obiekwe 2009: 21). The local peacebuilding approach focuses on the conflict itself and tries to identify the best avenues to address those causes (De Zeeuw 2001: 15). Since it is an inside-out, emergent approach, it is demand driven and recognises the local capacity of local actors as peace resources (De Coning 2013: 3). These peace resources can be identified and create peace processes with or without international or external help (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015: 830).

The local peacebuilding approach has also received mixed reactions on how it influences peacebuilding processes at the local and national levels of countries in conflict. One of the positive reactions is the appreciation that local peacebuilding, as an approach, guarantees durable peace because the local people understand the source of conflict and what to do to fix the conflict. Anchoring peacebuilding in local actors also recognises the value of locally grown solutions that ensure that there is inclusion and the involvement of multiple actors. Peace is also ensured because the peacebuilding strategies developed match the local conflicts identified by the same local actors (LAMIDI 2019: 55).

The local peacebuilding approach appreciates that conflict is inevitable and, therefore, local peacebuilding mechanisms are developed to address the current and future conflict. As noted by De Coning (2013: 3), local communities affected by a conflict are able to emerge from the conflict through self-organisation. From here, they are able to develop mechanisms that are not centrally controlled and do not require external interventions. This is what he called an inside-out, emergent, and bottom-up approach.

The only negative criticism of the local peacebuilding approach is the complex nature of conflict in relation to the local, national, and international conflict system. It is not unfamiliar to find that some of the local violent experiences have causes beyond the local context. In most cases, conflict observed in the local communities, especially in countries in conflict, are fuelled by the political and socio-economic inequalities and elite interests mainstreamed in the government institutional processes and along ethnic and religious cleavages, creating discrimination, marginalisation, and the oppression of one group while

acting in favour of other groups. Thus, the ability of the local peacebuilding approach to bring about institutional change at the national level with regard to income distribution, land reform, democracy and the rule of law, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, environmental degradation, and transitional justice is difficult but possible.

### **3.4.3 Hybrid Peacebuilding Approach**

The critical role of peacebuilding organisations in peacebuilding across the globe was recognised in the Agenda for Peace report in 1992; however, little information exists regarding their peacebuilding approach (LAMIDI 2019: 55). The peacebuilding organisations – being independent of the state, operating autonomously, and capable of significant influence on public policy in any country's governance – are better placed to influence both the local and national elite in peacebuilding processes (Moshe 2001: 22). The work of peacebuilding organisations having little recognition in the peacebuilding field can be associated with trends in the level of funding over the years. In most cases, the funding has been given to states for the purposes of institutional building in the aftermath of conflicts. However, with an appreciation of the local peacebuilding approach, the peacebuilding organisations have received significant funding to conduct peacebuilding. Increased support by international donors, such as USAID, and EU, is largely due to people-oriented approaches used by peacebuilding organisations. They appreciate local peace mechanisms and local capacities for peace and seek their involvement (Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler 2011: 449).

Over the years, peacebuilding organisations have been known to use conflict resolution and reconciliation among the communities. In addition, they have embraced both the institutional approach and other ways of peacebuilding (LAMIDI 2019: 59). They do this either by direct involvement in the capacity building of state institutions or by shaping public opinion, deliberating on the processes, and policy formulation. This integrated approach is what is called *hybrid peacebuilding*. This approach appreciates the importance of international and local peacebuilding dynamics and concludes that both are needed for sustainable peace to be attained.

The significance of peacebuilding organisations' engagement in peacebuilding is that they open opportunities for the inclusion of the marginalised and alienated while setting clear guidelines to govern that inclusion at the policy level (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779). They are also critical in ensuring collaboration and coordination between local and international capacities for peacebuilding despite coordination still being problematic. As a result of conflict, in their peacebuilding work in areas of conflict, they have been known to build on non-violent peacebuilding strategies, which is the basis for development skills, processes, and resources to sustain a culture of peace (Bures 2007: 420).

Most of the funding for peacebuilding organisations goes to Tracks II and III where their work falls (Duckworth 2016: 6). However, from a study conducted by Barnett *et al.* (2007: 45), it is clear that peacebuilding organisations are engaging peacekeeping, demobilisation, disarmament, humanitarian, and development activities, especially during the crisis stage of conflict, negotiation, and political dialogues, which fall under Track I. It is also clear that peacebuilding organisations are engaged in different activities, which is based on their knowledge on peacebuilding and mandate in the conflict context.

This approach has not escaped different reactions, as observed with liberal and local peacebuilding approaches. One of the positive reactions is the supplementary role offering a point of convergence for local and international peacebuilding actors. Peacebuilding organisations create a context for the acknowledgement of competing claims, opening an opportunity for inclusion of the marginalised and alienated in international peacebuilding.

One of the weaknesses of the hybrid peacebuilding approach is the fact that it cannot be completely independent from the international peacebuilding approach. Since it has incorporated some aspects of the international peacebuilding approach, which is financially supported by the international peacebuilding actors, the principles of liberal peacebuilding are largely promoted by the peacebuilding organisations. Notably, they have been accused of implementing the agenda of the donors in peacebuilding spheres rather than the local agenda, as they claim to be doing (Barnett *et al.* 2007: 48; LAMIDI 2019: 49). This has been confirmed by the fact that a variety of multilateral organisations

now make it their business to intervene in other people's wars. They insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat (Bures 2007: 418).

The peacebuilding organisations have also been accused of conducting peacebuilding activities in an overlapping and uncoordinated manner. Utstein's study of 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by EU countries over 10 years showed that the peacebuilding organisations suffered from inconsistency and lacked coherence at the strategic level (strategic deficit). In this type of work, a lack of accountability and biased assistance is prevalent (De Zeeuw 2001: 34; LAMIDI 2019: 57).

### **3.5 Conclusion**

It is important to highlight that the role of international peacebuilding organisations in peacebuilding was recognised in Boutros' report of 1992 as key in post-conflict peacebuilding and democratic state building (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 16). As observed in this chapter, the international peacebuilding approach remains prominent in peacebuilding work. The local and hybrid peacebuilding approaches are growing and taking shape as peacebuilding actors apply them. Peacebuilding organisations use local and hybrid peacebuilding approaches more than the liberal peacebuilding approach. It is important to mention that peacebuilding organisations use the three approaches depending on the peacebuilding actors, nature of the conflict, level at which the peacebuilding work is needed, and the expected peacebuilding outcomes. The peacebuilding activities under the three approaches depend on donor funding. What remains unknown is the impact of the three approaches due to weak monitoring and evaluation processes for measuring the peacebuilding work. The following chapter is about monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **MONITORING AND EVALUATION PROCESSES IN PEACEBUILDING WORK**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The definitions of conflict, violence, peace, and peacebuilding and the explanations of peacebuilding approaches in the previous chapters have laid the foundation for the understanding of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding work. The aim of this study was to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work by exploring and developing practical solutions to address the weaknesses that exist. This chapter is dedicated to critically examining the current monitoring and evaluation processes among the peacebuilding organisations. The chapter carries out an analysis of the processes of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding organisations. The processes include conflict analysis and project design, which include identifying expected changes, developing a theory of change, identifying peace indicators, and designing a monitoring and evaluation plan, evaluation and learning. The chapter highlights learning and adaptation, which have been scantily practised by peacebuilding organisations. The chapter further presents the strengths and weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes. The chapter ends with a conclusion and emphasises points covered in Chapter 5 on the research methodology.

#### **4.2 Introduction To Monitoring and Evaluation in the Peacebuilding Field**

The peacebuilding sector is extremely varied and context specific. It includes many individuals, community groups, organisations, and institutions operating in the conflict context. More often than not, the peacebuilding conducted by peacebuilding organisations has been packaged into peacebuilding projects containing logical frameworks, targets, workplans, budgets, and reporting mechanisms (Mac Ginty 2013: 57). This design for a peacebuilding project makes it a formal process that only benefits donors to fund and demand for accountability based on agreed funding conditions. It appears appropriate on

paper but is a challenging task for peacebuilding organisations during the implementation stage. The conflict context where peacebuilding projects are implemented is complex and never logical and fixed as the design of the peacebuilding projects indicates.

For over two decades, donors have increasingly supported peacebuilding work in different parts of the world. Initially, donors were lenient on demanding for accountability from peacebuilding organisations. However, with time, the pressure to show the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects arose and increased over time (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 42; Ernstorfer 2019: 4). In response, peacebuilding organisations resisted the demand for accountability because they believed then that peacebuilding could not be measured. They also had a perception that monitoring and evaluation, as in the development and humanitarian sectors, applied quantitative measures. For them, using quantitative measures in peacebuilding was impossible because peacebuilding yielded qualitative peacebuilding outcomes. This contestation between donors and peacebuilding organisations continued for several years, but in the recent past, they have come into an agreement that the effectiveness of peacebuilding work is measurable and must be carried out for all peacebuilding projects (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 9; Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 42).

### **4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Processes Among Peacebuilding Organisations**

Monitoring and evaluation is a critical component of peacebuilding work. It entails a range of monitoring and evaluation processes taking place throughout the project cycle (Blum 2016: 2). It supports the generation of relevant, accurate, and timely information that is used for reporting, improving the project design, and decision making. In addition, it is useful in providing information on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding activities and strengthening accountability of the organisations to the donors. It further supports the culture of learning and reflection among the stakeholders (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 9).

There is no single or superior monitoring and evaluation approach for generating evidence in peacebuilding work in conflict-affected contexts worldwide (Chigas, Church and Corlazzoli 2014: 7; Ernstorfer 2019: 34). This is worth noting because many donors and peacebuilding organisations have developed different monitoring and evaluation approaches as a response to weak mechanisms of producing sufficient evidence. None of these initiatives can claim superiority over the other because monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field is relatively new, although significant strides have been recorded (Ernstorfer 2019: 4). This shows that there is still more work to be done to develop a standard recognised monitoring and evaluation approach in the peacebuilding field.

From the literature on monitoring and evaluation approaches among peacebuilding organisations and existing guidelines, five specific processes have been established, as described in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5. A description under each process is given. Some of the gaps in the practices are also highlighted.

#### **4.3.1 Conflict and Peace Analysis**

To understand the conflict context is vital for peacebuilders as they seek to find appropriate strategies to manage, resolve, or transform it. Deep analysis is critical to understand socio-political and economic tensions, undercurrents, and potential ramifications for conflict (Elkins 2006: 5). Conflict analysis is now widely recognised as a standard tool to understand the conflict in a given context (Ernstorfer 2019: 15). There are over 15 conflict analysis methodologies developed by different organisations to conduct conflict analysis. These methodologies seek to identify the causes of conflict, the actors involved in a conflict, and the trends and patterns of a conflict. The differences among these conflict analysis methodologies are seen in the aspects of the conflict and preference of the analysis methods or tools that an organisation has decided to use. The differences are more often informed by the organisations' mandates. The growth and standardisation of conflict analysis shows the value that donors and peacebuilding organisations have placed on the conflict analysis frameworks before engaging in peacebuilding work in the conflict context (Mac Ginty 2013: 57).

One weakness observed in all conflict analysis methodologies is less emphasis being placed on the analysis of the peace processes in the conflict context. The attention is directed towards understanding the conflict issues, actors, and causes. Limited analysis of the factors that bring about peace, the actors who contribute to peace, and existing peace processes in the conflict context (Ernstorfer 2019: 15).

Despite the availability of conflict analysis methodologies, many of the peacebuilding organisations do not conduct conflict analysis, and in the cases where they do conduct it, they do it as a donor requirement but not to understand the conflict and inform peacebuilding strategies. Instead, the peacebuilding work is driven by favourable peacebuilding activities such as training, dialogues, negotiations, and community mobilisation rather than conflict analysis. This is dangerous because the peacebuilding projects are not anchored on any form of conflict analysis (Church and Rogers 2006: 85; Paffenholz 2014: 14).

Although conflict analysis is pivotal in peacebuilding, it has been established that there is no link between conflict analysis and the effectiveness of peacebuilding. This is contradictory to the belief that a peacebuilding project is anchored on a formal conflict analysis. An analysis of peacebuilding projects in 2003 by the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) during the Reflective Peace Practice (RPP) found that effective peacebuilding projects had carried out little conflict analysis and less effective projects had carried out an extensive conflict analysis. They also found that recognising opportunities for peace, identifying conflict actors who benefited from the conflict situation and who needed to be stopped, and addressing the regional and international factors impacting on local conflicts were missing from the conflict analysis. These three elements are critical for ensuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies (Anderson and Olson 2003: 46). Two explanations given for this finding are that (i) although conflict analysis was done, it was not linked to peacebuilding strategies, and (ii) the effective projects were grounded on the informal conflict analysis drawn from the experiences of the local people. The two explanations point to the need for continuous conflict analysis and its application by peacebuilders to inform both the design of peacebuilding projects and peacebuilding strategies and to update the conflict context. The continuous updating of conflict analysis



has become the basis for project adaptation to the constantly changing conflict context (Church and Rogers 2006: 12).

The conflict context in a contested space is a player in that space and must be considered at the stages of project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 208). Regular conflict analysis and updates on changes in the conflict context makes this possible. However, it has been widely observed that regular conflict analysis is not carried out by the peacebuilding organisations. While inadequate funds are given as the main reason not to conduct regular conflict analysis by peacebuilding organisations, this is a weak defence. This observation highlights a lack of understanding regarding conflict analysis being the start of the monitoring and evaluation for any peacebuilding project taking place. It also clearly shows that conflict analysis is understood as a distinct process from other monitoring and evaluation processes. It further shows that peacebuilding organisations do not value the regular tracking of the external conflict factors, including conflict triggers and how they affect peacebuilding strategies on a continuous basis and making correct decisions on what to respond to (Holdaway and Simpson 2018: 43). It can also be seen that most peacebuilding organisations conduct conflict analysis to fulfil donor requirements and never see the need of doing it regularly. This is because there is a sustained emphasis on conflict analysis by donors and scholars, as indicated in different monitoring and evaluation guidelines.

The effectiveness of a peacebuilding project is judged by the extent to which it addresses one or more causes of the conflict identified by the conflict analysis (Ernstorfer 2019: 9). A lack of regular conflict analysis at the design and implementation stages of peacebuilding projects has a potential and negative impact on the effectiveness of peacebuilding and how it is measured. Therefore, conflict analysis is at the centre of any meaningful monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work.

#### **4.3.2 Design of Peacebuilding Projects**

Moving the conflict analysis to the project design is never a straightforward endeavour and is the most difficult challenge faced by peacebuilding organisations (Ernstorfer 2019: 29). The acknowledgement of this challenge in peacebuilding has led to authors and

practitioners providing some guidelines on how to translate conflict analysis into a peacebuilding project. They have strongly recommended two critical steps. The first step is prioritisation of the conflict drivers identified in conflict analysis (Ernstorfer 2019: 9-10; Pact 2019: 17). This is critical because often peacebuilding organisations are tempted to address all the conflict issues identified in the conflict analysis because they all appear important and require equal attention. The second step after identifying the conflict drivers to be addressed involves developing a project hierarchy, which includes the goals, objectives, and activities, and later developing a project theory (theory of change). The project hierarchy is further used to inform the design of a logical framework.

In the peacebuilding field, the better the design of a peacebuilding project, the more likely it is that peacebuilding organisations will gather clear evidence of its success and identify where improvement is needed. The design process is critical for a peacebuilding project because it forms the backbone of monitoring and evaluation. It is at this stage that the expected change from the peacebuilding project is agreed upon among different actors, peacebuilding strategies to bring about peace are identified, assumptions are explained, and success indicators are identified. These project features are critical for an effective monitoring and evaluation process designed to generate evidence on the effectiveness of a peacebuilding project, as explained in Subsections 4.3.2a to 4.3.2c.

**a. *Changes expected to be measured in peacebuilding work***

In peacebuilding, the change expected in the conflict context concerns the conflict parties' behaviour, practices, processes, relationships, and status. Generating the evidence on the change of behaviour, practices, and relationships is a challenging task for peacebuilding organisations. As noted by Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 2), in most cases, peacebuilding occurs in a deep-rooted conflict context, which, in most cases, spirals into renewed violence. It first requires the building of broken relationships and trust, which are not easily measured, and sustainable peace requires concerted efforts from different levels and interventions. As quoted by different authors and also explained in the theoretical framework chapter (Chapter Two), Lederach (2003: 23-26) identified four dimensions of change that are expected to be achieved from peacebuilding projects:

- *Personal* – these are changes desired for individuals. They include the cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and spiritual aspects of personal experiences in the conflict. They deal with conflict issues such as superiority, a lack of respect, fear of contact with other groups, prejudice, and biases.
- *Relational* – these are changes expected to happen during face-to-face relationships between conflict parties. The changes focus on communication patterns, decision making, conflict-handling mechanisms, and cooperation between the conflicting parties.
- *Structural* – these are changes effected on social conditions such as inequalities, disparities, the disadvantages of some groups, and procedural patterns. The changes involve access to resources and basic services, participation in decision making, fairness, and equality opportunities.
- *Cultural* – these are changes that happen to the patterns of life in group life. The aim is to alter the cultures that fuel conflict into a culture of peace.

The RPP project by the CDA has more or less condensed the four dimensions of change by John Paul Lederach into two: individual/relational and socio-political changes (CDA, 2016: 34). Breaking the expected change, as done by Lederach and the CDA, is significant for peacebuilding organisations to identify the changes whenever they happen and generate sufficient evidence. It also brings out the need for peacebuilders to identify actors under the four dimensions of change and ensure that appropriate strategies are developed to bring about the expected change.

It is important to note that the transformation of conflict to peace is never a linear process, as depicted in peacebuilding project theory (Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 17). Due to the conflict context, which is complex and dynamic, it is not always clear how the achievement of one dimension of change will lead to another. This is why (Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 1) advised that efforts should be done to develop peacebuilding strategies that would address prevailing conflict issues and produce change regarding the root causes of the conflict. They further noted that although the four

dimensions were interrelated, many peacebuilding projects that operated at the grassroots mostly achieved personal and relational changes.

It also assumes that change at the personal and relational levels will translate automatically and naturally into change at the structural and cultural levels. Lederach's argument and a lesson learned from RPP, in their examination of 27 case studies of peacebuilding projects, is that the interconnection between the individual/personal and socio-political change levels is never direct. The same applies in the sense that socio-political change does not always trickle down to individual/personal change (Anderson and Olson 2003: 48-49). While this vertical linkage between the change levels is important, other linkages, such as those between multiple interventions and sectors, are also important. Successful peacebuilding work is anchored on how change is linked across many facets and the effective management of several factors in the conflict context (Campbell 2008: 5; Peyton and Scicchitano 2017: 156). This multidirectional interconnectedness in the peacebuilding process corrects the belief by peacebuilders that the achievement of change in one level will naturally translate into the next level. Instead, it is a deliberate intention by peacebuilders to ensure that peacebuilding is multifaceted and multilayered and that it clearly states the assumption on how change will occur, given the current conflict context.

Even with clarity on the dimensions of change in conflict transformation, there is still a gap in measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. As noted in the theoretical framework in this study, peace has different meanings for different people. This implies that just as conflict is context specific, peace is also context specific. This complicates the generation of sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. The peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have not come to an agreement regarding the type of evidence that should be generated. There is a debate as to whether monitoring and evaluation should focus on project effectiveness, which refers to assessing whether a project has achieved the intended change with reference to the four dimensions of change, or peace effectiveness, which shows how the project has contributed to peace at the societal level, usually referred to as Peace Writ Large (CDA, 2016: 2). This debate is a constructive one because it touches on the investments and value added by

peacebuilding work to the conflict context and the extent to which the peacebuilding organisations are accountable. It further brings about the donor's key role in conflict transformation. In most cases, donors shape the amount of evidence to be generated for a given peacebuilding project by prescribing the type of information that they need.

**b.        *Theory of change in peacebuilding work***

The effectiveness of a peacebuilding project depends on a clear understanding of the ways that the change happens in the conflict context. This is done through a process called the *theory of change*. Generating information on conflict dynamics through conflict analysis is a step towards developing a clear theory of change for peacebuilding projects. From the monitoring and evaluation guidelines for peacebuilding by different organisations, emphasis has been placed on the need to conduct conflict analysis before developing a theory of change for every peacebuilding project. They further state that a peacebuilding project must have at least one theory of change indicating how the project will address a conflict driver (Church and Rogers 2006: 20-22; Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt 2007: 26-29; Ernstorfer 2019: 22). Many theories of change are implicit, unstated, and occur in people's daily lives. None are wrong or completely accurate on their own. Every day, they guide engagement in the conflict context either to bring about violence or peace. Developing a theory of change involves identifying activities and the conflict drivers that they address, and it is brought to the surface to make it explicit (Ober 2012: 10-11).

A theory of change is a clear explanation of how one predicts peacebuilding projects will bring about the change that it hopes to create in the conflict context (Ernstorfer 2019: 22). It must state the underlying causal links backed by evidence, experience, values, and beliefs. These assumptions are individual and rooted in people's personal cultural experience. The most important aspect of a theory of change is to clearly state the logical flow from the start to the level where the project will be deemed successful. Showing clear linkages between activities and the expected change, the linkage between one level of change and the next above it, and the linkages between the project and context and between multiple projects and sectors is critical for the success of any peacebuilding process (Renger *et al.* 2015: 119). The articulation of clear changes, assumptions, and

logical flow is important for the determination of a program's effectiveness because it forms the foundation for peacebuilding efforts and the basis for conducting monitoring and evaluation (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 21).

In practice, the development and application of a theory of change by the peacebuilding organisations has received different reactions. A positive criticism is that a theory of change is crafted clearly to address the assumption that social change occurs in a linear process as indicated in the program theory (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 45), and change in the social context does not happen as a result of one factor but a series of interdependent factors. In most cases, they do not happen in a linear but rather in a non-linear manner (Jabeen 2018: 262). This is significant for peacebuilding organisations to be aware of such that an extensive explanation is given on how change moves from the personal to cultural or micro to macro levels. The challenge that many peacebuilding organisations face is that they do not articulate a theory of change at the start of the project, or if they do, it is a weak one. This leaves the peacebuilding organisations with a vague sense of how and why the peacebuilding work is being done instead of a well-thought-out change process which forms the basis of measuring peace (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 21).

An experience of OECD is worth noting. Frustrated by the scarcity of evidence on the impact of the investment in peacebuilding, it developed the guidelines on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, pretested them for 2 years, and reviewed them, leading to the revised guidelines (OECD, 2012: 17) . The review findings showed that peacebuilding interventions were not addressing the core conflict drivers because they lacked strategic targeting and were based on incorrect assumptions in their theory of change (Kennedy-Chouane 2011: 101).

In most cases, theories of change is unclear and unstated due to a lack of clarity and strategic direction at the design stage (Kennedy-Chouane 2011: 104). The reason is that they are not anchored on conflict analysis. They do not clearly show the change that the peacebuilding project hopes to achieve, and many logic gaps exist when explaining the logical flow from immediate to intermediate to long-term change and from local- to national-level change (Kennedy-Chouane 2011: 101-104; Ernstorfer 2019: 29).

Another positive response to the application of theories of change is that they act in a complementary role to the logic models, such as the logical framework and results framework. For decades, logic models have been used in the development and humanitarian sectors, and this approach has been borrowed in the peacebuilding sector. The donors have routinely incorporated logic models as a requirement for funding peacebuilding projects (Peyton and Scicchitano 2017: 156). As much as the logic models are useful in programming, they have received much criticism for being restrictive and not showing the connection between a program and its context. Instead, the logic models retrofit the activities in a predetermined project, its results, and its assumptions into a tight and perfectly aligned logical framework. In peacebuilding, where the context is complex and constantly changing, this linear and rigid models do not work as expected (Renger *et al.* 2015: 119). Theories of change were brought to fill this gap of inflexibility within the logic models. Currently, a peacebuilding project must have a theory of change accompanied by a logical framework in cases where this is a funding condition.

Theories of change have also received negative criticism from peacebuilding organisations. One of the negative responses is that a theory of change is another donor requirement. As a result, a theory of change is never articulated at the onset of peacebuilding work if not required by the donor beforehand, and if developed, it is not used beyond the project design stage. This is the same as the case for the logical framework, which is used less in the implementation stage (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 21; Peyton and Scicchitano 2017: 156). A theory of change is also taken for granted by the peacebuilding organisations and is something that is carried out as an afterthought by many peacebuilding organisations. This criticism is a portrayal of the power imbalance between donors and peacebuilding organisations in relation to funding. It also portrays the ignorance of the peacebuilding organisations regarding the importance of theories of change which makes it easy for them to implement peacebuilding projects. The ignorance could involve a lack of capacity and skills or could be a mere attitude among the peacebuilding organisations.

Another negative reaction is that peacebuilding organisations do not link, or vaguely link, a theory of change with the monitoring and evaluation for the effectiveness of

peacebuilding. For most of them, the theory of change resurfaces at the evaluation stage after the project design stage. This is the stage when the external evaluator asks for the theory of change to test it. Ideally, the testing of the theory of change should be done throughout the peacebuilding project cycle since the conflict context is continuously changing, affecting the project work. A lack of regard for the theory of change as a monitoring and evaluation process has ripple effects on defining the peace indicators and type of monitoring and evaluation tools to be used to measure progress. It is significant to state that a theory of change is the foundation of the monitoring and evaluation process. If clearly articulated, it contains activities that can be revisited on a regular basis during the implementation. It also contains changes and the pathways to those changes, making it the source of an effective change monitoring process. It is important to point out that collecting evidence on a project's effectiveness will be easy if the change in the theory of change is clear and measurable.

Lastly, assumptions showing how change will occur are drawn from the conflict context. Evidence is rarely collected on assumptions during the project implementation, the reason being that conflict context monitoring is rarely done through conflict analysis, as stated in Section 4.3.1. On this front, if assumptions supporting the theory of change are tracked, they then become useful in context monitoring and making sense of how both the context and project influence each other.

Currently, there is a consensus among donors and peacebuilding organisations that all theories of change are important and necessary instruments in peacebuilding work. In an attempt to fill the capacity gap in peacebuilding organisations on how to develop theories of change, donors and international peacebuilding organisations have developed their guidelines. Most of guidelines indicates how to develop a theory of change specifically for peacebuilding projects(Ober 2012: 6-10).

**c. *Peace indicators used in measuring peacebuilding work***

The generation of evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of a peacebuilding project is guided by peace indicators. Although they do not specify change, the fact that they stem from the expected change that a project hopes to achieve makes them critical in



measuring peacebuilding. Peace indicators are the building blocks of an effective monitoring and evaluation process in peacebuilding projects (Pact 2019: 43 -47). As defined by Church and Rogers (2006: 44), Pact (2019: 43), and Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 37), they are quantitative or qualitative factors or variables that provide a simple and reliable means to reflect on and monitor the changes connected to a peacebuilding project. This standard definition of indicators is useful and significant for peacebuilding organisations. It gives room for them to make approximations when measuring change that has occurred, the degree to which it has occurred, and the period of time over which it has taken place.

Generating information for both quantitative and qualitative peace indicators gives, over time, a change story of the performance of peacebuilding projects (Ernstorfer 2019: 58; Pact 2019: 45). Different experiences in the peacebuilding field have also shown that peace indicators can give a true picture of a project's effectiveness when two points are observed. One, a few peace indicators are needed, and they are selected for each significant element on which one is hoping to collect information. Peacebuilding projects with many peace indicators do not guarantee that sufficient evidence will be generated. Instead, the peacebuilders are overburdened by generating too much information, which is not always useful because it does not focus on the appropriate element of the peacebuilding project. Two, taking a mixed methods approach when thinking about the development of peace indicators is critical. This thinking informs the development of a mixture of quantitative and qualitative peace indicators to measure the effectiveness of a peacebuilding project. This mixture has proved to provide a more rounded picture of the type of change that a peacebuilding project is seeking to bring about in the conflict context.

An ongoing debate among peacebuilding organisations and donors concerns the use of standardised peace indicators, as advocated by international peacebuilding organisations such as the UNDP and USAID, and context peace indicators, which are locally generated from the context and are commonly known as everyday peace indicators. Those in favour of the context specific indicators argue that the standard peace indicators are donor-driven and quantitative in nature. These types of peace indicators are difficult to reconcile with local realities and cannot be locally validated (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 46). This is

an important argument because peacebuilding is context specific. Therefore, the generalisation of peace indicators drawn from the experiences in a particular context to any other conflict context is not appropriate. They also criticise the standard indicators as being overly reliant on quantitative information in evaluating post-conflict peacebuilding, which yields incorrect impressions of the impact of the peacebuilding (Denskus 2012: 149). Peacebuilding work is complex and dynamic and operates in a social political fluid context. In this situation, quantitative peace indicators may not give much information on the effectiveness of a project. This weakness of the quantitative peace indicators has been addressed by advocating for the use of qualitative indicators to complement them in measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding (Pact 2019: 45).

Over the years, there has been traction in the application of everyday peace indicators in peacebuilding work. In his study, Mac Ginty (2013: 56) argued that all peace indicators move beyond the data to cross-community dialogue in the peacebuilding context. This is because they are generated through a participatory process among the conflicting local communities and are context specific and culturally acceptable. In most cases, people in conflict are left out in the monitoring and evaluation throughout the project cycle, including in the development of peace indicators (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 46). As opposed to standard indicators, which are metric and technically sound, everyday peace indicators are generated by the people in the conflict settings and are qualitative, bringing out the richness of the evidence devoid of top-down metrical peace indicators that the international community advocates. Another argument based on the practical application of the everyday peace indicators is that they have an element of conflict transformation. Bringing the members of the conflict groups into a conversation on expected peacebuilding outcomes and indicators improves intragroup and intergroup relationships through an understanding and awareness of each other's perceptions and positions, demystifying stereotypes and prejudices where they exist (Mac Ginty 2013: 61).

#### ***d. Monitoring and evaluation plan***

For an effective monitoring and evaluation process for measuring peacebuilding projects, several conditions must be fulfilled. They include defining clear and measurable objectives, developing a theory of change and corresponding peace indicators,

conducting a baseline study before the intervention, and developing a data management plan. These elements are put together into a monitoring and evaluation plan. This is done at the design stage to guide the regular collection of information based on peace indicators (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 5).

The monitoring and evaluation plan is the cornerstone of measuring any project's effectiveness (Ernstorfer 2019: 38). It is a blueprint of how to generate evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding project and should be updated regularly as new information is generated on the complex environment and project's progress. Although this is a critical element of the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work, the ownership by the peacebuilding organisations is hardly present. This is partly because it is one of the donor conditions to have a monitoring and evaluation plan before the funds are given but, more importantly, because the peacebuilders cannot connect this plan with the generation of evidence on the effectiveness of the project. As pointed out by Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 3), the peacebuilders are dedicated to completing the proposed work and barely consider it a priority to generate evidence on the change that the project is making in the conflict context.

#### **4.3.3 Measuring Peacebuilding Work**

Measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding is no longer a choice but a legitimate demand from the donors, affected population, and other related stakeholders. Denskus (2012: 148-150) stated that measuring peacebuilding is the logical and suitable action for peacebuilding organisations. It concerns generating data guided by peace indicators to answer questions regarding the extent to which expected peacebuilding outcomes have been achieved. Two concerns have been raised by peacebuilding organisations, practitioners, and scholars regarding measuring peacebuilding. First, the concern is whether measuring the success of peacebuilding should be focused on peace attained as a result of a project or peace processes leading to peace conditions. As described by Galtung (1969: 168), in his ground breaking study on the types of violence, it is clear that there is no universal definition of peace. Therefore, working to attain peace as a state is not possible because it does not occur and cannot be the goal of peacebuilding. Esser and Vanderkamp (2013: 45) advised that monitoring and evaluation should focus on

peacebuilding processes rather than peace as a state. The second concern is the disagreement about the level at which monitoring and evaluation should be carried out in peacebuilding. Költzow (2013: 5) stated that there were two types of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding. One involves the peacebuilding project's effectiveness. This is where evidence is generated on the extent to which the project has achieved its desired peacebuilding outcomes. The second one involves the monitoring of the overall peace development in the country or region based on general indicators. This is what she referred to as peace effectiveness. As discovered by scholars such as Paffenholz, Abu-Nimer and McCandless (2005: 2) and Költzow (2013: 5), most of the monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work focus on micro and meso levels of change, which constitute the project's effectiveness. Little effort is directed into measuring peace at the macro level. Measuring the interconnectedness of the project activities and other interventions in the conflict context has also been given little attention.

The above observations on measuring peacebuilding work are significant for peacebuilding organisations, as they point out that currently, the measuring of peacebuilding depends on the level at which an organisation has decided to intervene. The observations are also significant because they show that the current monitoring and evaluation processes have given more attention to project effectiveness and disregarded peace effectiveness and connections with other peacebuilding interventions in the conflict context. They also explain why the evidence on a project's effectiveness in generating change at the personal and relational levels in most cases does not have any impact on the structural and cultural levels.

From the literature review on measuring peacebuilding, there is a strong recommendation to generate the information on at least three areas of the project. The first area involves tracking the project activities. This is common and easily carried out in all peacebuilding projects. Tracking the implementation of the activities is easy and always happens on time (Church and Rogers 2006: 87). The significance of implementation monitoring is that it accounts for the activities implemented, the budgets allocated, and the outputs from these activities, as indicated in the project work plans. It is easy because this stage of the peacebuilding work is under the direct control of the peacebuilding organisation.

Generating the information of the change created by the project is the second area of project monitoring and the most important and challenging task for a peacebuilding organisation. While donors appreciate the evidence generated on project activities, the demand for information on the achievement of the peacebuilding outcomes regarding the individual, relational, structural, and cultural changes is their focus. This suggests the need for critical thinking on how best to generate information that shows the effectiveness of a project or the success of a project. From previous studies by scholars and practitioners, the generation of the evidence on how a project has been successful is challenging for various reasons. One reason is that, in most cases, peacebuilding projects do not have baseline information on the current situation. This is common in the peacebuilding field, as in the development and humanitarian sectors (Bush and Duggan 2013: 13; Ernstorfer 2019: 49). Baseline information plays a critical role in measuring how effective a peacebuilding project has been by comparing the starting point and the end of the project. Peacebuilders frequently confuse conflict analysis with a baseline survey. For clarity, conflict analysis mainly focuses on understanding the conflict being addressed and occurs before or as part of the project design process. On the other hand, the baseline survey is the starting point of a peacebuilding project from which a comparison is made, and it is carried out at the start of the project implementation. The main focus is establishing the baseline information on the peace indicators regarding the expected change (Church and Rogers 2006: 87; Ernstorfer 2019: 49-52). The confusion has led to peacebuilding organisations conducting conflict analysis and avoiding baseline surveys and, sometimes, neither are carried out.

The second reason why generating evidence on the effectiveness of a peacebuilding project is challenging is the lack of clarity on the expected change that the project hopes to achieve and a clear articulation of the theory of change. As noted by Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (2012: 17), many peacebuilding projects have poorly developed objectives and weak theories of change, which eventually affect the type of peace indicators used in measuring peacebuilding work. This weakness runs across the project implementation and affects the type of information generated. The third reason is the emphasis by donors on generating quantitative information to demonstrate the project's effectiveness. This has led to peacebuilding organisations putting more effort in

generating quantitative information based on quantitative peace indicators. This is contradictory because peacebuilding work takes place in complex and fluid contexts that cannot be adequately measured using the quantitative indicators.

As stated in Section 4.3.5, once conflict analysis has been conducted, rarely do peacebuilding organisations engage in the continuous generation of information on the conflict context. The monitoring of the conflict context is key and critical in shaping the project implementation. The generation of the conflict dynamics on a regular basis is the third type of peacebuilding project monitoring and evaluation that should be carried out. It focuses on collecting information on events that pose a risk and present new opportunities to continue addressing the conflict identified in the conflict analysis. The tracking of the external factors can actually inform one on which peace-promoting strategies one needs to adopt. Despite the critical role played by the conflict context, most peacebuilding projects give less attention to the contextual changes. Neglecting the routine updating of the conflict analysis process has direct effects on the project's effectiveness. The conflict context is ever-changing and its influence on the project cannot be accounted for if there is no information collected. It is also in the conflict context where unintended and unexpected peacebuilding outcomes occur, and if context monitoring is not done, peacebuilding outcomes are left out when generating evidence on the program's effectiveness.

Many methods of monitoring conflict context have been suggested in guidelines for the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work. They include conducting interviews with key informants such as local leaders, civil servants, and local organisations living in the context. These key informants have access to information and receive reports on the occurrences in the context, whether formally or informally. Suggestions on the tools include conducting surveys and reviews of secondary reports such as newspapers, blogs, and reports from academic institutions (Church and Rogers 2006: 39).

Measuring peacebuilding in the three ways stated above is practical and effective. However, it has been acknowledged as the most challenging practice among peacebuilding organisations. Suggestions have been made by scholars and practitioners on how to overcome the challenge, but the challenge still persists. One of the practical

suggestions is the use of a mixed methods approach as an effective means in the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding. Mixed methods have been proven to address the issue of collecting rich qualitative information that matches the information needs in the peacebuilding field and capturing unintended outcomes of peacebuilding. They also allow for the use of emergent monitoring and evaluation approaches that are flexible to adopt as a project evolves and its context changes (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 6; Morton *et al.* 2012: 156; Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 45; Blum 2016: 58). The use of participatory approach in monitoring and evaluation has also gained traction in peacebuilding. Coupled with mixed methods, participatory approaches have effectively enabled peacebuilders to observe in real time and pre-empt any unintended effects of a peacebuilding project. Participatory approaches also serve as a catalyst for transforming relationships of power (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 257).

Due to awareness of the complexity of measuring peacebuilding work in a conflict context, some complexity-aware monitoring approaches have also been designed and some have been tested. USAID has been undertaking more innovative approaches that consider a high level of flexibility and constant adaptation as required in highly complex settings (Britt and Patsalides 2013). Although some complexity-aware monitoring and evaluation approaches have been developed, little evidence exists to show how effective they are in generating the evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. These approaches include outcome mapping, outcome harvesting, the Most Significant Change, sentinel indicators, monitoring progress towards impact, stakeholders' feedback, and development evaluation (Ernstorfer 2019: 34). However, they have the potential to be used in peacebuilding work because they are qualitative and participatory in nature. Although these monitoring and evaluation approaches have shown improvement in gathering evidence on the effectiveness of projects operating in a complex environment, they are still founded on the principle of a linear, logical, and result framework. They measure predetermined and expected change and hold assumptions that project activities result in expected change.

#### **4.3.4 Evaluation of Peacebuilding Work**

Evaluation is one of the instruments used by donors to determine the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects over the years. Much research work has shown that donors emphasise evaluation rather than monitoring (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 45). The obvious reason is that donors allocate funds mostly through the budgets of peacebuilding projects, and sometimes they directly fund external evaluations. Donors also give attention to evaluation because, over the years, it has been used as an accountability tool for donor funding as opposed to generating evidence for learning how peacebuilding work addresses conflict. It has also been observed that the donors insist on external evaluation because they have their own interests. Among these interests is the politics involved in funding dynamics. Many donors want to show their sources of funds and the successes of the peacebuilding projects that they have been supporting. This dynamic has resulted in some donors accepting only positive evaluation findings as a confirmation of a project's effectiveness (Morton *et al.* 2012: 156). The donors' involvement in appointing the external evaluator is a way of controlling the outcome of an evaluation. In some instances where donors pay for the evaluation, they do not expect to have much evidence about failures in the projects that they support. It is a form of direct control of the external evaluators, to the extent that the evaluators feel obliged to look at the positive side of the project because they have been paid by funders and, therefore, they are working for them. This is almost like an official instruction from the donors to the external evaluators.

Although in most cases the external evaluation is genuinely commissioned by donor and peacebuilding organisations, several challenges are experienced that constrain its scope and ability to generate sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. One of the most cited reasons is overreliance on a logical framework in the design, implementation, and evaluation by the peacebuilding organisations. Within the principles of the results-based management approach from which the logical framework is borrowed, a peacebuilding project is supposed to be implemented within the premise of a results-based and logical framework. As observed in this literature review, logic models are best used in the project design, but if strictly followed during the implementation, much evidence is missed because the information generated must show



the achievement of the expected change. The evaluation exercise becomes mechanically constrained to answer questions on whether what was anticipated by the project was achieved.

Methodological and logistical challenges have also become evident in conflict zones where active violence is occurring. In the context of evaluation, the conflict context refers to contested space. It is the field within which the evaluation will be conceived and implemented. The conflict context affects the logistics and methodology of the evaluation, but decisions about methodology and logistical arrangements may also affect the conflict dynamics (Bush and Duggan 2013: 8; Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 210). In the context spaces, evaluation is inherently an explicit political event (Roholt and Baizerman 2012: 208). Politics play out when determining who should participate in the evaluation, if it is not conflict sensitive, the access to stakeholders, biases to best sites, the pressure on evaluators to produce suitable findings, and the use of inappropriate data collection methods (Bush and Duggan 2013: 7; Chigas, Church and Corlazzoli 2014: 17-18).

#### **4.3.5 Learning and Adaptation in Peacebuilding Work**

There is emerging emphasis on monitoring and evaluation being considered a learning process rather than merely being a process of measuring results and accountability. To give weight to learning as a peacebuilding process, Esser and Vanderkamp (2013: 45) and Church and Rogers (2006: 5) stated that learning raises knowledge and improves understanding on new ways to perceive others in the conflict, new ways of engaging others, and new options and alternatives for acting differently as the conflict is being addressed. The learning practice that happens in peacebuilding work is not like the learning that occurs in learning institutions. Church and Rogers (2006: 7) noted two ways in which learning happens in peacebuilding. One, it happens where conflict actors are brought together for joint participation in the project activities, such as training, participatory workshops, and dialogues. In this type of training, according to Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 8), time and funds are allocated by donors and peacebuilding organisations. It became part of peacebuilding processes towards the expected change from the project implementation. It involves the project target actors and contributes to peacebuilding outcomes. Two, it involves the learning done by

peacebuilders. This type of learning is mostly neglected by peacebuilders themselves. It is the learning generated by the peacebuilders reflecting on their experiences.

Although significant to the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects, it is given little attention by peacebuilding organisations as well as donors. The experience of peacebuilders, which includes the personal dimension of living and working in conflicts, is left out in discussions on how peacebuilding work can be improved (Denskus 2012: 150). Ernstorfer (2019: 46) pointed out that reflecting and learning from the emerging evidence generated by the monitoring and evaluation process is primary. Reflection and analysis of this emerging data informs peacebuilders' learning (Duggan 2012: 203). What is lacking is the peacebuilding organisations making the time to conduct the analysis and make sense of the data and their experiences to inform learning conversations. In the current monitoring and evaluation practice, reporting takes precedence over reflection since reporting ensures that there is continuous funding (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 47).

Learning can be drawn from contextual changes, the implementation process, and achievement of the expected project results (Pact 2019: 75). In most cases, learning in these three areas happen in an ad hoc manner, resulting in a lack of benefits from such learnings. This reinforces the assumption that peacebuilding projects are implemented in the way that they are designed, and no change is required or happens during implementation. This is not true because peacebuilding work is carried out in a conflict context where unexpected events, interactions, and social change occur. In addition, the introduction of the peacebuilding project into the context naturally creates unexpected changes in the context, and finally, the context is dependent on other related context dynamics. This, therefore, calls for setting aside time to reflect on contextual changes and the project dynamics, which results in making adjustments to the project (Church and Rogers 2006: 7).

Developing an adaptive change process capable of adapting as the conflict context continuously changes is one of the elements of a successful peacebuilding learning process. The adaptation involves actions carried out in response to learning. It demonstrates that lessons and experiences have been learned and applied. The responsiveness to the conflict dynamics as a result of learning becomes a strength but

not a lack of planning to follow up. As highlighted above regarding the learning, the adaptation is done in an ad hoc manner. This means that little attention is given to ensure that the project copes with uncertainty brought about by changing conditions and unpredictable contexts (Pact 2019: 74).

#### **4.4 Strengths of the Current Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Work**

Although monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field is an emerging phenomenon, significant progress has been made, which is worth highlighting. One of the strengths is the commitment for support for the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding by donors. The commitment and interest have increased significantly among international organisations such as the OECD, USAID, and FCDO. Their commitment has been demonstrated by their support in the development of new monitoring and evaluation guidelines, developing rigorous impact evaluations, and linking evaluations to funding decisions (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 43). This focus by donors to show the effectiveness of peacebuilding has also led to the quest for better and appropriate monitoring and evaluation processes that will help in realising why peacebuilding works and why it does not work according to the plan (Denskus 2012: 148).

As mentioned above in Section 4.2, tension has been present between donors and peacebuilding organisations regarding measuring peacebuilding work. However, with time, they have come to an agreement that there is a need to generate evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. This, then, reveals the willingness of donors and peacebuilding organisations to have a robust monitoring and evaluation process. This interest for an effective monitoring and evaluation process, coupled with the commitment by donors to invest in such processes, is a significant shift in how peacebuilding works and how the overall investment in the peacebuilding field is made. Currently, there are no generic monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field; those that do exist are rare and have only been tested in small-scale peacebuilding work (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 11).

As peacebuilding organisations continue to develop and improve different monitoring and evaluation processes, it has been widely acknowledged by authors and scholars that measuring peacebuilding is challenging. The challenges are real, complex, and longstanding. They have caused peacebuilding organisations to struggle to show evidence of peacebuilding for decades (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 43). The acknowledgement of this challenge faced by peacebuilding organisations is a positive step towards strengthening the existing monitoring and evaluation processes to enable the peacebuilding organisations to generate the much sought-after evidence for accountability to donors and learning how peacebuilding transforms conflict in different contexts.

An effective monitoring and evaluation process is a strand of the peacebuilding project that cuts across the project from the start to completion. Equal attention should be given by peacebuilding organisations to monitoring and evaluation aspects at the design, implementation, and completion stages. This appreciation has led to the development of guidelines on how to conduct monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding work. Both donors and international peacebuilding organisations and networks have developed guidelines that articulate how monitoring and evaluation should be carried out. Although guidelines adhere to principles of results-based monitoring and evaluation, they are a step towards developing a robust monitoring and evaluation process. The case applies to conflict analysis, as discussed earlier in Section 4.3.1, and approximately 15 conflict analysis methodologies have been developed by different organisations to guide peacebuilding organisations and other peacebuilding actors in conducting effective conflict analysis. The development of standard methodologies, guidelines and their practical application indicate that organisations are in the process of discovering effective monitoring and evaluation approaches for peacebuilding work.

As noted in the discussions above, peacebuilding organisations perceive the development of measurable objectives, a clear theory of change, a monitoring and evaluation plan, and a logical framework as donor requirements for funding. Despite this perception, there is an appreciation that peacebuilders have developed the capacity to develop these project

features. They include designing monitoring and evaluation plans which are critical in guiding the generation of evidence during project implementation.

Finally, peacebuilding organisations have effectively generated evidence for peacebuilding activities carried out, funds used, and direct outputs from the activities. This has never been a challenge. The current emphasis is on generating evidence on how peacebuilding is making a difference in targeting the beneficiaries and the conflict context where it is being implemented. This means that the peacebuilding projects must be designed to address the root causes of the conflict. Attention has now been given to the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding outcomes and conflict dynamics. These two aspects have been a challenge for peacebuilding organisations.

Initiatives have been taken although in a limited scope on the use of more creative, adaptive, and responsive monitoring and evaluation approaches, such as process tracking, outcome mapping, and development evaluation, which are rooted in complex adaptive systems thinking. These approaches focus on how individuals and organisations interact, relate, and evolve within the larger social ecosystem while recognising the multiple chains of dependencies within the complex conflict context. Bush and Duggan (2013: 62) and Ernstorfer (2019: 62) have cited that there has been limited practical experience that relates learning processes on translating systems approaches during the analysis and design to systemic monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field. In addition, the use of adaptive programming and systems thinking, especially in combination, is still relatively new in peacebuilding, and documentation of the experience has only started recently. Systematic analysis of the monitoring and evaluation experience in projects that apply adaptive management is yet to be done.

#### **4.5 Weaknesses of the Current Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Work**

Peacebuilding takes place in rapidly changing and shifting conflict settings. To generate meaningful evidence on peacebuilding and outcomes, a real-time monitoring and evaluation process is needed. In the conflict settings, peacebuilding organisations have to be creative and continuously re-plan based on new information obtained from the

project implementation and contextual changes. Peacebuilding is carried out in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable environments where systems, dynamics, actors, and relations are constantly changing, and causal paths are not always linear and predictable.

The current major challenge of monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work is that they are linear and predictable, and they measure changes that were designed to be achieved. Despite the recognition of the limitation that the complexity of peacebuilding cannot be captured in neat causal chains organised in a traditional logical framework, donors and peacebuilding organisations continue to cling to traditional top-down, linear, and poorly adapted methods of monitoring and evaluation (Duggan 2012: 200; Bush and Duggan 2013: 15; Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 43). Logical framework assumptions are made in a manner that is linear, logical, and involving a cause-and-effect relationship between the input, outputs, outcome, and impact of any project. In reality and in peacebuilding, the change process is complex and can be circular, back and forth, and sometimes the process can be at a standstill (Lederach 2003: 39).

Little effort has been directed towards trying to develop a fit-for-purpose monitoring and evaluation process that is organic, process oriented, community controlled, responsive, and non-linear (Denskus 2012: 151). This is probably because donor conditions for funding must adhere to standardised linear approaches to evaluation which place emphasis on tangible, short-term outputs on which it is easy to report (Bush and Duggan 2013: 12). Many monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field continue to prioritise linear and logical frameworks over adaptive frameworks, linear thinking over systemic thinking, and rigidity over flexibility (Ernstorfer 2019: 72).

Another major gap is that many monitoring and evaluation processes focus on how successfully a project has achieved its intended outcomes, with little attention being given to identifying unintended outcomes. They are designed to capture the success of the project through the fulfilment of predetermined targets with a focus on tracking what was originally promised or expected in a linear pattern. In most cases, evidence is generated for predetermined outcomes or goals within the theory of change (Bamberger, Tarsilla and Hesse-Biber 2016: 263).

Unintended outcomes are positive and negative effects of the project other than those identified within the theory of change. They are direct or indirect naturally occurring by-products of complex systems in the conflict context where the peacebuilding project is introduced. They cannot be avoided or denied, but they have an impact on the project implementation course (Jabeen 2016: 144). Although they are viewed as unintended consequences of poor planning, error, or ignorance by peacebuilding organisations, unintended outcomes do not always arise from poor planning or implementation in peacebuilding work. It is important to understand that in a complex social system, it is not possible for a single project to produce a single change as assumed during the project design. A series of changes result from a single intervention. It is important to bear in mind that peacebuilding projects are subsystems in their own right. When introduced into a complex conflict-context system, interactions occur and produce both intended and unintended outcomes, which are mostly completely unforeseen (Jabeen 2016: 144; Jabeen 2018: 263).

Although it has been acknowledged that unintended outcomes occur in peacebuilding work, limited effort to develop methods to capture them has been witnessed. Most evaluation guidelines have not addressed how to capture unintended outcomes. This is because of their overemphasis on global quantitative methods which neglects explorative and innovative qualitative methods. In a study conducted by Lemon and Pinet (2018: 253 - 256), by reviewing and analysing 96 evaluations completed between 2013 and 2016 in 24 countries across Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and north African regions by Search for Common Ground, unintended outcomes were found in approximately 18% of evaluations in 2014, 25% in 2015, and 46% in 2016. This pattern was not due to any policy guidelines but due to the improvement of the monitoring and evaluation culture within the organisation. A lack of capturing the unintended outcomes results in the loss of a large amount of data on changes resulting from interventions in complex and conflict-affected contexts.

Although there is limited effort from donors and peacebuilding organisations to capture unintended outcomes, some monitoring and evaluation approaches have been suggested to help in documenting them. In a research article, Jabeen (2018: 269) recognised the

importance of prolonged engagement at the intervention sites rather than brief visits conducted by the evaluators. This engagement is vital because it allows the evaluators to interact with various people affected by the conflict and obtain positive and negative feedback on how the conflict and project have affected them. However, this is dependent on the budget and time allocated to the evaluator (Bamberger, Tarsilla and Hesse-Biber 2016: 157). Secondly, process monitoring of the ongoing project can help in identifying the unintended outcomes. In other studies carried out by Jabeen (2018: 145 -149) and Lemon and Pinet (2018: 257 - 258) on the measuring of unintended outcomes, the authors have given highlights of different qualitative approaches. They include social impact assessment, goal-free evaluation, Siebers' framework, Sherril's two-step approach, theory-based evaluation, development evaluation, agile evaluation, conflict sensitivity, outcome mapping and harvesting, and participatory monitoring. All these approaches are organic, emergent, and qualitative and are able to capture changes in complex systems.

The monitoring and evaluation culture among peacebuilders presents a major challenge in the development and application of the monitoring and evaluation process in peacebuilding. As stated by Holdaway and Simpson (2018: 25), monitoring is only as good as those who carry it, therefore, the capacity of the peacebuilders and attitudes play a large role in generating evidence to show the effectiveness of the peacebuilding work. Where evidence is appreciated and seen as a resource, better evidence of a higher quality is generated. Not only is it important to have a culture of appreciating evidence but also a culture of learning and reflection and feeling that there is a safe space for discussing failures and successes.

Methodological challenges have adverse effects on the amount and quality of the evidence produced by the peacebuilders. Conflict context changes can take any direction, and, in most cases, violence erupts, making it difficult for peacebuilders to collect the information. Unpredictable changes in a context involve change taking different directions at unpredictable rates and sequences and triggering new circumstances. Conflict zones are dangerous places, and collecting data in these areas is problematic or impossible (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 27). This is because it poses security risks to the peacebuilders, hinders access to the target actors, and promotes reliance on



third-party sources of information (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 214). As noted by Holdaway and Simpson (2018: 90), these challenges affect the reliability of the information collected. In the long run, additional costs are incurred for the physical security and access of stakeholders, reworking of the project work, and restructuring of an institution if necessary (Elkins 2006: 5).

Exclusion of the local actors in the monitoring and evaluation process is another gap that exists in peacebuilding work. External evaluation ignores the local actors despite them being the primary stakeholders (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 26). People in conflict have a stake not only in the project activities but also in the generation of the evidence of change achieved. As stated by Mac Ginty (2013: 59-62), communities in conflict are more engaged in the activities of the conflict assessment, implementation, and evaluation stages than in generating information during the monitoring stage. This has turned monitoring into an extractive process as opposed to a process that empowers the people in conflict, generates lessons and uptake by communities, creates more understanding of other conflicting parties based on the discussions, and creates sustainable relationships. The use of participatory approaches has helped overcome the challenge of devising culturally appropriate evaluation methods and debunk the idea that the evaluation process is a Western practice that misses the nuances of cultural variation across the conflict zones.

Due to the complex nature of how peacebuilding work takes place in the conflict situations, there has been a debate among peacebuilding organisations on the attribution gap (Chigas, Church and Corlazzoli 2014: 20). Conflict contexts are complex with a multitude of uncontrollable external factors constantly impacting the project implementation. Peacebuilding processes also transcend spatial levels, involve numerous actors, and build on multiple activities occurring simultaneously. Therefore, it is difficult to single out the impact of peacebuilding against the backdrop of large external factors playing a role in the conflict. It is significant to take note that years of peacebuilding work can be lost after only 1 day's incidents of violence between the conflicting groups, resulting in an immense loss in ensuring that dialogue happens. Peacebuilding processes in violently divided societies are slow-moving, and short donor timeframes are inept at capturing their

results, hence monitoring and evaluation have been reduced to ticking a box (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2009: 25; Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 44).

## **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter is at the centre of this research study because it is meant to critically describe the current monitoring and evaluation processes. It is important to describe how peacebuilding organisations conduct the monitoring and evaluation of their peacebuilding projects. Generally, due to donor requirements, they conduct conflict analysis and develop theories of change. They also develop a monitoring and evaluation plan consisting of peace indicators and data collection procedures. As stated in this chapter, baseline information is rarely generated at the start of a project. This affects the certainty in justifying the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. It is important to highlight that there are strengths found within the current monitoring and evaluation processes.

They include the commitment and agreement by donors and peacebuilding organisations to develop a robust monitoring and evaluation process for peacebuilding work and guidelines that have been developed to support the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects. There are also complexity-aware monitoring and evaluation approaches, such as outcome mapping, developmental evaluation, and process tracking, that are being tested. While the strengths can be built on, weaknesses inherent in the current monitoring and evaluation processes make this difficult for peacebuilding organisations. The main weakness is the resistance of donor and peacebuilding organisations to abandon the results-based, linear, and logical monitoring and evaluation processes, which, in this chapter, have been described as facing difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. The processes do not capture unexpected changes and exclude the local communities affected by the conflict. The study was focused on finding a fit-for-purpose monitoring and evaluation process that addresses these weaknesses, as described in Chapters Seven to Ten of this thesis. The following chapter concerns the research methodology that guided the research process.

## **PART III – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **CHAPTER FIVE**

#### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

##### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter outlines the research design of this study and its appropriateness. The chapter also describes the action research extensively as the research design adopted for this study. It further describes the peacebuilding organisations as the target population, how they were selected, and how they participated in the exploratory survey. It also explains how the action research was implemented and evaluated. The data collection methods and measuring instruments are described, and the validity and reliability of the study are also described. The chapter further sets out the delimitations of the study and describes how ethical considerations were observed during the research. The chapter ends with the limitations of the study and the conclusion.

##### **5.2 Research Design**

The research design is the overall structure or procedure for an investigation or inquiry. It is broadly categorised into data collection and analysis approaches (Leedy and Ormrod 2015: 92). This study adopted the action research design with an inclination towards the qualitative method (O'Leary 2013: 147). Action research, by nature, is a qualitative inquiry. It starts with a problem and the theory is developed in the process. Some of the reasons that support action research as a qualitative research approach are the use of qualitative data collection methods, being context specific, and the generation of qualitative data (MacDonald 2012: 34).

The action research approach mostly uses qualitative data collection methods to collect data from the diagnosis of the problem to the evaluation of the results of the action. The data collection methods include document reviews, interviews, observations, focus group discussions, the observation of participants, field notes, participatory mapping,

storytelling, diaries, and logs (MacDonald 2012: 41-42; Jull, Giles and Graham 2017: 3). These methods have been discussed in detail in Section 5.6. The qualitative data is generated from these data collection methods and is subjected to qualitative data analysis.

The action research, being a qualitative study design, is context specific. The action research can be implemented in an organisation, community, or institution (Bargal 2008: 20-24). This means that the problem solving, and action undertaken by the research participants are relevant to the context. The findings from this type of study cannot be generalised to any other population outside the research area. It is only the lessons learned that can be drawn from the research findings, but the same type of research cannot be replicated in a different site. This is why this research fits appropriately into the category of qualitative research.

### **5.2.1 Action Research Design**


Action research was conceptualised by Kurt Lewin in the 1940s and implemented with marginalised groups in the United States of America (USA) who were experiencing racial discrimination. The research involved these groups in realising and making decisions regarding the prevailing situation that they were experiencing. Lewin further introduced the action research to the UK in the early 1970s (Carr 2006: 423; Jull, Giles and Graham 2017: 3). Action research continued to spread to other countries. For instance, in the 1970s, Paulo Freire worked with illiterate non-Brazilians in South America on hierarchical education and advocated for equality among the marginalised groups using the action research method (Khanlou and Peter 2005: 187). Recently, action research has gained prominence in the feminism movement, with a call to reduce social ranks based on gender in society (Helskog 2014: 10).

Action research has been conducted in different fields such as organisational development, education, health, community development, and political science. Currently, it has gained traction in peacebuilding and conflict management. It is from this diverse application that action research has been given different names depending on the issue being researched, participants, and contexts. It has been called participatory action

research, participatory research, emancipatory research, and development action research, among other terms. The similarity in all these categories of action research is that an action must be taken, and the participation of the affected people becomes part of the research process (Glassman and Erdem 2014: 207-210).

Amidst many outstanding oppositions from the scientific research community, action research continues to grow, but not as expected. Action research integrates knowledge generation and actualising social change. The main focus of action research is solving the immediate and practical problem being faced by the group, community, or institutions and, at the same time, producing new knowledge from the action and results achieved (Bortoletto 2017: 486-487). This, therefore, means that the action and generation of new knowledge is carried out at the same time by the people affected by the practical problems.

Action research has no universal definition and approach, probably because it is an umbrella term for many activities in different fields and due to the disparities in its application. However, Lewin's definition of action research has remained a reference point for action research practitioners in all fields only with slight differences. It states that action research "consisted in analysis, fact-finding, conceptualisation, planning, execution, more fact-finding or evaluation; and then a repetition of this whole circle of activities; indeed a spiral of such circles" (Dickens and Watkins 1999: 128). Figure 5.1 depicts a model of the action research cycle.



**Figure 5.1** Model of the action research cycle.

Figure 5.1 summarises both Lewin's definition and the definitions of other action research practitioners into four phases, which include problem identification, action planning, action taking, and evaluation, as described shortly (Glassman and Erdem 2014: 209; Helskog 2014: 10). These cyclic phases of action research happen in a spiralling, recursive, and interactive manner in solving the problem. The number of cycles depends on the problem that the action research is directed to solve. The cycle can take a short time or be a long process, as it has happened with feminism movements. The subsequent cycles after the first cycle are never repeated during the research. The four phases of the action research cycle are:

- *Problem identification:* Action research starts with people's felt needs that are being experienced on a daily basis in a particular context and that need immediate attention. The context can be at an organisational, community, or institutional level (Bargal 2008: 20-24). The articulation of the problem is done through a systematic process of collecting and analysing data from available sources, either formally or

informally, with the affected people. Data collection methods such as interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, and observations, among other methods, are used (MacDonald 2012: 3; Jull, Giles and Graham 2017: 3). Problem identification is the start of creating awareness among the affected people, where they need to develop practical solutions to the problem that they are facing. The research problem can emerge from the ordinary meetings between the researchers and the group/community, or the researchers can perceive a problem and approach the community/group in addressing it (Khanlou and Peter 2005: 188).

- *Action planning:* The participatory collection and analysis of the information enables the participants and researchers to develop solutions and then package them into an action. It is important to highlight that the action to be undertaken stems from the information generated on the problem. During this phase, a set of specific activities, the targets, and implementation schedule are developed (McNiff 2017: 136-137).
- *Action taking:* This is the critical phase and focus of the action research. The theory of change is developed and tested around the action (Dick, Stringer and Huxham 2009: 6). The researcher and participants jointly take part in conducting the action to solve the problem or bring about change. They act on the conditions that the participants are facing to bring the desired change.
- *Evaluation:* This is an assessment of the results of the action undertaken. The evaluation provides an opportunity for participants to reflect on the process of implementing the action and assess the results of the action. It is also an opportunity to plan for the next action informed by the new knowledge acquired during action implementation (Bargal 2008: 17).

From the above description of the cyclic process, it can be concluded that an action research study consists of planning, acting, evaluation, and then taking further new action. During this spiralling and interactive process, there are three invisible but critical processes taking place to ensure that the action research achieves its main purpose of generating knowledge and bringing about the desired social change. One of the processes is participation and collaboration between the researcher and participants. The

participation element of the action research separates it from the scientific research design. Participation is important for three reasons. One, action research becomes a joint venture between an external researcher and the people due to a practical concern for them. They undertake action and participate in collecting the data during the action. This, essentially, increases the participants' capacity to solve the problem and improve the relationships among themselves. Two, it enables the blending of local knowledge ("insider" knowledge) from the people and expert knowledge ("outsider" knowledge) of the researcher (Khanlou and Peter 2005: 188). Three, the participants share their local context, culture, expectations, and values, which become part of the research process (Bortoletto 2017: 486). The other process is reflection. The participants and researcher conduct regular reflections on the action based on the evidence generated. Reflection is a continuous process occurring from the problem identification stage to the evaluation of the action (Carr 2006: 428). The final and third process is the generation of the data from the problem identification, monitoring during implementation, evaluation of the results, and continuous reflection. It is during this process that new knowledge is generated, analysed, and used to inform the actions being undertaken.

### **5.2.2 Principles of Action Research Related to This Study**

From the review of existing literature on action research, five principles were identified as being relevant to this study – these are described in the subsequent subsections.

#### **a. *Systematic study***

Action research explores a practical problem in an organised and structured way by collecting information to understand the problem and respond appropriately. Most scientific research stops once the problem has been understood, but action research goes further to generate new knowledge around a social action being undertaken (Ozanne and Saatcioglu 2008: 424). In this research, an exploratory survey was conducted on the status of monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects. This was done through an exploratory survey with 29 of the targeted 40 peacebuilding organisations that were implementing peacebuilding projects in Kenya during the study period. The study targeted both international and Kenyan peacebuilding organisations operating across the



47 counties of Kenya. The survey explored the current monitoring and evaluation processes being used in generating evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work. This phase was meant to generate empirical data to confirm the practical research problem regarding the existing monitoring and evaluation processes. The findings generated from the survey informed the development of a short-term action on how to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects. The study further systematically collected the data as the action was being implemented and during the evaluation.

***b. Cyclic process***

The researcher and participants take part in identifying the problem, generating information on it to understand the problem, action planning, action taking, evaluation, and reflection to take the next action. This is a dynamic process that is recursive in nature, involving people in dialogue and reflection as the research proceeds (Khanlou and Peter 2005: 187; Bargal 2008: 20-24). This research conducted the four phases of action research with four peacebuilding organisations. One cycle was conducted per organisation due to time constraints and the COVID-19 pandemic. It is important to mention that a new model was not developed, but the outcome harvesting approach was selected by the researcher as a monitoring and evaluation process that has the ability to increase the capacity of the organisations to improve evidence generation on the effectiveness of their projects. Its strengths and application have been discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. The implementation began with a 1-day virtual training on the outcome harvesting approach. Subsequently, the project teams immediately started collecting information on the outcomes. The research was carried out by four organisations that expressed interest in using the outcome harvesting approach. It was carried out between April and June 2020. It was adequate to demonstrate how the outcome harvesting approach effectively generated evidence and, to some extent, strengthened the conflict transformation processes.

**c. Collaborative partnership**

The cardinal principle of action research is allowing the people affected to drive the research process in partnership with the researcher. The participation of the people ensures that the desired change is achieved and owned by the people. This is done throughout the research process (Jull, Giles and Graham 2017: 3). In this research study, the project teams from the participating organisations were involved in the survey and implementing the action, reflection, and evaluation of the action. The project teams from the participating organisations were also actively involved in both the training and undertaking the generation of the evidence on the peacebuilding project that they were undertaking.

This study was conceptualised in a manner that each peacebuilding organisation made a choice to participate voluntarily. However, because of factors such as critical reflection, the resources involved in generating evidence, and time constraints, the study engaged four peacebuilding organisations that willingly and voluntarily decided to implement the outcome harvesting approach because their immediate need was to demonstrate the effectiveness of their peacebuilding projects. They included Saferworld, Mathare Social Justice Centre (MSJC), Ghetto Foundation, and Equal Access International (EAI).

**d. Generation of new knowledge**

According to Bargal (2008: 20-24), throughout the four phases, the participants are involved in generating the data through surveys, observations, focus groups, and other context-specific data collection methods. In this way, the participants and researcher became co-authors of the research products. In this study, the project teams were involved in the exploratory survey, collection of outcomes information, the post-training assessment, and the feedback survey carried out during the evaluation. It was a participatory process that involved the project teams from the four peacebuilding organisations.

**e. *Recruitment, training, and taking action***

The Lewin triangle has training as one of the three critical components of action research in addition to research and action. Training is a strategy to allow people to acquire knowledge on the problem and action of the research (Bargal 2008: 24). This study also had to ensure that the training was built into the research process. The project teams were trained on the outcome harvesting approach as a monitoring and evaluation process that has shown to have the potential to strengthen how evidence is generated in complex projects. First, the researcher sought permission to engage the project teams directly in the fieldwork from the sampled peacebuilding organisations. Subsequently, the training was conducted with the project teams from the four organisations by the researcher, and the project teams proceeded to undertake the action with facilitation by the researcher.

**5.2.3 Action Research as a Research Design for This Study**

From the above explanation of action research and how it is applicable in this study, it can be deduced that the action research design was applicable for this research study for various reasons. One, action research is context specific, allowing the researcher to obtain rich data on the subject matter. In context-specific research, there is no generalisation of the findings. This action research was carried out specifically within four peacebuilding organisations implementing peacebuilding projects in Kenya. The findings were not generalised to other organisations, such as those in the development and humanitarian sectors. However, lessons learned from this study can be applied to interventions operating in conflict areas in any part of the world. It is also important to highlight that conflict and peace are context specific and informed by historical and local conflict dynamics. Most large-scale intrastate violent conflicts have a bearing on the local context dynamics. Therefore, action research is the appropriate design to apply in a study conducted in conflict and fragile contexts.

Two, this research was focused on developing the capacities of the peacebuilding organisations in generating evidence on the effectiveness of their peacebuilding work and using the same in improving conflict transformation measures. Action research has been proven to be effective in improving organisational practices (Glassman and Erdem 2014:

207). This research focused on the practice of peacebuilding organisations with reference to the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects in an organisation's setup. The organisations receive funding to implement peacebuilding projects. It is the peacebuilding organisations that are responsible for generating evidence and using it to improve peacebuilding practices.

Three, action research is an organic and open form of research where the flexibility of the researcher and participants is key in adapting to the prevailing dynamics. The action part of the research occurs in a changing environment. In addition, action, by nature, is fluid and constantly changing due to changes in the context and interests of the participants. This is similar to unpredictable conflict contexts where peacebuilding projects are implemented. Action research, therefore, was the appropriate research design to employ in this research study in the peacebuilding field because the study would evolve and progress during the work (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood and Maguire 2003: 21). Four, protracted and intercommunal conflicts between two groups occur due to differences in values and norms, either traditional or religious; culture; and ideologies. Action research takes the values, perceptions, and interpretations of the participants, as well as the power dynamics into account as part of the research process. This aspect of the action research makes it a valuable tool not only to understand deep-rooted invisible conflict factors but also to take a step in resolving them. This eventually brings about improvement in the intergroup relationships.

### **5.3 Target Population**

Target population is the entire group of things or people with similar characteristics that are of interest to the researcher, where the research is concerned with generalising the study's conclusions to the target population (Fox and Bayat 2007: 52). This study engaged 29 out of 40 peacebuilding organisations involved in peacebuilding work in Kenya. The target organisations included in this study are those that had peacebuilding projects being implemented in one of the 47 counties in Kenya. The projects targeted different peacebuilding actors, such as religious leaders, elders from different ethnic groups, mainstream media, women, youth, state authorities, and policymakers at the national level and target counties. The target organisations were those that were legally registered and

that had started their operations in the late 1980s when Kenya had started experiencing violent conflict associated with the clamour for a multiparty democracy. Another factor considered was the external funding that the organisations received from donors such as USAID, FCDO, and the UNDP.

For the purposes of implementing the action research, four peacebuilding organisations were purposively selected. They have a local presence and were undertaking peacebuilding projects in at least one of the 47 counties during the research period. This gave the assurance that the existing monitoring and evaluation processes in those organisations were focused on peacebuilding work and not mixed with development and humanitarian projects.

#### **5.4 Sampling Methods**

A sampling method is a procedure of selecting representative research participants, known as the sample, from the target population (Maree 2016: 192). Kenya was conveniently sampled from other countries in Africa. It has a significant number of peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya. It also offers a conducive environment for peacebuilding organisations to operate from Kenya while conducting peacebuilding in neighbouring countries, such as Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, experiencing intrastate conflict.

For the exploratory survey, both international and Kenyan peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya were engaged in the survey. The survey targeted 40 organisations but only 29 participated in the survey. There was no sampling because the survey was to be administered to 40 organisations. A list of peacebuilding organisations in peacebuilding work were sourced from PEACENET, a membership network of all the peacebuilding organisations implementing peacebuilding activities in Kenya.

In each of the peacebuilding organisations, field-based or monitoring and evaluation staff were selected purposively to participate in the interviews during the survey. Field-based staff were selected because they play a role of being the interface between the target peacebuilding actors and peacebuilding organisation. They were involved in the

implementation of project activities that engage the peacebuilding actors and played a critical role in collecting data on the progress of the peacebuilding project. The field-based staff had extensive knowledge on the conflict in the target counties and could give views on whether the prevailing monitoring and evaluation processes were effective or not. For the monitoring and evaluation staff, purposive sampling was also used because they had experience with existing monitoring and evaluation processes of the peacebuilding projects. From their practical participation in generating evidence for peacebuilding projects, they were able to give feedback on whether the existing monitoring and evaluation processes were working or not.

For the selection of the organisations to implement the action, purposive sampling was used. From the 29 organisations that participated in the exploratory survey, four organisations were selected based on the following criteria. The organisations had a grassroots presence in one or more counties in Kenya through their structures or local organisations. They had clout with local communities and other peacebuilding actors in conflict areas across the country. They were also known to be conducting peacebuilding work between the 1980s and 2020. The selection of these organisations was carried out during the exploratory survey after they had shown an interest. Those that confirmed their participation in the research were officially requested by the researcher to participate. The permission was granted to the researcher by the designated authority to conduct the research.

## **5.5 Measuring Instruments**

A measuring instrument is a data collection tool that is used during the gathering of the data (O'Leary 2013: 202). Different data collection tools were used to generate data for this study. As explained in this section, five measuring instruments were used. They included an interview schedule for the interviews and a structured questionnaire for the exploratory survey with the peacebuilding organisations. During the implementation of the action, a post-training assessment tool and an outcome matrix were used by the project teams to gather and describe the outcomes. The feedback survey questionnaire was used for the evaluation of the action undertaken by the peacebuilding organisations. The details of each of the measuring instruments are described as follows:

- *Survey questionnaire:* During the exploratory survey, a structured questionnaire was used. It was divided into six sections. They included the staff's biodata, the peacebuilding organisations' background information, peacebuilding projects, monitoring and evaluation processes, and reflections on the current monitoring and evaluation processes. Each of these sections had open and closed questions.
- *Interview schedule:* Interviews were conducted with the field-based staff during the exploratory survey. The interview schedule had specific questions on conflict in Kenya, the actors involved, and the conflict issues and challenges that the organisations had faced in addressing peacebuilding. Questions were also asked on the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects that they had been using in previous and current peacebuilding projects.
- *Outcome matrix:* The matrix had three sections. The first section was a description of the outcome statements, seeking information to answer the four-part question of *who* did *what* differently *when* and *where*? The second section was on the significance of the outcome, describing why the outcome was worth noting. The third and final section was on the project's contribution to the outcome.
- *Post-training assessment test:* This was meant to assess whether the project teams had understood the concepts and steps of the outcome harvesting approach. It contained questions on the definition of outcome harvesting and outcomes, the description of an outcome, and the steps in outcome harvesting.
- *Feedback survey questionnaire:* This is a tool that was used in conducting the evaluation of the action. Information was sought on the experiences in the outcome harvesting process, perceptions of outcome harvesting in generating evidence for peacebuilding projects, and suggestions to peacebuilding organisations on the application of the outcome harvesting approach to other peacebuilding organisations.
- *Documents review questions:* Questions were used to select the relevant reports to review. They also guided in seeking information from the different reports. The questions sought to find out forms of conflicts, causes, historical patterns and

peacebuilding interventions. Any other information relevant to the research study was also collected in the process of desk review.

## **5.6 Data Analysis**

Quantitative and qualitative data were generated in this study. The quantitative survey data included data on areas such as the peacebuilding organisations, types of donors, categories of peacebuilding actors, main peacebuilding activities and peacebuilding outcomes, monitoring and evaluation practices and processes, the level of application, and perceptions of the evidence generated in categorical data. The data was analysed using categorical analysis as descriptive analysis. The frequency and percentages were used to find out the distribution of the data. To obtain the trends and patterns of conflict in Kenya, geographic information system (GIS) analysis was used. The data generated from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) was entered into the Arc GIS software and aided in generating the GIS maps.

Open-ended questions from the exploratory survey, desk review, interviews, outcomes harvesting, post-training assessment test, and evaluation feedback survey generated qualitative data. Thematic analysis was used to analyse this qualitative data. Emerging themes were generated from the transcribed notes and further categorised under different broader themes under each of the study objectives. Some quotes from participants were also used to support the findings present under the themes. Flowchart diagrams, bar graphs, GIS graphs, and tables were used to show the relationship between the themes and variables to gain understanding of the data.

## **5.7 Delimitations of the Study**

The study was conducted among the peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya. However, for the action implementation, among the peacebuilding organisations, only those with the sole mandate to undertake peacebuilding work in Kenya were involved, leaving out those that were implementing other projects. The reason behind this separation was that the study was focused on the peacebuilding projects that were specifically and directly aimed at reducing violence with the aim of building peaceful relationships. These types of peacebuilding projects conduct peacebuilding activities



among two or more conflict groups. It is important to appreciate that projects such as those involving service delivery, non-violence campaigns, and advocacy bear elements of peacebuilding. These types of projects contribute indirectly to peacebuilding in the communities. This study focused on the projects that were aimed at reducing violent conflict, rebuilding broken relationships among conflict groups, and addressing the root causes of conflict after violent conflict had occurred.

The study also specifically explored existing monitoring and evaluation aspects of the peacebuilding work. It left out other project management issues such as financing, human resources, administration, external relations, fundraising, and programme development. In the peacebuilding organisations, the study targeted the field-based staff, who interacted with peacebuilding actors, and monitoring and evaluation staff, who were involved in generating primary data on the peacebuilding projects.

## **5.8 Validity and Reliability**

Validity refers to the degree to which the research procedures and measuring instruments truly measure what they are intended to measure and the degree to which the results obtained from the analysis of data actually represent the phenomenon under study and facilitate accurate and meaningful inferences (Leedy and Ormrod 2015: 103). There are many types of validity. For the purposes of this study, internal and external validity were relevant. For external validity, two observations were made depending on the phases of the study. At the exploratory survey level, a census was conducted, thus there was a need for external validity. The findings from the survey were considered final and no generalisation was done. In addition, for the action implementation, no generalisation was done. It was context specific and qualitative in nature. However, it was assumed that the findings from the action research could be applicable to other peacebuilding organisations implementing peacebuilding projects in Kenya.

Internal validity, as stated above, concerns measuring instruments collecting information intended to be free from bias. This type of validity further examines the validity of the questions. This means that the questions must be tested on whether they have collected the information that they were meant to collect. Consideration must be given to the

wording, interpretation, and order of the questions. To ensure internal validity, the pretest was used for the structured questionnaire. The data generated was assessed to judge the extent of its validity and to modify or add more questions.

For the reliability of this study, internal reliability was considered. This is the ability of the questions in the instruments to produce consistent data. To ensure that the measuring instruments were reliable, triangulation was done by combining different sources of data. This study generated data from a structured questionnaire, interviews, post-training assessment, documenting outcomes, and feedback survey. The combination of these data collection methods confirmed the themes and patterns generated from the data. Detailed data was generated to ensure that the data was adequate for the emerging patterns.

## **5.9 Ethical Considerations**

Three ethical considerations were taken into account in this study. They include anonymity and confidentiality, securing access, and protecting the participants. How they were observed in this study has been described under sub sections 5.9.1 to 5.9.3.

### **5.9.1 Anonymity and Confidentiality**

The rights to privacy were maintained. The participants were given the individual freedom to select or choose the time, place, and circumstances under which to participate in this research. The names of the participants were not written in the questionnaire, interview schedule, and this thesis to ensure anonymity. The information provided was treated with confidentiality.

### **5.9.2 Securing Access**

These ethical issues concern obtaining permission for conducting one's research from organisations and participants (McNiff 2017: 126). An explanation of the research objectives, ways of participation, and benefits must be explained by the researcher. This is how the researcher obtained access to the peacebuilding organisations and project teams who participated in the research.

- Official permission was sought from NACOSTI for the researcher to conduct the study in Kenya. It is a legal requirement for anyone conducting research in Kenya to have a research permit.
- During the survey with the peacebuilding organisations, an email request and follow-up was done with the executive directors of the peacebuilding organisations to allow the researcher to conduct the interviews. In those peacebuilding organisations that accepted the request, the field-based staff or monitoring and evaluation staff were also expected to sign the formal consent form before starting the interviews.
- The peacebuilding organisations that implemented the outcome harvesting approach gave a formal letter to the researcher. The letter gave the researcher the permission to access the project teams and documents produced during the implementation.
- During the evaluation, an online feedback survey was conducted. The project teams were requested to complete the survey through an email containing the hyperlink to the survey. Those who accepted to participate filled and submitted the feedback survey questionnaire.

### **5.9.3 Protecting the Participants**

These ethical issues concern the security and safety of the participants during and after the research study. This ensures that the participants are not identified without their consent and ensures the protection of their information and even the location where the interviews will be carried out (McNiff 2017: 126). In relation to this study, the following were carried out:

- An explanation of the purpose of the research, the right to participate, and incentives for participation in the survey and interviews were given.
- Informal consent was sought from the participants before the researcher started the interviews or discussions.

- The researcher assured the participants of their privacy and confidentiality and made it clear that they were not expected to disclose personal experiences if they did not want to.
- The researcher did not record names without the consent of the participants. Where names were used, the participants were informed, and they accepted the use of their names in the study.
- All documents reviewed were acknowledged appropriately, and references were included in the documents generated from the data.
- To ensure privacy, especially for the interviews, adequate assurance was given, and the interviews were conducted in a location where there was no fear or external influence.

## **5.10 Limitations of the Study**

This researcher experienced certain limitations in the study. With regard to the coronavirus pandemic government restrictions, the first case of the coronavirus (COVID-19) was reported on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2021, and the government immediately instituted restrictions on the movement of people and public gatherings and enforced social distancing. According to the restrictions, public gatherings of any nature were stopped. This study was affected because this was the time when the research was preparing to conduct validation of the findings from the exploratory study and engage the representatives from the selected organisations in the development of a model. COVID-19 had the following impact on this study:

- There were no meetings held to design the model as explained, and instead the researcher settled on outcome harvesting approach as an action plan. This was easy because it did not require the people to physically meet. It relied heavily on the documents and engagement of the project teams. This was done through Zoom meetings.

- The use of ordinary data collection methods was not possible. Instead, the researcher settled on the use of online data collection methods for the implementation of the action.

### **5.11 Conclusion**

The research methodology included three areas to ensure that the data collection was carried out: the problem analysis, implementation, and evaluation of the action. The data collection methods used were survey questionnaires for the exploratory survey and evaluation. Interviews and a desk review were used to complement the exploratory survey. It is important to mention that this study adopted an action research study design, which involves qualitative research. However, the use of questionnaires generated quantitative data, making this study a mixed methods research study.

The research was carried out among the 40 peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya, which were implementing peacebuilding projects in Kenya in one or more counties at the time. Only 29 participated in the exploratory survey, and four participated in the implementation and evaluation of the action. To ensure the validity and reliability of this study, pretesting was done for the exploratory survey questionnaire. The use of different sources and data collection methods ensured the validity and reliability of the qualitative data collection. The study generated quantitative data, which was subjected to descriptive categorical analysis. For the qualitative data, thematic analysis was used. The following part of this thesis (including Chapters Six to Ten) concerns the implementation and evaluation of the action research.

## **PART IV – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **CHAPTER SIX**

#### **PEACEBUILDING WORK IN KENYA**

##### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter serves as the starting point of understanding and improving the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects from this action research. To appreciate the role of monitoring and evaluation in building peace, this chapter gives an initial landscape of peacebuilding work in Kenya, briefly describing the conflict dynamics in Kenya up until December 2019. It further describes the peacebuilding organisations and peacebuilding activities implemented to respond to the conflict context in Kenya. The chapter also describes the peacebuilding outcomes produced from the peacebuilding activities implemented by peacebuilding organisations. The chapter ends with a conclusion and highlights the topics to be addressed in Chapter Seven.


##### **6.2 Conflict Trends and Patterns in Kenya**

From an exploratory survey with 29 peacebuilding organisations, it was found that almost all worked on multiple issues. Thus, 22 worked on interethnic conflicts, 19 on natural-resource-based conflicts, 19 on political conflicts, 15 on cross-border conflicts, and 14 on other issues. Other forms of conflict that were reported were gender-based violence (GBV), violent extremism, and police violence. From the desk review, interethnic conflict was ranked first, having been mentioned in the previous nine conflict analysis reports. Violent extremism ranked second, followed by police violence and political conflict, respectively. Interethnic conflict occurred more frequently than other forms of conflict. Surprisingly, the same was established 4 years earlier and published in 2015 in a report on conflict analysis in Kenya for the European Commission by Brigitte Rohwerder. The analysis established that intercommunal conflict and violence were among the forms of

conflict with high levels in Kenya. The analysis further stated that Kenya had the highest levels of intercommunal violence in Africa (Rohwerder 2015: 4).

The observation of interethnic conflict being the most prevalent form of conflict can be explained by the fact that Kenya is a multiethnic country with over 42 ethnic groups spread across 47 counties. From colonial times, Kenya's administrative units have remained demarcated along geographic locations where certain dominant ethnic groups live. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 reinforced this state by dividing the country into 47 counties, with some being named after the dominant ethnic groups (Government of Kenya 2010: 165-166). Indigenous ethnic groups even laid claim to counties considered to be metropolitan, such as Nairobi and Nakuru, as their historical and ancestral lands. Other ethnic groups who find themselves in these ethnically dominated counties are excluded from participation in leadership and governance processes and experience an unfair allocation of resources and discriminatory service delivery. This is in addition to natural ethnic differences brought about by cultural values, beliefs, and traditions. In these counties, they share natural resources such as land, water, grazing land, and boundaries. Whenever political, resource-based, cross-border, and other forms of conflict have occurred, they have been manifested as interethnic conflict. This explains why interethnic conflict has been ranked high while political, resource-based, and cross-border conflicts have been observed to be ranked at almost the same level by peacebuilding organisations.

Figure 6.1 depicts the patterns of the forms of conflict across the country up until 31 December 2019. The data was derived from ACLED, an NGO registered in the USA that collects real-time, direct conflict data across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Europe, and the USA. The data is open for use by the public to build analytical conflict scenarios and inform conflict transformation.




**Figure 6.1** Patterns of Violent conflict in Kenya(ACLED, 2019).

As can be observed from Figure 6.1, Kenya has experienced several forms of conflict across its 47 counties between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2019. The different forms of conflict variedly occurred across the country depending on the regions of the country. It was also reported in the interviews that all the forms of conflict occurred throughout the year. Only political conflict was found to be visible around the electoral or political events in a given location within the 47 counties. It was interesting to find out that this conflict pattern is similar to what Brigitte Rohwerder found 4 years earlier in a conflict analysis undertaking in Kenya. In her report, she referred to Kenya as a country with multiple and overlapping conflicts across the country, with a higher intensity being



observed during the general elections cycle (Rohwerder 2015: 3). Figure 6.2 depicts the forms of conflict in Kenya.



**Figure 6.2** Forms of conflict in Kenya.

As can be observed from Figure 6.2, the four main forms of conflict in Kenya are connected and overlapping. Interethnic conflict has been intertwined with natural-resource-based conflict. Land, as a natural resource, has been the main driver of interethnic conflict. Kenya has a history of unresolved land disputes across the country, but this is more visible in the Rift Valley and coastal regions where the original owners of the land were evicted by colonialists, with the land never being returned after independence. Instead, other ethnic groups connected to the government regime occupied part of the land and continued to live there. This has bred interethnic hatred due to the historical injustices. The differences in land use have caused interethnic conflict among different ethnic groups in some counties. For instance, in some counties such as Tana River, where pastoralist and crop-farming ethnic groups live side by side, conflict

has occasionally been witnessed between the Pokomo crop farmers and Oromo pastoralists (FAO, 2017: 7). In most cases, the conflict over land use takes an interethnic angle as opposed to being viewed as an agro-pastoralist conflict. In the counties of northern Kenya dominated by pastoralist ethnic groups, natural resources such as water and grazing areas have perpetually caused interethnic conflict. Due to the competition for water and pastures for their livestock, violent conflict has occurred among the ethnic groups, as reported in a recent report on conflict analysis in northern Kenya. The report has indicated that pastoralist-related, resource-based, and land conflicts frequently occur among pastoralist communities. Interethnic and interclan conflicts have been reported to occur due to decreased access to land, water, and pastures (Haider 2020: 12).

Interethnic conflict has also been intertwined with political conflict. The elite and politicians from different ethnic groups have taken advantage of the existing grievances concerning land, boundary disputes, the allocation of resources, and ethnic hatred to encourage feelings of ethnic animosity, causing tensions and conflict. While they do this for their own interests to be elected, they generate interethnic conflict.

Violent extremism has also been linked to interethnic conflict, as reported by peacebuilding organisations implementing projects counteracting violent extremism. They explained that ethnic profiling is visible when a violent attack has occurred. The attacks have been directed at ethnic groups perceived to be in favour with the government. For instance, in the Al-Shabaab attack that happened in Lamu County in June 2014, most of the Kikuyu ethnic group was affected. Al-Shabaab selectively killed men from Kikuyu and left other ethnic groups unaffected, as reported in a research study conducted in Lamu in 2017 by Saferworld (Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017: 2). The attack was associated with local ethnic groups feeling disenfranchised from their ancestral land.

The connection among these forms of conflict has also been traced from the locations where they have occurred. All the forms of conflict, depending on the conflict drivers, have occurred in counties at varied degrees, as shown in Figure 6.1. For instance, Nairobi County, which includes the capital city of Kenya, hosts all the ethnic groups. Interethnic conflict has been witnessed in all informal settlements where the majority of the low-income population lives. During general elections, political conflict is a common

phenomenon. In some parts of Nairobi, conflict over land has also been witnessed. For instance, in Kibra, the Nubi ethnic group has felt that their ancestral land is being taken by other ethnic groups living in Kibra (Elfvorsson and Höglund 2018: 1754-1755). The violent extremist attacks have also occurred in the city of Nairobi. Those terror attacks have been linked to Al-Shabaab, an Islamic violent extremist group based in Somalia but with recruitment and radicalisation activities conducted across East African countries where they commit violent attacks. Whenever the attacks occur, the Kenyan security forces profile the Kenyan Somali ethnic group. For example, in 2014, after a series of violent attacks in Kenya, a security operation was launched to remove illegal immigrants mainly from the Somali ethnic group living in Eastleigh Estate in the city of Nairobi who were believed by the government to be linked to several terror attacks that had been committed. Over 6,000 soldiers descended into Eastleigh Estate, mobbed most of the Somali immigrants, and detained them at the Kasarani Sports Stadium. The operation left a trail of human rights violations inflicted on the Somali community – these violations were strongly condemned by the Kenyan Somali, and Muslim leaders for state profiling the Kenyan Somali community in the war against Al-Shabaab (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2017: 130).

Another feature that connected the forms of conflict was the conflict actors. From the desk review, it was established that different ethnic groups participated in the four forms of conflict as victims or aggressors. Young people were also known to be perpetrators in the four forms of conflict. They were involved as members of organised armed groups, such as community militias and terror groups. Both national and county governments were blamed for being part of natural-resource-based conflicts and violent extremism due to the sustained marginalisation in the northern and coastal regions of Kenya. Politicians were also found to be embedded in all forms of conflicts. They used historical grievances and discrimination to fuel interethnic conflict, resource-based conflict, violent extremism, and political conflict in one way or another. This finding is in support of the descriptions given of stakeholders involved in conflicts in Kenya by Rohwerder in a report on conflict analysis in Kenya. They included the national government, county government, Kenyan security forces, politicians and the elite, militia groups, pastoralist communities, young people, and the internal community (Rohwerder 2015: 11).


Other forms of conflict that were mentioned in the survey and desk review were police violence, GBV, protests, and riots. These forms of conflict have similarities to the other four described above because they share some of the causes. For instance, conflicts involving natural resources, such as land use, especially where mineral, oil, and gas exploration was being carried out, and sporadic interethnic and police violence were reported. This was associated with local communities feeling excluded from being part of mining or exploration. For example, interethnic conflict and police violence have been witnessed in Kwale County, where titanium is mined (Abuya 2018: 67-69), and in Turkana County, where oil exploration is ongoing (Johannes, Zulu and Kalipeni 2015: 154).

GBV occurs across the country but is underreported. In Kenya, which is a patriarchal society, men have more power than women. According to the peacebuilding organisations interviewed, the violence against women has been fuelled by negative cultural practices, such as child marriages, female circumcision, women being perceived as the property of men, and unfair traditional dispute settlement mechanisms. A systemic survey carried out by Muluneh *et al.* (2020: 13) established the same trend. It was found that the rate of GBV was high in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), confirming the findings of this study. There have been more cases of GBV in the western and eastern regions of Africa than the southern regions of SSA. Kenya, where this study was conducted, is among the countries that form part of the eastern African region

### **6.3 Causes of Conflict in Kenya**

From the desk review and interviews with the peacebuilding organisations, it was found that conflict was caused by many factors, as presented in Figure 6.3. These factors, according to Herbert (2017: 15-16), can be classified into three categories. First, there are factors built into government policies and structures. Social norms, traditions, and culture fall into this category. The factors are termed as structural causes. The second set of factors creates an enabling environment to commit violent conflict or further escalate existing conflict. These are called proximate causes. The third category of factors involves the actions, events, and situations that set conflict off or escalate violent conflict. These are called triggers because they are not real causes but prompt violent conflict to occur.

Figure 6.3 presents the categories of the causes of violent conflict in Kenya from the desk review and interviews with the peacebuilding organisations.



**Figure 6.3** Conflict drivers in Kenya.

From Figure 6.3, it can be observed that structural and proximate factors have been the main drivers of violent conflict in Kenya. The prominent structural cause of conflict has been marginalisation, which has affected over 29 arid and semi-arid counties and six counties in the coastal region. This means that more than half of Kenya has faced marginalisation, which is manifested in the form of poor public service delivery. The regions have remained underdeveloped for decades, leading to communities in these regions feeling excluded from the government. Poor and partisan governance, accompanied by the skewed and unfair allocation of resources and divisive politics, have been the structural conflict drivers mentioned during the interviews. Cultural and traditional practices, such as cattle rustling, stereotypes and cultural differences, and social identity, were also mentioned as the causes of interethnic conflict.

As shown in Figure 6.3, the number of proximate causes of conflicts in Kenya is almost the same as the number of structural causes. The causes are interconnected as they are directly responsible for all forms of conflict and are widely spread across the country. Some of the causes, such as historical injustices, have been more prominent in the Rift Valley and coastal counties where the land grievances persist. The proliferation of small arms along the porous border between Kenya and neighbouring countries affected by conflict, such as South Sudan and Somalia, have caused the interethnic conflict to become increasingly armed and deadly.


Elections were mentioned by all the peacebuilding organisations as being an event attributed to interethnic and political conflict. The scale of the violence has depended on whether the election has been in one location (a by-election) or in the entire country during general elections. In most cases, grievances, interethnic hatred, and intolerance have been exploited and trigger violent conflict. Mainstream and social media were also mentioned as a trigger in the past to mobilise ethnic groups to commit violence. This was evident in the 2007/2008 post-election violence across the country, where vernacular radio stations contributed to the mobilisation of ethnic groups to fight each other.

#### **6.4 Peacebuilding Sector in Kenya**

From interviews with some of the oldest peacebuilding organisations such as the Catholic Justice Peace Commission, it was established that the peacebuilding work by NGOs, especially faith-based organisations, had begun in the early 1990s. This is the period when the country was going through the demand for a multiparty democracy. There was a crackdown of the political and religious leaders who were advocating for a democratic space in Kenya. Since the 1992 general elections, Kenya has experienced politically motivated interethnic conflict every other electoral cycle of 5 years (Judith 2018: 7). The conflict situation has attracted peacebuilding interventions from international and local NGOs, including faith-based organisations. Since the 1990s, the peacebuilding sector has expanded in different ways depending on the forms of conflict being addressed and donor funding.

### 6.4.1 Peacebuilding Organisations in Kenya

From the monitoring and evaluation survey, 13 of the organisations were international, 11 were national, three were regional, and two were local. As shown in Figure 6.4, the peacebuilding organisations were operating in 47 counties. There were almost equal numbers of international organisations (n=13) and national organisations (n=11) operating in Kenya. The distribution of the two categories of peacebuilding organisations was attributed to most of the international organisations working through national organisations in implementing peacebuilding projects.



**Figure 6.4** Peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya.

The survey further established that the peacebuilding organisations had implemented an average of two projects each, with a minimum of one and a maximum of eight projects per organisation. The projects received funding from donors. The funding determined the number of peacebuilding projects that the organisations implemented. The donors

mentioned in the interviews and survey were categorised into two groups. The first category involved donors who were not well known in the peacebuilding sector, referred to in this study as non-traditional donors. They included the Netherlands Government, Forum Civic, Unilever, PeaceWomen Across the Globe (Switzerland), Uraia Trust, the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD), and the Ford Foundation. They also included church-based donors, such as Misesan Cara (Ireland) and Italian Bishops. The second category of donors included the dominant donors in peacebuilding field. These can be referred to as traditional donors. They included FCDO, the former DFID, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF), the UNDP, the Open Society Foundation, USAID, Diakonia (Sweden), the European Commission (EC), and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). All the 29 peacebuilding organisations received funding from traditional donors. The faith-based organisations received funding from both traditional and non-traditional donors, especially faith-based donors such as Catholic bishops. The funding was received for various peacebuilding project activities, as described in Section 6.4.2.

From the interviews, it was also established that the funding dynamics were complex and overlapping, as in the conflict context in Kenya. The funding sought to address all forms of conflict at the same time. Due to multiple causes and the overlapping nature of the conflicts in Kenya, no peacebuilding organisation would address only one form of conflict. The funding had also had effects on the working relationship between international, national, and local peacebuilding organisations.

The survey established that there were three funding methods used in the peacebuilding sector in Kenya. One, some of the donors gave the international organisations funds, which later gave subgrants to the national organisations directly to implement peacebuilding activities. This is why some of the peacebuilding organisations mentioned some international organisations, such as CAFOD and Forum Civic, as donors, but they were international organisations. Two, the donors directly funded national organisations to conduct peacebuilding activities in their target counties. Three, an arrangement was made where the donor organisations, such as USAID and FCDO, asked international, national, and local organisations to form a consortium or network to conduct peacebuilding



activities together. This ensured that the donor funding leveraged the strengths of each peacebuilding organisation and avoided duplication, which occurs frequently in the peacebuilding sector. The three funding mechanisms overlapped for many peacebuilding organisations. This explains why the number of international peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya was almost equal to that of national peacebuilding organisations.

#### **6.4.2 Peacebuilding Activities Implemented by Peacebuilding Organisations**

From the survey, interviews, and desk review, all the peacebuilding organisations had conducted different peacebuilding activities across the country for previous and current peacebuilding projects. The activities were packaged into peacebuilding projects funded by donors, as mentioned in Section 6.4.1. The activities were classified into five categories depending on the forms of conflict that they were addressing, as will be described subsequently. The activities also involved different conflict actors at the local, county, and national levels depending on the target areas where they were being implemented. The peacebuilding activities were classified as described in the following subsections.

##### **a. *Intercommunal dialogue***

These activities were ranked first, as a common category of peacebuilding activities conducted by all peacebuilding organisations. The activities in this category included holding interethnic community peace meetings, forums for interethnic leaders, local political dialogue, and reconciliation activities as well as implementing local joint initiatives. These activities draw their resources from traditional and customary practices that encourage conflicting ethnic groups to develop peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflict when it arises. This is because they produce effective local peace agreements and peace declarations by which ethnic groups in conflict abide whenever a conflict or disagreement arises. These intercommunal and traditional responses were used to resolve local, political, natural-resource-based, cross-border, and violent extremist conflicts with some degree of success.

**b.      *Mediation and negotiation***

These activities were applied at both the local and national levels. The activities included bringing together leaders involved in the conflict to find solutions to the conflict. Locally, they were applied where ethnic group leaders, local politicians, and sectoral leaders would come together and form an agreement on how to address existing conflict. This is the same with national leaders who, through the use of a third-party mediator, have been brought together for a truce. An example was given during interviews of people in Kenya during the post-election violence of 2007/2008, when the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was brought on board as a mediator between the president and opposition leader over the disputed presidential elections.

From the interviews, activities such as interfaith dialogues, meetings for council elders, multi-stakeholder forums, and national political dialogues were mentioned to have been used in addressing interethnic, cross-border, and political conflicts.

**c.      *Peace education***

This is a category of activities involved in public awareness on the adverse effects of violent conflict and the need for peace and reconciliation. They were carried out through public activities such as peace marches, peace caravans, and religious gatherings. These public platforms allowed for direct engagement with the public on the peace messages. Media, including mainstream and social media, was mentioned to have been used by the majority of the peacebuilding organisations. This was done through the dissemination of peace messages through print media, information, education, and communication materials. Talk shows conducted through the radio stations, social media, and television were mentioned. Projects countering violent extremism were reported to have used media to develop alternative messaging to counteract those disseminated by the terror groups as a recruitment strategy. These messages were specifically designed to target youth who were vulnerable to recruitment. Peace education was targeted more at addressing violent extremism and interethnic conflicts.

**d.      *Capacity-building training***

All the peacebuilding organisations mentioned that they had conducted participatory trainings. Some of them took the form of equipping the selected participants with knowledge and skills on mediation and negotiation to use later to resolve the local conflicts. Others had taken the form of education, where participants were taken through technical topics such as electoral processes, governance, and effective community policing. The participants were involved in intervening in local- and national-level conflicts. Other trainings engaged the leaders who participated in the trainings to develop strategies to resolve the conflicts. The capacity-building trainings were used by all peacebuilding organisations. An example is the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission engaging religious leaders in capacity-building training in 2017 on strategic advocacy and electoral affairs and giving the task to reach out to the leaders of political parties to ensure that peaceful general elections were held. This was reported by the project officer during the interviews. This category of peacebuilding activities was found to be used in addressing all the forms of conflict.

**e.      *Community policing and security responses***

Some of the peacebuilding organisations were involved in engaging the security providers and communities. It was used more in addressing violent extremist conflicts in northern and upper eastern Kenya where violent attacks happen and in addressing conflict in informal settlements in the city of Nairobi due to police violence. The activities included holding police and community joint trainings and dialogues with the police and forming community policing committees. They were directed at addressing the police violence against the civilians.

Further analysis was carried out to find out the types of peacebuilding activities that were used at each level of action, with reference to Lederach's peacebuilding pyramid. It was observed that all five categories of peacebuilding activities established in the study were implemented at Track III with the grassroots leaders and local communities (Palmiano *et al.* 2019: 7). Mediation and negotiation and capacity-building trainings were implemented at Track II with middle-level leaders, and only mediation and negotiation were

implemented at Track I with the top-level leaders. Two observations can be made from this distribution of peacebuilding activities. One, Lederach's peacebuilding approach of structuring society in conflict into three strategic and vertical levels was still being practised among peacebuilding organisations. This is because the framework categorises peacebuilding actors into these levels and, therefore, makes it easy for targeting by peacebuilding organisations. Two, as previous studies have found regarding Lederach's peacebuilding approach, more peacebuilding activities were implemented at the grassroots levels. This is because this is the level that experiences conflict on a daily basis, and it has many local leaders and populations affected by conflict. The conflict is physically visible and calls for more peacebuilding work at this level. Peacebuilding organisations have also been observed to be supporting more bottom-up peacebuilding that engages the local communities in Track III rather than leaders from Tracks I and II because in most of the top-down peacebuilding approaches, the local communities are left out. The donors have also placed emphasis on involving the local communities in the peacebuilding processes of peacebuilding organisations.

***f. Research work***

These activities were mentioned by two regional organisations (Jesuit Hakimani Centre and Hekima University College Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations). They conducted research work in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Tanzania. The Hekima Institute is an academic institution implementing research and peacebuilding projects.

**6.4.3 Challenges Faced by Peacebuilding Organisations**

When implementing the abovementioned peacebuilding activities, the peacebuilding organisations mentioned that they had faced different challenges. The achievement of peacebuilding outcomes was affected by these challenges. Both international, national, and local organisations were equally affected.

**a. *Highly dependent on donor funding***

From the interviews and desk review, this challenge was reported as critical because the peacebuilding organisations were highly dependent on donor funding to carry out the activities. This is a finding that confirms what was established by the CDA that both international and national peacebuilding organisations depended on the donor funding and donor priorities. This influenced the implementation of the peacebuilding activities (Ernstorfer 2018: 26). It was also revealed that donor funding in Kenya is available when there is a threat to peace, especially during the period of elections. After elections, the donor funds, especially from traditional donors such as USAID, FCDO, NCA, and UNDP, decrease significantly, slowing the peacebuilding work. However, non-traditional donors continue to fund small-scale peacebuilding projects to address the local conflicts. The donors also influence the type of the peacebuilding activities undertaken by the peacebuilding organisations. An example given by one of the field staff during the interviews was that since 2010, donor funds had been available to support the prevention and countering of violent extremism work. To remain relevant and viable for funding, most of the peacebuilding organisations have shifted to addressing violent extremism work while interethnic, resource-based, and political conflicts continue to happen unattended.

**b. *Political interference***

From the interviews, political interference occurs in two ways. One, it occurs through restrictive regulations. From 2013, the government of Kenya has continued cracking down on NGOs in Kenya. The Public Benefit Organizations Act, which was enacted in 2013, became an instrument of imposing stringent regulations that negatively affected the operations of peacebuilding and other organisations in Kenya (Ochido 2013). Two, politicians continue to fuel interethnic conflict by associating their personal interests with those of the ethnic groups to which they belong. One of the field staff gave an example of the North Rift region, where politicians have been accused of inciting the pastoralist Pokot and Turkana communities to fight, making it difficult for peacebuilding work in those conflict areas. In some instances, the political interference has led to years of efforts by the peacebuilding organisations being destroyed in a short period of time.

**c. *Peacebuilding efforts directed to peacebuilding events***


From the interviews, it was established that all peacebuilding organisations have focused on implementing peacebuilding activities to respond to incidents of violence, terror attacks, and electoral violence, among other forms of direct violence. A few organisations, such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), had activities suited to addressing the structural conflict drivers and long-term deep-rooted grievances. As established in this study, donor funding is available whenever there is a threat to the macrostate of calm in Kenya, especially around the time of general elections. The same finding was established by the CDA in their recent study in Kenya where they found that excessive funding was directed towards peacebuilding activities to address direct violence, especially during general elections, leading to ineffective peacebuilding (Ernstorfer 2018: 27). Few donors are willing to invest in long-term peacebuilding processes to address deep-rooted structural conflict drivers.

**d. *Inadequate capacity to collect, analyse, and report conflict and peace trends***

Although peacebuilding organisations were observed to have invested in building the capacity of the local and national leaders, local structures, peace mediators, and monitors, a gap was established in how peace and conflict data were being generated and shared at the local and national levels. From the interviews, it was noted that the peacebuilding organisations had less funds to conduct comprehensive monitoring and evaluation processes. The efforts to generate data were directed to account for peacebuilding activities carried out at the expense of capturing sufficient data on the peacebuilding outcomes generated by the activities. The capacity to equip the local peace actors with skills on data collection, sharing, and reporting was also lacking among the peacebuilding organisations. The analysis of current ineffective monitoring and evaluation processes and finding a practical solution that works in the peacebuilding field forms the thesis for this research study.

## 6.5 Peacebuilding Outcomes from Peacebuilding Activities

The monitoring and evaluation survey sought to obtain information on the peacebuilding outcomes achieved from the abovementioned peacebuilding activities. Figure 6.5, present those peace outcomes. Matching the peace outcomes and the conflict drivers to understand which conflict drivers had been addressed has also been done.



**Figure 6.5** Peacebuilding outcomes achieved by peacebuilding organisations.

Four categories of peacebuilding outcomes were identified from the exploratory survey. They included the individual understanding of others and having respect and strengthened intergroup relationships referring to both interethnic and interreligious groups, especially in the counties affected by interethnic conflict and violent extremism. Others included peaceful access to natural resources and improved trust between the police and

communities. The outcomes on the individual understanding of others and having respect, according to the dimensions of conflict transformation change, fall under personal change. According to Lederach (2003: 24), this change relates to cognitive factors and perceptions and mostly addresses the lack of respect, biases, and stereotypes. Peacebuilding outcomes on strengthened interethnic group relationships are all at the level of relational change, according to Lederach. The first two peacebuilding outcomes were realised when conflict happened due to differences in cultural practices, values, stereotypes, and beliefs. However, the outcomes remained fragile and unsustainable because interethnic conflict would occur in regions affected by structural factors such as marginalisation, poor governance, divisive politics, and historical injustices. As long as these factors remained, the possibility of a relapse into interethnic conflict was high.

The peaceful access to and use of natural resources can be placed under structural change. As shown in Figure 6.3, access to natural resources was found to be one of the proximate causes of conflict in Kenya and was found to be manifested as interethnic conflict. However, it is important to point out that land is an emotive issue in Kenya, as found by Onguny and Gillies (2019: 6-9) in their literature review stating that land disputes in Kenya are complex and highly politicised and bear historical injustices since colonial times. It remains a structural cause of conflict across the country. Therefore, peaceful access to and use of natural resources remain occasional and unsustainable, especially with land disputes. This is because of the root causes, such as boundary disputes, divisive politics, ownership, and historical injustices, that still persist.

Another observation from Figure 6.5 is that strengthening interethnic group relationships and the peaceful access to, and use of natural resources has a direct causal link. This happened in two ways. One, the interethnic relationship was restored and strengthened before the ethnic groups developed amicable solutions to access and use natural resources such as land, water, and pastures. Two, as a result of resolving natural-resource-based conflict, interethnic relationships were restored.

As described in Section 6.4.2, police violence had become a common and widespread violent conflict between security forces and communities in Kenya. This happened during violent conflicts, riots, after terror attacks, or when the police were administering law and



order. The violent confrontations between the police and communities created tension and damaged the relationship between the two parties. Some of the peacebuilding organisations implemented peacebuilding activities to restore this relationship with significant success, as reported in this study. However, as with other peacebuilding outcomes, the root causes of the different forms of conflict were never addressed. For instance, where people protest due to discrimination from the government, protests had to occur. In the north-eastern and coastal regions where youth are excluded from job opportunities and unresolved land issues and insecurity remain, violent extremism continued to happen.

As advised by Ernstorfer (2019: 9), peacebuilding projects are judged based on the extent to which the activities have responded to conflict drivers. A peacebuilding project should be designed to address one or more conflict drivers, as identified in the conflict analysis. As can be observed from the above peacebuilding outcomes, the structural and proximate conflict causes presented in Figure 6.3 remain inadequately addressed by the peacebuilding projects. The peacebuilding outcomes identified in this study were more concerned with addressing direct violence by bringing the conflict actors together, hence improving their relationship, rather than going further to address the deep-seated structural causes of conflict, such as marginalisation, discrimination, and historical grievances.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

From this analysis of the peacebuilding work, it can be observed that Kenya has a complex conflict system at both the local and national levels with multiple conflict actors involved. The four main forms of conflict include interethnic, resource-based, political, and violent extremist conflict. Police violence, cross-border conflicts, GBV, and violent protests were also observed by peacebuilding organisations to happen across the country. The forms of conflict are overlapping and interconnected.

It can also be observed that the structural and proximate causes were intertwined, leading to a complex conflict situation. The peacebuilding activities yielded some of the peacebuilding outcomes though at the personal and relational levels. The peacebuilding

outcomes observed were individual understanding about others and having mutual respect, strengthened intergroup relationships, peaceful access to natural resources, and improved relationships between the police and communities.

Structural causes such as marginalisation, poor governance, social inequalities, and historical injustices were not addressed by the peacebuilding projects. This can be attributed to the peacebuilding organisations not having done conflict analysis or having developed a weak theory of change or a weak monitoring and evaluation process to facilitate measuring the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. The following chapter is an analysis of the current monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects by peacebuilding organisations.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **STATUS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS**


#### **7.1 Introduction**

To improve the current monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects, there was a need for peacebuilding organisations to understand its strengths and weaknesses. The exploratory survey was conducted to analyse the problem as the first phase of this action research. The chapter explains the monitoring and evaluation processes by peacebuilding organisations. It further explains the level of application of monitoring and evaluation and the factors that determine the level of application. The chapter also explains the strengths and weaknesses of current monitoring and evaluation and goes further to discuss some of the threats to monitoring and evaluation in the peacebuilding field. The chapter ends with a highlight of areas of improvement that were proposed by the peacebuilding organisations. Finally, the chapter has a conclusion on the ideas presented in the chapter and points out what is expected in the subsequent chapter.

#### **7.2 Monitoring and Evaluation Processes of Peacebuilding Projects**

Monitoring and evaluation is a set of processes that facilitate the timely collection of the information on the performance of a project in addressing the development problem. As noted in the literature review, the peacebuilding field does not have its own standard monitoring and evaluation approach; instead, it has borrowed from the development and humanitarian sectors. Five processes were established in this study as to what constitutes the current monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work identified in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5. The peacebuilding organisations, according to the survey, conducted conflict analysis, designed monitoring and evaluation plans as part of the designed projects, conducted monitoring of peacebuilding projects as a way of measuring the peacebuilding process, carried out evaluation and learning activities from the peacebuilding processes. It was established that 20 of the peacebuilding organisations had conducted the five monitoring and evaluation processes for previous and current peacebuilding projects,

while nine had conducted them for some or no projects or did not know whether monitoring projects had been done, as shown in Figure 7.1.



**Figure 7.1** Monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding organisations.


Although not indicated in Figure 7.1, the study established a difference between conflict analysis and baseline surveys. It was observed that while two-thirds of the organisations conducted conflict analysis, less than half conducted a baseline survey. This percentage difference in practice indicated that organisations did not understand that the two events needed to be given equal attention. As mentioned in the literature review, Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four, there is confusion among the peacebuilding organisations between conflict analysis and a baseline survey. Conflict analysis tends to be given more attention than baseline surveys because it is a donor requirement and, in most cases, funds are allocated to it. The baseline survey is usually neglected, as seen with 14 of the organisations that conducted it.

On monitoring the peacebuilding projects, further findings were established. Most (25) of the organisations reported that they had used surveys including baseline, feedback, and perception surveys; 24 had used change stories; 14 had used outcome mapping; seven had used peace journals; and two had used other methods, which included social media metrics and evidence of change diaries. Most of these processes subscribe to a logical

framework, which is famous in results based monitoring and evaluation approach to generate the information on the expected change.

In relation to the information generated on the peacebuilding projects, it was also established that the majority of the organisations collected information on peacebuilding activities (n=28), context dynamics (n=23), and the expected results (n=27) in addition to information on the funds spent in the implementation. In relation to the results, 25 organisations were collecting information on the results/changes observed from the peacebuilding projects. This is contrary to what is stated in the literature review Section 4.3.3 in Chapter Four, on the three types of monitoring and evaluation for peacebuilding organisations. The literature shows that activity monitoring was done with less attention being given to the results and conflict monitoring. Surprisingly, what has been established in this study is that most of the peacebuilding organisations gave attention to the three monitoring and evaluation areas of peacebuilding projects which are activity, change and conflict context.

The survey further established that the data collection was done regularly, with quarterly data collection being ranked high and used by 22 of the peacebuilding organisations. Others reported that they collected the information monthly (n=19), annually (n=14), and biannually (n=10). Further analysis of the measured results was done. Figure 7.2 shows the changes that were captured during the monitoring process by the peacebuilding organisations.




**Figure 7.2** Conflict transformation's change levels documented by peacebuilding organisations

As observed in Figure 7.2, the peacebuilding organisations collected information on the four levels of change within the conflict transformation change framework. However, the frequency of personal changes was higher than the frequencies of relational, structural, and cultural changes, in descending order. It is interesting to find that structural and cultural changes were captured by most peacebuilding organisations. It is also similar to the finding on the peacebuilding outcomes established in Section 6.5 of Chapter Six, Figure 6.5 where changes at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels were recorded. However, this is contradictory to the belief that peacebuilding organisations only captured changes at the personal and relational levels.

### 7.3 Level of Monitoring and Evaluation processes in Peacebuilding Organisations

The exploratory survey showed that there were varied levels of application of monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding organisations. The project teams who participated in the survey were asked to rate the level, on a scale of 1 to 10, based on how they perceived

monitoring and evaluation processes from their experience and what was happening in their organisation. It can be observed from Figure 7.3 that the application was varied. The level of the application, according to the peacebuilding organisations, depended on many factors, which included donor influence, the technical capacity for monitoring and evaluation among the project teams, and the culture of monitoring and evaluation in the organisations, as explained in the subsequent subsections.



**Figure 7.3** Level of application of monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding organisations.

### 7.3.1 Donor Influence

From the responses, the donor influence was identified to occur in two ways. One, at the project design stage, the donors would dictate what should be included in the proposal before providing funding. For example, it was found from all the peacebuilding organisations that the project had to have a logical framework, theory of change, and a monitoring and evaluation plan and activities as basic requirements for the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects. Two, it was also revealed that the donors dictated

the budget allocation for the monitoring and evaluation activities for peacebuilding organisations. According to the survey, in most instances, the donor would allocate funds to end the project evaluation at the expense of monitoring activities. For peacebuilding projects, which are process oriented, more funding should go to monitoring than evaluation activities. The size of the budget would also be determined by the donors. It was reported in the survey that during the call for proposals, the donors would give a percentage limit on the budget which could not be exceeded. This meant that if the budget was small, the peacebuilding organisations would scale down the monitoring and evaluation activities and vice versa.

### **7.3.2 The Project Teams' Technical Capacity**

The capacity for monitoring and evaluation was also found to be another factor in determining the level of monitoring and evaluation practices shown by the peacebuilding organisations. The responses from the peacebuilding organisations were categorised into the knowledge and skills required to conduct effective monitoring and evaluation and the presence of a technical monitoring and evaluation person to guide the monitoring and evaluation. The knowledge and skills were ranked high by the project teams who participated in the survey as a factor that determined the level of application. The technical knowledge and skills were in reference to what they should monitor in peacebuilding projects and how this should be done.

The capacity gap on the availability of a technical monitoring and evaluation person conducting monitoring and evaluation was also mentioned. Some mentioned that they did not have a technical monitoring and evaluation person in place to guide the rest of the team. This was expressed by one of the interviewees who stated, "We have no monitoring and evaluation officer, we dependent on the services of external expert, who visit once in a while". Another interviewee also echoed the same sentiment by stating that "Most of the organisations do not have monitoring and evaluation persons. Even if they have, they do not have the training on monitoring and evaluation". This shows that having an internal monitoring and evaluation person in the peacebuilding organisations is a valuable resource for an effective monitoring and evaluation process.



### **7.3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Culture**

In the survey, the culture of monitoring and evaluation was also established to have a contribution to the level of application. According to the responses, the culture revolved around two factors. One was the purpose of conducting monitoring and evaluation. From the survey, it was found that the majority of the organisations collected information on activities (n=29), context dynamics (n=23), and results (n=27) in addition to information on the funds spent in the implementation. It is significant to point out that although the peacebuilding organisations reported to be generating information on the results, it was further established through the interviews that they had collected information on outputs that were direct results of peacebuilding activities and easy to capture. Examples of the outputs mentioned were the formation of local peace committees, community leaders who had participated in the capacity-building training, and interethnic declarations that were made. The outputs serve as stepping stones towards achieving peacebuilding outcomes and relating them to changes observed from conflict actors on behaviour and relationships. Peacebuilding outcomes are more difficult to document due to their qualitative nature and their being as a result of interaction between peacebuilding activities, different activities of multiple actors, and the exchange of information. The survey further found that the data collection was done regularly, with quarterly data collection being ranked high and used by 22 of the peacebuilding organisations. Collecting the information regularly is a good indicator of a positive culture because progress can be assessed at any time.

The second factor was the involvement of conflict actors in data collection, particularly the local communities who were affected by conflict. From the survey, the project teams from all the peacebuilding organisations were involved in conducting the monitoring and evaluation processes. The conflict actors who were recipients of the peacebuilding activities were reported by 15 organisations to be sparingly involved, and donors were rarely involved, according to four organisations. This could be attributed to the extractive nature of current results-based monitoring and evaluation approach used by peacebuilding organisations. It seeks to generate information for accountability and reporting with less emphasis on learning and improving peacebuilding processes. This


was confirmed by this study where all the organisations were found to use the information to inform the donor of the progress (reporting) and to inform the project design of the next project. Only a few organisations (approximately three) mentioned using the information for learning and improving the current peacebuilding activities.

#### **7.3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation methods and approaches**


Most (25) of the organisations reported that they used the current monitoring and evaluation methods such as surveys, evaluations, and change stories, and a few used some of the effective approaches, such as peace journals and outcome mapping. As cited earlier in the literature review, these methods and approaches used by the peacebuilding organisations were not suitable for the complex and organic nature of the peacebuilding projects. Peace journals and outcome mapping have been tried by a few organisations and shown to be effective to some extent in collecting the data on peacebuilding outcomes. The two are among complexity-aware approaches that are emergent and adaptive.

### **7.4 Evidence on Effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Projects**

The project teams were asked whether they had generated enough evidence to show how peacebuilding projects were working and if they had made a difference. Based on their overall assessment, they gave individual rates between 1 and 10. The results showed varied rates across the project teams from the peacebuilding organisations. As can be observed from Figure 7.4, most of the peacebuilding organisation rates were below 6, a level that the researcher feels does not generate insufficient information. As noted in this section, most of the information generated as evidence was more on the peacebuilding activities conducted and their related outputs and less on the peacebuilding outcomes. The study found that the same factors that affected the level of application affected the amount of evidence generated on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. The factors included donor influence, weak monitoring and evaluation processes, the monitoring and evaluation culture, and technical capacity. Figure 7.5 shows the factors that affect the evidence generated by peacebuilding organisations.



**Figure 7.4** Perception rate on evidence generated on effectiveness of peacebuilding work.




**Figure 7.5** Factors that affected evidence generated by peacebuilding organisations.

As shown in Figure 7.5, there was a causal link between some of the factors that affected the evidence generated by the peacebuilding organisations. Donor influence that includes monitoring and evaluation requirements and funding allocated to monitoring and evaluation was a foundational factor. It had a direct effect on the technical capacity for monitoring and evaluation because the training of the project teams attracted a cost to it. Each peacebuilding project is unique and, therefore, training of the staff is required. If there is no budget allocation, the project teams conduct the monitoring and evaluation in a trial-and-error manner. The donor influence also had a direct influence on the monitoring and evaluation processes. As noted in the survey, the project teams claimed that the current monitoring and evaluation was donor-driven. Therefore, the peacebuilding organisations, in most cases, were given the guidelines that they had to use during the project implementation. Once the donors had dictated the processes, the evidence generated was directly influenced because deviation from the donor requirements would mean that they risked losing their funding. The technical capacity and monitoring and evaluation culture influenced each other. When the staff had knowledge and their skills

built, there was a likelihood of them changing their attitude and perception on the monitoring and evaluation and way of generating evidence.

## **7.5 Analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation Processes**

A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis (SWOT) was conducted to gain insight into the dynamics of monitoring and evaluation processes being carried out by peacebuilding organisations. Strengths were characteristics of the monitoring and evaluation that peacebuilding organisations felt were advantageous, and weaknesses were those characteristics that constrained them in measuring the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. The strengths and weaknesses were internal, and the peacebuilding organisations had some control over them. On the other hand, opportunities were external factors that peacebuilding organisations could exploit to strengthen their monitoring and evaluation. Threats were external factors but negatively affected how the peacebuilding organisations conducted monitoring and evaluation. The findings generated from the survey and interviews with the peacebuilding organisations were used to generate the SWOT analysis, as presented in Figure 7.6.



**Figure 7.6** SWOT analysis of current monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects.

The current monitoring and evaluation processes had different strengths that peacebuilding organisations could leverage to improve the monitoring and evaluation. Each donor, with the exception of a few non-traditional donors, had monitoring and evaluation guidelines on how the monitoring and evaluation processes for the peacebuilding projects that they were funding should be conducted. Examples of such donors included USAID and FCDO which have their own guidelines and strongly recommended the use of the guidelines with little flexibility.

In the survey, the peacebuilding organisations reported that they collected information frequently. Despite the challenges of technical capacity, the culture of the regular collection of information by the peacebuilding organisations was a strength. The collection of information ensured that results were reported more frequently as they emerged from the activities implemented. Conducting regular reviews was another strength, as reported by 22 of the peacebuilding organisations. It was a moment to gather more information on performance and to analyse the progress of the peacebuilding projects. It was also a platform for learning from experience and making decisions on the implementation of the project. The survey revealed that 21 of the organisations conducted evaluations for all projects, while four did this occasionally. Evaluations were also moments for learning from the peacebuilding projects on whether the peacebuilding strategies had been effective or not. The learning informed the improvement of the peacebuilding processes.

Four weaknesses were observed from the survey, as shown in Figure 7.6. The technical capacity of the project teams was mentioned by all the peacebuilding organisations as a major weakness. As described above, inadequate skills and knowledge on the monitoring and evaluation processes made it difficult for peacebuilding organisations to conduct effective monitoring and evaluation. Weak monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods were also identified as a weakness by the peacebuilding organisations, particularly on generating evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. The findings showed that the available monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods were ineffective in capturing the peacebuilding outcomes on changes in behaviour, attitudes, and relationships, which are critical in peacebuilding work. Inadequate data analysis was also another weakness that was identified. The data analysis helps the project teams to identify trends and patterns and select lessons that can be used to improve the project. A few (nine) organisations conducted data analysis. The final weakness was the exclusion of the many conflict actors in the collection and analysis of the information. A lack of participation by the conflicting parties, especially the target communities, does not yield as many peacebuilding outcomes as expected and does not support evidence-based conflict transformation.

Some of the threats observed for the monitoring and evaluation included donors having power over how the peacebuilding organisations conducted monitoring and evaluation. The fact that donors demanded that the organisations adhere to their monitoring and evaluation guidelines and restricted funding for the monitoring and evaluation activities meant that the peacebuilding organisations remained under their control with little autonomy to improve the prevailing monitoring and evaluation processes on their own. The availability of funding for peacebuilding events was another threat. As explained in Section 6.4.2 in Chapter Six, the donors funded peacebuilding events and not projects that addressed the root causes of the conflict. With this orientation, all the peacebuilding organisations reported on what was done and whether the conflicting parties had stopped fighting. This type of peace does not last because the root causes persist. The fact that the donors and peacebuilding organisations continue to focus on funding the peacebuilding events is a threat to monitoring and evaluation, which is focused on generating evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding work.

Two opportunities were identified in this survey. The first was the fact that there were monitoring and evaluation approaches that had emerged that were flexible and focused on the conflict actors' behavioural changes and relationships. These approaches are adaptative, flexible, and support the generation of evidence and learning. They are also participatory in nature. Outcome mapping and peace journals were identified to have been used by peacebuilding organisations. The experience on the use of these approaches can be exploited to test others such as developmental evaluation, process tracking, process monitoring of impact, and outcome harvesting. The second opportunity was the fact that the peacebuilding sector had created an environment conducive to reflection and learning. Both peacebuilding organisations and donors have accepted and started to encourage learning from peacebuilding processes as opposed to only reporting for accountability.

## **7.6 Areas for Improving Monitoring and Evaluation Processes**

A number of suggestions were given by the peacebuilding organisations on how the current monitoring and evaluation processes could be strengthened. The suggestions indicate how to generate sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work.



From the responses and SWOT analysis, four broad categories or areas were established:

- *Capacity building of the project teams:* All the peacebuilding organisations identified the capacity of the project teams as being inadequate to conduct effective monitoring and evaluation. They proposed that capacity be built on monitoring and evaluation processes, the use of monitoring and evaluation findings, learning, and improving the peacebuilding activities. There was a need for the project teams to understand that monitoring and evaluation was a continuous process during peacebuilding, which is different from the development sector. Therefore, they should be conscious of new monitoring and evaluation approaches and seek continuous skills development.
- *Develop simple monitoring and evaluation process suitable for peacebuilding:* The peacebuilding organisations reported that current monitoring and evaluation processes have not been able to capture behavioural and relationship changes, which are the main, or key, inputs in building sustainable peace. In addition, some reported that there was a need to integrate and mix approaches to complement each other during data collection. The monitoring and evaluation approach should also be dynamic enough because peacebuilding is a dynamic process and context specific. As observed in this study, the current monitoring and evaluation processes are rigid and based on linear and logical frameworks that do not work in rapidly changing and complex conflict situations.
- *Involvement of community and other conflict actors:* The majority of the peacebuilding organisations reported that they did not engage communities in the conflict context in data collection and analysis. The survey found that the project teams mostly generated data for reporting progress. The engagement of the community and other conflict actors in the process of data collection and analysis will ensure that the evidence is used for transforming the conflict by the community and for the community.
- *Learning and adaptation is needed:* Due to a lack of or little data analysis, there was little discussion on the evidence during the regular review. Evidence-based

learning and reflection will enable the peacebuilding organisations to adapt accordingly to a changing conflict context. The learning should be embedded in the processes rather than done as an afterthought.

The areas of improvement cut across international, national, and local organisations. From the analysis of the current monitoring and evaluation processes, it is significant to point out that this action research aimed at improving the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects and was informed by these findings. The research study selected the development of a simple monitoring and evaluation process suitable for peacebuilding work; the involvement of conflict actors, especially communities directly affected by conflict; and learning and improving peacebuilding processes to inform the selection of the outcome harvesting approach as an action to be undertaken, as will be described in Chapter Eight.

## **7.7 Conclusion**

Most of the peacebuilding organisations had monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects, as established in this study. It can be observed that the processes were more oriented towards results-based, logical, and linear frameworks dictated by results-based monitoring and evaluation approach. It was also found that the organisations had varied levels of application of the monitoring and evaluation processes. They reported regularly on implemented activities, results, and the conflict context. The peacebuilding organisations also had varied levels of generation of evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. The application and evidence generation were affected by donor influence, monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods, the capacity of the project teams, and the monitoring and evaluation culture.

A SWOT analysis identified monitoring and evaluation guidelines by donors, the culture of collecting the information regularly, and conducting project reviews as strengths. The weaknesses included donor influence, weak monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods, the exclusion of communities and other stakeholders, and inadequate technical capacity of the project teams. There were also opportunities identified that also assisted the achievement of this research. The emerging complexity-aware approaches that had

been developed and commitment to learning by donors and peacebuilding organisations became facilitating factors for this research. The two threats were donor influence and peacebuilding work still being focused on events as opposed to change. As stated in the following chapter, the outcome harvesting approach was used to address the weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **ACTION TO STRENGTHENING MONITORING AND EVALUATION FOR PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

This chapter concerns the action undertaken to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes being carried out by peacebuilding organisations. The outcome harvesting approach was selected by the researcher as a monitoring and evaluation process to address some of the weaknesses identified in Chapter Seven. Outcome harvesting approach is a relatively new monitoring and evaluation process which has been known to support the generation of sufficient evidence of change for projects operating in a complex environment. It has been used in evaluating projects such as those involving human rights advocacy; policy-making advocacy; political, economic, and environmental advocacy; among other projects.

The chapter begins with a brief description of the outcome harvesting approach. Subsequently, an outline of the action planning and implementation is done. The chapter further presents the findings on the post-training assessment of the project teams on the outcome harvesting approach. Finally, the chapter conclusion highlights the focus of Chapter Nine on the outcomes harvested for the peacebuilding projects implemented by four peacebuilding organisations.


#### **8.2 Outcome Harvesting Approach**

Outcome harvesting was invented around 2002 by Ricardo Wilson-Grau and his colleagues, or co-evaluators, as an evaluation tool to enable evaluators, grantors, and managers to identify, formulate, verify, and make sense of changes associated with intervention (Railer *et al.* 2020: 1139). However, with time, it has emerged that the outcome harvesting approach is also effective in monitoring (Paz-Ybarnegaray and Douthwaite 2017: 279). By 2019, when Ricardo Wilson-Grau published a book on outcome harvesting, the approach had been applied by over 500 NGOs, networks, government agencies, funding agencies, CBOs, research institutions, and universities

worldwide in evaluating projects on human rights advocacy; political, economic, and environmental advocacy; conflict; and peace; among others.

Outcome harvesting is now a monitoring and evaluation process used to systematically identify, describe, verify, and analyse outcomes as a result of project influence (Blundo-Canto *et al.* 2017: 2). Outcomes can be positive or negative, intended or unintended, and planned or unplanned. In the context of outcome harvesting, an outcome is an observable and verifiable change in behaviour, relationships, actions, activities, practices, or social norms or policies of an individual, group, community, organisation in civil society, corporation, government, the media, or member of the public (Wilson-Grau and Britt 2012: 1). Outcome harvesting collects evidence of what has been achieved and works backwards to establish the link with the project. Unlike other traditional monitoring and evaluation approaches, it does not measure progress towards predetermined goals, objectives, outcomes, or targets (Paz-Ybarnegaray and Douthwaite 2017: 281). Outcome harvesting is applicable where there is no plan or where the plan has become irrelevant due to rapid and unpredictable changes in the context. It is useful in complex settings, where there is no clear link between the intervention and the change. Outcome harvesting has also become a useful tool to uncover intangible and unintended changes and encourage learning on how social change happens (Blundo-Canto *et al.* 2017: 276).

The outcome harvesting process is carried out in six iterative steps, as explained in a recent book entitled *Outcome Harvesting: Principles, Steps, and Evaluation Applications* by Wilson-Grau (2018: 59-159) and depicted in Figure 8.1. The step includes, design the harvest, review documentation and draft outcomes, engage with informants, substantiate, analyse and interpret and support use of the findings. These steps have been described after Figure 8.1.



**Figure 8.1** Steps of outcome harvesting process(adapted from Wilson-Grau 2015)

The steps of the outcome harvesting process are explained as follows:

- **Step 1: Design the outcome harvest**

In this first step, the roles of the harvester (external evaluator), harvest users (primarily the managers, grantors, and donors), and change agents (implementing organisations) are clarified. Outcome harvest evaluation questions are also designed, information needs are outlined, and data collections are clarified. In some instances, where there are many documents, the selection of documents to be reviewed for the identification of initial outcomes is done during this step.

- **Step 2: Gather data and draft outcome descriptions**

The harvester reviews all the relevant documents. They include progress reports, press statements, feedback from target beneficiaries, and donor reports, among other documents. The harvester identifies and starts describing the outcome statements. One of the noticeable gaps in this stage is the information gaps in the outcome statements. In some instances, especially when outcome harvesting is used as a monitoring tool, the outcomes are identified from primary sources, which include the target actors involved in the project. The harvester asked the project teams to draft the outcomes and then brought them forth for further discussion.

- Step 3: Engage with key informants

Discussions are held by the project teams to review and give further information on the outcome descriptions. This can either be done in one-on-one interviews or through participatory workshops. Additional outcomes are identified during the engagement between the change agent and harvester. The information on who changed, what changed, and when and where changes took place is generated. Further description is given on why the change agent considers the outcome noteworthy or relevant. Finally, the harvester ensures that the contribution analysis is done by establishing how the change agent contributed to the outcomes identified. In some cases, the source of the information is indicated.

- Step 4: Substantiate the significant outcomes

In most cases and depending on the project period, many outcomes are harvested. It is within the power of the harvester to select the most significant outcomes and subject them to an independent and objective review by a third party. Caution must be taken to ensure that the review is done by an independent party knowledgeable on change agent work. Sometimes, an internal review can be done by internal project teams who are not the implementers of the project under review or externally by other stakeholders who have interacted with the project under evaluation. The aim of the substantiation is to verify the accuracy of the outcomes' information. In some instances, more outcomes may be identified and documented.

- Step 5: Analysis and interpretation of the outcomes

The analysis can be done in different ways to serve monitoring and evaluation purposes. For evaluation, the analysis is done once. However, for monitoring, there is a continuous collection of the outcomes over time to give a change story. The analysis is done by categorising the outcomes according to the type of change, social actor, or type of contribution of the projects. The patterns developed are interpreted to answer the outcome harvest questions.

- Step 6: Support the use of the findings

During this step, the primary users have a choice to engage with the harvester in internalising the recommendations and implementation. In most cases, the

harvester conducts the exit meeting and leaves the change agent, donors, and managers to use the findings in the way they find most suitable.

For the purposes of this action research study, the outcome harvesting approach was chosen as a suitable action to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work. Outcome harvesting has challenged the assumption of a linear relationship between the project and change, which has been held for decades. It documents the outcomes and, working backwards, traces the contribution of the project, which does not necessarily have to be linear. Peacebuilding projects are implemented in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable conflict contexts. Peacebuilding outcomes from these projects come from the non-linear interaction of many social actors and factors in the conflict environment. The fact that outcome harvesting collects evidence of change and works backwards to identify and verify the contribution of the peacebuilding projects makes this tool valuable in peacebuilding work.

The flexibility of outcome harvesting informed the decision by the researcher to settle on it as an approach that has the potential to be applied in peacebuilding work. According to Wilson-Grau (the originator of the outcome harvesting approach), outcome harvesting can be applied in different contexts for different projects as long as the process and content principles are adhered to. Being an iterative process, from the six steps, one can choose the steps to use and the ones to leave out. In this research study, outcome information was collected from data from the target social actors (step 2), outcome descriptions were crafted (step 3), and analysis was conducted (step 5). These three steps were adequate in generating evidence of peacebuilding projects for the purposes of the monitoring of current running projects.

It is also important to mention that outcome harvesting is an emerging monitoring and evaluation process and has not yet been widely tested (Guerin 2020: 2). It is among many other complexity-aware monitoring approaches that are still emerging and growing to fill the gap where traditional monitoring and evaluation approaches have failed to explain how social systemic change happens in the complex settings. Although it has been used in evaluating different projects involving advocacy, human rights, and the environment, little information exists on its extensive use in monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding



projects. This research, therefore, provided an opportunity to test the effectiveness of outcome harvesting in collecting evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects.

### **8.3 Action Planning and Implementation**

For this action research, four parts were developed to guide the implementation. The section includes theory of change for action research and this study, purpose and objectives of the action, plan for activity implementation, activities plan and activity adaptation during implementation. The subsections 8.3.1 to 8.3.6 has been described in the following sections.

#### **8.3.1 Theory of Change of Action Research**

A theory of change is a description of how change will happen from the implemented activities. The practice of developing a theory of change has become increasingly prominent in international development, and it is a requirement for every project to have one (Archibald *et al.* 2016: 121). It explicitly describes the change pathways, hence showing the progress and achievement which is to be tracked progressively. The preconditions necessary to move from outcome to outcome, known as assumptions, make the theory of change a flexible tool and one that is applicable in the planning of a complex project. In action research, there are two theories being tested during the research process. One is the content theory, which involves the issue and action in the research, and the other is the methodological theory, which involves the process of inquiry. This section focuses on the content theory, and other sections on the research methodology have been laid out in the research methodology chapter, Chapter Five.

The theory of change of this action research was informed by the findings of the monitoring and evaluation survey, which established the monitoring and evaluation processes, level of application, and implications for the evidence generated on peacebuilding projects. The study also identified strengths and weaknesses of current monitoring and evaluation processes. The outcome harvesting approach was selected because it captured the aspirations of peacebuilding organisations on how to address some of the weaknesses in measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. The subsequent subsection describes the theory of change for this action research study.

### **8.3.2 Theory of Change for This Study**

The main challenge in peacebuilding work has been measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding and generating evidence to support the claim that peacebuilding projects have worked. The changes are intangible and abstract in nature because they relate to changes in the attitudes, behaviours, and relationships among other conflict actors. Some of these changes include mutual respect, trust, tolerance, influence, perceptions, and mindsets, which cannot easily be measured. The logical and linear nature of results-based monitoring and evaluation currently being used has proven ineffective because of the complex nature of the conflict contexts where peacebuilding projects are implemented. The change happens in non-linear ways and, in most cases, the relationship between the project and expected change is not clear. Peacebuilding organisations continue to struggle with measuring peacebuilding outcomes, and, therefore, there is an urgent need to have a flexible, emerging, and dynamic monitoring and evaluation process in place.

This action research study is one of many other initiatives that have been previously taken to resolve this challenge. The outcome harvesting approach has emerged to be useful in monitoring projects that are operating in a complex and rapidly changing context. Unlike the linear and logical model of traditional monitoring and evaluation, outcome harvesting is focused on generating evidence of observable changes and, by working backwards, tracing how the project has contributed to the change achieved. The contribution is not necessarily linear or direct. The fact that evidence is generated around observable changes in behaviour of social actors and relationships proves to be useful in peacebuilding work.

This researcher, therefore, believed that the project teams from four peacebuilding organisations should acquire knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach, as described in the outcome harvesting methodology by Wilson-Grau (2018: 8), in a way that was simple for them to understand and practically use the outcome matrix to collect outcome information to show the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects with support from the researcher. The project teams would then understand and appreciate the need to have sufficient information on the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities, start gathering sufficient evidence guided by the outcome matrix for current and future

peacebuilding projects, and start to understand how the evidence strengthens existing peacebuilding processes to address conflict drivers.

The adoption of the outcome harvesting approach by the project teams and, by extension, the peacebuilding organisations, will start strengthening their monitoring and evaluation process. The above changes among the project teams will happen because outcome harvesting demands the generation of simple and straightforward information on observable and verifiable behavioural changes of conflict actors and changes in relationships between and among the conflict actors that can be linked to the peacebuilding projects. Further information is sought on the dynamics of conflict drivers and what the achieved changes mean for the conflict context. It is also a participatory tool that ensures that the conflict actors take part in generating information, analysing the outcomes, and taking action to address the current conflict issues. Being a participatory process means that there is also an infusion of learning from the generated evidence by both the conflict actors and peacebuilding organisations on how change happens in their target conflict context. This enables the project teams to learn from the peace process, new emerging conflict actors, and improvement of the current peacebuilding activities.

This theory of change became a reference point throughout the implementation of the cycle of this action research. It also guided the research team in coordinating the action and reflections on the research process before, during, and after the research.

### **8.3.3 Purpose and Objectives of the Action**

The purpose of the action was to empower the project teams who are critical in the implementation and generation of evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects in peacebuilding organisations. To ensure that this purpose was achieved, the research had the following specific research objectives to be achieved:

- a. To equip the project teams with knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach and how to collect evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work
- b. To support the project teams in collecting sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects using the outcome harvesting approach

- c. To evaluate the effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach regarding how it strengthened the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects

#### **8.3.4 Plan for Activity Implementation**

Under each of the above objectives, a set of activities and their targets were developed as follows:

- a. *To equip the project teams with knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach and how to collect evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work*

This objective targeted the project teams from Ghetto Foundation, MSJC, Saferworld, and EAI. There were seven female and seven male staff who participated in the research. The project teams were to undertake training in the outcome harvesting process and how to use the outcome matrix. Four trainings were done, with one training for each participating peacebuilding organisation.

Before the training, a planning meeting for each organisation was held, and the researcher developed a *simplified summary manuscript for the outcome harvesting in peacebuilding organisations* and the *post-training assessment test*. The first outcome harvesting sessions were held with Ghetto Foundation and MSJC on 6 and 7 April 2020. The outcome harvesting sessions with Saferworld were conducted on 6 May 2020, and those with EAI were conducted on 17 and 18 June 2020.

- b. *To support the project teams in collecting sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects using the outcome harvesting approach*

The project teams used the outcome matrix to fill in the information with different social actors. Airtime was provided for the project teams to conduct telephone interviews with their social target actors as they described the identified outcomes. The draft outcome matrix was shared with the researcher for review. The researcher and all the project teams went through the information on the outcomes and identified the gaps, and the researcher asked the project teams to fill the identified gaps with consultations with their social target actors. The final outcome matrices were produced. The main activities under this objective were to fill the

outcome matrix and consult with the researcher. The findings have been presented in Chapter Nine.

- c. *To evaluate the effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach regarding how it strengthened the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects*

The activities done under this objective were the outcome harvesting feedback survey, desk review, and personal reflection. The feedback survey was done between December 2020 and January 2021, while the desk review continued after the outcome matrices had been populated for use by the peacebuilding organisations. The personal reflection was done throughout the research period. The evaluation findings have been presented in Chapter Ten, and the personal reflection is presented in Section 11.4 of Chapter Eleven.

### 8.3.5 Activities Workplan

Table 8.1 presents a set of main activities that were conducted in this research study along with their timelines. One cycle was conducted with the project teams from the four peacebuilding organisations.

**Table 8.1** Activity implementation during the research period.

Phases	Activities	Target	Dates
Action planning	Monitoring and evaluation survey	1 survey	November 2019 – January 2020
	Peacebuilding organisations recruitment	10 organisations	February 2020
	Developing the presentation and action plan	1 manuscript	March 2020
Action Taking	Planning for training on the model	1 action plan	April 2020
	Outcome harvesting sessions – Mathare Social Justice Centre	3 (1 male and 2 females)	6 April 2020
	Outcome harvesting sessions – Ghetto Foundation	2 (1 male and 1 female)	7 April 2020
	Outcome harvesting sessions – Saferworld	5 (3 males and 2 females)	6 May 2020

	Outcome harvesting sessions – Equal Access International	4 (2 males and 2 females)	17 and 18 June 2020
	Filling Outcome Matrix	4 matrices	April to June 2020
Evaluation and reflection	Personal reflection	No target	November 2019 – May 2021
	Outcome harvesting feedback survey	1 survey	January 2021

### 8.3.6 Activity Adaptation During Implementation

During the implementation of the activities in Table 8.1, several changes were made to the workplan to adapt to the context.

#### a. *Action-planning phase*

This phase started with conducting an exploratory survey of the current monitoring and evaluation processes used in the peacebuilding work. This was done between November 2019 and January 2020. Due to COVID-19, no validation workshop was held as planned. Instead, the researcher held individual consultations with the project teams, specifically those who were engaged in implementing the outcome harvesting process. In addition, the researcher did not develop a new Peacebuilding Oriented Monitoring and Evaluation Model as planned earlier. The model was to be developed through a consultative process with peacebuilding organisations, which was not done because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, the researcher adopted the outcome harvesting approach. Recently, donors have been involved in a campaign to fund peacebuilding organisations to adopt outcome harvesting in the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work. The researcher, therefore, decided to use the outcome harvesting approach in place of a model in his action research. He developed a *simple manuscript and design for the outcome matrix* to guide the project teams in generating information on the peacebuilding outcomes of the projects that they were implementing.

**b. Action-taking phase**

This was done by peacebuilding organisations that had expressed an immediate need to improve the way that they gathered evidence during the monitoring and evaluation survey. The researcher sought permission and started engaging the project teams in implementation and reporting. The implementation of the outcome harvesting approach was started in April 2020 and completed in June 2020 with four organisations. The implementation work was centred on filling the outcome matrix with outcome information.

**c. Evaluation phase**

The evaluation was done through an online feedback survey on the experience of using the outcome harvesting process and a review of the evidence generated. Personal reflection was also carried out throughout the research period instead of holding reflection meetings with organisations on their experience of the use of the outcome harvesting approach and how it can be used to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding organisations. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic where some of the participants had lost their jobs or moved to other organisations.

## **8.4 Monitoring of the Action**

Monitoring data was generated for two aspects of the action. One was activity implementation where the researcher checked whether the planned activities were implemented, as stated in Table 8.1. The results monitoring was also done with a focus on whether the objectives of the action had been achieved. The researcher used the performance indicators, as shown in Table 8.2.

**Table 8.2** Results of the action.

<b>Results</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Data collection</b>	<b>Time</b>
Project teams understood the outcome	Level of understanding on outcome harvesting in	5 from Saferworld had used outcome	14 project team members from four	Post-training assessment test	After the training

harvesting process	peacebuilding work	harvesting before	organisations had understood the concept of outcome harvesting		
Project teams collected sufficient information on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects	Evidence of sufficient information on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects	Project teams experienced difficulty in collecting evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects	Project teams started to collect sufficient information using outcome matrix	Outcome matrix and desk review	1 week after training and evaluation
Project teams articulated the appropriateness of outcome harvesting in improving current monitoring and evaluation practices	Extent to which outcome harvesting has improved the monitoring and evaluation processes	Little analysis, reflection, and learning is done from generated information	Project teams to make sense of the generated information and confirm how outcome harvesting improved monitoring and evaluation practices	Feedback survey	Once during feedback survey

## 8.5 Outcome of the Action

The findings from the action have been presented in two subsections under this section involving the findings on the action implementation and the findings on the results of the actions. Under the activity implementation, the status of the action implementation was established. Findings on the training participation have been presented. Regarding the results, indicators were used to show the progress towards the predetermined target, as described in Section 8.5.2.



### 8.5.1 Activity Implementation Status

The review of planned target and achieved was done at the end of this study. Table 8.3 presents the activity implementation progress at the end of the research process. The table contains phases of action research, activities planned, target and achieved.

**Table 8.3** Activity implementation progress of the research

Phases	Activities	Target	Achieved
Action planning	Monitoring and evaluation survey	1 survey	1 survey conducted
	Peacebuilding organisations recruitment	10 organisations	4 organisations accepted to participate in the research
	Developing the manuscript and action plan	1 manuscript	3–5 pages manuscript developed
Action taking	Planning for training on the model	1 action plan	1 action plan done
	4 outcome harvesting sessions held	4 sessions	4 sessions were done
	Implementation of outcome harvesting	4 outcome matrices	4 matrices filled with outcome information
Evaluation and reflection	Collective reflection meetings	Reflection to be done	Reflection conducted
	Evaluation	1 feedback survey	1 feedback survey conducted

The activities were implemented as planned with slight modifications, as explained in Section 8.3.6. Apart from the monitoring and evaluation survey, the outcome harvesting sessions, filling of the outcome matrix, and feedback survey were done virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions. A total of 14 people (seven male and seven female) participated in the outcome harvesting training. It was a 1-day virtual training on how to document the outcomes from the peacebuilding projects that the organisations were implementing. Table 8.4 presents the gender of the project team participants.

**Table 8.4** Gender of the project team participants.

<b>Organisations</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Mathare Social Justice Centre	1	2	3
Ghetto Foundation	1	1	2
Saferworld	3	2	5
Equal Access International	2	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>

### **8.5.2 Results of Implementing the Outcome Harvesting Training Sessions**


To capture the information on the results of the action research, the findings have been described under each specific objective. The first objective has been described in this chapter. The second objective will be described in the following chapter. The third objective will be described in the discussion of the evaluation because it matched the study's third objective on the evaluation of the action. Under each objective, the progress towards the indicator was assessed.

*Objective: To equip the project teams with knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach and how to collect evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding work*

*Indicator: Level of understanding of the outcome harvesting approach in peacebuilding work*

To assess whether the project teams had understood the concepts of outcome harvesting, a post-training assessment test was conducted. From the assessment findings, all 11 members of the project teams who had participated in the outcome harvesting sessions agreed that outcome harvesting collects evidence of change and then works backwards to assess the contribution of the peacebuilding projects. Out of the 11 members, nine agreed that outcome harvesting was appropriate for complex situations where cause–effect relationships cannot be easily traced or understood, and finally, all 11 members agreed that outcome harvesting, if done correctly, can collect evidence for both expected and unexpected outcomes. This showed that the project team members understood the concepts of the outcome harvesting approach.


In relation to the development of the outcome description, the project teams were asked whether they knew the three parts of the outcome description. All 11 members indicated that outcome description has outcome statements, significance, and contribution. They were also asked to identify the four questions that needed to be answered when collecting the outcome information. As seen in Figure 8.2, most of them indicated that *who changed*, *what changed*, and *when and where* changes took place were the most critical questions to generate evidence on the outcomes.



**Figure 8.2** Questions to be asked during outcome harvesting.

Regarding the understanding of the contribution to the outcome, six members correctly stated that contribution is about the verified influence on the change achieved as opposed to causing it. Five members agreed with a statement that showed that they had not clearly understood that in outcome harvesting, the contribution is what is verifiable as opposed to attribution of change to the projects. In relation to the significance of the outcomes, 10 out of 11 members stated that when describing the significance, one focuses on linking the outcome with the project objectives, determining the size of the outcome, whether the outcome is being achieved for the first time, and whether the outcome involves systemic change. This finding further confirmed that the project teams had understood how to collect the outcome information. It is this structure that was used to develop the outcome matrix that they used in generating the outcome information.

The post-training assessment test further sought to find out whether the participants had understood which steps of the outcome harvesting could be applied in the monitoring of peacebuilding projects. The findings are shown in Figure 8.3.



**Figure 8.3** Application of outcome harvesting process.

As can be observed from Figure 8.3, the majority would apply all the steps, but the members reported that they would mainly use steps 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Practically, steps 4 and 6 are the least used in the monitoring using outcome harvesting. When they were asked about their level of confidence to conduct outcome harvesting, seven members were at level 4, and four were at level 5. This showed that the participants felt that they were confident in conducting the outcome harvesting process. Some of the reasons cited by the project teams are presented here. A staff member from Ghetto Foundation stated that “I have been present during the outcome and seen the process of collecting outcomes and verifying these outcomes with the related activities”. One of the staff from Saferworld stated, “I have been trained on outcome harvesting and participated in more than eight outcome harvesting exercise of projects which were led by Thomas”, and another from Saferworld stated, “I have gone through the trainings, participated in actual outcome

harvesting process as well as outcome harvesting evaluation process that has given me significant level of practice and understanding of the subject and its application”.

From the above findings, it can be concluded that the project team understood the concepts of outcome harvesting, which are constituted of internalising the definition of an outcome; crafting outcome statements that have a description, significance, and contribution; and the three major parts and steps of conducting outcome harvesting. Of significance to generating evidence is the fact that they had a high level of confidence in conducting the outcome harvesting. This means that they gained skills to identify and formulate the outcomes from the peacebuilding projects that they had implemented.

## **8.6 Conclusion**

The outcome harvesting approach was selected as an action to be implemented by four peacebuilding organisations. It is a monitoring and evaluation process that collects evidence of change and tracks backwards to identify the contribution from the peacebuilding project. To implement this action, 14 project team members from the four organisations were trained on outcome harvesting. This was done between April and June 2020. The training was done virtually, and coordination was achieved through telephone calls. The findings from the post-training assessment test showed that they had understood the process of outcome harvesting and outcomes description during the data collection.

It is also important to state that apart from conducting outcome harvesting sessions with the project teams, other activities were conducted in this action research study. They include developing and implementing the workplan, monitoring the progress, and developing the action research theory of change. These activities resulted in 35 outcomes harvested by the project teams, as will be described in Chapter Nine.

## **CHAPTER NINE**

### **OUTCOME HARVESTING OF PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS**

#### **9.1 Introduction**

This chapter describes the evidence generated by peacebuilding organisations during the action research in line with the second objective of the action research. The objective involved *the project teams being able to collect sufficient information on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects*. The indicator to measure progress on this objective can be stated as “Evidence of sufficient information on effectiveness of peacebuilding projects available”. The chapter has been structured in accordance with three peacebuilding projects implemented by four peacebuilding organisations.

The three projects were subjected to the outcome harvesting process by the project teams. First, Saferworld had a project implemented in Samburu County addressing resource-based conflict brought about by different uses of rangeland resources. The second peacebuilding project was implemented by Ghetto Foundation and MSJC. The project sought to address extra-judicial killings (EJK) in the informal settlements in the city of Nairobi. The third was a project implemented by EAI on preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE) in the counties of Nairobi, Garissa, and Wajir. Under each project, a brief description has been presented on the context and expected changes. The evidence generated during this research has also been analysed and shows how the project addressed the conflict drivers. Under each project, a test of the theory of change using the harvested outcomes was done. The chapter ends with a conclusion and statement on the following chapter.

#### **9.2 Prevention of Resource-Based Conflict in Samburu County**

Samburu County is one of the counties in the greater region of northern Kenya. It borders Marsabit County to the east and north-east, Isiolo County to the south-east, Laikipia County to the south, Baringo to the south-west, and Turkana County to the west and north-west. The county is sparsely populated with a population of 223,947. Eighty percent (80%) of the Samburu inhabitants belong to the Samburu ethnic group, while the remaining 20%

are shared among the Turkana, Pokot, Borana, and other ethnic groups of Kenya (Trizer 2019: 14-17). The county is semi-arid; thus, a majority of the inhabitants keep livestock as the main source of their livelihoods, with a few, especially those living in the highland areas of Malaso and Morijo in Poro and Ang'ata Nanyukie Wards, respectively, practising agro-pastoralism. Pastoralism is the main economic activity but also a source of employment and support for the cultural system for over 90% of pastoralist communities in Samburu and the neighbouring counties of Marsabit, Baringo, Turkana, and Isiolo (County Government of Samburu 2018: 1).

The rangeland resources, particularly water and pastures that support livestock production, have largely been managed by a council of elders over the years, with informal rules to regulate the access to and use of these resources in the common areas. Samburu County has a complex rangeland ecosystem with different actors having different ways of access and use. The rangeland actors included private ranches, different ethnic groups in the county and from neighbouring counties, national and county governments, private investors, and a council of elders. The inconsistency in and different ways of access to and use of rangeland resources cause a complex conflict system in Samburu County. There is a lack of an effective legal framework to coordinate rangeland resources. The previously effective informal council of elders and its informal rules have almost been rendered irrelevant in Samburu County. This has led to the unregulated exploitation of rangeland resources, the alienation of others from having access to rangeland resources, and perennial resource-based conflicts (Pas 2018: 3).

The effects of climate variations and weather shocks mostly characterised by recurrent droughts and erratic rainfall has also made the situation unbearable for these pastoralist communities. The delayed onset of rainfall, poor and unevenly distributed rainfall, and high temperatures coupled with long dry spells experienced in the county have reduced the availability of pastures and water. Climate variations in arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) counties have significantly increased the resource-based conflict due to competition over the scarce resources of water and pastures for the livestock.

It is significant to note that the same challenges experienced in Samburu County are also faced by the neighbouring counties of Baringo, Turkana, Marsabit, Isiolo, and Laikipia. As such, nomadic pastoralists in these counties traverse these arid counties to share grazing land and water points located in these counties. During dry spells, the physical boundaries across counties are disregarded as pastoralist communities cross over to other counties in search of pastures and water. The intra-ethnic rules of access to rangelands become impossible to apply to other ethnic groups who neither understand nor know whether they exist, consequently leading to violent confrontations among different ethnic groups, counter-accusations of aggression, and sometimes claims of taking over land ownership.

### **9.2.1 Peacebuilding Initiative by Saferworld**

Saferworld, with support from FCDO and the former DFID, implemented a project dubbed “Promoting sustainable natural resource management through improved rangeland governance in Samburu County in northern Kenya”. The project covered five wards of Samburu County. They were the wards of Wamba, Waso, Ang’ata Nanyukie, Suguta, and Loosuk. These were the wards most affected by the effects of climate change and experiences of violent conflicts among the different ethnic groups. The project supported local communities to organise themselves and become part of decision-making processes at the community and county levels.

The communities were organised into ward community action groups (WCAGs) to generate conversations around rangeland resource issues affecting them and seek local solutions that include engaging county officials at the local and county levels to legislate and provide service delivery. By December 2019, a total of five WCAGs were formed in five target wards: Wamba, Waso, Ang’ata Nanyokie, Suguta, and Loosuk. They had a total of 89 members (72 males and 17 females) with each WCAG’s membership ranging from 14 to 20 community representatives. The membership comprises elders, youth, women, people living with disabilities, private ranch owners and conservancies, ethnic groups, pasture and water management committees, water user associations, and local religious leaders, among other groups.



Forming the WCAG by communities was one of the significant steps in developing a collective framework for regulating access to rangeland resources in Samburu County. The capacity of WCAGs was developed to engage with local and county authorities and other stakeholders on different issues. To ensure that this happened, the WCAGs were facilitated through a participatory rangeland resource mapping and action planning between January and April 2019. They actively implemented their action plans, which included holding awareness meetings on climate change mitigation, providing oversight to county government projects, and mobilising communities to participate in county planning and budgeting processes.

### **9.2.2 Effectiveness of Project Activities in Samburu County**

From the outcome harvesting by the Saferworld project team, a total of 12 outcomes were harvested as evidence on how the project was addressing the resource-based conflict in the target wards. Nine of the outcomes were observed at the community level, and three were observed at the county level. At the community level, the key social actors involved were community members; community leaders; and local structures such as councils of elders, women groups, WCAGs, and private ranchers. It can be observed that more outcomes were collected on the changes happening at the community rather than county level. This was expected because resource-based conflict is experienced by different communities and other local social actors living in the target wards. At the county level, the county assembly and county executive were identified to have changed due to the influence from community members and WCAGs supported by Saferworld and other development partners such as Child Fund.

The outcomes were categorised into three change categories, as shown in Table 9.1. As can be observed from Table 9.1, more outcomes were about regulating access to rangeland resources and local peacebuilding structures. This indicates that both regulations and structures are important as local conflict transformation mechanisms in the communities.

**Table 9.1** Outcomes harvested by Saferworld

Themes	County	Community	Total
Regulatory mechanisms	1	3	4
Local peacebuilding structures	0	5	4
County investments in rangeland management	2	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>

Further analysis was carried out to examine the outcomes under each change category. The findings have been described in the following subsections.

**a. *Regulatory mechanisms developed to regulate access to pastures and water***

From the outcomes harvested, four outcomes (Table 9.2) explicitly showed that the project achieved this directly. The mechanisms were in two forms. First, collective agreements made by the different social actors at the community level. This included agreements between private ranchers with local pastoralists and a council of elders taking the responsibility to develop rules for grazing. These forms of local agreements reduced incidents of conflict at the community level. Second, the other two outcomes were about county governments developing a rangeland management policy through a participatory process that saw the incorporation of community rangeland issues in the policy.

**Table 9.2** Outcomes on regulatory mechanisms.

Outcome statements	Social actors
In June 2019, at the Waso Ward office, a community leader who is a member of a ward community action group (WCAG) in Waso Ward held a meeting with a Member of County Assembly (MCA) where they deliberated on policy issues specific to Waso Ward that needed to be incorporated in the Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy.	Community leader and MCA
Council of elders from target communities in all 5 wards together with WCAG members identified grazing zones and classified them into wet, dry, and drought condition zones as they were setting ground rules on pasture management during the last quarter of 2019.	Council of elders

Since the last quarter of 2019, in the wards of Suguta Marmar and Loosuk, private ranchers made an agreement with local pastoralists on how to get into ranches for grazing during the dry season. Part of the agreement was allowing pastoralists to graze their livestock for three months upon payment of a fee ranging between KES 100 and KES 500, especially during the dry season.	Private ranchers and local pastoralists
In 2019, the Samburu County Government incorporated the community priorities of rangeland communities in the Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy. The rangeland community priorities are in sections 2.4 and 2.5 and its nexus with climate change in section 2.6 of the Draft Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy.	County government

**b. *Formation and strengthening of local peacebuilding structures***

Four outcomes were observed to contain changes on local peace structures. As shown in Table 9.3, three of the structures were formed during the project period, and one was revived from its dormant state. They included WCAGs in five target counties supported directly by Saferworld. These groups became a mediation platform of many local conflicts in the communities. The Samburu, Baringo, and Laikipia (SABALA) association was formed to address conflict associated with the movement of livestock across the borders of the counties of Laikipia, Samburu, and Baringo where different ethnic groups live. The formation of a water management committee was occasioned by conflict over water points. Its formation resulted in amicable solutions to the competition over water points. One of the features in these structures was the inclusion of all the social actors and different ethnic groups. As noted in one of the outcomes, it was indicated that WCAG in the wards of Loosuk, Ang'ata Nanyoike, and Suguta Marmar expanded their membership because it had left out the vulnerable groups. As noted by Lederach (2003: 33), and in line with this evidence on the formation and strengthening of the peacebuilding structures, they should provide a mechanism and process that provide adaptive responses to local current and future conflict incidents in the community. If peacebuilding structures sustainably and effectively provide the solutions, they ultimately address the long-term relational and systemic patterns that produce conflict among different groups. If not effective, they become redundant, just as it was found in this study, where the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu (POTUSA) grazing committee was revived because it had become

dormant, because it had not served the purpose of regulating grazing among the communities of Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu as it was formed to do.

**Table 9.3** Outcomes on local peacebuilding structures.

Outcome statements	Structure	Status
On 20 May 2019, communities living around Mnanda Pump Omo Sordo dam in Wamba Ward formed a water resource management committee to support community efforts to address water problems and associated conflicts over water points. The meeting to form the committee was held at Wamba Catholic Parish.	Water Management committee	New
Between January and March 2019, WCAGs in the wards of Ang'ata Nanyoike and Waso were involved in resolving conflict among the communities of Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Borana over pastures and water.	Ward Community Action Groups	New
In March 2019, WCAGs in the wards of Loosuk, Ang'ata Nanyoike, and Suguta Marmar expanded their memberships to include women, youths, and other social actors such as people with disabilities.	Ward Community Action Groups	New
In March 2019, WCAG members from the communities of Samburu and Turkana in Ang'ata Nanyoike Ward revived the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu (POTUSA) grazing committee by reaching out to Pokot community leaders, thereby including them in the committee.	Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu grazing committee	Old
In 2019, a Samburu, Baringo, and Laikipia (SABALA) association established a grazing committee to help in coordinating relations between the community and ranchers from the two counties. The formation was done during a meeting held at Suguta Marmar Ward by a WCAG that took action through community dialogues.	Samburu, Baringo, and Laikipia (SABALA) association	New

**c. County investment in rangeland management**

From the outcomes harvested, two outcomes at the county level and one outcome at the community level were recorded. The three outcomes had indicated the actions being invested, planned, or done at the community level. Although the County Assembly had not enacted a Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy, through other county regulations, it allocated a budget for water development projects. A total of KES 20 million was allocated to provide water to various wards, where Loosuk Ward would have new

boreholes drilled. Other development partners also supported women to form women groups formed with the support from WCAG members. Some of the women groups were conducting tree planting and other local initiatives to mitigate the effects of climate change. Table 9.4 presents the investments made in rangeland management.

**Table 9.4** Outcomes on investment in rangeland management.

<b>Outcome statements</b>	<b>Project</b>
In the fiscal year of 2018/2019, the Samburu County Assembly allocated a budgetary support of KES 20 million for ward development on water resources, following a successful petition by Waso WCAG and the Member of County Assembly.	Water resources
Since 2019, the Samburu County Government took action to resolve the lack of water in Loosuk Ward by constructing 2 new boreholes with 5 more under construction, following a petition by a WCAG in Loosuk Ward.	Boreholes
Between January and April 2020, women in Loosuk Ward formed and registered about 13 women self-help groups to mobilise resources for self and community development. Five of them were conducting tree planting and other climate mitigation initiatives.	Environmental measures

**d. Analysis of unexpected outcomes**

Three outcomes of the harvested outcomes were unexpected. This is because the project was aimed at influencing the county authority to enact a regulatory mechanism of rangeland resources. However, due to community participation in the budget process, the county authorities were put under pressure and allocated KES 20 million to provide water to communities. The formation of 13 women groups was also not anticipated by the project. However, due to the capacity building of WCAG members in Loosuk ward, they supported the women to register the groups. Five of the 13 groups addressed the effects of climate change through tree-planting activities.

**9.2.3 Testing the Project Theory of Change**

Using the harvested outcomes, the validity of the theory of change was tested. First, the four activities that contributed to the 12 outcomes were implemented. They included capacity-building trainings, intercommunal meetings, community mobilisations, and

interface meetings between the community and county officials. From the evidence indicated in the harvested outcomes from Tables 9.2 and 9.3, it can be observed that the project by Saferworld had made progress in resolving resource-based conflict in Samburu County. Four of the outcomes showed significant progress in the development of informal regulations (councils of elders, private ranchers and pastoralists, and water management committees) for peaceful access to both pastures and water. Secondly, the evidence also showed that local peacebuilding structures (both new and old) were important for local conflict transformation concerning the access to resources, and these were strengthened. The structures were the SABALA association, the POTUSA grazing committee, and WCAGs. The evidence further showed that there were efforts by county governments to make water available at the ward level, hence reducing conflict related to the shortage of water. The county had allocated a budget and started implementing it in Loosuk Ward. The above evidence showed significant progress being made in achieving the expectation of the project regarding resource-based conflict prevention.

### **9.3 Preventing Extra-Judicial Killings in Informal Settlements in the City of Nairobi**

It is estimated that the city of Nairobi has approximately 175 informal urban settlements, or slums, housing a population of 2.5 million people. This is approximately 60% of the city's population living in approximately 6% of the city's land. These informal settlements have poor conditions of social amenities and service delivery. Other challenges faced by informal settlement populations include unemployment, insecurity, social inequality, and pervasive poverty. These informal settlements are spread across 17 constituencies and 85 wards of Nairobi County. Some of the wards in these constituencies are purely informal settlements (Nairobi City County 2018: 6). Mathare, Kayole, Dandora, Baba Ndogo, Huruma, and Kariobangi are some of the known informal settlements that were within the target sites of this project.

Human rights violations are prevalent in the informal settlements. They include police brutality, especially when they arrest and harass the public with the aim of extortion and causing fear. The killing of innocent youths as suspected criminals by the police happens

before and after the youths have been arrested. To address this problem, the human rights defenders (HRD) are constantly in confrontations with the police regarding the gross violation of human rights. In most cases, they are often the only support for the relatives of victims of EJK in the informal settlements. In the informal settlements, it is often poor young men suspected of having committed a crime who are victims of EJK. Reporting of the cases is also unlikely. The community members keep quiet, either out of fear of the criminals retaliating or because they resent the police due to the profiling of informal settlements; corruption; and the judicial system, which is slow and predominantly ineffective.

Tension between police and residents (particularly youth) in the informal settlements that spills over into confrontations is a common occurrence in the informal settlements. This increases when arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, and harassment are committed by the police. This causes the youths to retaliate, leading to the police resorting to the use of force. For decades, the police in Kenya have been accused of widespread human rights abuses, including committing EJK.

### **9.3.1 Initiative by Mathare Social Justice Centre and Ghetto Foundation**

This initiative was implemented in three constituencies in the city of Nairobi which host the informal settlements. They included the constituencies of Mathare, Kamukunji, and Embakasi North of Nairobi County. The initiative was to address EJK through strengthening the capacities of HRD and the police. It was funded by the European Commission and implemented by a consortium of four peacebuilding organisations. They included the local organisations (Ghetto Foundation and MSJC) located in Mathare and two international organisations (Peace Brigades International and Saferworld). For this action research, Ghetto Foundation and MSJC accepted to participate. The outcomes analysed in the following section are those influenced by the two local organisations.

HRD in the informal settlements work under difficult circumstances, with extremely limited resources, and put themselves at risk to reduce violence from the state and hold the state authorities accountable for human rights violations. The majority of HRD are youth, hence they are potential victims of EJK. This is especially relevant given that the youth are often excluded from decision making in the social and governance structures.

Besides the capacity development of the police, HRD, and youth, their interaction and relationships were critical. The community dialogues, which were all-inclusive, became local state–community platforms for engaging in matters related to EJK. The social actors involved in the community dialogues included local administrative and community leaders, women, youth, media workers, HRD, police, and leaders of CSOs, among other actors. Influential youth in the settlements, who have groups of young people under their influence and who are often mobilised by politicians and government officials to conduct harassment, extortion, or other types of criminality, were also a main target of the project. They were engaged in human rights protection trainings by Ghetto Foundation such that they could promote advocacy for any human rights violations committed by the police, leaders, community members, and other social actors.

### **9.3.2 Effectiveness of Police–Community Relations in Nairobi Informal Settlements**

A total of 13 outcomes were harvested by the two organisations implementing the project. Eight outcomes were recorded by Ghetto Foundation, and five were harvested by MSJC. Ghetto Foundation had more evidence on change influence among the youths than the MSJC, which was more targeted to the HRD and the police. This is because youths are the target of police brutality and killings. Building their capacity on human rights protection made them vigilant and spoke against any form of human rights violations.

The outcomes were categorised into four main themes (Table 9.5). From the observations, the actors influenced by the project were the police, HRD, youths, survivors, and mothers of victims of EJK. Apart from the police, who are the government authorities, the rest of the social actors are found within the informal settlement population. They are vulnerable to police violence and human rights violations.

**Table 9.5** Outcomes harvested by MSJC and Ghetto Foundation

<b>Themes</b>	<b>Ghetto Foundation</b>	<b>MSJC</b>	<b>Total</b>
Police–community relationship	2	3	5
Access to justice	1	2	3
Youth engagement	3	0	3



Confidence among youths	3	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>

Further analysis was carried out on the outcomes under each of the change categories. The findings are described in the following subsections.

**a. *Improved relationship between police and community***

Three outcomes from MSJC and one outcome from Ghetto Foundation described the changes observed after the project had restored the relationship between the police and community. As indicated by the harvested outcomes, the attitudes of both the youth and police had changed, hence the youth and HRD could visit the police at the police station to pay a courtesy call. At the same time, the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) was invited to launch a justice centre that is supposed to monitor human rights violations by the police. This shows that the police had an understanding of the work of HRD before the emergence of a strained relationship between the police and community, especially the youth. Due to the project's influence, the police never considered the youth as their enemies. On the other hand, the youth became free to engage with the police, hence removing the fear of visiting the police station, as was the case previously. Table 9.6 presents the outcomes showing the improved relationship between the police and community.

**Table 9.6** Outcomes on improved relationship between police and community

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Outcome statements</b>	<b>Social actors</b>
MSJC	The Officer Commanding Station (OCS) for Huruma police station attended a launch of Kiamaiko Community Justice Centre following the invitation from the leadership of the centre. During the launch, she expressed her willingness to work with the community in her mandate as an officer. This happened in January 2020.	Police
	The officer in charge of crime and Officer Commanding Station (OCS) engaged community members in intercepting the trafficking of 10 foreign nationals from Ethiopia. The police were reported to have called a community human rights defender to	Police

	confirm the reports of human trafficking in Kiamaiiko Ward, Mathare Constituency. Together with the police, the 10 Ethiopian nationals were rescued from a house in Kiamaiiko, and the traffickers were arrested and charged. This happened in January 2020.	
	Individual human rights defenders held a courtesy meeting with the police at Pangani police station. This was a non-policing/informal engagement in the police station between the community members, HRD, mothers of victims, and police.	Human rights defenders
Ghetto Foundation	The youths, through the Kariobangi Community Justice Centre in Embakasi North, on 8 November 2019, confidently visited Kariobangi police station without fear, as it was before, to seek security services and for other meetings.	Youths

***b. Access to justice by victims of the extra-judicial killings***

As observed in Table 9.7, the HRD took an initiative to record the cases of human rights violations, including forced disappearances and EJK. They further went ahead to report the cases to law courts for prosecution. The recording of the cases, as indicated in the outcomes, gave the HRD sufficient evidence to prosecute the police who had committed the human rights violations. From the recording of the cases and further engagement of the mothers of victims and survivors in the court processes, according to the outcomes harvested, the victims felt that there was a need to form a network to ensure that the cases were followed to a logical conclusion. The network, according to the outcome, has been following up the cases with the police and law courts. Before the network was formed, it was the MSJC that used to follow up and which faced many challenges. It was being accused by the police of engaging in protecting criminals in the informal settlements. The revival of social justice centres, according to the outcomes, is not only an avenue for recording the cases but also a platform for engaging the communities and victims in human rights protection.

**Table 9.7** Outcomes on seeking justice for the victims.

Organisation	Outcome statements	Social actors
MSJC	Human rights defenders from Mathare, Dandora, and Kamukunji recorded and shared the cases of police killings and other human rights violations. The cases of extra-judicial killings (EJK) are shared on the Missing Voices platform. Recording started from 2019 and the practice is still ongoing.	Human rights defenders
	Mothers of victims and survivors came together and formed a network that is now doing follow-ups of cases of EJK. The network was formed in April 2019.	Mothers of victims and survivors of human rights violations
Ghetto Foundation	Youths from Kiambiu, Kiamaiko, Kariobangi, and Korogocho revived the social justice centres in their community between October 2019 and January 2020.	Youths

**c. Youth engagement in productive activities**

One of the reasons given by the police who commit EJK was that the youth in the informal settlements were involved in criminal activities. Although this is not always true, it does not permit the police to kill anyone before the person is prosecuted in a law court. The three outcomes recorded by Ghetto Foundation show the attempt of the youths to convert from criminal activities into productive activities, such as initiating a saving scheme by the groups (Kamukunji) and starting a food kiosk in the Komarock area. Table 9.8 presents the outcomes on youth engagement in productive activities.

**Table 9.8** Outcomes on youth engagement in productive activities.

Outcome statements	Activity
The Ibeba group from Majengo, Kamukunji, Constituency is a group that is associated with hard labour; all members are potters, and they help business people who come to Gikomba Market by carrying luggage. In October 2019, they formed a saving scheme to help each other in difficult times and to start earning a decent income.	Saving scheme
Some youths who were criminals converted into human rights defenders. They have converted and joined the Dandora	Defending human rights

Community Justice Centre. They belong to the Migrim Youth Group who work at the Dandora dumpsite, the largest dumping site in Nairobi.	
In the Alkamar area in Komarok, the youth organised themselves and started a food-vendor kiosk. They did this through their own contributions. The small hotel is located in Komarok Market.	Small-scale business

**d. Youth gained confidence to face the police**

Due to police harassment, arbitrary arrests, police brutality, and EJK, the youth had developed an intense fear of the police. This fear constrained the relationship between the youth and police, resulting in violent confrontation. The outcomes harvested by the two organisations show a significant improvement in the relationships between the police and youths. The outcomes show that the youth had gained courage to face the police whenever one of them was arrested. For the first time, the youth from the informal settlements went to the police station to report the police who had extorted money. The police were asked to return the money back. This was associated with the knowledge that they had gained on human rights protection from the trainings conducted by Ghetto Foundation. Table 9.9 presents the outcomes on the youth's courage to face the police.

**Table 9.9** Outcomes on youth's courage to face the police.

<b>Outcome statements</b>	<b>Violations</b>
Youths from Vietnam Base confidently visited Pangani police station in the Mathare Area on 20 January 2020 to inquire about charges laid against one of their members who was arbitrarily arrested by the police. Upon arrival at the police station, they introduced themselves and raised their concerns with the commanding officer at Pangani police station. The member of Vietnam Base was finally released.	Arbitrary arrest of youth by police
Youths from Bevers Base in the Mathare Area reported and filed a theft case at Pangani police station on 8 February 2020 against two policemen. The policemen went to their base and vandalised their video show and water kiosk business. The police then took away one of their video-show screens. The group members learned that the police never took it to the police station. The group treated the case as a theft since the police did not want to return their video-show screen.	Vandalised video and police carried away

One of the members of Angola Base in Kamukunji in the Majengo area, in October 2019, reported an extortion case by a policeman; she reported the matter to the Buru Buru police station until the policeman who took her money was summoned and returned the money to the lady.	Police extortion
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**e. *Analysis of unexpected outcomes***

In addition to the improvement in the police–community relationship as expected, four unexpected changes were observed. For instance, the youth started small-scale businesses and saving schemes as a source of income to keep them away from criminal activities. Some youths also changed from being criminals and became HRD. It was also surprising for the youths to report the police to the police station and the OCS doing a follow-up with the police who had committed crimes to take action. This, according to the project teams, was happening for the first time, and before, it looked impossible because of the strained relationship between the police and youth in the informal settlements.

**9.3.3 Testing Project Theory of Change**

From the outcomes harvested, four main activities contributed to the change recorded. They included community dialogues, Court Users Committee trainings, support for justice centres to record cases, and training of HRD. These activities contributed to the achievement of the 13 outcomes recorded. In relation to the change realised, it can be observed that the channel of communication and trust was restored between the police and youths in the informal settlements. This enabled youths to visit the police station freely and brought about the police’s willingness to participate in the community activities. It can also be observed from the outcomes that the fear and suspicion that the youth had of the police had decreased. The manner in which they followed the arrested youths and other police to the police station showed that they had gained sufficient courage to face the police in case of any violations of HRD. Weaknesses in the judicial system also caused the EJK not to be addressed, but from this project’s attempt, follow-ups were done by HRD and the network of mothers of victims and survivors. The lack of sufficient evidence and follow-ups is one of the contributing factors not allowing prosecutions to be carried out effectively. A step to initiate recordings of cases of human rights violations for the

purposes of collecting sufficient evidence for prosecutions, according to the harvest outcomes, indicated progress being made towards ensuring that the victims of EJK get justice. From the outcomes recorded by Ghetto Foundation, it was shown that the youth are becoming involved in productive activities and staying away from criminal activities. All these changes point to addressing the EJK directly and indirectly in accordance with the project's theory.

#### **9.4 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism**

Kenya has experienced violent extremism since 1998 when the first violent attack was committed at the US embassy, leaving hundreds dead and injured. The attacks have continued to increase with Nairobi; counties in north-western Kenya such as Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera; and coastal regions being the epicentres of violent extremism. The counties of Nairobi and Garissa have suffered the worst large-scale Al-Shabaab attacks. They include the West Gate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015. The counties of Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, and Lamu share borders with Somalia. The southern part of Somalia is where the Al-Shabaab Islamic violent extremist group is located. It is also dominated by the Kenyan Somali community who are connected to clans found in Somalia. The Somali community is found in Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County, and the counties of Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera in the north-east of Kenya. The Somali community has been adversely affected by the state response to violent extremism. They have been profiled by security agencies and face discrimination in service delivery. They are perceived to be linked to the Al-Shabaab Jihadist group. Contrary to this perception, the Somali community has suffered from the Al-Shabaab attacks. Somali youths have also found themselves getting recruited into this terror group either as a source of livelihood or taking revenge against the suppression by the Kenyan government.

Since the entry of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia in 2011, Kenya has suffered many attacks from Al-Shabaab, which is based in South Central Somalia. Although, in 2012, the group claimed that they were retaliating due to atrocities committed by the KDF in Somalia, the activities of the group have changed into criminal activities meant to instil fear among the Kenyans. It has used marginalisation, insecurity,

discrimination, historical injustices, and perceived victimisation of Muslims as part of their narratives to attract youths to be enlisted.

#### **9.4.1 Providing Alternative Narratives by Equal Access International**

The Somali Voices Kenya project was implemented by EAI in the counties of Nairobi, Wajir, and Garissa targeting the Somali community. The Somali Voices Kenya project was funded by the Global Engagement Center (GEC). The overarching goal within its counterterrorism mission is to expose the true nature of violent extremist organisations (VEOs), thereby diminishing their influence and decreasing their allure in the eyes of potential recruits and sympathisers. EAI supports and enhances the capabilities of local partners, individuals, and institutions with the following goal: Somali-speaking community is increasingly resilient to violent extremism as a result of increased capacities to counter Al-Shabaab's ideologies and recruitment efforts and shifts in attitudes related to ideologically motivated violence.

The project strategy was centred on increasing the capacity of young Somali-speaking Kenyans and Somali nationals living in Kenya who are or can become influencers capable of developing and delivering CVE-relevant and CVE-specific media content through technical support and networking with religious leaders and change-makers. This was done by supporting youth influencers to develop media content, in key media identified in the alternative messaging strategy, that resonated with identified at-risk populations and that could be disseminated through social media platforms.

#### **9.4.2 Effectiveness of Alternative Narratives in Counties of Nairobi, Garissa, and Wajir**

As observed in Table 9.10, 10 outcomes were harvested by the EAI project team. Seven outcomes were observed at the local level in the target counties, while three were observed to happen online and at the national level. Part of the latter-mentioned three are the outcomes relating to youth engaging in online discussions on alternative narratives across the counties and countries by Somali youths living beyond the target areas. The outcomes were observed among different actors such as the youth; security teams; local

leaders; Somali community; and government authorities, such as security agencies and the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NTCT).

Three themes were identified from changes recorded in the 10 outcomes, with alternative narratives provided by the youth and security-related information sharing being observed prominently in the target counties.

**Table 9.10** Outcomes harvested by Equal Access International.

Themes	Local	Others	Total
Alternative narratives targeting youths	2	2	4
Security-related information sharing	2	1	3
Responses to other different conflicts	3	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>

Further analysis was carried out on the outcomes under each of the change categories to examine change patterns among the specific outcomes. The analysis has been described in the following subsections.

**a. *Alternative narratives against violent extremism***

As can be observed in Table 9.11, four outcomes were observed to have provided youths with information on narratives used by Al-Shabaab in recruitment. One of the noticeable outcomes is over 1 million vulnerable youth being involved in discussions on different issues on violent extremism. During the discussion, clarifications were sought on some of the narratives used by Al-Shabaab, such as religious ideologies by quoting the verses in the Quran. The youth themselves were the ones who led the discussions online by developing and uploading content on various topics. From this online engagement, the propaganda used by Al-Shabaab was demystified. From the outcomes, it can also be observed that the discussions opened a space and provided freedom for the Somali community to discuss the issues with no fear of Al-Shabaab. Before the project, there was fear among the Somali community to discuss the activities of Al-Shabaab in target counties. The combination of radio shows and online discussions made it possible for the



public to open up and condemn the activities of Al-Shabaab. This also happened in religious institutions, as stated by the outcomes on the sheikh from Eastleigh Estate, Section 3, Nairobi City who preached against youth joining Al-Shabaab. At the community level, according to the outcomes, the local leaders were taking initiatives to create awareness on recruitment and radicalisation, as shown by the outcome on a Nyumba Kumi member who had held meetings with parents to educate them on recruitment and radicalisation.

**Table 9.11** Outcomes on alternative narratives on Violent extremism.

Outcome statements	Social actors
Between August 2019 and March 2020, over 1 million Somali youths from the counties of Wajir, Garissa, and Nairobi and other parts of the country, including Mombasa, Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret, and the diaspora in places such as the UK, Europe, and Australia participated in an online discussion on different issues that cause violent extremism through posting comments and sharing and viewing the social media campaign contents posted by the Peace Promotion Fellowship (PPF) and community reporters (CR) on social media platforms. The discussion was to demystify the violent narratives propagated by Al-Shabaab in northern Kenya.	Youths
Since August 2018, the Somali community, through the radio, and youths, through social media, have continued to strongly condemn the activities of Al-Shabaab in Garissa County.	Somali community
The Nyumab Kumi initiatives in Iftini Ward, in Garissa County, held meetings with parents in this area of jurisdiction to discuss ways to prevent their children from being recruited by Al-Shabaab. They discussed signs of radicalisation among the youth and the best approaches and responses.	Local peace and security leader
On 12 November 2019, the sheikh from Eastleigh Estate section 3, Nairobi city was increasingly preaching against youth joining terrorist and violent extremist groups.	Religious leader

**b. Sharing security-related information**

Another significant change observed was the community sharing the security-related information with the police. In the past, the community feared sharing information because they would become victims of both the police and Al-Shabaab sympathisers. Due to the

engagement of different security-related actors, the communities started taking initiatives. For instance, as observed from the outcome about the Kutulo area, in Tarbaj Sub county, Wajir County, the heads of 27 households had come together and started holding regular meetings on the whereabouts of their children and members and also shared information on any potential threats. Since that time, no violent event has taken place. In Garissa County, due to the unity of purpose between security teams, communities, and other stakeholders, they shared and even discussed security issues online through their Twitter accounts. The outcome on the NCTC was observed as significant because it is the government institution with a mandate of countering violent extremism in Kenya. This outcome also presented an opportunity for EAI to work closely with the NCTC and other security agencies in the target counties.

Sharing the information with the police to alert the public such that they could report any suspicious people was important. The sharing of information and responses by the police has given the communities confidence to respond. For instance, this was shown by the outcome where the public in Wajir County arrested the suspect who had planted the Improvised Explosives Device (IED) near the Kenya Power Station, as stated by the outcome. Table 9.12 presents the outcomes on information sharing.

**Table 9.12** Outcomes on information sharing.

Outcome statements	Social actors
In December 2019, a village in Kutulo, in Tarbaj sub county, Wajir county, with 27 households and where one of the PPF lives, came together, led by the PPF, Chief, and Imam and started meetings to share information on any potential threats to their security. They ensured that they know where their children are and where they have gone in other parts of Wajir County or Kenya, especially through the schools.	Head of the families
On 18 January 2020, the National Counter Terrorism Centre shared an analysis of a potential threat from Al-Shabaab with Perspective Media, the Radio Production partner for EAI, to ask the public to be vigilant in northern Kenya.	National Counter Terrorism Centre

**c. Responses to different conflicts**

These outcomes show that there were other forms of conflict in the target counties that were not addressed. They are GBV and interclan conflict. The level of GBV is high among the Somali community and, therefore, although this project did not concern a gender-related conflict, it was able to have some effects on it. The same case applies to interclan conflicts. This happens as people compete for grazing land and water. It is important to mention that these outcomes were influenced by the Peace Promotion Fellowship (PPF) work in the counties. Table 9.13 presents the outcomes on the responses to other forms of conflict in the target counties.

**Table 9.13.** Outcomes on responses to other forms of conflict

<b>Outcome statements</b>	<b>Conflict actors</b>
The area chief and principal of Makaror Mixed Secondary School rescued two school going girls from early marriage in April 2020. One was a candidate, and the second one was a form three student. Their parents were aware of it and had allowed it to happen. They were taken back to school, and the case was reported to the government to take action against the parents.	Chief and school principal
In November 2019, the two clans leaders from Somali community in Wajir North Sub-County held a peace meeting to deliberate on the causes of the conflict. They reached an agreement that made them reconcile.	Interclan leaders

**d. Analysis of unexpected outcomes**

It is significant to mention that the project was aimed at addressing the violent extremist narratives used by Al-Shabaab. However, the project had two unexpected outcomes related to other forms of conflict in the target counties. In the Somali community, historically, interclan conflicts have occurred due to clans' rivalry and competition for pastures and water (Haider 2020: 27). In this project, despite it addressing violent extremism, the need for addressing interclan conflicts was raised. An outcome where PPF was involved in facilitating peace meetings between two clan leaders was observed. GBV is also prevalent in the Somali community. Although underreported, different forms of GBV take place. Early marriages is one of the GBV practiced by Somali community. This type

of conflict was also addressed in the course of the project, as noted in the outcomes above.

#### **9.4.3 Test of Project Theory of Change**

The evidence shows that as a result of implementing six activities that included social media campaigns, radio shows, capacity building of PPF and community reporters (CR), CVE stakeholders' forums, community security forums, and interreligious forums in the target counties, 10 outcomes were harvested. The evidence further shows that the Somali-speaking community had increased their resilience to violent extremism in different ways. One of those ways, according to the outcomes harvested, was that the Somali youths in the target counties and beyond had understood the tactics used by Al-Shabaab in recruitment and radicalisation. This was achieved through youth participating in discussions on various issues concerning violent extremism, including factors that caused youth to become attracted to such groups. The Somali community members came out to strongly condemn the acts of Al-Shabaab online and in the communities. As observed in the outcomes, the Somali community lived in fear of Al-Shabaab and never used to talk about their violent activities. This was because some had lost their lives after openly talking about Al-Shabaab. However, after social media campaigns and radio show campaigns, the Somali community started talking about and openly discussing violent extremism. This openness in discussing the issues has made recruitment difficult for Al-Shabaab. The improved relationship between the police and the Somali community has allowed the sharing of potential threats and other security-related information to occur in time. The Somali community has taken initiatives to ensure that the information is shared but that it is also a part of the responses. In summary, the evidence generated showed that the project had made progress in addressing some of the issues on the recruitment of youth by VEOs in the target counties.

### **9.5 Conclusion**

From the three peacebuilding projects, a total of 35 outcomes were harvested showing how the projects had addressed the forms of conflict that they were envisaged to address. It is clear that the development of regulatory mechanisms to facilitate access to water and

grazing lands and the formation of local peacebuilding structures had an impact on the resource-based conflict in Samburu County.

In the city of Nairobi, the two local organisations, in partnership with Saferworld and Peace Brigades International, were able to restore the relationship between the police and community. The youths also regained courage to defend their rights from being violated by the police. Other youths also converted from being criminals to being HRD and started their own businesses.

EAI, on the other hand, had sufficient evidence to show that millions of youths had been reached with alternative messaging different from violent extremism. Security, especially in the counties of Wajir and Garissa, had also improved due to the engagement of youths and other security actors in reporting suspects and any potential threats. The evidence generated clearly shows that the outcome harvesting approach is suitable for monitoring and evaluation process for peacebuilding projects. This has been supported by evaluation findings that are stated in Chapter Ten.

## **CHAPTER TEN**

### **EVALUATION OF ACTION OUTCOME**

#### **10.1 Introduction**

The evaluation of the outcome of this action research was meant to assess the effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach as a monitoring and evaluation process in generating sufficient evidence to demonstrate how the peacebuilding projects by the four peacebuilding organisations facilitated conflict transformation. The findings in this chapter answer the third objective of both the study and the action which is “To evaluate the effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach regarding how it strengthened the monitoring and evaluation processes for peacebuilding projects”. The indicator to measure the progress for this objective was stated as “Extent to which outcome harvesting has improved the monitoring and evaluation processes”.

The chapter starts by briefly describing how the evaluation was conducted. An assessment of whether the project teams had understood the outcome harvesting approach is described in the following section. The effectiveness of the outcome harvesting approach in generating the evidence, as the central question in this study, is also presented. The chapter shows the validity of the theory of change for this action research and the appropriateness of the outcome harvesting approach in addressing the weaknesses of monitoring and evaluation processes identified in Chapter Seven. The chapter ends with a conclusion and an indication of what is expected in the subsequent chapter.

#### **10.2 Summary of Evaluation Methods**

The evaluation was conducted with the project teams from four peacebuilding organisations that were participating in this action research. As described in the previous chapter, the peacebuilding projects were implemented in different project sites in the four target counties and addressed different forms of conflict. The researcher developed the following evaluation questions to guide the process of conducting the evaluation:

1. Did the project teams understand the concepts of the outcome harvesting approach?
2. Was the outcome harvesting approach an effective monitoring and evaluation process of peacebuilding projects?
3. What was the appropriateness of the outcome harvesting approach in addressing the weaknesses of current monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding projects?

To answer the above evaluation questions, two data collection methods were used. An online feedback survey was administered among the 14 project team members from the four organisations. The survey was used to obtain feedback on the experience of the project teams in using the outcome harvesting approach. The survey was filled online and submitted by 11 project team members from the four organisations. The desk review was also used. The documents reviewed included the post-training assessment findings and outcomes harvested and documented in four outcome matrices. The review of the documents was conducted to give insights on how the outcome harvesting process was done. The review of Chapters Six to Nine was also done to understand what was achieved from implementing the outcome harvesting approach and its theory of change. The data generated was analysed, and the findings of this evaluation are presented in Sections 10.3 to 10.6.

### **10.3 Understanding of Outcome Harvesting by Project Teams**

The evaluation sought to establish whether the project teams had understood the concepts of the outcome harvesting approach. Regarding the activities implemented, the project teams from the four peacebuilding organisations participated in the outcome harvesting sessions as planned. The outcome harvesting sessions were conducted virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions. A total of 14 project team members attended the outcome harvesting sessions, as shown in Table 10.1.

**Table 10.1** Project team participation in outcome harvesting sessions.

<b>Organisations</b>	<b>Total number of the staff</b>	<b>Staff who participated in the outcome harvesting sessions</b>
Saferworld	7	5
Mathare Social Justice Centre	3	3
Equal Access International	7	4
Ghetto Foundation	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>14</b>

From Table 10.1, it can be observed that 14 of the 19 project team members from the four organisations participated in the outcome harvesting sessions. This is a significant number of the project team members who had gained skills and knowledge on the outcome harvesting approach. This presents an opportunity for the four organisations to adopt outcome harvesting as a monitoring and evaluation process. From the post-training assessment, the findings showed that the project teams' capacity was built, and they understood the importance of the outcome harvesting approach. All the project teams had understood the concept of outcome harvesting. They used the skills gained to harvest the 35 outcomes (Table 10.2).

After the training, the 14 project team members proceeded to harvest the outcomes. It is significant to mention that the project teams did not rigidly follow the six steps of outcome harvesting. Only three out of the six steps were applied, namely, the collection and description of the outcomes from social actors as primary sources (step 2), the project teams being involved in the outcome descriptions together with the researcher (step 3), and the analysis of the harvested outcomes (step 5). According to Wilson-Grau (2018: 8), the six steps were designed for conducting evaluation. However, for monitoring purposes, some steps can be left out depending on the user's purposes for conducting the outcome harvesting. Contrary to this study's finding on reducing the steps of outcome harvesting from six to three for the purposes of monitoring peacebuilding projects for the four organisations, Outcome harvesting evaluation conducted in 2017 by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), increased outcome harvesting



steps from 6 to 10. CGIAR is a global network based in France and engaged in research on food security in developing countries. The outcome harvesting approach was used to evaluate the Aquatic Agricultural System Program that was implemented in Zambia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The aim of the program was to make a difference among the 6 million poor and marginalised people by 2023. The outcome harvesting steps were increased from 6 to 10 steps to meet the need of the program's evaluation challenge with a sequence of outcome harvesting steps not strictly followed. This was what the CGIAR indicated as an adaptation of the outcome harvesting approach. At the end of the evaluation, the modified outcome harvesting was called outcome evidencing (Paz-Ybarnegaray and Douthwaite 2017: 278-281). The finding from this study and that of CGIAR on the steps of the outcome harvesting process show that outcome harvesting can be modified depending on the project and uses of the outcome information collected by the peacebuilding organisations. This is why Wilson-Grau (2018: 149) made it clear that outcome harvesting can be adapted so long as the principles are kept.

The outcome description was done by 14 project team members. The engage conflict actors in the target areas of the peacebuilding projects. A total of 35 outcomes were harvested, as shown in Table 10.2.

**Table 10.2** Outcomes harvested by peacebuilding organisations

<b>Organisations</b>	<b>Forms of conflict</b>	<b>Total number of the staff</b>
Saferworld	Resource-based	12
Mathare Social Justice Centre	Police Violence	5
Equal Access International	Violent Extremism	10
Ghetto Foundation	Police Violence	8
<b>Total</b>		<b>35</b>

As seen in Table 10.2, the number of the outcomes varied with the organisations. The differences in the number of outcomes harvested did not reflect on the relative performance of the organisations. They implemented different peacebuilding projects addressing different forms of conflict.

However, three observations can be made from the implementation of the outcome harvesting by the four organisations. One, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the outcomes were harvested by the project teams. This means that the outcome harvesting approach can be used remotely to collect information on peacebuilding processes in the contested conflict areas. Therefore, it serves as an innovation to overcome data collection challenges in peacebuilding, as described in the literature review in Section 4.5 of Chapter Four. The section identified security risks and access to the target areas in the volatile conflict areas as the main methodological challenges. However, more important is the reliability of the information collected in a volatile conflict zone (Esser and Vanderkamp 2013: 214). From this study, based on the experience of the project teams, it can be argued that outcome harvesting has overcome the reliability challenge because it is an iterative and back-and-forth process. The project teams spent some time making follow-up interviews with different social actors documented in the outcomes. This allows for triangulation of the generated outcome information.

Two, outcome harvesting is a process that can be adapted to suit the monitoring and evaluation needs for any peacebuilding project. Therefore, in this research study, only three steps were used. They sufficiently served the purpose of generating outcomes.

Three, the outcome harvesting approach was used for the three peacebuilding projects implemented in four different counties. The counties included those of Nairobi, Garissa, Wajir, and Samburu. The counties have different conflict contexts and have experienced different forms of conflict. This meant that the outcome harvesting approach was sensitive to the data collection processes in each of the four counties and three peacebuilding projects implemented by the four organisations. It can be further deduced from the above observations that outcome harvesting is highly flexible and can be adapted to different contexts and peacebuilding projects for the purposes of generating the evidence on what has been achieved, making it an effective monitoring and evaluation process. This is consistent with findings from an evaluation of a learning project conducted by the Community Development and Learning Initiative in Calgary, Alberta, Canada in 2016. The use of the outcome harvesting approach was to test whether it could be used across different community development contexts. The suitability of outcome harvesting in

monitoring the project implementation was evident from the evaluation because outcome harvesting made the project teams think about how to be flexible in collecting the information from various sources in different community development contexts (Abboud and Claussen 2016: 53).

#### **10.4 Effectiveness of Outcome Harvesting Approach**

The evaluation was also focused on establishing whether outcome harvesting was effective in generating sufficient evidence. From the feedback survey by the project team members who participated in the evaluation, 10 members reported that from their experience during the research, they felt that outcome harvesting was an effective approach to be used in peacebuilding work. To support their argument, some of the project teams felt that outcome harvesting captured the changes in attitudes, behaviours, and relationships, which had been proven difficult to capture in the past. One of the project team members from EAI reported:

The change in relationships and behaviour among actors targeted in such projects is very difficult to quantify using conventional monitoring and evaluation. Outcome harvesting comes in as a probing tool that deeply examines the project (aside from activities undertaken) to pick out changes which would otherwise have gone unnoticed.

Another project team member from Ghetto Foundation stated, "Outcome harvesting is a qualitative tool able to measure the qualitative changes in behaviour, attitude, relationships of other actors as a result of the intervention". Further, regarding the effectiveness of outcome harvesting in capturing behavioural changes, some of the project teams stated, "Peacebuilding and related projects have a human interface, and sometimes other methodologies of evaluation as it digs deeper into relations between and among actors and processes" (a project team from MSJC). Another statement was that "Given the challenge of quantifying behavioural changes for the aforementioned programs, the Outcome Harvesting offers an opportunity to interrogate the context, get the views of respondents/beneficiaries, and document the real changes based on the beneficiary testimonies" (a project team from Saferworld).

The potential for the outcome harvesting process to capture changes in attitudes, behaviours, and relationships among the conflict actors is a step forward in enriching the conflict transformation theory. Lederach, while explaining conflict transformation, stated that it was anchored on human relationships, which were dynamic and continuously changing. Therefore, peacebuilding organisations conducting peacebuilding processes should consider peace to be continuously evolving and developing quality human relationships (Lederach 2003: 8-12). Therefore, capturing of the peacebuilding outcomes generated by peacebuilding projects provide evidence to improve them progressively.

Other project teams felt that outcome harvesting documented unexpected outcomes: "Sometimes the outcomes are not tangible and straightforward. Outcome harvesting is able to get both intended and unintended outcomes", as was the sentiment from one of the project teams from Saferworld during the survey. From the desk review of the outcomes harvested, nine unexpected outcomes were documented. They included three from Saferworld, four from Ghetto Foundation and MSJC, and two unexpected changes from EAI. For instance, in this research, MSJC documented that the "Officer in charge of crime and Officer Commanding Station (OCS) intercepted and rescued 10 foreign nationals from Ethiopia being trafficked in a house in Kiamaiiko informal settlement in January 2020". This was an unexpected outcome that, in a normal tracking of expected results, could not have been documented at all. The ability to capture unintended results that are frequently missed out by traditional monitoring and evaluation processes was one of the criteria used by the UNDP when it accepted that the outcome harvesting approach would be among the 11 monitoring and evaluation innovations to be used in their programming (United Nations Development programme 2013: 19).

The ability of outcome harvesting to capture both expected and unexpected outcomes, as established in this study, was also established in another study conducted by Queen's University in 2020 for an evaluation of competency-based medical education (CBME). It was found that outcome harvesting identified other areas of progress that were not directly linked to the overall intended outcomes as much while they were able to identify the intended outcomes related to the CBME curriculum (Railer *et al.* 2020: 1139).

Learning and improving were also observed by the project teams to be an advantage of outcome harvesting in monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects. One of the project teams from MSJC stated:

[Peacebuilding is] about changes that are complex given that the changes are qualitative in nature (mostly about behaviour). Outcome harvesting provides a very useful means of measuring this kind of change while allowing practitioners to reflect on why that change is important and without being confined to numbers that may not mean much is such soft changes.

With reference to learning in particular, another project team from Ghetto Foundation reported that “Outcome harvesting is very useful in any project on peacebuilding/violent extremism; it brings out new ideas and how to improve”. In a long comment, one of the project teams from EAI stated the following in support of using outcome harvesting in improving the projects:


Outcome harvesting should therefore, be used as often as possible to gauge the level of change and then have the findings used to inform further programming. Project activities might be undertaken in full but should have meaningful impact on the context. Therefore, making deliberate efforts to identify what people are doing differently as a result of your work as often as possible in programming will help you make informed decisions on your approach and whether you need a change of plans to ensure you achieve the desired objective on the context.

Other project teams also felt that outcome harvesting was an effective approach because it involved different social actors. One of them from Saferworld commented, “it engages each and every individual in the society and also through outcome harvesting you can monitor most, if not all, individuals because you will know who does what, when, where, and why”. Another project team stated, “It is a useful tool in peacebuilding since it’s very inclusive”. This was an acknowledgement that the outcome harvesting approach was a participatory and inclusive process critical for peacebuilding work.

Finally, the project teams also felt that the outcome harvesting approach could fit into the current monitoring and evaluation to complement other processes. In support of this thought, one of them from MSJC stated, “frequently to be used to gather evidence on the project implemented in addition to what we have”, and another stated, “it should be more mainstream and fully understood by donors funding the projects”. Yet another from EAI

suggested, “embedding outcome harvesting as part of routine programming”. From the Saferworld team, another of them suggested that “The outcome harvesting methodology can also be complemented by other methodologies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) methodology to allow for documentation of quantitative outcomes”.

The project teams were also asked to give opinions based on their experience regarding the extent to which they felt that the outcome harvesting process had generated evidence to show how peacebuilding projects were working and making a difference. The results are presented in Figure 10.1.



**Figure 10.1** Perceptions on outcome harvesting in generating evidence.

From Figure 10.1, it can be observed that most of them felt that it had generated sufficient evidence. A comparison was also made between the scores before and after the use of the outcome harvesting approach for the four organisations generating evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. The results are presented in Table 10.3. As observed, the scores on the perceptions of the project teams on the evidence generated before and after the use of the outcome harvesting approach shows that the process improved their capacity for the generation of evidence in the organisations.

**Table 10.3** Scores from project teams on their organisations' evidence generation capacity.

<b>Organisations</b>	<b>Baseline score</b>	<b>Evaluation score</b>
Equal Access International	7	10
Saferworld	4	9
Mathare Social Justice Centre	5	8
Ghetto Foundation	7	10

The perceptions of the project teams on the effectiveness of outcome harvesting can be corroborated by a recent brief produced by the facilitators of the Outcome Harvesting Community and the Board of Stewards of the Outcome Mapping Learning Community. Informed by the experiences from the two learning communities, they observed that outcome harvesting was a robust and rigorous process of recording observed peacebuilding outcomes for both monitoring and evaluation. This is because the outcome harvesting requirements for recording outcomes are clear. An outcome constitutes a behaviour change for a social actor. It must have outcome statements and the significance and contribution of the project, among other aspects (Facilitators of the Outcome Harvesting Community and the Stewards of the Outcome Mapping Learning Community 2021: 3).

From the desk review of the 35 generated outcomes, it can be observed that the harvested outcomes described the changes influenced by the three peacebuilding projects. The 35 outcomes were assessed against five criteria developed by the researcher for the purposes of assessment on the sufficiency of evidence generated. The assessment was based on the question of whether the amount of information generated was enough to demonstrate the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. The following observations were made:

- *Validity:* From the outcomes harvested by the project teams, the evidence generated clearly described the change that was influenced by the three peacebuilding projects and showed how the conflict drivers had been addressed. For instance, for Saferworld, approximately five outcomes described how the social

actors at both the community and county levels had developed mechanisms to regulate peaceful access to pastures and water. They included outcomes such as private ranchers and local pastoralists developing agreements on how to access pastures in the ranches, the council of elders developing rules including the delimitations of grazing areas, and the Samburu County Assembly and executive developing a Natural Resources Management and Planned Grazing Policy that incorporated community issues.

- *Significance:* The outcome descriptions also showed how the project was addressing the conflict context with reference to how it was before the project was implemented. The descriptions showed whether the changes were happening for the first time. For instance, as reported by Ghetto Foundation, youths were reporting police to the OCS for illegal activities that they had committed against them. As reported, this was the first time that this was happening for the youths who previously had an intense fear to face the police. It also shows the level of influence from the project on the youth to gain that courage. For EAI, youth participation in discussing issues on violent extremism opened a space for the Somali youth and community at large to openly discuss issues on violent extremism without fear of any security risks from Al-Shabaab.
- *Verifiability:* All the outcomes, as reported, were observed to have taken place. However, substantiation was not carried out in this study. The reporting of the outcomes involved the outcomes that had occurred, when they had occurred, and the social actors who had changed. One could follow up and find out from the social actors whether they had experienced the change.
- *Completeness:* The project teams tried as much as possible to give sufficient details for each of the outcomes. All the outcomes were supposed to answer the questions “when did the change happen, where and when?”. Other outcomes gave details on the social actors, context, and contribution. For instance, the Saferworld team captured that the “community leader had a meeting with MCA [Member of County Assembly]”. It was explained that the community leader was a member of a WCAG, and the MCA was the chair of the environmental house committee of the



Samburu County Assembly. The outcome further gave information on the community leader and MCA.

- *Progress:* All the outcomes generated could be compared with the theory of change to judge whether there had been any progress towards the expected change. The outcomes could also be compared against the project timelines and geographical locations of the target counties to determine the project's performance. This criterion follows from the fact that enough details were subjected to the different forms of categorical analysis.

## **10.5 Validity of Theory of Change for Action Research**

From the above evaluation findings, it can be observed that the content theory in this action research was achieved. It can be reported that the project teams were equipped with skills and knowledge on the outcome harvesting approach. This is supported by the findings from the post-training assessment test that showed that the project teams had understood the basic questions for collecting evidence and information on the peacebuilding project contribution and the context in which the outcomes had been achieved. Their skills on outcome harvesting were put into practice by harvesting 35 outcomes within the research period. This confirms that they had understood the outcome harvesting process. It was believed that the project teams will start to document outcomes, as realised in this study, as an immediate change.

It can also be implied that by having 14 of the 19 members of the project teams participating in the study, there was a likelihood of the peacebuilding organisations taking up outcome harvesting as a monitoring and evaluation process. The findings also proved that the assumptions were valid. This is because outcome harvesting was found to be a simple and straightforward process that did not require a technical understanding of monitoring and evaluation.

The project teams found outcome harvesting practical because they engaged the social actors in a participatory manner through telephonic discussions on the outcomes. This engagement can also be viewed as a point of learning for the project teams and social actors regarding some of the changes that had taken place and how they had occurred.

The evidence generated by the project teams gave them confidence that they could generate evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects, which was proven to have been difficult before the involvement in outcome harvesting. This is probably why some have recommended immediately taking up outcome harvesting as a monitoring and evaluation approach in their organisations.

## **10.6 Appropriateness of Outcome Harvesting Approach**

This research study was meant to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes used by peacebuilding organisations in generating evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. From the study findings generated from the engagement of the four peacebuilding organisations, observations were made on the different ways that the study had improved the current monitoring and evaluation processes. From the review of the status of the current monitoring and evaluation processes by the peacebuilding organisations, several weaknesses and threats to the current monitoring and evaluation were identified. The weaknesses included the weak monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods, including the inability to capture unexpected changes, the exclusion of the community and other conflict actors, little learning being derived from the evidence generated, and the inadequate technical capacity of the project teams.

Based on the findings, the researcher identified five features of the outcome harvesting approach that potentially addressed the weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes. They included its ability to capture changes in behaviours and relationships among the conflict actors; its flexibility to be used in different contexts and peacebuilding projects; its participatory nature, which ensures that conflict actors are involved in monitoring and evaluation processes, creating a conducive environment for learning and adaptation to changing conflict contexts; and its ability to be used with other monitoring and evaluation approaches.

As stated in the analysis of the status of monitoring and evaluation, current monitoring and evaluation processes have generated evidence on implemented peacebuilding activities. The reason is because the peacebuilding organisations have control over the

activities. However, current monitoring and evaluation processes have failed to capture sufficient information on peacebuilding outcomes produced by the implemented peacebuilding activities.

The product of outcome harvesting is the assorted outcomes describing actions undertaken by the social actors involved and others after the activities have been implemented. As stated by Wilson-Grau (2018: 1), the focus of the outcome harvesting approach is outcomes and not activities. In this research, the descriptions of the 35 outcomes were done by the project teams. Although peacebuilding activities were also described, this was distinctly done to show how they had contributed to outcomes.

In the context of outcome harvesting, an outcome is uniquely defined as an observable and verifiable change in the activities, actions, practices, relationships, and policies of social actors. From this definition, an outcome is viewed as a behavioural change. The peacebuilding activities are conducted to influence the behaviour of conflict actors from being unpeaceful to peaceful. Behaviour, in this case, can be reflected in the activities, actions, and interactions between or among the conflict actors. In this research, for instance, Ghetto Foundation found out that the youth had gained courage to face the police whom they had feared before the project due to the strained relationship that had existed. This was derived from the outcome description that addressed actions such as paying a courtesy call to the police for a meeting and request. It is also significant to highlight that outcome harvesting starts with social actors who have changed, unlike the current monitoring and evaluation processes that focus on activities and then proceed to look for expected outcomes. In this research, the data collection started by identifying the targeted social actors who did something different as a result of the peacebuilding projects. For instance, Saferworld identified community leaders, pastoralist communities, private ranchers, and the county assembly and executive to have done things differently after participating in the project activities.

From this study, outcome harvesting has also been found to be flexible and applicable in complex contexts. One of the main challenges with current monitoring and evaluation processes is that the processes have been founded on the basis of linear and logical frameworks. While logical thinking is applicable in strategy making or project design, it

does not apply in the ever-changing conflict context as a result of non-linear interactions among many factors and social actors. The flexibility of outcome harvesting makes it applicable in measuring change in any complex context in different ways.

First, one is free to not follow the six iterative steps of outcome harvesting rigidly so long as the principles are adhered to. This feature allows the users of outcome harvesting to adopt it to suit their purposes for using it. For instance, for this research, the purpose was to generate sufficient evidence to show the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects in four organisations during the project period. The outcome harvesting approach, in this case, was being used as a monitoring process. Only three steps were used to generate the evidence analysed in Chapter Eight: gathering data and drafting outcome descriptions (step 2), engaging with key informants (step 3), and analysis and interpretation of the outcomes (step 5). The three steps have proven to be useful in generating real-time and sufficient evidence for monitoring peacebuilding projects.

The second indicator of flexibility is that it does not adhere to linear and logical principles as noticed in the traditional monitoring and evaluation processes. Outcome harvesting generates evidence and looks backwards to show how the project has influenced the change. The contribution can be not only direct and linear but also indirect and non-linear. In most cases, the contribution information shows a completely non-linear relationship. For instance, MSJC documented the point that “mothers of victims and survivors came together and formed a network to follow up cases themselves” as an outcome. This was as a result of HRD recording and following up cases in law courts where the mothers of victims and survivors were sometimes present. The outcome was as a result of training conducted by MSJC and Peace Brigades International on recording cases of human rights violations. However, an explanation given regarding MSJC and HRD is that as they continued to document cases, the number continued to grow, and during one of the meetings, an idea to form a network, the role of which was to follow up these cases, was agreed upon. This has proven to be successful. They are considered authentic witnesses because some of them are victims and survivors of human rights violations. As described about this outcome, there is no linear relationship between the training of HRD and the formation of the network of victims’ mothers and survivors.

From the implementation of the outcome harvesting process, it can also be observed that most of the social actors in the conflict being addressed by the project were involved in generating the outcome information. The project teams, together with social actors described in the outcomes, were involved. It is significant to mention that one has the liberty to craft the best and most suitable way of engaging the social actors. In this research, due to COVID-19 restrictions, telephonic conversations with the social actors were held by the project teams. Engagement of the social actors through a participatory process brings in the understanding of other conflict actors and how their behaviour has changed. The participation of the social actors can also be coupled with the learning aspect of how best the conflict can be transformed peacefully. This happens when actors are involved in explaining how the behaviour of social actors has changed during the peacebuilding processes facilitated by the projects. For instance, having the relationships of the police, HRD, and youth improved was as a result of holding or attending joint activities together. After attending the Court Users Committee (CUC) training, where the HRD and police had three days of interactions inside the training sessions, and during their free time, the understanding was developed, and the existing tension diffused. This led to a series of activities when they went back to the community. As recorded by MSJC, the outcomes included paying courtesy calls to the police by the HRD and police attending the launch of the Kiamaike Justice Centre.

The outcome harvesting approach is a qualitative process by nature. It generates qualitative evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding projects. Its ability to be used with other monitoring and evaluation processes makes it appropriate in peacebuilding work. In relation to the collection of information, there is a recommendation to use mixed methods in generating evidence on the peacebuilding work. Most of the traditional monitoring and evaluation processes capture quantitative data and, therefore, outcome harvesting comes in to complement them. The outcome harvesting approach is a process that collects the evidence of change and tracks backwards to find out the link with peacebuilding projects. However, the traditional monitoring and evaluation process tracks changes achieved by an implemented activity progressively. This makes this approach useful in tracking foreseen and predictable changes. The combination of the

two approaches increases the chances of capturing both expected and unexpected outcomes from peacebuilding projects. Although the research study only implemented the outcome harvesting approach, at the analysis level, the document outcomes were used to test the validity of the theory of change of the projects, which included activities that were planned and carried out.

## **10.7 Conclusion**

The evaluation has brought out to the fore the usefulness of the outcome harvesting approach in the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects. From the findings, the outcome harvesting approach has significantly addressed the current monitoring and evaluation weaknesses. Its potential to generate sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects is one of the great achievements in peacebuilding work. The advantage of the outcome harvesting approach from this study included captured changes in attitudes, behaviours, and relationships among social actors; the documentation of unexpected outcomes and the project contribution; and the potential to be used with other monitoring and evaluation processes. The outcome harvesting process involves all the social actors known to have changed due to the project and encourages learning. The following chapter gives a summary of the findings of this research and highlights the researcher's personal reflections. It further presents the conclusion and recommendations.

## **PART V – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **CHAPTER ELEVEN**

#### **SUMMARY, REFLECTION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

##### **11.1 Introduction**

This is the final part and chapter of this thesis. It presents the summary of the study's findings based on the four phases of an action research study. The findings are arranged under each of the study objectives. The personal reflection on the four stages of the action research is also done. The chapter also makes a conclusion based on all the findings established in this study. Further, the chapter makes recommendations for peacebuilding organisations. The chapter ends with the researcher pointing out the areas of further research as far as the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects is concerned.

##### **11.2 Summary of the Findings**

The study encompassed three sections: exploratory survey of the monitoring and evaluation of the peacebuilding projects and the implementation and evaluation of the outcome harvesting approach as the action research. The exploratory survey was conducted among 29 peacebuilding organisations that had peacebuilding projects being implemented during the study period. Four of the 29 organisations expressed an immediate need to implement the action research. The action research was undertaken by 14 project team members from the four organisations. They participated in training and conducted outcome harvesting sessions within their organisations with the support of the researcher. An evaluation was also conducted with the 14 project team members using an online feedback survey. The summarised findings presented in Section 11.2 have been derived from Chapters Six to Ten of this thesis and have been presented under each of the study objectives.

### **11.2.1 To Assess Peacebuilding Practices among Peacebuilding Organisations in Kenya**

The study established that peacebuilding work in Kenya began in the 1990s. It was a response to political tensions due to nationwide agitations for a multiparty democracy. According to the study, in 1992, Kenya first experienced interethnic conflict associated with general elections. The cycle of interethnic conflict has been repeated every 5 years around the time of general elections.

This study further established that interethnic conflict is the dominant and most widespread form of conflict in the 47 counties. It has been intertwined and interconnected with resource-based, political, and violent extremist forms of conflict. For instance, natural-resource-based conflict associated with land in the Rift Valley and coastal regions has taken an interethnic dimension whenever it has occurred. Political conflict, according to the peacebuilding organisations, has always taken an interethnic divide during any electoral event. The politicians would return to their ethnic groups and mobilise them against others using some of the historical injustices, such as land issues, as they sought political support. The overlapping and interconnectedness of the forms of conflict can be observed from different angles.

All forms of the conflict established in this study had similar causes, whether structural or proximate. For instance, marginalisation of some ethnic groups by successive government regimes, especially in the northern and coastal regions of Kenya, has been the structural cause of interethnic conflict. Land use and competition have also caused interethnic conflict, especially in northern Kenya where the communities depend on pastoralism as a source of livelihood. According to the findings, land disputes were also a main cause of natural-resource-based conflict. In the past, politicians have used land disputes between ethnic groups to trigger political violence in both by-elections and general elections. The study also established that the forms of conflict were also connected based on the geographical locations in which they occurred. For instance, interethnic, natural-resource-based, and violent extremist conflict were found to occur in the northern and coastal regions of Kenya. In Nairobi County alone, according to the study, all forms of conflict had occurred, with informal settlements being more affected



than other parts of Nairobi County. Conflict actors were also found to connect the forms of conflict. For example, young people, ethnic groups, and politicians had participated in all forms of conflict.

As described above, according to this study, Kenya has been a conflict-burdened country since the 1990s. According to the study, although peacebuilding work has grown variedly over the years, the peacebuilding organisations have continued to struggle in addressing the conflict situation in Kenya. The study found that there were three types of peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya. They included international, national, and local peacebuilding organisations. The study further found that these organisations received funding from donors based on their peacebuilding projects. This confirms the findings by CDA on the outsider role in peace work, where peacebuilding work by peacebuilding organisations has depended on donor funding. This dependency has caused the peacebuilding work to become short-term and unsustainable. The short-term nature of peacebuilding projects has caused the efforts to address the deep-rooted structural causes of conflict to become unattainable (Anderson and Olson 2003: 40).

The study further found that all the peacebuilding organisations, except the International Transitional Justice Centre (ITJC) which only supports political dialogues, implemented all peacebuilding activities. It was established that different forms of conflict were addressed by the peacebuilding activities. For example, intercommunal dialogue targeted interethnic conflict and, to some extent, prevented violent extremism. Negotiation and mediation were established to address the resource-based and political conflicts at local and national levels.

From the activities, four broad peacebuilding outcomes were established in this study. The included the individual understanding of other conflict actors and having mutual respect as a result of peace education. The strengthened intergroup relationships were as a result of intercommunal dialogue. Peaceful access to natural resources was brought about as a result of mediation, and improved relationships between the police and community were as a result of community policing forums. Capacity-building trainings contributed to the four-peacebuilding outcome categories. From these peacebuilding outcomes, it can be observed that they represented change achieved at the personal and

relational levels, with less changes being observed at the structural and cultural levels. No indication of the four peacebuilding outcomes to address the structural and proximate causes of the conflict was observed. This could be explained by the fact that the peacebuilding projects were short-term and highly dependent on funding from donors. Once the funding had come to an end, the peacebuilding activities would also stop, leaving no peacebuilding efforts to move the change from the relational to structural level. This also meant that the peacebuilding work done in Kenya for decades had not proceeded beyond the relational level. This could have either been due to a weak theory of change or the lack of evidence to inform peacebuilding organisations' decisions in addressing conflict drivers.

According to this study, the activities were funded by two categories of donor organisations: non-traditional donors and traditional donors. Some of the non-traditional donors included the Netherlands Government, Forum Civic, Unilever, and Peace Women Across the Globe (Switzerland). They were found to fund small-scale peacebuilding projects to address local conflicts. The traditional donors included FCDO, USAID, and the UNDP. They funded large-scale peacebuilding projects. However, the funding was short term.

Several challenges were also established to have affected the peacebuilding activities. The top three were donor and peacebuilding organisations' focus on peacebuilding events, donor funding, and weak monitoring and evaluation processes. According to this study, peacebuilding efforts were focused on addressing the peacebuilding events at the expense of addressing structural and proximate causes of conflict. This is an observation confirmed from the four broad peacebuilding outcomes achieved by those activities. None of the peacebuilding outcomes were as a result of addressing structural causes such as marginalisation, poor and partisan governance, and land disputes, among other causes. This was due to peacebuilding organisations responding to physical violence when it occurred rather than systematically addressing the deep-rooted injustices and grievances. The second challenge was donor funding. As observed in this study, the donor funding was available when there was a threat to the calm in the country. This happened more during the general elections or major terror attacks. The donors also had a tendency of

dictating what should be funded. For example, as established in this study, current funding in Kenya is available for the prevention of violent extremism at the expense of interethnic and resource-based conflict that continues to persist across the country.

The final challenge was weak monitoring and evaluation processes to document peace and conflict data from the peacebuilding projects. According to the study, this was attributed to peacebuilding organisations being overdependent on the linear and logical monitoring and evaluation processes which were difficult to use in peacebuilding processes that occurred in a non-linear and dynamic manner. According to this study, the linear monitoring and evaluation generated evidence on expected changes and left out unexpected changes. The efforts to generate peace data regularly were not sufficient, probably due to the current state of monitoring and evaluation being rigid and linearly oriented and, therefore, sometimes being irrelevant in complex conflict environments where non-linear interactions occur.

#### **11.2.2 To Explore the Current Monitoring and Evaluation Processes Used by Peacebuilding Organisations in Peacebuilding in Kenya**

The monitoring and evaluation survey established that all peacebuilding organisations conducted different monitoring and evaluation processes at different levels. Most of the organisations had conducted the five processes variedly. They included conflict analysis, developing monitoring and evaluation plans, conducting regular monitoring, evaluation, and learning. The use of surveys and evaluations is in line with linear and logical frameworks of the traditional monitoring and evaluation processes famous in the development and humanitarian sectors. Few organisations had used peace journals and outcome mapping in monitoring and evaluation. Outcome mapping, as a complexity-aware approach, has been used in the past with some success. However, its design and procedures are in line with the logical framework, making it too rigid to be employed in measuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects that operate in a fluid and rapidly changing environment. The peacebuilding organisations were also found to generate information and reporting on a regular basis, with a quarterly period being observed in most of the organisations. However, as reported by some organisations, little data analysis was done, resulting in less learning and adaptation to the conflict context.

It was also established that the monitoring and evaluation processes were applied at varied levels by different organisations. The application had direct effects on the evidence generated, especially regarding the effectiveness of peacebuilding. From this study, it was found that all the peacebuilding organisations generated information on the activities implemented but less on the peacebuilding outcomes that are building blocks for sustainable peace.

The differences in the application by the organisations were attributed to the strengths and weaknesses of current monitoring and evaluation processes. For instance, the fact that donors had developed monitoring and evaluation guidelines gave the organisations an advantage to start monitoring from the start rather than starting to develop the monitoring and evaluation processes where they did not exist. However, this top-down approach to monitoring and evaluation has caused some organisations not to use some of the methods due to them being irrelevant to the context where the peacebuilding projects were being implemented. It was also established that the culture of regular data collection was being practised by all the organisations. This allowed the organisations to regularly generate evidence on the progress of the project activities and changes being achieved. Although most of the evidence generated was on peacebuilding activities, the practice gave the organisations an advantage as they continued gaining skills to collect sufficient evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects.

On the other hand, some weaknesses had direct effects on the evidence generated. One of the main weaknesses established was that the monitoring and evaluation processes were deficient in capturing evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects. As explained in this thesis, the current monitoring and evaluation processes were founded on the results-oriented, linear, and logical frameworks. This constraint hindered the processes from capturing peacebuilding process data, unexpected peacebuilding outcomes, and some of the systemic factors that promote or hinder change in the course of project implementation. The information generated from this set of processes was quantitative and activity based. Donor restrictions on the budget to fund monitoring activities were another significant barrier. Peacebuilding is a dynamic process and, therefore, continuous monitoring would give an account of peacebuilding outcomes and

their associated change processes. Inadequate budget allocations by donors to sufficiently cater for monitoring activities had a direct effect on the amount of evidence generated.

Opportunities for improving the current monitoring and evaluation processes were also identified from this study. Frustrated by the traditional monitoring and evaluation processes, the peacebuilding organisations and donors started trying emergent, flexible, and adaptive monitoring and evaluation approaches. These included outcome mapping, outcome harvesting, process tracking, process monitoring of impact, developmental evaluation, indices, and outcome evidencing. From this study, a few organisations, such as Saferworld and the Life and Peace Institute, had tried outcome mapping and outcome harvesting in their previous projects. Another opportunity identified was the willingness of donors and peacebuilding organisations to invest in learning from peacebuilding processes in order to adapt to the context and improve peacebuilding processes.

Based on the analysis of current monitoring and evaluation processes, the researcher decided to select three areas of improvement that were part of the suggestions by the peacebuilding organisations. They included developing a simple and flexible monitoring and evaluation process sensitive to the complex and dynamic nature of peacebuilding projects, the involvement of social actors, and learning and adaptation in peacebuilding processes. Considering these areas and the strengths and weaknesses of monitoring and evaluation processes, the researcher selected the outcome harvesting approach as the appropriate action to monitor and evaluate peacebuilding projects. The outcome harvesting approach was selected to be implemented in this research to address the weaknesses of the current monitoring and evaluation processes in the peacebuilding field. It is a complexity-aware approach that has recently gained acceptance among donors such as the World Bank, UNDP, USAID, and Open Society foundations, among other organisations. Outcome harvesting has been tried in other fields such as human rights advocacy and governance and proven to be an effective tool in measuring change in a project operating in a complex environment. A unique strength in the outcome harvesting approach as compared to other complexity-aware approaches is its nature of being non-linear and independent of a logical framework. Other complexity-aware approaches

previously mentioned still subscribe to linear and logical frameworks that are founded on measuring predetermined changes linearly linked to the project activities.

### **11.2.3 Using the Participatory Action Research Approach and Developing and Implementing Actions to Improve Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Projects in Peacebuilding Organisations in Kenya**

This study was an action research study where four peacebuilding organisations participated. Saferworld and EAI were international organisations. The MSJC and Ghetto Foundation were local organisations. A total of 14 project team members (seven males and seven females) were involved in the action research. The action research was conducted in three phases. In the first phase, a total of 29 peacebuilding organisations were involved in the problem analysis through an exploratory survey. The desk review was also done to generate data on the previous conflict analysis in Kenya. The exploratory survey was conducted between November 2019 and January 2020. The second phase was conducted in outcome harvesting sessions with the 14 project team members from the four organisations. They were taken through the outcome harvesting approach as a monitoring and evaluation process to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation practices. After the sessions, the project team members and researcher participated in collecting data and describing the outcomes for the three peacebuilding projects.

The third phase was an outcome evaluation of action research. An online feedback survey was conducted with the project teams from the four organisations to collect information on their experience in conducting the outcome harvesting and whether it was an effective process to address the weaknesses in the current monitoring and evaluation processes.

From the post-training assessment test, all the project team members had acquired knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach. This was demonstrated by the project teams having understood the three basic and simple concepts of the outcome harvesting approach. One, the project teams had understood the four questions that outcome harvesting seeks to answer and that form the basis for crafting an outcome statement. The questions involve the “who”, “what”, “when”, and “where”. The “who” refers to the conflict actors who have changed, “what” is in relation to the observable and

verifiable behavioural change, “when” is about the time when the behavioural change was observed, and “where” refers to the place where the conflict actor was located when the change happened. Two, the project team members understood that the significant outcomes were those that were linked to the peacebuilding projects. They also understood how to obtain information on the contextual changes. Three, they understood the six iterative steps of outcome harvesting. The most important point for the project teams to understand was that in the context of evaluation, the six steps are followed as they are, while for monitoring purposes, three steps are critical – these included gathering the outcome information (step 2), developing the outcome description (step 3), and the outcomes analysis (step 5). The three steps were applied in the outcome harvesting in this study.

Three peacebuilding projects were implemented by four peacebuilding organisations. The three projects addressed resource-based conflict, police violence, and violent extremism. These forms of conflict were identified in the exploratory survey to be prevalent in some regions in Kenya. Saferworld implemented a peacebuilding project to address access to grazing land and water in Samburu County, where intercommunal conflict had perpetually played out as a resource-based conflict. The project was implemented in five wards of Samburu County, in the northern part of Kenya. The project on police violence that manifested as EJK in the informal settlements of the city of Nairobi was implemented by Ghetto Foundation and MSJC in partnership with Peacebuilding Brigade International and Saferworld. It supported interface engagement between the youth and police through state–community dialogues in the informal settlements. The third project was implemented by EAI to counter violent extremism in the counties of Nairobi, Garissa, and Wajir. The project conducted peace messaging through radio shows, social media campaigns, and community engagement.

The project teams harvested a total of 35 outcomes. Saferworld harvested 12 outcomes, Ghetto Foundation harvested five outcomes, MSJC, eight outcomes, and EAI got 10 outcomes. These outcomes formed a body of evidence showing how the three peacebuilding projects addressed the forms of conflict.

For the Saferworld peacebuilding project, the competition between different rangeland actors over grazing land and water due to unregulated access was the main cause of resource-based conflict in the target wards of Samburu County that always took an interethnic dimension or involved private ranchers and local pastoralist communities. The 12 outcomes generated by the project team showed that the conflict driver was addressed in three ways.

One, regulations on the access to and use of rangeland resources were put in place. For example, the council of elders developed rules to regulate grazing in the common grazing zones, the private ranchers and pastoralists developed an agreement on how to access pastures and water in the ranches, and the county government reviewed the draft Natural Resources Management and Planned Grazing Policy and included the community issues. These regulations allowed the social actors to access rangeland resources in a peaceful manner.

Two, the formation of local peacebuilding structures was observed. The structures provided conflict transformation platforms for resolving and managing local conflicts whenever they arose. The structures were formed through inclusive and participatory processes to ensure representation. They became accessible neutral spaces for local conflict transformation.

Three, there was improvement regarding the rangelands resources, such as ensuring the availability of water. The evidence showed that the availability of water was a way of addressing the resource-based conflict related to water being scarce for livestock and people. For instance, the county government allocated KES 20 million during 2020/2021 to sink boreholes across the counties. At the time of this research, Loosuk had two boreholes drilled.

Regarding police violence in the informal settlements of the city of Nairobi, the strained relationship between the youth and police was the main cause of confrontations between the police and youth. The confrontations led to EJK of innocent young people. It is important to point out that the strained relationship was not a cause but a trigger, and the



deep-rooted cause of the conflict was poverty, inequalities in service delivery, and a lack of economic opportunities for youths in the informal settlements.

From the 13 outcomes harvested by Ghetto Foundation and MSJC, significant changes were achieved. The relationship between the police and youth was restored. This was demonstrated by the outcomes on the courtesy interactions between the HRD and police at the police station and police participating in the launch of MSJC in the Kiamaiko area. It was also observed that the youth had gained courage to face the police when human rights violations occurred. For instance, when police arrested one of the youths at Vietnam Base, Mathare Area, the youth went to the police station to find out the reason for the arrest, and upon discussion with the OCS, the youth was released. On two occasions, the youth went to report cases of police extortion acts on the youths to the police stations and the police were reprimanded. Evidence from the outcomes also showed that access to justices was also documented in the outcomes. The HRD documented cases and proceeded to take them to the law courts for prosecution. As a result of following the cases, a network of mothers of victims and survivors was formed, which, by the time of the research, had sustained pressure on the police and courts to prosecute some of the cases of human rights violations.

Regarding EAI, it can be observed that they were able to reach the Somali community and especially the youths. The first breakthrough in the prevention of violent extremism was the creation of awareness through online and radio shows that gave people a safe space to discuss their fear of Al-Shabaab, security risks, and intimidation. This made the Somali community, including religious leaders, publicly condemn the violent activities by Al-Shabaab. It also made people aware about the Al-Shabaab recruitment tactics and narratives that they were using. This exposure made Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts difficult in the target counties. The Somali community sharing security-related information was another significant achievement. This allowed communities and the police to respond to any potential threats from Al-Shabaab. Communities also became confident to respond to such violent attacks. For example, when IED went off at Kenya power station in Wajir town, Wajir County, it was the public who searched for suspects and arrested and handed

them to the police. This was not possible before because the public feared the police as well as Al-Shabaab.

#### **11.2.4 To Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Actions Implemented by Peacebuilding Organisations to Improve the Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding Projects**

The final phase of this action research was the evaluation of the results throughout the process. The evaluation was conducted through a desk review of the post-training assessment findings; outcome matrices; and Chapters Six to Ten, which concern the process and results of this action research. An online feedback survey from the 14 project team members was conducted, and 11 submitted their surveys.

From the evaluation findings, it can be reported that despite the COVID-19 pandemic that had an impact on the implementation of the action, the action research was successfully conducted. From the 19 project team members from the four organisations, 14 were equipped with knowledge and skills on the outcome harvesting approach. This was confirmed by the results from the post-training assessment test that showed that the project teams had understood the process of outcome harvesting. The project teams harvested 35 outcomes from the three peacebuilding projects by the four organisations. According to the project teams' perspectives, it was felt that outcome harvesting was an effective process for monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding work. From their experience during the research, they confirmed that the outcome harvesting process collected evidence on the change in attitudes, behaviours, and relationships among the social actors who were known to have changed. These changes are critical for any peacebuilding process. They also felt that it was effective in fostering learning and adaptation by virtue of involving all the conflict actors in monitoring and evaluation. This was observed during the consultations as the project teams collected the information from the social actors. It was also evident during the discussions of the outcomes with the researcher.

The project teams also perceived that outcome harvesting had generated sufficient evidence to show the peacebuilding implemented by Saferworld, Ghetto Foundation,

MSJC, and EAI. The outcomes harvested were observable and verifiable evidence to show the extent to which the peacebuilding projects had addressed the causes of the conflict in the target counties. According to the evaluation findings, the outcome harvesting generated evidence because it involved all the social actors who were found to have knowledge on the peacebuilding projects. This was done in a participatory manner and was also flexible. In this study, three out of six steps of the outcome harvesting process were used, and enough outcome information was generated.

The outcome harvesting approach generated both expected and unexpected outcomes. The nature of the outcome harvesting approach, being an actor-focused process, made it easy for the project teams involved to capture enough evidence. This is because it was an open process of gathering information from both targeted and untargeted social actors so long as they were influenced by the peacebuilding projects. The involvement of all the conflict actors ensured that the information captured regarding different perspectives of the change was sufficient and balanced. The contribution to the outcomes was verifiable and never linear as in the case of linear and logical frameworks advocated by traditional monitoring and evaluation processes. This gives the outcome harvesting approach an advantage in being used as a monitoring process.

### **11.3 Validity, Reliability, and Limitations**

As explained in Part Three, in Section 5.3 of Chapter Five, this study ensured that the data collection process and tools were valid and reliable. The following subsections describe the actions taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the study.

#### **11.3.1 Validity and Reliability**

At the level of the exploratory survey of monitoring and evaluation, 40 peacebuilding organisations were targeted by the survey. Involving all the peacebuilding organisations operating in Kenya ensured that the survey captured the actual state of the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding projects in peacebuilding organisations. This is referred to as external validity. The survey was also complemented by interviews with field staff and monitoring and evaluation persons in each organisation. Regarding the conflict analysis, a desk review was conducted. The questions developed in the three sets of data

collection tools ensured that the data collected was crosschecked and any gaps were addressed by probing further. The use of the three data collection methods was also done to confirm that the findings on the problem analysis were accurate and representative.

During the action implementation, more project-specific analysis per organisation was carried out. The outcome matrix template was used to collect information on the outcomes achieved per peacebuilding project. The discussion and consultations between the project teams and researcher ensured that the project teams adhered to the principles of outcome harvesting and collected sufficient information on each outcome. The researcher also had an opportunity to ensure that the information collected during the consultations was accurate. The project teams also carried out follow-up interviews with the social actors who had changed after the project teams and researcher had held discussions on the harvested outcomes. Sufficient details on the harvested outcomes make the outcomes specific and measurable. The researcher also went through the final outcome descriptions and ensured that the outcome harvesting requirements had been met. During the evaluation, the feedback survey questionnaire was reviewed by experienced evaluators to see whether the tool had captured the correct information before administration.

In this study, being a mixed methods' study with a large part of it being qualitative research, triangulation was the only method used to ensure the reliability of the qualitative data. Different data collection methods were used at different stages of the research. At the problem analysis level, survey questionnaires, interviews, and a desk review were used. At the implementation level, the outcome matrix and consultations were used to ensure that the data generated was reliable. At the evaluation stage, a feedback survey and desk review were used. The use of the different data collection methods and tools ensured that internal reliability was achieved. The combination of these data collection methods also confirmed that the themes and patterns generated from the data were representative.

### **11.3.2 Limitations of the Study**

As explained in Section 5.10 in Chapter Five, the study experienced the following limitations. These limitations didn't do affect the quality of the data collected. They informed the adaptation of the study.

- The COVID-19 pandemic had a negative impact on the research timelines. The participatory design of the model was not carried out as proposed, and instead, the researcher settled on the recent complex aware monitoring and evaluation approach known as the outcome harvesting approach as an action. This scaled down the study to the generation of evidence and learning. The initial design was to generate evidence and support conflict actors in transforming conflict in the conflict areas.
- The study did not use focus groups, group reflections, or a validation workshop. These methods could have generated more data on the study and given more insight on how the outcome harvesting process was experienced.
- Remote data collection and implementation of actions affected the feedback on the action research. The evaluation targeted 14 members, but only 11 were able to give feedback. This caused the study to miss some of the feedback from the three remaining project team members.
- If not for the limited time and financial resources, this study would have further substantiated the generated outcomes to obtain the views of third parties on the outcomes. However, due to time and funding constraints, this was not done.

### **11.4 Personal Reflection**

This research was informed by the struggle of donor and peacebuilding organisations to show the effectiveness of peacebuilding work in conflict situations at the local, national, and international levels. It was the researcher's desire to find a practical solution to the weaknesses of current monitoring and evaluation processes, as was carried out in this study. The study was carried out among 29 peacebuilding organisations in Kenya, and in particular, four organisations agreed to take part in the action research. The researcher's

reflection is based on his experience in research processes including problem analysis, planning, and implementing the action and evaluation.

The engagement of 29 peacebuilding organisations participating in the problem analysis between November 2019 and January 2020 allowed the researcher to appreciate that peacebuilding work in Kenya is informed by direct violence at the expense of structural and cultural violence. It made the researcher feel that during the past 40 years of peacebuilding work, the investment by donors had had a dismal achievement in addressing the deep-rooted structural and proximate causes of conflict. This allowed the researcher to understand why Kenya is still a conflict-burdened country. The researcher felt that if peacebuilding organisations were not going to consider this gap and urgently address it, then donor funds would continue to support the same peacebuilding projects expecting different results.

According to this study, only personal and relational changes can be accounted for as opposed to structural and cultural changes. The researcher was not surprised by this finding because past research studies have pointed out that the peacebuilding work is done at the community level with fewer activities at the policy level.

To address structural and cultural violence, policymakers have to be sufficiently influenced. The researcher believes that it is not the donor's fault if they choose not to fund peacebuilding projects to address the deep-rooted structural and cultural violence. The researcher discovered that there is no sustainable mechanism that exists to collect, collate, and analyse peace and conflict data in Kenya. Donors would like to fund peacebuilding projects guided by available peace and conflict data. In reality, the peacebuilding organisations conduct the monitoring and evaluation and report on the progress, and the completion of the project marks the end of the peacebuilding process. The researcher thinks that this situation has left peacebuilding organisations with no coordinated mechanism to share peace data and shape peacebuilding work based on available evidence. The researcher believes that peacebuilding organisations urgently need well-thought-out initiatives to generate evidence for both conflict and peacebuilding work in Kenya. The researcher needs to share the findings of this study with peacebuilding

organisations in Kenya to understand the urgent need for such efforts towards conducting a continuous peace and conflict trend analysis.

The peacebuilding organisations were also found to be implementing “quick fix” responses to address direct violence that had taken place. Quick responses to any violence and ignoring hidden violence in the governance and social structures and systems cause conflict to turn into large-scale conflict that sometimes turns into civil war. From this study, the researcher felt that this was a mistake that Kenya has continued to make for years by ignoring the deep-rooted historical injustices, grievances, and other causes of conflict.

During the implementation of the action research, great appreciation was shown by the 14 project team members involved. During the training, the researcher could feel the enthusiasm and energy that the team had to grasp the concept of the outcome harvesting approach. One of them stated, “it appears that a lot of information on the changes will be generated from outcome harvesting. It will make it easy for evaluation now”. The simplicity of the outcome harvesting approach allowed the project teams to appreciate that monitoring and evaluation were not as difficult as they had thought them to be. This gave the researcher the confidence that the project teams had changed their mindset on monitoring and evaluation, which, in most cases, are observed as difficult and meant for a monitoring and evaluation expert.

From their feedback, the researcher was confident that they were going to use outcome harvesting not only during the research time but also for other projects in the future. It was a discovery for the researcher that the outcome harvesting approach can only be beneficial if one conducts practical trainings with the participants rather than technical training for a number of days. The researcher believes that this points to a paradigm shift and departure from results-based monitoring and evaluation processes, which have been perceived to be too technical for project teams. This perception has led to monitoring and evaluation training being treated as special. The researcher reached the realisation that complexity-aware and systemic approaches to monitoring and evaluation should be practical, carried out by the participants, and be kept simple. This, therefore, explains why outcome harvesting is spreading at a high rate among donors and civil society, including peacebuilding organisations.

Regarding the outcomes harvested from the three peacebuilding projects, the researcher can confirm that it was an eye-opener for him, to realise that an effective peacebuilding project must deal with a conflict driver. For example, the researcher discovered that after the Saferworld project, and after the council of elders had developed rules and further local peace structures had been developed, there was a reduction in violent conflict. Although the evidence generation on the effectiveness showed that outcome harvesting worked as an appropriate approach, the researcher felt that something was missing because no negative outcomes or non-action by the conflict actors were recorded. This brings to the fore the question of whether the peacebuilding organisations were doing enough and taking more risks to engage in real conflict drivers. This confirms the finding from this study of peacebuilding work being focused on violent events rather than the deep-rooted causes of conflict. The introduction of peacebuilding in a conflict context will cause both negative and positive change. From the evidence generated, only positive change was recorded. The researcher feels that further probing could have generated negative peacebuilding outcomes.

After further analysis of the outcome descriptions, the researcher found that behind each of the outcomes was a hidden attitude change that came about after enough probing of the conflict actors had been done, especially with regard to personal change. This transformation is internal and occurs within a person and should happen first before the behavioural change. The researcher, therefore, feels that there is a need for outcome harvesting to be modified to delve deeper into perceptions, values, mindsets, norms, and beliefs that cannot be observed or verified as outcome harvesting dictates. This can be documented when asking why people feel that outcomes are significant. The researcher also discovered that sustainable peace starts from within and understanding others' values, perspectives, beliefs, and norms. This led the researcher to feel that outcome harvesting is a significant process to start evidence-based conversations between conflict actors.

In summary, from the outcome harvesting process and outcome findings, the researcher feels that the outcome harvesting approach is appropriate for measuring peacebuilding work. During the evaluation, one of the project teams was quick to state, "let this be taken



up immediately”, showing their positive reaction and the value that the project teams placed on the tool after participating in the outcome harvesting process in this study.

## **11.5 Recommendations**

From the findings, the following are the recommendations made for peacebuilding organisations on the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work:

1. Peacebuilding organisations implementing peacebuilding projects can adopt the outcome harvesting approach as a monitoring and evaluation process. It generates information on peacebuilding outcomes, peacebuilding processes, actors’ dynamics, and change in the conflict context. This is an effective process for measuring systemic changes.
2. Capacity building of donors and peacebuilding organisations on the outcome harvesting approach should be done to encourage the wide adoption of the approach. Using the examples of the four organisations, the findings can be used for further training.
3. Donor and peacebuilding organisations should develop a mechanism for conducting peace and conflict analysis in Kenya. The value in investing in such a mechanism would help the organisations in uncovering weaknesses in peacebuilding work. This study has found that an investment of peacebuilding work carried out for 30 years has not had an impact on structural and cultural violence. This could have been discovered if the peace and conflict trend analysis was being done.
4. There is a need for peacebuilding organisations to develop a coordination mechanism to share experiences on peacebuilding work. This will encourage learning from each organisation and finding solutions on how to address structural and cultural violence in Kenya.

## **11.6 Areas for Further Action Research**

Areas for further research include the following:

1. There is a need for investigation on the outcome harvesting process to see how it can capture negative outcomes. From the four organisations, no negative outcome was harvested. This indicates a weakness of outcome harvesting that needs to be urgently addressed.
2. Peacebuilding organisations can conduct further field research of the other complexity-aware monitoring and evaluation processes, such as outcome evidencing and developmental evaluation. This will help grow the number of monitoring and evaluation approaches for peacebuilding projects in complex situations.
3. Further research can be carried out on how the current evidence can be used to awaken the realisation among the state and non-state peacebuilding actors regarding why there is a need to address the structural and proximate causes of conflict as an urgent matter.
4. Outcome harvesting can be used by other traditional monitoring and evaluation tools. Further research can be done in this area to establish how they work and complement each other. It is important to note that traditional monitoring and evaluation processes are focused on quantitative indicators, different from the qualitative outcome harvesting tool.

## **11.7 Conclusion**

This research study intended to strengthen the current monitoring and evaluation processes used by peacebuilding organisations in generating evidence on the effectiveness of peacebuilding. From the study findings generated from the engagement of the peacebuilding organisations, observations were made on the different ways that the study had improved the current monitoring and evaluation processes.

It is important to highlight that peacebuilding work has been occurring for 30 years, but there is little change to show this in the conflict context in Kenya. From the peacebuilding

projects funded by donors, peacebuilding organisations have achieved peacebuilding outcomes at the personal and relational levels with little being achieved at the structural and cultural levels. While this can be attributed to short-term funding by donors, this study has established that the monitoring and evaluation generated evidence of what has been done and short-term changes at the expense of showing that the peacebuilding has not delved deeper to address the structural and proximate causes of conflict, such as marginalisation, poor governance, inequalities in service delivery, and unemployment. Instead, the peacebuilding projects have been focused on responding to direct violence, and after returning to the status quo, no further engagement has been carried out. A lack of a monitoring and evaluation process to document peacebuilding processes and outcomes has turned peacebuilding work into a “quick fix” response without achieving sustainable peace. The current linear and logical frameworks that support the documentation of only expected changes are no longer effective in peacebuilding work that is dynamic, where changes occur in non-linear manners.

This study sought to develop an open, adaptive, and flexible monitoring and evaluation process. An exploratory study showed that peacebuilding organisations were indeed conducting monitoring and evaluation at varied levels and that they supported the generation of evidence on the effectiveness of the peacebuilding at various levels. However, there were serious weaknesses that needed urgent attention. The weaknesses included rigid monitoring and evaluation approaches and methods designed to measure predetermined peacebuilding outcomes, leaving out unexpected outcomes which occur more often in peacebuilding work; the exclusion of the communities and other conflict actors who are party to the conflict in the target areas; and inadequate learning from the peacebuilding processes undertaken, with minimal use of the evidence to improve those processes. It was observed that there were two critical opportunities. One, there were already emergent and adaptive monitoring and evaluation approaches that had been tested and proven to work. One of those approaches is outcome harvesting, which was selected by the researcher as an action in this research. Two, donors and peacebuilding organisations’ willingness to invest time and resources to learning and sharing on effectiveness of peacebuilding processes.

From the analysis of the process of using outcome harvesting and the outcomes generated, it was established that the outcome harvesting process had addressed the identified weaknesses. The tool engaged the social actors who had observed the behavioural changes in a participatory way. This meant that outcome harvesting involved the local communities affected by the conflict and other stakeholders who were not the target actors of the projects. Collecting the peacebuilding outcomes and backtracking to find how the project had influenced the change is another strength. The contribution can be either direct, linear, or non-linear. This, then, addresses the challenge presented by linear and logical processes that peacebuilding organisations have faced for years. Outcome harvesting, as observed from the outcomes harvested, has the ability to capture unexpected changes from the project, making it suitable to monitor systemic changes that happen due to change brought about in the context. Finally, through discussions during the data collection became a learning processes and thinking about how the peacebuilding process can be shaped and adapted from contextual change. This is because project team involved social actors in iterative discussion as the generated outcomes information.

In summary, this research study outcome harvesting approach has been proven to be an effective process to document the effectiveness of conflict transformation by peacebuilding organisations.

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## ANNEXES

### Annex 1 Target Peacebuilding Organisations

Name of the Organisation	Website	Legal Identity
1. America Friends Service Committee	<a href="https://www.afsc.org/">https://www.afsc.org/</a>	NGO
2. World Vision	<a href="https://www.wvi.org/kenya">https://www.wvi.org/kenya</a>	NGO
3. Catholic Relief Services	<a href="https://www.crs.org/">https://www.crs.org/</a>	
4. Care International	<a href="https://www.care.or.ke/index.php/aboutcare">https://www.care.or.ke/index.php/aboutcare</a>	NGO
5. Action Aid	<a href="https://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/where-we-work/kenya">https://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/where-we-work/kenya</a>	NGO
6. Organisation of African Instituted Churches	<a href="http://www.oaic.org/">http://www.oaic.org/</a>	
7. Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa	<a href="http://www.npi-africa.org/">http://www.npi-africa.org/</a>	NGO
8. Catholic Justice & Peace Commission	<a href="http://www.cjpckkenya.org/">http://www.cjpckkenya.org/</a>	NGO
9. International Rescue Committee	<a href="https://www.rescue.org/country/kenya">https://www.rescue.org/country/kenya</a>	NGO
10. Rural Women Peace Link	<a href="http://www.ruralwomenpeaceLINK.org/">http://www.ruralwomenpeaceLINK.org/</a>	NGO
11. Africa Peace Forum	<a href="http://www.amaniafrika.org">www.amaniafrika.org</a>	NGO
12. Peace and Development Network Trust (PEACENET KENYA)	<a href="http://www.peacenetkenya.or.ke">http://www.peacenetkenya.or.ke</a>	Trust
13. Coalition for Peace in Africa	<a href="http://copafrica.org/">http://copafrica.org/</a>	Network
14. Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli	<a href="http://www.chemichemi.org/">http://www.chemichemi.org/</a>	Trust
15. Equal Access International	<a href="https://www.equalaccess.org/our-work/countries/kenya/">https://www.equalaccess.org/our-work/countries/kenya/</a>	NGO

16. Security Research & Information Centre	<a href="http://www.srickenya.org">http://www.srickenya.org</a>	NGO
17. Saferworld	<a href="https://www.saferworld.org.uk/kenya/kenya">https://www.saferworld.org.uk/kenya/kenya</a>	NGO
18. URAIA	<a href="http://uraia.or.ke/">http://uraia.or.ke/</a>	Trust
19. ACT!	<a href="http://www.act.or.ke/">http://www.act.or.ke/</a>	NGO
20. Jesuit Hakimani Centre	<a href="http://jesuithakimani.net/">http://jesuithakimani.net/</a>	Trust
21. Amani Communities Africa	<a href="http://www.acafrica.org/">http://www.acafrica.org/</a>	NGO
22. Seeds for Peace Africa	<a href="http://www.sopa.or.ke/">http://www.sopa.or.ke/</a>	NGO
23. ACORD	<a href="http://www.acordinternational.org/our-work/where/kenya/">http://www.acordinternational.org/our-work/where/kenya/</a>	NGO
24. Local capacities for Peace International	<a href="http://localcapacities.org/">http://localcapacities.org/</a>	NGO
25. Mercy Corps	<a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/kenya">https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/kenya</a>	NGO
26. Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation	<a href="http://www.shalomconflictcenter.org/">http://www.shalomconflictcenter.org/</a>	NGO
27. Global Peace Foundation Kenya	<a href="http://www.globalpeacekenya.org/">http://www.globalpeacekenya.org/</a>	Ngo
28. Universities and Colleges Students Peace Association of Kenya	<a href="http://www.ucspak.or.ke/">http://www.ucspak.or.ke/</a>	Association
29. Life and Peace Institute	<a href="http://life-peace.org/tag/kenya/">http://life-peace.org/tag/kenya/</a>	NGO
30. Women in International Security	<a href="https://www.wisglobal.org/">https://www.wisglobal.org/</a>	NGO
31. Secretariat Interreligious council of Kenya	<a href="http://www.interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/">http://www.interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/</a>	NGO
32. County Governance Watch	<a href="http://cgwkenya.org/">http://cgwkenya.org/</a>	NGO
33. PACT International		NGO

34. CAFOD	<a href="https://cafod.org.uk/About-us/Where-we-work/Africa/Kenya">https://cafod.org.uk/About-us/Where-we-work/Africa/Kenya</a>	NGO
35. African Peace Forum	<a href="https://www.c-r.org/organisation-profile/africa-peace-forum">https://www.c-r.org/organisation-profile/africa-peace-forum</a>	NGO
36. Pamoja for transformation	<a href="http://www.pamojapamoja.org/new/">http://www.pamojapamoja.org/new/</a>	CBO
37. Peace Cop	<a href="http://peacecopkenya.blogspot.com">http://peacecopkenya.blogspot.com</a>	NGO
38. Ghetto Foundation	<a href="https://www.kiva.org/trustees/1116">https://www.kiva.org/trustees/1116</a>	CBO
39. Mathare Social Justice Centre	<a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/">https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/</a>	CBO
40. International Transitional Justice centre	<a href="https://www.ictj.org/about">https://www.ictj.org/about</a>	NGO

#### Abbreviations

NGO – Non-Government Organisation

CBO – Community Based Organisation

## Annex 2 Peacebuilding Organisations Survey Questionnaire

**Introduction:** My Name is Thomas Kimathi Nyagah. I'm a student at Durban University of Technology. I'm carrying out a study titled **"Monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes among civil society organisations in Kenya"**. The purpose of the study is purely academic purposes. I will treat all the information you share in the questionnaire with strictest confidentiality. I am kindly asking you to voluntarily take part in this research as a respondent. If you agree, kindly spare sometime to answer the questions in this questionnaire. If you find some of the questions sensitive feel free not to answer. I am also making a request for you sign the **Consent Form**, attached in your email. **If you have questions/problem related to this study you can contact me (+254 721 910 367, Email – [calkamia@gmail.com](mailto:calkamia@gmail.com) ).**

Serial No.....

Date.....

Name of the organisation:.....

### PART A: PEACEBUILDERS BIODATA

1. Indicate your gender (Tick in the appropriate box)

☐ Male      ☐ Female

2. For how long have you worked for this organization?

☐ Less than 1 year

☐ 1 – 3 years

☐ 4 – 6 years

☐ 7 – 10 years

☐ Over 10 years

### PART B: PEACE BUILDING ORGANISATION INFORMATION

3. Indicate the years registered.....

4. Year started operations in peacebuilding.....

5. Type of the organisation

☐ International

☐ Regional (Kenya and other African countries)

☐ National (2 more and counties)

☐ Local (Limited to one county)

6. Select number of counties where this organization has/is operating.

- ☐ 1
- ☐ 2 - 10
- ☐ 11 - 19
- ☐ 20 - 28
- ☐ 29 - 37
- ☐ 38 - 47

7. List the counties where peacebuilding projects wer/are implemented?(Counties per project).....

.....

.....

.....

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.....

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.....

.....

.....

8. How many peacebuilding projects is your organization currently implementing?.....

9. How many staff are currently implementing peacebuilding projects?

- ..... Male
- ..... Female

10. Which donors funds your peacebuilding projects?

- ☐ USAID
- ☐ DFID
- ☐ SWISS
- ☐ DIAKONIA
- ☐ DANIDA
- ☐ OTHERS(SPECIFY).....
- .....
- .....

11. How much funding (in KES) have you received for each peacebuilding project?

- ☐ Less than 1 M
- ☐ 1 - 10 M
- ☐ 11 - 20 M
- ☐ 20 - 30
- ☐ 30 - 40
- ☐ 41 - 50

☐ Over 50

### PART C: PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS

12. Which of the following categories of conflict are you addressing?

- ☐ Resource based (Land, water, grass, infrastructure)
- ☐ Ethnic/tribal/communal
- ☐ Cross border
- ☐ Electoral/political conflict
- ☐ others specify.....

13. Who are the main target groups/actors?

- ☐ Community (youths, elders, women, business people)
- ☐ Local leaders (Elders, opinion, religious, clan, women, youths)
- ☐ Local authorities (County government, security, academic, NGO)
- ☐ National Authorities (Parliamentary, state departments, religious institution)
- ☐ International actors (International NGO, commissions, UN, IGAD)
- ☐ Others specify.....

14. Which are your main peacebuilding activities?

- ☐ Community peace dialogues
- ☐ Forming peace committees/commission
- ☐ Mediation and negotiation
- ☐ Participatory conflict workshops
- ☐ Development activities - water, food security etc
- ☐ Peace campaigns/nonviolent campaigns
- ☐ Media (talk shows, experts panel, news etc)
- ☐ Theatre/drams
- ☐ Others.....

15. Which of the following is your peace building activities trying to achieve?

- ☐ Creating institutions, mechanisms or/ and framework
- ☐ Capacity building, empowerment and awareness
- ☐ Reduce all forms of violence (Personal, structural and cultural\0
- ☐ Building peaceful relationships
- ☐ Increase culture of peace (non - violence ways, peace education)
- ☐ Increase social and economic development
- ☐ Change of perception, prejudice, stereotypes
- ☐ Others (Specify) .....

16. What difference have this/these project (s) made in the conflict areas? Why do you think it happened? (For each impact, explain why and how it happened)

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

17. Are there unexpected outcomes that came about when peacebuilding activities were being implemented? (Ask for give examples).

☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, ask for examples

.....

.....

.....

#### PART D: MONITORING AND EVALUATION PROCESSES FOR PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS

18. Looking at Monitoring and evaluation of all the peacebuilding projects you have implemented, give your opinion or view about the following statements with regards to monitoring, evaluation and learning in those projects? (Tick your choice of answer).

	Statements	All	Some	None	Don't Know
1.	Conducted conflict analysis before the project was designed and regularly updated				
2.	Articulated clearly Theory of change based on conflict analysis				
3.	Project had logical flow from activities, outputs, outcomes and impact demonstrated clearly				
4.	Sufficient change indicators were developed				
5.	A monitoring and evaluation process/plan design at the beginning of the project				
6.	Baseline survey was conducted for each project before implementation				
7.	Right monitoring tools and methods were used in generating evidence				
8.	Evaluations were conducted periodically for each of the project				
9.	Project adjustment was done informed by the conflict analysis findings				
10.	Information was sharing regularly to all actors for their needs				

19. In your opinion (out of 100%), what is the level of the application of the monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding projects in this organisation .....



20. Give reason(s) for your answer above (qn 9).

.....  
.....

21. What information is generated in relation to how peacebuilding projects are performing based on indicators? (Multiple Choice)

- ☐ Activities implemented
- ☐ Context of the project and changes happening
- ☐ Interaction between activities and context
- ☐ Results/changes/ outcomes observed/achieved
- ☐ Finances/funds used
- ☐ Others (Specify.....)

22. In relation to violence prevention/reduction and conflict transformation, which changes get documented as they happen?

- ☐ Personal/individual
- ☐ Relational
- ☐ structural
- ☐ Cultural
- ☐ Others (Specify.....)

23. How often is information generated for the peacebuilding projects? (Multiple Choice)

- ☐ Activity
- ☐ Monthly
- ☐ Quarterly
- ☐ Bi-annually
- ☐ Annually
- ☐ Others (Specify.....)

24. Who are involved in collecting the information for the peacebuilding projects?

- ☐ Donors
- ☐ Project team (Field officer, M&E, etc)
- ☐ Target actors (community, local CBO, authorities and Institutions)
- ☐ Others.....

25. In your opinion, out of 10, to what extent do the organisation is generating enough evidence to show how peacebuilding projects are working and making a difference?.....

26. Which monitoring tools are being used?

- ☐ Outcome Mapping
- ☐ Surveys (baseline, feedback, perception or once off)

- ☐ Peace outcomes journals
- ☐ Change stories (Case study/story, MSC or Human-Interest Story)
- ☐ Others (Specify) .....

27. In your opinion, do you conduct learning and reflections in your organisations?

- ☐ Yes      ☐ No

If yes. Which platforms are being used?

- ☐ Regular review
- ☐ Reflection meetings on information generated
- ☐ Learning exchanges visits
- ☐ Learning events
- ☐ Data analysis sessions
- ☐ Evaluations (e.g. self or participatory evaluation)
- ☐ Others (Specify).....

28. How does your organization use the information generated practically to improve how conflict is transformed in the target conflict areas?

.....

.....

.....

.....

## **PART E: IMPROVEMENT OF THE CURRENT MONITORING AND EVALUATION PROCESSES**

29. What are your observations on the current M&E process in peacebuilding projects? (Probe on what is working well and not working well).

.....

.....

.....

30. Any suggestions on how to improve the current monitoring, Evaluation and Learning process of the peacebuilding projects in your organization and how information generated can contribute to peacebuilding processes? (Get short term and long term suggestions).

a. Improving current M&E to capture evidence on effectiveness of peacebuilding

.....

.....

.....

b. Evidence gather can contribute to transforming conflict into peace outcomes

.....

.....

.....

**THANKS FOR YOUR TIME AND FEEDBACK**

## **Annex 3 Document Review Questions**

1. What are forms of conflict that exists in Kenya?
  - a. Hotspots areas per county
  - b. Root causes/ triggers, actors
  - c. History and target areas?
2. Which are the peacebuilding and conflict management interventions that have been implemented in the past and currently by peacebuilding organisations?
  - a. Target areas per county
  - b. Peacebuilding activities
  - c. Impact of the projects
3. Any other useful information.

## **Annex 4 Interview Schedule**

### **1. Introduction**

The researcher will introduce himself and the purpose of the research study. A request will also be made for consent and period of the interview.

### **2. Questions**

1. What are the existing conflicts in the target community? – Probe on the causes and effects of the conflict.
2. How does the different actors (especially the peacebuilding organisations) handle the issues? – interrogate the actors' relationships – identify the spoilers?
3. What contribution has current peacebuilding initiatives made to the conflict context? – Ask how monitoring and evaluation has help in conflict transformation?
4. What challenges are faced by the project team in monitoring and evaluating the peacebuilding initiatives
5. What are the suggestions for improvement of monitoring and evaluation processes in peacebuilding work?

**GIVE VOTE OF THANKS**

## **Annex 5 Outcome Harvesting Manuscript**

### **MANUSCRIPT FOR PEACEBUILDING ORGANIZATIONS OUTCOME HARVESTING TRAINING BY THOMAS NYAGAH**

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#### **What is the history of Outcome Harvesting?**

Outcome Harvesting was invented in 2002 by Wilson – Grau Ricardo and other evaluators as an evaluation tool to enable the evaluators, grantors and managers systematically identify, formulate, verify and make sense of the changes associated with intervention. However, there is an emerging shift towards applying Outcome Harvesting approach as a monitoring process for real time information gathering about the social change. Outcome Harvesting has been applied by over 500 Non-Government Organizations, Networks, government agencies, funding agencies, Community Based Organizations, research institutions and universities worldwide. It has been used in monitoring and evaluation of projects on Human Rights, policy work, campaigns, political, economic and environmental advocacy, conflict and peace among others.


#### **What is Outcome Harvesting?**

Outcome harvesting is a monitoring and evaluation process used to systematically identify, describe, verify and analyse outcomes as a result of your project's influence. Outcome can be positive, negative, intended and unintended, planned and unplanned. In the context of Outcome Harvesting, an outcome is observable and verifiable change in behaviour, relationship, actions, activities, practices, social norms or policies of an individual, group, community, organisation in civil society, corporation, government, media or member of public. The Outcome Harvesting collect evidence of what has been achieved and track backwards to establish the link with the project. Unlike other traditional monitoring and evaluation processes, it does not measure progress towards pre-determined goal, objectives, outcomes or targets.

Outcome harvesting is applicable where there was no plan in the first place, or the plan became obsolete due to rapid and unpredictable changes in the context. It is also appropriate for complex contexts where there is no clear link or relationship between the project and observed change or is not fully understood. The Outcome Harvesting has in the past been employed in complex and dynamic situations to uncover intangible and unintended changes of an intervention. It has also been used to encourage learning on how social changes take place.

## How does Outcome Harvesting works?

Ricardo Wilson Grau, the inventor of Outcome Harvesting, emphasizes on six iterative steps for proper Outcome Harvesting process.



Adopted from: <https://outcomeharvesting.net/the-essence/>

**Step 1: Design the Outcome Harvest:** in this first step, the roles are clarified among the Harvester (External Evaluator) and Harvest users (primarily the managers, grantors and donors). Together, they come up with Outcome harvest questions, information needed and data collections to be used in gathering the outcomes data. In some instances where there are many documents generated already, the selection of the documents is necessary. Timelines and deliverables are also agreed upon, mode of participation in all the steps and channels of communication and consultation agreed upon by harvester and harvest users.

**Step 2: Gather data and draft outcome descriptions:** The harvester reviews all the relevant documents. The documents include and not limited to progress reports, press statements, target beneficiaries' feedback, survey reports and donor reports among others. The harvester identifies and start describing the outcomes. One of the noticeable gaps in this step is the information gaps in the preliminary outcome descriptions. In some instances, especially when Outcome Harvesting is a monitoring process, the outcomes are identified from the primary sources which include social actors involved in the project implementation. The harvester can also opt to review documents and conduct interviews with other social actors to get sufficient information to describe the outcomes.

Step 3: Engage change agent in formulating the outcome descriptions: Discussions are held by the project team to review and further give more information on the outcome descriptions. This can be done either one on one interviews or through participatory workshop. Additional outcomes are identified during this engagement between the change agent and harvester. At this step, the outcomes descriptions must be simple, specific, accurate and detailed. The information on who changed, what changed, when and where is generated. Further description is given on why the change agent considers the outcome worthy noting or relevant. Finally, the harvester ensures the contribution analysis is done by establishing how the change agent contributed to the outcomes identified. In some cases, the sources of the information are indicated. It is also allowable for change agent to consult with well-informed individuals (inside or outside the organization) who can provide information about the outcomes. This step also become the beginning of the outcomes analysis by categorizing them into emerging umbrella categories.

However, for monitoring purposes, the harvester combines step 2 and 3 by asking the project team to draft the outcomes on their own and then bring forth for further discussion with the rest of the team in formulating the outcome descriptions. This is best done through an Outcome Harvesting workshop with the project team.

Step 4: Substantiate the significant outcomes: In most cases and depending on the project period, many outcomes are harvested. It is within the power of the harvester to select most significant outcomes and subject them to a review by an independent third party. Caution must be taken to ensure the review is done by an independent and knowledgeable person of the change agent work. Sometimes, internal review can be done by internal project team who are not the implementors of the project under evaluation or externally by other stakeholders who have interacted with the project under evaluation. The aim of the substantiation is to verify the accuracy of the outcome's information. In some instances, more outcomes maybe identified and documented.

Step 5: Analysis and interpretation of the outcomes: Ricardo Wilson-Grau, the originator of Outcome Harvesting has noted, *"The true value of an outcome harvest is not collecting individual outcomes but demonstrating how sets of outcomes reveal processes and patterns of change over time. So, the evaluator must take care not to be drowned in outcome detail and ensure that the story or picture of change emerges"*. The analysis can be done in different ways to serve monitoring and evaluation purposes. One outcome or a group of outcomes or both ways can be applied when conducting analysis.

For evaluation, the analysis is done once. However, for monitoring, it is regular, systematic and continuous collection and analysis of the outcomes over time to give a change story. The analysis is done by categorising the outcomes by the type of change, social actor, type of contribution or any other way the harvester and change agent feels suitable. The patterns developed are interpreted to answer the outcome Harvest questions.



1- Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree

10. Outcome Harvesting, is appropriate for complex situation where cause - effect relationship cannot be traced easily or understood.

1- Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree

11. Outcome Harvesting, if done correctly can collect evidence for both expected and unexpected outcomes.

1- Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree

12. a. An outcome should have detailed information on Outcome description, significance and contribution. Yes or No?

b. If yes, which of the following questions should guide you in collect accurate information.

Who, What, Why, when and where?

- c. If yes, does the following statements relate to significance of an outcome/change?

a. Change relate to the project goal/objective

b. Is it happening for first time?

c. Used more or less money

d. Is it systemic or policy change?

e. Does it relate with Theory of Change?

- d. The contribution to the outcome means influence from project activities but not causing the change to happen. Yes/No

### **PART C: STEPS OF OUTCOME HARVESTING**

13. From the Outcome Harvesting training or sessions, which of the following steps do you understand most?

a. Design the outcome Harvest

b. Identify the outcomes from project documents and describe them

c. Discuss outcomes with project team and target beneficiaries

d. Verify a sample of the outcomes with a non-project team or beneficiary

e. Analyse and interpret all the harvested outcomes

f. Support the use of the findings

14. Which of the following steps of Outcome Harvesting must be done in monitoring of the peacebuilding projects?
- a. Design the outcome Harvest
  - b. Identify the outcomes from project documents and describe them
  - c. Discuss outcomes with project team and target beneficiaries
  - d. Verify a sample of the outcomes with a non-project team or beneficiary
  - e. Analyse and interpret all the harvested outcomes
  - f. Support the use of the findings
15. Based on your level understanding of Outcome Harvesting, what is your level of confidence in conducting Outcome Harvesting in monitoring of peacebuilding projects? 1 to 10.

## Annex 7 Outcome Matrix

A Outcome Description (Who did what differently, when and where?)	B Significance (Why do the change worthy noting?)	C Contribution (project activity linked to the outcome)
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-
		-

## **Annex 8 Feedback Survey on Outcome Harvesting Training**

**Introduction:** My Name is Thomas Kimathi Nyagah. I'm a student at Durban University of Technology. I'm carrying out a study titled **"Monitoring and Evaluation of peacebuilding programmes among Civil society organizations in Kenya"**. Apart of this action research, I am conducting a feedback survey on the application of Outcome Harvesting by organisations that I trained or conducted Outcome Harvesting sessions for their project team between January – July 2020. I am collecting feedback from you because you participated in one of the Outcome Harvesting trainings or sessions that I facilitated. The information will help me in assessing whether Outcome Harvesting approach is a suitable approach for conducting monitoring and evaluation for peacebuilding projects. Feel free to give any feedback based on your experience in using the Outcome Harvesting.

I will treat all the information you share in the questionnaire with strictest confidentiality. I am kindly asking you to voluntarily take part in this research as a respondent. If you agree, kindly spare sometime to answer the questions. If you find some of the questions sensitive feel free not to answer.

If you have questions/problem related to this study you can contact me (+254 721 910 367, Email – [calkamia@gmail.com](mailto:calkamia@gmail.com)).

### **PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

1. Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Organisation: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
2. Target counties: \_\_\_\_\_ Indicate your gender (M/F)
3. How many years have you worked in peacebuilding or other related sectors?
  - a. Less than 1 year
  - b. 1-3 years
  - c. 4-6 years
  - d. 7-10 years
  - e. Over 10 years



(MSJC)  
**IN DEFENCE  
OF SOCIAL  
JUSTICE**

Mathare Social Justice Center (MSJC)  
Mathare and Fashara areas Juja road,  
opposite Olympic Petrol Station  
Tel. +254 714738701  
Email: [matharesocialjusticecentre@gmail.com](mailto:matharesocialjusticecentre@gmail.com)  
Website: <http://matharesocialjustice.org>

17<sup>th</sup> December 2019

Dear Thomas

**RE: PERMISSION FOR THOMAS NYAGAH**


We are pleased to let you know that your permission to conduct the Action Research on Monitoring and Evaluation in the organisation has been accepted. We appreciate that you choose our organisation as one of the beneficiaries of your research.

Let us know the kind of the support that you need from us to successfully finish your research. Your intention to training the project team is highly appreciated and it will have benefits event after you research.

In case you need further help as you conduct your research, let me know.

Yours Faithfully,

Dr. Wangui Kimari  
Programme Manager





Phone No +254 0720 84 71 02

+254 0710 87 83 30

Email [gf@ghettofoundation.org](mailto:gf@ghettofoundation.org)

[www.ghettofoundationkenya.org](http://www.ghettofoundationkenya.org)

Laying a firm foundation for the ghetto community

15<sup>th</sup> January 2020

Dear Thomas,

**RE: ACTION RESEARCH STUDY**


Your request to conduct an action research with us has been granted. Kindly provide with us the more information on the dates for the training and any other support you require from us. Monitoring and Evaluation has been a challenge to us, and we hope that this engagement will build our skills on how be to generate and use evidence to improve our project.

We wish you all the best as you interact with the Ghetto Foundation team.

Regards,

Samuel Kiriro

Programme Manager





25<sup>th</sup> February 2020

Dear Thomas

**RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT AN ACTION RESEARCH**

Following your request to conduct a research in the Saferworld Kenya programme, this is to confirm my approval to proceed and engage the programme team on your research activities. Let us know if you need further support as you conduct your research.

We will be happy to get the feedback on the findings and recommendations once you successfully complete it.

Best wishes,

**Emmy Auma,**  
Country Manager





**Thomas Nyagah**  
**Nairobi.**

20<sup>th</sup> May 2020

Dear Mr. Nyagah,

**RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT PHD RESEARCH STUDY AT EQUAL ACCESS INTERNATIONAL - KENYA OFFICE**

Following your request to conduct action research as part of your engagement with Equal Access International (EAI), we have agreed to allow you to undertake the research.

We will be happy to get the results of the research and the recommendations you will give to EAI to have an effective monitoring and evaluation in the Preventing Violent Extremism sector.

I wish you all the best with your work and feel free to inform me in case you need any support during your research work.

Your reference person in the organisation will be the Senior Program Manager, Christopher Wakube. His email is [cwakube@equalaccess.org](mailto:cwakube@equalaccess.org)

Yours sincerely,

20/5/2020  
Abdirashid A. Hussein  
**Country Director- East Africa**

**No. 24 Kufuga Lane, Kufuga Road, Off Langata Road, Karen, P.O. Box 61980-00200, Nairobi Kenya**



## Annex 10 Sample of Signed Consent Form



### LETTER OF INFORMATION

#### Introduction:

My Name is **Thomas Kimathi Nyagah**. Reg.No.21751162. I'm a student at Durban University of Technology. I'm carrying out a study titled '*Analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation in peacebuilding work: An action research among Peacebuilding organisations in Kenya*'. The purpose of the study is purely academic, to enable me fulfil the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Management. I will treat all the information you share in the questionnaire with strictest confidentiality.

#### Right of Participation, Risks and Benefits:

You are asked to take part in this research as a respondent. Taking part is completely voluntary. If you agree, I will conduct an interview with you which touches on the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding work. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes. If you find some of the questions sensitive feel free to stop me from asking any question or terminate the interview. I do not anticipate any risk to you and there is no payment for participating in the study.

#### Confidentiality:

The information from this study will be kept private and will be used for only academic reason. The publication will not include any of your personal information. Only the research team will have access to this information.

If you have questions/problem related to this study you can contact me (+254 721 910 367, Email – [cardke@gmail.com](mailto:cardke@gmail.com) ) or my supervisor Prof Geoff Harris (031 373 5609/031 201 4079, Email: [Geoffreyh@dut.ac.za](mailto:Geoffreyh@dut.ac.za) ) or the Institute Research Ethics Administrator on 031 3732900. Complaints can be reported to the Deputy Vice Chancellor, Technology, Innovation & Partnerships Telephone: 031 373 2375 Fax: 0866 851 845 au [dvctip@dut.ac.za](mailto:dvctip@dut.ac.za)

Kind regards,

Thomas K. Nyagah

### INFORMED CONSENT FORM

**Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:**

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, **Thomas Kimathi Nyagah**, about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: \_\_\_\_\_
- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me

(Optional) Full Name of Participant \_\_\_\_\_

18<sup>th</sup> 11/2019  
Date

11:40am  
Time

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

I, **Thomas Kimathi Nyagah** herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study

\_\_\_\_\_  
Full Name of Researcher

12/11/2019  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Full Name of Witness (If applicable)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

## Annex 11 Outcome Matrices from Four Peacebuilding Organisations

### Outcomes Matrix – Saferworld

Outcome Statement	Significance	Contribution
1. In June 2019 at Waso ward office, a community leader who is the member of Community Action Group (WCAGs) in Waso Ward held a meeting with Member of County Assembly (MCA) who was a chair of Environment house committee of Samburu County Assembly where they deliberated on policy issues specific to Waso ward that needed to be incorporated in the Natural Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy.	The Ward Community Action Group (WCAG) has emerged as a new rangeland community organizing structure, giving voice to community priorities in policy development processes. Further, this potentially enhanced WCAG's credibility in the eyes of local leaders including MCA who is a political leader and community members, as a legitimate local structure which is able to influence the county government to take up community priorities in policy making.	Capacity building training of WCAG on the advocacy in April 2019. The advocacy strategies of engaging policy makers were among the topics taught during the training. This activity can be directly linked to this outcome.
2. On May 20 <sup>th</sup> , 2019, communities living around Mnanda Pump Omo Sordo dam in Wamba Ward formed a water resource management committee to support community efforts to address water problems and associated conflicts over water points. This meeting to form the committee was held at Wamba Catholic Parish.	The borehole was mismanaged by the previous committee and became a source of conflict among the community members because they could not access water from it. This outcome is significant as it demonstrates through dialogue forums community are able to discover their individual and collective strengths and their mutual responsibilities.	Capacity building trainings of WCAG on rangeland management and conflict resolution. The training was done in April 2019. This activity has an indirect contribution because, the focus of the training was on how to engage formal and informal local and county leaders in rangeland

	towards addressing their issues.	management. However, the WCAG saw the need to resolve the existing resource-based conflict by forming water management committee.
3. Council of elders from target communities in all 5 wards together with WCAG members identified grazing zones and classified them into wet, dry and drought conditions zones, as well as setting ground rules on pasture management during the last quarter of 2019.	Council of elders in Samburu community are the custodian of the natural resources such as grazing land and historically have been able to organise communities on how to access pasture in both wet and dry seasons. Interference of rangeland management by county government has resulted to conflicts among the rangeland users. Bring on board council of elders to identify the grazing zones brought back the legitimacy of the elders and by laws will ensure peaceful access of the pasture.	Implementing WCAG activities derived from the Action plan developed at the beginning of the project, When?
4. In March 2019, WCAG in Loosuk and Ang'ata Nanyoike, Suguta Marmar wards expanded their memberships to include women, youths and other key actors such as people with disabilities who were excluded in the initial formation of WCAG.	Never before the interests and knowledge of previously marginalised groups especially women had been integrated in community actions to define joint actions in a long-term process. Therefore, inclusion of women and youth in leadership of resource use structures is a key milestone and a significant departure from the social and traditional norms in the highly patriarchal	Mobilization and creation of awareness on participation of women and inclusive processes.

	<p>pastoralist communities, dominated by the council of elders as gatekeepers. Rarely, are the marginalised groups be involved in community affairs. Probably this was the first time.</p>	
<p>5. Since last quarter of 2019 in Suguta Marmar and Loosuk wards, private ranchers worked an agreement with local pastoralists on how to get into ranches for grazing during the dry season. Part of the agreement was allowing pastoralists to graze their livestock for 3 months upon payment of a fee ranging between KES 100 to KES 500 especially during the dry season.</p>	<p>This happened after several incidents of attacks between the herders and ranches owners due to livestock getting into the ranches without permission. The ranches are carved out from community land and sometimes without consultations with local communities. Private ranchers and pastoralists both depend on shared resources like pastures and water and therefore the agreement created a moment they start to working together and generate collaborative actions.</p>	<p>Community mobilisation and awareness forum held on February 2019 across the 5 wards where all local actors attended the meetings. Since it was their initiative, the activity contributed to the outcome indirectly.</p>
<p>6. Between January and June 2020, women in Loosuk ward formed and registered about 13 women self-help groups (SHGs) to mobilize resources for self and community development.</p>	<p>This is significant in addressing socioeconomic exclusion, particularly of women and youth. The women self-help groups have started a community drive, promoting environmentally friendly income generating activities among women as an alternative to charcoal burning, that is rampant among the pastoralist communities. Notably, 5 of the</p>	<p>Capacity building trainings of WCAG on community rangeland management. They were facilitated by the WCAG.</p>

	13 groups focus on Environmental conservation.	
7. Between January and March 2019, WCAG in Ang'ata Nanyoike and Waso wards were involved in resolving conflicts among the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Borana communities over pasture and water.	This was also observed in all the five (5) wards covered by the project interventions, showing increased prominence and role of WCAG as important interlocutors in sustainable natural resource management and conflict resolution, that is vital for pastoral community adaptive capacity.	Project contribution through support for intra- and inter-community level consultations among communities in Baringo and Samburu counties.
8. In March 2019, WCAG members from Samburu and Turkana communities in Ang'ata Nanyoike ward revived the Pokot, Turkana and Samburu (POTUSA) grazing committee by reaching out to Pokot community leaders thereby including them in the committee.	This is a major achievement for the project as it signifies thawing of tensions among the neighbouring communities that was characterized by sporadic conflicts.	Project contribution through support for intra- and inter-community level consultations among communities in Baringo and Samburu counties.
9. In 2019 a Samburu, Baringo and Laikipia (SABALA) association established a grazing committee to help in coordinating relations between the community and ranchers from the two counties. The formation was done during a meeting held at Suguta Marmar ward by the CAGs took action through community dialogues.	Samburu and Laikipia have experienced conflict among the communities sharing the borders. The conflict is on grazing areas across the two counties. This association will be critical in facilitating the peaceful access to pasture and water. This will also enhance enhanced community linkages to support greater dialogue including cross-territorial and cross-boundaries involving pastoral communities – Turkana, Pokot and Samburu	Project contribution through support for intra- and inter-community level consultations among communities in Baringo and Samburu counties.

<p><b>10.</b>In 2019, Samburu County Government incorporated the community priorities of rangeland communities in NRM and climate change governance. The rangeland community priorities are in sections 2.4 and 2.5 and its nexus with climate change in section 2.6 of the Draft Rangeland Management and Planned Grazing Policy.</p>	<p>This outcome shows increased responsiveness of the County Government to rangeland communities, representing a major shift in how county governments engage with communities from a mere formality to an open and consultative process in ensuring that rangeland communities views and priorities are taken on onboard to inform state priorities. This is a core element of inclusive and accountable NRM and Climate Change Governance. In most cases, policy hardly have community priorities embedded. This was a unique process.</p>	<p>The project mobilized and supported local community structures, WCAG to identify, collate and present their priorities and further supported consultative meetings with county structures to present rangeland communities' priorities.</p>
<p><b>11.</b>In the fiscal year of 2019/2020, Samburu County Assembly allocated a budgetary support of KES 20 million for Ward development on water resources, following a successful petition by Waso WCAG and the Member of County Assembly.</p>	<p>This is another instance of increased county government of Samburu responsiveness to and prioritization of rangeland community sustainable natural resources needs. It also demonstrates increased advocacy capacity among WCAG.</p>	<p>Samburu County public hearings supported by Saferworld where they submitted petitions demanding integration and allocation of resources towards pressing community priorities on water resources.</p>
<p><b>12.</b>Since 2019, the Samburu County Government took action to resolve the lack of water in Loosuk Ward by constructing 2 new boreholes with 5 more under construction, following petition by WCAG in Loosuk ward.</p>	<p>This is another instance of increased county government responsiveness and prioritization of rangeland community sustainable natural resources needs. It also demonstrates increased capacity of WCAG to articulate and advocacy for</p>	<p>County public hearings where they submitted petitions demanding integration and allocation of resources towards pressing community needs. The project is also credited</p>

	community needs on NRM and climate change.	with building capacity of WCAG on advocacy.
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### Outcomes Matrix - Mathare Social Justice Centre

<b>A</b> <b>Outcome Description (Who did what differently, when and where?)</b>	<b>B</b> <b>Significance (Why do the change worthy noting?)</b>	<b>C</b> <b>Contribution (project activity linked to the outcome)</b>
<p>1.The Officer in Charge of crime and Officer Commanding Station (OCS) engaged community members in intercepting trafficking of 10 foreign national from Ethiopia. The police are reported to have called a community Human Rights Defender and confirmed reports of human trafficking in Kiamaiko ward, Mathare constituency. Together with the police, the 10 Ethiopian nationals were rescued from a house in Kiamaiko, and the traffickers were arrested and charged. This happened in January 2020.</p>	<p>Better police-community relations are marked by cooperation between both police and community towards ensuring the safety and security of community members. As an impediments lack of cooperation and trust has in turn created room for corruption, crime including trafficking, and a lack of accountability where case of illegitimate police actions arises, existing gap of mistrust and allow better relations between the police and the community.</p>	<p>Community dialogues offered through the project by MSJC attended by police and community members.</p>
<p>2.The Officer Commanding Station (OCS) for Huruma Police Station attended a launch of Kiamaiko Community Justice Centre following the invite from the leadership of the centre. During the launch she expressed her willingness to work with community in her mandate as an officer. This happened in January 2020.</p>	<p>Legitimacy by the community to the work of police is necessary and essential towards the creation of better police–community relations and working together. Where community members feel an encroachment to their rights by the police, their trust for the work of the police deteriorates and a disconnect is created between the police and the community. Such trust can be rebuilt when the two stakeholders commit their time, knowledge and resources towards</p>	<p>CUC trainings offered through the project by Saferworld. The training brought together the CUC members which included HRD and police officers</p>

	creating avenues for accountability and promotion of justice.	
<b>3.Human Rights Defenders</b> from the Mathare, Dandora and Kamukunji have been recording and sharing cases of police killings and other Human rights violations by the police. The EJK cases are shared on Missing Voices platform. Recording started from 2019 and the practices is still on.	The Missing Voices is a national online platform where cases of Police killings and updates relating to these cases are shared and monitored. The platform brings together civil society organisations advocating against police executions. Recording of the cases is a way of generating credible evidence of EJKs for purposes of prosecution.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human Rights monitoring trainings offered by Peace Brigades International</li> <li>- MSJC supported DCJC with a desktop computer, airtime for communication, and a monthly stipend.</li> </ul>
<b>4.Mothers of Victims and survivors</b> came together and formed a network that is now doing follow up of cases of Extra Judicial Killings (EJKs). The network as formed in April 2019.	- Through the established network, follow up of cases albeit with challenges, has been formerly done through the network. Members of the network offer solidarity to each other when reporting, attending court appearances and advocacy efforts. There is better case monitoring and management.	- Monitoring of reported cases
<b>5.Individual Human Rights Defenders</b> held a courtesy meeting with the Police at Pangani Police Station. This was non-policing/informal engagement in the police stations between the community members, HRD, Mothers of Victims and police.	Better police engagement allows for legitimate service provision by the police and accountability from the policed. The result has allowed for more progressive interaction between the two stakeholders, better conflict resolution and a promising environment for work of Human Rights Defenders. The impact from this outcome is evident in the ease in which the two stakeholders better engage and how often they meet informally and in non-policing activities.	- CUC training and community outreach

### Outcomes Matrix - Ghetto Foundation

<b>A</b> <b>Outcome Description (Who did what differently, when and where?)</b>	<b>B</b> <b>Significance</b>	<b>C</b> <b>Contribution (Project activity linked to the outcome)</b>
<p>1.Youths from Vietnam Base confidently visited Pangani police station in Mathare Area on 20<sup>th</sup> January 2020 to inquire charges put on one of their members who was arbitrary arrested by the police. Upon getting to the police station, they introduced themselves and raised their concerns with the Officer Commanding Pangani police station. The member of Vietnam Base was finally released.</p>	<p>There was a lot of fear of police by youths before. They could not visit Police station even if one of them was arrested. The courage of youth shows the youth were enlightened on their rights.</p>	<p>After organizing and facilitating 3 community dialogues in the area of Vietnam Base in Mathare. We did a Human training at Vietnam Base and enlightened them on their rights specifically insisted on the right of an arrested person and the rights of the arresting police.</p>
<p>2.Youths from Bevers Base in Mathare Area reported and filed a theft case at Pangani police station on 8<sup>th</sup> February 2020 against 2 policemen. The policemen went to their base and vandalised their video show and water kiosk business, the police then took away one of their video show screens and the group learnt that the police never took it to the police station. The group treated the case as theft since the police did not want to return their video show screen.</p>	<p>Reporting the matter to the police station as theft case by the youth was very important and unique. This is extra ordinary for civilian reporting a security office to the police station. Something that was seen to be impossible. It also shows the group is well informed with their rights and also the right procedure to follow.</p>	<p>Bevers group consulted Ghetto Foundation for advice before reporting the matter. Members of Bevers group were very active in all the dialogues and human trainings that we facilitated with them.</p>
<p>3.Ibeba groups from Majengo, Kamukunji is a group that is associated by hard labor, all members are potters, they help business people who comes to</p>	<p>Ibeba group has lost some members from EJK which disorganised their group. They took this initiative to rehabilitate reformed youths.</p>	<p>Out of the community dialogues and human rights trainings we have engaged youths on issues of EJK, danger</p>

Gikomba Market by carrying luggage. In October 2019, they formed a saving scheme to help each other at hard times and start getting a decent income.	Majengo is known for EJKs associated with security forces. This initiative withdraws young people in this area from criminal activities.	of engaging in criminal activities. During the dialogues we urged the youth to bring change in Majengo.
4.Youths from Kiambiu, Kiamaiko, Kariobangi and Korogocho revived the Social justice centres in their community between October 2019 and January 2020.	The community members have embraced the Justice centres as avenue for seeking justices. The centre has been recording the cases of human rights violations. They are also avenues for information on civic education in the community.	Holding the community dialogue with communities. The youths were encouraged to revive the social justice centres.
5.Some youths who were criminals converted to Human Right Defenders. They are converted and joined Dandora Community Justice centre. They belong to Migrim Youth Group who work at the Dandora Dumpsite, the biggest dumping site in Nairobi.	Most of the youths were associated with criminal activities and they have lost many members through EJK. The transformation from criminals to Human Right Defenders is something to emulate by other criminals in the areas. They are also the best in addressing the EJK because they experienced it first-hand.	Conducted 4 community dialogues and one Human Right training for youths in Dandora and got connected to Dandora Community Justice centre
6.One of the members of Angola base in Kamukunji in Majengo Area in October 2019 reported an extortion case by a policeman, she reported the matter to Buru Buru Police Station until the policeman who took her money summoned and returned the money to the lady.	This has never happened in Kamukunji where police officers unleash brutality. The community fear the security a lot. The Nyumba Kumi is very strong and known to gather intelligent information for the police. They are known by base groups.	The Human Right trainings that we have done with the group and also the follow up of what practices individuals have practiced out of the Human Rights trainings that they have attended
7.The youths through Kariobangi Community Justice centre in Embakasi North on 8 <sup>th</sup> November 2019 confidently	It has been a blame game between Kariobangi youths and the Kariobangi police station police, the police were	Kariobangi Community Justice centre through the support from Ghetto foundation

	<p>sensitization and the people opened up and started discussing issues of Violent extremism. Due to this awareness, there has less attacks witnessed in Garissa County which means there is less recruitment taking place. The forced disappearances and police and community relationship has improved.</p>	
<p>6. In December 2019, an explosive went off near the Kenya power station in Wajir Town, adjacent to Police Station. The two Somali youths suspected to have committed the incidents were wrapped up by the public and taken to the police. One was a local youth known by the community and one was suspected to be AS member.</p>	<p>The high-level of awareness and look out of the people in Wajir town on the any suspect of the Al Shabaab enable them take initiative immediately to search for the people who had committed the act. The public taking this action and taking the suspect to the police was an indication of the improved relationship between the community and police in Wajir town. Before when such event happened, the police would respond by descending on public near the location it happened, beat them up and conduct arbitrary arrest.</p>	<p>- Radio programs through Wajir Community radio</p>
<p>7. On 18th January 2020, the National Counter Terrorism Centre, shared analysis of a threat from Al Shabaab to Perspective Media's Radio Producer to happen in Northern Kenya.</p>	<p>This is significant because the collaborative engagement between Perspective media (SVK media partner) and National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) can be an opportunity for further engagement between EAI and NCTC. The information sharing also can apply to the</p>	<p>- Stakeholder workshop held at the beginning of the project</p>

	target counties whenever there are threats. NCTC is the agency that deals with CVE in Kenya. This presents an opportunity for future collaboration through PM as a connector. It is an indication that Talodoon online radio and Star FM is reaching beyond the target counties.	
8. From August 2019, the police and the communities in Garissa town, Garissa county started sharing the information with the police on security issues, potential threats, incidents of arbitrary arrest and any suspects noticed in the Bullas	Usually the target counties, there has been strained relationship between security and community associated with Al Shabaab activities. Improvement of the Security - Community relationship has reduced the AS activities and improved security in the area. Police brutality, discriminatory arrest and EJK is one of the push factors to youths joining Violent groups. The meetings and discussions between the communities and police has increased information sharing, more understanding and improved security in the target counties.	- Stakeholder workshop and PPF follow up with community engagement with stakeholders
9. In November 2019, the two clan among the Somali communities in Wajir North Sub-County held a peace meeting to deliberate on the causes of the conflict. They came up with agreement that made reconcile.	PPF also can become peace facilitators in their communities and used the skilled earned in training of conflict management to assist the community members to know the cause of the problem and come up with the best conflict solution possible that is fair to both parties. With this the community learns from the	- PPF capacity building on Conflict Management

	PPF as well as can call up the Peace Promoter Fellow anytime and anywhere they may be conflict in the county.	
10. On 12 <sup>th</sup> November 2019, Sheikh from Eastleigh Estate section 3, Nairobi City increasingly preaching against youth joining terrorism and violent extremism. This was noticed in October 2019.	From the formative research, religious leaders are trust and reliable voices in the Somalia community. The message from them is likely to be effective to the youths. Previously religious leaders were not explicit in their preaching especially when it came to abhorring Al Shabaab and other terror groups. Increasingly the sheikhs are now speaking openly and advising the youths against joining extremist groups or being radicalised due to unemployment and minimal knowledge on Quran. Religious leaders were also identified by the formative research as most influential person to the Somali youths. They considered as trustworthy, reliable and provide accurate information and on religious teaching to make firm decision before joining the terror groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PPF participated in the interfaith dialogue organized by the Tumaini community-based organization.</li> <li>- Radio show where religious leaders were invited as guest speakers</li> </ul>





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**Thomas Kimathi Nyagah**  
Durban University of Technology  
**SOUTH AFRICA.**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation in peacebuilding work: An action research among Kenyan Civil Society Organizations in Kenya*," I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in all Counties for the period ending 19<sup>th</sup> June, 2018.

You are advised to report to the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf of the research report/thesis to our office.

**GODFREY F. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM**  
**FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

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All Counties.

The County Directors of Education  
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