

**DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY**

**EXPLORING THE STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO PREVENT AND COMBAT  
XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM  
SEEKERS LIVING IN CHESTERVILLE (DURBAN)**

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**Exploring the strategic approaches to prevent and combat xenophobia in  
South Africa: Case study of refugees and asylum seekers living in Chesterville**

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Management Sciences  
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## ABSTRACT

Since the 1994 transition from apartheid to democracy, South Africa SA has saw a series of violence ranging from racism, service delivery and xenophobia. Although scholars have reported that violence is normalized in the South Africa context, the occurrence of xenophobia is not only affecting the lives of migrants, but also the pretence of projecting South Africa as the "rainbow nation". Xenophobic violence in the South African context is been reported of being unique due to the fact that the violence goes beyond the definition of xenophobia which is limited to the attitude exhibited by one group (local communities) towards the other (foreigners, outsiders) because of their foreignness. In SA xenophobic violence against is a combination of a negative attitude and extreme act of violence perpetrated against foreigners. That means that xenophobic violence in South Africa is characterized by extreme violence action such as murder, looting, assault, physical harassment, robbery, arson, intimidation and mass displacement. Coupled with that is the fact that the integration of migrants in the country is non – existent, leaving migrant the choice to settle where they choose without the full knowledge of the language or no means of survival.

In SA, xenophobic violence is only directed to Black African migrants, with an exception to migrants from countries bordering SA such as Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. Coupled with that is the fact that European migrants or Whites migrants are not targeted. This has resulted in scholars and government officials to label the attacks against migrants *Afrophobia* or black on black racism. The causal factors of xenophobia are related to socio – economic problem, political and historical. Thus, different interventions adopted by the government and civil societies have proven to be ineffective due to the fact those efforts are failing to mitigate the violence against migrants.

This thesis aims to prevent and combat xenophobia in South Africa using Action Research. The study used a combination of conflict transformation and contact theory. The study engaged a sample of migrants and South African youths in order to promote social cohesion, to strengthen the relationship between both groups and to improve their quality of life through skill transfer. Through contact theory, the study brings out different activities such as sharing the language similarities, cultural commonalities, cooking and sharing meal together between participants in the community. The purpose of having such activities was to show the humanness within participant in order to build a bridge to connect both groups and break the stereotypes and stigma that both groups have towards each other. While scholars have accused the government' intervention of being ineffective, this study found that promoting social cohesion between migrants and South Africans should start at the grassroot level, using dialogue as a way of giving the groups a time to listen to each other, to narrate their stories, and giving both groups activities that required group collaboration and teamwork.



## Declaration

I Mwamba Nkuanga – Patient declare that:

This research is my original work and has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university. Where I have used the work of others, this has been correctly referenced in the thesis and in the reference list, and that any similar research that has been used in the development of the research project is also referenced.

.....  
Mwamba Nkuanga – Patient

I hereby approve the final submission of the following thesis.

Doctor S. B Kaye

Professor G.T. Harris



## **Dedication**

This work is dedicated to my wife Gloria Kalala and My daughter Myla.



## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This thesis would not be feasible without God's gift of life, blessing and strength, His grace made this challenging journey possible. My gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr Sylvia Blanche for her invaluable guidance, and knowledges that she empowered me with. Thank you so much Dr Kaye for the support and motivation through challenges that I experienced in that journey. I gratefully acknowledge the support received from Prof. Harris for always being accessible and providing assistance. I remained indebted to Mr. Thèogene Haguma who was a pillar in making this project possible, for financially supporting not only me but also the participants in need. May God Bless you sir. I'm indebted to my father Andre Tshibangu Nkuanga and my Mother Brigitte Kabanga for advising and encouraging me during the hard moment of this research.





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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACMS	African Centre for Migration Society
ANC	African National Congress
AU	Africa United
AL	Action Learning
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
SA	South Africa
CBD	Central Business District
CoRMSA	Consortium for Refugees and Migrants South Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Unions
FMS	Forced Migration Studies
GCRO	Gauteng City – region Observatory
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMC	Inter – ministerial Committee
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRRSA	Institute for Race Relations in South Africa
JSR	Jesuit Refugee Service
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MMP	Media Monitoring Project
NGO	Non–Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SADC	Southern African Development Commission
SAMP	Southern African Migration Programme
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
STATSA	Statistics South Africa
SCRA	Standing Committee for refugees Affairs
SAPS	South African Police Services
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WTO	World Trade organization



# PART I

## Chapter 1: General Introduction

### 1.1 Research Overview

This chapter presents a brief historical overview of xenophobia in South Africa (SA), while xenophobia was witnessed in the country soon after the end of the apartheid regime in the 1990s, the violence against migrants reached its peak in 2008 and has become a recurrent phenomenon. The chapter briefly explains the extent and prevalence of xenophobia, and the attitude of the local people towards migrants. This research explores the potential strategies to prevent and curb xenophobia and how social cohesion can be promoted between migrants and the local people in order to build a relationship of friendship and sustainable peace. The overview in this chapter gives a general portrayal of the xenophobic violence in SA that migrants are experiencing almost every year in SA.

### 1.2 Problem Background

Xenophobic violence has become a controversial issue in SA. Migrants have increasingly become victims of xenophobia at the hands of South African citizens. Empirical studies have reported that SA started experiencing xenophobic violence during the transition period in 1990s (Crush *et al.* 2018: 21) (this is fully explained in Chapter 2 below. But xenophobic violence became a greater public concern in 2008 after the country experienced mass xenophobic attacks on African migrants in different cities within the country. Different reports revealed that the 2008 attacks claimed the lives of at least 62 people including 21 South African citizens. More than 100,000 foreign nationals were violently displaced from their homes, and this led to the loss of their livelihoods (Mlambo 2019: 53-67).

While the section above states that xenophobic violence was present in the country since the 1990s, scholars have revealed that since 1994, tens of thousands of migrants have been physically attacked, harassed, or killed due to their foreignness (Misago 2019: 1). Although the violence against migrants was witnessed during the transition period and soon after the first democratic election, the government has not fully acknowledged the attacks against migrants as being xenophobic in nature and never implemented policies condemning the attacks or adopt effective strategies to curb the violence (Peter 2019). That means that in most cases, government officials can deny or refuse to acknowledge that the violence that is still destroying the country and taking lives of migrants and unfortunate South Africans is

xenophobia, but rather qualifies it as *Afrophobia* or simply small criminal activities (Bekker 2015: 229-252). This point is fully discussed in detail in Chapter 3 below. Thus, the government attitude towards the attacks is qualified by Jonathan Crush and Ramachandran (2014) as “xenophobia denialism” which means that the government is not acknowledging the attacks against migrants as xenophobia, and government officials are rejecting and denying the existence of xenophobia in SA (9).

This was further demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic violence that took place in Durban, which saw the then Minister of Police stating that it is difficult to view the attacks against migrants as xenophobia. He was quoted stating further that “In a sense, what we are witnessing are Afrophobic kinds of activities and attacks, resembling elements of self – hate among Africans. The evidence shows the attacks are mainly against the Congolese, Zimbabweans, Malawians, Somalis and some South African nationals as well” (Gqirana 2015). The failure to acknowledge the violence continues to lead to more xenophobic attacks, as at the moment of writing this thesis more than two xenophobic violence has taken place in two major metropolitans which is Johannesburg and Durban.

Government officials are not only denying that the violence against migrants is xenophobia, but scholars have also accused the government of triggering the violence through their public speeches. For instance, the 2015 xenophobic violence that took place in Durban is attributed to King Goodwill Zwelithini, the Zulu king who in his 2015 speech asked migrants to “pack their bags and go” (Ndou 2015). Although he denied the fact that he had no intention to trigger the violence and the fact that the media mis-quoted his statement, scholars and civil societies have accused him of being the author of the violence (Gatten 2015). Coupled with the King’s statement is the statement made two years later in February 2017 by the then Mayor of Johannesburg, Mr. Herman Mashaba, who was quoted stating that “illegal immigrants are holding our country to ransom and I’m going to be the last South African to allow it” (Davis 2017). The above-mentioned statements did not only give birth to xenophobic violence, but different Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and scholars have directly denounced it and viewed it as the reasons behind two incidences of xenophobic violence that followed, namely, the 2015 xenophobic violence that took place in Durban and the 2017 xenophobic violence that took place in Johannesburg. Different xenophobic violence followed the 2017 attacks, and the recent one take place at the time of completing this research in November 2020 involving members of Umkhonto weSizwe Veterans (MKMVA) attacking and looting migrants’ shops in Durban CBD (Duma 2020; Nxumalo, Singh and Mavuso 2020).


Xenophobia is defined differently, but it has an impact on aggression that is expressed by terror, rejection, and insecurity. However, in the South African context, it refers to any hostile or negative attitude or behaviour shown by the local people towards migrants (Nenjerama 2020: 1-18). In most cases, academic scholars have used the term *xenophobia* to explain the dislike of foreigners. Thus, xenophobia is characterised by a negative attitude against foreigners – a fear, hatred, or a dislike (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 17). Xenophobia is not solely a South African trait but is an international phenomenon which is witnessed in many countries globally (Misago 2016a: 9), nor is SA the only country in the world where migrants, especially Africans, are vulnerable to extortion, harassment, and physical violence. This was reported by experts on the seventy-first session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as they reported that “racism and xenophobia is increasing globally” (United Nations General Assembly 2016).

Xenophobic violence in SA has its own particularity, which is different to other countries. That means that in the South African context, the government allowed migrants to come in as refugees or asylum seekers, and does not support or integrate them, leaving them with no other choice than to live in townships and informal settlements where the local people can live in poverty and unemployment. Coupled with that is the fact that xenophobic violence towards migrants has become perennial in the post-apartheid SA and it involved extreme violence perpetrated towards African migrants by black South Africans (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 1-11). That means that migrants living with South Africans in townships and informal settlements become victims of xenophobic attacks involving acts such as direct killings with knives and sticks, wounding aggressors, wounded victims, and the burning alive of migrants. This was supported by Dassah (2015:127-142) who posited that the attacks are directed mostly towards migrants living in townships and informal settlements where many South Africans live. However, many countries around the world admire and respect SA for putting an end to the brutal apartheid regime and for being the leader of the African Unity, democracy, and good governance. Sadly, xenophobia and its manifestations in the country are viewed as a shame to the post-apartheid government and demonstrate poor leadership at the local, regional, and national levels in the country. Moreover, it represents a threat to South Africa’s image as the ‘rainbow nation’ (Graham and Bohmke 2013; Bekker 2015).

Scholars have reported that during apartheid, xenophobic manifestations were not reported in the country since the then immigration policies prohibited Africans to immigrate to SA (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013: 192-205), and citizenship was denied to black South Africans. The apartheid regime enacted the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, which saw the creation of ten Bantu homelands/Bantustans. The purpose of the homeland was to divide

South Africans and assign every black South African to be a citizen of one of the Bantustans to suppress the claim of citizenship of the black majority in the country and to prevent black South Africans from uniting to a single national organization. While some blacks may have believed that the Bantustans' citizenship gave them the full political rights, it effectively removed them from the political body (South African History Online 2019a). Scholars have stated that during apartheid the local people were considered as foreigners or foreign natives in their own native land or country (Landau 2010; Adjai and Lazaridis 2014).

**Figure 1:** The Bantustans map available at GlobalSecurity.org (2016).



The apartheid regime did not only divide South Africans through the above-mentioned Act, but it also implemented the Group Areas Act of 1950 which separated racial groups, cities and towns. These were then divided into segregated residential and business areas. Through the Areas Group Act of 1950, Blacks, Coloured, and Indians were then removed from areas classified for white occupation, forcing black South Africans to live in the reserves, except when they worked temporarily in white towns or farmers. Moreover, while African migrants were limited in terms migrating into SA and the locals were denied citizenship, the then government privileged only white Europeans, Americans, and Australians in the country. Special treatment was given to Dutch and British nationals who were encouraged to migrate to Sa (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237 – 255). However, an exception was given only to migrants working in the mining and agricultural industries. These migrants were only allowed to live

near the mining areas and had to leave the country once their contract was terminated or if they were on holiday, and these were mainly nationals from Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014).

It was in 1995, a year after the first democratic election which took place in 1994, that many academic scholars and different civil societies started reporting on the growing attitude of xenophobia amongst black South Africans, the public, and among some members of the government. For instance, in 1998 the Southern African Bishop conference concluded that there was an increasing degree of xenophobic attitude amongst the local people towards migrants in the country (Human Rights Watch 1998). The conclusion of that report supports the argument of the Southern African Migrations Programme (SAMP) in their 2008 study, which stated that "South Africans were xenophobic even before 1994, have become increasingly after 1994" (Bekker *et al.* 2008: 15). Although this statement is dated, it shows that xenophobic violence that we are witnessing today in SA is rooted in the long hatred attitude that the local people have been exhibiting ever since the country transitioned to democracy.

### **1.3 Perception of Migrants during the Period of Transition**

The end period of the transition from apartheid to democracy saw a great increase in the economic growth of the country, but it also saw an increase in the rate of migrants moving to SA. Coupled with this is the fact that some of the African countries that supported the anti-apartheid regime were facing civil wars, political unrest, or humanitarian and economic crises, which also contributed to a very large flow of migrants to SA seeking refuge and safety (McKnight 2008: 21). Although some of the nations that saw their population moving to SA supported the anti-apartheid regime, their presence was not appreciated by the South African population, including some politicians and leaders of political parties. This was revealed in a study conducted by Crush (2001) and the SAMP which reported that many South Africans called on a strict limitation or prohibition of African migration into the country (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

Furthermore, migrants are perceived as potential threats to the economic and physical security of South Africa, especially undocumented migrants (Mohlabeng 2020). Hence, some government officials have portrayed migrants as criminals, the reason being that different reports have highlighted migrants as being involved in criminal activities. Further, migrants are seen as scapegoats for different socio-economic problems affecting the country such as housing and education (See in Graham and Bohmke 2013: 21-41). A joint study conducted in

2004 by the University of Witwatersrand and the SAMP reported that the local people hold a strong negative attitude towards migrants and immigration when compared to 29 other countries (Landau 2010: 213-230). Scholars have argued that the media have played a key role in promoting the negative attitude towards migrants, which is now witnessed among many South Africans. When there is no direct contact between migrants and the local, the negative attitude is passed through hearsay (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015; Muchiri 2016).

Even though the above-mentioned report was made in 2004, it is evident that the hostile attitude that the local people have towards migrants has not changed. The reason is that since 2008, two more incidences of xenophobic violence took place in the country, namely, the 2015 attack which started in KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) and later spread to Gauteng (Johannesburg), and the recent ones that took place in February 2017; in September 2018; and in March, April, and August 2019 at the time of writing this thesis (Human Rights Watch 2019c, 2019d). Coupled with these attacks are the unnoticed xenophobic attacks in different communities in the country which usually take place on a weekly or monthly basis in townships and informal settlements, but which are not reported in the media. This clearly demonstrates that xenophobic violence in SA constitutes a deeply rooted, widespread, ongoing, and evolving socio-legal problem in SA, and one that is difficult to eradicate (Landau and Misago 2009: 99-110).

Furthermore, it is important to mention that the increase in the number of migrants has given birth to a misconception about the presence of migrants amongst the local people. An example of such a misconception is that the local people are perceiving migrants as illegal in the country. This misconception is based on the fact that the majority of African migrants moved from their respective countries to SA in large numbers as refugees fearing persecutions, armed conflict, and the economic and humanitarian crisis taking place in their countries. Thus, to support those fleeing internal conflict, persecutions, and humanitarian crises, the South African government passed the Refugees Act of 1998 to protect migrants (McKnight 2008: 18-42).

Amongst those fleeing armed conflict were Mozambicans, who immigrated to SA as a result of the 1980s internal armed conflict; Nigerians; Angolans; Somalis; Rwandans; Burundians; and the Congolese from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), who are making their way to SA in order to seek refuge and economic opportunities (Odunayo 2017: 81-96). To this list one can add Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and the Chinese who are making their way to SA looking for economic opportunities as well. However, it is important to mention that not all migrants living in SA are refugees or asylum seekers. McKnight (2008: 22) argues that some

foreign nationals are illegally present in SA and are searching for job opportunities rather than refugee status, and some are hunting for casual labour, such as gardening and construction, and these jobs are always given to foreign nationals willing to work for cheaper wages and under poor conditions. This usually includes nationals from Malawi and those from Zimbabwe.

#### **1.4 South Africa – A Safe Haven for Refugees and Asylum Seekers**

According to the UNHCR (2019), the SA legal system has been a safe haven to migrants, especially vulnerable ones, that is, refugees and asylum seekers who are qualified for international protection. Since the country officially adopted the Refugee Act in 1998, it has received large numbers of asylum seekers making SA a home to the highest number of asylum seekers in the world. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) report that in 2019 alone, SA welcomed nearly 273,500 vulnerable migrants including some 89,300 refugees and 184,200 asylum seekers. Most of these were from Ethiopia, the DRC, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Zimbabwe (UNHCR 2019). Coupled with this report is the UNHCR 2015 UNHCR report on the global trend in forced displacement, which revealed an increase in the number of asylums claims as it was reported to rise to 1,096,063 (Grant and Brodie 2016). Refugee and asylum claims made in SA are mainly dominated by nationals from Sub-Saharan Africa which accounts for 84% of the total, entailing mostly nationals from Zimbabwe followed by Somali nationals who are 41,500 in total, 9,300 Ethiopians, 6,600 Nigerians, and 6,400 Congolese from the DRC (Businesstech 2016).

There is no available accurate data of migrants living in SA. For example, the UNHCR reported that there were 1.9 million immigrants living in the country, which was 3.7% of the population, more than anywhere in the world (See in Maina *et al.* 2011: 1-7) – in the same vein, the Institute of Race Relations in South Africa (IRRSA) believed that there are between 3 and 5 million immigrants in SA (ibid). The lack of accuracy in the number of migrants in SA is in part because the country did not anticipate that there would be a flow of migrants that would seek asylum, thus, the country was not prepared to receive a large number of asylums claims nor to deal with mixed flows of refugees (UNHCR 2019). This has resulted in a serious backlog causing systematic failure in the asylum management process (Amnesty International 2019). Although there is no accurate number of migrants living in SA, it was revealed through the 2011 census that there is a total of 2,188,872 migrants living in the country. However, this number was reported to have decreased to 1,578,541 according to the 2016 community survey (Africa Check 2019).

Furthermore, in recent years, SA has seen an increasing number of economic migrants who are not truly legal beneficiaries of the international protection offered to refugees and asylum seekers. Different reports have claimed that there are millions of Zimbabweans living in SA, that belief was also witnessed in the speech of then Minister Lindiwe Zulu who stated that “there are millions of Zimbabweans living in SA” (Madia 2019). This claim has been rejected by Tom Moultrie, the director of the Centre Actuarial Research at the University of Cape Town, who stated that there is no available data supporting that claim, since the 2011 census revealed that there were 672,308 Zimbabweans living in SA, while the community survey of 2016 showed that there was 574,047 (Africa Check 2019). Unlike migrants from the DRC fleeing the armed conflict and those from Somalia who are fleeing the *al-Shabaab* terror war, migrants from Zimbabwe are welcomed in SA due to the humanitarian crisis that their country is facing, which has made the South African government to be lenient in granting them refugee status.

## **1.5 Support provided to South Africans during Apartheid**

Although the local people are reported to have strong negative attitudes towards migrants, during the apartheid regime, South African citizens, including top African National Congress (ANC) members, were welcomed, and received accommodation in many African countries as they were seeking refuge, safety, and life opportunities or a base to organise a change in their country. Thus, countries such as Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho, including countries from further north such as Angola, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania played an important role not only in accommodating South Africans, but also in supporting the African National Congress (Pitamber 2015). Moreover, South Africans were not only welcomed in those countries, but the above-mentioned countries played a role in fighting against the apartheid regime logistically and financially. Empirical studies have reported that South Africans who had left their country during apartheid were living peacefully in those countries (Crush 2008; Landau 2010).

Although migrants often face xenophobic violence every year, government officials and different political party leaders have always questioned the attacks perpetrated by local people towards migrants seeking refuge, irrespective of the past when they were once refugees and were welcomed in other African countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia etc. during the apartheid struggle (Crush 2008: 7). Despite the fact that the above – mentioned nations welcomed South Africans during apartheid, the main question was to know the treatment that they received in those countries, and whether they were also facing xenophobic violence, as was the case in SA. A study conducted by Crush (2008: 7) revealed that 39% of South Africans



believed that they were treated very well, while 20% opposed that view, and 41% had no opinion.

## **1.6 Targeted Groups during Xenophobic Violence and past Immigration Legislation**

Xenophobic violence and the hostile attitudes exhibited by South Africans towards migrants are directed and limited only to black African migrants with an exception for those bordering SA, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, coupled with white Europeans, Americans, or Australians (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). This has led scholars to link xenophobic violence taking place in the country to the past immigration legislations. For instance, the then immigration legislations, known as the Immigration Act of 1913 and the Immigration Quota Act of 1930, prohibited the migration of black Africans into the country and favoured only Europeans, especially the British and Dutch, as explained in the section above (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237-255). This means that black South Africans were isolated from their fellow Africans with whom they did not have much contact but instead were exposed to the white minority who were considered to be South Africans regardless of their origins, and when the apartheid policies were abolished, they had to meet new black Africans whom they perceived to be outsiders or the unknown (Crush and Ramachandran 2009; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

Furthermore, Asians, especially the Chinese and Pakistanis, were not targeted due to the fact that they were not perceived as a threat to the country's economy during the 2008 attacks. It is worth noting that the Chinese and Pakistanis communities are not living in townships and informal settlements like other migrants such as African vulnerable migrants. However, in the recent xenophobic attacks especially the 2015 attacks, there have been reports of Chinese and Pakistani shops being looted (Shai and Mothibi 2015: 64), but the attacks on these two groups were not general as it was the case of refugees and asylum seekers, those attacked represented an isolated case. Thus, the exemption from attacking certain groups of migrants and targeting few Chinese and Pakistanis shops presents a challenge for those who are labelling xenophobia as Negrophobia or Afrophobia. Asians are also victims of the attacks especially those from Bangladesh, and this is making xenophobia in the South African context very complex. Moreover, unlike other nationals who are not targeted, migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, especially those from the central, eastern, and western parts of Africa, are targeted due to their inability to speak the local languages and are reported to have a different English pronunciation and a different hair and dressing style which differs from that of the locals, especially the Congolese and Nigerians (Klotz 2012: 189-208; Tella 2016).

## **1.7 The Government Response to Xenophobia**

The high presence of African foreign nationals in the country coupled with job scarcity, poor service delivery, and crimes are believed to be the reasons for the 2008 mass xenophobic attacks and the 2015 xenophobic violence. While many migrants were being attacked, the government responses to the violence were late, ineffective, and failed to denounce the attacks nor arrest the perpetrators of the violence. That attitude has been condemned by civil societies working closely with migrants, as they accuse the government of being uncaring and of failing to take the proper action to prevent, manage, and to end xenophobia in the country (Misago 2016b: 443-467). This means that since the 2008 attack to date, the government has not yet developed or implemented effective policies and institutions that directly address and prevent xenophobia from taking place in the country.

The position and the attitude of the South African government during and after the xenophobic violence, which Jonathan Crush referred to as denialism (see Crush and Ramachandran 2014), is considered by many academic scholars as an encouraging factor for perpetrators to initiate attacks. Moreover, the failure to address the xenophobic violence affecting the lives of migrants has been portrayed as a leading factor that motivates the local people to become more hostile towards migrants, and the most vulnerable groups during these attacks are asylum seekers and refugees living in townships and informal settlements (Beetar 2019: 122-140).

## **1.8 Brief Historical Background of the 2008 and 2015 Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa**

Since 1994, xenophobic violence has been an ongoing reality in SA, however, the first outrageous xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals took place on 11 May 2008 in Alexandra (Johannesburg), and spread into other neighbourhoods, namely, Hillbrow, Diepsloot, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park, and Thokoza, and soon spread to other provinces, namely, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape (Hadland 2008; Misago, Landau and Monson 2008; Dodson 2010). Not all South Africans were supportive of the 2008 attacks against migrants. This was demonstrated by the fact that many South Africans from all races took to the street to march against the attacks and they included faith-based leaders as well as different civil societies (Dodson 2010: 1-22). The marches and campaigns to stop the attacks against foreign nationals did not stop or prevent the attacks from taking place in the country, as it was reported that many foreign nationals had been attacked or killed between 2009 and 2013 (see in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

On 30 April 2015, another xenophobic attack took place in the country, and unlike the 2008 attack which started in Johannesburg, the 2015 attack started in Kwazulu-Natal (Durban), as a result of the Zulu King Zwelithini speech which called on foreign nationals to leave the country (Ndou 2015). The violent attack began in Isipingo and KwaMashu and spread to Johannesburg. The attacks displaced approximately 2,000 people from different nationalities, namely, Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Malawians, Burundians, and the Congolese from the DRC – five people were reported dead and foreign-owned shops were looted (Bekker 2015; South African History Online 2017).

## **1.9 Context of the Research and Problem**

Since the changing of the apartheid regime to democracy, the manifestation of xenophobia has been witnessed in all the provinces of SA, and South African nationals have developed a strong negative attitude of hostility and discrimination towards migrants (Dassah 2015: 127-142). A study conducted by the SAMP in 2000 found that South African nationals are uncomfortable with the presence of foreign nationals in the country, especially black Africans, and many were supportive of the idea of a total ban on foreign-national immigration to the country and to tighten border control to prevent their entry into the country (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25). Xenophobic violence constitutes a significant human rights violation against migrants and a threat to the lives and peace of refugees and asylum seekers living in SA. While xenophobia simply means a fear or hatred towards outsiders, in the South African context, xenophobic manifestations range from hostility, discriminatory attitudes, collective violence, institutional or social exclusion, harassment and incitement, to hatred (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2013). The purpose of xenophobia is to chase migrants out of the country, to humiliate, denigrate, and hurt them, as it was witnessed during the 2008 and 2015 attacks (ibid).

Xenophobic violence has become an ongoing phenomenon taking place every year in SA, causing stress among refugees and asylum seekers who, in many cases, are victims of the attacks due to the fact that most of them live in townships and informal settlements where the attacks usually take place, and for those who survive the attacks, it brings about depression as most of them lose their properties, their belongings, or members of families (Matunhu 2011: 98). Although the government and different civil societies are trying to prevent the attacks against migrants, the hostile attitudes observed amongst the local people continue to harden regardless of their immigration status in the country (Harris 2002: 12). Thus, it has been reported that the reasons behind xenophobic violence dwell on a public rhetoric that portrays African foreign nationals as the scapegoats for social and physical problems affecting South

Africans' lives (See in Crush and Ramachandran 2009: 15), coupled with that is the economic situation and scarce resources in the country, with the majority of black South Africans living in poverty (Thevathasan 2017; Sulla and Zikhali 2018).

Furthermore, research conducted by different scholars and civil societies on xenophobia revealed that:

- a. South Africans are highly desensitised to the magnitude and impact of xenophobia in their country, with the majority ignoring or denying the prevalence of xenophobia (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25).
- b. There is a lack of effective legislation and strong policies and institutions that can be useful in combatting xenophobia and hate crimes, and for this reason, there is a strong need to enact legislations that will tackle xenophobia and related hate crimes (Breen and Nel 2011: 33-43).
- c. The poor socio-economic and the high rise in criminality situations in the country, especially in informal settlements and townships, have resulted in competition for scarce resources among foreign nationals and nationals and are considered to be factors leading to the tensions, hostilities, and violence observed in the country between these two groups (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 1-11).

Due to the high rise in the attacks against foreign nationals, especially those living in informal settlements and townships, and particularly refugees and asylum seekers, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees Regional Office of South Africa (UNHCR ROSA) declared in 2013 that the South African Police Service is worried about the increase of the attacks and is overwhelmed by the violent attacks (see in Neocosmos 2008: 586-594 and Muchiri 2016). Since 2008, xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals have become a feature in their daily lives (Harris 2002), and this view is also shared by David Holdcroft, the Director of the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) in Southern Africa, who stated that "xenophobia appears to be a well-established part of the South African landscape" (Harris 2002: 169-164 cited in Muchiri 2016: 6). This study sought to promote social cohesion by reducing prejudice through contact of both groups to build a relationship based on friendship between the local people and migrants. Moreover, the study sought to build sustainable peace through the promotion of *ubuntu* by including both groups in the research process.

Furthermore, the current research explored the historical and current factors believed to be the triggers for the scourge of xenophobia in SA – this would be carried out through a clear analysis from a socio-economic and socio-political perspective to identify the appropriate strategy to prevent and combat xenophobia in SA and to explore whether social activities have

been carried out to promote social cohesion between the locals and migrants. Moreover, the study includes a participatory action research approach in an attempt to illustrate the means by which the South African government's responses can be improved in preventing and combatting the scourge of xenophobia and in building peace between foreign nationals and South Africans in the country. Lastly, the research concludes with recommendations to strategically prevent and combat xenophobia in SA.

## **1.10 Motivation and Rationale for the Study**

Xenophobia is present in any country or society regardless of whether that country is known to be developed, industrialised, developing, least developed, or mono- or multi-cultural, and it can take different forms depending on the country in which it is taking place (Olowu 2008: 296-318). However, that which is being witnessed in SA goes beyond xenophobia, the reason being that the violence witnessed in SA as compared to other countries is very different, as in SA, migrants are dehumanised every time that the violence erupts and the attitudes of the locals towards the migrants have been reported as being negative since 1994, and this has not changed. Moreover, while employment in SA is scarce and crime is still on the rise, migrants are always scapegoated and stereotyped for being behind the socio-economic challenges. Thus, being a migrant and having a chance to socialise with both groups, the researcher was saddened to see that the few migrants with whom the researcher interacted were struggling to get jobs, as the majority of them are holders of Bachelor's degrees (BA), but are forced to work as car guards due to the fact that they are regarded as outsiders, and coupled with their challenges, they are limited in accessing the employment market.

Furthermore, the researcher's inspiration to conduct research on xenophobia was motivated by the desire to contribute to the knowledge of migration and refugees and the local people's attitude, especially in the area of conflict transformation, social cohesion, and contact theory. Thus, the researcher hopes that the findings of this study will not only contribute to the body of knowledge but will also assist the government in using different approaches to prevent and combat xenophobia or prevent conflict in any community where the violence is taking place. While scholars have criticised the efforts and interventions provided by the government of not being effective and of not addressing the real problem, this study hopes to contribute to the ongoing literature on implementing an effective intervention to prevent xenophobia and to reduce prejudice, since xenophobic violence in the South African context can be seen as prejudice.

## **1.11 Research Aims and Objectives**

### **1.11.1 Main objective**

The main objective of this thesis was to prevent and combat xenophobic violence by promoting social cohesion, friendship, and cooperation between the locals and migrants, and to transform xenophobic violence in SA to create a peaceful environment where both groups can live together by upholding *ubuntu*.

### **1.11.2 Specific objectives**

This research addressed the following objectives:

1. To examine the historical and current causes of xenophobia in SA to identify that which truly triggers xenophobic violence
2. To investigate the extent and prevalence of xenophobic attacks and discrimination and to analyse and examine the effectiveness of the law in mitigating xenophobia
3. To design and implement a training programme with the sample of youth from both communities/groups (foreign nationals and nationals)
4. To evaluate the outcome of the interventions

## **1.12 Note on theoretical framework**

This research considered three set of theories in order to understand and combat xenophobia namely, conflict transformation, contact theory and social cohesion. However, social cohesion is not a theory *per se*, but it is used as a mean to connect migrants and South Africans. The research selected these three theories due to their focus on reducing prejudice in all its forms. All the theories provided below are fully explained in chapter 4.

### **1.12.1 Conflict transformation**

Conflict transformation theory plays an important role in the modern field of peace and conflict transformation and is attributed to the 1995 work of Jean Paul Lederach (Miall 2004: 67-89). According to Tikka (2020:8), conflict transforming goes beyond a shared victory results and re-evaluates the process of transforming the relationships, the interests, the discourses, and in some instances the structure of the society that supports the violent conflict. That means that conflict transformation is beyond a set of certain strategies (Traore 2020: 19). Lederach (2014: 20) sees conflict transformation as a predicament between human interactions that needs to be transformed from a negative to positive through a series of steps. Coupled with

this view is the fact that scholars posit that the problem is not the conflict that take place in societies, but the violence that takes place as a result of the conflict. Thus, they view conflict transformation as the motivation of building and promoting social change (Tikka 2020).

Conflict transformation is given much attention as the means of resolving conflict due to the fact that it received extensive influence from the work of Johan Galtung, who developed three components that he believed are witnessed in conflict, namely contradiction, attitude, and behaviour. While contradiction refers to the incompatibility of goals amongst the parties to the conflict, attitude is regarded as the perception and misperception towards each other and themselves. Lastly, behaviours refer to the actions of coercion, cooperation, conciliation and hostility (Tikka 2020). While the above-mentioned components apply to a conflictual situation, there are two more important elements that play a significant role in fostering the interaction in conflict transformation, namely empowerment and recognition. Thus, Etcheson (1999: 393) is of the view that settlement will proceed if the conflictual parties established empowerment and recognition (cited in Traore 2020: 18).

Conflict transformation takes place at different levels, which Lederach (1997) described as personal, structural, relational and cultural. Transformation at the personal level involves reinforcing people's capabilities to resolve the violent conflict taking place. At this level, people are expected to restore the individual sense of their ability to handle conflicts and willingness to seek sustainable peace (Bush and Folger 1996 cited in Wafula 2020). The relational level expects parties to the conflict to be transform their relationship into peaceful ones, which entails co-operation and mutual efforts to resolve the conflict (Currie 1971, cited in Wafula 2020). The cultural dimension involves a clear understanding of the impact of the conflict on the culture. This level involves an identification of cultural patterns that contribute to the formation of the conflict, that understanding will play a role in stopping the conflict from taking place (Lederach 1997; Wafula 2020).

#### 1.12.2 Theory of contact

This theory plays a crucial role in the social sciences, especially when dealing with prejudice. Scholars have posited that contact between rival groups can reduce prejudice and stereotypes (Klein *et al.* 2019: 146-164). However, Allport is not fully supportive of the view as he argued that contact theory does not fully reduce prejudice, in some occasions, it can trigger stereotypical views of the outgroup and increases negative sentiments (Allport 1954 cited in Christ and Kauff 2019: 145-158). This theory is believed to come to light in the 1930s, as social scientists introduced it as a way of creating contact between members of different groups and

to provide a way to overcome the groups tensions and conflict that existed (Pettigrew *et al.* 2011a: 271-280).

Although Allport (1954) did not give contact theory full support at first, he later explained that intergroup contact can only reduce prejudice in a case where four important elements are present namely, equal group status within the contact situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities, law or custom (cited in Klein *et al.* 2019). Different empirical studies have validated the effect of contact theory on attitudes, both in formal meeting and non – specific informal meeting (Dovidio *et al.* 2010: 3-28 ). Coupled with that is the fact that (Pettigrew *et al.* 2011b) have acknowledged that the higher frequency of meetings can generate higher possibility of reducing prejudice.

### 1.12.3 Social cohesion

Social cohesion is defined as an interaction between different members of the society that are defined by a set of attitudes and norms that include trust, it is regarded as a sense of belonging and a desire to contribute and support. It is a broad structure that surpasses the economic and political realm of societies (Watters, Ward and Stuart 2020: 82-94). Although scholars do not regard it as a theory, but in peace studies and conflict resolution, social cohesion plays an important role when it comes to connecting people from different origins, race and background, this is due to the fact that it is always linked to social and cultural belief (Ibid). it involves building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income. Moreover, social cohesion entails two major elements that sustain it, which is inclusion and belonging, these two elements are followed by positive emotional responses and an attachment to one or more specific social groups (Schiefer and Van der Noll 2017: 579-603). Thus, Alaluf (1999) posited that social cohesion is promoted through a sense of unified national identity (cited in Fonseca, Lukosch and Brazier 2019: 231-253).

## 1.13 Methodology

This study entails three components which are: exploratory, action research, and evaluation design. As a qualitative research, this is the most appropriate method as it provided the means for understanding the complexity of the situation by exploring the meaning that individuals or groups ascribe to a social problem (Creswell 2013: 44). The exploratory design was preferred because it helped the researcher to investigate the extent of, prevalence of, and barriers to prevent and combat xenophobia in SA; to explore the effectiveness of national, regional, and international legal frameworks to combat xenophobia in SA; and to analyse the role of the government before, during, and after the attacks. Action research is “a design that has a



cyclical inquiry process” which incorporates diagnosing a problem, planning steps, and implementing and evaluating outcomes (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53). The action research part of the research engaged the participants in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of a training programme to empower them to become involved in building and developing sustainable peace in the community.

### **1.14 Study Population and Sampling**

Babbie (2004) views the study population as research objects from whom conclusions are intended to be drawn. The suitable study population are migrants and the local people. However, special attention was paid to migrants who had been, in one way or another, affected by the May 2008 or April 2015 xenophobic attacks and those who are affected by discrimination due to their foreignness, and some local people who will help share their views on the presence of migrants in SA and xenophobic violence in the country. The study included participants from various countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Somalia, and some South African citizens. A total of 26 participants were selected in the research process, among which 15 were migrants and 11 were South Africans. The participation of women was encouraged, and the age to participate in the study ranged from 18 years above. The sample population was used as it would not have been feasible to study the entire population, thus it is required to have a portion of the population known as a sample that had to be selected to participate in the study (Flick 2014: 16). The study used purposive sampling and snowball sampling, which is due to the fact that the researcher purposively selected the participants based on how well they were suited to the purpose of the inclusion and exclusion criteria.

### **1.15 Data Collection and Analysis**

Different activities led to the collection of the data of this study. The research team gathered data through in-depth interviews with both groups, workshops, generative dialogue, world cafés, observations, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) throughout the research process. Thematic and content qualitative analysis were used as techniques for analysing the data gathered during the field work. Thematic analysis offers an accessible and theoretically flexible approach to analyse data, and Braun and Clarke (2006 cited in Flick 2014: 421) define it as a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) of meaning in a dataset of usually text, and detailing complex interpretations of a socially and historically located phenomenon.

## **1.16 Definition of Concepts**

### **Asylum seeker**

The word asylum seeker is used interchangeably with the word refugee notwithstanding the fact that the two concepts are different. The 1998 Refugees Act No 130 referred to asylum seeker as a person seeking recognition as a refugee in South Africa. The UNHCR (2014) defined an asylum seeker as a person who left his country of origin or home and is seeking refuge in another country, but who is not yet granted a refugee status, nor his case evaluated by the reception officer. Once the claim is accepted, he/she will become a refugee, but if the claim is rejected the person must leave the country or face arrest and deportation (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1951). However, in the South African context when an asylum claim is accepted the applicant will get an asylum seeker permit which is subjected to renewal twice in a year before being officially recognize as a refugee (Amended Refugees Act No. 33 of 2008).

### **Refugee**

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 under its article 1 (A) (2) defined a refugee as any person who has fled his country as a result of "events occurring before 1<sup>st</sup> January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is willing to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it" (14 -15).

## **1.17 Significance of the study**

This is socio-economic and socio-political study that did not only aim at preventing and combatting xenophobia in SA, but also build a sustainable peace between migrants and the local people. Different studies on xenophobia and migration have focused on the responsibility and the role of the government to intervene during xenophobia and to adopt strong policies against its occurrence. This study excluded the government in the solution process, the reason being that empirical studies have accused the government interventions of being ineffective and late, while civil societies have accused the government of triggering the violence. Instead, the study used both dialogue and intergroup contact to prevent and combat xenophobia. That means that this study took place at the grassroot level, thus, the researcher spent a year and

a half with participants in the field to break the barrier between both groups. Furthermore, social cohesion was easily promoted in this study through contact theory; through contact theory the researcher managed to show the humanness within both groups, as prior to the research both groups were referring to each other as “*us*” and “*them*”, but at the end of the study they that was changed into “*us*”, which showed a sense of responsibility that they both have.

Moreover, the peace action used in this study made it unique compared to other study. That means that we identified a peace action that connected both groups, which was “cooking and sharing meal together”, a seemingly simple act but one which required preparation and collaboration. All the participants and those that did not take part in the study related or identified themselves through food. That activity reinforced further the connection between both groups, as all the participants whether South Africans or migrants saw the similarity and connection through food. Although conflict transformation was used as a theory of peace, the uniqueness of this research dwells on the fact that this was a contact theory focused research, which differs from other study on the prevention of xenophobia. Unlike other studies that focused on collecting data and leave the field sometimes without the appropriate intervention, the time that both groups spent with each other as part of intergroup contact and the relationship that they build during this study demonstrated the effectiveness of the intervention, as at the end of the research, both groups’ attitudes were changed towards each other.

## **1.18 Structure of the Research**

This research is composed of eleven chapters, which are outlined below as follows.

**Chapter 1:** This chapter is the foundation of this research as it provides an overview and background of xenophobia in the South African context – it provides a brief overview of the methodology and data collection process, including the motivation behind xenophobia.

**Chapter 2:** This chapter gives the context of SA, which means that xenophobia cannot be understood without exploring the historical background of SA. Thus, the chapter starts by explaining colonisation and apartheid, and explores the consequences of the aftermath of these two brutal events that took place in the country, thus included in the chapter is the exploration of violence in all its forms.

**Chapter 3:** This chapter presents the literature review; it is very important because it presents that which empirical studies have revealed regarding xenophobia. The first part of the literature review provides a background of xenophobia in SA, its causes, its manifestation, and the

extent of xenophobia in the South African context. Included in the literature review is the distinction between xenophobia, racism, Afrophobia, and prejudice in order to determine the real qualification of the violence, and the role of the government and civil societies during the violence. The second part of this research presents the theoretical framework of this study.

**Chapter 4:** This chapter constitutes the second part of the literature review; it provides the theoretical framework and is divided into two parts. The first part explores the theory related to prejudice, and the second part provides the theories related to peace.

**Chapter 5:** This chapter provides the research design and methodology of this research study. The chapter explains Action Research (AR) and how it has been used to meet the objectives of this study.

**Chapter 6:** This chapter presents the data collected during the research process; the chapter presents the discussion based on different themes that were generated from the data collection process.

**Chapter 7:** This chapter presents a general discussion from the data collected. It complements Chapter 6 and broadens the discussion to include different aspects that lead to stereotypes against migrants.

**Chapter 8:** This chapter complements Chapter 7 and continues with the discussion focusing on how different activities were conducted and the planning of the intervention.

**Chapter 9:** This chapter explains the evaluations approach and criteria. It presents how the study's intervention played a role in strengthening the relationship between both groups.

**Chapter 10:** This chapter presents a summary of the findings that emerged from this research, the recommendations, and the conclusion.


## **Chapter 2: Context**

### **2.1 General Introduction**

This chapter provides a historical overview of South Africa (SA), its geographical position within the African continent, historical background, the impunity that the country faced during apartheid, immigration policies in the pre- and post-apartheid periods, the rule of law, and the peace process that the country has adopted. Included in this chapter is an exploration of the concept of violence in the South African context and the history of xenophobic violence in the country: empirical studies have always linked xenophobic violence to the history of violence experienced in the country (Muchiri 2016: 58).

### **2.2 Geographical position of SA**

The Republic of SA is located in the southern region of the African continent; it occupies the tip of Africa. The country shares common borders with Botswana, Eswatini (also known as Swaziland), Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the mountain Kingdom of Lesotho which is landlocked by South African territory in the south-east (Vigne 2020). SA has no significant natural lakes, and none of the country's rivers are commercially navigable. However, the Orange River is known to be the largest river in SA. Starting in the Drakensberg mountains, the Orange River passes through the Lesotho Highlands and joins the Caledon River between the Eastern Cape and Free State before it empties into the Atlantic Ocean, and it forms a border with Namibia. Figure 2.1 depicts a political map of SA.



**Figure 2.1:** Political map of SA available at [www.mapworld.org](http://www.mapworld.org).<sup>1</sup>

It was reported in mid-2014 that the South African population included approximately 54 million inhabitants, but in mid-2018, STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (2018) reported that the number of the South African population had increased by 1.55% between 2017 and 2018, making the population stand at 57.73 million. In SA, the population is grouped in terms of specific races, with black South Africans still being the majority in the country, as it is reported that they constitute 80.2%; followed by Coloureds who constitute 8.8%; the white population in SA who constitute 8.9%; and Asians, especially those from India, who constitute 2.5%. The racial diversity in SA clearly shows that SA is the only African country with the highest number of Whites, Coloureds, and Indians. Thus, the archbishop Desmond Tutu referred to the country as the “rainbow nation” which constitutes the new South African reference.

## 2.2 South African Natural Resources and Economic Indicators

SA is well known globally to be the second largest powerful economy in the African continent after Nigeria (International Monetary Fund 2016). Being a middle-income country, the economy

<sup>1</sup> Political map of South Africa with provinces and capitals, available at: <https://www.mapsofworld.com/south-africa/southafrica-political-map.html>, accessed on 14 September 2020.

of SA relies mostly on natural resources, a sophisticated industrial base, and a modern telecommunications and transport infrastructure (Explore Economics 2018). The country is the most industrialised country not only in the Sub-Saharan region but on the African continent. While many African nations have faced civil wars and humanitarian crises, since 1994, SA has been politically stable as the country has not faced any civil war or humanitarian crisis as with other African nations. Moreover, the country has managed to maintain economic stability regardless of some challenges that affects it. However, in the past few years the political South African sphere has been affected by poor governance, corruption, inequality, racism, unemployment, and poverty. These elements have significantly exacerbated violence and crime (Cilliers and Aucoin 2016: 4).

According to The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (2002), SA is not only a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but the country has policies that largely promote free trade, and it has a sophisticated financial sector and a stock exchange that ranks among the 20 largest in the world. Unlike other African nations, since 1996, SA has implemented a very developed legal system. Unlike Western industrialised countries, SA has lower labour costs, and since the transition period of 1993, the country has enjoyed positive economic growth (Brand South Africa 2017; Mathe 2020).

In terms of its natural resources, SA is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, and it is renowned for its mineral resources, which make up a large portion of the world's reserves. The South African mineral reserves are estimated to be worth approximately \$2.5 trillion, with the largest reserves of platinum and manganese (Smith 2018). SA is also among the top producers of gold, diamonds, chromite ore, vanadium, and ferrochrome (Smith 2018). The above-mentioned wealth that the country possesses has attracted migrants from neighbouring countries since the during apartheid, as many migrants from countries such as Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland were recruited to work in the mining and agricultural sectors in the country (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013: 237 -255). Given the casualties and damages of xenophobic violence in SA, the researcher chose SA due to the fact that the xenophobia affecting this country is unique in its character as compared to other countries in the world. The researcher intentionally selected Chesterville, which is a township located in Durban. Durban is one of the cities where the violence often starts and Chesterville is one of the oldest townships in the city.

### **2.2.1 Location and History of Chesterville**

Chesterville is originally known as the "blackhurst", unlike other townships like which are located away from the peripheries as imposed during the apartheid regime, Chesterville is

exceptional since it is located seven kilometres from the Central Business District (CBD). The reason for the location is because when established in 1946 by the then Municipal Native Administrative Department management named TJ Chester, the area was initially created for retirement village and agricultural purposes (Cited in CAST 2018 and Vukukanye Community Upliftment Initiatives 2009 Masinga 2014: 36). However, the area was abandoned, and later became a large township, thus, through the group Areas Act of 1955 which forcefully removed black South Africans from white designated areas, Chesterville was developed into a large area to accommodate a large informal settlement (Cited in Mkhize 2004 Masinga 2014: Ibid). Chesterville was completely established in 1946, although it is not located in the urban periphery, it is affected like many townships within South Africa with widespread poverty, unemployment, a high prevalence of HIV infection, crime, abuse and domestic violence, and a low level of education (Vukukhanye Community Upliftment Initiatives 2009; CAST 2018).



**Figure 2.2:** Chesterville map from google map 2020.

## 2.3 Historical Background of South Africa

To better explore xenophobic violence in SA, a deep analysis of the historical background of the African continent and SA in particular is important, and for this reason, colonisation and apartheid are always linked to the current challenges that the country is facing which often leads to protest and violence.



### 2.3.1 Colonization

Known as a system or process where powerful states, especially sovereign states, impose their power and dominate the powerless nations or impose control over the indigenous people, colonisation can also be referred to as a method of assimilating foreign people into the culture of an imperial country.

The colonisation of the African continent has its roots at the Berlin conference, which took place from 1884 to 1885. This conference saw all European countries partitioning the African continent and recognising each other's share of the continent. The purpose of the conference was to reach an agreement on imperial boundaries in order to avoid any future conflict among European countries (Khapoya 2015: 100). The actual colonisation of the African continent saw its beginnings in the 1870s (Iweriebor 2011). It has been reported that during colonisation and the sharing of the African continent amongst European countries, France and Great Britain were the two largest colonial powers. The two countries controlled two-thirds of the African continent before the First World War, and more than 70% after the war (Oliver and Fage 1972; Khapoya 2015). All African countries have been colonised by Europeans (Iweriebor 2011).

The colonisation era reached its peak during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This period marked the two world wars which humanity faced. As a result of the wars, many Africans were recruited by their respective colonisers and sent to the battlefield to fight on their side. Soon after the Second World War, the colonisation period started to decline as many African countries were calling for independence during the 1950s and 1960s (Oliver and Fage 1972: Ibid).

While most of the African continent was mostly colonised by the British and French, these two colonisers had different approaches regarding their attitudes and treatments towards their colonies (African people). For instance, in the British colonies, Africans were highly segregated, which means that the British separated themselves from the African communities and this was done through the ill treatment of Africans and the separation of social institutions such as schools and recreational facilities. Moreover, hospitals were maintained for different racial groups. For example, in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, which were colonised by the British, there were separated facilities for each racial group. This means that schools, hospitals, and means of transportation were racially designated. Africans living in the urban cities were confined to African locations and were not allowed to walk in the neighbourhood where the Whites were residing unless they had authorisation (Khapoya 2015: 107). The British did institute educational systems, civil society and spread the teachings of the Bible as many came to Africa as missionaries.

### **2.3.2 Attitudes and Influence of the Colonizers towards Africans**

Unlike the British, the French attitudes towards their African colonies were softer than those of the British, and although they looked down on Africans and mistreated them, the French were more focused on “civilising” the Africans. This means that the Africans colonised by the French had to reflect the French attitudes and behaviours and this was implemented through a system of education that would transform Africans’ behaviours and characters into those of the French (Khapoya 2015: 107). Through education, the French made their culture accessible to African natives, whereas the British culture was inaccessible (Mngomezulu 2015: 4 -44). Moreover, at the end of the Second World War, the French granted citizenship to the citizens of their colonies.

While comparing the attitudes of the French to those of the British, Khapoya (2015) states that Africans living in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and elsewhere in the French empire did not recall having used separated bathrooms, being sent to separate schools, sitting on a separate aisle in the church, or even enduring the humiliation of signs such as “Whites Only”, or “Africans and Dogs not Allowed”, although racial indignities were present in the colonies (Khapoya 2015: 109).

Britain did not follow the French process of granting citizenship to African natives. After first and second World War (WW), the British did not grant citizenships to Africans: although colonised by Britain, they were not part of Great Britain. The French granted full citizenship through its constitution of 1946, whereas the British government suggested the possibility of self-government in its separate colonies. Cooper argued that: “The Nationalities Act of 1948 created something of an echo of what the French were doing – a second tier commonwealth citizenship, derivative of the primary citizenship of the Dominions, but applied to colonies as well”. This allowed British Africans to gain access to the British Isle, a far cry from recognition among citizens African could be considered as citizens in the British Isles but not in Britain itself (Mngomezulu 2015).

Based on the attitudes and treatments that the colonisers were displaying, which have been explained above, it has been demonstrated empirically that it has affected post-colonial Africa. This is exhibited by the fact that many African nations are using similar legislations and policies that were implemented by the colonisers and have borrowed the characteristics and attitudes of the colonisers that promoted violence, hatred, and the separation of different tribes within the continent. Some of the characteristics that the colonisers used are now witnessed in some African nations. For example, taking a closer look again at the Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994, empirical studies have revealed that the genocide that took place in Rwanda is

linked to the divided rules and tactics used by their coloniser (Belgium) in separating the Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa. This later sparked a tribal conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis (Riemer 2011; Cowell 2014; Becker 2017).

### **2.3.3 Colonization of South Africa**

In terms of SA, with regards to colonisation, it is important to mention that the country experienced two major periods of colonisation somewhat differently from other countries. The first one took place in 1652 and it is known as the Dutch colonisation which took place as a result of the Dutch-Portuguese war – it was then followed by the British colonisation which took place in 1815 (South African History Online 2011). This period was marked by different internal armed conflicts which made the South African history very complex, with the reason being that, on the one hand, there was a conflict between the colonisers and the native South Africans; the conflict between colonisers refers to the conflict where the colonisers were opposed and fought against each other in order to have full control of the country from the natives. The conflict against colonisers was between the British and the Dutch, also called “Boers”, and this conflict is known as the “*Anglo-Boers wars*”. On the other hand, there was a political conflict which opposed different political parties within SA were. That conflict took place in 1990, involving the African national Congress (ANC), The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP) (ibid).

It has been demonstrated empirically that since the colonisation period, SA has remained a violent and racially divided country, and as mentioned above, the division did not only involve Europeans and Africans, but also Europeans against Europeans themselves as one group wanted to have dominion over the entire country, but in both ways, black South Africans were always the victims (Oliver and Oliver 2017; News 2018).

### **2.3.4 Apartheid**

Apartheid is known to be the fundamental ideology of racial discrimination implemented by the National Party (NP) in 1948, and it affected the lives of black South Africans in many facets of their lives such as socially, economically, politically, and culturally (Tshishonga 2019: 167-191). Worden 1994 cited in (Mhlauli, Salani and Mokotedi 2015a: 203-219) states that apartheid came to light as a symbol of the NP, which was inspired by the rise of Afrikaner nationalisms, an ideology that promoted Afrikaners’ supremacy and pride in response to the British invasion, as well as the threat from Blacks who were against subordination. Scholars have reported that apartheid was founded on the belief in the national distinctiveness of different South African groups. Gardner (1977 cited in Tshishonga 2019) asserts that

apartheid was classified into three categories, namely, economic, regional, and political, through separate developments with different ethnic groups being forced from the developed white area to the periphery. When introducing the apartheid policy in 1948, the newly elected National Party had the idea of regulating political parties in SA; sadly, the policy went further in regulating racial separation and banning racial mixing (Mhlauli, Salani and Mokotedi 2015b; South African History Online 2019b). This simply means that apartheid was a legal racial discrimination that violated different international treaties that SA ratified.

To achieve this, different Acts favouring separation were implemented in the country, namely, the Immorality Act of 1950, and the Group Areas Act of 1950 which promoted the residential separation of Blacks and Whites etc. (Mhlaudi, Salani and Mokotedi 2015: 203-219). Moreover, in addition to the Immorality Act of 1950 and the Group Areas Act of 1950 which promoted the placement of Blacks and Whites in separated residential areas, the NP passed the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which enforced segregation through the use of public facilities such as transport, cinemas, restaurants, and sports facilities; and the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which entailed separating the school curriculum on the basis of race and the abolition of missionary schools (Mhlaudi, Salani and Mokotedi 2015: 203-219). In order to enforce the policies of separation, black South Africans were given a passbook which was a form of passport that they were supposed to carry wherever they went, as they were restricted from moving from one place to another and from moving in different provinces of the country (South African History Online 2011). Apartheid officially ended in 1994, which marked the year of the first democratic elections in SA.

### **2.3.5 The Effect of Apartheid in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Different policies and legislations provided above clearly demonstrate that apartheid was the continuation of colonisation under a different name. Although apartheid was officially abolished in 1990 and SA had its first free elections in 1994, scholars have argued that apartheid is the reason behind the attitude of exclusion that South Africans exhibit towards migrants, and that apartheid is the main contributor to the actual xenophobic violence that SA is facing (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Neocosmos 2008; Misago 2016b). In supporting the above-mentioned argument on apartheid as the cause of xenophobia, Morris (1998) argues that apartheid isolated South Africans from other Africans living beyond the southern African border and after the abolition of the apartheid regime, South Africans had to meet other African nationals of whom they had never heard or known before.

Apartheid did not only separate black South Africans from Whites or other African migrants. The policy built a type of a wall that separated black South Africans among themselves, and

this was done according to the tribes, cultures, and languages. This means that the Zulus were confined to the Zulu community where they would only speak Isizulu, and the children had to attend schools where they had to learn everything in Isizulu. This was applied to all the tribes of the country (Noah 2016: 50). This means that apartheid made black South Africans “outsiders or unknown” towards one another as there was no contact between local tribes. This created a form of distrust when a Xhosa was in a community where Zulus were ruling (Noah 2016: Ibid).

Furthermore, apartheid did not only restrict contact between South Africans amongst themselves, but it also restricted migration from certain groups of people, especially black Africans. This means that during apartheid, black South Africans did not have contact with their fellow African brothers from other countries, as the latter were restricted from entering the country (Crush and Ramachandran 2009; Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). Scholars have posited that the attitudes that were prevailing towards the local people during apartheid have now shifted to migrants as the latter need to carry with them their identity document for fear of being arrested and deported (Crush 2008; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). As explored above, since the period of colonisation, violence has always defined SA. Thus, it is important to analyse violence in all its forms since the South African society is characterised by violence including xenophobia.

## **2.4 Violence**

Empirical studies have attributed peace and violence research to Johan Galtung, who is considered as the father of both concepts (Galtung 1969: 167-191). While the World Health Organisation (WHO) defined violence as the “use of force or power directed towards oneself, towards a group or a community, that often result in injuries, death or deprivation” (Krug *et al.* 2002: 5), Galtung (1969) referred to violence as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what. He further provided the different types of violence. According to Galtung (1969), there are three types of violence, namely, direct, indirect, and cultural violence. This means that violence is direct when it is perpetrated by an actor, and it is also called personal violence. Violence is indirect where there is no such actor to perpetrate the violence. It is also known as structural violence. The third form of violence is known as cultural violence, which is also invisible but is used as a means to justify direct or structural violence (Galtung 1996b: 25).

A clear analysis of violence is very important in the current research. The reason is that one cannot explore the xenophobic violence that migrants are facing in SA without exploring the

concept of violence. However, only two types of violence will be reviewed in this study, which are personal violence (also known as a direct violence), as it is the form of violence where the perpetrator of the violence is visible and can be identified; and invisible violence (also known as structural violence), as it is the opposite of personal violence due to the fact that there is no perpetrator of the violence (Galtung 1969: 167-191). In the South African context, one cannot single out violence into one type, as both types of violence are witnessed in the country. Scholars have posited that violence is part of South African culture, which means that the history of SA has been marked by different series of violent activities, which has tended to normalise violence in the country (Misago, Landau and Monson 2008; Alexander 2010).

#### **2.4.1 Direct Violence**

Most acts of violence are considered to be direct or personal, which is the primary form of violence, due to the fact that it involves the use of a visible and identifiable force of violence; structural violence is the opposite of personal violence as one does not need to see the harm or violence in operation or to accuse someone of intending to do harm (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014: 1). Direct violence plays a large role in helping in the identification of perpetrators in an easy way as the violence perpetrated is visible, and it renders the extent and damages of the violence quantifiable. Christie, Wagner and Winter (2001, cited in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014: 2) argue that direct violence is the common form of violence, as it involves one or more groups of perpetrators (actors) committing violence towards those with whom they are in conflict. While structural violence is considered as psychological harm, direct violence involves visible violent actions such as organised violence and torture and the use of physical force, and is typified by intimidation, murder, rape, and assault (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014: 2).

#### **2.4.2 Structural Violence**

Structural violence is an avoidable violence built into a structure where there is unequal power and unequal life chances (Galtung 1969: 167-191). The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2014) refers to structural violence as a physical and pathological harm that results from exploitative and unjust socio-political and socio-economic systems. It is a product of the historical process of socio-economic and political changes. It includes poverty to which a group or community might be subjected, and it can include the lack of food, the lack of access to land, the lack of service delivery, the deprivation of basic needs for survival, and the lack of employment for the majority. Thus, South African youth living in rural areas and informal settlements often face the above – mentioned challenges.

Structural violence is observed when poverty and unequal socio-economic and socio-political systems and structures are not beneficial to the people or are slowly killing people (see in Stiles 2011: 4). One of the characteristics of structural violence is the denial of people's important rights such as the denial of socio-economic rights, denial of economic opportunity, and the denial of social equality. One aspect of structural violence is that it is difficult to see, and it kills people slowly (Burtle 2013).

Structural violence takes place when the economic and political system has failed to satisfy the needs of the entire population, and instead a group of people are deprived of their socio-economic and socio-political rights (Christie 1997: 315-332). This means that not all the people are affected by structural violence, and the structure of the society causes severe social injustices to a particular community of people based on their race, ethnicity, classism, and sexism, amongst many other factors (Sashy 2013). Empirical studies have reported that structural violence mostly affects people living in poverty (Chopra 2014).

Thus, structural violence is a protective notion for other forms of injustice, oppression, marginalisation, inequality, exploitation, domination, and repression (Parsons 2007: 176). Although scholars have stated that structural violence is invisible, Chopra (2014) provides that certain actions can make structure violence visible, namely, identifiable institutions, relationships, and certain ideologies favouring separation and discrimination such as racism, gender inequality, and discriminatory actions. Taking the above-mentioned concepts into consideration, the South African society has been affected by structural violence for years. This means that from colonisation to apartheid, many South Africans have been victims of different oppressive political regimes.

According to Schirch (2004), structural violence can give birth to an actual direct form of violence that is witnessed in different forms such as civil war, crime, domestic violence, and substance violence and abuse (23). This taps directly into the reality of SA, which also constitutes one of the triggering points of xenophobic violence, as it is known that xenophobia negatively affects the lives of African migrants living in SA, especially those living in the townships and informal settlements (Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Tella 2016). Being an invisible form of violence, certain representations of the violence, namely, the high rate of disease and death (HIV/AIDS), unemployment, homelessness, the lack of education, powerlessness, and the shared fate of miseries also fall under structural violence (Chopra 2014), and these forms of violence have been observed in SA.

(a) *Disease and Death (HIV/AIDS)*

SA is known to be one of the countries that is highly affected by the HIV/AIDS disease, and according to the Joint United Nations programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) report, SA has the highest number of people living with HIV as compared to other countries, with an estimated 7.2 million people living with HIV in 2017 (Avert 2019). The prevalence of HIV in 2017 alone was reported to reach 18.9%, and this figure is regarded as high for a country despite the fact that it varies from one province to another, for instance, KwaZulu-Natal is known as the province with the highest rate of HIV reaching 12.2% as compared to other provinces (Avert 2019). However, the above-mentioned prevalence rate of KwaZulu-Natal increased in 2017 reaching 27.0% in that province alone, and the Western Cape with only 12.6%, making it the lowest prevalence rate in the entire country (TBFACTS 2019).

With regards to SA being a country with much racial diversity, it has been reported by different studies that HIV/AIDS within the country varies from one race to another. A study conducted in 2008 revealed that only 0.3% of Whites were infected with the virus, while 13.6% of black Africans were HIV positive (Avert 2019). These rates increased in a 2017 study, showing 16.6% of black South Africans as being HIV positive, and 1.1% of Whites, 5.3% of Coloureds, and only 0.8% of Indians/Asians being HIV positive (TBFACTS 2019). From the statistics provided above, most of the people infected with the disease are notably black South Africans as compared to other races in the country.

In addition, it has been reported that South African women are the most infected with the HIV/AIDS pandemic (TBFACTS 2019). Many reasons explain the high rates of women infection of HIV as compared to men, and among the many reasons there is rape, which is still rising in SA, especially in townships and informal settlements; discordant relationships; and the refusal of the use of condoms (Page 2008).

(b) *Poverty*

Empirical studies have reported that approximately one billion of the population in the world live in extreme poverty (see in Van der Westhuizen and Swart 2015: 734), it is important to mention that poverty is not a new phenomenon in South Africa, and it has had a long history in the country (May and Govender 1998: 1). Since the 1920s, the government has tried to eradicate poverty in the country through different efforts, for instance, in 1922, the First Carnegie Inquiry on poverty took place with the specific focus on “the problem of poor white people”, and it led to the implementation of an important policy framework for the eradication of poverty amongst Whites living in the country. The second Carnegie Conference took place



years later in 1983 and its purpose was to examine poverty amongst the black South African population, and as a result, the conference highlighted the critical conditions in the rural areas and townships of South Africa where most black people were forced to live (May and Govender 1998).

Although the country transitioned from apartheid to democracy 25 years ago, poverty is still high, and the government is still battling with the issue of eradicating poverty in the country. The Department of Statistics in South Africa reported that 49.2 percent of the population over the age of 18 falls below the upper-bound poverty line (Bittar 2020). Coupled with this is the fact that the upper-bound poverty line measured by the government indicates an income of ZAR 1,183 per month, leaving nearly half the adult population of South Africa in poverty (Ibid). While the monthly income is very low, the 2011 report on poverty in the country revealed a much lower income, as many South Africans lived below the breadline of R 321 per month (Westhuizen Carlene 2012: 33-34). SA is known to be an upper-middle-income country, but many South African households experience outright poverty or vulnerability to being poor. One of the contributing factors to this is the fact that SA is known to be among the most unequal countries in the world in terms of the distribution of income and wealth. Furthermore, many South Africans are still having challenges in accessing clean water, energy, health care, and education (May and Govender 1998).

Several studies conducted on poverty in 2011 reported that 27.3 million people (53.2%) of the population lived below the poverty line (Van der Westhuizen and Swart 2015; Omarjee 2017), in 2015, Stats SA recalculated the poverty line in the country while compiling data from the 2010/2011 income and expenditures survey – the result was released in 2017, and it included estimates from 2006 to 2015 (Africa Check 2018). According to the Poverty Trends Report for 2006 to 2015, a reported figure of 30.4 million people in SA (55.5%) are living in poverty (Omarjee 2017). A report from Stats SA stated that the period between 2011 to 2015 has been very difficult in terms of the national economy of the country which was as a roller coaster for the country, driven by a combination of international and domestic factors such as low and weak economic growth, an increase in unemployment rates, low commodity prices, higher consumer prices, lower investment levels, greater household dependency on credit, and policy uncertainty (Merten 2017).

In the South African context, poverty varies from one province to another and from one racial group to another. According to a report from Stats SA, poverty in the country has increased between 2011 and 2015 in eight provinces of the country. From all the provinces, the Eastern Cape had the highest rates of poor residents as 72.9% of the population are poor, while

Limpopo was slightly lower at 72.4%. In 2015, it was reported that the province of Gauteng had the lowest share of poor residents as only 33.3% of the residents in the province were poor (Omarjee 2017; Statistics South Africa 2017a).

As mentioned above, poverty in SA affects people according to their specific racial groups. Stats SA reported that the most affected racial group in terms of poverty in SA are the black communities, as it was reported in 2015 that nine out of every ten poor people living in SA were Blacks. White people living in the country are reported to have the lowest levels of poverty (Omarjee 2017). According to the most recent statistics, 64.2% of black people are poor, followed by Coloureds with 41.3%, followed by Indians/Asians with 5.9%, and Whites at the bottom of the list with only 1%, which concluded that 55.5% of South Africans are poor (Omarjee 2017; Statistics South Africa 2017a).

Although the country is affected by poverty, the government is fighting this challenge every year by trying to prioritise the issue of poverty. This is done through the allocation of social grants as it was reported that 60% of the government expenditure is allocated to social grants, and that expenditure is also related to the increase in the national minimum wage which has doubled over the past year and reducing inequality in the country (Van der Westhuizen and Swart 2015: 731-759). However, corruption, and poor leadership in the government acts as a barrier to preventing the reduction of poverty in the country (Wike *et al.* 2016).

### *(c) Unemployment*

Unemployment is a significant problem for its impact on economic prosperity, development, depletion of human resources, social inequality, violence, and social unrest. Some consider the extent of unemployment and its growth as the most important problem that South African society and its government are facing (Kingdon and John 2004: 391-408). SA is referred to as a dual economy, in the sense that it exhibits favourable economic features such as a highly developed financial system and a sound fiscal system. However, the country has always faced a high degree of unemployment which impacts society and the government, and this has had devastating effects on economic growth, development, crime, and social stability in the region (Pikoko and Phiri 2019: 365-387).

Unemployment in SA is not a new phenomenon, and notably, scholars have traced it back to the end of the apartheid regime, which means that unemployment in the country has been unacceptably high since the 1994 general election (*ibid*) and has worsened since 2008, leaving many people on the brink of joblessness. Kingdon and John (*ibid*) have reported that unemployment in SA is exceptionally high and is tending towards rising in the near future.

While one could disagree with their view, this has been witnessed during the Covid-19 pandemic, as Stats SA's quarterly labour force survey for the second quarter of July 2020 revealed that the country's unemployment crisis is heightening (Webster 2019a).

According to Stats SA, the official unemployment rate increased by 1.0% point to 30.1% in the first quarter of 2020 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2019. This means that the number of employed people decreased by 38,000 to 16.4 million and the number of unemployed people increased by 344,000 to 7.1 million in the first quarter of 2020 (BUSINESSTECH 2020). It is in that vein that different reports have ranked the official unemployment rate in SA as one of the highest in the world, and it continues to grow beyond the inequalities imposed under the apartheid regime, where 46% of black Africans are unemployed, and only 9.8% of Whites are unemployed (Burger and Fourie 2019; Webster 2019a).

In 2018 alone, the second quarter of labour revealed that the unemployment rate stood at 27.2%, however, this rate did not include those who had given up on looking for work, which means that if that category of people were to be included, the unemployment rate would stand at 37.2% (Burger and Fourie 2019: 1-12). Moreover, It is important to mention that the country has not been able to stabilise the unemployment rate to a certain percentage, as it has been reported to be increasing almost each year, for instance, statistics from Trading Economics revealed in 2015 that in the fourth quarter of 2014, the unemployment rate increased from 24.30% to 26.40% in the first quarter of 2015. Coupled with this is the period between 2000 and 2003, which reported the average of the unemployment rate at 25.27%, which in the first quarter of 2003 reached a high of 31.20% and a low of 21.50% in the quarter of 2008 (Mamabolo 2015: 143-150).

The above-mentioned statistics demonstrate that unemployment is widespread across SA, however, it affects each particular age group – this was demonstrated in the July 2019 national unemployment survey which revealed that the unemployment rate stood at 29%, affecting an estimated 6.7 million people. Approximately 56.4% of those aged between 15 and 24 and 35.6% of those aged between 25 and 34 are unemployed. While one might wonder the reason for the high unemployment rate amongst the youth, the South African National Treasury (2011) posits that job opportunities are limited for South Africans because employers look for skilled and experienced candidates. They see unskilled and unexperienced job hunters as a dangerous investment (Kingdon and John 2004: Ibid). This argument was supported by the study conducted by Dahir (2019) who supported the South African National Treasury provided above by stating that “poor education levels and weak labour policies have been blamed for

the low growth in employment, while some have pointed to the need to upskill workers in the face of growing technological innovation”.

While the youth are the most desperate in seeking employment, Stats SA reported that the unemployed appeared to be less skilled and inexperienced: almost 86% do not have further formal tertiary education, while two-thirds have never worked (Kingdon and John 2004). Regardless of the economic challenges that SA is facing, Barnerjee *et al.* (2008 cited in Pikoko and Phiri 2019: 365-387) have attributed unemployment in the country to the aftermaths of the apartheid regime.

## **2.5 Xenophobic Violence before the 1994 Election**

Empirical studies have reported that xenophobic attacks against migrants, especially those from the African continent, are not a new phenomenon in post-apartheid SA. Notably, they date back to the 1990s and were limited to the townships and informal settlements but spread to all the provinces in 2008 (Mbecke 2015: 71-82). The SAMP reported that South African nationals were xenophobic before the first democratic election of 1994 took place and became increasingly xenophobic after the 1994 election, and that xenophobia flourished between 1994 and 2002 (Bekker *et al.* 2008: 15).

The first xenophobic incident witnessed in the country took place in March 1990 in Hlaphekani near Giyani, which saw South African nationals burning 300 huts belonging to Mozambicans. There were the 1993 attacks on Namibians and Angolans who were accused of gaining access to land while many South Africans were homeless, and in 1994, another attack took place which saw Namibian fishermen being attacked by Xhosas who accused them of stealing their jobs on the fishing boat (Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni 2011: 129-142). This clearly demonstrates that xenophobic violence was present in the country during the transition period and that foreign nationals living in townships were not welcomed in the community, but no attention was paid to the attacks as the country was in the period of transition moving from apartheid to democracy. Between 1994 and the mass xenophobic violence several attacks of xenophobic nature took place in the country, affecting migrants in different provinces.

### **a. Xenophobic violence between 1994 and 1999**

Soon after the country transitioned from Apartheid to democracy, migrants were experiencing violence which often resulted in killing and looting of their properties. For instance, in January 1995, a group of youth living in Alexandra township (Johannesburg) destroyed the homes and properties that belonged to migrants on the basis that they were undocumented and marched to the police demanding that migrants should leave the country (Ogunnoiki 2020: 1-9). In the

same year there were reports of attacks against miners from Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique working in the Free state which resulting in killings. In 1997 the Cape Town Refugee Forum reported that at least 20 migrants were killed as a result of xenophobic violence perpetrated by South African youths (Bekker *et al.* 2008: 18).

b. Xenophobic violence between 2000 and 2008

Table 2.5.1 below present the different xenophobic incidents reported in different provinces.

Year	Province /City	Area	Causalities
2000	Western Cape (Cape Town)	Langa, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Milnerton and Bellville South	12 people lost their lives
2001	Western Cape (Cape town)	Langa, Du Noon, Zandspruit	112 shacks gutted and 126 dwellings looted.
2002	Western Cape (Cape Town)	Milnerton	3 people lost their lives
2003	Western Cape (Cape town)	Western Cape	28 people died
2005	Western Cape	Western Cape	8 people died
2006	Western Cape	Masiphumelele, Delft south, Du Noon, Khayelitsha	27 people were killed, 14 Somali Shops looted
2007	Mpumalanga	Delmas	Displacement of 40 migrants

**Table 2.5.1 adapted from Bekker *et. al* desktop research conducted in 2008.**

The table above present the extent and manifestation of xenophobic violence prior to the mass attacks of May 2008. The attacks were taking place in different provinces and although some provinces are not in the table, violence has been reported of taking place. For instance, in the Gauteng province it was reported that violence against migrants took place in 2007, resulting in more than 100 shacks belonging to migrants being torched. Coupled with that is the fact that Cape town, Port Elizabeth and Gauteng were regarded as the hotspot for attacks against

migrants (Ibid). Table 2.5.2 below shows that some provinces such as the Gauteng, KwaZulu – Natal and the Western Cape are hotspots of xenophobia.

### 2.5.2 Xenophobic violence by province from 1994 to 2018

Province	Number of xenophobic incidents
Gauteng	212
Western Cape	111
KwaZulu – Natal	67
Limpopo	40
Eastern Cape	33
Mpumalanga	22
North West	20
Free State	19
Northern Cape	5

Adapted from Xenowatch by Mlilo and Misago 2019

## 2.6 Immigration Legislation

In SA, immigration plays an important role, especially when dealing with a topic such as xenophobia. The reason is that most migrants living in SA are accused of being illegal in the country, (Crush 2001; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015), especially African migrants, and this constitutes one of the reasons of the xenophobic attacks that they experience. This section will explore a few relevant legislations dealing with migration and the protection of migrants.

### 2.6.1 Immigration Legislation during Apartheid

Different scholars have provided that immigration in SA under apartheid dwelled on four pillars, namely, racist policy and legislation; the exploitation of migrant labour from neighbouring countries; tough enforcement legislation; and the repudiation of international refugee conventions (Crush and McDonald 2001: 1-13). During apartheid, immigration legislation was discriminatory and prohibitive towards African migrants, as the then government implemented

racial and religious criteria to determine who was allowed to migrate to the country and who was not (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 235-255). While African migrants were restricted to migrate to SA, the then government favoured white Europeans, Americans, and Australians (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014).

McKnight (2008) argued that white minorities were encouraged to immigrate to SA. However, it is not all the Whites who were encouraged to immigrate to SA – the then government favoured Dutch and British migration to SA, while the Jewish, Chinese, and Indians were restricted (see in Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 238). Two legislations were set to encourage Europeans to migrate to SA, namely, the Immigration Act of 1913 and the Immigration Quota Act of 1930.

The first immigration policy implemented in the country, which is viewed by several civil societies and scholars as being present in post-apartheid SA, is the Immigration Act No 96 of 1913 (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014). This legislation contained provisions that isolated black South Africans and restricted black African nationals from immigrating to the country. This Act did not only isolate the country from African migration, but also turned South Africans into that which Neocosmos (2010) refers to as “foreign-native” which means that black South Africans were denied citizenship and were considered to be foreigners in their own country and were therefore subjected to the same laws that were applicable to African foreign nationals living in the country.

It is important to mention that restricting African foreign nationals in the country does not mean that they were not migrating to the country, and notably, the country welcomed migrants to perform cheap labour. This means that they were accommodated under the migrant’s labour system which allowed foreign nationals from neighbouring countries to work in the mining, agricultural, and commercial sectors (Crush and McDonald 2001: 1-13). These were nationals from neighbouring countries, namely, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland etc. (cited in Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: Ibid). Foreign nationals were allowed to live closer to their working place, and they had to return to their home countries once their contract was terminated, at the end of their working days, or during the holiday seasons (Crush and McDonald 2001: 1-13).

It was only in 1986 that foreign nationals were given legal permission to immigrate to SA, and this was limited only to the skilled migrants, especially nationals from East and West Africa (see in Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: Ibid).

### *Dealing with Illegal Migrants during the Apartheid Period:*

During the period of transition from apartheid to democracy, the country faced an influx of illegal migrants, especially those from Mozambique fleeing armed conflict in the country. As the number of illegal migrants was increasing, the Alien Control Act was amended to introduce new sanctions and penalties for illegal immigration to SA (Alien Control Act 1991). The Act gave power to law enforcement agents to enter into migrants' houses, and search and arrest the illegal migrants. The most targeted group were the Mozambican nationals who fled from internal civil war (South African Human Rights Commission 1999). This was done through *Operation Sentry* launched by the South African Police as a result of the 1991 Aliens Control Act, and it has been reported that 47,000 Mozambican nationals were brutally arrested and deported as a result of that so-called operation (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237-255).

Although the country moved from apartheid to democracy, it took the country seven years to implement a new Immigration Act, which means that it took the country more years than expected to replace the Alien Control Act, which prohibited African migrants to move to SA, changing it into a more dignified immigration legislation. Moreover, although the new Act was implemented, scholars and civil societies still criticised it of containing discriminatory provisions towards the treatment of African foreign nationals (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014).

#### **2.6.2 Immigration Legislation in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Adjai and Lazaridis (2014) refer to immigration legislation as a tool that helps in determining the rights and duties relating to the entitlement of residing in any country. In the South African context, immigration legislation provides the legal status of staying or entering the country, and it also allows immigration officers to detain and deport whoever is illegal in the country. It has been empirically argued that since 1994 when the country moved from apartheid to democracy, the then newly elected government never changed the brutal Alien control Act. In fact, that Act was used till the year 2000, as the government heavily relied on it, since it was the last legislation that the apartheid legislation implemented. This means that the immigration legislation did not change automatically when the country transitioned to democracy (Crush and McDonald 2001: 1- 3), and this also meant that the attitude directed towards black South Africans during apartheid was still observed in the post-apartheid, but this time it shifted towards migrants. This was allowed under article 53 (1) of the above – mentioned Act which states that:

If any immigration officer or police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that a person is an alien he may require such a person to produce to him proof that he is entitled to be in the Republic, and if such person fails to



satisfy such officer that is entitled, such officer may take him into custody without a warrant and if such officer deems it necessary to detain such person in a manner and at a place determined by the Director General, and such person shall as soon as possible be dealt with under Section 7 (Alien Control Act 1991: Art 53).

The above-mentioned section applied only to illegal migrants, those with a valid document or permit were not subjected to detention and deportation. While article 53 gave permission to immigration officers and law enforcement agents to detain, arrest, and deport migrants who failed to produce their legal status in the country, the provision did not provide a code of conduct that law enforcement agents were supposed to refer to in arresting those perceived to be illegal in the country. Thus, in 1999 the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) denounced the brutality and ill treatment that migrants were facing during their arrests and in detention centres by law enforcement agents (South African Human Rights Commission 1999: 6).

In addition, the Alien Control Act did not determine the elements that would help police officers in identifying legal or illegal migrants. Thus, Valji (2004: 5) provides elements to which police officers always referred to control a migrant and in determining whether a person was a citizen or a migrant, namely, the skin colour, height, and the presence of inoculation marks. However, it has been reported that in the process of arresting and deporting African migrants, law enforcement agents have also arrested and deported South African nationals who had physical similarities to foreign nationals and those who carried names related to non-South African nationals (see in Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 349).

As a result of the abuse of African migrants by the law enforcement agents in the post-apartheid period, in 1999, a research conducted by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) denounced the Alien Control Act, especially its article 53 and 55 which gives the law enforcement agents the authority to abuse their power towards migrants regardless of their status in the country, whether they are legal or illegal, and that in most cases, the arrest and detention were arbitrary (South African Human Rights Commission 1999: 6). The SAHRC report was supported by the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) which reported that most assaults and abuses that migrants faced took place in detention centres and, in most cases, they had led to the death of some detainees (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 2007).

Although the Alien Control Act No 96 of 1991 was amended in 1995, the amendment did not bring any change regarding the abuses, assaults, and discrimination that migrants were facing in the country. It is important to mention that since 1994, there was no law protecting refugees

and asylum seekers in SA; it was only in 1998 that the country had to pass the Refugee Act of 1998 which was welcomed nationally and internationally. Thus, the SAHRC report of 1999 demonstrated that although refugees and asylum seekers were allowed in the country, those that were found without a document were arrested and might face the law enforcement agents' abuses and physical harassment which mostly took place in detention centres.

### **2.6.3 Refugees Act of 1998**

As SA was transitioning from apartheid to democracy, many Sub-Saharan nations were facing severe political turmoil and economic catastrophes leading to internal armed conflict. As a result of the conflicts, many migrants moved to SA in search for safety and job opportunities (McKnight 2008: 18-42). As there was no legislation protecting refugees and asylum seekers in the country, which was making most refugees and asylum seekers into illegal migrants, in 1998, the country implemented the Refugees Act to protect those who were fleeing from war and economic instability (South Africa Department Home Affairs 1988).

The purpose of the Refugees Act was to give effect to the relevant international and regional legal instruments that SA had ratified, the principles and standards relating to refugees, to provide for the reception of asylum seekers into SA; to regulate applications for and recognition of refugees' status; to provide for the rights and obligations flowing from such status; and to provide for matters connected therewith (Provincial Government of Kwazulu-Natal 2015: 32).

Although the Act prohibits refusal of entries to people seeking refuge in SA, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, however, deal with the cessation of refugees' status recognition and exclusion of refugees in the country. The Act further enshrines the role and mandate of the Refugees Reception Offices (RROs), the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs (SCRA), and legally the Act gave power to the SCRA to review all the decisions regarding the refugees' status recognition and to monitor the more routine decisions (see sections 8 and 9 of South Africa Department Home Affairs 1988).

The Act provides rules in relation to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, and it also complies with the rules of the international convention on the protection of refugees and asylum seekers regarding the provisions dealing with the prohibition of deportation, non-refoulment, and non-prosecution on the basis of illegal entry into the country.

Although SA passed the Refugees Act, scholars have heavily criticised the South African government for being slow in determining the refugee status process, with the reason being

that most migrants living in SA are in fact asylum seekers and foreigners waiting for their refugee status to be affirmed (Gordon 2016: 1-17).

#### **2.6.4 The Current Immigration Act of 2002**

The 2002 Immigration Act is the most important piece of legislation in the country, the reason being that not only did it completely replace the Alien Control Act of 1991 provisions which were related to the apartheid regime, but also because it is the only legislation that addresses the issue of xenophobia in the country, by stating in its preamble that “xenophobia and prevented and countered” (Immigration Act 13 2002). More importantly, while the Alien Control Act of 1991 referred to non-nationals as “*Alien*”, the 2002 Act and its amendment replaced the term *Alien* with “*foreigner*” and defined a foreigner as a person “who is not a SA citizen or a non-resident of the republic nor an illegal foreigner” (preamble of Immigration Act 13 2002).

The 2002 Act was amended in 2014, thus it called on the government to cooperate with the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and Trade Unions in educating communities and organs of civil societies on the rights of foreigners, illegal migrants, and refugees, and to conduct other activities in order to prevent and combat xenophobia.

While the Act has its positive sides, this Act also has a negative side regarding immigration in SA. For instance, the Act borrowed some provisions from the Alien Control Act, especially in terms of arresting, detaining, and deporting anyone who fails to show a valid permit or who is in the country illegally (sections 34 and 49 Immigration Act 13 2002). This section demonstrates that since the transition period, the government has not been able to fully implement Acts or legislations that are unique and not linked to the Alien Control Act of 1991.

### **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter presented the historical context of SA, and it further presented different events that have led to the culture of violence witnessed in SA, such as colonisation, apartheid, and ethnic conflict. These three events have caused structural and direct violence to be present in SA, as both forms of violence are witnessed in post-apartheid SA. Coupled with this is the fact that since apartheid, the country has never implemented a fair legislation that does not borrow provisions from the Alien Control Act. This means that although the country is trying to implement legislations that protect migrants, the government is still relying on the past provisions which promoted the exclusion of African migrants in the South African territory, and this explains the fact that most migrants living in the country are still asylum seekers regardless of the many years spent in the country.

## **PART II**

### **Chapter 3: Literature Review**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

A literature review entails a critical reading of the academic literature on a given topic to uncover the current arguments and information regarding the topic at hand. This chapter addresses the first, second objectives of this research study which are very important in understanding the scourge of xenophobia that SA is experiencing based on empirical studies. The major contributor to the review of the literature in this research is the existing knowledge regarding the concept of xenophobia. Included in the discussion are the literature sources regarding the theoretical framework, and the effectiveness of the law in curbing xenophobia at the national, regional, and international levels.

This chapter entails two categories of theoretical frameworks, namely, the theories related to xenophobia on one hand and peace theories on the other. The chapter begins with a clear exploration of that which is believed to be the origins of xenophobia, which many scholars have believed is linked to the past history of the country; the concept of xenophobia and the difference between it and xenophobic violence; and its prevalence and manifestation in the South African context, especially in post-apartheid SA. Also included in the chapter is a suitable theoretical framework which will be helpful in curbing the scourge of xenophobia.

#### **3.2 Xenophobia and Xenophobic Violence: The Concept and Difference**

The concept of xenophobia cannot be explored without differentiating it from xenophobic violence, especially in a study concerning South Africa. As it is well known, xenophobia is just a negative attitude that one group has towards the group whom they consider as “outsiders” or the “other”, while xenophobic violence is a demonstration of the attitudes through “action” (Maina *et al.* 2011: 2). This illustrates that although the two concepts are closely related, they are in fact very different, but that which makes xenophobia (*attitudes*) and xenophobic violence (*actions*) interesting is the fact that one can mean the other depending on the country and circumstances, as is the case in South Africa. Providing the conceptual meanings and differences of these two concepts and connecting them at this stage is very important, the

reason being helped the researcher in identifying the relevant research methodology to apply in this research.

### 3.3 Definitions of Xenophobia

Different scholars have provided important definitions on xenophobia, but to explore these definitions, it is important to firstly consider the etymology of xenophobia as the starting point. Etymologically, *xenophobia* derives from the Greek words *Xenos*, meaning stranger or foreigner, and *Phobos*, meaning fear or dislike (Arogundade 2008: 167-172 ). Based on the etymology, xenophobia simply means the fear or dislike of foreigners and strangers. However, this definition has been reshaped by scholars to align it to a particular incidence that is taking place between local people and migrants. For instance, while on the one hand (Nyamnjoh 2006: 5) defines xenophobia as “an intense fear or dislike of foreigners”, which links directly to the etymology, on the other hand, xenophobia is regarded as the fear of foreigners encapsulated within persons or groups (Berezin 2006: 273-284). However, Misago (2016: 32) supported and adopts the definition provided by the International Labour Organization and the International Migration Organization in (2001) which define xenophobia as “the attitudes and prejudices that reject, exclude and often vilify people based on the perception that they are outsiders”.

Based on the above-mentioned definitions, it is clear that xenophobia is more of an attitude of one group towards the other group. Coupled with this is the fact that the negative attitudes towards foreign nationals are not a new phenomenon in the world. For instance, in SA, although the country is called the *rainbow nation*, empirical studies have revealed that South Africans started excluding and manifesting the hostile attitudes towards migrants since the 1990s when the country was transitioning from apartheid to democracy, and that hostile attitude has grown after the first democratic election in 1994 (Crush 2008; Neocosmos 2008).

As the definitions provided above mainly focused on the attitudes, David Kollapan, the former chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission, challenged the above-mentioned definitions by stating that “xenophobia cannot be separated from violence and physical abuse; thus, the definition provided in the *Oxford Dictionary* needs to be changed” (Maina *et al.* 2011: 1 -7). This means that one cannot simply define xenophobia as a negative attitude while the reality of xenophobia is beyond the attitudes and fear, especially in the South African context. Kollapan’s views were later supported by Maina *et al* (2011: Ibid) which suggested that the definition of xenophobia needs to be reviewed in order to specify the group or category of foreigners to whom the fear, hatred, and dislike are directed. Different scholars

have extended the definition of xenophobia which was then considered as an attitude to address the issue of violence (action) which is always linked to xenophobia.

### **3.3.1 Xenophobic Violence**

Xenophobia is not only limited to the attitudes that one group might have towards the others as I have explained above. Notably, the attitudes that one group has towards the others can escalate to action which is xenophobic violence. Scholars had to reframe the definitions provided in order to include the violence which follows the negative attitudes and to address the people who are likely to be the victims of the attack (ibid). While keeping the etymology of xenophobia in mind, Harris (2002) reframes the definition of xenophobia by stating that xenophobia is not just a dislike of foreigners or an attitude, but it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm and damages (cited in Maina et al. 2011: 1 – 7).

While the definition above includes the violence part of xenophobia (action), Crush and Ramachandran (2009: 10) emphasise that although there is a negative perception towards foreign nationals which usually results in violence, the violence is directed towards a certain category of migrants. This means that in most xenophobic incidences, only nationals from certain regions of the African continent are victims. Though Harris, Crush and Ramachandran have provided clear definitions of xenophobic violence which show that xenophobia is not only about the attitude directed towards certain nationalities, Dassah (2015: 127-147) argues that different definitions provided by scholars have failed to address the practice of xenophobia, especially in the South African context. He therefore stated that in SA, xenophobia involves the destruction of properties, hostility, and abuse which sometimes can lead to deaths. Based on Dassah's argument, it is clear to mention that in the South African context, xenophobia is unique, as it goes beyond the fear and dislike of foreign nationals and manifestations of xenophobia are more externalised than internalised. This means that in South Africa, one cannot single out the definition of xenophobia to an attitude, the reason being what we termed *xenophobia* always entails extreme direct violence which usually takes place in different forms ranging from everyday street-level abuse to discrimination and physical harassment by law enforcement agents (Misago 2016a: 38). Moreover, xenophobic violence refers to any act of violence perpetrated by local community or group directed at migrants due to their foreignness. Dodson (2010) view xenophobic violence is an explicit targeting of migrants for violent attacks despite other material, political, cultural, or social forces that might be at play. In the South African context, xenophobic violence entails grievous bodily harm, looting, robbery, arson attacks, intimidation, and physical harassment (Misago 2016).

### **3.3.2 Redefining Xenophobia in the South African Context**

Having a look at the way scholars have defined xenophobia and taking into consideration the targeted groups and the way in which the violence is taking place in SA, it is worth providing a clear definition of xenophobia that links directly to the objectives and aims of this research. Thus, the researcher defines xenophobia as:

[A]n attitude, prejudice and behaviour that reject, exclude and vilify foreign nationals from the third world countries based on their races, origins or ethnic groups; it is manifested through the acts of killings, lootings, beatings, incitement to hatred and any other form of violence with a purpose of dehumanizing foreign nationals.

Due to the fact that in South Africa, certain African nationals are always targeted during xenophobic violence, this research focused on both xenophobia (attitude) and xenophobic violence (action). Since the two concepts have been explained above, it is important to mention at this stage that both terms will be used interchangeably as they are linked in the Southern African context. In addition, there have been different arguments amongst scholars on whether xenophobia in the South African context should be regarded as a form of racism or crime or Afrophobia due to the fact that the locals only target African migrants. Thus, the following section will differentiate xenophobia from the above-mentioned concepts.

### **3.4 Establishing the difference between Xenophobia and Racism**

While there are similarities between xenophobia and racism, these two concepts also diverge, especially when it concerns their origins, targets, and expression (Yakushko 2009: 36-66). However, one matter to keep in mind is the fact that the root of xenophobia and racism is prejudice.

The National Action Plan to combat racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance defined racism as an:

[I]deology assigned to a particular race or group to a position of power or superiority over the other. It is the denial of people's basic human rights, dignity and respect, and it is usually expressed through small but everyday acts of discrimination, barriers and omissions that may be inadvertently established at an institutional level, to acts of threatening behaviour and violence (National Action Plan to combat against Racism Racial Discrimination Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 2016-2021).

The difference between racism and xenophobia is based on their historical realities. For instance, racism is mostly based on subordination, slavery, colonialism, and segregation, while xenophobia comes into action in times of economic and political instability or imbalance that results in the migration of large groups of people across the border (Yakushko 2009: Ibid). In most cases, racism occurs within a cultural and economic structure in which one group

seeks to have dominion over the other by gaining cultural and economic privileges from such a domination. However, xenophobia focuses more on the discomfort of the presence of foreigners in the community or in the country as they represent a threat to the economy, social life, and culture of that community (Yakushko 2009). Karlsson argues that “xenophobia implies behaviour based on the idea that the other is a stranger to the group and racism entails distinction based on physical characteristic differences such as skin colour, hair style and facial features” (Karlsson 2009: 3).

Yakushko (2009) validates the point that the researcher has mentioned above by stating that “xenophobia and racism are interactive and mutually supportive of prejudice”. However, racism does not always imply xenophobia, and conversely, xenophobia does not always imply racism. Racism implies a distinction based on the differences in physical characteristics such as race and facial features, and xenophobia is an attitude, a prejudice, and behaviour that rejects or excludes people based on the perception that they are foreigners or outsiders (International Labour Office, International Organization for Migration and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2001: 1).

The issue of xenophobia and racism in the South African context is relatively controversial. Some scholars have argued that the attacks against foreign nationals are purely racially based rather than being due to xenophobia, while on the other hand, others have argued that the attacks are indeed due to xenophobia and have further stated that since the attacks target only black foreign nationals, they should be labelled as *Negrophobia* or *Afrophobia* (Gathogo and Phiri 2009; Bekker 2015; Mbecke 2015). For the purpose of this research, it is important to state the researcher’s position on whether the attacks are racially based or if they are indeed due to xenophobia.

### **3.5 Xenophobia, Afrophobia, or Racism in South Africa?**

The question as to whether xenophobia should be regarded as racism or Afrophobia was developed by Adjai and Lazaridis (2013), and it shows that xenophobia and racism are very complex and controversial issues in SA. The reason is that SA is known to be a racially divided country internally. This means that the past history of the country on the one hand has divided black and white South Africans, and on the other hand, there is a division between black South Africans and black African migrants. Coupled with this is the ethnic conflict and division between different South African tribes such as the Zulus versus the Xhosas. On the other hand, the socio-economic situation has divided South Africans with African migrants due to the fact that the latter are stereotyped as stealing jobs designed for the nationals, and that



they are drug traffickers and criminals (Harris 2002; McKnight 2008; Landau 2010, 2011; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

Adjai and Lazaridis (2013: 192-205) provide two forms of racism, as they first looked at that which they termed as *old racism*, which refers to the perception of the superiority of one race over the other; and *new racism*, which is based on the discriminatory treatment of the other. "*New racism* is a shift from the notions of the biological superiority to exclusion based on the cultural and national difference" (see in Adjai and Lazaridis 2013: 192-205). Based on this definition, Tafira (2018) argues that *new racism* is a form of racism manifested by people with the same skin colour, such as black people against other Blacks who belong to the same community but who are seen to be socially and culturally different and inferior (15-33). Many academic scholars have validated the fact that xenophobia is *new racism* or *black-on-black racism*. This is based on the fact that during the attacks, the local people target only migrants from the African continent (Blacks), while the Europeans and others are exempted from the attacks.

Furthermore, since xenophobic violence is only targeted against migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have labelled the attacks as being black-on-black racism, while some members of the government refer to the violence as Afrophobia. However, the 2015 xenophobic violence shows a different image of the attacks as migrants from Southeast Asia were also targeted during the violence (Shai and Mothibi 2015: 15). However, based on the distinction made above between racism and xenophobia and considering the divergence of academic scholars regarding xenophobia and racism and the attitudes of the government and the local people towards migrants, it is clear that analysing whether xenophobia should be viewed as racism can be likened to avoiding the true qualification of the attacks witnessed in SA. This is because it is well known that both xenophobia and racism are indeed plain prejudice (Hurt 2015). Thus, it is important to carry out an exploration of prejudice since xenophobia finds its root in it.

### 3.6 Prejudice

Prejudice is defined as a prejudgement or forming an opinion before acknowledging the facts of a particular case. The Encyclopaedia of Identity refers to prejudice as an unfavourable judgement towards people based on their gender, beliefs, values, social class, age, eligibility, religion, sexuality, race or ethnicity, language, nationality, occupations, education, criminality, or other personal characteristics (Jackson II and Hogg 2010: 902). While this definition refers to a positive or negative evaluation of another person based on their perceived groups, Gordon

Allport (1954) has further defined prejudice as a favourable or unfavourable feeling towards a person or a thing, which is not based on the actual experience (see in Katz 1991: 125-157).

The definition of prejudice demonstrates that, that which one is terming *xenophobia* in SA is in fact pure prejudice (Hurt 2015), while xenophobia is viewed as a fear or dislike of foreigners, where the etymology of 'phobia' involves the word *phobos*, meaning fear, which presents quite an opposite reality of xenophobic violence in SA. The reason is that it has been demonstrated empirically that xenophobia in SA is not about the fear of foreigners, but it is about hate, killing, and physical harassment with an intention of sending a clear message to migrants that they are not welcome in the country or in a particular neighbourhood or community (Hurt 2015; Misago 2016a). For this reason, it is important to first explore the possible links between prejudice and xenophobia in the South African context. Prejudice is important in this research and is explored in section 4.2 below and further discussed in chapter 8. In exploring and analysing prejudice, the researcher relied on the book published by Gordon Allport titled "The nature of Prejudice" which was first published in 1954 and edited in 2015. The study used both sources to better explain prejudice.

### **3.7 The Genesis of Xenophobia in South Africa**

To better understand the history of xenophobia in SA, it is important to mention that the majority of African migrants moved to SA due to the armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters, economic instability, and political persecutions that were taking place in their respective countries during the 1990s (McKnight 2008: 18-42), and which are still taking place. Their displacement to SA was not appreciated, since the 1990s, it triggered xenophobic attacks which I have explained in section 2.5 above.

#### **3.7.1 Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

The end of apartheid in 1994 saw SA rising above racial segregation and having its first democratic election in 1994 which saw Nelson Mandela being elected as the first black president of the country. The end of apartheid was applauded globally, as it marked the beginning of the new era and exposed SA to global developments. However, the end of apartheid saw a mass influx of migrants in search for job opportunities, education, refuge etc. (Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni 2011: 129-142). The influx of migrants was followed by a strong negative attitude by the locals towards them, which was then followed by mass xenophobic attacks in May 2008 as the local people were not comfortable with the presence of migrants in the country (Monson *et al.* 2010; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

Soon after the country elected its first democratic president, different negative campaigns aiming at sending migrants back to their home countries took place in Alexandra (Johannesburg) in 1995. This was known as "*Operation Buyelekhaya*" (go back home) (Solomon 2020: 3). Sadly, the hatred against migrants was not only demonstrated by the locals, it was also witnessed amongst some government officials, who were reported of portraying migrants as the scapegoats of the socio-economic problems that the country was facing (Harris 2002; Crush 2008). An example of this is seen in the speech made by the then Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who, in delivering a speech in parliament, stated that:

If we South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into SA, then we can bid goodbye to our RDP ... the rising level of migrants has awesome implications for RDP as they will be absorbing unacceptable proportions of housing subsidies and adding to the difficulties we will be experiencing in healthcare (See in Neocosmos 2008; Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237-255). This statement is believed to be the trigger of the 1995 *Operation Buyelekhaya* mentioned above which aimed at harassing and intimidating foreign nationals living in Alexandra (Johannesburg) (Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni 2011: 129-142). Similar statements have been made by different members of the government, for instance, in 1998, the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, stated that:

[F]or crime, the army is helping the police get rid of crime and violence in the country. However, what can we do? We have one million illegal immigrants in our country who commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. That is the real problem (Human Rights Watch cited in Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 8).

Coupled with this statement, the then Johannesburg Mayor was quoted in 2004 deploring the presence of Nigerians on every street corner, committing crimes, and undermining the city's safety and security (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 8). These types of statements are perceived to be the reason behind the attacks taking place in SA. Moreover, they can change the perception of foreign nationals in the country and can create a climate of hatred between the two groups.

Following these statements, Sheena Duncan from Black Shash warned that xenophobia was growing very fast among South Africans and it was causing serious concern. Duncan then blamed the politicians, the bureaucrats, and the media for exacerbating the situation. He stated that:

[T]hey repeatedly quote discredited figures for the number of illegal aliens said to be in SA and more often link those figures to the crime wave they have aided and abetted by some sections of the media who do not investigate but merely report inaccurate statements (see in Crush 2008: 16).

Empirical studies have revealed that the xenophobic violence that one is witnessing in the post-apartheid SA is the result of many political leaders' negative statements towards the presence of migrants, coupled with inflammatory statistics on the presence of foreign nationals provided by the media tabloids (Bekker 2015; Misago 2016b). Moreover, before the mass 2008 xenophobic violence took place in the country, the SAMP conducted a study on the negative attitudes towards migration and foreign nationals worldwide in 1997, and a similar study was also conducted in 2006. Both studies revealed that South Africans exhibit high levels of intolerance and hostility towards foreign nationals (Crush 2008: 1). Crush (2008: 1) argues that "South Africans are least open to outsiders and want the greatest restrictions on immigration", and he further notes that a third of South Africans would be willing to take action against foreign nationals.

In supporting the study mentioned above, scholars have considered SA to be the most xenophobic society, and which does not recognise and respect the rights of migrants simply because they represent a threat to the socio-economic situation of the country (Dodson 2002 see in Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005). Coupled with this, the Human Rights Watch report concluded that "South Africans' public culture has become increasingly xenophobic" (Neocosmos 2008: 586-594). Monson *et al.* (2010: 10) argue that as long as the economic situation continues to be a major issue that frustrates many South Africans, there is little chance that the negative attitude that foreign nationals are facing is going to change. This simply means that foreign nationals will remain the soft targets of the South African frustrations (Misago, Landau and Monson 2008). However, it should be noted that it is not all the local people that have developed a negative attitude towards migrants, and there are also many South Africans who have helped distressed migrants in many ways (Neocosmos 2008: *Ibid*).

While academic scholars have argued that most of the perpetrators of the attacks are black South Africans, Crush (2000) and Landeau *et al.* (2005) find that white South Africans also hold a stronger anti-immigrant view than the other groups, although they are not usually taking a direct part in the violence. Crush (2001: 103-135) attributes the above-mentioned reason to the fact that only a "few white South Africans regularly interact with non-nationals or are in a position to make official policy towards them" (cited in Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 4).

Although there are signs and examples of tolerance within the country, and South Africans are raising their concerns about xenophobia and are acknowledging the rights of refugees and migrants in general, it has been reported that the majority of South Africans are uncomfortable with the presence of foreign nationals from the third world countries (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 5). Crush argues that:

Intolerance is extremely pervasive and growing in intensity and seriousness. Abuse of migrants and refugees has intensified and there is little support for the idea of migrant rights. Only one group of South Africans, a small minority have a regular personal contact with non-citizens (Crush 2001: 103-133).

However, while academic scholars are considering South Africans to be the most xenophobic and intolerant people towards migration and foreign nationals in the world (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 3), it is worth questioning whether xenophobic violence was present in the country when Nelson Mandela was president.

### **3.7.2 Xenophobic violence during Nelson Mandela's Presidency**

During Nelson Mandela's presidency, xenophobic violence towards migrants was still present in the country. However, the attitudes of South Africans towards foreign nationals were mostly internalised as there were few incidences of xenophobic attacks against migrants that were reported. A look at the many reports from academic scholars and civil societies on the negative attitudes exhibited by South Africans towards foreign nationals during Nelson Mandela's presidency revealed that the attacks were not taking place in the entire country as it happened in 2008 but were limited and managed (Bekker *et al.* 2008; Crush 2008).

Nelson Mandela is regarded as an icon for peace not only in Africa but also globally and he publicly condemned the 1995 *Operation Buyelekhaya* mentioned in the section above, which took place in Alexandra (Johannesburg). While addressing a gathering in Alexandra, the then President Mandela stated:

During the years I lived here, the people of Alexandra ignored tribal and ethnic distinctions. Instead of being Xhosas, or Sothos, or Zulus, or Shangaans, they were Alexandrians. We were one people, and we undermined the distinctions that the apartheid government tried so hard to impose. It saddens and angers me to see the rising hatred of foreigners (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2015: 1-4).

However, xenophobic violence escalated when Mandela was no longer in office, and it was during Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma's presidencies that South Africans started to use

extreme violence towards migrants to chase them all out of the country or communities. In most cases, scholars have argued that the reasons behind these attacks are mainly attached to social issues such as corruption, poor security in communities, poor border controls and immigration practices, poverty and unemployment, and poor service deliveries (Crush 2008; Monson *et al.* 2010; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

### **3.8 The Manifestations, Extents, and Prevalence of Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

#### **3.8.1 Manifestation of Xenophobia in South Africa**

In the South African context, xenophobia is manifested in different ways, ranging from derogatory terms to unacceptable levels of violence against foreign nationals. In many cases, during xenophobic violence, asylum seekers and refugees are the most vulnerable as they can be easily identified because of their legal status and physical appearance (Handmaker 2001: 1-12). According to Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015: 20), xenophobia in SA is manifested in different ways ranging from everyday street-level abuse to discrimination, harassment by law enforcement agents, and recurring bouts of popular xenophobic violence of varying intensities and scales.

Sadly, the harassment, violence, and discrimination that foreign nationals face in their everyday lives are not only perpetrated by the normal citizens, but also by the government officials such as the private organisations contracted to manage and provide services, promote urban development, or those selected to manage the detention centres and the deportation process (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Neocosmos 2008). Furthermore, migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, face challenges in accessing employment, accommodations, banking services, and healthcare services, and challenges involving extortion by the police, targeted corruption, arbitrary arrest, detention, and deportation (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Crush 2008; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

It is important to mention that xenophobic attacks mostly take place in townships and in poor and marginalised informal settlements where citizens and foreign nationals live in poor conditions and where there is a scarcity of public services, employment, and business opportunities (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 21).

### **3.8.2 The Extent of Xenophobia in South Africa**

Since the 2008 attacks against migrants, xenophobic attacks in SA have reached another level, which means that the attacks have extended to foreign shop-owners and workers and have resulted in a growing number of injuries from individuals and gangs (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 21). It has been reported that the post-2008 attacks have claimed more lives than the 2008 attacks, and every month there is at least one attack on foreign nationals in the country. Between mid-2009 and late 2010, at least 20 deaths and over 40 serious injuries have been registered, at least 200 foreign-national shops have been looted, and more than 4,000 people have been displaced because of the violence that was targeting them (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 21).

In 2011, at least 120 foreign nationals were killed, five of them were burnt alive, 100 were seriously injured, at least 1,000 were displaced, and 120 shops and businesses were permanently or temporarily closed due to the violence. The numbers of the attacks were reported to have increased in 2012, as at least 250 incidents were recorded resulting in the death of 140 people and 250 people being seriously injured. In 2013, an average of three major incidences of violence were recorded per week with the attacks being regularly reported in many areas across the country during 2014 (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 21).

In a report provided by the UNHCR ROSA, an estimated number of 300 incidences of violence against asylum seekers and refugees were reported, and an estimated number of 200 shops were looted and 900 migrants had been displaced. Due to the increase in the attacks against foreign nationals, the SAPS was overwhelmed and required assistance from all relevant government departments (see in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 21).

Based on the reports provided by different scholars and organisations regarding the extent of xenophobia in SA. In addition, it is important to mention that the killings of migrants and looting of their properties and businesses clearly demonstrate that the extent of xenophobia in SA is unique in its applicability and character as compared to other countries (Crush 2008: 33).

### **3.8.3 Prevalence of Xenophobia in South Africa**

Empirical studies have demonstrated that xenophobia is still a very complex issue in SA, and it is an ongoing phenomenon that will continue to affect the human rights of the country in the near future (Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010). This has been demonstrated by the fact that there is no sign of improvement regarding the negative attitude of South Africans towards foreign nationals and by the failure of the government to take necessary measures to eradicate

the violence since the 2008 mass xenophobic attacks in the country (See in Muchiri 2016: 37). The CoRMSA made another report in 2013 which revealed that there is no collaboration between the government and different civil societies in fighting the scourge of xenophobia in SA (see in Muchiri 2016: 38). The lack of collaboration between the government and civil societies constitutes one of the many reasons that xenophobia is still prevalent in SA.

### **3.9 The Causes of Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Globally, there are several different causes behind xenophobia and its manifestation, and according to Bordeaux (2010 cited in Muchiri 2016), the causes of xenophobia include economic distress, increased nationalism and nativism, and pressures related to immigration. It has been argued empirically that in the South African context, xenophobic violence is linked to the involvement of a “third force”, poor border control, poor service delivery, poverty and unemployment, corruption, or rising prices in food commodities (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 24). In this research, the researcher divided the causes of xenophobia into two categories, which are the historical and contemporary causes. The historical cause are linked to the past history of SA, as scholars have argued the past history of SA is also behind the current politics of exclusion witnessed by migrants in the country (Harris 2002; Neocosmos 2008; Adjai and Lazaridis 2013).

Thus, xenophobia in SA is always linked to colonisation and the apartheid political system that was implemented in the country in 1948, which entailed politics of exclusion and discrimination (Harris 2002; Crush and Ramachandran 2009; Misago 2016b). The extent and manifestation of xenophobic violence demonstrated in the 2008 attacks has motivated scholars in the field to look at the current causes of xenophobia, which they identified to be linked to the socio-economic struggles. This means that scholars have identified poverty, poor service delivery, corruption, and the rising of food or commodity prices to be what I classified as contemporary causes of xenophobia (Hadland 2008; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). The following sub-sections will deeply analyse the causes believed to be behind xenophobic violence.

#### **3.9.1 Colonization, Apartheid, Racism, and Citizenship**

To better understand the causes of xenophobia, it is important to look at the history of the politics of exclusion established during the apartheid era. According to the Human Sciences Research Council, the history of apartheid has shaped the relationship between white and black South Africans and foreign nationals (Hadland 2008: 15). However, the history of segregation and exclusion in SA dates to the colonial period, and it reached its peak during the apartheid era (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009: 13).



For instance, Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015: 22) posit that “during the apartheid era, the state termed *alien* to deny political rights and the rights of residence to the city’s surplus people”. Furthermore, the then immigration legislation favoured the migration and welfare of Europeans (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237-255). Neocosmos (2010) further argue that “any unwanted visitor authorised or required in the urban areas was seen as draining on resources and a threat to the desired cultural and political order”.

As stated above, the apartheid system toughened the immigration law for migrants, especially those from the African continent to migrate to SA, by limiting their ability to mix and accommodate each other, and to tolerate differences amongst the local people and between the locals and migrants (Morris 1998: 1125). This was proven empirically that black South African citizens did not have much contact with other fellow Africans (Nyamnjoh 2006). Moreover, this was also supported by the Alien control Act which I have explained in the second chapter of this research.

In 1994, when the country officially ended apartheid and elected Nelson Mandela as the first black president of SA, the country saw a mass influx of migrants from the Central and the Southern African regions, both illegal and legal, moving to the country. However, their presence in the country was not appreciated by the nationals who were isolated as they considered them to be the ‘*unknown*’ or the ‘*outsiders*’, and this created a zone of hostility between the two groups. It was in that vein that Morris (1998: 1116-1138) explained the attitude exhibited by the local towards migrants by stating that “it is difficult for a group that has no history of accepting and incorporating strangers in its community, it might be difficult for that group to welcome foreign nationals”.

Furthermore, during the apartheid period black South Africans were segregated and isolated within their own country, it is in that vein that Neocosmos (2010) in his book titled “*From foreign natives to native foreigners: Explaining xenophobia in post – apartheid South Africa*” qualified the then South Africans to be “*native foreigners*”. Which means that although they were born in SA, but they were not considered by the then government to be legally South Africans. In other words, this means that they were considered to be migrants in their own country due to the fact that they were denied citizenship and were forced to live in the isolated areas, where they had no contact with other African foreign nationals; and they had to be in possession of an authorisation to move within the country, and failure to produce that will results in an arrest.

The Citizens Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI) states that the apartheid period created and radicalised the notions of identity and worth, which encouraged black South Africans to see themselves not only as inferior to Whites, but also as separate from the rest of the continent.

It encouraged separation and compartmentalisation of various populations as a means of governance and discouraged integration or contact between groups and finally, it institutionalised violence as a means of communication of grievances and achieving political ends (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 22). In addition, “xenophobic violence that the contemporary SA is witnessing is a result of a legacy of the country’s racist history, it is also a product of futile, isolationist policy designed to intimidate and control migrants” (Handmaker and Parsley 2001: 40-51). They further state that SA’s past exclusion for the international community has resulted in the inability to tolerate and accommodate differences.

McKnight (2008: 18-42) also confirms the fact that the prevalence of the manifestation of xenophobia in SA is linked to the past history of exclusion and racism that prevailed in the country during the apartheid era. This means that xenophobic violence is something that South Africans inherited from their oppressors, which they are now applying on their fellow African brothers. Adding to this is a statement made by the author Antoine Bouillon who states that “black South Africans are just coming out of oppression and have much to learn; that apartheid taught them that Africa is just South Africa”. In addition, Misago, Landau and Monson (2009: 15) argue that non-nationals are the functional equivalent of black South Africans two decades ago, the primary difference being that the citizenry is now South Africa’s black majority, and the aliens are, with notable and disturbing exceptions, people from beyond the country’s political boundaries.

### **3.9.2 Culture of Violence in the Townships and Informal Settlements**

Many scholars have considered violence to be part of South Africans’ culture. Harris (2001: 62) describes a culture of violence in which social relations and interactions are governed through violence, rather than non-violence means. During the transition process to democracy in the 1990s, violence became a defining feature of SA (Kynoch 2005: 493-514). Thus, scholars have argued that violence in SA has been normalized or violence is viewed as a legitimate way to seek solutions to a particular problem (Maina *et al.* 2011).

Harris (2001:62, cited in Misago 2016: 63) states that “violence in SA has become a norm of pursuing material interests, seeking justice and calling for social change”. This view is also shared by Hamber and Lewis who argue that “in the South African context, violence is seen as legitimate means to achieve goals particularly because it was legitimised by most political role-players in the past”. (Harris 2001: 62). Historically, South Africans living in townships and in informal settlements have had a long history of social and economic deprivation, combined with repressive policing and a criminal predation and a corresponding reliance on vigilantism

which usually became a normative reason of pursuing material interests, resolving conflict, and seeking justice and material goals (Kynoch 2005; Monson *et al.* 2010).

The violence in SA saw its roots in the 1980s when many South Africans were claiming their freedom from the oppressive regime by violently fighting against the apartheid regime. It is believed that the brutal politics of the 1980s laid the foundation of the ongoing culture of violence (Harris 2001: 62). Coupled with this was the 1990s ethnic conflict between the Zulus and the Xhosas which is also known to be more of a conflict between political parties as it involved the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which mostly took place in the hostels located in different townships and informal settlements in Johannesburg. Moreover, it is worth adding that the politics of vigilantism established in townships and informal settlements took the form of people's courts, operating in similarity to the Kangaroo courts, where executions by necklacing were visible (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Monson *et al.* 2010).

Due to the high prevalence of violence in the past history of SA, empirical studies have considered the past history of the country to be the epicentre of the current violence and discrimination that migrants are now facing. This view has been demonstrated by Kynoch (2005: 493-514) who states that "social dislocation and institutionalized racism that stemmed from the state policies governing the African urbanization laid the foundation for a violent environment". He further states that the violence in SA must be seen in the history as it was characterised by years of economic disadvantage, repressive policing, criminal predation, and a consequent recourse to vigilantism.

In the same vein, (Hamber 2000) acknowledges that the current level of violent crime in SA and its multiple manifestations have been built on the legacy of the past civil conflict, and that culture of violence has bled into the social and civic arena of society. She further notes that the structural violence effected by the state through repression and legislated inequalities and the distribution of resources and opportunities in the apartheid era has created a climate in which all forms of social existence, including housing, education, employment, and service delivery are politicised Hamber 2000 (cited in Misago 2009: 10). Moreover, Harris (2001: Ibid) argues that the culture of violence explanation hammered the explanation that xenophobia is a product of nationalism. The above arguments presented by scholars were justified by the 2008 xenophobic attacks as the motives behind the attacks were justified by the issues of employment and houses.

During the period of transition in the 1990s, the violence experienced in the country had two angles as it involved, on the one hand, the citizens against the rival party, which means black

South Africans were fighting against the NP and the abolition of apartheid; on the other hand, there was a violent conflict between political parties (the IFP *versus* the ANC) or social factions against each other. Lastly, the “Boers”/Afrikaners were fighting to keep maintaining apartheid (Hamber 2000: 5-18).

### **3.9.3 Socio-Economic Deprivation**

Empirical studies have revealed that there is a significant relationship between xenophobic violence and socio-economic factors (Hadland 2008: 14). As mentioned above, most of the attacks against migrants usually take place in townships or informal settlements where most of the people are poor and the youth are unemployed. Thus, a study conducted by Statistics South Africa (STATSA) revealed that millions of South Africans are poor and unemployed, which was based on their recent statistics which revealed that the rate of unemployment was at 27% and that of poverty was at 50% (Moya 2017; STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA 2017b).

The majority of black South Africans live below the poverty line, and this means that they are facing some challenges in accessing the economic benefits, with high competition in accessing economic resources such as employment, houses, healthcare, and commodities and these challenges are transformed into frustration and violence (Hadland 2008: 16). Thus, Antonio Guterres, the current UN Secretary General, has acknowledged that poverty is the underlying factor of violence. This view was further supported by Moeletsi Mbeki from the South African Institute for International Affairs stated that “the underlying problem is the extreme and widespread poverty in SA, accompanied by homelessness and landlessness and the way out of this” (Hadland 2008: Ibid).

The fact that the rates of poverty and unemployment are high in the country has created resentment towards migrants as they are perceived to be a threat to many socio-economic rights reserved for South Africans, especially employment. As stated by (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005: 6):

Most of them (migrants) come to SA well educated, trained and ready to work for low wages in comparison to South Africans and they play a role in increasing the prices of the houses in the townships and informal settlements.

Harris (2002: 169-184) concluded by stating that unemployment, poverty, and the increased prices of commodities have created frustrations amongst South Africans which then turned into the scapegoating of migrants for the economic deprivations that the nationals are facing. Furthermore, the 2008 report conducted by the HSRC revealed that the main causes of the 2008 mass xenophobic attacks were mainly based on the issue of housing, as many nationals accused migrants of occupying houses that were exclusively meant for South African

nationals, known as the RDP houses, and this view was shared by many South Africans living in townships and informal settlements. This view was also revealed in a joint survey conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Forced Migration Studies (FMS) in 2009 (Hadland 2008; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009).

While the issue of housing is viewed as a starting point of the 2008 xenophobic violence, it is important to couple it with the economic competition between South Africans and migrants living in townships and informal settlements. A survey conducted by the FMS revealed that there is a close relationship between the prevalence of xenophobic sentiments and economic competition between the local people and migrants running businesses in the townships and informal settlements. The survey also found that there were socio-economic tensions from the local people towards successful migrants running small businesses, a high level of impunity, institutionalised discrimination against migrants, and high levels of vigilantism in townships (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009 (cited in Muchiri 2016: 65)).

### **3.10 Efforts made to combat Xenophobia in South Africa**

Since the mass xenophobic violence of May 2008, the government and different civil societies have tried to implement policies and have taken different initiatives to prevent the violence from occurring in the country. Unfortunately, all the efforts that they have made have seemed to be ineffective and have been highly criticised by scholars and civil societies (Misago 2016b: 443-467). For this reason, it is important to explore the role that they have both played during the attacks and different strategies and policies that they have made in order to fight the scourge of xenophobia.

#### **3.10.1 The Government's Approach to Xenophobia**

Different civil societies within the country have accused the government of not making enough effort in mitigating and combatting xenophobia in SA, and this is justified by the fact that xenophobia is still taking place in the country (Crush 2008; Maina *et al.* 2011; Bekker 2015; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). Coupled with this is the fact that the government has been accused by scholars of triggering the violence against migrants for political gain (Neocosmos 2008: 586-594). This means that members of the government have been caught accusing, directly or indirectly, migrants for being responsible for different socio-economic problems that the country is experiencing.

For instance, the earliest example of the government's direct motivation is found in the speech made by the then Home Affairs minister Buthelezi which has been mentioned above, and to

this can be added the 2015 comment made by the national Small Business Development Minister who stated that African migrants running businesses in SA must know that they are here as a courtesy and the government's priority is directed first to the sons and daughters of this country Mail & Guardian 2015 (cited in Bekker 2015: 229-252). As simple as these statements might look like, they have triggers xenophobic violence in townships and informal settlements.

In addition, based on the fact that government officials always publicly condemn the presence or behaviour of migrants in the country, Amisi *et al.* (2011) accused them of masterminding and triggering xenophobic violence that takes place in different townships or informal settlements within the country. However, there is a motive behind the government officials' attitude and behaviour towards the presence of migrants in the country. It is in that vein that Maina *et al.* (2011: 4) posited that the only motivation that the local leaders have in encouraging the attacks is nothing else than to gain authority or to fulfil their political interest. Moreover, a study conducted by the IOM revealed that the local leaders and the police officers' failure to protect the migrants during xenophobic violence is due to the fact that they are afraid of losing the legitimacy and political positions if they were seen as defending migrants (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009: 3). A similar finding was also made by the CoRMSA in a study conducted in 2010 which revealed that the motivation of the violence against migrants in SA dwells in the competition for political and economic power. Leaders and aspirant leaders often mobilise residents to attack and evict foreign nationals as a means of strengthening their personal and political or economic power within the local community (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 2010).

On many occasions, national and international civil societies called on the government to take a firm action to prevent the attacks against migrants and to deal with the issue of xenophobic violence in a sustainable way. A recent example is found in the call made by Shenilla Mohamed, the Executive Director of Amnesty International South Africa, who stated that:

There is a lack of political will on the part of the government to deal with the issues of xenophobia and violence in a sustainable way, and the consequence of this inertia has resulted in continuing sporadic bursts of violence which often end in deaths, injuries and damage to property (Amnesty International 2018a).

Moreover, in an anti-xenophobia march organised in March 2017 by foreign nationals and South African nationals at the Union Building (in Pretoria), the government was once again accused by the protesters of not taking the attacks against migrants seriously and the protesters went further by accusing the government of being the mastermind behind the xenophobic violence that the country was facing (Tandwa 2017). However, it is important that

that although the government is accused of not taking xenophobic attacks seriously or not taking the necessary steps to prevent and stop the attacks from taking place in the country, the latter is always seen responding when there is xenophobic violence erupts.

### **3.10.2 The Government's Responses and Efforts to combat Xenophobia**

The South African government has the constitutional obligation to protect everyone living in the country, whether legally or illegally (in terms of customary law). While many victims of the attacks including civil societies always look at the government to respond to the violence, scholars and civil societies have always denounced the government of not taking the necessary steps in responding to the attacks (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). However, the earliest government effort to combat xenophobia took place in 2001 under the declaration adopted at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related intolerance that took place in Durban. In this conference, the government acknowledged the importance of converting the objective of the Durban declaration into a practical and workable plan. Unfortunately, until now, the Action Plan to combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance is still under discussion at the Department of Justice Constitutional Development (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25).

Furthermore, during the May 2008 xenophobic violence, the government put in place an ad hoc committee and designated a task team in parliament, ministries at all the levels of the government, and the police to deal with xenophobia. However, that ad hoc committee disappeared soon after the violence against migrants subsided, and the government's response to combat xenophobia ceased (ibid). In the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic violence, the then President Jacob Zuma established a ministerial task team which was composed of eleven ministers to fight and quell xenophobia in the country, and amongst the ministers selected were the ministers of Home Affairs, Defence, Health, State Security, and Social Development (Nicolaides 2015). The purpose of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) was to strengthen conflict resolution and conflict prevention mechanisms at the community level. However, all the efforts made by the government in combatting xenophobia through conflict prevention and conflict resolution were empirically found to be unsuccessful (Misago 2016b: 443-467), one reason being that the interventions are not evidence based and are not informed by a clear understanding of the drivers of the violence (Ibid).

Scholars have criticised the government's response to xenophobia of being late, which means the government intervention to xenophobic violence often take place late after the violence

had erupted and caused damages, and for being ineffective. Moreover, the government intervention or initiative to curb xenophobia is not implemented on the permanent basis, as it's always tending to be temporary due to the fact that the interventions and policies are not operational after the violence is managed (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25). Crush (2009: 19) considers the government's attitudes towards xenophobia as being characterised by "denialism", due to the fact that government officials always portray xenophobic violence as "just a crime" and not xenophobia. Furthermore, Crush states that:

Despite the overwhelming research evidence of a powder-keg of xenophobic sentiment, the issue was largely ignored in public political discourse, until it was too late. Even then, the response of those in government to May 2008 was largely denialist in character. Several prominent politicians initially voiced surprise and concern and acknowledged that xenophobia was a significant problem. They were quickly silenced by an official party line from the president's office. The attacks were criminal, not xenophobically motivated, said President Mbeki at an official day of mourning for the victims. South Africans were not xenophobic and anyone who said so was themselves being xenophobic (see in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25).

The failure of the government to acknowledge xenophobia that is affecting migrants always give room to scholars, national and international civil societies to criticise the efforts and responses of the government during and after xenophobic violence. This was supported by Misago (2015: 25) who posits that "the unwillingness to recognise xenophobia coupled with the current judicial system has also led to an alarming culture of impunity and lack of accountability for perpetrators and mandated institutions". Moreover, it has been empirically argued that recognising xenophobic violence in the country is ideologically and politically uncomfortable for the ANC which considers itself as being at the head of the pan-African ideology Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010 (cited in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 25).

In addition, Monson and Misago (2009: 25-34) argue that the failure to directly acknowledge the attacks against migrants that the country is witnessing, coupled with the lack of proper sustainable policies and institutions that deal directly with the issue of xenophobia, are the key factors to directly accuse the government of encouraging not only xenophobic violence but also the perpetrators of the violence.

### **3.10.3 The Response and Efforts of Civil Societies during Xenophobia**

Civil societies in SA have played a very important role during the attacks as most of the assistance that migrants received were coming from the national as well as international civil



societies. Civil societies started denouncing xenophobic attacks towards migrants before the May 2008 mass attacks took place. The first response to address and combat xenophobia in SA was made by a joint work of civil societies, namely, the SAHRC, CoRMSA, and the UNHCR in 1998, in that which is known as the Rolling Back Xenophobia Campaign (RBX) which aimed at combatting the scourge of xenophobia, and this was supposed to be done through public education in the media, communities, schools, and work (Polzer and Satgé 2009; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015).

Scholars acknowledge and praise the efforts that civil societies provide during the attacks. For instance, during the 2008 and 2015 attacks, different civil societies took the initiative of assisting the victims of the attacks with the humanitarian aids, while some others were engaged in the advocacy work on the prevention of the attacks through social cohesion campaigns and advocating for the rights for migrants and the promotion of conflict resolution strategies that would help destroy the inter-group boundaries (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 27). While the efforts of civil societies in assisting those affected by xenophobic violence are highly appreciated in the country as compared to efforts of the government, Amisi *et al.* (2011: 81) stated that the responses of civil societies are ineffective because they fail to address the root causes of xenophobia in the country.

### **3.11 The South African Media and Xenophobic Violence**

The media play an important role in a country, as they can change people's ways of thinking on particular issues. Thus, the promotion in the media of hatred or stereotypes directed towards migrants can change the way in which the latter are perceived in a country (Saleh 2015: 298-313). According to Berg (2003 cited in Smith 2009: 18), the role of the media is to help maintain the invisibility of paradigms by constructing a perception of diverse opinions through standards such as balance objectivity and fairness. This means that in terms of xenophobia, the media has the responsibility to report on xenophobic attitudes and actions taking place in the country – this also concerns the print media which have a responsibility to ensure that they are not unduly contributing to the problem of xenophobia by internalising xenophobic language, uncritically reproducing anti-immigrant stories and research, or giving unrestricted freedoms to xenophobic reporters and commentators (Danson and McDonald 2001: 115-137).

Smith (2009) argues that due to the fact that many South Africans are passive in terms of the media reports in the country, the main responsibility is placed on the media, which means that

the media must be careful about the news that they publish. Danso and McDonald (2001 cited in Smith 2009: 23) posit that:

The effects of news reporting are therefore of particular importance in accessing the ideological consequences of public reaction to foreign migration in South Africa. The press translates the dominant ideology into public opinion and by doing so helps structure public perception and legitimises the actions of state institutions ... it is both in their potential role in creating moral panics and inciting anti-foreigner sentiments, and in their ability to reproduce ideologies and shape popular perceptions, that the print media play an important role in issues of smuggling, drugs and clandestine migration in SA.

Furthermore, as a result of the 2008 mass xenophobic attacks, the media was blamed for inflaming the violence that foreign nationals experienced. Different civil societies and academic scholars have directly or indirectly accused the media, especially the South African press, for contributing to the anti-migrants sentiment that the country faced (Danso and McDonald 2001: 115-137). As a result of the mass xenophobic violence of 2008, the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) and the CoRMSA launched a complaint against the Daily Sun to the then Ombudsman, Joe Thlooe, and the Human Rights Commission accusing the Daily Sun for the continual and unjustifiable usage of derogatory and discriminatory stereotypes being perpetrated against migrants and the usage of logos and headlines such as *Alien Terror* and *War on Aliens* (Gordin 2008; Guardian 2008). The Daily Sun was viewed as one of the sources that encouraged the attacks due to the fact that most readers of the Daily Sun lived in communities where the attacks took place, and it was easy for them to believe in the stories and stereotypes portrayed towards migrants in the Daily Sun (Gordin 2008).

According to Danso and McDonald (ibid), the press coverage in SA regarding immigration is divided into two categories. On one side of the press, there is a majority group which portrays immigration from an anti-migrant perspective and calls for stringent and immediate controls and even an outright banning of immigrants. An example of this group can be seen in the Daily Sun which is the most read newsprint in South Africa, and which has been criticised for the discriminative coverage against foreign nationals (Muswede 2015: 87-101). On the other side of the press, there is a minority group which is more lenient, accommodating, and thoughtful in its coverage and attitude towards immigration. This second group always reports on the positive impact that labour migration has for the development of the country's economy and national reconstruction programme. As an example of this second category is the *Sowetan* which is well appreciated in terms of the content of the violence that they publish. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic violence, the *Sowetan* dedicated two pages in its

edition dated 24 April 2015 which called on the unity and freedom of all Africans and further reminded the readers that some of the ANC stalwarts were welcomed in other African countries during the period of apartheid ( Muswede 2015).

### **3.12 The National and African Regional Legislations protecting Migrants**

#### **3.12.1 Regional Legislations protecting Migrants**

SA has the rights and obligations to ensure that it complied with the international and regional legal instruments dealing with the protection of refugees and asylum seekers living in the country. Regionally, SA has ratified and signed several legal treaties dealing with the protection of migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, in 1998, the country passed the Refugee Act of 1998, which was implemented in 2000, and the purpose of the Act was to give effect to the international and regional instruments that SA has signed and ratified. Moreover, the purpose of the Act was to provide principles and standards relating to the reception of refugees and asylum seekers into SA, to regulate applications for and recognition of refugees' status, and to provide for the rights and obligations attached to their status (Provincial Government of Kwazulu-Natal 2015: 32).

The Refugee Act of 1998 was implemented to give effect to the 1969 African Union Convention governing the specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa which SA ratified in 1995. More importantly, the Refugee Act of 1998 borrowed many provisions from the 1969 AU Refugee Convention which was implemented by different African Heads of State with the purpose of providing assistance to African nationals fleeing persecutions, armed conflict, external aggression, and foreign occupation in their country (Organisation of the African Unity 1969: article 1).

While there exist different regional legislation dealing with the protection of migrants, Muchiri (2016: 136) however stated that the most important conventions that SA can rely on is the 1969 AU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugees problem in Africa is the more appropriate legal instrument that SA must rely upon instead of the 1951 UN Refugee's Convention. The reason being, the majority of migrants seeking refuge and asylum in SA are mainly citizens from the Central and Southern African region, namely, from Zimbabwe, the DRC, Somalia, and Mozambique, who, in most cases, are facing persecution, armed conflict, internal turmoil, or a humanitarian crisis.

While the Refugee Act was approved to comply with the international and regional legal instruments, the application and implementation of the 1998 Refugee Act has received much criticism from civil societies working closely with refugees, who have criticised the Refugee Reception Office of being slow in determining refugees' status process. That is demonstrated in the fact that the majority of refugees living in SA are actually asylum seekers waiting for their refugee status to be affirmed regardless of the many years that they have spent in the country (Gordon 2016: 1-17).

Furthermore, to respect its regional obligation and protect everyone living in the country regardless of their national origins, SA has signed and ratified the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), which called on state members to domesticate the provisions of the ACHPR into their national laws. SA has however implemented some provisions of the 1981 ACHPR into its 1996 Constitution, which is appreciated globally because it addresses many modern-day human rights issues. For instance, Article 2 of the ACHPR guarantees the rights to the enjoyment of freedom without any kind of discrimination based on ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, or national and social origin etc. Furthermore, the ACHPR called on the inviolability of human beings and respect of their right to life and the integrity of human beings. All these rights are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) under the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution (Organization of the Africa Unity 1992; Constitution 1996).

### **3.12.2 The International and National Legislations protecting Migrants**

On the international scale, SA has ratified important international treaties which have important provisions that SA has introduced in its Constitution of 1996. Since the enactment of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the country has included some relevant provisions of different international conventions and treaties into its national law, to comply with the international standards. For instance, the Constitution of the country, under its chapter two entitled *The Bill of Rights*, guarantees necessary human rights to everyone living in SA, regardless of their country of origin. The Constitution clearly states that "*South Africa belongs to everybody living in it*" (Constitutional Assembly 1996: the preamble). This provision clearly indicates that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, which are known to be the basic human rights that people need to survive in a society or a country, are also applicable to foreign nationals, whether refugees or asylum seekers.

In addition, the South African Constitution covers almost all-important treaties dealing with the human rights of those living in the country. Although the South African Constitution does not have specific provisions dealing directly with the protection of refugees and asylum seekers,

SA has, however, adopted important legislations that deal directly with immigration and the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, to have a more appropriate immigration legislation, SA has passed that which is considered to be a more appropriate immigration Act as compared to the 1991 Alien Act, which was criticised for having provisions related to apartheid. Moreover, in complying with its obligation to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers based on the 1951 UN convention relating to Refugee status and its protocol, SA passed the Refugee Act of 1998, to assist those fleeing persecutions in their respective countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1951; Alien Control Act 1991; Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2011).

In its effort to combat racism and xenophobia nationally, in 2001, SA held one of the most important conferences known as the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, and related Intolerance dealing with prejudice, such as racism and xenophobia. The purpose of that conference was to create a platform where the government and the people of South Africa, foreign nationals, and different civil societies could work together to change the prejudice and attitudes, and to raise awareness about the scourge of xenophobia, racial discrimination, and racism and to establish and to strengthen specialised bodies to combat it (National Action Plan to combat against Racism Racial Discrimination Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 2016-2021).

Despite the fact that SA has relevant legal provisions dealing with hate crimes (xenophobia and racism), this has not stopped the local people from being abusive towards migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, law enforcement agents are also participating in the harassment of migrants in a dehumanising way. An example of the law enforcement abuse towards migrants can be found a few years ago in an incidence when a video of a Mozambican taxi driver named Mido Marcia was arrested because he was accused of causing traffic congestion, and he was handcuffed and dragged behind a police van in Daveyton (Johannesburg) in the full view of local residents and he was later found dead in a holding cell (Ncube 2014: 53-56).

### **3.13 The Effectiveness of Legislations protecting Foreign Nationals in South Africa**

The section above on the response of the government to xenophobia demonstrates that since the 2008 mass xenophobic violence that took place in the country, the law has not been applied effectively, the reason being that there have not been more arrests made against the perpetrators nor knowledge of the locations of the few people whom the police have arrested

(Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 26). Dewa Mavhinga, a director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) Southern Africa posits that “South Africa lacks accountability of xenophobic crimes. No one has been convicted for the past outbreaks of xenophobic violence” (Human Rights Watch 2019a). Thus, the lack of accountability and the lack of arresting perpetrators play a role in encouraging the latter in their wrongdoing, since there are no legal consequences. The Daily Sun newspaper published, on 21 April 2015, that which revealed that there are no legal consequences for those who carry out xenophobic attacks in SA, and this argument was clear from the headline titled “there is no charge called xenophobia” (see in Muswede 2015).

Although SA has signed and ratified relevant regional and international legal instruments, Muchiri (2016: 74) argues that there is no law established in the country that deals directly with preventing and fighting xenophobia in SA. However, the fact that there is a *legal lacuna* does not mean that the law should not be applied to perpetrators, and Judge Mojapelo called on the laws to be applied effectively and on the judiciaries to play their part in confronting and combatting the scourge of xenophobia in the country (see in O'Reilly 2015). In order to have the effective legal process dealing with hate crimes such as xenophobia, the perpetrators of the violence must be held accountable and severely punished for the crime committed, and the victims of the violence must obtain the legal recourse for their loss and suffering. Coupled with this, the country must fully enforce the legal treaties and declaration that have been signed and ratified which will mostly make human rights the strong pillar for protecting refugees and asylum seekers (Muchiri 2016: 265).

### **3.14 Rights enjoyed by Refugees in South Africa in comparison with other African States**

Though scholars and civil societies have criticised the South African government's approach towards xenophobia and the treatment of migrants, it is important to mention that migrants living in SA and those seeking asylum in the country are enjoying the same rights from which the locals benefit except the right to vote, unlike in other countries such as Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (Constitutional Assembly 1996). This means that the government of SA has provided the same socio-economic rights to which citizens are entitled to migrants. For instance, while refugees and asylum seekers living in SA are allowed to live in a city or province of their choice and to work and pursue studies (South Africa Department Home Affairs 1988), this is not the case in the countries that have been mentioned above. In Kenya and Uganda alone, refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to live in the cities or provinces of their choice, and they are obliged to live in refugee camps, hence they are

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excluded from accessing the job market as they are mainly supported by international funds and civil societies (Hovil 2007; Pavanello, Elhawary and Pantuliano 2010; Huot 2014; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/Kenya 2017).

The fact that SA allows refugees to live anywhere in the country and to obtain employment and pursue studies without the support of international donors or civil societies, explains the reason why there is a high number of refugees in the country as compared to other nations. Coupled with that is the fact that they flee to South Africa to escape poverty, political violence and war (Masuku 2020).

### **3.15 Xenophobic Violence at a Regional Level: Comparison between South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda**

At the regional level, xenophobic violence has been witnessed in different countries of the African continent, but in this section, it is worth exploring two countries that are similar to SA in terms of the number of refugees and asylum seekers that they are accommodating, the history of both countries, and the violence and stereotypes against migrants; these are Uganda and Kenya (Landau and Misago 2009: 99-110). The Kenyan and Ugandan xenophobic violence present points of similarities and divergence in terms of the accommodation of migrants, as has been explained in the section above, and the treatments that migrants receive from those hosting countries. This means that on the one hand, some countries are doing better in terms of the treatment of migrants, and on the other hand, South Africa is also doing much better than those countries in terms of accommodating foreign nationals.

As in SA, the majority of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya are escaping internal armed conflict, and harsh, oppressive, and undesirable conditions in their home countries – these are mainly nationals from South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the DRC (Danish Refugee Council 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2016). Unlike in SA, where refugees and asylum seekers are allowed to live everywhere or in any city in which they would like to live, work, and study (Refugees Act No.130 of 1998), in Kenya, migrants are required to live in refugee camps that the government, in collaboration with the UNHCR, have implemented, namely, the *Dadaab* camp, which is the world's largest refugee camp, and the *Kakuma* camp, which is reported to have 185,993 registered refugees and asylum seekers (Al-Jazeera 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/Kenya 2017).

In terms of the violence, in SA, foreign nationals are mostly targeted because they are perceived as a threat to the socio-economic rights of the country, and in most cases, they are

accused of competing with South African nationals in terms of access to employment and that they are benefitting more from the country than South Africans (Monson *et al.* 2010; Matsinhe 2016; Misago 2016b). However, in Kenya, foreign nationals are targeted as a result of the terror attacks that the country has been witnessing recently. This means that migrants are perceived as terrorists, however, not all migrants are considered as terrorists. It is mainly nationals of Somalia who are believed to belong to the *al-Shabaab* terror groups (Pavanello, Elhawary and Pantuliano 2010; Huot 2014). In South Africa, nationals from Zimbabwe, the DRC, Malawi etc. face direct discrimination, hostility, and violence, however in Kenya, it is only nationals from Somalia who are mostly targeted and considered as terrorists (Soi Wambua 2012; Huot 2014).

While the situation in SA and Kenya is similar, in Uganda, the violence seems non-existent as there are not many reports on the occurrence of the attacks. However, it must be mentioned here that Uganda is also one of the countries that has a high rate of influx of refugees and asylum seekers, especially nationals from the DRC and South Sudan. Similar to Kenya, in Uganda, refugees are also required to live in camps after registration, and the camps are located in the northern province near the border, and this is where they are mostly attacked by the rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Kaiser 2005: 351-367). Although there is a negative attitude towards migrants in the cities where the camps are located, such as in Bidibidi (north of Uganda), there are not many xenophobic incidents that have been reported thus far in that region (Liebling *et al.* 2017; Hoff 2019).

### **3.16 Xenophobia – An International Phenomenon**

Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in the world and is not only taking place at the African regional level, though there are more articles written on the attacks taking place in SA than in any other country. Notably, xenophobia is an international phenomenon which has been witnessed in almost every country whether developing, developed, or under-developed, and it has been reported that xenophobic manifestations and violence increase every year worldwide in different forms which are mainly based on citizenship and belonging (Nyamnjoh 2006: 3). Incidences of xenophobic violence and its manifestation have not only been witnessed in the African countries, and it has also notably been reported in countries such as Australia, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (USA) (Soyombo 2008: 85-104). However, in some cases it is more of an anti-immigrants' attitude than xenophobia.



From the above-mentioned countries, xenophobic violence and its manifestation take different forms according to each country. For instance, Germany is known as the country where xenophobia takes a form of anti-Semitism, which means that most hostilities are directed towards Jews, although this dates back to the Holocaust era (Enstad 2017: 4). In addition to the anti-Semitism attacks against the Jews, due to the fact that since 2015 migrants from Syria have been fleeing to Germany to seek protection, it has been reported that they are not welcome. In 2017, Simon Cullen and Susannah Cullinane from CNN reported that “thousands of asylum seekers and refugees were injured in more than 3,500 attacks on them and their shelters” (Cullen and Cullinane 2017).

While Germany opened its borders to welcome refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, despite the attacks that the latter are facing, the USA appeared to distance itself from welcoming refugees from those countries. However, it has been historically reported that hostility against Asian migrants, especially those from China, dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In response to the high immigration rate from Chinese nationals to the USA, the American Congress adopted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 which considered Chinese nationals as a danger to the good order of some cities of the USA. This saw a massacre of 31 Chinese Americans in 1887 (Head 2018). Coupled with this are the attacks against Italians in 1890 as they were stereotyped as being “mafia”. In the modern century, xenophobic manifestations have been targeted towards nationals from Mexico as they are perceived as taking over white identity (Fetzer 2000 see in King and Tiobo 2016: 12), xenophobic attitude is also extended to non-white, which means Latino, Black and Arabs are also included. Moreover, xenophobic attitudes in United States (US) had been directed towards Irish-Catholics, as they were stereotyped of being “savage”, “Celtic” race of people. Such stereotypes against migrants in the US promoted hatred and violence against Irish Immigrants (Lee 2019).

Since the 9/11 terror attack against the USA, xenophobic manifestations have also been witnessed towards nationals from the middle east. It is important to mention that since President Trump took office in 2017, that which is known as xenophobia or racism in the USA has now shifted to that which is now termed as *Islamophobia*, which means that the USA imposed a travel ban on seven Muslim countries, namely, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya to fight Islamic terrorism (Siddiqui and Gambino 2017). The attitude against migrants from the middle east is more of religious prejudice, as they are Muslims while the US is dominated by Christianity. That has promoted a anti-immigrant attitude towards some Arab migrants. However, exception is given to those from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Lee (2019) posited that in the US xenophobia promotes American nativism, nationalism, and religion discrimination.

Although xenophobic violence is an international phenomenon, xenophobic violence in the South African context is unique as compared to other countries (Olukaju 2008: 39-51), the reason being that the attacks towards migrants in SA involve direct killings, looting of businesses, and the burning of properties.

### **3.17 Prejudice and Xenophobic Violence in South Africa**

Gordon Allport's book entitled *The nature of prejudice*, originally published in 1954, is considered as the starting point on the modern nature of prejudice and the method of reducing it (Brown 1995: 7). For this reason, this study's exploration of prejudice is mainly based on the work of Allport. Allport defines prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group, or towards an individual because he is a member of that group" (Allport 1954: 10).

While different academic scholars in the field have provided relevant definitions of prejudice, Brown (1995: 7) opposed them by stating that "prejudice is not only about negative attitudes manifested by one group, it can also have positive attitudes". He further defines prejudice as:

[T]he holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards membership of a group (Brown 1995: 10).

Prejudice is also regarded as a negative attitude towards a particular social group and its individual members due to the fact that they are part of the out-group (Cohrs and Duckitt 2011: 1-7). Taking the above-mentioned definitions into consideration, the definition provided by Brown clearly shows that prejudice is not only about the internal attitudes against the other groups, but it can sometimes contain elements of hostility and violence. This taps directly into that which one is witnessing in SA, as the negative hostile attitude against migrants is now resulting in extreme violence and killings, including derogatory name calling such as "*amakwerekwere* or *amagrigamba*", used with an intention to intimidate the migrants and to perpetuate hatred towards them (Maina *et al.* 2011: 3).

In addition, Eagly and Diekman (2005) consider prejudice as a process that preserves disparities in status and responsibilities between groups. However, they also stress how individual reactions lead to this process (Psychology 2020b). Cohrs and Duckitt (2011) posit that prejudice has a collective aspect which deals with the self-identification and perception of a group member, their feelings and behaviour towards the targeted group, and their relation in society. While it is well known that prejudice can start off individually, in many cases,

prejudice starts as a group process which means that although prejudice starts individually, it can be spread to other groups (Brown 1995: 10).

It is important to mention that there are two essential elements that are required to talk about prejudice. Allport has stated that firstly, there must be an attitude of favour or disfavour, and secondly, it must be related to the overgeneralised erroneous belief (Allport 1954: 13). This clearly taps into the realities of post-apartheid SA, as it has been reported that since the transition from apartheid to democracy in the 1990s, South Africans have exhibited a negative attitude of dislike towards migrants. The reason is that the local people believe that all black migrants living in the country are either illegal or are involved in criminal activities (Harris 2002; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Crush 2008; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015), and coupled with this is the fact that they are taking jobs that belong to the locals, as they work for lower wages (ibid).

In most cases, the negative attitude that one group might have towards the other usually expresses itself in the actions of hostilities. The more intense the attitude is, the more likely it is to result in a vigorously hostile action (Allport 1954: 14). This is evidenced in post-apartheid SA, as mentioned in the previous section, that since the country abolished apartheid and moved to democracy, there have been many reports on the intensified negative attitude towards migrants. This was due to the fact that the government failed to fulfil the promises made to its people during the 1994 transition to democracy. Some of the issues that are intensifying the hostile attitude towards foreign nationals are mainly high levels of poverty, unemployment, and the failure in providing service delivery (Crush 2008).

According to Cohrs and Duckitt (2011), prejudice entails different aspects such as cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects. Each aspect has its own function. For instance, the cognitive aspect deals with evaluative attitudes about characteristics of the group in question or its members; the affective aspect deals with emotional reactions; and ultimately, the behavioural aspect refers to propensities or intentions to exhibit discriminatory behaviour. These three aspects can be exhibited individually or as a group, and according to Dovidio *et al.* (2010: 3-28), prejudice is an individual-level attitude (whether subjectively positive or negative) towards groups and their members that establishes or maintains hierarchical status relations between groups.

Although prejudice is often exhibited by the in-group or the majority group, it can also be witnessed amongst the disadvantaged group, or the out-group, towards the advantaged group, or ingroup (Dovidio *et al.* 2010: Ibid), and this means that one often focuses on the attitudes exhibited by the majority group forgetting that the negative attitude or prejudice can

also be expressed by the minority groups. However, much of this prejudice is reported as being reactive, reflecting an anticipation of being discriminated against by the majority group members (Dovidio *et al.* 2010: Ibid).

### **3.17.1 Manifestation of Prejudice**

The negative attitude that one group has can be manifested towards the others through the promotion of a character or a behaviour of rejection of the minority group or the group perceived as the outsider in a community. As a result, Allport (1954) has distinguished five degrees of negative action which always result in a rejective behaviour, namely:

1. Antilocution
2. Avoidance
3. Discrimination
4. Physical attack
5. Extermination

He further simplifies these into three degrees of rejection of the outgroups, namely: 1) verbal rejection (antilocution), 2) discrimination (including segregation), and 3) physical attack (of all degrees of intensity) (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: 49). These three forms of rejection of the outgroup have been witnessed in SA, as foreign nationals are experiencing verbal rejections and discrimination, as it has been demonstrated empirically that foreign nationals in SA, especially refugees and asylum seekers, have difficulties in accessing houses, banking services, health care etc. (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Landau 2006; Landeau 2007). Lastly, physical attacks constitute that which make xenophobic violence in SA unique as compared to other countries, the reason being that in SA, xenophobia has always involved killings, the looting of properties and foreign-owned businesses, and the burning and stabbing of foreign nationals (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015; Misago 2016b).

Allport posits that most attacks usually take place in the lower economic class, such as in townships and informal settlements. Most perpetrators of the violence are young males aged from 18 to 30 years old, who are motivated by unemployment, poverty, insecurity, and fear which frustrates them, and which are also some of the leading factors to the hostility (Allport 1954: 60). This has been observed in SA as different studies reported that the majority of perpetrators of xenophobic violence are youths living in townships and informal settlements, who are affected by poverty, unemployment and lack of adequate service delivery (Ukwandu 2017; Okoye 2018).

### 3.17.2 Prejudice and Stereotypes

Although there is a difference between the two concepts, they are connected, which means that prejudice is always followed by stereotypes and discrimination (Cohrs and Duckitt 2011: Ibid). A stereotype is defined by Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 191) as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category”. Its function is to justify (rationalise) our conduct in relation with that category. The belief is often about the characteristics of typical members of a group (Cohrs and Duckitt 2011). This means that a stereotype is more of a negative attitude exhibited by the ingroup towards an outgroup or a disadvantaged minority group. The notion of a stereotype originated more than a generation ago in the work of Lippman who describes a stereotype as just “pictures in our heads” (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015). Dovidio *et al.* (2010: Ibid) define stereotypes as “an associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group”.

This definition links directly with the reality of migrants' lives in SA, as the local people have painted a different portrait of them, and this has resulted in that which is known as the cause of xenophobia which has been explained in the section above. However, the negative picture that the local people have painted of migrants is based on the fact that the latter's life seems to be successful as compared to those of the locals, which has created some form of jealousy towards them (Sigsworth, Ngwane and Pino 2008: 35). Glick (2002) argues that successful minorities are stereotyped as competent but are more likely to be scapegoated by cold competitors. Only envious minorities are seen to have both the capacity (competence) and the motive/intent (coldness) to intentionally trigger widespread misfortunes (Dovidio *et al.* 2010: Ibid).

Furthermore, the attitude of the ingroup towards the outgroup, which is referred to as “stereotypical beliefs” by Cohrs and Duckitt (2011), has two main evaluative dimensions known as warmth and competence. The warmth dimension includes features such as morality, integrity, and kindness, while the competence dimension includes traits such as efficacy, confidence, and intelligence. Prejudice can thus be expressed in the view that a group and its members are either cold or hostile, competent, and weak, or negative on both dimensions. Both dimensions of stereotypical beliefs are witnessed in SA, which are also known to be triggering xenophobia in the country.

While it is known that stereotypes are linked to discrimination, they only promote discrimination by manipulating attitudes, interpretations, and judgement, and they also arise from and are reinforced by discrimination, justifying differences between groups (Dovidio *et al.* 2010: Ibid).

Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 192) posit that “stereotype acts both as a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in perception and in thinking”. A stereotype therefore reflects a collection of perceived attributes that constitute the nature of a nature of an attitude. Systematically, stereotypes affect how people perceive, interpret, and process information and respond to group members. It is transmitted through socialisation, the media, language, and discourse (Dovidio *et al.* 2010).

Although different studies conducted to show the attitude of South Africans towards migrants have revealed that the local South Africans are the least open to migrants and that migrants are accused of different social ills in the country (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 24), there are also local people who exhibit positive attitudes towards migrants and those acknowledging the work qualities of the latter. Dovidio *et al.* (2010) posit that stereotypes not only represent the beliefs about characteristics that define typical group members but also include details about other attributes, such as social roles and the degree to which group members share specific qualities, which affects emotional reactions to group members.

### **3.18 Conclusion**

This chapter provided existing literature on the concept of xenophobia and explored xenophobia in the South African context. Although xenophobia is an international phenomenon which is also witnessed in developed countries, in SA, xenophobia is unique and complex, as it is characterised by extreme violence, physical harassment, and the destruction of properties and businesses belonging to migrants. Moreover, due to the fact that scholars have reported that South Africans hold a strong negative attitude towards migrants, this has led scholars to label South Africans as being xenophobes and intolerant towards migrants. While the causes of xenophobia are always linked to socio-economic challenges, in the South African context, the causes are extended and traced back to apartheid which excluded migrants from immigrating to SA, and coupled with this, scholars have also identified the culture of violence in townships as one of the causes of xenophobia, which makes the manifestation and extent of xenophobia in SA unique.

Although the causes of xenophobia are known to the government, the latter's responses are always criticised by scholars and civil societies for being ineffective and late as the violence is still prevalent in the country. However, scholars have also criticised the law for being ineffective as well, the reason being that there is no direct law addressing the fight of xenophobia, and coupled with this is the fact that since the 2008 mass xenophobic attacks,

no arrest or trial has been made against the perpetrators of the violence. This chapter also compared xenophobia in SA with that in Kenya and Uganda. Thus, it showed that although there are similarities in those countries, there are also differences, as in SA, migrants are not confined to refugee camps as in Kenya and Uganda, and Ugandan' attitudes towards migrants are better as compared to those from SA and Kenya.

## **Chapter 4: Relevant Theories**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore different theories related to xenophobia and peace studies to fight the scourge of xenophobia. Due to the complexity of xenophobia, this study has chosen conflict transformation as a peace theory. Little attention has been paid to the field concerning xenophobia and conflict transformation in South Africa, which the researcher believes is due to the fact that xenophobia and its manifestation are still a new challenge to the South African provincial and national governments.

In this chapter, three categories of theories will be reviewed to better understand xenophobia. The first category to be reviewed is the category of theory related to xenophobia – this is an important part of the chapter as it deals with the attitudes and perceptions of South Africans towards foreign nationals. The foundation of this chapter will mainly be based on prejudice, considering as a seminal author the work of Allport. The first section of this chapter will explore empirical reasons as to why foreign nationals are being targeted in SA. The second section will focus on theories related to peace. In that section, a peaceful approach to prevent and combat xenophobia in SA will be explored.

### **4.2 Theories of Xenophobia associated with Prejudice**

Different theories related to xenophobia are rooted in prejudice. Academic scholars in the field have referred to them as hypotheses (Harris 2002: 169-184), but in this research study, the researcher has referred to them as theories as they provide the best explanation for the causes of xenophobic violence that migrants are experiencing in SA and the reasons attached to the attacks. More importantly, these theories are linked to prejudice.

#### **4.2.1 The Scapegoating Theory**

This theory, which largely emerged from sociological theory, locates xenophobia within the context of social transition and change (Maina *et al.* 2011: Ibid). Thus, Allport views scapegoating as one of the most important theories of prejudice, and it is referred to by Glick (2002) as an extreme type of prejudice within which an outgroup is unfairly blamed for intentionally causing an ingroup misfortune (see in Psychology 2020b). “The theory also refers to the tendency to blame someone else for one’s own group problems, a process that often results in feelings of prejudice towards the person or a group that one is blaming” (Psychology 2020b). Thus, under the scapegoating theory, migrants from the Sub-Saharan regions are to



blame for the current crisis, the increase in criminality, and challenges in accessing houses and poor health care that the country is facing. This means that migrants are the reason behind all the wrong happenings in South Africa since 1994.

According to Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 285), the term *scapegoating* implies that “the dominant group has stereotypical ideas about the out-group”, and moreover, the term has a psychological flavour as it has been used to analyse group prejudice (Graham and Bohmke 2013: 21-44). The scapegoating theory provides the reason as to why certain African migrants are victims of xenophobic attacks, while others are not. It is important to mention that in most cases the attacks are linked to the stereotypes that are attached to them (foreign nationals) by South Africans. More importantly is the fact that the scapegoated groups are the minority group or those perceived to be outsiders bearing differing forms of stereotypes attached to them. It was in this vein that Glick (2002) posited that the scapegoated group tends to be powerless, the reason being that if they are powerful, they will be able to stand against the opposition or stereotypes brought from the masses (Psychology 2020).

Furthermore, the scapegoated group tends to be a group that is somehow recognisable as distinct from the ingroup, such that group members can easily be identified in the undesired situation. Coupled with this, the scapegoated group pose a real threat to the ingroup intentionally or unintentionally (Psychology 2020). This explains the reason why under the scapegoating theory those perceived as outsiders or others usually face attacks and hostilities orchestrated by the frustrations suffered by the ingroups (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: Ibid). It is in the same vein that Tshitereke (1999: 3-5) argues that hostility towards migrants in post-apartheid SA is better explained and analysed in relation to limited resources, such as housing, education, healthcare, and employment, which many local people are accusing migrants of benefitting from, coupled with high expectations during the 1994 transition to democracy (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015; Muchiri 2016).

This means that many South Africans expected very much from the newly elected government (ANC) after the transition period, and amongst their expectations, they wanted land redistribution, which is still a very complex issue at the moment; free houses, which involves the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); and free education. They also expected to have a share of the country's wealth, but as they realised that the government was unable to deliver or fulfil its promises towards them, they created a “frustration-scapegoat”, and the only group to blame for the frustration is the migrants from the African Sub-Saharan region (Harris 2002: 169-184). Dovidio *et al.* (2010: 3-28) explain that “Scapegoating is better understood as a strategy that people use to minimise feelings of guilt

over their responsibility for a specific negative outcome by transferring blame for that outcome to another individual or group”.

Empirical studies have reported that since 1995, migrants living in SA have been stereotyped as criminals, job stealers, or threats to the economy of the country (Harris 2002; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Crush 2008). An earlier example was found in the 1995 speech made by the then Home Affairs Minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and later was followed by different influential members of the government. Thus, scapegoating serves an opportunity to explain failure or misdeeds, while maintaining one’s positive self-image (Psychology 2020). Dovidio *et al.* (2010: 3-28) explain that “in scapegoating, the individual or group seeks to symbolically purge their own feelings of inferiority, guilt and self-hatred by perceiving a target individual or an outgroup as immoral or dangerous, and by expelling, isolating or punishing the scapegoated target”.

While Harris (2002) views xenophobia as due to social and economic factors, Tshitereke (1999: 4) views xenophobia as a psychological theory of aggression and frustration, thereby establishing a causal link between relative deprivation, xenophobia, and collective violence, and further states that “the direct attacks against migrants is due to the fact that South Africans feel frustrated by the lack of housing, job opportunities, healthcare and education, as a result of relative deprivation, violence becomes inevitable” (Cited in Muchiri 2016: 70).

### *Frustration and Aggression*

Also known as the frustration-aggression hypothesis, frustration and prejudice are closely related, which means that the two concepts share a relationship (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: 343). Frustration and aggression originate from the work of Dollard *et al.* (1939 cited in Breuer and Elson 2017: 1-12) who state that the presence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, on the contrary, the existence of frustration usually leads to some forms of aggression. Dill and Anderson (1995) took into consideration the definition of frustration and aggression formulated by the fathers of the concepts mentioned above, who defined frustration as the act of preventing others from receiving the desired response; aggression, on the other hand, is defined as an act of any behaviour that is meant to harm the person or group to whom it is directed (Breuer and Elson 2017). Aggression is one of several possible consequences of frustration. Aside from aggression, the characteristics that frustration can affect include the development or increase of prejudice and depression (ibid). Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 350) provide three stages of frustration and aggression leading to hostility, which is depicted in Figure 4.1.



**Figure 4.1:** Three stages of frustration and aggression leading to displacement, adapted from Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015).

This is explained as follows: 1) frustration generates aggression, 2) aggression becomes displaced upon relatively defenceless “goats”, and 3) this displaced hostility is rationalised and justified by blaming, projecting, and stereotyping. However, while Glick (2002) states that aggression against the true source of frustration is inhibited and that aggression is displaced towards others who are weak and unable to retaliate, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 350) state that “frustration does not always lead to aggression and that aggression is not always displaced, but rather is more likely to be directed at the true source of frustration”. The authors further explain that it is not true that the defenceless minority is always chosen for displacement purposes.

Lombard (2015: 15) argues that the South Africans’ frustrations regarding their socio-economic rights, which in most cases is internalised, then becomes externalised and transformed into violence, especially when the entire community share the same frustrations and decide to take action. Scholars shared this view as they argued that the local people have developed a belief that they are entitled to get more than that which they are getting, while migrants are getting more from the country as compared to the citizens. This taps directly into the argument posited by Glick (2002) which states that individual frustrations drive people to blame others for their problems, while shared frustrations predispose people to blame other groups.

The local people are also frustrated by the increase in prices for houses and food, corruption of the law enforcement agents, and criminality which is on the rise in the country, and they blame migrants for not only being the cause of the mentioned social ills (Ukwandu 2017: 43 – 62). This clearly explains the fact that the ingroup always blames the outgroup for the socio-political problems that they are facing. In the same vein, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 188) argue that “the stereotype acts both as a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group”. In the South African context, it is more about the rejection of the outgroups, as they are associated with the socio-economic problems, as it is well known that

since the first democratic election that took place in 1994, migrants are considered to be the reason behind the poor socio-economic problems that the local people are facing.

Moreover, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 230) state that:

The minority group represent a threat in a situation where some members are reluctant to join trade unions, present a willingness to work long hours for low wages under poor conditions of safety and health, there is a tendency to become public charges and pay negligible taxes, there is a tendency to spread disease or to commit crimes.

This view taps directly into the post-apartheid realities, as migrants are accused of stealing jobs that belong to South Africans, and this is due to the fact that they usually accept to work for long hours for low wages under poor conditions. Coupled with that is the fact that service delivery protests shift into attacks against migrants because the latter are accused of draining the country's resources (Mamokhere 2019; Gous 2019).

Based on the fact that migrants are stereotyped as criminals, in 2017, Lieutenant-General Deliwe de Lange from the SAPS Gauteng Provincial Commissioner claimed that 60% of suspects arrested for violent crimes in the province are migrants, which adds to the perception that migrants are criminals. However, that report was found to be biased by Gareth Newham, the Head of Justice and Violence Prevention, who accused Deliwe's report of lacking evidence. Moreover, Deliwe's report was in contradiction to the report provided by the Justice and Correctional Services Minister, Michael Masutha, who reported that in July 2017, there were only 7.5% of foreign nationals in correctional prisons and went further by stating that most crimes across the country are committed by South African nationals (cited in Newham 2017).

#### **4.2.2 The Isolation Theory**

While the scapegoating theory positions migrants at the centre of the economic deprivation, job opportunities, social ills, and frustration, it does not explain the reason as to why migrants are perceived as such, especially black Africans by black South Africans, or explain why nationalities and race have played a role in scapegoating black migrants. The isolation theory views xenophobia as a result of the politics of exclusion from the international community, as well as the atrocities and violence that were taking place in the country during the apartheid era (Maina *et al.* 2011).

As previously noted in chapter 2 under section 2.5, SA restricted immigration of African migrants into the country. It was in the 1990s that the country witnessed a great increase in legal and illegal migration (Neocosmos 2008: 586-594). This means that prior to the 1990s, South Africans did not have much contact with African migrants as they have today, and in

1994, when the apartheid regime officially ended and SA officially opened its borders to African migrants, the local people had to then face that which (Morris 1998; Harris 2002) termed as the '*unknown*' or the outgroup (the migrants), as they entered the country in large numbers.

This encounter creates an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion as the "*unknown*" was accused of increasing crimes and unemployment and limited infrastructural growth and fiscal resources (Neocosmos 2008: 586-594). In the same vein, Morris (1998: 1116-1136) argues that "it is difficult for a group that has a history of unwelcoming people and of exclusion, to turn into a welcoming society". This shows that an isolated group of people always finds it difficult to incorporate people into their communities, and they will always perceive the latter as a threat to their well-being (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015). Furthermore, Allport argues that:

Victimization can scarcely leave an individual with a merely normal amount of prejudice, the then prejudiced person will have two paths to join: he will either join the pecking order and treat others the way he has been treated or he will consciously avoid this temptation (Allport 1954: 150).

In the South African context, it is sad to notice that many local people, especially those living in townships and informal settlements, have chosen to treat migrants in the same way that they were treated during apartheid. This transition of attitude had been explained in a study conducted by Plummer and Cossins (2018: 286-304) which reported that there are conditions that can make a victim an offender, which are: age of onset of the sexual abuse, duration and frequency of the abuse, gender of the abuser, the relationship between victim and abuser, grooming behaviours, the types and severity of abuse. Thus, in the South African context these elements apply. For instance, during the apartheid period, youth were the most targeted and were victims of the abuse; abuse could last for decades and the most targeted were young South African men, although women were also abused. Men were majority on the frontline fighting the apartheid regime. In most cases the abusers during apartheid were white men working as law enforcers. However, Plumber and Cossins (2018) posited that one cannot conclude that the transition from victim to offender is influenced by gender, it is rather related to the degree of psychological trauma experienced. Thus, scholars have concluded that xenophobic violence in SA has a degree of pathology (Muchiri 2016: 69). The abuse that the local people experienced during apartheid varied from physical harassment, arbitrary detention, beating, killings, torturing. These elements have arguably transformed South Africans who were victims during apartheid into offenders to migrants.

Furthermore, the exclusion of black South Africans during the apartheid era created a state of hostility towards migrants. The direct hostility towards migrants is a consequence of the international isolation that restricted the immigration of African foreign nationals into SA

(Muchiri 2016: 72). It is also a consequence of internal isolation which restricted South Africans in accessing certain neighbourhoods and cities without a valid permit, which was known as the “*dompas*” which is an Afrikaans word that mean “stupid or dumb pass” (Adjai and Lazaridis 2014: 237-255). These views are also shared by Handmaker and Parsley (2001) as they argue that “xenophobic manifestation that is being witnessed in SA is a legacy of the country’s futile, isolationist policy designed to intimidate and control foreigners”.

Moreover, the country’s past exclusion from the international community has resulted in the inability to tolerate and accommodate differences. Similarly, Morris (1998: 1116-1136) postulates that the immigration restriction between South African citizens and other African countries disabled South Africans from tolerating differences, and the fact that migrants are different and unknown has given birth to xenophobia in the country (Muchiri 2016).

In trying to explain the isolation theory, Handmaker and Parsley (2001) refer to the work of Hobshawn in which he explained xenophobia as a change and rapid social transition that creates a sense of fear of the migrants amongst the people. Thus, the local people resorted to excessive violence against migrants as a defensive mechanism (Ibid).

#### **4.2.3 The Bio-Cultural Theory**

Academic scholars have explained that xenophobia is not applied to all migrants equally, and some African migrants are exempted during the attacks while others such as the Congolese, Malawians, Zimbabweans, Nigerians, and Mozambicans are vulnerable to the attacks. Scholars have posited that xenophobia rests on visible differences or “*otherness*” (Hatch 2018: 248-259). This means that during the attacks, the perpetrators target their victims through their physical appearances, biological factors, and cultural differences. In this vein, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew state that “visibility plays a crucial role especially when members of a group are thought to have a distinctive sensory characteristic, that change their thoughts about the other group” (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: 136).

Based on visibility that certain migrants exhibit, it was reported that although many of them had been killed during the 2008 attacks, at least 21 South Africans were also killed by their own (Maina *et al.* 2011: 4). This was due to the fact that they were perceived to be too dark to be South Africans (Harris 2001: 5), which simply means that visibility can sometimes be erroneous. In support of this theory, Morris postulates that Nigerians and the Congolese are easily identifiable as the “other”, and this is because of their physical features, their bearing, their clothing style, and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages – they are, in general, clearly distinct and can easily be located and scapegoated (Morris 1998: 11125).

The bio-cultural theory always plays a crucial role, because it points out who is not a South African by the looks, inability to speak South African languages, and cultures; it also indicates the particular group of foreign nationals that are more disliked by South Africans and initiates violent hostility towards them (Harris 2002). This theory is seen as insufficient by Harris, because it does not explain why the attacks are made directly towards African migrants and not the Europeans and Chinese (Harris 2002: 168-184).

While developing these three theories, Harris concluded by acknowledging that these theories do not explain the “whys” of xenophobia, and for this reason, he suggests a development of a new theory which will help in understanding why xenophobic manifestation is only targeted towards black foreign nationals, especially those from Africa. This theory will locate xenophobia within SA’s transition from a past of racism to a future of nationalism (Harris 2002).

#### **4.2.4 Theory of ‘Othering’**

This theory is useful as it helps to describe the formation of identity (Jensen Qvotrup 2011: 63-78). Jensen Qvotrup (2011) provides a definition of “othering” which is relevant to this research (as well as Lister 2004, cited in Jensen Qvotrup 2011: 63-78), who defines othering as a “process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between the more and the less powerful through which social distance is established and maintained”. From that definition, one can see that the othering theory established a difference between the “self” and the “other” who are regarded as mildly or radically different (Rigging 1997 cited in Nevo and Sidi 2012: 200). Moreover, while the term ‘other’ points to anything or anybody, Nivo and Sidi (2012: 299) referred to otherness as a way of establishing the moral code of inferiority of differences. It is a critical discursive tool of discrimination and exclusion used against people based on their belonging to a marginalized group.

A detailed definition of othering was given by Crang (1998) who describes othering as “a process...through which identities are set up in an unequal relationship” (Cited in Brons 2015: 90). In addition, Nevo and Sidi (2012) have provided three dimensions of the relationships between self and other that tap directly into the South African context, which are as follows:

- Value judgement: The value is perceived as good or bad. This dimension points directly to scapegoating as explained in section 4.2.1 above, which painted migrants as the ‘bad people’ in the country because they are the source of their misfortunes, and they a threat to development, social security, and national stability (Eyo and Eta 2020: 43).
- Social distance: The other is perceived as distant psychologically and physically.

- Knowledge: The history and the culture of the other is relatively unknown. This is demonstrated in the fact that during apartheid, South Africans did not have knowledge of other Africans nor their history as they were isolated from other countries by the apartheid government.

The above-mentioned dimensions can provide reasons for the local people distancing themselves from migrants, making it difficult for migrants to integrate in the country. There is a line drawn between both groups, and that line rests in the fact that black South Africans perceive African migrants as a threat in the country. For this reason, they must leave the country as their presence is making the local people uncomfortable.

Another definition is given by Schwalbe (2000 cited in Jensen Qvotrup 2011) who defines “othering” as a process whereby a dominant group defines another group as inferior. While this definition may seem superficial, Brons (2015:60) argued that “othering is the simultaneous construction of the self, in-group, and the other, the out-group, through identification of some desirable characteristic that the self/ in-group has and the other/ out-group lacks and/ or some undesirable characteristic that the other/ out – group has and the self/ in – group lacks”.

Based on the definitions of othering provided above, this theory is attached to the politics of nationalism and belonging, which means that there is a principle of “Us *versus* Them” or “Insiders *versus* Outsiders”. It was in the same vein that Dodson stated that the narrow identity politics is one of the core elements of xenophobia, as African migrants find themselves positioned as the new “Other” against which the “Us” of the new SA are created, and for this reason, their exclusion is therefore justified as necessary for the good of the nation (Dodson 2010 see in Graham and Bohmke 2013: 21-41).

This theory is also observed in Europe, for instance, Edwards Said’s work referred to the Orient as the *other* in an imagined geography, where the orient is viewed as ‘*alien*’ and Europe as superior. Furthermore, the othering theory can be viewed as a process of marginalisation of the majority to the minorities (Ott and Mack 2010: 145). This can be observed in SA where migrants have not only been perceived as alien according to the Alien Control Act of 1995, but who are also minorities and are considered to be outsiders and inferior to South Africans. Thus, scholars have argued that most South Africans have affiliated themselves to Europeans and considered their fellow Africans as being purely ‘Africans’ (Misago 2016; Misago *et al.* 2015; Harris 2000).

Taking the two above-mentioned definitions and the four theories mentioned above, it is clear that migrants are perceived as inferior, powerless, and defenceless. Since the latter are not



welcome in the country, their presence is viewed as polluting and contaminating the country, as they are being accused of criminal activities and other types of security issues, but it has been empirically demonstrated that only a few portions of foreigners take part in those activities (Burns R., Kamali and Rydgren: 6). While these theories provide a clear explanation of the reasons for the attacks in SA, they do not however provide a peace theory that would be helpful in curbing the prejudice of xenophobia in the country. For this reason, the next section will explore different peace theories and will help the researcher in identifying which theory might be useful in curbing prejudice caused by xenophobia.

#### **4.2.5 Rational for using prejudice theory**

As stated above, xenophobia cannot be explored without an analysis of prejudice, the reason being, both concepts are interrelated and play a significant role in xenophobic violence taking place in SA. While the above-mentioned theories might be regarded as overwhelming the research, they are in fact demonstrating that xenophobic or being a xenophobic is a state of mind that needs to be understood before dealing with it. Thus, the theories above which are called theories of prejudice provides not only the causal factors that lead a person to be xenophobic, but also the way to deal or prevent that attitude to be externalized. That means that the theories above which experts in the field have identified as hypothesis, shows that xenophobia in the South African context is emotional, behavioural, and attitudinal, thus preventing it from occurring required one to understand all these factors and their *modus operandi* before moving to the next stage of promoting peace. Hence, the theories above are relevant in this research because they lay a strong foundation in promoting peace and preventing xenophobic violence in SA.

### **4.3 Contact Theory**

#### **4.3.1 Historical Background**

This theory came to light in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century by scholars involved in understanding how conflict and prejudice could be reduced (Hopper 2019). Studies conducted in the 1940s and 1950s, for instance, demonstrated that contact with members of other communities was linked to lower degrees of prejudice. The theory was further studied by Gordon Allport in 1954 and reprinted in Allport *et al.* 2015 in his book entitled "*The nature of prejudice*". After he reviewed previous research on intergroup contact and prejudice, he found that contact reduced prejudice in some instances, but it was not a panacea – there were often situations when intergroup contact worsened prejudice and conflict. The effort to understand if contact between

groups would facilitate intergroup relations was triggered after World War II (WWII) by the human relation movement (Psychology 2020a).

#### **4.3.2 Understanding the Contact Theory**

Also referred to as the contact hypothesis, this theory is known as one strategy that is applied when the researchers aimed to reduce prejudice. Although the theory is old, it is now being acknowledged as one of the essential psychological strategies to promote social change (McKeown and Dixon 2017: 1-13). Thus, Allport (1954) states that prejudice can be minimised by equal interaction between the majority and minority groups in pursuit of common objectives (See in Wagner and Hewstone 2012: 1-16). Although contact and prejudice are linked, it is important to mention that there is a highly significant negative relationship between contact and prejudice, and it was in this vein that a study by Pettigrew (1998: 65-85 ) indicated that contact is an effective instrument to minimise prejudice (See in Hewstone *et al.* 2014: 39-53). This means that contact can have beneficial effects on the attitudes between groups, especially under favorable conditions (McKeown and Dixon 2017). Moreover, an experimental study by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) with different racial groups revealed that contact situations play an important role in reducing greater prejudice (Hewstone *et al.* 2014). This means that contact strengthens intergroup behaviours by improving interpersonal relations with the outgroup members. However, the contact situation needs to take place in a way to empower the participants with an opportunity to become friends (Pettigrew 1998).

According to Allport (1954), the contact theory would be more likely to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations if the following four optimal conditions are met, namely:

- first, there should be equal status among the individuals in the contact situation
- second, the situation in which ingroup contact occurs should require cooperation between groups
- third, groups should work towards common goals
- and finally, contact should be legitimised through institutional support (Hewstone *et al.* (2014: 19-53).

All these conditions fall under that which is termed as direct contact, which is favourably correlated with attitude as extended contact. Furthermore, in the post-conflict societies, there are three mediators that were identified to be relevant in promoting social change through direct contact, namely: intergroup anxiety, empathy, and group-oriented perceived threats (ibid).

(a) *Intergroup Anxiety*

Intergroup anxiety refers to the feelings of discomfort and nervousness that take place in intergroup meetings. It has been argued empirically that intergroup anxiety is normally felt in anticipation of the future, or in direct interaction with an outgroup member (Hewstone *et al.* 2014). Empirical evidence has revealed intergroup anxiety as the key mediator of the effects of contact on attitude (*ibid*). An experimental study on intergroup anxiety conducted in SA between different racial groups provides a critical test for the value of intergroup contact in the post-conflict society as it revealed to be effective in reducing prejudice through generic contact and building strong friendships between groups (*ibid*).

(b) *Empathy*

Empathy refers to a capacity for expressing and recognising the emotions of another person. It is a vicarious emotional state, triggered by witnessing other people's emotions and circumstances (*ibid*). Empathy has the advantage of making group membership salient by reminding people of the experiences that a person has as a member of an outgroup (*ibid*). In his study that focused on empathy, Batson *et al.* (1997) explain how positive connections to specific outgroup members can serve to change and improve attitudes towards stigmatised communities in general. By taking the perspective of stigmatised persons and imagining how they are affected by their stigmatised status, people would be more likely to understand and feel concern for the stigmatised person (See in Tropp and Pettigrew 2004: 246-269).

(c) *Group-Oriented Perceived Threats*

Intergroup relations are characterised not only by participant-level concerns, such as feeling insecure or uncomfortable in ingroup relationships, but also by beliefs that the outgroup presents a threat to the ingroup (*ibid*). This is demonstrated in the South African context as migrants are perceived to be a threat to the wellbeing of the country and to the socio-economic opportunities, which are now regarded as a major cause of xenophobia. Unlike intergroup anxiety which is thought to be individually oriented due to the fact that it is expressed by an individual who experiences anxiety during intergroup interactions, a group-oriented threat takes place at the group level, which means that it is the group that has developed a belief that it may lose power or may have to change its belief system (Hewstone *et al.* *ibid*). This is witnessed in the South African context as different empirical studies and civil societies have reported that the locals are of the view that migrants are taking control of their country. Prejudice through contact requires an active goal-oriented effort, Hewstone *et al.* (2014: 19-53) provided an extension of direct contact which they termed "extended contact".

### 4.3.3 Extended Contact

Extended contact is a type of indirect contact which refers to the knowledge that an individual has of an ingroup member's direct contact with outgroup members. It has one major limitation; it can only be seen as a tool to reduce prejudice when the group members have the opportunity for a direct or face-to-face contact in the first place. However, in the case of groups that do not live in the same community or share the same institutions, such as the workplace, church, or school as a member of the outgroup, they are unlikely to come into contact with them nor befriend them, and it becomes difficult to promote social change (See in Hewstone *et al.* 2014: Ibid). Unlike direct contact, Wright (1997) argues that strategies involving extended friendship and contact are more effective and swifter to execute than direct friendship. Thus, Pettigrew (1998: 65-85) indicates that the strong relations created by cross-group friendships contribute to a greater sense of affection and solidarity with outgroup members; in turn, these changes give rise to more positive feelings towards the outgroup as a whole. Moreover, Wright (1997 cited in (See in Hewstone *et al.* 2014: Ibid) demonstrated, based on his study's experiment, that:

When controlling for direct contact, the respondents belonging to either majority or minority groups who knew at least one ingroup member with a cross-group friend reported weaker outgroup prejudice than did respondents without indirect friends; furthermore, the greater the number of members of the ingroup who were known to have friends in the outgroup, the weaker the prejudice.

### 4.3.4 Reducing Prejudice through Contact Intervention

The purpose of contact interventions is to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations (ibid). Early studies on intergroup contact mainly centred on cognitive (e.g., stereotyping and beliefs) and cognitive/emotional (feelings and emotions) aspects of prejudice, generally finding greater effects of contact on affective than cognitive components (ibid). Moreover, Wagner and Hewstone (2012: Ibid) posit that knowledge of a relationship between a member of an ingroup member towards an outgroup can lead to a more positive attitude which will play a role in reducing prejudice. However, Allport (1954) suggests that positive effects of contact take place only in situations marked by four key conditions which are: equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, laws, or customs. These conditions play an important role in part due to the fact that they provide the setting that encourages intergroup friendship (Pettigrew 1998: 65-85).

- i. Equal status: Allport (1954) underscores equal group status within the situation. This claim is being supported by more literature, although equal status is challenging to describe and has been used in different forms (See in Pettigrew

1998: Ibid). Allport believed that contact in which members of one group are treated as subordinate will not reduce prejudice and could actually worsen the situation (Psychology 2020a). This means that there is an importance for both groups to be equally involved in the relationship, and both groups should have similar backgrounds, qualities, and characteristics.

- ii. Common goals: Prejudice reduction through contact requires active, goal-oriented efforts (Pettigrew 1998: Ibid).
- iii. Intergroup cooperation: Reaching common goals must be an inter-dependent effort without intergroup competition.
- iv. Support of authorities, laws, or customs: The final condition concerns the contact's auspices. With explicit social sanctions, intergroup contact is more readily accepted and has more positive effects. Authority support establishes norms of acceptance (ibid). This means that group interventions are effective if the institutional support, such as group leaders or other authority figures, support the contact between groups (Psychology 2020a). This is supported by Wagner and Hewstone (2012: Ibid) who also acknowledged the importance of sanctioning the negative attitude by positing that the effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional support.

While these conditions are partly important due to the fact that they provide the setting that encourages friendship, it was in this vein that Pettigrew (1998) identified the fifth condition which he associated with Allport's (1954) condition for reducing prejudice which he named 'friendship' and posited that the contact situation must provide the participants with the opportunity to become friends. Such opportunities imply close interactions that would make self-disclosure and other friendship-developing mechanisms possible. It also implies the potential for extensive and repeated contact in a variety of social contexts.

According to McKeown and Dixon (2017), positive contact between groups improves intergroup relations, which means that positive contact creates social harmony and social equality, which was stressed by Allport (1954). Both of these terms are influenced by interventions to promote the reduction of prejudice, which is the most important matter. However, if there are few positive contact experiences between groups, it becomes crucial that when those contacts do occur, that they have the broadest possible effect on group-based prejudice (Hewstone *et al.* 2014: Ibid). Moreover, Wright *et al.* (1999 cited in Pettigrew 1998) suggest that a greater sense of intimacy and closeness to a single outgroup member can promote reductions in intergroup prejudice. Although intergroup contact leads to positive changes, the change takes place when the intergroup contact takes place under optimal

conditions (Tropp and Pettigrew 2004: 246-269). There are processes leading to positive change and the reason for the change to take place and mediate attitude change. These include, learning about the outgroup, changing behaviour, generating effective ties, and ingroup reappraisal (Pettigrew 1998: Ibid).

#### **4.3.5 Prejudice Reduction and Collective Action Models**

Scholars have developed two models of social change that deal with tension between groups, namely, a prejudice reduction model and a collective action model. Historically, these two models of change have been observed by researchers as promoting parallel, although largely complementary, strategies to transform intergroup discrimination and inequality. However, Wright *et al.* (2012) concluded that they may sometimes set in motion social psychological processes that operate in opposing directions.

##### *(a) Prejudice Reduction Model*

This model largely focuses on bringing members of socially disadvantaged groups to develop more positive and constructive attitudes towards others. This model promotes majority group bigots to look more like others, based on the assumption that this process gradually reduces broader forms of discrimination (McKeown and Dixon 2017: Ibid). This model advises measures that aim to minimise the salience of group divisions, disagreements, and personalities, thus promoting social cohesion (ibid).

##### *(b) Collective Action Model*

This model is primarily based on the mobilisation of the disadvantaged to challenge the status quo (See in McKeown and Dixon 2017: Ibid). It allows subordinate group members to consider intergroup disparities, experience a sense of injustice, and become angry enough to take part in collective action. Their involvement in such group foster harmony among group members which will result in collective collaboration, hence, the synergies to question the status quo (ibid).

The above-mentioned demonstrates contractions between these two models which have led some scholars to conclude that prejudice-reduction interventions can have a “sedative impact” on the collective resistance of historically disadvantaged groups to social injustice, up to the point of encouraging them to acknowledge their own exploitation. This argument has been demonstrated especially powerfully by recent studies of intergroup contact (ibid).

#### **4.3.6 Rational for using group contact theory**

The previous section laid a foundation for preventing xenophobic violence in SA by providing the theory of prejudice. Group contact theory complements this study based on its capacity to bring both local people and migrants together and overcome prejudices. The history of SA indicates that local people did not have access to their African counterparts and had no contact with them, which gave birth to stereotypes as described in the previous section. Contact theory proposes the way to break the negative stereotypes that the local people exhibit towards migrants. This is very relevant in this research because, after understanding and linking xenophobia to prejudice by exploring different factors that have contributed to the violence in SA, both parties need to come into direct contact to break the barriers that exist between them. Thus, one of the most important theory to prevent prejudice and combat prejudice is putting both parties together. As noted above, contact theory originated from Allport (1954) theory on prejudice and provided the means to reduce prejudice.

### **4.4 Peace Theory**

This section is important in the research, as it will help the researcher to identify the relevant peace theory that will help in building peace between South Africans and foreign nationals. In this section, the researcher has chosen to explore conflict transformation as a theoretical framework that will help build sustainable peace between South Africans and migrants. Transformation will be analysed first, before proceeding to conflict transformation and xenophobia. It is important to mention at this stage that there is not much research on xenophobia and conflict transformation.


#### **4.4.1 Understanding Transformation**

One of the most desirable purposes for the government is to resolve and transform a conflict affecting the country or a community, with the reason being that by transforming and resolving a conflict or violence, the government saves lives, prevents an internal turmoil or disorganisation of the country, and restores stability diplomatically (Vayrynen 1991: 4). The understanding of transformation with regards to peace literature is broad and complex, thus scholars have shared different views of the origins and meaning of transformation. For example, in terms of the origins, Curle (1990) is known to be the first person to use the term *transformation* (See in Ryan 2009: 303-314). It was then developed by other academic scholars, namely Bush and Folger in 1994, Galtung in 1996, Lederach (1995), Rupesinghe (1995), and Vayrynen (1991) (Sandole *et al.* 2008: 303).

Moreover, transformation came into existence as a result of the ineffectiveness of resolution, thus scholars criticised the use of resolution for standing for “what would have been termed managed outcomes and strategies” (Mitchell 2002: 1-13). Thus, this would have clearly fallen into a category characterised by David Bloomfield as a “settlement” approach. Secondly, transformation can also be found in terms of small conflicts involving individuals and groups as parties (Mitchell 2002). Unlike resolution, transformation’s purpose is directed to deep and profound changes in a conflict situation that goes beyond the traditional approach (Ryan 2009: 304). Johan Galtung (1996b) used the term *transcendence* which means going beyond the goals of the parties and creating a new reality, such as the European Community (EU), in order for the parties to live and develop together (Galtung 1996b: 96). While Galtung focuses more on going beyond the goals of parties to the conflict, Lederach emphasises getting at the “epicentre” of the conflict (Lederach 2003: 31), and Francis (2002: 40) suggests the transformation approach to recognise and address the limitations of existing resolution approaches, while the Berghof institute focussed their work on suggesting that it is important to address the root causes of a conflict to transform it.

According to Lederach and Maise (2003), transformation goes beyond the issue at hand and explores the places and areas where conflict takes place, and moreover, in transformation, there is a need to view the presenting issues as a window onto a web of interactions at a number of levels. Galtung (1996) directs his focus on expanding conflict from immediate issues underlying problems. Taking Galtung (1996) and Lederach’s (2003) work into consideration, it is clear that transformation can take place at a different level, and it will depend on the researcher to design a suitable approach that he/she would like to use in transforming a particular conflict. The pyramid below demonstrates that different forms of conflict can be approached through conflict transformation to build sustainable peace in the society and that each type of violence had to be approach in a different way in order to transform it to peace.





**Figure 5:** Pyramid of Violence and Pyramid of Peace adapted from the Mosaic project.

The figure above illustrates that each type of violence has its peaceful aim to be accomplished by peacebuilders. From example, when we look at the top of the pyramid of violence we see “war”, while on the top of pyramid of peace there is peace, illustrating that the objective of a peacebuilder in a situation of war is to bring peace. Moreover, a look at the bottom of both pyramid show segregation as violence and connection as peace (The Mosaic Project 2020). In addition, most academic scholars have acknowledged the importance of working at the grassroots level, and they refer to this as building local capacity (Ryan 2009: 305). Thus, Ryan (2009) is of the view that working at the grassroots level dwells on the fact that a forced transformation seems to be an oxymoron and that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to all conflicts. Transformation takes time, but if it is implemented successfully, it will change conflicts or violence in many areas of life such as the political, economic, and social spheres and will cause people to have a fundamental change of perception of individuals or groups with which they come into contact (Ryan 2009).

#### **4.4.2 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: The Difference**

The field of peace studies in the current century is dominated by two main topics of research, namely, conflict transformation and conflict resolution (Bergh 2007: 20). The world is not at peace with itself, which means that different countries are facing different forms of conflict which might be terrorism, as is the case in the USA, Europe, and the Middle East; armed conflict and political instability, as is the case in most African countries; or internal turmoil. To choose a suitable theory, it is important to keep the purpose of peacebuilding in mind.

According to Lederach (1997), the purpose of peacebuilding is to achieve sustainable peace in societies that have recently experienced violent conflict. In the same vein, (Schrach: 2) posits that peacebuilding is mostly used as an “umbrella term” or “meta-term” to envelop other terms such as conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict prevention, and conflict transformation. However, there is conflict among academic scholars on whether conflict transformation is the same as conflict resolution, with the reason being that the term *conflict transformation* was not commonly used among scholars and peace theorists since the term is newly conceptualized in the broader field of peace and conflict studies (Botes 2003: 2).

Schrach refers to conflict resolution as a way of managing and resolving a conflict, while conflict transformation is transforming the conflict (Schrach: 2). On the other hand, Mitchell (2002) is against the term *conflict resolution* as he considers it to be corrupted and it is used indiscriminately to stand for that which previously was referred to as “managed” outcomes and strategies, and this is why there is a need for transformation (Mitchell 2002: 2). He further postulates that resolution implies finding a solution to some problems while transformation implies bringing some major change in some aspects of the conflict or the socio-political system in which it is embedded or another factor.

While academic scholars have regarded transformation to be too value-laden, too idealistic, or too new-age, Lederach has found it to be “the accurate, scientifically sound and clear in vision” (Lederach 2015: 1). He further posits that conflict transformation is beyond the resolution of a particular problem and aims to address the nature of the relationships of individuals or parties in conflict (Lederach 2003). While there is a form of opposition regarding the two concepts, it is important to note that conflict resolution and conflict transformation are interchangeably used in common languages and in academic literature (Botes 2003: 1-27).

For the purpose of this research, the researcher will refer to conflict resolution as a way of temporarily resolving a conflict and that which erupts at any moment when there is a disagreement, and to conflict transformation as a way of transforming a conflict and people’s minds on a particular conflict affecting a country, community, or society in order to create a peaceful environment for all that will last for decades.

#### **4.4.3 Concept of Conflict Transformation**

Scholars have explained conflict transformation by starting with conflict settlement, then conflict management, conflict resolution, and ending with conflict transformation (see in Botes 2003). While conflict transformation is perceived to be a new theory in the domain of peacebuilding, Lederach, in *Conflict Transformation*, acknowledged to be using the term

*transformation of conflict* since the 1980s (Lederach 2015: 1). This theory has borrowed ideas from conflict management and conflict resolution in order to address the issue of contemporary conflict to which the researcher can add xenophobia. In this regard, Hugh Miall (2004) referred to conflict transformation as a concept in emergent situations that rests on the same tradition of theorising a conflict. Therefore, conflict transformation should not be regarded as a new concept but rather as a reconceptualization of the field to make it more relevant to contemporary conflict (Miall 2004: 67-89).

The practice of conflict transformation is associated with the work of academic scholars such as Johan Galtung and Jean Paul Lederach. Conflict transformation is known as a process through which a conflict of an ethnic character can be transformed into peaceful outcomes. The purpose of peacebuilding constitutes the foundation of conflict transformation. It has been argued by scholars that the purpose of peacebuilding is to address the underlying causes of violent conflicts and crises by either preventing it, or if the conflict has occurred, then the purpose would be to ensure that the conflict does not recur (Clements 1997: 1-13). Moreover, conflict transformation is a comprehensive approach that attempts to stop the conflict, and to deal with negative effects resulting from the conflict to change the underlying conditions that have led and may again lead to violence (Lucade 2012: Ibid).

Conflict transformation is defined as a "process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary, the constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict, it requires more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes" (Miall 2004: 4). "Conflict transformation is not only referring to armed conflict but can take place at all the spheres of human lives which means it can happen in global conflict, social or inter/intra personal conflict (macro, meso, micro)" (Galtung 2000: 3). Conflict transformation is not only applied to a particular violent situation or in certain areas, but it is applicable at all levels of life whether in a home, community, nationally, or internationally (Clements 1997). Mitchell (2002: 1-23) posits that transformation implies the need for significant improvements in the socio-political and economic structure from which the conflict originated.

John Paul Lederach refers to the conflict transformation theory as the lenses of a set of glasses which he called progressive lenses due to the capacity of seeing matters clearly from different dimensions and distances – conflict transformation helps to pay attention to certain aspects of the conflict that have not been clearly understood (Lederach 2015: 2). The Berghof Institute postulates that conflict transformation is a comprehensive approach that attempts to stop the conflict, to deal with the wound resulting from the conflict, and to change the underlying

conditions that have led and may lead again to violence (Lucade 2012: 22). Furthermore, the foundation describes conflict transformation as a complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behaviours, interests, and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings.

Many schools of peace studies have agreed that the purpose of conflict transformation is to address the root causes of a conflict over a long-term period, however they differ in their view on the way of addressing the purpose of and understanding conflict transformation. For instance, while the Berghof Foundation states that the purpose of conflict transformation is to transform negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict and deal with the structural, behavioural, and attitudinal aspects of the conflict, the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding regards conflict transformation as not only an approach or a tool but rather views it as a mindset that needs to be comprehensive, compassionate, and creative (Lucade 2012: & the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding 2015). In the same vein, Johannes Botes (2003) posits that transformation entails not only addressing the sources or causes of the conflict, but it necessitates a psychic transformation in the attitudes between the conflictual parties (Botes 2003: 1-27).

One cannot talk about conflict transformation when the conflict is still taking place. Thus Clements (1997) argues that conflict transformation takes place when violent conflict ceases or when it is expressed in a non-violent way and when the economic, social, political, military, and cultural sources of the conflict have been changed in one way or another. Furthermore, a conflict is transformed by normal socio-political processes, by the parties acting alone, by expert third party interveners and parties acting together, or by judicious advocacy. Similarly, Botes (2003) states that a conflict is transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play an important role.

In referring to conflict transformation as progressive lenses, Lederach effectively meant a process through which a conflict can be framed, approached, and transformed. This means that a lens is needed to see the immediate situation, and to see past the immediate problems and view the deeper relationship patterns in order to find a solution and to address the problem taking place. Lastly, a lens is needed to help envision a framework that holds these together and creates a platform to address the content, the context, and the structure of the relationship (Lederach 2015: 3).

While talking about the process to build peace through conflict transformation theory, Johan Galtung argued that the transcendence method is needed for conflict transformation for the

parties to the conflict to go beyond their goals in order for them to be able to live together (Galtung 2007: 14). Galtung further states that unlike classical mediation which brings parties together for mediation and compromises, the transcendence approach starts with one party at a time, in deep dialogue, and in a joint creative search for new reality, while the classical approach brings the parties together for negotiation with a facilitator (Galtung 2007: 14).


However, Rupesinghe (1995, 1998) provided a clear and comprehensive approach of conflict transformation. He sees conflict transformation as a “broad approach incorporating conflict resolution training and interventions including diplomatic interventions and peacekeeping”. He therefore proposed that peacebuilding should start at a grassroots level and across the parties at the civil societies level, and that peace alliances should be made with any group able to bring change, such as a business group, the media, and the military (see in Miall 2004).

Scholars have argued that conflict transformation is a continuing process without a clear beginning or end, the reason being that conflict transformation involves restructuring, building, validating, empowering, understanding, training, promoting, participating, and reconciling (see in Mitchell 2002: 9). In contributing to Galtung’s pyramid of peace, Lederach partitioned different groups as follows: leaders and decision-makers must be placed at the top; leaders of social organisations, churches, and top journalists should be in the mid-level; and the grassroots community would be at the base (cited in Miall 2004: 7), as depicted in Figure 4.2.

To have effective conflict transformation, people from all social levels and parties must be involved. This means that people playing an important role in a country or community such as top decision-makers, middle-range opinions, and grassroots constituents need to be taken into consideration in the process of building conflict transformation. Once included, there is a need to investigate the past conflict that has been unresolved or unaddressed and from which people have suffered. Once the past unaddressed conflict has been identified, it is necessary to understand the ongoing conflict, which means that it is important to understand the origins of the conflict to transform it and ensure that it does not erupt in the near future, or that any similar conflict does not erupt. Lastly, the parties to the conflict or the group involved in the conflict needs to implement an effective procedure that will maintain and continue the changes found necessary to resolve the conflict at the table or the one that might erupt in the future (Mitchell 2002: 10).

## TYPES OF ACTORS

## HOW TO ACHIEVE CHANGE



**Figure 4.2:** (Participatory Conflict Assessment 2010).

Conflict transformation can take place at different stages described by scholars, according to (Vayrynen 1991: 4-7). There are four levels for transformation to take place which are issue transformation, actor transformation, rules transformation, and structural transformation. While Vayrynen identified four key areas of transformation, Miall (2004) has identified five types of transformation, namely, context, structure, actor, issue, and personal (cited in Ryan 2009: 303-314). Despite the fact that the theory of conflict transformation is praised by many scholars, it has also been criticised by others for lacking clarity in its implementation and that some changes need to be made (Ryan 2009, and Mitchell 2002). This includes the need to respect indigenous cultures, the need to deal with the past while addressing the present conflict in trying to build a peaceful society, the need to promote positive change without causing strong opposition from those who value the *status quo*, and the need to balance objective and subjective strategies (Sandole *et al.* 2008: 312).

#### 4.4.4 Dialogue and Conflict Transformation

Ropers (2004: 255-269) refers to dialogue as a constructive way of dealing with a conflict. In the words of Ropers, dialogue is “the meaningful and meaning-creating exchange of perception and opinions, is one of the methods people most frequently turn to when addressing conflicting issues” (Ropers 2017: 5). Alone, the term *dialogue* means communication that promotes conversations among people with different social identities or opinions (Diaz and Gilchrist 2010: 1-14). (Ropers 2017) defines dialogue as “conversation between two or more people characterized by openness, honesty and genuine listening”. However, while the above-mentioned scholars have referred to dialogue as a conversation or communication, Feller and Ryan (2012) define dialogue as “a movement that aimed at generating coexistence and does so through encountering the ‘other’ to share experiences, to think together in creative and flexible ways, and to explore assumptions together”.

This definition taps directly into the reality of SA as migrants are referred to by scholars in the field as “the others” or the “unknown”. Thus, dialogue in the case of SA will play an important role in bringing together the local people and migrants to find suitable solutions. The definition provided above clearly shows that primarily, the purpose of dialogue is the confrontation and engagement of the party that is often viewed as “the other”, the enemy or perpetrator, or the one causing people harm. This means that engaging parties to the conflict is the centre of the conversation, however, according to Feller and Ryan (2012: 351-380), dialogue is about the engagement of the parties to the conflict, it is important to mention that the engagement within a dialogue must be collaborative and inclusive with all the parties or representatives in order to hear diverse perspectives and to share an understanding of the issue at hand (Diaz and Gilchrist 2010: 1-14).

Dialogue is not only about engaging the parties to a conflict, it aims at empowering the participants by equipping them with the necessary knowledge to help them in avoiding cycles of cruel violence by “fostering a more understanding of conflict dynamics, conscientization of the deeper contexts and the reframing of the goals” (Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou 2008: 16). Moreover, it helps in broadening participants’ skills in interacting constructively with one another (Ropers 2004). Dialogue is believed to have its origin in antiquity and the Middle Ages, however Ropers (2004: 255-269) states that it is not a new phenomenon in the conflict or violence situation, and he traces it back to the post-1945 period in Europe. At the time of its usage, it targeted mostly young people and its purpose was to expand the contact and interaction between individuals from different backgrounds with the hope that it could help eliminate prejudices and enemy images and create trans-frontier loyalties. Dialogue can take

place at different levels such as the political, grassroots, or leadership levels, but in this study, the researcher will focus on dialogue at the grassroots level.

(a) *Dialogue at the Grassroots Level*

At the grassroots level, dialogue is more applicable to the local communities or neighbourhoods, with the purpose of bringing people facing similar challenges or situations together (Ropers 2004: Ibid). However, it is not only limited to local communities or people, and it can also train members of civil societies for that which may or may not be achieved in formal negotiation (Lothian *et al.* 2015: 9). Whether dialogue is run in a conflictual neighbourhood or community, the main point is the fact that it must allow personal meetings between the groups and break the barriers that prevent them from communicating or mixing to promote peace (Ropers 2004: Ibid).

(b) *The Importance and Process of Dialogue*

According to the UNDP (2009b), “dialogue is not a one-size-fits-all strategy ... it is just one flexible process that policymakers or civil societies use to adapt to different conflict situations, especially when the conflictual parties are not favourable or not able to get a negotiation”. Dialogue is not an exclusive process that results in removing certain parties in the conversation, it is rather inclusive, and it brings various opinions together in order to bring change into society, and in so doing, it helps participants to identify new strategies to address the challenges that they both face (UNDP 2009b). Dialogue requires a face-to-face confrontation in a communicative way within a well-organized group (Ropers 2004: Ibid). Thus, dialogue is not only about communicating or talking to one another nor sitting around the table, the process is rather about changing the way people talk, think, and communicate with one another (UNDP 2009b: 2).

Although in this research the researcher focuses on dialogue at the grassroots level, notably dialogue takes place at several levels, requiring all the participants to engage in order to achieve the objectives. This means that different parties can engage in a dialogue process such as party leadership, executive bureaus, political bureaus, and youth and civil societies, and in so doing, sustainability and patience are required in the dialogue process. Moreover, practitioners are required to be consistent and pervasive when using dialogue as an approach to post-conflict management (Feller and Ryan 2012; Lothian *et al.* 2015). Thus, for dialogue to be effective, it must be regarded as an important element to reconciliation and the conflict resolution process. This means that through dialogue, perpetrators of the violence will be advised and encouraged not to attack or kill the group perceived as ‘the other’ in order to



create a peaceful and harmonious society. Thus, dialogue expresses itself into a coexistence between the parties (Feller and Ryan 2012: Ibid).

Dialogue is not only about forging communication between participants, it also gives an opportunity for the participants to reflect on personal and culturally influenced assumptions, judgements, and thought processes, which is done through a transformation of one's self, others, relationships, and the social system in which the participants live and interact (Diaz and Gilchrist 2010: Ibid). the UNDP (2009b: Ibid ) states that unlike other approaches of promoting peace, the presence of the following are very important in a dialogue, namely, self-reflection, the spirit of inquiry, and personal change. Coupled with this, participants must be able to address the root causes of the crisis at hand and not merely the symptoms. However, achieving peace through dialogue is not a one-day process, for instance, in a situation of protracted conflict, dialogue between the fighting parties has to take place in multiple dialogue events, which sometimes can be extended to months or years if necessary (Ropers 2004: Ibid). Ropers (2004:5) states "that the objective of the protracted conflict can only be achieved within the framework of a long-term process of work and learning".

During a dialogue process, it is important to exhibit the humanity of the participants, which means that the participants must be willing to show empathy towards one another, recognize their differences as well as their common ground, and demonstrate a capacity for change, thus, to accomplish this type of interaction, it is important to prepare a safe and neutral setting that will help the participants to be at ease (UNDP 2009b: 4). Thus, in order to lead the participants to reach a level of exhibiting empathy, different exercises must take place in the dialogue process, such as telling the group or partner something that has happened to one or one's family during the conflict, and the listening partner must be instructed to listen and to remain silent in order to avoid making the person sharing the story feel uncomfortable (Feller and Ryan 2012: Ibid). Diaz and Gilchrist (2010) state that the interaction between participants must take place with a deep respect in order to honour the other person.

Furthermore, in the process, it is also important to work with the participants separately, which means that instead of having both groups in the same room at the same time on the same day, the researcher can work with just one side of the divided community – this process is called "single-identity" work. This strategy is important in the preliminary investigation to encounter the divided community. However, due to the fact that coexistence is at the centre of dialogues, at some point facilitators will have to begin the process of coexistence (Ropers 2004: Ibid). In terms of conflict transformation and dialogue, the former can borrow the latter as a way of understanding the opposing views, and also as a precursor to mediation and

negotiation, and moreover, using the transformation of a conflict through dialogue plays an important part in generating new solutions that meet the interests and needs of the community (Diaz and Gilchrist 2010: Ibid). However, it must be mentioned that using the dialogue approach in conflict transformation will require the use of new approaches and strategies such as mediation (ibid).

(c) *Difference between Dialogue and Debate*

Dialogue is different from other approaches used by practitioners, for instance, the dialogue process alone differs from negotiation in the sense that dialogue is run with the purpose of fostering peace and coexistence, and there are no winners in the dialogue process, whereas in the negotiation process, the parties' purpose is to reach a concrete agreement or settlement. Moreover, dialogue is aimed at uniting communities, sharing perspectives, and discovering new ideas (UNDP 2009b: 3). In addition, while other forms of conversations can be achieved on a short-term basis, dialogue tends to focus more on the symptoms of the conflict instead of the root causes, and dialogue is rather a long-term perspective that addresses the root causes of the conflict in the process. In this research, the researcher sets out the differences between dialogue and debate, as given in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1:** Differences between dialogue and debate.

	<i>Debate</i>	<i>Dialogue</i>
Goal/purpose	Winning the argument is the main aim by supporting one's own view and disputing others' views.	Understanding different perspectives and learning about other views
Participant's approach	Participants listen to others in order to find weaknesses in their arguments.  The experiences of participants are evaluated as inaccurate and quashed.	Participants listen to the others in order to understand their experiences and beliefs.  The experiences of the others are accepted as genuine and valid.

Dealing with others' views	<p>Participants are not willing to change their views on the issue.</p> <p>People speak based on beliefs held about others' situation and motivations.</p> <p>There is a mutual opposition among people and attempts to prove each other wrong.</p>	<p>There is an expansion of people's understanding of the issue.</p> <p>People speak primarily from their own understanding and experience.</p> <p>People work together towards common understanding.</p>
Role of emotions	<p>There is an exhibition of strong emotions such as anger in order to intimidate the other side</p>	<p>Strong emotions such as anger and sadness are appropriate when they convey the intensity of an experience or belief.</p>

Source: (Ropers 2017: 6).

## 4.5 Social Cohesion

Social cohesion is very important as it provides a critical understanding of the link between poverty, inequality, and violence. This means that through social cohesion, public policies and institutions are designed to address the causes and effects of poverty, social exclusion, social distrust, and political marginalisation (Brown and Zahar 2015: 10-24). Moreover, social cohesion is relevant in the sense that it can provide a reason as to why violence can be experienced in one poor neighbourhood and not in the other, as it was the case with the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic violence which was not witnessed in all the townships and informal settlements of the country (Barolsky 2014: 72).

### 4.5.1 Origin of Social Cohesion

Social cohesion came to light during the period when there was an increase in the critiques made towards the perceived limitations of the politico-institutional approach to peacebuilding. Originally, different research studies on peacebuilding were generally based on the issues of state-building, power sharing, and democratisation. It was in this vein that these approaches were evaluated and found to be incapable of fostering sustainable peace. Thus, it was argued that it was necessary to also pay attention to individuals and groups, culture, and sub-state forms of engagement (Brown and Zahar 2015: Ibid).

However, initially, social cohesion dated back to the nineteenth century as it was introduced by Emile Durkheim who studied the effects of modernisation and industrialisation on the form

of solidarity (King, Samii and Snilstveit 2010: 336-337). Based on Durkheim's studies, the lack of social cohesion in a society can lead residents of a particular society or community to hate one another and can also lead to the killing of one another (See in Cloete and Kotze 2009: 6). For this reason, social cohesion plays an important role in a society or community. Furthermore, social cohesion has been used in multiple ways and at different levels. Since the concept of social cohesion is primarily linked to social development, it has been identified as the main goal of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU).

Furthermore, since the 1990s, peacebuilders have been experiencing significant challenges on a best approach to contribute to fostering peace in war-torn zones where the population is divided along identity lines, and it was in this vein in 1995 that the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development formally promoted social cohesion, together with social goals such as equity to being a central tenet in current development practices. Subsequently, the World Bank established its Social Development Department, which associates improvements in social cohesion with shared and sustainable economic development (King, Samii and Snilstveit 2010: 336-370).

#### **4.5.2 Understanding the Concept of Social Cohesion**

Considered as a social concept without a proper definition, social cohesion has a different meaning to different sets of people (Beauvais and Jenson 2002: 1). Cloete and Kotze (2009: 7) refer to social cohesion as the bonding between two people and groups and which is manifested in social interactions and social structures and processes. Furthermore, social cohesion incorporates some of the issues affecting people's lives in a society, community, or in a country, including unemployment, poverty, discrimination, exclusion, and disenchantment with politics (Abe and Katsura 2016: 57). Brown and Zahar (2015) posit that social cohesion is often associated with an effort to address inequality and build social capital. In addition, King, Samii and Snilstveit (2010) associate "social cohesion to behaviours and attitudes within a community that reflects a propensity of community members to cooperate".

Social cohesion cannot be condensed into one specific definition that will assess the intervention. (Monson *et al.* 2012) provide a definition of social cohesion that taps directly into the South African realities. Thus, they define social cohesion "as a condition in which tensions and conflicts are dealt with in a manner that does not result in open violence, paralysing chronic tensions, or extreme marginalisation among groups of residents in a specific area". However, while the above-mentioned definition emphasises violence and conflict within a community, the Council of Europe refers to social cohesion as the capacity of a society to

ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation (Brown and Zahar 2015: Ibid).

Furthermore, social cohesion takes place in exploring the root causes and consequences of social turmoil, violence, misallocation of aid, entrenched poverty, slow or negative economic growth, and failures to realise welfare gains from market-oriented economic reform (King, Samii and Snilstveit 2010: Ibid). This demonstrates that social cohesion rests on three dimensions, namely, horizontal equality, social capital, and effective institutions (Brown and Zahar 2015: 12).

Social cohesion is often paralleled with the concepts of inclusion, social trust, equality, solidarity, political and social participation, the legitimacy and transparency of institutions, and the recognition of and tolerance for differences and diversity (Monson *et al.* 2012: 19). Brown and Zahar (2015: 10-24) posit that social cohesion is about reducing horizontal inequalities and promoting social cohesion will require effective state institutions. In most cases, social cohesion is believed to be linked to common values, consensus, and the absence of conflict within a society or community (Monson *et al.* 2012: 19). King, Samii and Snilstveit (2010) argue that social cohesion “is the effective bond between citizens, local patterns of cooperation and the glue that bonds society together in order to promote harmony, a sense of community, and a degree of commitment to promote the common good”.

In addition, despite the fact that social cohesion is a glue that bonds people together, Brown and Zahar (2015) consider it as a set of public policies devised by inequalities, which are connected to the onset of conflict. Social cohesion is useful when one is about to implement and establish a durable peace within a community. However, one of the biggest challenges in building social cohesion is witnessed in a community where there is a presence or influx of migrants, and in that case, social cohesion is perceived as being weak and challenging to implement (Abe and Katsaura 2016: 57). This simply means that social cohesion can sometimes be ineffective especially in a case of social diversity. Cox, Orsborn and Sisk (2014) argue that governments often fail to promote social cohesion in a deeply divided society, and although they try to implement institutional reforms, they often fail to address the historical grievances and provide the basic human security needs of the most marginalised.

Although social cohesion aims at bonding people in a community, certain elements affecting people in a community might represent a threat to the success of its promotion and this includes unemployment, poverty, income inequality, and social exclusion (see in Beauvais and Jenson 2002: 3). This means that whenever a community is affected by the above-mentioned issues, the promotion of social cohesion will be challenging. However, when they

are well managed via redistribution across different social groups and geographic spaces, the implementation of social cohesion will be successful and existent in a society (Beauvais and Jenson 2002). Jenson (1998 cited in Barolsky 2014: 73) states that in times of rapid social change, the implementation of social cohesion becomes challenging and critical.

#### **4.5.3 Social Cohesion in South Africa and its Dimension**

Taking into consideration the definitions provided by different scholars, Monson *et al.* (2012) argue that in order to have a proper and clear definition of social cohesion, the following criteria must be addressed:

- It must be realistic
- It must be applicable
- It must have measurable indicators and be adapted to the context

The indicators provided above are very useful as they help in assessing the extent to which social cohesion has been achieved or to determine which social cohesion weaknesses need to be addressed. Due to systematic prejudice, impunity, and ineffective institutions that were demonstrated by the African Centre for Migration Studies (ACMS) as a result of the mass xenophobic attacks that took place in 2008, Monson *et al.* (2012) proposed six dimensions of social cohesion (as depicted in Figure 4.3) and amongst the six, the authors selected only three that prevail over the others in the South African communities. These are the practice of non-violence (which establishes the starting point for social cohesion), preceded by inclusion and tolerance of difference as well as legitimate and effective institutions.



**Figure 4.3:** Six dimensions of social cohesion, taken from (Adapted by Monson *et al.* 2012: 23).

The practice of non-violence means that all groups positively value and practice non-violent coexistence and resolve conflict in a peaceful way through inclusive, open dialogue and debate, while inclusion and tolerance of difference means that all groups are recognised and treated as part of a community, regardless of their differences (e.g., nationality, origin, age, ethnicity, gender, disability, culture, sexual or political orientation, or language). This is followed by another dimension of social cohesion which is the presence of legitimate and effective institutions, both informal and formal. Legitimate and effective institutions value non-violent conflict resolution and are accessible and considered legitimate by all agendas, uphold the rule of law, and ensure that they are accessible and considered legitimate by all groups within the community. Inclusion and tolerance are very important in terms of different dimensions of social cohesion, the reason being that the exclusion and intolerance of one group will be unfair, will result in unequal participation and create bridges, and positive social relationships will be few (Monson *et al.* 2012: 24).

Due to the past history of SA, scholars have posited that an inclusive social cohesion can actually be advocated through a substantive active citizenship. This means that the usefulness of citizenship can effectively encourage inclusion within a community on the one hand, and it can also encourage exclusion and structured inequality within a community on the other hand

(Monson *et al.* 2012: 23). Lastly, is the presence of legitimate and effective institutions which is a very important dimension of social cohesion at both the formal and informal levels, the reason being that this dimension is more legitimate by the groups within the communities because it values non-violent conflict resolution. More importantly, legitimate, and effective state institutions serve clear agendas, uphold the rule of law, and ensure that they are accessible and considered legitimate by all groups within a community (Monson *et al.* 2012: Ibid).

Monson *et al.* (2012: 22) posit that social cohesion in SA was very successful during the apartheid era. This was due to the fact that many townships were characterised by a remarkable depth of organisation, as people co-operated against those perceived as the “others”. This means that those who were considered as the “others” were mostly traitors or black people supporting the then apartheid regime through their work in the law enforcement office as spies, and they were referred to in the communities as the “*Impimpi*”. However, in modern SA, there is a shift on those regarded as the “others”. This means that in post-apartheid SA, the “others” are now the African foreign nationals (Barolsky 2014: 73). A study conducted by Monson (2012) argued that there is little inclusion of foreign nationals in the South African local structures, and in most cases, South Africans consider foreign nationals as the outsiders, people who are in the country just to make money.

#### **4.5.4 Social Cohesion and Ubuntu in the South African Context**

Social cohesion is always linked to the concept of *ubuntu*, the reason being that etymologically, social cohesion simply means to form a united whole, and on the other hand, *ubuntu* implies that a person is a person only through another person within a community. *Ubuntu* simply means that a human being is a human being only through its relationship to other human beings (Marx 2002; Monson *et al.* 2012). *Ubuntu* and social cohesion are usually intertwined because it is impossible to promote social cohesion without *ubuntu* in the South African context, which means that social cohesion lays its foundation in the concept of *ubuntu* (Monson *et al.* 2012: 22).

Originally, *ubuntu* means a way of life, a universal truth, an expression of human dignity, an underpinning of the concept of an open society, African humanism, trust, helpfulness, respect, sharing, caring, community, and unselfishness (Cilliers 2008: 1). In most cases, *ubuntu* is used as a way of calling for solidarity which is an important precondition for survival in communities, especially in South African communities that are characterised by poverty and violence (Marx 2002: 49-69). In the South African context, although the concept of *ubuntu* is popular, unfortunately, it is still undermined in post-apartheid SA due to the fact that many African



migrants are excluded from the communities. However, the concept itself is very popular in terms of restructuring the post-apartheid SA (Marx 2002: 2).

Furthermore, the concept of *ubuntu* plays an important role in building the nation. For instance, the South African government acknowledged the importance of *ubuntu* when they talked about nation building, transformation, and reconstruction, and this was demonstrated in the government's White Paper on Welfare which stated that:

Ubuntu is the principle of caring for each other's well-being ... and a spirit of mutual support ... Each individual's humanity is ideally expressed through his or her relationship with others and theirs in turn through a recognition of the individual's humanity. Ubuntu means that the people are people through other people ... it also acknowledged both the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and social well-being (Cilliers 2008: 2).

Different acts of xenophobic violence witnessed in SA are not only a real threat to the democracy of the country but they are also rendering the promotion of social cohesion and *ubuntu* quite difficult to achieve in the country in the sense that the exclusion of migrants living in the country is making the implementation of reform programmes within the country difficult, especially reforms that will include the latter, and that is affecting the building of the nation and the image of South Africa being the rainbow nation (Marx 2002: 49-69). Scholars have argued that *ubuntu* is a sign of a nation that is already in existence, but in the South African case, the nation itself is still to be built (Marx 2002; Cilliers 2008).

Furthermore, in an attempt to explain *ubuntu* in post-apartheid SA, Cilliers (2008: 7) introduced a notion of "*Intu*" which means "*a thing*", which simply means that human beings nowadays do not treat one another as human beings but as things. The ill-treatment (*Intu*) of human beings saw its days in the country soon after the end of the apartheid regime. When apartheid was abolished in the country, different forms of ill-treatment towards people have been witnessed in the country and these include xenophobic stigmas flowing from unemployment, HIV/AIDS, alarming crime statistics, etc. Based on Cilliers' (2008) arguments, it is clear that post-apartheid SA is now moving from *ubuntu* (humanness) towards the *Intu* which means treating fellow humans from the African continent as things. The principle of *ubuntu* is relevant to this research and an in-depth discussion is provided in chapter eight below.

## **4.6 Rationale for Conflict Transformation and Social Cohesion**

From the literature on xenophobia presented above, it is clear that xenophobic violence in SA dwells in the minds of the local people as they have set out to believe that migrants are the

enemies and a threat to their socio-economic development. Thus, the only way for the former to regain their socio-economic opportunities is to get rid of migrants by all means, which is demonstrated in violence and physical harassment. This means that migrants and the local people have a non-existent relationship or friendship. Having these facts in mind, and having explored conflict transformation, it is evident that the latter is relevant in curbing xenophobia in SA, the reason being that conflict transformation focuses on the transformation of deep-rooted conflicts into peaceful ones (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 10-55). Resolving xenophobic violence in SA will likely be unsuccessful since there are no relationships between the groups, however, the violence can be transformed by building relationships and connections between the two groups and addressing the root causes of the violence. Furthermore, conflict transformation is not limited only to armed conflict, but can take place in different types of conflict situations that a country or a community is facing (Galtung 2000: Ibid). This means that in the case of xenophobic violence in SA, conflict transformation can be applicable. In addition, in the South African context, many efforts to achieve peace and social cohesion between foreign nationals and South African citizens have failed, as has been explained in Chapter 3. In criticising their efforts, Misago argues that:

[The] reason for the failure lies in the fact that the interventions by various civil societies and academic scholars are not evidence-based and are not informed by a clear understanding of the drivers of the violence, in addition the interventions made are based on shaky foundations and untested theories of change (Misago 2016b: 443-467).

Based on Misago's arguments, there is a need to understand firstly the driving motivation of the violence. As there is a lack of understanding of the reason behind the violence. Due to the above-mentioned facts, conflict transformation appears to be the most relevant theory, because that transformation of the conflict goes beyond the current issues and explores the places and areas where the conflict has taken place, and moreover, it goes beyond the limitations of traditional approaches (Lederach and Maise 2003; Ryan 2009). In addition, Lederach (1997 cited in Paffenholz and Spurk 2006) mentions that conflict transformation rebuilds destroyed relationships, it focuses on reconciliation in a society, and reinforces the society's peacebuilding potentials. Although the researcher will be using conflict transformation as a peace theory, Empirical studies have demonstrated that social cohesion is not truly considered to be a peace theory, however, it is a useful tool in restoring the '*ubuntu*' between foreign nationals and South African nationals. Thus, that social cohesion will be used as a strategy to reinforce conflict transformation by identifying individuals or groups and empowering them to build peace and to support reconciliation and building relationships.

Furthermore, social cohesion, as a complement to conflict transformation, will help in reducing the violence which is elusive when the root causes have not yet been sufficiently addressed (Cox, Orsborn and Sisk 2014: 26). Moreover, the lack of social cohesion is often a prerequisite for conflict and violence (ibid). In addition, the conflict transformation theory provides a different approach to address a conflict, as it addresses conflict that lies in the past history of a country or community and it is useful in changing people's minds regarding the "others", and its applicability requires different influential members of the country who can play a role in addressing a particular conflict and participating in the peace process (Galtung 1996a: 25-36).

Scholars and civil societies working in the field have reported that xenophobia in the South African context is a result of a long-lasting frustration from the local people against migrants based on the deprivation of socio-economic opportunities. Thus, Cox, Orsborn and Sisk (2014) state that social cohesion is a function of equal access to national resources, services, and land rights. Hence, these are the basic elements that the local people accuse migrants of benefitting from. In the South African context, the conflict transformation theory and social cohesion will be useful in this research as they will not only explore the root causes of the conflict between migrants and the local people but will also address the above-mentioned elements from which the local people feel excluded or from which they are not benefitting. In addition, social cohesion gives scope for dialogue between identity groups and between state-level and civil-society-level actors to work together in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of the direct violence and to address the specific causes of the conflict (See in Cox, Orsborn and Sisk 2014: 45).

For this reason, in this research, xenophobia will be explored through the three lenses provided by Lederach, and the research will mainly focus on the grassroots level which many academic scholars term "Building Local Capacity" (see in Ryan 2009). This means that different members of the communities will be approached based on Lederach's pyramid of change in order to achieve change in communities. In this research, much attention will be paid to youth since most of the perpetrators of the attacks are youth, and NGOs working closely with South African youth and migrants, as well as community leaders will be approached in order to build peace in the community.

#### **4.7 Relevance of the adopted theories**

Different theories presented in this research are selected based on their effectiveness to deal with violence and promote peace, this has been previously discussed. The theory of prejudice fits in the scope of the study because xenophobia cannot be explored in the Southern African

context without having a closer look at prejudice. Thus, from the many theories of prejudice that are discussed above which are initially known as hypothesis, the research paid particular attention to group contact theory, as the most appropriate in terms of linking prejudice to xenophobia and searching for solutions. This theory helps bring both local people and migrants together to break the negative narratives and stereotypes portrayed against migrants. Coupled with that the theory helps both groups in identifying the commonalities and similarities they have. Combatting xenophobia in SA entails a clear adoption of the appropriate theories that does not only deal directly with the violence at hand, but that start by exploring the attitudinal factors that local people have developed for the past years which ultimately can be transformed into violence.

Once the theories of prejudice are clearly understood and dealt with, then it becomes easier to provide a peace theory that will promote peace in the selected community. In that vein, it was important to explore conflict transformation and its impact in situations of violent conflict as a mean of promoting peace. That means that once the emotional, attitudinal, and behavioural aspects of both groups have been understood, it is easier to adopt a peace theory and peace activity that is likely to work. Thus, in this study conflict transformation is the perfect fit because it deals with violence at different levels within the community, and its success involved the full participation and commitment of people involved in the conflict and their leaders.

## **4.8 Conclusion**

This chapter provided an exploration of different theories of xenophobia. Based on the findings of academic researchers, it is evident that the xenophobic attacks that one is witnessing now in SA are rooted in the politics of exclusion that the country was facing during the apartheid era. For this reason, this chapter looked at conflict transformation as a relevant peace theory that will be helpful in the building of sustainable peace in SA. Furthermore, this chapter provided an overview of the concepts of both theories, namely, theories on xenophobia and peace theories, including the applicability of peace theory in terms of xenophobia.

## PART III

### Chapter 5: Research Methodology and data collection

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research design and methodology adopted for this research. Included in this chapter is the origins of Action Research (AR), the difference between AR and participatory action research (PAR), and the process of AR, and the data collection process in an AR study. The chapter also presents a description of the qualitative methodology, which is the selected method for this study, and the data collection and analysis process.

This research adopted an AR mode of inquiry as the first approach for this study. AR gives the researcher the ability to identify and develop questions and objectives to a problem and develop theoretical frameworks directly addressing the problem and objectives identified in the study (Kiyala 2016: 311). In an AR, the researcher can conduct his/her research through action and facilitation of social change by allowing each participant to play an important role throughout the research by identifying, designing, and implementing an intervention to a problem faced in the community. The use of AR fits well with the objectives and purpose of this research which is not only to promote social cohesion but also to build a peaceful community where migrants and South Africans can live together according to the principle of *ubuntu*.

#### 5.2 Research Design

A research design is defined as a blueprint or a map that provides the different stages of the research from the broad assumptions to a detailed method of data collection, data analysis, and interpretation (Mouton 2001: 55). Generally, it provides the approach that the researcher must use in his/her study. Creswell refers to the research design as the “types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures in a research design” (Creswell 2014a). It is important to mention that the terms *research design* and *methodology* are always intertwined, and their terminologies are sometimes quite similar.

For instance, van Wyk (2012: 1-16) provide a clear definition of a research design which dissociate it from methodology to terminate the confusion. Thus, she defines research design as:

The overall plan for connecting the conceptual research problems to the pertinent empirical research ... in other words, the research design articulates what data is required, what methods are going to be used to collect and analyze the data and how all of this is going to respond to the research questions.

In this research study, I adopted action research (AR) as a design that fits in this study due to the complexity of xenophobia in SA, and the level of violence perpetrated against migrants is a recurring phenomenon which will require a proper intervention and action in order to fight the scourge of xenophobia.

### **5.3 Understanding Action Research (AR) and Related Terms**

AR is different from Participatory Action Research (PAR), and Greenwood and Levin (2006: 131) posit that AR is a blanket term covering multiple practices and ideologies. This means that PAR is a component that sits within AR, and although the two modes of inquiry are aimed at empowering a community or organization, PAR also aims at transforming the community. Moreover, different definitions have revealed that PAR is more of an approach than a method of inquiry (Participatory Action Research & Organizational Change 2008). In AR, the researcher's main purpose is to peacefully transform and solve the people's concern in a collaborative way, which means that the researcher is not an excluded observer during the process, rather he/she is a participant who assists in solving the problem through the encouragement of the development of the capacity of a system to facilitate, maintain, and regulate the cyclic process of diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning (Whitehead 2013).

Being a blanket term, AR is also referred to as learning by doing (O'Brien 2001), thus AR is always linked to Action Learning (AL) and both terms are used interchangeably, although AR uses a more systematic and rigorous methodology. Skerrett (2001: 18) differentiates AR from AL by stating that "AL means learning from action or concrete experience as well as taking action as a result of this learning".

#### **5.3.1 What is AR?**

AR is described as "a systematic approach to investigation that enables people to find effective solutions to problems that they face in their daily lives ... It focuses on specific situations and localized solutions" (Stringer 2014: 1). Moreover, action research focuses on a way that people in different fields or disciplines such as education, business, community, organizations, and health and human services may increase the effectiveness of the work in which they are engaged by assisting them in working through the complex issues with which they are

confronted in order to make their work meaningful and fulfilling (Stringer 2014). It is important to mention that action research is very complex to define, the reason being that action research is known to be a natural process that can take different forms, and it has been developed according to a specific discipline or field of research (Tripp 2005: 443-466). The definition of AR cannot be limited to one single definition; thus, it is important to explore other definitions provided by scholars (Kaye and Harris 2017: 9). Reason and Bradbury (2001: 2) provide the following definition of action research:

[Action research is a] participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in the participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities.

Action research helps people in investigating and changing their social and educational realities by changing some practices which constitutes their lived realities (Atweh, Kemmis and Weeks 2002: 23).


Furthermore, action research is defined as a cyclical process that incorporates diagnosing a problem, planning steps, and implementing and evaluating outcomes (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53). Altrichter *et al.* (2002: 125-131) refer to action research as “a spiral of activity which entails planning a change, acting and observing the process and consequences of change, reflecting on these processes and re-planning, and so forth”. It involves action, evaluation, and critical reflection. Based on the evidence that the researcher will gather, he/she will then have to implement the changes in practice (Koshy, Koshy and Waterman 2010: 1-24). However, the shortest and clearest definition of action research has been provided by Elliot (1991 cited in Nasrollahi 2014: 18663-18668) who states that “action research is the study of a social situation with a view to improving the quality of action within it”. This definition directly addresses the reasons, motivations, and importance of action research.

AR is not exclusive, it is indeed participative and collaborative, and it is undertaken by individuals sharing a common purpose. Based on the interpretation provided by the participants in the research, reflection is developed. It generates knowledge through action during its application. More importantly, action research can involve problem solving in the case where the solution to the problem leads to the improvement of practice. However, the findings of the action research are not conclusive or absolute (Koshy, Koshy and Waterman 2010). that which makes action research unique in practice is the fact that it includes both action and reflection that mostly lead to practice (Power and Naysmith 2005: 8).

Based on the definitions provided above, it is evident that AR entails three important elements, namely, research, action, and participation. In case one of these three elements is missing, then the entire process is no longer worthy to be called action research (Greenwood and Levin 2006: 6).

### 5.3.2 Process and Work of Action Research

Scholars have described AR as a cyclical, spiraling, and helical process (Kemmis 1998 see in Hine 2013: 151-163). AR entails four process stages known as “Plan, Act, Observe and Reflect”, and in most cases, AR requires the researcher to conduct his/her study with an assistant or as part of a team (Power and Naysmith 2005: 5). In this research, the researcher included the action research helix provided by Stringer (2007: 7), which is usually referred to as “Look, Act, and Think”, as depicted in Figure 5.1.




**Figure 5.1:** Action Research helix (Stringer 2007).

For the researcher to find an effective intervention, the stages provided in the helix above have to be followed during the research process. This means that in the first stage, which is “Look”, the researcher is required to carefully collect the necessary information and make observations through looking, listening, and recording. At the “Think” stage, the researcher is now required to analyse the collected information, for him/her to identify significant features and elements of the phenomenon being studied. Lastly, at the “Act” stage, the researcher will use the collected information to provide solutions to the problem being studied or investigated (Hine 2013: 154). In the definitions of AR provided in the previous section, one can notice that there are four themes in those definitions that demonstrate the aim of action research, namely: “the empowerment of participants, collaboration through participation, acquisition of knowledge and social change” (Ferrance 2000: 9). To successfully implement these four themes, it is important to apply the AR cycle which in turn will expand the action research helix (see Figure 5.1). The AR cycle is divided into five different steps that the researcher must follow, namely: designing the study, collection of data, analysing data, evaluation of data, and



taking action (Hine 2013: 151-163), as depicted in Figure 5.2. This process is known as a common process of AR inquiry (Stringer 2008 cited in Hine 2013).



**Figure 5.2:** Action Research cycle (adapted by Stringer 2004 see in Hine 2013).

The action research cyclical process requires the researcher to firstly design his/her study, and in doing so he/she must carefully the issue to be investigated, and he/she must have a plan for the processes of inquiry and check the ethics and validity of the work. Secondly, the researcher collects the information from different sources concerning the issue he/she is investigating, and after doing this, the researcher moves to the third stage which is the data analysis – here, the researcher needs to analyse the data for him/her to identify the key features of the issue that is being investigated. Fourthly, the researcher needs to evaluate the data that has been collected, and this is important as it will help the researcher to identify whether there has been an improvement or not. In the case that no improvement has been made, the researcher is required to do changes until he/she finds the proper action. Lastly, the researcher acts by using the outcomes of the study. The successful outcome of the research will be implemented in the issue investigated (Ferrance 2000; Hine 2013).

The cycle of AR provided above might be interpreted differently from one researcher to another. However, the researcher is required to repeat certain stages during the research

process, the reason being that it is mandatory to use a combination of both theory and practice to have effective AR research (Kaye and Harris 2018: 1 -25).

### **5.3.3 Reason for using Action Research in this Study**

Xenophobia is known to be not only a complex issue but also a critical problem to many migrants living in SA, as almost every year the latter face xenophobic attacks resulting in mass displacement, death, and the looting of properties and businesses. AR aims at building a collaboration between members of the community in bringing social changes and empowers them to negotiate their life plans (O'Brien 1998; McNiff and Whitehead 2011). Thus, AR was appropriate in this research because preventing and combatting xenophobia in SA requires taking on different strategies, approaches, and methods to mitigate the violence and attitude. Furthermore, it requires involving different participants at different levels to promote social cohesion between migrants and locals, and this will be successfully achieved through an AR design.

The necessity to curb the xenophobia in SA and to promote social cohesion in SA, which is the main objective of this research, requires a direct involvement of both groups (migrants and South African nationals). AR fits in a sense that it has a participatory, collaborative, and emancipatory learning character in the peace action project which would be useful in fulfilling the objectives of this research. Moreover, since xenophobia is a real problem affecting the lives of not only migrants but also local people, AR is very appropriate in terms of bringing both groups together and having them explore the motives behind the violence and to empower the youth in the community with the necessary skills and knowledge that will help them in standing against xenophobic violence, since they are always at the frontline of the attacks.

AR cannot only be limited on its capacity of bringing diverse people from different backgrounds together, but also on its ability to promote collaboration between groups through contact, and the participants had to share their experiences in an open and safe environment in collaborative ways to find appropriate solutions that would be helpful in combatting xenophobia and preventing it from taking place in the near future. The prevention of xenophobia from taking place through the promotion of social cohesion and youth empowerment can only be effective through a full collaboration and participation of both the victims and perpetrators, the locals and the migrants, and those who were directly or indirectly affected by the violence, whether migrants or locals, including community leaders and civil societies.

While many people are still waiting for the government to intervene in the xenophobic violence that is affecting different communities, AR motivates the participants to share the narratives of their circumstances and develop suitable strategies that might be helpful in addressing the issue and remedying the situation. This means that AR positions the participants at the centre of the investigation in order to establish social change and promote social cohesion, which means that the participants will be the actors of change in their communities.

## **5.4 Data Collection in Action Research**

Collecting data in an AR requires patience from the researcher, as the data cannot be gathered in one single day or incidence, and moreover, the research and its findings cannot rely on a single type of data. Researchers are always encouraged to use a series of different approaches undertaken at different times and using different strategies to produce effective findings. Johnson (2012: 1) compares the collection of data in AR to a use of soil samples, which requires the researcher to collect small amounts of soil in different places over time; Different techniques were used as data collection methods. However, due to the AR nature of the study, more methods were used during the data collection process, namely, workshops, generative dialogues, still image dialogues, and world cafés. These are explained in the following sub-sections.

### **5.4.1 The Action Research Process of Data Collection**

Although the full process of AR in this study is provided in chapter 9, this section provides an overview of how it was accomplished. Prior to running the dialogues and workshops, the researcher set up a team comprising both migrants who had experienced xenophobic violence and South Africans. Participants availed themselves to attend all the processes of the study, namely, being interviewed and attending focus groups, in order to gain more information on the issue being investigated, that is, the xenophobic violence phenomenon. Different invitations were sent to NGOs working closely with migrants, church leaders (pastors), and community leaders. The first session of collecting data was more of an introductory session where the initial insights on xenophobia were listed. This means that the researcher fully explained the issue being studied and discussed in detail and reviewed the objectives of the research and emphasized the importance of social cohesion. The introductory session was then followed by different processes of collecting data.

It is well known that the first element of AR is the fact that it is exploratory, thus, in the first session, the group thoroughly explored xenophobia in the South African context and discussed that which has been done since the violence broke out for the first time in 2008. The group

evaluated the current situation/tension between migrants and locals. This means that the group had to look at the prevalence of xenophobia in the country. In addition, it is important to mention that in all the sessions, the participants had to work in groups and report their discussions to the plenary. At the end of the first session, the group reported their discussions and introduced the second session.

In the second session, the group focused more on the description or current approaches to deal with the problem, which constitutes the second element of AR. This means that the attention in this session was more on breaking the stereotypes that exist between the two groups and plan for preventive measures promoting social cohesion as a way of building sustainable peace in the community. At the end of the session, the group progress was reviewed, and the third session was introduced. While two elements of AR had already been used in the process, namely, exploration and description, it was important to design an intervention. It was in this vein that the third session was more about designing strategic interventions and analysing different options for change. In the third session, different prospects and limitations of curbing the scourge of xenophobia were analysed and the group also focused on planning sustainable peace through youth skills empowerment as an alternative future preventive measure to combat xenophobia in the country and the adoption of social cohesion as a suitable preventive measure to combat xenophobia in the country. At the end of the session, the group identified the suitable strategic approaches or actions to be implemented, the key task was selected from the team, and the group contacted different community leaders and counsellors, civil societies, and victims and non-victims of xenophobic violence.

After the third session, team meetings were held to compile reports, discuss the future contact, and create a new team. The last session entailed distributing the report to different facilitators and civil societies that assisted in the research process. The group planned more dialogue where the new team was tasked to run more social cohesion workshops and dialogue sessions and to evaluate the outcomes in different communities.

#### **5.4.2 Data Collection Methods**

The process for data collection in an AR study that the researcher followed has been explained above and the following activities were used.

##### *(a) Workshops*

Ørngreen and Levinsen (2017: 70-81) refer to workshops as dispositions that allow a group of people to learn, to acquire new knowledge, to present a creative problem-solving approach,

or to innovate in connection to a domain-specific issue. It was in this vein that workshops were planned in this study as it enabled the researcher to build and to establish an AR team from the selected participants and second key informants with more experience in conducting workshops in order to equip them with the necessary understanding and skills in promoting social cohesion. Different activities took place in the workshops, namely, the sharing of a story or personal experience either with migrants or South Africans, games that intended to exhibit social cohesion and its importance, and exercises. These were done in order to make the participants feel comfortable during the sessions.

(b) *Generative Dialogue (GD)*

Generative Dialogue (GD) outlines the movement of conversation from conventional discussion (talking nice) to debate (talking tough), through reflective dialogue and landing into sensing and unpacking new knowledge in the group (Gunnlaugson 2006: 1-15). It promotes conditions for participants to learn and think together in order to generate new knowledge and possibilities for actions (Bohm 1992; Gunnlaugson 2006). Combatting xenophobia involves an honest dialogue with both groups, thus, the generative dialogue played an important role in opening a discussion and debate on the first objective of this study which is a clear examination of the causes that trigger violence. However, examining the causes is not sufficient as there are always stereotypes that are attached to foreigners.

(c) *World Café*

A world café is a conversational and cooperative dialogue that allows a group of people to have a round-table discussion regarding the problem that they are facing in the community or organization. Schieffer, Isaacs and Gyllenpalm (2004: 3) describe it as a practical way to broaden the human ability for collaborative thought, and that it assembles dynamic conversations and opens new possibilities for action. Since the study's focus was on youth empowerment as a way of combatting xenophobia, this technique was very important as it allowed all the participants to first explore the problem that was affecting them and then to identify potential interventions/actions that would be appropriate. A world café conducted in a small, intimate conversation links and builds on each member as it requires people to move between groups, cross-pollinate ideas, and make new connections that are of concern to their life, work, or community (Schieffer, Isaacs and Gyllenpalm 2004: 3).

(d) *Narrative Inquiry*

Research on xenophobia involving migrants and South Africans requires a narrative technique in order to gain in-depth information from the participants, the reason being that most victims

of xenophobic violence are refugees and asylum seekers living in informal settlements or townships. Thus, the use of the narrative technique of collecting data played an important role as it opened a window for both migrants and South Africans to share their experiences. Narrative inquiry is known as a psychosocial approach that focuses on stories (Frank 2010 cited in Brett 2017: 1). This is further explained by Johnson and Golombek (2017:55) who posit that “the act of narrating, as a cultural activity, influences how one comes to understand what one is narrating about. The telling or retelling of the experience entails a complex combination of description, explanation, analysis, interpretation and construal of one’s private reality as it is brought into public reality”. Moreover, Leavy (2009 cited in Kim 2015: 17) provides the following description of narrative inquiry:

[Narrative inquiry is] a phenomenon to understand multidimensional meanings of society, culture, human actions, and life, it attempts to access participants’ life experiences and engage in a process of storytelling.

Furthermore, although a few participants knew each other prior to the data collection process, the narrative inquiry built a zone of friendship and trust amongst the participants, and it gave birth to a sense of curiosity as South African participants wanted to know more and asked the migrants many questions regarding their experiences and cultures.

(e) *Dialogue through Image and Testimony Theatre*

Also known as image theatre, this approach was very useful in this research study, as the research team understood that language is a stronghold to the communication of both groups as some participants were not able to communicate in English or Isizulu, thus the team used this technique to collect data and generate information from participants and observing the reactions of the audience. This technique was used only twice throughout the research process. According to Boal (2002), image theatre is used to allow participants to use their bodies as clay which they can use to create still images depicting a particular topic or theme (see in Janis 2019).

The image presented can serve as a catalyst for a critical group reflection in order to better understand the situation and to try out possible solutions. In addition, in an image theatre, solutions to the problem that the oppressed or marginalized group are facing are identified by the participants and the latter propose the possible action that needs to be taken into consideration. The research team had to explain the purpose of the image to the participants and the importance of finding a proper theme to present – the process was successful as the latter captured the audience and took their task seriously.

## **5.5 The Character of the Researcher in an Action Research Project**

In an AR process, the researcher is required to be as unremarkable as possible in order to not influence the results of the research. Being unremarkable does not mean that the researcher should not participate in the research process, and in fact, he/she is required to actively participate in the research process not as a director or a manager of the research, but rather as a facilitator or as a catalyst to assist participants to clearly interpret their problems, and to guide and support their activity as they work to find an adequate resolution of the issues being investigated (Stringer 2013: 20). Moreover, the researcher's attitude in the research process should not be to dictate his/her views or opinions, but the researcher should encourage the participants to bring change by enabling them to develop their own analysis of the issues. The researcher is also required to assist the participants in analysing the situation, considering the findings, and in planning on how the change should be implemented. The researcher is not an advocate for the participants etc. (Stringer 2013: 21). According to O'Brien (1998), the researcher's role is to be a:

- Planner-Leader
- Catalyser-Facilitator
- Teacher-Designer
- Listener-Observer
- Synthesiser-Reporter

## **5.6 Ethical Rules in an Action Research Design**

The rules in research involving humans requires a consideration of ethical norms that will map and build a relationship between the researcher and the participant, with the purpose of protecting the latter from unfair treatment, disrespect, and harm (Chevalier and Buckes 2013: 171). Canada's Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, published in 2010, gives more details on the ethical norms that a researcher needs to take into consideration, and this includes respect for a person's welfare and justice. The tri-council statements put these mentioned norms as principles, especially for research that is critical, action-oriented, and community-based (Chevalier and Buckes 2013: 171).

The researcher is under an obligation to respect the autonomy and freedom of individuals and groups to deliberate about a decision and act on it. This is demonstrated through the free, informed, and ongoing consent for those willing to participate in the research project. The

consent must be informed, which means that the researcher must take necessary measures to ensure that participants have understood the purpose of the research, and the risks and potential benefits that may result from the participation (Chevalier and Buckes 2013: *ibid*). The principle of the welfare of participants should not be exposed to any unfavourable balance of benefits and risks. This means that all participants in the study must remain anonymous, and the information collected must be confidential, and they must also protect themselves and each other against potential risk.

The principle of justice requires that all people be given equal treatment and concern for fairness and equity. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the criteria of appropriate inclusion in order to ensure that no particular groups or people receive an unfair share or burden in participating in the research, and no groups should be discriminated from participating in the research without a justification and from taking advantage of them while participating in the research (Chevalier and Buckes 2013: 172).

## **5.7 Methodology and Data Collection**

As stated above, this research adopted a qualitative methodology which is different to a quantitative methodology. However, although there is a difference between a qualitative and a quantitative research methodology, they both involve a clear approach that will be helpful in providing the researcher with the result on the issues that he/she is investigating. In this vein, Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge (2007b: 6) provide a table that clearly explains the differences between qualitative and quantitative research methodology. Bacon-Shone (2013: 33) opines that the “qualitative method is more concerned with the context that counts and provides richness not easily achieved with quantitative measures”. On the other hand, generality is much harder with qualitative analysis because it does not use probability samples. From that which scholar have provided above, it is evident that the quantitative method deals with the numeric, while the qualitative method is more about the recording such as voice and video (Bacon-Shone 2013: 33).

While qualitative methodology is known for providing insights into a research study, quantitative methodology is more about the measurements. For this reason, it is considered as an approach that collects numerical data which are analysed using mathematical methods (Muijs 2004: 1). In the same vein, Smith (2012: 2) states that quantitative methodology deals with measurable data. This means that in a quantitative methodology, data gathered are first measured then analysed statistically. Qualitative methodology can explain the daily



experiences of migrants, and the perception and the attitudes that one group might have towards the other (South Africans versus migrants).

Qualitative methodology fits in this investigation, as it facilitates the examination and interpretation of data to understand the meanings, patterns, and relationships in order to find a proper intervention. Furthermore, it allows the researcher to collect data through interviews and FGDs which could not be quantified as they were expressed through words. This allowed the researcher to observe the participants' emotions.

## **5.8 rationale for using a Qualitative methodology**

The researcher purposively chose the qualitative method of inquiry because it helped him to conduct a more in-depth investigation on the participants' everyday life challenges in the community and their relationships in the community (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz 2012: 93). In responding to the aims and objectives of this research, exploratory, explanatory, analytical, and participatory design was used to explain and to provide a clear investigation of xenophobia and how both groups are affected each time the violence erupts.

While researchers using qualitative research are accused of avoiding the statistics that comes in the quantitative research (Silverman 2013), the researcher must state at this level that in using qualitative research, it is not the intention of the researcher to avoid statistics but it is because the qualitative approach is helpful in gathering data through a clear exploration of the meaning of the challenges and difficulties that migrants are experiencing in their daily lives in SA.

According to Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge (2007a), qualitative research deals with social phenomena, and since xenophobia is a social phenomenon, it will best be explored through a qualitative paradigm. It must be specified at this stage that the objectives of this study tap more directly into the meaning of xenophobia than the numbers or statistics of xenophobia (Braun and Clarke 2013: 20). Moreover, since this study is using the AR paradigm, qualitative research always works well with action research.

An exploratory design was necessary as the researcher had to explore the relationships of South Africans and migrants and the attitudes that each group had towards the other, or the attitudes of South Africans towards the presence of migrants, and the feelings, experiences, and behaviour of both groups. This was then followed by an analysis of the causes of xenophobia in the country, as scholars have reported that the causes of xenophobia are very complex. Moreover, an exploratory design was combined with an analysis design in order to

look at empirical interventions from the government and civil society in preventing and mitigating xenophobic violence and their role during the violence.

An explanatory design was also useful as it helped the researcher to explain the effectiveness of different interventions adopted by the government and civil societies, and how those interventions are promoting social cohesion. The participatory design was helpful from the beginning to the end of the data collection process. This entailed involving participants in different activities in the research to find a proper action that promotes social cohesion and builds *ubuntu* between the participants. This was done through sport activities and skills transfer activities from migrants to South Africans, visits of different townships and informal settlements, and workshops and dialogues with both groups.

## **5.9 Study Population: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

According to (Alvi 2016: 7), “A target population refers to all the members who meet the particular criterion specified for a research investigation, the population might be homogenous or heterogeneous depending on the nature investigated on”. For this reason, this research focused on foreign nationals, especially refugees and asylum seekers living in Durban who had experienced xenophobia in one way or another, and those who are still experiencing discrimination due to their foreignness in the country, including South Africans who have a view on xenophobia. The targeted population of this research is divided into two categories, namely, the primary key informants, entailing male and female refugees and asylum seekers, including South African citizens: and the second key informants entailing NGOs, community leaders, and refugees’ leaders. Targeting a population is a very important step in research, the reason being that the members of the study population are viewed as objects from whom it is intended to draw conclusions (Babbie and Mouton 2001).

While this study focuses on the victims and the perpetrators of xenophobic attacks, children are excluded in the research. However, those who were under the age of 18 years during the attacks and who are now adults were allowed to participate in the research and to share their experiences. The researcher excluded migrants who had been in SA for less than a year, especially those who had never experienced or witnessed xenophobic violence while being in the country. Although the researcher was mainly looking at those who had experienced the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic violence, it must be stated here that the researcher also extended the study to those who had witnessed the 2016 to 2018 xenophobic violence, as those events took place at the time of writing this research.

## **5.10 Study Population Size**

While quantitative research requires a large size of population, in a qualitative study, a smaller size is often preferred as more data does not generally lead to more information, and it is for this reason that 26 participants were selected for this investigation, the reason being that the qualitative method requires an intensive analysis, thus a large sample can be time-consuming and impractical (Mason 2010). The participants were mainly youth aged between 18 years and above. The researcher approached two NGOs that work closely with migrants and South Africans to assist him in identifying the potential participants, and two refugee organizations were also approached.

A sample population is used as it would not have been feasible to study the entire population, thus a portion of the population known as a sample must be selected to participate in the study (Flick 2014: 16). The importance of using a sample is to save costs and time (Grossoehme 2014: 109-122). For this reason, the researcher must point out that the sample used in the research is not representative of the population. The participants were separated into two groups: 11 South African nationals and 15 migrants. The groups were not divided equally because there was not a strong presence of migrants in the community where the investigations were taking place. This is due to the fact that migrants are leaving townships and informal settlements and moving into areas where there are many migrants due to the threats that they receive daily.

A total of four FGDs were held: one FGD was done with South African nationals only, one was done with migrants only, and the last two entailed a combination of both migrants and South Africans. Both FGDs had seven participants each. After the two mixed FGDs, six participants were selected to be part of the combined FGD: the combined FGD had a total of 12 participants. The action team (AT) was selected out of the combined FGD, which means that I had to select 6 people equally from the last FGD to be the action team. Their purpose was to develop an experimental dialogue process model and develop creative ideas for an appropriate action to be adopted to prevent and combat xenophobia.

## **5.11 Sampling Method**

It is important to select a sample for the research, whether the research is qualitative or quantitative (Ritchie *et al.* 2013: 77). To have successful research, the researcher is required to understand the topic and to find feasible techniques which will help him/her in carrying out the research and to have relevant data (Merkens 2004: 167). With regards to feasible

techniques, scholars have provided relevant techniques for research such as snowballing and purposive sampling (Babbie 2013: 180).

### 5.11.1 Sample size

As noted, the participants were separated into two groups entailing 11 South African nationals and 15 migrants. The groups were not divided equally because some participants withdrew from the study because they were uncomfortable working with either migrants or locals, and some were affected due to the fact that the venue of a meeting was moved from Chesterville to Durban Central Business District (CBD). Although I had 25 participants that I worked with, it is worth noting that for the in-depth interview, I did not pre-determine the sample size of people to be interviewed; I interviewed as many people as I could until the point where I was getting repeated information and there was no new emerging information regarding xenophobia.

For the FGDs, the participants were selected based on the information given during the in-depth interview process, I tried to avoid having participants with no knowledge of the topic being study. From the people that I interviewed a total of four FGDs were held: one FGD was done with South African nationals only, one was done with migrants only, and the last two entailed a combination of both migrants and South Africans. After the two mixed FGDs, six participants were equally selected to develop an experimental dialogue process, where they had to develop creative ideas for an appropriate action to be adopted to prevent and combat xenophobia.

#### a. Sample size of migrants

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the sample size and participant profiles of migrants and South African nationals respectively.

Table 5.2 Sample size and profile of participants by nationality, gender, and origin

Code used	Gender	Age	Country of origin
AI	Male	33	Somalia
VK	Male	27	DRC
KK	Male	38	DRC
MN	Female	25	Zimbabwe

JH	Female	35	Rwanda
SU	Male	30	Burundi
MR	Female	29	Rwanda
AO	Male	39	Ethiopia
FB	Male	36	DRC
RH	Female	33	Burundi
VN	Female	40	DRC
RV	Male	32	Zimbabwe
MH	Male	32	Burundi
VZ	Male	28	Zimbabwe
TO	Male	37	Ghana

Source: Field data

Table 5.3 Sample size of and profile of South African participants, by gender, and ethnicity

Code used	Gender	Age	Ethnicity
ZM	Female	30	Zulu
FN	Male	25	Zulu
MG	Male	36	Zulu
MU	Female	23	Xhosa
SJ	Female	27	Zulu
BZ	Female	40	Zulu
SG	Male	32	Zulu
SN	Female	33	Zulu
MB	Male	26	Zulu

TJ	Male	18	Zulu
SC	Male	32	Zulu

Source: Field data

### 5.11.2 Snowball Sampling

Babbie (2013: 180) defines snowball sampling as a “non-probability sampling method often used in field research”. It is also referred to as a referral sample. According to Lune and Berg (2016: 39), snowball sampling is the most popular among researchers interested in studying various classes of deviance, sensitive topics, or difficult-to-reach populations, and it is the best way to identify participants with particular attributes or characteristics necessary in the study. Moreover, Babbie (2013: 188) adds that “snowball sampling is considered appropriate when the members of a special population are difficult to locate such as homeless individuals, migrant workers, or undocumented immigrants”. In this research, the researcher faced a difficulty in locating or reaching participants, especially the migrants who had been attacked during the 2008 and the 2015 xenophobic violence, as most of those victims were displaced during the violence and coupled with this is the fact that the migrant communities are difficult to reach in rural settlements as they represent a minority in the communities.

Lune and Berg (2016: 39) state that the basic strategy of snowball sampling entails identifying different people with relevant characteristics and interviewing them or otherwise gathering data from them. These are then asked for the names of other people who possess the same relevant attributes. Thus, in this research, using snowball sampling, the researcher must acknowledge that churches and NGOs played an important role in this research, as they referred the researcher to different people whom they believed would be helpful in the researcher’s studies. From the referral from the latter, the researcher would identify people to interview, especially people that fitted the description of the study. After the interview, the person who participated in the process would lead the researcher to another person to interview. This was mostly applied to migrants as they are not living in one section or road.

Furthermore, snowball sampling was appropriate because it gave the researcher access to refugees and asylum seekers, and since the researcher is a foreign national and he is able to easily communicate in English, French, Swahili, and Lingala, it was the most convenient way to approach people and explain the researcher’s project to them and interview them in their preferred language. However, for the South African nationals who could not express themselves in English, the researcher had to work with a South African national who is fluent

in Isizulu as an assistant to translate the questions and answers for the researcher and assist as an interpreter.

### **5.11.3 Sampling Technique**

The sampling technique used in the research is purposive sampling which entails selecting a sample based on the knowledge of the population, its elements, and the purpose of the study sample (Babbie 2013: 186). It is also referred to as judgmental sampling (See in Lune and Berg 2016: 39). Purposive sampling is widely used in qualitative research for the identification and choice of data that are related to the phenomenon being investigated. This entails identifying and selecting participants or groups of participants who have knowledge or experience of the phenomenon of interest. In this research, the selected participants considered to have experienced xenophobia are African migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, and these were the primary informants of this investigation, with special attention being given to those who had, in one way or another, experienced xenophobic violence. South African nationals were also included in this investigation. The study also included community leaders and members of NGOs working closely with refugees.

## **5.12 Data Collection**

Data collection is known as a process of collecting and measuring information of variables of interest in a systematic and proper way that allows the researcher to address the research objectives, to test the hypothesis, and to evaluate the outcomes. The purpose of data collection is to capture quality evidence and to richly analyse it (Kabir 2016: 201-276). This investigation used both categories of data collection, namely, primary, and secondary data, which are explained in the sub-sections that follow.

### **5.12.1 Primary Data**

Primary data are data collected from first-hand experience (Kabir 2016: 204). It is the most appropriate in this research as the research involved an AR component which aimed at preventing and combatting xenophobia in SA. Primary data was used through the following:

#### **(a) *In-Depth Interviews***

An interview is a conversation between the interviewer and the participants. It differs from the questionnaire in the sense that in a questionnaire, there are a series of questions that come one after the other, while an interview is less open and structured (Skovdal and Cornish 2015: 1-33). An interview is characterized by three elements which are firstly that the researcher must look for rich and detailed information; secondly, the answers should not be 'no' or 'yes';

and thirdly, the responses must be 'agree' or 'disagree' (Flick 2014: Rubin and Rubin 2012 see in ). The purpose of an interview is to fully explain the experience and behaviour of people in their social lives to bring social change (Schultze and Avital 2011: 1-16).

The interview process of this study entailed a combination of both semi-structured interviews and narrative interviews. The use of narrative interviews is very important as it allowed the participants to share their journeys to SA, their periodical experiences of xenophobia in SA, and the type of discriminations that they usually encounter, while the semi-structured interviews were applied flexibly as they allowed participants to share their own understandings and perspectives of xenophobia. Overall, all the 25 participants were interviewed, including the key informants, community leaders, and migrant representatives. Data collected from the interviews completed and supported the data generated from the FGDs and workshops.

*(b) Focus Group Discussions*

The Focus Group Discussion (FGD), also referred to as a group discussion by Babbie (2013), is mostly used in contemporary quality studies. "It is based on structured, semi-structured or unstructured interviews" (Babbie 2013: 315). It is also referred to as a type of in-depth interview conducted within a group (Freitas *et al.* 1998a: 2). In this research, four focus group discussions were used with each group separately, which means that one FGD entailed only South African nationals and another one entailed only migrants, and the reason for doing this was to allow each group to express themselves freely and to avoid any conflict between the participants which might ruin the entire process of the research. However, after the two-separate primary FGDs, two more FGDs were done, and this time the researcher had to have a mixed group discussion which means that the researcher had to select four migrants and four South Africans. This was important as the use of the FGDs, especially the mixed discussions, was to set a scene for a workshop with both participants and set an appropriate action where both groups could effectively see the strategies that need to be implemented to combat and prevent xenophobia.

However, due to financial limitations experienced during the process, the last FGD took place at the later stage as a form of an open dialogue between both groups. It is important to mention that the FGDs with South Africans took place in a home cell, which is a house that is selected by the church for the brethren living in a particular section of the community to gather and share the word of God based on the main sermon that was preached on a Sunday. The researcher had to attend home cell groups which would take place every Thursday evening and have a group discussion for 40 minutes with the participants.



Observation was used during the FGDs to see how both groups were interacting with one another.

*(c) Observation*

Observation is very important in a qualitative study as it serves as a method of data collection – this has been approved by Kawulich (2005: 3) who states that “many researchers have been using observation as a tool of collecting data. Observation is regarded as the most prevalent and fundamental practice of all modern science” (see in Flick 2014: 294). Observation is also regarded as a strategy that involves a general and efficient selection, watching and recording the behaviour and characteristics of living beings, objects, or phenomena (Elmusharaf 2012: 9). The most used technique of observation is known as the “participation observation”, where Flick (2014: 296) considers it as the “most prominent way of doing observation”, the reason being that it allows the researcher to go into the field and try to become part of that field and an active member of it.

Moreover, participant observation allows researchers to check the meaning of the key definitions of terms that participants use in interviews and observe events that informants may be unable or unwilling to share. Thus, in conducting this research, the researcher became a member of not the entire Chesterville community, but a member of Road 4 section. The researcher was introduced in that particular section by the leading pastor of a church called New Beginnings Church, which is one of the oldest churches in that community. Before the church services, the researcher had to walk in the community alone or with a few people with whom the researcher was working, and this was very important as the researcher had to ensure that the residents of Road 4 knew him and it allowed the researcher to understand the behaviour, attitude, and lifestyle of the members of the community towards migrants or people whom they had never seen in the community.

### **5.12.2 Secondary Data**

Secondary data is referred to as data gathered from a source that has already been published (Kabir 2016: 205). Secondary data was important to use in the literature review of this investigation as the researcher had to review different books and articles published by scholars dealing with xenophobia in South Africa. Although xenophobic violence takes place almost every year in the country, the researcher could not include updated information regarding the recent violence towards truck drivers and Somali shops as the cause of those attacks taps directly into those that have been explained in the literature review, however, secondary data was open for updates in case there were new policies or institutions aiming at

curbing the scourge of xenophobia. Amongst the secondary data used in this investigation were government action plans, journal articles, NGO reports, newspapers, UNHCR documents, online websites, Doctoral and master's degree theses, as well as different legislations and the South African Constitution.

### **5.13 Data Analysis**

Flick (2014:370) defines data analysis as the “interpretation and classification of linguistic material with the aim to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning making in the material and what is represented in it”. Data analysis is the most important part in research, and (Kothari 2004: 122) refers to the analysis of data as “the computation of certain measures along with searching for patterns of relationship that exist among data groups”. This research employed thematic and content qualitative analysis as techniques for analysing the data gathered during the field work. Thematic analysis offers an accessible and theoretically flexible approach to analyse data, and Braun and Clarke (2006 cited in Flick 2014: 421) define it as a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) of meaning in a dataset of usually text, and detailed complex interpretations of socially and historically located phenomena.

For the purpose of this research, data from the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observations will be analysed thematically. This entails the reading of interview notes word for word and underlining ideas or major concepts that have been mentioned repeatedly and assigning codes to each idea in a particular paragraph. Thereafter, similar ideas falling in different paragraphs will be brought together under one theme (Dey 2003). The researcher must however clarify that the software used for coding the themes or patterns collected is NVivo 12. The second method of analysing data in this research is the qualitative content analysis, which is described by Bauer (2000 cited in Flick 2014: 429) as a classical procedure for analysing textual material regardless of its origins, and this may range from data from the media, data from both participant interviews, focus group discussions, and observations.

### **5.14 Evaluation**

Social cohesion and conflict transformation cannot be achieved in a situation of xenophobic violence without changing the attitudes of and breaking the barriers that exist between South Africans and migrants. This inquiry designed an interventionist approach to change the attitude among the participants, and in doing that, certain questions needed to be considered, namely: 1) Who are the people that are needed? 2) What role are they playing in the community during

xenophobic violence? Are they perpetrators or preachers of peace? 3) How many people are needed to benefit from the intervention? The identification of the relevant people is very important as a closer observation on the behaviour and attitude will generate from them, and through them the researcher will determine whether a change took place through different interventions.

The information collected from participants in the interviews and FGDs were evaluated prior to the interventions. To understand the attitudes and perceptions that both groups have towards each other, it was important to closely observe the language used, and the tone, actions, and body language of the participants during the interviews and FGDs. These were very important in determining someone's attitude. Since skills transfer, or skills empowerment is one of the objectives that this study aimed to accomplish, the researcher will evaluate the outcome of the skills training that the participants are attending. Moreover, the skills transfer that the participants are doing is sponsored by an NGO called 'Up Skills' which specialises in training people to do practical jobs.

### **5.15 Validity and Reliability**

Validity and reliability are very important in a qualitative research. This has been acknowledged by Golafshani (2003: 597-607) who states that the use of validity and reliability are common in a qualitative research methodology. Validity and reliability are also considered as the most important components of a qualitative research as they help the researcher in designing and analysing the data collected to judge the results (see in Golafshani 2003). In the same vein, validity and reliability recognize poor research from good research and are very convenient in assuring that the researcher agrees that his/her findings are credible and trustworthy (Brink 1993: 35-39).

While some scholars have acknowledged the importance of validity and reliability in a qualitative research, it is important to mention that there are controversies on the application of validity and reliability in a qualitative research, as many scholars are of the view that both validity and reliability are irrelevant in a qualitative study. For instance, Stenbacka (2001 cited in Golafshani 2003) posits that reliability is more applicable in the case of measurements, and for that reason, it is irrelevant in a qualitative research. The researcher must however state at this stage that validity and reliability are very important, whether in a quantitative or qualitative study, and this is because a good research study needs to show integrity, credibility, and trustworthiness.

### **5.15.1 Validity**

Validity is defined as a “trustworthiness of inferences”, and although there are controversies on the use of validity in a qualitative study, in past years, validity in qualitative studies has received more attention (Daytner 2006: 3). “Validity helps the researcher in determining whether the results and interpretations accurately reflect the meanings, perceptions, and beliefs of the participants, programs and settings about which they are written” (Daytner 2006). This means that in a qualitative study, validity deals with the appropriateness of the tools, process, and data. Thus, all the steps taken by the researcher during the research process must be appropriate from the aims and objectives of the research to the findings and conclusion of the research (Leung 2015). Although many scholars are against the use of validity in a qualitative research, Creswell recognises it as one of the pillars in a qualitative study (Creswell 2013: 251). He further states that qualitative validity allows the researcher to check for the accuracy of the findings, by employing certain procedures, and coupled with the accuracy of the findings, it is the truthfulness of the research findings that the researcher is providing. However, some scholars have used that which they consider as appropriate terms in *lieu* of validity, namely, quality, rigour, and trustworthiness (Davies and Dodd 2002 see in Golafshani 2003: 597-606).

### **5.15.2 Reliability**

While Brink (1993: 35-38) refers to reliability as the ability of the researcher to collect and record information accurately, Leung (2015: 324-327) posits that “reliability refers to the exact replicability of the process” (Golafshani 2003; Leung 2015). Reliability mostly deals with the consistency of the research (Creswell 2013; Leung 2015). This means that reliability is the ability of the researcher to constantly produce the same results over a repeated period of time (Brink 1993: 35-38). While conducting the research, the researcher is required to use the same or comparable methods to obtain the same or comparable result every time he/she uses the methods on the same or comparable subjects (Brink 1993).

## **5.16 Achieving Validity and Reliability**

Multiple approaches were taken into consideration when achieving validity and reliability in this research. To ensure reliability and validity, the researcher followed the valuable steps provided by scholars in order to ensure that the information collected was accurate, namely, credibility, neutrality or confirmability, consistency or dependability, and lastly applicability or transferability (Golafshani 2003).

### 5.16.1 Achieving Validity

Creswell (2014b: 249) advises researchers to use multiple approaches to access their abilities to ensure the accuracy of the findings and convince leaders about the findings of their research. Thus, in this research, six approaches were adopted to achieve validity, namely, triangulation, member checking and participants' review, use of description to convey the findings, presentation of negative or discrepant information, spending a prolonged time in the field, and clarifying the bias (Daytner 2006; Creswell 2013).

#### (a) *Triangulation*

According to Flick (2004: 193-183), triangulation is a combination of data collected from multiple sources at different times, in different places, or from different people. It is viewed as a way of improving the validity and reliability of a research study (Golafshani 2003: 597-606). It is not only limited in using one particular data source, but it entails using multiple data sources, investigators, theories, or methods to confirm a warranted interpretation or conclusion, in order to build a coherent justification for themes. In doing so, it creates room for trustworthiness (Daytner 2006: 4).

Due to the fact that xenophobia is a very complex problem in SA, both source, methodological, and investigator triangulation were used accordingly in order to avoid relying on one source. Firstly, the researcher used source triangulation in order to obtain direct information from the selected informants. This means that different interviews were conducted with both groups, namely, migrants and South African nationals, including NGOs aiding refugees and asylum seekers. This was done in order to gain a clear understanding and information about the attitudes and the attacks that migrants are experiencing, and coupled with this, gaining information on how both groups can tolerate each other regardless of the socio-economic condition.

Secondly, to ensure triangulation, the researcher used methodological triangulation which entails the use of information gathered during in-depth interviews with participants at their agreed time depending on their availability, and observations of participants and focus group discussions were used. The researcher ensured that his assistant during the research process and himself took note of all the information that the participants were giving, and they also used a recorder to ensure that all appropriate information gathered from participants could be captured appropriately.

Investigator triangulation was very important in this research as the researcher had to work with an assistant who was helping in the interview process, observations, and FGDs; the

researcher and assistant completed each other in a way that whatever information that the researcher did not obtain or information that the researcher failed to record or write down, the assistant would capture it. However, all the transcripts that the researcher received from the assistant had to go through a thorough analysis to ensure that if there was any mistake, the researcher and assistant would correct it, and if it was required to go back to the field, the researcher and assistant would go back and rectify the mistake.

*(b) Member Checking and Participants' Review*

According to Lincoln and Guba, "member-checking involves seeking feedback from representatives of the participant groups involved in or affected by the investigation" (Lincoln & Guba 1985 see in Daytner 2006: 6). The purpose of checking is to determine the accuracy of the findings through the process of taking the findings back to the participants and seeing if they agree with the accuracy of the findings. Keeping these facts in mind, the researcher was in constant communication with the participants using social network communication after the field work. It is important to note that all participants did not access the review process as the researcher randomly selected those who participated in that process. In following Mabry's (1998) advice, through the review process, the researcher opens a space for the participants to critique the findings of the data – this was done through the process of giving them copies of relevant data that was not yet interpreted, namely, transcripts or observations from the field notes. In doing so, the researcher's aim was to give the participants an opportunity to correct the errors and to provide additional information that would improve the accuracy of the data (see in Daytner 2006: 6).

*(c) Use of Description*

The use of description is important in determining and adding to the findings' validity of a qualitative research as it takes the readers to the settings experienced and facts experienced during the investigation, and moreover, it provides the effectiveness of the findings. Since the research was qualitative, the findings were thoroughly analysed and richly presented with full descriptions and explanations.

*(d) Negative or Discrepant Information*

This part deals with the information that is contradictory or cases of uncertainties in the findings where both groups of the informants are providing the researcher with contradictory information and narratives since the research touches on the real life and on the attitude of both groups of informants in the research. Since xenophobia affects both groups (migrants and South African nationals), the researcher had to ensure that the information collected was

not contradictory, although in some instances, contradictory information was presented since xenophobia is a social phenomenon. It is important to mention that the action research method was relevant in determining inaccurate information as the researcher had to take the information collected to the informants. An in-depth analysis of this chapter is presented in the data discussion chapter 7 below (Creswell 2013: 253).

(e) *Spending Prolonged Time in the Field*

Prolonged time in the field is considered by Denzin (1989) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) as “an investment of a sufficient amount of time in the research setting. Scholars in the field have argued that repeated observation in a qualitative research gives more credibility to the research” (see in Daytner 2006: 7). Moreover, spending time in the field helps the researcher to achieve certain purposes of the study such as learning and understanding the context of the study, testing for misinformation introduced by distortions of the researcher or the respondents, building trust and rapport with the informants, and lastly identifying the characteristics and elements in the situation that are most relevant to the problem or issue being investigated (Daytner 2006: 7). Since it is being reported that xenophobia in townships and informal settlements takes place on a monthly or weekly basis, half a year was spent in the field (six months) and the researcher believes that this was enough time to grasp the issue under investigation.

### **5.16.2 Achieving Reliability**

To achieve reliability, Creswell advises the qualitative researcher to document the procedures of the case studies and to document many steps of the procedures that they undertake. He further recommends a study protocol that other researchers can follow and that the researcher also followed in their research, namely:

1. Checking of transcript to ensure that no mistake is made during the transcription
2. Ensure that there is no drift in the definition of codes – this is done by constantly comparing data with the codes
3. Cross-check codes developed by different researchers by comparing results that are independently derived (Creswell 2013: 253)

### **5.17 Ethics**

Ethics is very important in a research as it governs the behaviour of the researcher towards the participants throughout the research process. This means that the researcher and the participants are called to commit to each other and to respect each other's views on the topic

being investigated. Thus, the researcher is under the obligation to protect participants, build trust with them, promote the integrity of the research, protect against improper behaviour that might reflect on the organisation or institution, and manage new challenges (see in Creswell 2008: 87). This research followed all the ethical principles in order to abide by the rules of the university ethics committee.

#### **5.17.1 Informed Consent**

All the participants were given the information and consent form prior to the start of the data collection process. All information pertaining to the research, including the objectives of the research, were given to them in written form and was then explained orally for those who could not understand the purpose of the research. Moreover, the participants understood that by signing the consent form, they were agreeing to be interviewed on the topic being investigated several times, as this might be necessary for the researcher. In the cases where the participants could not read English, the researcher had with himself an IsiZulu information and consent form. However, at some points, the researcher encountered participants who could not read, and in that case, the researcher had to ask his assistant to explain the purpose of the research to the participant.

The researcher clearly explained to the participants that he was a student, therefore there would be no monetary payment involved as a result of their consent to participate in the research. The consent form was given freely to the participants. However, the researcher explained to them the benefit of the research as the main purpose of the research is to prevent and combat xenophobia which affects all groups, be it migrants or South African nationals.

#### **5.17.2 Voluntary Participation and the Right to withdraw**

The researcher has an obligation to inform the participants about the right that they have to voluntarily participate in the research or to withdraw at any stage of the research for whatever reason they have (Silverman 2013: 162). In this research, most participants were informed of their right to freely participate in the research and to withdraw at any stage for their own personal reason. The researcher also explained to the participants that they were free to answer or not to answer any question with which they were not happy. This happens especially with those who have been physically assaulted during the violence and those who potentially played a role as a perpetrator. However, it was clearly explained to them that they need to be honest and truthful in the information that they provided.



### **5.17.3 Confidentiality and Anonymity**

All the participants were assured that the information that they shared during the process was to be confidential and that their anonymity was protected, as they were aware that their initials would be used in *lieu* of their names.

#### **Avoiding Harm to Participants and Biasness**

During the data collection, the researcher had to choose an environment that was not harmful to the participants and keeping in mind that migrants living in the townships are mostly affected by xenophobia, the researcher had to find a place that did not present risks to both migrants and South African nationals. For activities that involved the participation of both groups, the researcher had to sit back to let a South African lead either a FGD or workshop to avoid any bias or being accused of siding with one group and not the other, and during these activities, the researcher was playing the role of an observer. This was also a way of avoiding any conflict of interest.

### **5.18 Conclusion**

This chapter explained the research design, methodology and data collection that was employed in this research. This chapter provided the analysis of AR as the appropriate design for this research in building peace and harmony between migrants and local South Africans, starting from the definition of AR, its concept, and the reason for choosing it as a mode of inquiry. The chapter demonstrated that AR is important because of its ability to help the researcher in identifying a problem where he/she will not be playing a role in terms of planning and designing the suitable intervention as this can only be done by the participants. Furthermore, the qualitative methodology was adopted as it taps directly into the purpose of this research which is to explore strategic ways of preventing and combatting xenophobia. This cannot be accomplished numerically but rather through an in-depth explanation of the feelings and attitudes that one has towards the other. The snowball and purposive techniques were used as a way of identifying and selecting key informants. Since xenophobia is a complex topic in SA, the research used primary and secondary sources in the data collection process. Primary data was very important as it entails in-depth interviews, FGDs, observations, and workshops, and these help the researcher in capturing the feelings and experiences of both groups towards each other. The secondary data collection helped the researcher to use publications from scholars on the topic being investigated. Thematic and content analysis was used in analysing the information collected from the informants.

## **Chapter 6: Presentation of Results and Discussion**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the data collected for this study in order to promote social cohesion and bring social change and friendship between migrants and the locals. The chapter explores all the possible motives behind xenophobia from the social aspect to the political aspect. The data presented in this chapter are presented according to the two groups, which means that on the one hand, the chapter presents the data collected from migrants, and on the other hand, the data from the local people, who are the second group. This chapter reports the views and narratives obtained from the semi-structured interviews which was the initial data collection process. Moreover, in order to understand the depth of xenophobia in the South African context, different methods were also used as a means of collecting data, namely FGDs and observations, including data collected through television and radio interviews from different political leaders and government officials. All these efforts were done in order to understand and address the historical and current causes of xenophobia which constitute the first objective of this study. Thus, data that emerged from the interviews were deductively coded and thematically analysed. All analysis was performed using NVivo version 11. This chapter will set a ground for discussions for the objectives of this study, which have been presented earlier in Section 1.11 in Chapter 1. The information presented in this chapter was collected through semi-structured interviews with the participants – some participants were interviewed in Chesterville, and others were interviewed in Albert park in Durban's Central Business District (CBD) due to the 2018 and 2019 xenophobic violence that took place.

### **6.2 Foreign National Participants' Biographical Information**

This section is very important in this study as it presents the biographies of the migrants who participated in this study. Included in this section are their countries of origin, highest level of education, pushing factors and family structures, and their presence in SA. This information is very important in understanding the xenophobic attitudes and stereotypes directed at them. It is important to mention that the reports of this section are a result of semi-structured interviews conducted with migrants.

#### **6.2.1 Age of Foreign National Participants**

While the study seeks to find appropriate strategies to prevent and combat xenophobia, the study understood that the youth are always on the frontline of the attacks, and This study targeted migrant youths living in Chesterville, from ages ranging from 18 to above. However,

in this study, the researcher did not get a chance to find participants who were above the age of 50 – the eldest participant was aged 48 and was a refugee from the DRC. The majority of the participants were aged between 22 and 36 years of age. It was important to focus on youth representing the migrants due to the fact that the youth are always the victims of the attacks as they are portrayed as job stealers or taking advantage of South African women. Thus, having them in the study was significant in finding a possible way of curbing xenophobia.

### 6.2.2 Gender

To gain a clear understanding of xenophobia, it was important for the research to work with both male and female participants. It was in this vein that during the research process, there were ten male participants who availed themselves and five female participants. This was important as both groups had to share their experiences in terms of xenophobia, and this also helped the researcher in finding whether there were similarities in the harassment that migrants of both sexes are facing in SA. Both groups agreed to be interviewed, without any hesitation, and they cooperated with the interview researcher.

### 6.2.3 Country of Origin

This research explored the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers living in Durban, and for this reason, it was important to work with different groups of migrants from different countries. Thus, this research study had one participant from Ethiopia, four participants from the DRC, three participants from Burundi, one participant from Ghana, one participant from Somalia, two participants from Rwanda, and three participants from Zimbabwe. It was important to interview these groups of people because the majority of them are living in the country as refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, during incidences of xenophobic violence, they are always targeted or called out to leave the country by the local people.

The countries of origin of the foreign nationals who participated in the interviews are shown in Table 7.1. Most (n=4; 26.7%) were from the Democratic Republic of Congo, while three (20%) were from Burundi and Zimbabwe. Other foreign nationals who participated included those from Rwanda (n=2; 13.3%), while Ghana, Somalia, and Ethiopia had one representative each.

**Table 6.1:** Foreign nationals' country of origin.

Country	Frequency	Percent
Ethiopia	1	6.7

Democratic Republic of Congo	4	26.7
Burundi	3	20.0
Ghana	1	6.7
Somalia	1	6.7
Rwanda	2	13.3
Zimbabwe	3	20.0
Total	15	100.0

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The above-mentioned group involved the ones who agreed to take part in the research process. However, in the past years, people have witnessed strong negative attitudes towards the Nigerians who are accused of being involved in criminal activities, leading to the killing and harassment of migrants from Nigeria (Adebisi 2017; News 2019; Ogunnowo and Joshua 2019). Thus, in the past years, Nigerians have been at the centre of xenophobic attacks in the country, and it was in this vein that in this research study, it was important to work with Nigerians. However, to avoid any physical or violent altercation between participants, this discussion had to take place in a safe environment, and it intervened as a FGD which had three Nigerians and two other South African participants.

#### **6.2.4 Reasons for leaving the home Country: Push and pull factors**

Working with migrants from different countries within the African continent shows that their pushing factors differ, however the factors share a point of commonality which is finding a safe country. It was in this vein that during the interview process, the researcher found that most participants were leaving their country of origin due to different motives such as internal conflict, economic deprivation, humanitarian catastrophes, or terror attacks. For instance, a 33-year-old migrant from Somalia revealed in the semi-structured interview that:

I left my country because of the armed conflict opposing the government troops against the al-Shabaab terror organisation. I'm from the Northern of Somalia, and my town is called Qardho. There is an intense conflict between the government and al-Shabaab, so I had a choice of either joining one the group, because if I failed to join, I will be accused of working for the other group, whether the terror or the government. Because I didn't want to join any of them, I took the third choice which was to run with my friends (Interview with **AI** at Emmanuel Church, 18 July 2018).

While a participant from Somalia had a choice of either joining the government troops or the al-Shabaab terror group, this was not the case for migrants from the DRC, who were not given a choice to join the rebel groups but had to run to save their lives and families. This was explained by a 27-year-old Congolese refugee from the Eastern province of DRC which is still facing armed conflict, and the participant stated that:

My brother, I live today by the grace of God, because I saw my parents being killed in my presence. My little brother was abducted, and I don't know where he is until today, maybe they have killed him. I had no other choice than to run into a safer country. That is why I'm in South Africa (Interview with VK in Chesterville, 10 May 2019).

Table 6.2 details the reasons that the participating foreign nationals left their home country to come to South Africa. More (n=5; 33.3%) indicated that armed conflicts in their nations were the cause for their migration. Other reasons noted were economic reasons (n=2; 13.3%), al-Shabaab terror attacks (n=1; 6.7%), political instability (n=1; 6.7%), and tribal conflict (n=1; 6.7%). It is worth stressing here that five (33.3%) did not disclose reasons for their migration to South Africa.

**Table 6.2:** Reasons for migration of foreign national participants into South Africa.

Reasons for leaving	Frequency	Percent
No response	5	33.3
Al-Shabaab terror attack	1	6.7
Armed conflict	5	33.3
Economic reasons	2	13.3
Political instability	1	6.7
Tribal conflict	1	6.7
Total	15	100.0

Migrants who have left their countries of origin due to armed conflict share similar experiences. This means that the experiences of Congolese migrants are similar to those from Burundi, since that country is also facing armed conflict and political turmoil. However, that reality is different with migrants from Zimbabwe and Rwanda. This was demonstrated to the researcher by a 25-year-old participant from Zimbabwe who revealed that she did not leave Zimbabwe

because of armed conflict, but because of the economic opportunities that SA can give and which she is unable to obtain in Zimbabwe (Interview with **MN** at Emmanuel Church in Chesterville, 3 July 2018). That which **MN** revealed is partly similar to statements of migrants from Rwanda, as **JH**, a 35-year-old lady from Rwanda, stated during the interview that “I left Rwanda because of the political dictatorship that is affecting our country, coupled with this it was difficult to be in a country where I witnessed my all families being killed during the genocide of 1994” (Interview with **JH** at Emmanuel Church, 24 April 2018). This section demonstrates that regardless of their countries of origin, migrants are in SA because of the peace, safety, and security that their respective countries are failing to provide for them.

#### **6.2.5 Status in South Africa**

When planning the study's samples, the researcher thought that everything would flow as planned, and initially, the researcher had planned to have an equal percentage of asylum seekers and refugees, since these are the people who are mostly affected during xenophobic violence. However, the researcher was surprised to find that the majority of migrants living in SA, or more precisely the migrants whom the researcher found in Durban, are asylum seekers regardless of the years that they have been in the country. Only a few migrants have refugee status, while another small group have managed to have a Permanent Residence (PR). This was explained by Ramjathan-Keogh from Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) who condemned the process of Department of Home Affairs Regional Office of being slow and ineffective, which has resulted in keeping people in asylum limbo for many years, instead of processing them in order for them to know whether they have been granted refugee status or refused asylum (Grant and Brodie 2016). This means that there is a multi-year backlog of unresolved asylum cases in SA, which has resulted in having fewer refugees and many asylum seekers. This was evident in this research as most of the participants in the study were asylum seekers.

The importance of this section rests on the fact that it is important to know the legal status of migrants living in SA to understand their vulnerabilities during the attacks, and moreover, since the attacks are against migrants, it is important to know whether those with refugee status or permanent resident (PR) also face similar harassment and discrimination shown to asylum seekers. Thus, Table 7.3 describes the status of the foreign nationals who participated in the semi-structured interviews in South Africa. As explained above and from Table 7.3, more than half (n=8; 57.1%) identified as asylum seekers, three (21.4%) had refugee status, two (14.3%) were students, while only one (7.1%) had a South African Identity Document (ID).

**Table 6.3:** Foreign nationals' status in South Africa.

Status in South Africa	Frequency	Percent
Refugee status	3	21.4
SA ID	1	7.1
Asylum seeker	8	57.1
Student	2	14.3
Total	14	100.0

### 6.2.6 Number of years living in South Africa

The numbers of years that the foreign national participants have lived in South Africa are shown in Table 7.4. The minimum number of years given was two, while 19 was the maximum years indicated. Overall, the foreign nationals had lived on average  $10 \pm 4$  years in South Africa.

**Table 6.4:** The mean years lived by foreign nationals in South Africa.

Years in South Africa				
N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
14	2.00	19.00	10.0714	4.37588

### 6.2.7 Marital Status

The marital status of the foreign nationals who participated in the interviews is shown in Table 6.5. The majority ( $n=10$ ; 71.4%) indicated that they were married while three (21.4%) were single. It was also noted that one among them indicated to be co-habiting.

**Table 6.5:** Foreign nationals' marital status.

Marital status	Frequency	Percent
Married	10	71.4
Co-habiting	1	7.1

Single	3	21.4
Total	14	100.0

#### 6.2.8 Employment Status

The employment status of the foreign nationals who participated in the interviews is shown in Table 6.6. It was observed that more (n=4; 30.8%) indicated that they were employed while a similar number also claimed to be unemployed. More so, two (15.4%) indicated that they were students while a similar number were self-employed.

Table 6.6: Foreign nationals' employment status.

Employment status	Frequency	Percent
Informal leader	1	7.7
Employed	4	30.8
Self-employed	2	15.4
Unemployed	4	30.8
Student	2	15.4
Total	13	100.0

### 6.3 South African National Participants' Biographical Information

It is well known that xenophobic violence in SA is a result of socio-economic frustrations that the local people are facing. Thus, xenophobia cannot be prevented with migrants alone, and this means that it is important to work with South Africans to find a peaceful approach to prevent and combat xenophobia. This section presents the biographical information of the participating South African nationals, which is very important in curbing xenophobia. This section is very important as it provides the background of the local people to draw the similarities and differences with migrants which can play a role in identifying a possible way of preventing xenophobia in the country. Thus, the information provided in this section was obtained during the semi-structured interviews with South Africans alone.



### 6.3.1 Age of South African National Participants

Youth play an important role in societies and in communities, and the researcher had to work with South African youth to find an appropriate strategy to prevent xenophobia. It was important to work with South African youth since they are always at the centre of attacks against migrants, and moreover, they can be easily manipulated by the community elders or community leaders to attack migrants. The age range for South African participants was between 19 and 45 years of age. Youth also constitute a group that is affected by unemployment, which results in these youth accusing migrants of stealing their jobs.

### 6.3.2 South African Nationals' Gender

Although men are always reported as attacking migrants, this research could not be limited to men alone, and it was in this vein that the researcher had to also approach women for them to participate in the research process. Although the majority were not comfortable attending the study, the researcher had 11 participants in total, who included five females and six males. It was important to include both sexes in the study as the researcher believed that within them, there would be different views on xenophobic violence.

### 6.3.3 South African Nationals' Marital Status

The marital status of the South African nationals who participated in the interviews is shown in Table 6.7. It was observed that equal numbers ( $n=5$ ; 45.5%) of the participants were married or single, while only one (9.1%) indicated to be engaged.

**Table 6.7:** South African nationals' marital status.

Marital status	Frequency	Percent
Single	5	45.5
Married	5	45.5
Engaged	1	9.1
Total	11	100.0

### 6.3.4 South African Nationals' Educational Level

The levels of education indicated by the South African nationals who participated in the interviews are shown in Table 6.8. The majority (n=7; 63.6%) had a matric qualification, while the others (n=2; 18.2%) had certificate and diploma level qualifications, respectively.

**Table 6.8:** South African national participants' educational level.

Educational level	Frequency	Percent
Matric	7	63.6
Certificate	2	18.2
Diploma	2	18.2
Total	11	100.0

### 6.3.5 South African Nationals' Employment Status

One of the causes of xenophobia in SA is linked to unemployment of the local people, as the locals are of the view that migrants are taking their jobs. However, the local people are more likely to be employed as compared to migrants. This will be discussed in the following chapter. The employment status of the South African nationals who participated in the interviews is shown in Table 6.9. It was observed that most (n=6; 54.5%) indicated that they were employed, while five (45.5%) were unemployed.

**Table 6.9:** South African national participants' employment status.

Employment status	Frequency	Percent
Unemployed	5	45.5
Employed	6	54.5
Total	11	100.0

### 6.3.6 Ethnicity of the South African Nationals

The ethnicity of the South African nationals who participated in the interviews is shown in Table 6.10. The overwhelming majority (n=10; 90.9%) identified as Zulu, while only one (9.1%) indicated to be of the Xhosa ethnic group.

**Table 6.10:** South African national participants' ethnicity.

Ethnicity	Frequency	Percent
Zulu	10	90.9
Xhosa	1	9.1
Total	11	100.0

Given that the majority (n=10) of the participants were Zulus, it was important to know whether they were originally from Chesterville or came from another township within the KwaZulu-Natal province. This would help to learn whether those not originally from Chesterville also face negative attitude when they moved to Chesterville or when they relocated to KwaZulu-Natal. Among those (n=8) who answered the question, more (n=5) indicated 'no', while three answered 'yes' that they were originally from Chesterville, as shown in Table 6.11.

**Table 6.11:** Chesterville origin of South African national participants.

Originally from Chesterville?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	3	37.5
No	5	62.5
Total	8	100.0

## 6.4 Summary of Participants

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 have provided insight into the biographical information of the participants. It emerged that armed conflict in the migrants' home countries was a main cause for their migration to South Africa, and the majority identified as asylum seekers in South Africa. In terms of their employment status, it was observed that more South Africans are employed

when compared to the foreign nationals. Nonetheless, some of the foreign nationals were self-employed. However, it is not surprising that more South Africans are employed as compared to migrants, since they are entitled to certain benefits provided to them by the government – this will be thoroughly discussed in Section 6.6 and in Chapter 7. Regarding their marital status, more of the foreign nationals were married when compared to their South African counterparts. This information plays an important role in identifying the elements that trigger xenophobia in SA, and moreover, xenophobia in the South African context cannot be explored without a full knowledge of the participants' biographical information. Coupled with this is the fact that the study uses the AR paradigms, hence it was important to know and understand the participants' background.

## 6.5 Emerging Themes and Subthemes from the Semi-Structured Interviews with Foreign Nationals

The analysis of the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews resulted in the identification of the themes and subthemes highlighted in Table 6.12. the data presented in this section was derived from semi-structured interviews with migrants identified in Table 6.1. This section presents the views provided by the migrants and they have been reported in a narrative way.

As stated in Section 6.1, NVivo 11 was used in this research, thus data from semi-structured interviews was transcribed verbatim and used as such during the analysis phase. More so, relevant quotes from the data generated from the semi-structured interviews were used in supporting the discussion on themes. The names of the participants are not published in the study to ensure their anonymity. Instead, the researcher used their first names and initials to report their views, and in the case where there is more than one person using the same initials, the researcher associated their identification with a number to avoid any confusion.

**Table 6.12:** Identification of themes and subthemes from the interviews with foreign nationals.

Themes	Subthemes
1. Causes of Xenophobic conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Job conflicts</li> <li>• Drugs and criminality</li> </ul>
2. South Africans and Xenophobic Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discrimination against foreign nationals</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence against foreign nationals</li> </ul>
3. Combatting Xenophobic conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community engagement and integration</li> <li>• Government interventions</li> <li>• Role of the media</li> <li>• Role of NGOs</li> </ul>

The themes and subthemes presented in Table 7.12 were identified in line with achieving the research objectives in this study, which have been mentioned earlier in Section 6.11 in Chapter 1.

### 6.5.1 Causes of Xenophobic Conflict in South Africa

As highlighted in the literature, xenophobic violence and its manifestation have been witnessed in SA since the changing of the apartheid regime to democracy in 1994. More worrisome is that South African nationals have developed an attitude of hostility and discrimination towards foreign nationals (Misago 2016b: 443-467). Although xenophobia dates to 1994, xenophobia in SA is witnessed in the country almost every year, leaving migrants helpless. The recent xenophobic attack against migrants took place in 2019 in Gauteng (Human Rights Watch 2019b). Bearing this in mind, it was prudent to know from the perspective of both the foreign nationals and the South African citizens the factors that could have influenced xenophobic hostility in the country. It emerged from the interviews with the participants that job conflicts, drugs, and criminality were the core causes of the hostilities amongst the South Africans. The excerpts from the interviews are further discussed under the subsequent subthemes.

#### (a) *Job Conflicts*

Undeniably, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to a recent study, the democracy dividend in the country is undermined by challenges of high inequality, high poverty, and unemployment (Sulla and Zikhali 2018). The underlying factors may be driving the xenophobic assault on foreign nationals, who are seen to be competing with the locals for the limited jobs available in the country. Consistent with this, some of the foreign national participants acknowledged that job conflicts may be partly blamed for the xenophobic conflict in South Africa. Although job conflicts can relate to both groups, the views expressed in this subtheme are only those expressed by migrants.

It was revealed empirically that foreigners take home cheaper wages under poor working conditions, hence companies are now preferring to hire foreign nationals. This is reflected in the following statement expressed by migrants:

That is true! I must agree with them, but you must know that sometimes they are right and sometimes they are not. Let me give you an example. We foreigners came to this country where we don't have a cousin, or parents; we must find accommodations because if you don't, you will sleep outside, and we must find a job, because if you don't find one you will not survive, and these facts alone are very stressful. Now you see a job paying R10,000, the only condition for you to have that job is that you must provide a South African ID which you don't have because Home Affairs doesn't make it easy for us. Knowing that you must pay your rent and foods, you will agree to take that job for R4,000 instead of R10,000. That won't please South Africans, because a South African will never accept to be paid R4,000 for a job that is supposed to pay R10,000. This means that they are right in their claim, but they need to understand that we have to do it for us to live (MR).

With reference to the foreigners working under poor conditions that South African citizens hardly accept, the following was noted:

Sometimes yes, because some companies hire foreigners because they are cheap, and they don't have proper papers. Most of them have no place to complain about the abuse and treatment they receive. While South Africans when something is wrong in the company they will protest, and the government will hear them, which is different with foreigners (MR).

Revealing a further point, the participants however noted that there are some jobs that South African nationals would decline doing while foreign nationals would embrace those jobs. For example, South Africans hardly work as security and car guards. These are notable and main areas where foreign nationals are employed:

There are some sectors that South Africans don't like such as securities, car watches, and waitresses. These are the things that they don't like but foreigners are involved in those. You must also know that it is now, that you are seeing them working as security guards; before that, you will see none of them working as security guard (MR).

Apart from security and car guard work, it was also revealed that South African employers preferred foreign nationals to the locals as hired maids due to their impeccable attitude to work:

Plus when you look at those that are looking for maids, the majority of South Africans prefers people from Malawi and Zimbabwe instead of the local South African. Because a South African won't come if, for example, it is raining, while a foreigner will come because she must pay rent and send money back home (MN).

Drawing from the above, it can be stated that foreign nationals are only taking jobs that the locals are unwilling to do because of low salary offered by the employers. This assertion is further supported by another of the interviewees who argued that the accusation of foreigners taking local jobs depends on the type of jobs:

What kind of jobs are we stealing? These car watch jobs that we are doing is not stealing any job, if they think that they are strong and they really want it, they can come and do it. Because you don't need a qualification to do it. But the hardship that comes with it, always chased them away. I have worked with some of them before, but they all run away because this job is not easy. Now imagine with this job I have to take care of my family (SU).

Echoing similar sentiments, another of the foreign interviewees hinted that it is nearly impossible for foreigners to secure a good job without a South African identity card: It depends now on what type of jobs they are saying foreigners are stealing. Because in this country for you to have a good job you need to have a SA ID, which we don't have.

Further to the above, the interviewee lamented on the difficulty in finding a good job as an asylum seeker. Hence, and to mitigate against this, foreign asylum seekers have no other alternative but to compete with the locals for the menial jobs at any given condition:

Some of us are here for ten years without the permanent residence. Which company will hire an asylum seeker from Burundi? So, that leave us with no option than to look for those small jobs that we can find to survive. For us to do it, we must make sure that we take it at whatever cost or price, because if you don't do it, the end of the month will be waiting for you. We are stealing jobs, but we are trying to survive in a country that does not want us (RH).

While sharing a similar view as the above, another of the foreign nationals however acknowledged that some foreigners are taking jobs belonging to South Africans and pointed out that foreigners are creating jobs and hiring South African citizens. Hence, it cannot be stated that foreign nationals are poaching jobs from the locals if they are also contributing to the employment opportunities in the country:

These things are two ways, some are taking jobs belonging to South Africans like people from Zimbabwe and Malawi; they are disputing the petty jobs with South Africans. And there are also those that are creating jobs for South Africans. For example, in our shops we have hired South Africans, can those guys said that we took their jobs? No! they will never say that (MH).

Moreover, one of the foreign nationals considered the accusation of job stealing by the locals as false. On the contrary, the interviewee pointed out that foreign nationals are rather creating job opportunities for themselves, and thus in doing so, have created employment for South Africans:

These are false accusations to me. I'm going to talk about me and my experience in SA. I'm an Ethiopian, where in this country do you think that they can hire an Ethiopian? So instead of looking for a job, I create a job opportunity for South Africans, because as you can see there are three South African ladies working in my shop. Maybe there are other people taking their jobs, but I don't think that those accusations are true (AO).

The view presented above shows that migrants are opposing the fact that they are portrayed as job stealers, however, it also shows that some migrants have accepted the fact that they are taking jobs belonging to the local people due to the exclusion that they are facing. This section is thoroughly discussed in Section 7.3.2 in Chapter 8. The reason of providing a thorough discussion of this subtheme in a later section is due to the fact that in this section, the views expressed by the participants are only being reported without challenging them to empirical studies.

(b) *Drugs and Criminality*

According to the opinion of Crush and Ramachandran (2019: 15), xenophobic attacks in SA dwell on a public rhetoric that portrays African foreign nationals as the scapegoats for social and physical problems affecting South Africans. Part of the public rhetoric is the accusation that African foreign nationals are drug traffickers or criminals. Consistent with this, one of the interviewees pointed out that while it can be stated that some foreign nationals are engaging in drugs, South African nationals are also guilty of the same crime:

These accusations are also two sided. That means that it is true that people like Nigerians are selling drugs in the country, but there is also South Africans selling drugs. Criminals are from Mozambique and Zimbabwe in this country but South Africans in the communities also are killing each other. These accusations are true, but we must look at both sides (MH).

Echoing similar sentiments, another of the interviewees attributed the generalisation of all foreign nationals as criminals and drug traffickers when some South Africans are also involved in criminal activities as a lack of proper education on the part of South African citizens. As an example, the interviewee voiced that when a Nigerian or a Mozambican is caught for a crime, it does not generally mean that all Nigerians and Mozambicans are criminals and drug dealers:

Many South Africans did not go to school and that has affected their thinking. Because they heard or read in the news that one Nigerian was arrested for selling drugs or two Mozambicans guys were arrested for killing or stealing a car, they generalise the case by saying that all Nigerians are drug dealers, all Mozambicans or that groups are criminals. But I heard that my neighbours who is a South African was arrested because he allegedly kills his friend in Mayfair. This means that there is also South Africans killing and selling drugs, is not only us (foreigners) (KK).



On the contrary, another of the participants agreed with the accusation that African foreign nationals are involved in criminal activities. The interviewee acknowledged that that which some foreign nationals are doing in the country in terms of drug dealing is somewhat wrong. In the interviewee's own words:

That one, I must tell you that our brothers are rights because what we are doing in this country is not correct. Look what the Nigerian are doing, they are selling drugs and they are always involved in organise crimes (VR).

Although this section has presented migrants' concerns about drugs and crimes, the accusations are scapegoating the migrants and are part of the accepted rhetoric. Section 8.3.1 in the following chapter (Chapter 8) provides an in-depth discussion on this issue.

### **6.5.2 South Africans and Xenophobic Violence**

It has been argued in the literature that South Africans are xenophobic. While many scholars have presented empirical evidence in support of these arguments, others have attributed the South African xenophobic violence to the past apartheid history, inequality, poverty, etc. Despite this popular view, one of the interviewees stressed that there are good South Africans who have truly shown empathy towards the plight of immigrants, while at the same time, the aforementioned interviewee noted that there are others who do not want immigrants in the country:

I cannot say that South Africans are xenophobes, there are good South Africans who understand our problems and want us to be in the country, there is also bad South Africans who doesn't want to be in the country, and they are ready to use all means to chase us away (KK).

From the above narrative, it is not sufficient to allude that South Africans are xenophobic. In an attempt to unravel the state of xenophobic behaviour in South Africa, the subsequent subthemes provide further opinions on the xenophobic nature of South Africans. However, xenophobic violence does not take place in all the communities within SA. Notably, it has been demonstrated empirically that xenophobic violence often takes place in townships and informal settlements where most residents are reported as being poor. In many instances, xenophobic violence does not reach the suburbs, as it is often limited to the CBDs within the country. Thus, xenophobic violence in SA is a result of poverty and inequality experienced by the local people in townships and informal settlements which has turned the latter against migrants.

#### **(a) *Discrimination against Foreign Nationals***

From a historical context, South Africans have had a sad history of racial segregation and discrimination (Maylam 2017; Cooper 2019). This may perhaps be associated with the current

violence and discrimination that migrants are experiencing in SA. This view is reinforced by one of the interviewees who felt discriminated against in the workplace:

Yes, I face discrimination often in my workplace as many South Africans have the negative attitude towards me, especially when they are aware that my English is not good and my inability to speak Isizulu. I have also notice that my neighbours have a negative attitude towards me because I'm a migrant. Every time I call them on something wrong, they did at work, they always gossip about me and call me names. Some of them even ask me when I will go back to my country (FB).

Drawing from the above narrative, it is evidently clear that foreign nationals are discriminated against because of their nationality. Derogatory language, such as the Zulu word *amakwerekwere*, has been used to describe foreign nationals. This, and according to the statement by one of the interviewees, makes foreign nationals more vulnerable and susceptible to attacks:

I didn't know the meaning of makwerekwere until my friend told me the meaning of it, then I did not like it because I felt like they were insulting me, and I was vulnerable. Especially after the 2015 xenophobic violence. Coupled with that is one old man in the community who always call me "kwerekwere", so having the knowledge of kwerekwere, when I'm waiting for the taxi and that old man call me makwerekwere, I will run, and I was afraid that they will attack me (RH).

Although it was revealed by South Africans that *makwerekwere* was not an insult nor a call to other people to come and attack foreign nationals, the above participant, however, stated that during the xenophobic attacks, the locals in her community protected her despite them describing her in a derogatory manner:

I never ask them to stop calling me that, because I realised that at the end of the day, they were protecting me during the attacks, and it is their way of addressing me. So, now even if they call me that, we are good and sometimes I make fun of it to them, and they like it whether in the taxi or the bus (RH).

Apart from the use of derogatory words that discriminate against foreign nationals, Muchiri (2016: 65) found that socio-economic tensions among South Africans towards successful business migrants running small businesses had resulted in a high level of impunity and institutionalised discrimination. Consistent with this, some of the interviewees noted that a form of perverse jealousy exists amongst South Africans towards foreign nationals due to the latter's dedication to their work:

There is no competition between us and them, but there is jealousy from the South Africans towards us. They are jealous because we are dedicated in what we are doing (AO).

(b) *Violence against Foreign Nationals*

Violence against foreign nationals has become a sad reoccurring issue plaguing South Africa (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 20). While some of the attacks against foreign nationals, particularly those from African countries, have been attributed to criminal elements in the society, the victims of these violent assaults completely disagreed. It emerged from the interviews with foreign nationals that some had experienced both direct and indirect assaults attributed to the xenophobic violence in South Africa. As noted by one of the interviewees: “Yes, but I was lucky some people came to my rescue in 2015. If not, those animals were going to burn me alive” (AO). Sharing another experience, one of the interviewees narrated how he had been assaulted on two occasions due to the xenophobic violence:

Yes! twice, for the first time is when I was working in Isipingo as a security guard, some guys just came from nowhere and started beating me, saying that I should go back to the bush that I come from. For the second time, it was in 2015 during the violence that took place as a result of the king speech, some guys took me from the taxi that I was and told me that they are going to help me go back into my village, they beat me like a child (SU).

On the other hand, while some of the participants had not been direct victims of xenophobic violence, they nonetheless gave a glimpse on the extent of the violence against victims close to them:

It was a very bad situations as many South Africans were ready to kill migrants, and these later had no way out of the situation except seeking refuge or hiding at different police stations (DK).

Echoing similar views, one of the interviewees recalled that her spouse was once a victim of xenophobic violence to the extent that he was hospitalised for his injury: “Here in Chesterville is quiet, I have never been a victim of xenophobia, but my husband was beaten in 2015 and he was even admitted to the hospital” (J).

In a similar context, another of the interviewees revealed that some of his friends had been victims and their shops had been looted. He then asked rhetorically “it is very bad but what can we do? Because these people don’t like us, and it is very bad” (MH).

Equally concerning was the revelation that under-age children were also victims of the xenophobic attacks directed against foreign nationals living in South Africa. As one of the interviewees revealed, the xenophobic violence had resulted in the loss of properties and sources of livelihood, as well as attacks on her child:

Not me but my husband and my first born who is 17 years old now. During the 2015 attacks we were living in Isipingo, we lost everything as we had to run for our lives. Our house was looted, because the neighbours were saying

that we must go back to our country because the king said so. My child was beaten last year by some boys living on the other side of Chesterville called Jamaica, they beat him and told him that he is not welcome he must go back where he come from (VN).

The consequences of xenophobic violence and perceived uncertainty and volatility might have created fear and anguish among some of the interviewees who had witnessed similar violence in their home nations. As one of them noted:

I'm afraid, because being refugees means that I have seen violence; and coming in this country I was hoping to have peace, and complete my degree and get a job, but it is very sad that I see myself trapped in my hopes. These people are very bad people and through the violence we can see that they don't want us here (M).

Drawing from the above statement, one could rightly state that xenophobic violence degrades humanity and destroys every sense of civility. Noting this concern, one of the interviewees admonished the South African society for the impacts of xenophobic violence by stating that "xenophobia is not good brother, for both of us it is not only affecting us also these people are also affected".

Another of the interviewees therefore advised foreign nationals to be cautious and vigilant, particularly during xenophobic incidences:

You must be careful because they are sceptical. So, you have to move from one place when the violence erupts, which is something that I have been doing in the past years (V).

Despite the nature of the violence, it is worth stating here that not all South African citizens are in support of the violence against foreign nationals. Notably, some of the interviewees acknowledged the protection that they had received from their South African neighbours during the xenophobic incidences in the country. They attributed this to the fact that their neighbours recognised them as good people who would not engage in any criminal activities while doing their legitimate business. Another notable reason given for the protection enjoyed by some of the interviewees could be attributed to community integration. This is reflected in the following statement:

No, ever since I live in this community I have never been attacked or touched. Every time that the violence starts people always protect me and they say whoever will try to touch me they will deal with him, and they protect us both including my children and my husband, and my children are even fluent in Zulu (R).

### 6.5.3 Combatting Xenophobic Conflicts

Xenophobic conflicts have become a major headache for the ruling ANC government post – apartheid (Harvey 2019; Stone and Khumalo 2019). While the government has remained aloof and, in some cases, in denial of xenophobic incidences in the country, the escalation and confrontation between South African citizens and foreign nationals continues with a frightening pattern. This theme hopes to explore measures by which the reoccurring episodes of xenophobic violence could be addressed once and for all. Accordingly, this theme is discussed under four subthemes, namely: community engagement and integration, government interventions, the role of the media, and the role of NGOs.

#### (a) *Community Engagement and Integration*

A critical point that could be derived from the above theme was that foreign nationals who had integrated very well into the South African society and among the South Africans were protected against attacks. As such, one could rightly assume that cohesive integration into the South African culture and social life may be a way of addressing or reducing xenophobic conflicts (Smit 2015: 19-55). It was concerning, however, that many of the foreign nationals who were interviewed noted that they had never formally integrated themselves with the locals. The reason given for this was a lack of time and language barriers. These are reflected in the following statements:

I don't because I don't have time. You see my brother, if I attend the community meeting, who will take care of business. Plus, I'm not a South African, and I don't speak the language. My friend told me they only speak in isiZulu (AO).

With the type of job that I'm doing, I don't have time to interact in the community because I leave early in the morning and only come back late. But those that I find in different shops I always interact with them and provoke them because they like that (MH).

Despite the presumed lack of time in attending community meetings, one of the interviewees revealed the following:

Yes, they know me because I'm always there when there is a problem in the community. Be it a mourning, or someone is affected. If I cannot make it, I at least send someone to represent me with an envelope (MH).

From the above statement, it is sufficient to assume that some of the foreign nationals have demonstrated community inclusiveness and cohesion by the way of financial support to the community. Moreover, the introduction of others to the leaders in the community demonstrates foreign nationals' willingness to integrate with the locals in the community:

Yes, I did. I and my husband saw the councillor of this ward and explained to him our situations. He invited us to the community meeting to tell why we are here. There were also some workshops that the DDP run in this community on social cohesion, where we had a chance to sit with South Africans and tell them why we are here and our stories; why we run from our countries and why we are refugees (MR).

Yes, when I first got in my community, I went to see the leaders and I told them my story and where I was coming from. They took me to the counsellor. They helped me find a place to live because I did not have a cousin living in the community (RV).

Despite the efforts, it emerged from the interview that this did not additionally help to stop the xenophobic tendency towards foreign national migrants in the community. As one of the interviewees noted: "But they don't know us, they think that whether you are a refugee or a normal immigrant with a valid passport, you are just here for their wealth" (MR).

Furthermore, and while acknowledging that learning the local language is good, one of the interviewees pointed out the fact that foreign nationals who reside in the informal settlements and rural areas speak the local language fluently but are the first to be attacked or killed, suggesting that learning the language is not an asset in the country:

Learning the language is not an asset in the country but it is good. Most violence take place in rural areas or informal settlement, and those living in those areas do speak the language fluently, but they are the first to be attacked or killed. It all goes back to the government as no one in the country is powerful than the government (K).

*(b) Government Interventions*

It is believed by many in the society and among the foreign nationals that the xenophobic violence has both political and social-economic dimensions (Blaser Mapitsa 2018: 3-19). The critics of the government's approach and response to end the violence against African foreign nationals argue that the government is using the attacks as a smoke screen to hide their own failures while looking for easy scapegoats for the social vices bewildering the country (Jonathan Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Africa Unite 2019; Heleta 2019). Hence, and according to some of the interviewees' views, government interventions could easily put an end to xenophobic violence. According to one of the interviewee's views: "this thing can only be combatted by the government, because they have the power to tell these people that we are innocents" (AO).

Sharing similar sentiments and beliefs, another of the interviewees noted the following:

I think the government must help because they are the most powerful. They can organise nationwide dialogue with South Africans, where they can

educate them about our reality. After these dialogues we can also have social cohesion where us and them we can sit and share our story (FB).

The call for educating the locals through dialogue, with government serving as the moderator, was also reaffirmed by others:

We need to have a dialogue, and in those dialogue the members of the government must be present so they can tell the truth to their people, and they must also educate them about the refugees, why are we refugees in this country (J).

Yes, the government plays an important role in this country especially the ANC because they have more followers. They can launch a mass dialogue with both group foreigners and South Africans, they can include in the curriculum for the children in school something about refugees because the hatred is passed from one generation to another. They can organise workshops and call on people to love each other (MR).

However, some of the interviewees expressed reservation on the government's motives to end the violence. In their own views, the South African government lacks the political will to combat the violence since the government benefits from it:

The government is very powerful, but there is nothing that the government can do because the attacks is benefitting the government in times of elections. Because they triggered the violence during election (MH).

Hence it is suggested that the government must lead the way to help address the violence and conflicts. This is reflected in the following statement:

You must first know that xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in SA. it is just a lack of government will to combat it. So, the government manipulates the population. Plus, it's something that people inherit from their parents or grandparents. Because it is something that is triggers by the government, therefore, the government must help first before any institutions can intervene. After the government intervention then, other institutions can also help in mitigating the violence (KK).

While also blaming the government for the violence, others suggested that the government must pass harsh laws against the perpetrators to help end the violence:

I'm not sure if they did, but what I know is that sometimes the government is the mastermind behind the violence. Because, before the violence erupts there is always one members of the government who will incite the violence. In case they have done that, they must pass harsh law to punish severely the perpetrators of the violence (MR).

It is also important for the government to pass law that directly address the issue of xenophobia so that perpetrator will know that once they go that road they will be prosecuted (VR).

Equally important, some of the interviewees called for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to become involved in ending the xenophobic violence in South Africa. According to some of the views expressed:

Xenophobia is not a South African problem only; it is also a SADC problem. The South African government needs to push at the SADC and other countries so that solutions can be taken on both side at the sending countries, receiving countries and the SADC. These will help enact implement policies that directly address and prevent xenophobia (RV).

Adding further support to the notion that collaboration between the South African government and SADC countries can solve the xenophobic conflicts, another of the interviewees revealed how this could be achieved:

The only way combat and prevent xenophobia in the country is through conjunction works or agreements between governments and the SADC. At the local level, the government must educate South Africans about migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, and why they left their country. Moreover, the government must educate people in their political parties. These will enable people to know each other, because South Africans do not know who refugees are and why they are here. They only know the stereotypes about them. Xenophobia can also be prevented and combatted through dialogue and workshops (V).

In summary, the above theme explicitly highlights that government interventions could effectively curb xenophobic violence in South Africa. It was revealed that the government could address this by enacting and passing laws that criminalise xenophobic actions and violence. More importantly, it emerged from the interviews that through dialogue and community education, xenophobic violence could be an issue of the past in South Africa. As one of the interviewees rightly suggested:

Now the only way for us to prevent and mitigate xenophobia is for us foreigners and South Africans to sit down and have a dialogue on how we can work together; accept each other differences and love each other. Once we do that, then we can find a way to mitigate and prevent xenophobia. Because through friendship and love, foreigners can teach South Africans how to run a shop successfully and South Africans can assist foreigners in having the proper papers (MH).

(c) *Role of the Media*

The media is a powerful agency that could either help address or spread the xenophobic conflicts. In South Africa, their role in the xenophobic violence has been well documented in the literature. The media has been accused of only presenting and projecting negative narratives of foreign migrants such as crimes and drugs, and deliberately neglecting their contribution to the South African society (Maharaj 2009; Smith 2011). The critics of media



reporting have suggested that such bias has contributed to the stereotyping of African foreign nationals, thus fuelling xenophobic violence:

The media is also corrupted and play the government game. But the media has a power to change a narrative of our lives in this country, instead of reporting only on our bad side while there is a lot of good things that we are doing (S).

Given the above concern, some of the interviewees noted that the media needs to show the importance of the economic contribution of the migrants. Moreover, the government can engage in dialogue with and educate the locals through the media. As noted by one of the interviewees:

It is easy when the government attend the dialogue with these people and us. they will tell them the truth, then they can go into the communities starting educated these people in communities, in schools and on national television (J).

In support of the role that the media could play, particularly as a vehicle for peacebuilding, one of the interviewees called for the media to centre their advertising during xenophobic conflicts on peace: "The media must also advertise on peace and calling people to stop the violence" (R).

#### (d) *Role of Non-Governmental Organisations*

The non-governmental organisations are noted to be critical players in the fight to end xenophobic violence in South Africa. They have been vocal, providing support, prompting interventions, as well as facilitating peace between the locals and foreign nationals when the need has arisen (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 27). Hence their role in ending the xenophobic violence in South Africa cannot be underestimated. This is highly acknowledged by many of the interviewees for their immense contribution to end the violence: "NGOs are already doing a great job, they just have to keep on what they are doing, and we are praying that they get more funders" (MR).

While also praising the NGOs for their contribution to end the violence, others called on them to organise roundtable workshops between the locals and foreign nationals to discuss and dialogue on the problems contributing to xenophobic incidences in the country:

NGOs are already doing a good job, so they must organise workshop and dialogue for us both, so we sit at the table and explain our story to these people because they know nothing (S).

The civil societies can organise workshop and dialogue with all of us so we can talk and fix our misunderstanding once for all (MH).

#### 6.5.4 Section Summary

This section has demonstrated that migrants share different views regarding the causes of xenophobia. This means that where the public rhetoric has pointed to them as job snatchers or criminals, the latter are of the view that although these accusations may be true, they are also vulnerable in accessing the job market due to their foreignness, leaving them no other option than to lower their wages. Moreover, the latter denounce the discrimination that they face in the community since they are regarded as outsiders. However, the section also revealed that it is not all migrants who are involved in criminal activities. This means that both groups share a responsibility in that area because there are local people who are involved in criminal activities. However, migrants did not hesitate to point fingers at Nigerians whom they view as the only groups that are seen on the frontpage of criminal activities. While the study seeks to find strategic ways of preventing xenophobia, migrants reported that government interventions in the matter can be the only effective way since the local people have much respect for the government. However, the government cannot do it alone, and it was in this vein that the participants also mentioned the role that civil society and the media can play in mitigating the violence. In addition, they also revealed the role that they believe that they can play in the community which involves community engagement.

### 6.6 Emerging Themes and Subthemes from the Semi-Structured Interviews with South African Nationals

The analysis of the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews with the South African nationals resulted in the identification of the themes and subthemes highlighted in Table 6.13.

**Table 6.13:** Identification of themes and subthemes from interviews with South African nationals.

Themes	Subthemes
1. Violence in South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Types of violence</li><li>• Protest interventions</li></ul>
2. Perceptions of foreign nationals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Negative perception</li><li>• Positive perception</li></ul>
3. Causes of Xenophobic violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unemployment</li><li>• Drugs and crime</li></ul>

4. Measures of combatting Xenophobic violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government interventions</li> <li>• NGOs and media interventions</li> </ul>
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### 6.6.1 Violence in South Africa

#### (a) *Types of Violence*

As reported in the literature, xenophobia in SA has always been linked to the culture of violence in SA. It has been suggested that South Africans resort to violence in order to show their unhappiness or to claim that which they believe they are entitled to (Fröhlich 2019; Newham 2019). This was also noted in the interviews as there was a consensus amongst the interviewees that violence in their community is often triggered by poor service delivery protests:

It depends, in Inanda where I usually spend my weekend the type of violence that we experience there is service delivery. But here it's more like drug abuse, some taxi drivers' disputes, GBV, child abuse, thieves (SN).

In terms of service delivery protests, empirical studies suggest that violence mostly affects people living in poverty (Chopra 2014). As noted by one of the interviewees, the form of violent protests in the communities is not witnessed in other affluent areas in South Africa:

In this place we protest a lot about electricity, service delivery is a problem. Youth fighting against each other until one kill the other, drug abuse leading to violence and theft ... these are the things that you will not see in Ballito (MS).

From the above revelation, other contributions to violence in the community that were noted were violence attributed to drug abuse, taxi violence, theft, and child abuse. Not surprisingly, taxi violence is a known source of conflicts and still presents a fundamental challenge in the country. (Ngubane 2016: 18-19) attributes the taxi violence to fights over taxi routes, taxi rank spaces, and the picking of passengers from one taxi association by another, as well as greed. The consequences of the violence have reportedly resulted in thousands of dead taxi drivers, taxi owners, and commuters.

#### (b) *Protest Interventions*

It is well known that violence is a global phenomenon, however, in the South African context, it has been reported that youth violence is always preceded by death. Saferspace (2015) reveals a report from Crime Statistics which reported that from April 2014 to March 2015 alone, 17,805 people had lost their lives due to violence. Coupled with this, there are also those who lost their lives during the protests and those who sustained serious injuries (Gous 2019; 172

Ngcamu 2019). It was in this vein that it was suggested by the interviewees that violent fights, particularly amongst the youth, lead to death and serious injuries. Hence, it was critical to know who intervenes when such violence erupts in the community. From the interviews, it emerged that the police, community leaders, and sometimes the councillors intervene in the violence. While many of the interviewees agreed that the police interventions were very effective, as they always arrested those involved in the violence, it appeared that the ability to quell the unrest is dependent on the time at which they arrived at the scene of protest:

The police always intervene, and their intervention is effective depending on when they arrived at the scene. ecause sometimes they come late, and the damage have taken place, so they just come to collect the pieces (SN).

It was revealed that the police also play the role of monitoring the protests to prevent further escalation:

Sometimes the police come just to monitor the situation so that it doesn't escalate, sometimes people fight until one is dead or blood is out then the violence can stop (NN).

While the role of community leaders in mediating conflicts within the locality is well known, one of the interviewees, however, revealed that in some cases, the community leaders are the ones motivating the protesters:

In most cases is the police and the community leaders and the counsellors. The police are always there to make sure that the violence does not escalate, but they just watch when the people are burning tyres on the street. The community leaders are sometimes the ones motivating people to protests leaving the councillor no choice than to rely on the police. These are my understanding of the violence in the community. Having these in mind you can see that the police and community leaders' intervention is not effective (S).

Alexander (2010: 25-40) has reported that service delivery protests in SA entail mass meetings, the drafting of memoranda, petitions, toyi-toying, processions, blockading roads, the construction of barricades, the burning of tyres, looting, the destruction of buildings, the chasing of unpopular individuals out of the townships, confrontations with the police, etc. This may perhaps be associated with the role that the community leaders play in motivating the protesters and the unwillingness of the police to engage in direct confrontations with the protesters.

### **6.6.2 Perceptions of Foreign Nationals**

Gleitman *et al.* (2010) define perception as an immediate product of sensory experience whether through taste, sight, hearing, touch, or smell. In the context of this study, perceptions are viewed as a process of forming and interacting with mental representations about people

who, in this case, are black African immigrants. Due to the historical past of apartheid, many black South Africans had very little knowledge of their African neighbours. Hence, their perceptions of other black African immigrants were shaped by stories that they had heard or through the media. This theme explores the views of South Africans on black African immigrants. For ease of interpretation, the perceptions of South African nationals on black foreign immigrants were classified as negative and positive perceptions.

(a) *Negative Perception*

While white migrants are regarded as investors in the country, African migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, are regarded as socio-economic competitors and as thieves, stealing jobs and opportunities which belong to South Africans (Neocosmos 2010; Tshabalala 2015). This view may have shaped the hostility shown to African immigrants by South Africans. Some of the interviewees accused the immigrants of stealing jobs, running tuck shops, etc. According to one of the interviewees:

These people are so bad, they come here, and they are taking most of the jobs, now if you go to my college most of my lecturer are foreigners. see in this township, they are running tuck shops, if you go to town, you will see them having shops, what is left for us now? It's like they are taking over our country (SC).

Adding further to the above statement, the above interviewee accused the immigrants of selling expired food in the community and polluting the environment. Equally, the legality of their status in South Africa was questioned:

Many things, for example they are selling expiring food in the community, they are selling drugs, they are illegal here, and they open their businesses with fake documents. These things are not rights. See the way the CBD is dirty and noisy, because of them (SC).

While sharing similar sentiments, another interviewee mentioned that the presence of immigrants in the country was akin to a hostage situation:

Its feels like they are taking our country into hostage, they open business without proper documents, they are selling us expired foods, they are selling drugs to the kids, and these are the things that we don't like (SG).

Added to this, foreign nationals' accent was also mentioned as a reason for the negative perception. According to the opinion of one of the interviewees:

I do like them; they teach very well but the problem is the accent because sometimes we are struggling to hear their English. They have a different sound of English, which I don't understand (SC).

(b) *Positive Perception*

While some of the interviewees appeared to be indifferent to the presence of African immigrants in the country, one interviewee pointed out the following: "As human being I don't have any bad perception about them, but I just don't like what they are doing here" (SC). However, others disapproved of the attitude and treatment of their fellow country people on African immigrants:

Most black people in my community every time that there is a strike, they always attack foreigners and loot their shops. Especially the Somalis, like that shop at the corner there, every time there is a violence, it is looted but these people helped us (MU).

The above interviewee attributed the hatred towards foreign African immigrants to jealousy on the part of South Africans due to the success of the foreign nationals in the country:

I think South Africans are jealous of the foreigners because they are making money in the country. But these people are very nice, you can go to their shops without money, they will give you food on a credit. In our house, sometimes we go to them to take food without money, and we can only pay when we have money and sometimes it might be after 1 months and that is making South Africans jealous (MU).

In support of the above interviewee, another of the participants acknowledged the hard work and kindness of the foreign nationals in supporting and helping needy South Africans:

Do you know that they work hard? In this community they always open the shops earlier so we can buy bread or things that we don't have. If you don't have money, they let you take a bread and you will pay when you have money (MS).

Drawing from the above theme, it can be gathered that many of the South African nationals are uncomfortable with African immigrants in the country. This perhaps may have formed the accusation that foreigners are selling expired foods and that their tuck shops are illegal and lacking the proper documentation. As one of the interviewees noted:

I don't like it when South Africans, especially black people, beat them or accused them of selling expired food, but they took the expired food and eat it. I feel bad for them.

Adjal and Lazaridis (2013) 192) write that "there is only a small group of South Africans that have a regular personal contact with African migrants". Corroborating the statement of the above authors, it was found that many of the South African nationals had little knowledge of or relationships with foreign black immigrants. Perhaps this might have caused the stereotyping of immigrants and their businesses in the country. This is supported by a statement made by one of the interviewees:

There is this fear and stereotype that my family and my friends are concerned about. Such as He's marrying me because he wants the ID, or he will maybe travel with me to Nigeria and kill me and repatriate my body with drugs inside. So, some people are just not fine with it (BZ).

According to the above interviewee, the narrative that foreign nationals marry South African girls for visa permits is not essentially true. Sharing her own experience, the interviewee revealed the following:

I don't, because people are different, and I know my fiancé since I was doing my first year at university. He does have a permanent residence, so he doesn't need to marry me to get an ID because he can just apply for that (BZ).

### **6.6.3 Causes of Xenophobic Violence**

Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015) have revealed that xenophobic violence in South Africa has been an ongoing reality in the country since 1994. This theme explores the causes of xenophobic violence in the country from the perspective of the South African nationals.

#### *(a) Unemployment*

Unemployment is a matter of serious concern affecting economic welfare and production in the country, and leading to the erosion of human capital, social exclusion, crime, and social instability (Kingdon and Knight 2001; Mamokhere 2019). The unemployment rate in the country, particularly among the youth, was noted to influence the incidences of xenophobic violence. This was noted to have a relationship with the vices experienced in the community such as robbery and drug addiction:

I think youth unemployment is very bad, because some youth don't have a employment, they are now robbing people in the community, and some have become addicted to drugs (AM).

The high rate of unemployment has contributed to job conflicts between the South African nationals and the foreign nationals. It was suggested that the foreign nationals are taking lower wages in jobs, thereby denying the South African nationals of job opportunities:

These accusations are true, because you can see a job that was supposed to pay R15,000 per month being narrow down to R4,000, because foreigners are willing to even go down to R2,000, which is not good (MS).

Similar sentiments were also shared by another of the participants who noted that employers are now accusing the South African nationals of laziness due to the willingness of foreign immigrants to take lower wages. This was noted as the reason behind the frustrations of South Africans and thus the xenophobic violence:

Sometimes yes, because these people are working for cheap labour to survive, which create some sort of competition. Now employer want them because they are paying them less money and they are saying that we South Africans are lazy (AM).

On the contrary, another of the participants strongly disagreed with the assertion that foreign nationals are taking jobs away from South Africans. The interviewee reaffirmed the common assumption that unlike South Africans, foreign African migrants are hard workers: "I don't think so, because these people when they come here, they work hard, unlike our South African brothers who like to sit at home doing nothing" (TZ).

Cloete (2015: 513-525) has reported that young South Africans have lost their hope in the government, as most of them feel betrayed by the latter since their lives have not improved or changed for the better. Accordingly, some of the interviewees blamed the government's failures to provide essential services and improve the quality of life of its citizens rather than the immigrants for the xenophobic violence. This perhaps may have contributed to the continuous and recurring xenophobic incidences:

Obviously, the government play a role which is not fair. I'm a South African but let me tell you that the government is using foreigners to justify their failure. Even the small councillor to be elected also use foreigner presence as a strategy to be elected (TZ).

(b) *Drugs and Crime*

It has been a common and widespread belief in most South African communities that African immigrants are peddling drugs and are involved in criminality in the country (Dube 2019: 191-210). Much of this is being fuelled by the perceived success of black foreign immigrants in the country (Van der Berg 2015). While the perceived views are being fuelled by the media, Smith (2009: 23) warns that these have the potential to create moral panics and incite anti-foreigner sentiments. Consistent with this, many of the interviewees voiced their displeasure on the state of crime and drugs in the country for which they blame the foreigners. Some of the accusations were apparently based on rumours and hearsay. As one of the interviewees acknowledged:

I heard stories of Nigerians bringing drugs in this country, and I read it in the newspapers. I don't go to South Beach because my friends told me that Nigerians are kidnapping girls and force them into prostitution. They are behind cash heist in the country, and they are messing up the youth of our country (SG).

When probed if there were no South African nationals involved in drug dealing, the above interviewee stated the following:



Some of them work for these Nigerians, they are selling drugs for them. But I heard that before there were not drug dealers in this country. It is only when these Nigerians started coming that we started having problem with drugs (SG).

While drug dealing was ascribed to Nigerian nationals, crimes such as car theft were blamed on Zimbabweans and Mozambicans:

Most of the drugs that these people are smoking I heard that they get it from Nigerians, but I can't confirm that because I haven't met with any in this community. Crime is also something that people in country face because of the presence of Mozambicans and some Zimbabweans (NN).

For drugs I can blame them because the Nigerians are drug traffickers. So, they are messing up our youth as most of them are now addicted to drugs. They are also involved in organised crime, when you look at the people who hijack cars, most of them are from Mozambique (M).

Sadly, and although one cannot dismiss the incidences of drugs and crime in the country, it involves presumptions and stereotyping to allude that every incidence of drug dealing, and crime is due to African foreign nationals. This suggests that South African nationals are not only deflecting the situation of drugs and crime in the country but also exonerating themselves of any criminal act in the country. As one of the interviewees noted:

I'm not so sure but I heard that many foreigners are involved in criminal activities, but I also know that there are South Africans too who are doing bad things and yet they are blaming foreigners (BZ).

Echoing similar sentiments, another interviewee cautioned against blaming foreigners for every social vice in the country. According to the interviewee, South Africans must also share the responsibility of the state of matters in the nation. This is reflected in the following statement:

I think we must share responsibilities; we cannot always blame foreigners. We need to look at the way corruption is messing up this country at the top level. You don't have to blame foreigners for things like service delivery or safety in the community, these are the responsibility of the government, and we are entitled to that. But, because they are corrupted, they are unable to help the community. Foreigners for instance, when they come here, they corrupt the police or the government so they can establish themselves here, open spaza shops without proper documents, selling expired foods or being involved in criminal activities such as selling drugs or robbery. It is the government responsibility to first fight corruption (S).

#### **6.6.4 Measures of combatting Xenophobic Violence**

Even though most of the interviewees blamed the foreign nationals' activities, such as drug and crime dealings, for the xenophobic violence, one could gather that the cause of

xenophobic violence may be, in every sense, the struggle for resources and the inequality in the country. As one interviewee noted:

I personally don't like when it starts, but these people need to understand now that it is too much. We cannot accommodate them and they must stop coming here because us South Africans are suffering, we also want to enjoy our country, but we can't because they are everywhere (**SC**).

Regardless of the above view, the participants were unanimous in condemning the violence against foreign nationals. For example, one of the interviewees expressed the following: "I feel bad, it is not good the government must find a way to stop the violence because now every year it is taking place in the country" (**MS**).

However, some of the interviewees, while condemning the violence, voiced that foreign nationals should be aware that they are no longer welcome in the country:

I feel very bad, but do you know that every time that xenophobia starts, there are South Africans who are also being killed, but they never reported about that. It is a situation that I don't like but they just must understand that they are not welcome in this country anymore (**M**).

Another suggestion on ways to address the violence was for all foreign nationals to depart from the country. According to one interviewee, "The only thing at this stage is for foreigner to just leave because if they don't want, we will still have this problem of xenophobia" (**SG**).

On the contrary, another of the interviewees advocated for education. The interviewee lamented that those involved in the killings of foreign nationals are uneducated and unaware of what it is to be African:

We must educate our people, because the people that you will see killing foreigners are uneducated people, we must teach them the importance and values of being Africans. I was lucky because my grandfather told me the story of Africa, especially how people used to move back in days from one place to another, but many of my people don't know that (**S**).

Reinforcing the above view, one of the interviewees, who indicated that they were engaged to a foreign national, hinted at the importance of education and awareness:

I feel bad because since I'm marrying a foreigner, I have a different understanding about them, which most South Africans don't have. So, I think we must stop because it is not right what we are doing to them (**BZ**).

Given the need and call for education, this theme was further explained under two subthemes, that is, government interventions and NGO and media interventions.

(a) *Government Interventions*

It has been argued that the South African government is culpable for the xenophobic violence by making foreign nationals as scapegoats for their failures (Jonathan Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Bornman 2019). Given this concern, many of the interviewees therefore called for the government to put measures in place to address the violence. Amongst the suggestions made were closing the border to illegal immigrants, providing job employment, as well as mediating in the conflicts between the South Africans and foreign nationals.

For those who called for border closure, the following was captured:

We must stop taking more people now, we are full in this country now. The government must close the border to illegal migrants and make tougher law on immigration. Because the less foreigner we will have, the less xenophobic violence we will have (M).

Among those who called for the government to provide employment for the people as a measure to end the crisis, the following was captured:

I think we must call for unity in this country, the government must make sure that they create jobs for us South Africans first, because what is pushing us to attack our brothers is poverty and we think that they are living a better life than us in our own country. So, the government must create good opportunities for us (NN).

Others called for the government to mediate in the xenophobic violence:

We need a public education about the presence of foreigner. These people might be bad but not bad as we South Africans think about them. The government need to play a role in mitigating xenophobia because it's getting out of control which is not good (TZ).

Such a mediating role could involve educating the people on the negative impacts of xenophobic violence:

I think there is a possibility for the government to call an end to it and tell our people the truth about foreigner. That is why I like Malema because he always tells us about them each time xenophobia breaks (BZ).

I think the government and the counsellors must tell people to stop attacking foreigners, because it is not good, you see now some people are burning shops forgetting that tomorrow they will need to buy from those shops, because here in township there is no any spar that is closer or Shoprite (MS).

The calls for government interventions were premised on the fact that the people listen to them and that, at times, they are the ones responsible for the violent protests:

Yes, the government can intervene and call on people who are attacking foreigners to stop the attacks. Even councillors and community leaders can

also call people to stop the attacks, because sometimes these are the same people in the community, who send messages to others to start the attacks (SG).

*(b) Non-Governmental Organisations and Media Interventions*

Apart from the government, the NGOs were seen as another reliable means of bringing the xenophobic violence in the country to an end. Thus, scholars have appreciated the efforts that different civil societies have been making in assisting and preventing xenophobia and coupled with this is the fact that the latter are calling on the government to end xenophobic violence (Amnesty International 2018b). Thus, the local participants are of the view that civil societies can prevent the scourge of xenophobia through dialogue and educating the people on the reasons why the foreign nationals are in the country:

I think NGOs needs to organise workshop and dialogue in the community meeting so that people will know the reason of the presence of foreigner. I was lucky to know about foreigners, but it is not all South Africans that have knowledge about them (TZ).

Equally, the media could help in terms of changing the stereotypical narrative of foreigners in their reporting. This is reflected in the following statements:

Yes, they can come to the communities and explained to us the reasons why these people are here. Maybe organising some workshops and dialogue. The media also can start saying good things about the foreigners, because they always report on the bad things (SG).

I think the NGO can help us in organising dialogue and workshop in the community where foreigners can come and share their story. The media they must also start advertising on unity of Africa, telling the people that we are one people (S).

#### **6.6.5 Section Summary**

This section demonstrated, from the points of view of the local participants, that violence is predominant in SA and that it often takes place in townships and informal settlements. However, on many occasions when the violence has taken place, the police officers and community leaders' interventions have been reported as being effective. However, the perception of migrants is either positive or negative, which means that while some local people portray migrants with negative stereotypes, this section reported that there are also some local people holding a positive perception of migrants, which they have linked to the migrants' kindness and assistance in the community. Thus, those holding negative attitudes justified their attitudes by the fact that they view migrants as drug dealers and blame them for the unemployment situation. This section observed that the local people also believe in government and civil societies' interventions as a possible way of mitigating and preventing xenophobia.

## **6.7 Focus Group Discussion with South Africans (both groups)**

This section details the data gathered from the focus group discussions with selected South Africans and migrants. The FGDs were held with the purpose of exploring the depth of xenophobia and the perceptions that both groups have towards each other, as well as the relationship between both groups. I believed that having a discussion with separate groups was a good idea as each group could express its concerns and knowledge on xenophobia and of the other group freely. Having a mixed FGD was challenging and risky, as my fear was that the participants might not be comfortable to express themselves freely and the type of discussions or feedbacks would result in a conflict. Thus, to avoid any of those issues taking place, I sought assistance from a person who had more experience with working closely with both groups to moderate the discussion, I took notes and observed the participants' reactions.

Furthermore, I avoided leading questions and gave every participant a large degree of latitude to freely express their thoughts and experiences. The questions asked during the combined FGD was mainly indirect and in the third form of plural to avoid any discomfort to a particular group. An example of such questions included: "What do you feel when people are killed during xenophobia? Why are foreigners seen as criminals or traffickers? How do you feel when people are killed during xenophobia? How do you feel when someone does not speak your language?". The outcome from these questions is discussed in depth in chapter eight. The FGDs with both groups also gave an opportunity to address the stereotypes against migrants and the reasons attached to it.

One FGD was held with migrants, and one was held with the South Africans and had a total of six participants, the migrant FGD had a total of 7 had a total of seven participants. However, the combined FGD had a total of 12 participants divided equally (6 migrants and 6 South Africans). It must be mentioned at this stage that the researcher managed to get three Nigerian nationals to participate in the FGD to hear from them, since they have been accused of criminal activities in the country. While the researcher's plan was to organise a fourth FGD with both groups, issues regarding financial limitations and participants' availability prevented this (explained in chapter 6 above). From the FGDs, the researcher selected those who would take part in the action research component. The analysis of the data resulted in themes and subthemes, which are discussed in the sub-sections that follow. Thus, this section presents the mixed views of both groups.

### 6.7.1 Understanding of Xenophobia from both groups

Although xenophobia is generally seen as a hatred or fear of foreigners or anything that is strange or foreign, Maina *et al.* (2011), however, contend that xenophobia in South Africa goes beyond the fear and dislike of foreigners as it results in an intense violence towards foreign nationals, and more specifically against those from the African continent. Corroborating the views of Maina *et al.*, it emerged from the focus group discussions that xenophobia in South Africa results in the killing of foreign nationals. **SJ**, a local team member, viewed xenophobia as a discrimination, “because we kill people who are not from here because we think that they are stealing the job, while these people are actually working and creating their own jobs” (**SJ**).

Equally, it was found that xenophobic violence was only directed at African immigrants. This reinforced the views that in the South African context, xenophobia is best described as **Afrophobia**, which is violence or hatred against African immigrants by South African nationals. From **SA**’s own perceptions:

To me xenophobia is discrimination towards African migrants, because here in SA you see there is migrants coming from Europe, America, and Australia, but we never attack them, and we don’t have a problem with them (**SA**).

Noting from the above dialogue from **SA**, it is important to know the perceived reasons for the disparity in the treatment of African and Western immigrants.

Participant **MG** provided an explanation for why South Africans never attack Western immigrants. From the participant’s point of reasoning, African immigrants are stealing their wealth while the Western or European counterparts come with foreign money to invest in the country. This context, according to **MG**, provides the reasons why African immigrants are not needed in South Africa:

We don’t attack white migrants because they bring money in the country. They bring the US currencies or Euro, but foreigners are here to steal our wealth, instead of investing in SA, they invest in their own countries. That is why we don’t want them (**MG**).

However, the view presented above by the local people was quite different from that which the migrants reported. For instance, while the local people reported that xenophobia involves discrimination against migrants, **MN**, a migrant from the DRC, agreed on broadening that characteristic by stating that:

Xenophobia is not just a discrimination or jealousy against us, but it is also a hatred that these people have towards us, the intolerance that they have towards us; because even whites’ people are also found to have the same stereotypes and stigma that black South Africans have towards us (**MN**).

From **MN**'s perceptive, it appears that both groups have acknowledged the fact that xenophobia is a result of jealousy towards migrants, however, **TO**, a Nigerian migrant, explained:

Xenophobia is a result of self-entitlement that the local people have towards us, they think that we owe them for being here, and that self-entitlement has born (Pidgin English)<sup>2</sup> hatred and jealousy towards us because we are succeeding in the little thing that we are doing (**TO**).

#### **6.7.2 Contribution of African Immigrants in South Africa**

Drawing from the above theme, it can be seen that some South African nationals have belittled the contributions and influence of African immigrants to the economy of the nation. This group's argument was that African migrants are entirely economic immigrants and make no positive contributions to the South African economy as compared to Western migrants. However, this point of view strongly undermines the contribution of migrants in South Africa, and on the migrants' side, there was a strong argument that through the small businesses that they have opened or their entrepreneurial skills, they are also creating jobs rather than poaching them. This has been explained in previous research which has shown that African immigrants are an important driving force in the establishment of new businesses, thus playing a vital role in reducing the escalation of the high rate of unemployment in South Africa (Fatoki 2014). This is supported by participant **FN**, a South African participant, who strongly pointed out that the contribution of African immigrants, particularly in the community, was greatly undermined and underappreciated. In the participant's own words:

I think we need to understand that foreigners are helping us in this community. Although we don't like what they are doing. For instance, if you don't have money for a bread, or cooking oil, even mealy meal they will give it to you on credit, and they will tell you don't forget to pay me when you have the money. Sometimes I pay them after one month, while a South African tuck shop owner will never do that. They open their shops earlier in the morning when we are preparing our child for school, while the brother who run a tuck shop next to my house, who is my good South African brother, open his container at 8hr30 or 10hr00 (**FN**).

The view presented by **FN** was also supported by migrants, and a Somali participant explained that they assist people in the community with food on credit as a way of showing appreciation to the community, as they believe that it is because of the community that their businesses are succeeding, and the participant, in his own words, further stated that:

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<sup>2</sup> Pidgin English is a broken English spoken across Nigeria.

That is the way to show our sense of *ubuntu* to the people, because we understand that they don't have money and if they have, they would have bought cash, and as part of our work ethics and experience we know that there is always people that need to buy something early in the morning. So, we must be there to help them (MH).

The above view provided by FN strongly resonates with other studies (Chimucheka 2014; Fatoki 2014) that African immigrants are playing a key role in alleviating unemployment in the communities in which they operate. Hence, and as observed by participant MB, the entrepreneurship abilities and determination of African immigrants are the core reasons for being disliked by South Africans. This is in agreement with De Jager (2013) that the dislike or fear of immigrants by South Africans are built on jealousy due to the business success of African foreign immigrants:

Foreigners have one thing in their mind when they come to SA, which we South Africans don't have, and that is a business mind. We don't have that. We have the pride and that is why South African men don't like them. Because they like fast money, buying cars and start showing off in the community (MB).

### 6.7.3 The Relationship between Migrants and South African Nationals

Ngota, Mang'unyi and Rajkaran (2018: 1-9) have acknowledged that since 2008, South Africans have increasingly become *Afrophobic* in recent years with a large percentage of citizens perceiving black foreigners as 'dangerous' and 'undesirable'. To explore this context, it was important to know the type of relationship between or how South Africans perceived their African migrant neighbours within their communities. According to participant MG, a South African participant, there is no interaction with immigrants. The participants blamed this on the inability of the African immigrants to learn the native South African languages:

We don't interact with them because these people don't even want to learn our language. You see someone being in this country for more than 5 years, but they don't speak our language, it clearly show that they are not interested in our culture nor language, rather in our opportunities (MG).

Apart from the language concern, participant FN, a South African participant, while agreeing with MG, added the following:

MG is rights, if I can add something to what he said is that who are these people, where are they coming from, and why are they here? I cannot just start to interact with the people that I don't know, what if they are criminals? We know each other in this community ever since, all of the sudden people start coming, how can I trust them. Foreigners must first tell us who they are (FN).

Echoing similar sentiments to those from MG and FN, participant ZM, a South African participant, stated that the poor social interactions between immigrants and South Africans lie



in the fact that there is a lack of knowledge or history of the migrants. Hence, and according to **ZM's** point of view, they cannot merely interact with someone of whom they have no knowledge:

When the government give these people the paper, they don't bring them to us or tell us about them, so they come in the night and in the morning, you see someone who you don't know, who you never seen before, and he doesn't look like a South Africans. If a crime took place, who will I suspect? because I know almost everyone, what is that person is a criminal? I cannot just interact with someone that I don't know (**ZM**).

Perhaps the above excuse or reasons why there is a perceived poor relationship between migrants and South African citizens might have created a close niche amongst migrants who are not South Africans. This is supported by the opinion of participant **SA** who stated the following:

Migrants always talk to themselves; they don't want to associate with us. For example, if a Tanzanian meet a Kenyan automatically, they become connected. I have also noticed that Ghanaian and Nigerian although they look alike, but they get along well (**SA**).

On the other hand, participant **SJ**, a South African, noted to have good interactions with migrants. **Jane** revealed the following:

I do interact with foreigners, and my neighbours are foreigners as in my cottage there is two guys from Malawi, and they told me that most of foreigners, especially the black ones are refugees (**SJ**).

Despite the perceived lack of interactions with immigrants, it was important to know that all the members in the focus groups had a good perception of immigrants. Some considered them as fellow Africans and brothers. Participant **ZM**, however, warned that her favourable perception of immigrants was centred on her Christian faith and that other non-Christians may have a different view of immigrants: "I don't have a problem with them because I'm a Christian, but you might get a different answer from a non-Christian" (**ZM**).

While some of the local people have pointed out the fact that they do not have a relationship with migrants and accuse the latter of failing to show their interest in the local languages and cultures, this study found that the migrants are also blaming the locals for not showing any interest in interacting with them. It was in this vein that **FK**, a Congolese refugee, explained that:

These people when they noticed that you are not from South Africa, they run away from you. They don't want to talk to you, and that is why I personally don't like to approach them; because I have tried that with my neighbours, but it was like they were not interest in me at all (**FK**).

In supporting **FK's** view, **RM**, a Congolese asylum seeker, explained that:

When I move in this community, I saw my neighbour for the first time, and I went to greet her in English, and she replied to me in IsiZulu and asked me a question which I could not understand because I don't speak isiZulu. I kindly told her that I don't speak isiZulu. She looked at me like I was carrying dirt, I'm telling you my brother since that day she never greets me, and when I greet her, she doesn't reply (**RM**).

However, it is not all migrants or local people who do not have a good relationship in the community. For instance, in supporting **SJ's** statement provided above with regards to her relationships with migrants, **NN**, a South African lady, explained during the FGD with the local people that she lives with her migrant neighbours as though they are one big family and that they assist each other – in her own words, she explained that:

My neighbours are from Nigeria and when they came into our neighbourhood, they first introduced themselves to us and in the community, we know them and we trust them, now we are sharing food or electricity, we don't have any problem with them (**NN**).

#### **6.7.4 Factors influencing Xenophobia**

Previous research by Cronje (2009) has classified the causes of xenophobia or, in the more contemporary South African context, Afrophobia, into three broad areas which are corruption in the government, the high rate of unemployment, and subversion of the rule of law. This view is elaborated further below.

##### *(a) Foreign-Owned Business*

Given the economic pressure and the perceived unemployment rate, Ngota, Mang'unyi and Rajkaran (2018) aver that immigrants are often stereotyped as a threat to the economic and social interests of South Africans. Participant **ZM** attributed this to the perceived “culture of entitlement” that is fundamentally endemic amongst black South Africans:

We have developed a bad culture us South Africans, which I can call as a culture of self-entitlement. Because of apartheid, us South Africans think that everything should be given to us. Everything must be about us, and that culture is always apparent in us black South Africans. They think that they just sit and relax. They don't want to do anything that is on their way, they think that migrants are taking their jobs meanwhile they are just sitting and doing nothing (**ZM**).

However, another of the participants disagreed with **ZM's** reference to South Africans' idleness. According to the participant, South Africans are not lazy but rather that migrants are stealing every job opportunity. The participant therefore wondered why a Somalian, for example, could open a tuck shop in a South African township in a manner that no South African would be allowed to do in Somalia:

We don't sit and relax, it just that foreigners are doing everything, even the little things that we are supposed to be doing. Look at the case of tuck shops for example, you just wake up one morning and you see people building a tuck shop for a Somali. I cannot go to Somali and go in a Somali township to open a tuck shop. They will never allow me, reason why we just want them out so that we can open our own tuck shops in our own community (MG).

While the above view tends to support the narrative that South Africans are being denied business opportunities by migrants, this is faulted by the report released by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2017) which noted that the number of South Africans who are involved in entrepreneurship activities has been noted to be dropping since 2013. The report reveals that immigrant entrepreneurs have tried to maintain the balance of entrepreneurial ventures in the country by filling the vacuum left by local entrepreneurs. Going by this, one could assume that African immigrants are only filling the vacuum where they have found untapped opportunities. This was revealed by a migrant from Nigeria who explained that:

From back home they don't teach them to just sit at home and relax, as if food or money is going to fall from heaven. They must open those the small business as a way to survive in SA, because of discrimination that they face in the country, that explain why the majority of them are either fixing computers or selling phones (OK).

OK's views were also shared by MH, a Somalian participant, who emphasised the fact that them, having their own businesses, is something that they see as a way of having identities to survive in the country, and they have learned to support each other in the business of spaza shops, while some of them are also working for the big bosses. However, MH explained that:

Before you start running your own spaza shop, you have first to work for someone who will teach you how to run a business and how to buy goods. Then from there you will see if you can make it or not (MH)

**(b) Drugs and Crime**

Apart from economic challenges, South Africa has a problem of crime and drug-related issues. According to some of the participants in the focus group discussions, African migrants are behind and responsible for the drugs and crime rate in the country. Although some noted that not all foreigners are involved in crime, certain nationalities such as the Nigerians and Zimbabweans are known for drugs and criminal acts.

For example, it was noted that Nigerians are the ones who are selling drugs, while Zimbabweans are responsible for and willing to work for low wages. However, one could rightly assume that the crime accusation of African immigrants may be more of a stereotype than the actual picture of events. It emerged that part of the accusation of drug dealing stemmed from

the exposure to Nigerian movies, which some of the participants may have misinterpreted as representing a culture in Nigeria. This is reflected in the following statement:

I cannot say that all Nigerians are drug traffickers, but it's something that come with culture. We grew up watching Nigerian movies where they sell drugs, robbing people and banks. Plus, when we now reading in the news that two Nigerians were arrested for drugs trafficking, or 5 Nigerians were arrested as they try to rob a bank, we can only think of the obvious about them (**MB**).

Equally, and fuelling the narrative of drug dealing, is the assumed extravagant lifestyle of some foreign nationals. For instance, participant **SJ** noted that the hotels, shops, and expensive cars owned by Nigerians are evidence of their dealings with criminality and drug-related offenses:

There is a place here in Durban called Point Road, if you take that road as you are heading towards South Beach, you will see a lot of clubs, shops and hotels owned by Nigerians; and you will see flashy, expensive cars parked across the road from 7hr00 in the morning to 7hr00 in the evening you will see them sitting in those cars. To me it triggers that it's easier to find customers on the road (**SJ**).

While it will be premature to dismiss the fact that some African migrants such as Nigerian nationals are involved in drug-related crimes, this does not in any way give credence to the narrative that only African migrants are responsible for the crimes in South Africa. Participant **SB**, while narrating a newspaper crime report, revealed the following:

Two years ago, I read a story in the Daily Sun Newspaper on an Indian couple involved in human trafficking, and some Nigerian guys were also involved in that matters (**SB**).

Despite the incidence of reported crimes among South African citizens, it was apparent that some of the participants had the mindset that drug-dealing and crimes in South Africa are carried out by African immigrants:

The story we heard about them now is in our minds, that they sell drugs and that they are not good people. But I never heard of another group of foreigners being involved in drugs or criminal activities (**ZM**).

Furthermore, participant **ZM** noted that South Africans only deal cheap drugs, and they are well known in the community: "The guys involved here sells cheap stuff called wonga. But we know them, and we know that there is someone behind them because they are suffering" (**ZM**).

Another interesting point noted was that the economic standard of the South Africans dealing drugs suggests that they have access to foreign nationals who are the main drug-dealing

masterminds. This view may perhaps be the cause for the tagging of successful foreign migrants as drug dealers and criminals. In the opinion of participant **MG**:

Us South African like to change our lives, but if you see someone selling drugs and he is selling suffering, its means that there is a mastermind behind them, and he is the one getting big money (**MG**).

However, since Nigerians are viewed as the drug dealers by the local people, it was important to ask their views on the issue of drugs, and surprisingly, the Nigerians did not deny the fact that some of their brothers do sell drugs, but **OK**, a Nigerian participant, explained that:

My brother, we Nigerians we don't go to townships selling drugs or selling the cheap stuff in townships, because there is no one that will buy it there. The Nigerians that are selling drugs, they sell pure drugs and they sell in in Durban North where whites people can affords, they drive to Durban North to sell it there they don't have time to go in townships (**OK**).

(c) *Stealing of Women*

Another critical cause of dislike or xenophobic violence in South Africa is the accusation that foreign nationals are stealing South African women. When probed on this allegation, it was found that South African women had a good perception of foreign men. Some of the reasons given included:

We like them because they give us money (**SJ**).

They know how to take care of women, while our men just want beer and sex (**ZM**).

Foreigners, especially Nigerians, spoiled us with gifts and money (**MB**).

Migrants did not hide the fact that they like the local women because of their beauty, but they also emphasised the fact that the local women love them because they know how to treat them. It was in this vein that **KK** explained that:

We know how to spoil women, and we know that for you to make a woman happy you just must spend on her as a way of taking care of her and sometimes it is because of those little things that we do that they like (**KK**).

In addition to **KK**'s statement provided above, **RV** explained that:

I heard that the local people don't often spend on their women, when they go to a restaurant, they share the bill, or share money for transport, they don't take the women out for shopping. Sometimes, you don't have to spend a lot of money on these things, even clothes at Mr Price will make a woman happy. You don't have to take her to expensive shops (**RV**).

Drawing from the above, one could assume that the empathic characters of foreign nationals are responsible for the attraction by South African women. Understandably, the preference of

foreign men by South African women may be further spreading the hatred and dislike of immigrants in the country.

#### **6.7.5 Perception of Xenophobic Violence**

Although one could draw from the previous themes that there are poor social interactions and relationships between the locals and foreign nationals, it was also noted that South Africans, particularly their women, had a good positive perception of foreign nationals. Hence, it was not surprising that all the participants in the focus groups found the xenophobic violence to be an unpleasant situation in the country. Participant **Jane** noted that “Killing our African brothers is not good, we must have always ubuntu” (**SJ**).

While others such as participant **MG** abhor the beatings, **MG** however subtly justified the violence and noted the following:

I don't like it when I see them being beaten but they need to understand that we don't want to see them in our townships running businesses, they are bad for South Africa, they are looting our country (**MG**).

However, the discussion turned into a form of debate between participants **ZM** and **MG**. **ZM** reminded **MG** of the past during the period of apartheid of how foreign nationals had protected South African freedom fighters who had escaped to neighbouring countries for protection against the repressive apartheid regime:

I just want to tell **uMG** that their people like us, during apartheid our South Africans brothers went to live in their countries, and they protect them so that today we can have a country that we always wanted to have. For that we need to be grateful and tolerate them (**ZM**).

In his own defence, **MG** alleged that there was no evidence that those who sought protection in foreign nations were involved in criminality or running businesses in those nations:

Yes, they accommodated our brothers who managed to escape, but I have never heard that they were selling drugs in those countries or selling expired bread in the tuck shops in Somali (**MG**).

In summary, the focus group discussions brought to the forefront the pressing issues and concerns of xenophobic violence in South Africa. It was glaring that a lack of understanding, poor knowledge, and the misconception of foreign immigrants were behind the negative perceptions of foreign nationals in the country. Contrary to the assumption that the presence of immigrants had no value, the focus groups also highlighted the economic contributions of immigrants to the lives of South Africans. It was also suggested that the business success of the immigrants, as well as the culture of entitlement of South Africans, are part of the cause of xenophobic violence.

## **6.8 Conclusion**

This chapter presented different data gathered throughout the investigation. While the research entailed working with both groups (migrants and the locals) on the possible ways of preventing and combatting xenophobia, this chapter reinforced that which different scholars have argued about in terms of the character of xenophobia in the South African context. However, while xenophobic attitudes were exhibited amongst some local participants, it must be pointed out that it is not all South Africans who are supporting the xenophobic violence perpetrated towards migrants, as some participants showed a different opinion. However, while xenophobia is known to be an international phenomenon, this chapter provided that the issue of xenophobic violence is different and unique in SA as compared to other countries since the socio-structural behaviour of South Africans is mainly dominated by violence, which in most cases, ends either in deaths or shedding blood between the conflictual parties, requiring an effective intervention in the conflict from the municipal government. Moreover, the socio-economic inequality that prevails in SA is one of the contributing factors to xenophobic violence as migrants are portrayed as economic competitors. Having presented the data collected above, it is important to have a closer look into the xenophobic violence that is still prevalent in the country. This means that the discussion on the causes and motives of xenophobia needs to be broadened and requires a different perspective, based on the themes presented above, and the next chapter will provide a general discussion to demonstrate that which the problem truly entails.

## **CHAPTER 7: General Discussions – Xenophobia: A Demon without *raison d'être***

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a discussion that emerged from the data collection process, including different activities that were conducted to obtain a clear understanding of the xenophobia phenomenon that is affecting the lives of foreign nationals and South Africans. This chapter comes in to broaden the discussion provided in Chapter 7 to give a clear understanding of xenophobia in the South African context and its causes. Based on the observation that since 2008, there have been different motivations that have triggered xenophobia in South Africa, the motivation changes depending on the circumstances almost every year, which means that sometimes migrants are accused of stealing jobs, sometimes they are attacked for selling drugs, and on some occasions, they are accused of selling expired foods to people living in the townships or informal settlements. Thus, due to these facts, this chapter argues that xenophobia in SA does not have a clear justification for taking place, which means that the attacks against migrants are blurred as they depend on the locals' mood or challenges that they are facing during that particular period or season (Claassen 2017: 1).

Furthermore, the chapter looks at the role that the government has been playing during different incidences of xenophobic violence that have prevailed in the country, and in so doing, the chapter argues that the South African government has played a role during xenophobia, meaning that the government has been at the centre of triggering different acts of violence that have been taking place in the country by indirectly blaming the migrants in the country. This links directly with Hanekom and Webster (2009) statement on the responsibility of the government as they argue that "the fact that the government played a vital role in xenophobic violence does not mean that it created xenophobia, but rather the government has done little to alleviate the tension". Coupled with this, there are different negative public statements made by government officials.

Thus, this chapter will explore and analyse all the motivations behind xenophobia, taking into consideration all the elements that the participants revealed during the interviews, FGDs, workshops, and dialogues that have been provided in the previous chapter.



## **7.2 Attitude and Perception of Migrants and South Africans towards each other**

Attitude is defined, in the simplest way, as a mindset or a tendency to behave in a particular way due to both an individual experience and temperament (Pickens 2005: 43-76 ). It often assists in conveying how people understand situations and how they behave *vis-à-vis* the situation, and it includes feelings, thoughts, and actions (ibid). In addition, attitudes and perceptions always play a motivating role towards each other. They become apparent in a situation of violent conflict with two different opposing groups, as one of the opposing parties always develops a negative attitude which gives birth to different types of stereotypes against the other, and this gives birth to emotions of insecurity, anger, bitterness, and hatred.

Attitudes play an important role in all societies as they can influence different policies towards migrants and can have an impact on their well-being in the country (Tunon and Baruah 2012: 149-162). Scholars have explained that in most hosting countries, there is usually a strong negative attitude and perception towards migrants, especially those who are working. The reason is nothing other than the fact that the public are more concerned about the fact that their country's economy might decline and that there may be a job crisis (ibid). An exploration on the attitudes that both groups have towards each other was worth carrying out, and a special observation was made of the South Africans, as they were the hosting group. Coupled with this is the fact that an attitude, if negative, will result into violence (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: Ibid). People are witnessing that xenophobia, which is known as a negative attitude, results in extreme violence in the South African context.

As has been mentioned in the literature, a minority group can also have a prejudice or stereotypical attitude towards the majority, which means that one cannot only focus on the attitude of the locals towards the migrants. Thus, it is important to critically explore the attitudes that both groups have towards each other, as it is the starting point of xenophobic violence in SA.

### **7.2.1 Attitude and Perception of South Africans towards Migrants**

The attitudes of the local people towards migrants have been seen as one of the elements that always triggers xenophobia, as scholars have argued that xenophobia is a direct message to migrants that they are not welcome in the country (Jonathan Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Crush and Peberdy 2018). The local people have developed a general suspicion that migrants are not legal in the country, and there is a strong belief that migrants are an economic threat. The most important and persistent result that emerged from different studies not limited

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to SA revealed that migrants are poaching rather than generating jobs (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 2). The negative attitudes towards migrants are similar and general to almost all the local people regardless of their race, economic status, and sex (ibid: 1). However, while Blacks are always seen on the frontline of the attacks and always show the negative attitudes to migrants and migration to SA, **MS**, a participant from Rwanda, and **KK**, a participant from the DRC, revealed that unlike black South Africans who are ready to attack and tell them that they are not welcome, white South Africans often show empathy towards migrants and they are always helping them (Interview at Emmanuel Church, 2018).

There is a common belief among the local citizens that SA is under siege from outsiders. This belief is also believed to be at the centre of xenophobic discourse. South Africans have developed a stronger perception towards migrants, accusing them of harming the country's economy. Thus, 35.8% of the local people believe that migrants are detrimental to the economy of the country, 10.1% believe that migrants are engaged in illegal activities, 14% believe that they should keep out of the country, and 15.3% believe that migrants cause over-population within the country (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 20). However, while different studies have pointed out the economic situation of the local people as a reason for the negative attitudes, some scholars have a different view on this, for instance, Aymar and Segatti dispute the connection between economic status and the attitudes of the locals towards the migrants (Magbunduku 2016: 15 -32). Coupled with this, Neocosmos (2008) posits that it is the connection between the local people and autochthonous men that fuels hostility and negative attitudes towards migrants, and not economic conditions. Based on the statistics provided above, the local participants did not hide the fact that there were too many migrants living in the country, and a 28-year-old local lady explained to the mixed group that:

Foreigners are living in numbers in the metropolitan cities, suffocating us to get many opportunities. They must settle in our villages or deep rural areas so that we can also enjoy the benefits our metropolitan cities. If you look at our history, you will see that our fathers and grandparents use to come in the metropolitan cities to find work, now we can't, because foreigners are everywhere in the cities (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church on 20 October 2019).

Taking the above-mentioned statement into consideration, it is clear that the local people feel that they are competing with migrants for the same socio-economic opportunities. A survey conducted in 2011 by the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa (IDASA) confirmed that the negative attitudes towards migrants are still strong. This report showed that the negative attitude towards migrants has not changed as compared to previous surveys. A more recent survey was conducted in 2014 by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO), which also revealed that the rates of xenophobic violence and intolerance are increasing in Gauteng, as

thirty-five percent of the respondents were of the view that migrants should leave the country (See in Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015: 19). As mentioned above, migrants are stereotypically seen as poaching jobs from the locals, sending their earnings out of the country, accessing social programs such as health services and grants, and being involved in criminal activities. Thus, a study revealed that 64% of the local people believe that migrants are involved in crime, 60% believe that they poach jobs from the local people, 62% are of the view that they are culturally different, 60% believe that migrants cheat South Africans, and 56% believe that they use the health services (Crush and Pendleton 2004; Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013).

Thus, the stereotypes provided above have made migrants scapegoats in the country, hence, based on Renè Girard's work on scapegoating, it is clear that there is a mimetic rivalry over objects of desire between South Africans and migrants which creates a situation of conflict (Magbunduku 2016). Consequently, in the South African context, migrants are not arbitrarily selected victims, but they serve as scapegoats due to existing rivalries in the communities or in the country as a whole (ibid). The word *scapegoat* is widely used to define a person who is blamed for the mistakes of others, or with regards to a procedure in which an individual or a group is reconciled at the detriment of a third party who appears guilty for whatever harms, disturbs, or frightens the scapegoaters (ibid). Hence, in the South African context, the above-mentioned rivalries are seen as an underlying justification for the negative attitude exhibited towards migrants as they are the scapegoat of the country's socio-economic problems. Landau (2012: 3) argues that "outsiders have come to be understood as a threatening obstacle to achieving justice and retribution for decades of discrimination and indignity". This view was observed during the data collection process as the local participants were questioning the locations of migrants during apartheid, as they were not suffering while the locals were falling short in the apartheid regime.

The way in which mimetic rivalries translate into scapegoating is evident and apparent with respect to unrealistic generalisations expressed by local people towards migrants. However, the scope of the unconscious projection of societal ills on migrants is not simply a local phenomenon but is rooted in national sentiments (Magbunduku 2016: Ibid). This is revealed in different national surveys on the local people's attitudes towards migrants, which reveal that migrants are framed as targets of prejudice, discrimination, and ultimately scapegoating (Crush 2008: Ibid). Coupled with this are the SAMP surveys which revealed and concluded that the local people's attitudes towards migrants reached the gloomy conclusion that SA has continued to be a society in which xenophobia has remained well-entrenched, as citizens'

beliefs about migrants have been informed mostly by stereotypes, myths, and unverified biases (Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013: 1).

Chapter 7 demonstrated how an individual attitude can affect and change other people's views in a negative or positive way. For instance, the point raised by participants **SC** and **MG** on their perception of migrants can negatively influence other local people who had a positive attitude towards migrants. The study found that most of the local people, whether elders or the youngsters, are not comfortable with the presence of migrants in the country. Notably, the elders are the ones motivating the youngsters to attack migrants. As **PZ** mentioned during the dialogue, those who are motivating the young people and encouraging them to attack migrants and to loot their shops are the elder people in the community, on the basis that the country will be better off without migrants (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 10 August 2019). With this in mind, participant **MG** is much older than **SC**, which means that his view can influence other young people in the community to disregard migrants.

The stereotypes and stigmas that the local people have developed towards migrants have also shaped the negative attitudes that the latter are facing, such as job competitions, criminal activities, legal status in the country, etc. While different scholars and civil societies have been reporting and denouncing the negative attitudes exhibited by the local people towards migrants since 1994, during the research, the migrant participants revealed that South Africans should not always be blamed for their attitudes and perceptions towards migrants, and notably, migrants play an important role in shaping an unfavourable image of themselves in the country through the behaviour that they exhibit in the country, behaviours that they could not and would never exhibit in their own countries. This means that their wrongdoing in SA is pushing the local people to develop stereotypes against them and attack them or paint a negative picture of them. This was also acknowledged by a refugee from Burundi who explained during a dialogue that:

We must not always blame South Africans for not welcoming us or having a negative attitude towards us. But we need to understand that what we are doing in this country is not correct. Look at what Nigerians are doing in this country, they are selling drugs like peanuts; some marry South African women just because they need a South African ID, and once they have the ID, they chased the girl away. Another example is our brothers from Uganda. they came here and become fake *sangomas* (traditional healer), they run away with people's money, and they are impregnating these South African young ladies, when they give birth, they run away from the girl. These things are not correct, that is why I'm saying that we must also blame ourselves for what is happening to us in this country. We would react the same way that South Africans are reacting, if they were doing in our countries what we are doing in their countries (Dialogue on 25 October 2019).

However, Crush and Peberdy (2018: 1) state that although migrants are being portrayed as criminals or as being part of organised crime organisations, these represent a minority as compared to those who are living in the country to work, trade, shop, or visit. They further state that even the undocumented migrants are not criminals, as their undocumented status is open for debate. They conclude by acknowledging that some migrants are involved in petty and serious crimes, “but, then are so many South Africans”. It is important to mention that migrants have acknowledged, in a dialogue, that the negative attitudes that the local people have towards them is far from changing, and whether they behave according to the local people’s expectations or not, the latter are far from accepting them in the country or tolerating them, and for this reason, they have to ‘buckle up and live with it’ (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 30 August 2019).

### **7.2.2 Attitude and Perception of Migrants towards South Africans**

The negative attitude is not only limited to the local people, and migrants have also developed a negative attitude towards South Africans. While the local people are accusing migrants of stealing their jobs, the latter view the local people as lazy since there are many employment opportunities in the country that are available to them, but the latter are not interested in taking those opportunities as they prefer to sit at home to receive grants from the government and drink (Modise 2015; News 2015). Coupled with this, migrants see the local people as uneducated since they possess a limited knowledge in various aspects. This view is also supported by empirical studies, as the illiteracy of black South Africans is linked to the history of the country, resulting in an increased rate of illiteracy (Akindele *et al.* 2008; Kinge and Tiobo 2016). However, Plecher (2019) states that “as of 2015, South Africa’s total literacy rate was around 94.37%”, and this survey was done based on people who can read and write and aged between 15 years and above. This percentage revealed migrants’ thoughts on the level of education of the local people as erroneous, and **KK**, a participant from the DRC, explained during the interview that:

We are wrong by thinking that the local people are illiterates, we need to understand that they are different from us, on the basis that they focus more on what they are doing and what they know. Unlike us for example Congolese you will see a medical doctor who can also work as mechanic. But with South Africans, you will see that if he studied economics, he will only search for jobs that fits into his qualification, he is not going to find a small or piece job in the meantime. That is why you will see that they don’t bother to know what is happening outside SA or know other countries in Africa, expect their bordering countries; It is because they focus on one thing. That is why you will see someone from Durban telling you that he never been to Johannesburg or Cape Town. That means that they are comfortable where they are (Interview with **KK** at DUT Steve Biko campus).

Thus, in terms of the local people being lazy, migrants are of the view that it is not something that they can afford to do, as they do not have a government to look after them, as they are not beneficiaries of any grants as compared to the local people. This means that if they do not work, they will have to find alternative ways of paying rent and taking care of their families (FGD observation, 15 July 2019). However, this view was again contested by **TH**, a participant from Rwanda, who stated that:

If you said that South Africans are lazy, then you do not know what you are talking about, because if pass by market in town early in the morning, you will see the people (local people) ready to open their shop, or those ladies sending tomatoes ready to set their tables (Dialogue observation at the Bat centre, 2019).

**TH's** views were also supported by **FK** who stated that:

Unlike us (migrants) the people (South Africans) know they are rights and their worth, that is why you will never see them working as car watch. Especially if they have completed university. But us, we don't know our rights and we are hosted. So, we must do whatever we can to survive. They know that they will toyi-toyi and the government will listen. But us, we cannot do that (Interview with **FK**).

Furthermore, the local people are also not sharing this opinion, as they blame the government for not giving them the opportunities to show the world that which they can do. This view was also shared by the former mayor of Johannesburg through that which he termed "The people's Dialogue", as he weighed in on the claims that South Africans are lazy (Nkanjeni 2020).

Migrants avoid the local people as they consider them as being violent. The latter not only exhibit their violence during xenophobic attacks but also when they are fighting against themselves or protesting. This means that the long history of violence in the country has legitimised and institutionalised violence (Heineken 2020), and moreover, violence in SA and amongst South Africans is viewed as a form of communication (Van der Merwe 2013: 65-84). Migrants are of the view that the local people are ready to kill for a small problem. Thus, migrants revealed that they avoid having a discussion or argument with the local people as the latter are short-tempered and can easily kill. **ST**, a refugee from the DRC, explained during the dialogue that:

We avoid the Zulu because they are dangerous and good people at the same time. That means that, when you show them that you respect them, and you avoid them, you will live peacefully with them, they will never disturb you. But they are very dangerous when you have a problem with them, plus they don't forget a problem. When your anger is at 30% theirs is at 70%, by the time your anger reached 100%, they will be already at 1000% and that mean they are ready to kill for nothing. That is one of the reasons that we

avoid them, and we tend to live in the areas where other migrants lives so we can be protected in times of the violence (ST).

### **7.2.3 Divided by the past Political Regime and invaded by the unknown**

With regards to SA, being a young democratic country, during apartheid, South Africans were divided internally according to their tribal groups, as has been explained in the review. It was only at the end of the apartheid regime that the tribal groups had to learn about other tribes within their own country. While they were trying to identify themselves and learn to live as one people with other tribes, they had to face the influx of migrants whom Neocosmos (2008) referred to as the '*unknown*', due to the fact that they were unknown to South Africans. The study found out that migrants are still unknown to many South Africans, as many of the latter are only aware of the presence of other African migrants in the country, but they do not know the reasons pushing migrants to SA, while there are other countries around SA. This explains the fact that most of the local people with whom the researcher had to work as participants were not able to explain who a refugee is and when one person becomes a refugee.

However, while one might be quick to judge that interest in the presence of migrants and the lack of contact, Crush and Pendleton (2004: 25) explain that internationally, interactions with non-citizens have been found to have both beneficial and detrimental impacts on the attitudes of the local people towards migrants. Their survey revealed that only 15% of the population had a great deal of contact with migrants, and 10% had contact with African migrants out of 25% of the population who are believed to be migrants (ibid). These numbers clearly show that it is only a small number of the local people who are in contact with migrants.

While the end of apartheid saw South Africans fighting against each other for power and opportunities (the Zulu *versus* the Xhosa), it is worth noting that there has been a shift in terms of the tribal conflict in the country. This means that migration of African migrants to SA has shifted the tribal conflict between the local people into a xenophobic conflict that is being witnessed in post-apartheid SA, as migrants are regarded as the new unwanted '*alien*'<sup>3</sup> in the country; this constitutes one of the reasons that empirical studies always link xenophobia to apartheid.

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<sup>3</sup> The term 'Alien' is used in reference to the Aliens Amendment Act of 1986 which was challenged by different civil societies in the country as it was not the correct word to describe migrants.

Furthermore, the fact that many migrants are regarded to be unknown to the local people is one of the major concerns in the communities and in the country as a whole, the reason being that the local people feel that they have been invaded. Crush and Pendleton (2004: 25) state that a greater interaction with migrants will help to minimize prejudice. Casual contact can, therefore, have the opposite effect. However, scholars have reported that the local people are not willing to associate with the people whom they do not know nor to make any effort to meet them. That alone supports Harris (2002) view on the attitude of the local people as he stated that South Africans are uncomfortable with the presence of migrants (See in Misago 2015: Ibid).

While SA is known as being the '*rainbow nation*', it is also known as being a racially and tribally divided country. It is a racially divided country due to the fact that apartheid divided Whites and black South Africans (Smith 2012), and being a tribally divided country does not only refer to the division between the Zulus and the Xhosas, as these are the major tribes in the country battling for leadership and domination, but also to the minor tribes such as the Shangans and Venda who are considered as not being South Africans due to their physical features and their languages which are in no way related to isiZulu and isiXhosa, and who are also tribally fighting against each other (Mukwevho 2016; Mathebula 2019).

Thus, a nation that is internally divided will always find it difficult to welcome people from other nations, and even if it does, the latter will find it difficult to integrate. This demonstrates the realities of migrants in the country. The latter have found it difficult to integrate due to the fact that they are not only unknown to many South Africans, but they are also unwanted in the country.

The same factors that are shaping the exclusion of Venda and Shangans in the country are shaping the exclusion of and stereotypes against migrants. This means that migrants are viewed as the unknown in the country due to their physical looks and the languages they speak. Thus, these are explained below respectively. Furthermore, the presence of migrants in the country has developed feelings of invasion, insecurities, and competition not only amongst ordinary South Africans but also among government officials who are deploring the high presence of migrants in the country. This was demonstrated by the then Deputy Minister of Police who stated in a press conference that migrants are taking over SA as 80% of foreign nationals are living in the city Centre of Johannesburg (Hillbrow)<sup>4</sup>. He further stated that "we fought for this land, and we cannot surrender it to foreigners" (Lindeque 2017).

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<sup>4</sup> Hillbrow is one of the main suburbs located in Johannesburg, and many locals have reported the area to be dominated by migrants. However, Africa Check reported that there are only 37.3% of migrants

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The above-mentioned statement shows that the local people are of the view that migrants, who are seen as the unknown or outsiders, are taking over the country. Hence, the local people are frustrated due to the presence of migrants. During the investigation, the researcher observed that local people are not comfortable living with migrants on the basis that “they don’t look like them, they don’t talk like them, they are not part of them” (FGD with South Africans, 12 May 2018). This is explained below as follows.

(a) *They don’t look like us (Physical Features)*

South Africans have developed some physical traits which have made them look different from migrants, and amongst these traits is skin colour, as many South Africans are of the view that migrants from other African countries are quite darker as compared to them. However, it is not only skin colour that differentiates the two groups, and height is also a factor as migrants are described as being tall as compared to the local people, and coupled with this, there is the fact that migrants’ ways of dressing are completely different from that of the local people. The fact that the local people exhibit a negative attitude towards migrants taps directly into the bio-cultural theory which has been explained above. Taking a closer look at the definition of this theory, Carroll *et al.* refer to the theory as:

An integrative research designed to investigate the causal interactions between biological adaptations and cultural constructions. From the bio-cultural perspective, cultural processes are rooted in the biological necessities of the human life cycle: specifically, human forms of birth, growth, survival, mating, parenting, and sociality. Conversely, from the bio-cultural perspective, human biological processes are constrained, organized, and developed by culture, which includes technology, culturally specific socio-economic and political structures, religious and ideological beliefs, and artistic practices such as music, dance, painting, and storytelling (Carroll *et al.* 2017: 1).

From the definition provided above, two themes that emerge are enough to understand the biocultural attitude exhibited by the local people towards migrants, which are ‘human behaviour’ and cultural background (way of life). This clearly shows that the local people have set a distinctive bar between themselves, and migrants based on those two characteristics,

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living there, while the 51.7% of residents are South Africans. However, thus far, there are no official statistics from STATSA/ the Africa Check report available on: <https://africacheck.org/reports/unproven-that-hillbrow-nearby-areas-are-80-foreign-national-as-claimed-in-much-shared-video/> (Accessed 15 January 2020).

and moreover, empirical studies have demonstrated that the most affected groups that are seen as different as compared to the locals are migrants from Nigeria and those from the DRC (Muchiri 2016: 72). Thus, participants revealed that they are easy to identify because the majority of them are tall, dark, and loud, and coupled with this, they have a different dressing style as compared to the local people (FGD observation with South Africans).

The researcher was surprised during the investigation to find that except for migrants from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Somalia, who are easily identified due to their skin colour, the local participants assimilate the rest of the migrants living in SA to Nigeria due to their skin colours and heights. Thus, there was a point in the research process where some local people refused to participate in the study as they thought that the researcher was a Nigerian because of the researcher's height and dark skin colour. This shows a lack of good information regarding migrants living in the country and their origins.

Since the physical features play a large role in shaping the attitudes of the local people, Mario Matsinhe (2011: 295-313) posits that physical features are regarded as a nation-building block that is subjected to an ongoing patriotic process of selection. The bodies caught on the sieve are rejected, labelled as coarse and strange, and denied belonging and usefulness. They must not infiltrate South African social spaces. If they do, they must be hunted down and destroyed or removed. Although all the social groups within SA share these same assumptions, black South Africans are the most ardent, rigorous, and vigorous in deploying them. Thus, while during the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic violence the local people relied on physical features, languages, and skin colour to attack African migrants, it has been reported empirically that attacking migrants based on their physical features has claimed the lives of many South Africans as compared to migrants (Maina *et al.* 2011; Guardian 2015; Watch 2019).

For instance, taking into consideration the 2015 xenophobic violence that took place in Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), it was reported that out of the seven people who lost their lives, only two migrants were killed, while the five remaining deaths were South Africans. If one looks at the 2008 xenophobic violence, it was reported that out of sixty-one deaths, at least 21 South Africans lost their lives in the violence because they were mistaken as foreigners, or their languages were different as compared to the main spoken language. One can also consider a recent example of xenophobic violence which took place in Johannesburg and Pretoria in 2019 and which was reported of claiming the lives of ten South Africans while none of the migrants died. These examples above show that attacking migrants based on their physical appearances is a dangerous move that the perpetrators usually make as some local people have the same physical features as those regarded as the unknown, while some unknown

have similar physical features to South Africans, which results in South Africans killing South Africans on the basis that they do not look like South Africans, and law enforcement agents arresting South Africans sharing similar physical features with migrants (Misago, Landau and Monson 2008; Mario Matsinhe 2011; Muchiri 2016).

(b) *They don't talk like us (Language)*

The socio-linguistic aspect plays an important role in exploring xenophobia and the negative attitude exhibited towards migrants in SA. While SA is known to be a linguistically diverse country, with 11 official languages, scholars have reported that migrants often use 'destination language' once they arrive and settle in SA (Brits, Kaschula and Docrat 2020). Thus, language plays a large role in a society, as one can easily be integrated in the community due to one's ability to speak the language, while the other can be excluded due to his/her inability to communicate with the local people. Moagi *et al.* (2018: 196-200) argue that SA has a long history of ethnocentrism in which the indigenous population have privileged their linguistic, cultural, and geographical identities. Thus, migrants are easily targeted due to their inability to communicate in the local languages, as they find it difficult due to the fact that their first aim when they enter the country is to learn English. The fact that the migrants are focused more on speaking and communicate only in English does not sit well with the locals.

While migrants openly expressed their inability to speak the local language, they have also acknowledged the importance of speaking isiZulu which they regarded as a necessity to show to the hosting community or country that they are interested in the culture and language. Mkize (2019) postulates that "migrants relied on English as a form of communication with local people and are fluent in it, as opposed to local indigenous languages". However, the preference of learning and communicating in English over isiZulu is based on the argument that isiZulu does not guarantee them job accessibility as most employers speak English (Interview observations). During the investigation, most of the people interviewed did not hide that they felt bad when they were being asked something in isiZulu to which they were unable to respond, or when they met someone who did not want to communicate in English. participant from Zimbabwe stated during the interview that:

I feel embarrassed when I want to buy something in town, and the seller is only speaking in isiZulu; or when I am sitting in a front chair of a kombi with a talkative driver, who will be talking to me in the local language even if he can see that I am unable to speak the language (Interview with **VK** at Emmanuel Church, 2019).

In support of **VK**'s above-mentioned views, Katsere, a Zimbabwean national and a University of Cape Town researcher on xenophobia and language, explained that "when you speak in

English to local people, especially where there is a lot of people, like when you go to hospital, they will laugh – they will laugh at you. When they laugh, they will start to talk and whisper: Heeeee, this is that kwerekwere” (Mkize 2019). He then stated that language is an important source of misunderstanding. (ibid).

The fact that the two groups speak different languages has created some form of insecurity and mistrust between them. This was revealed during the dialogue as some local South Africans acknowledged that they do not feel safe being in a place full of migrants speaking their home languages, while migrants also revealed that they would rather keep quiet when they are in a place full of South Africans speaking isiZulu for fear of being attacked (Dialogue observation at Emmanuel Church, 28 September 2019). This taps directly into different studies on xenophobia, which have reported that migrants refrain from speaking their own languages and try to speak the local languages for them to blend in or they just prefer to keep quiet for fear of being attacked (Mkize 2019; Brits, Kaschula and Docrat 2020). Thus, migrants who are unable to speak the local language feel uncomfortable when they find themselves in the presence of the local people, as some have the tendency of taking advantage of their vulnerabilities. It was in this vein that a migrant from Burundi revealed in the dialogue that:

Every time I’m in the taxi, I just keep quiet because if I say something and the driver realised that I’m not speaking IsiZulu, that day will be a nightmare to me. Especially if I’m expecting my change back, the driver will not give it back and throughout the road he will be talking about you and the people in the taxi will be laughing (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 28 October 2019).

While migrants feel threatened by the fact that they are unable to speak the local language, that fact does not sit well with the local people as well, the reason being that they are regarding that attitude of not speaking the local language as a sign of no interest in the hosting country’s culture. This has pushed some locals to take a different attitude towards migrants, and such might include ignoring whoever is talking to them in English and responding only in isiZulu during a conversation (FGD observation with South Africans, 17 May 2018). Some local participants revealed that they appreciate when they meet a migrant who is interested in their language and culture, as compared to those who do not show any interest. During the FGD with South Africans, they accused migrants that are not speaking any local language by stating that “it is clear that they are not here as brothers but looters because if they were brothers, they would have learned our language” (ibid).

While the majority of migrants come from war-torn countries, they prefer communicating in their home language as it is known as a way of preserving their identity and are proud to communicate in their first language as it is considered as being part of their identity, and it is

also connected to their cultural beliefs, and moreover, it bonds them to the lives that they have left behind (Krumm and Plutzar 2008: 2). The fact that the migrants are using a different language as compared to the ones that the locals use, and the fact that the local South Africans always complain that their language is fast as compared to the local languages, they are now being referred to by some derogatory names such as *amakwerekwere*, and most of them are not comfortable when being referred to as such.

(c) *Derogatory Name attached to Different Languages*

As mentioned above, many local people are of the view that migrants' languages are quite different as compared to theirs, and it is fast when they are talking. However, during the dialogue, the research team had to address the issue of migrants being referred to as *amakwerekwere*, as many migrants do not feel comfortable when being referred to as *amakwerekwere*. Bostick (2012: i) refers to the term *amakwerekwere* as an informal term used by the local people to identify migrants living in the country. Thus, during this investigation, the researcher found that migrants have an opposite view regarding that term and any derogatory term used to describe them. Migrants believe that the term *amakwerekwere* is used by the local people to humiliate or dehumanise them. As was observed, one migrant from the DRC was very furious during the dialogue, with his finger pointing at the South African participants that they should not call them such names because they are human beings and have families that they have left behind, as for him the word does not exist in any English or IsiZulu dictionary (Dialogue observation at Emmanuel Church, 26 November 2019).

While the study found that the original term and meaning of *amakwerekwere* is more about the language spoken by migrants as compared to the local languages, this was well explained by Nyamnjoh (2016) who looked at the explanation of the term provided by Phaswane Mpe, who describes *amakwerekwere* in his novel book as a derogatory term for foreigners who are unable to speak or articulate the local language (HSRC 2016: 27). Isike and Isike (2012: 93-116) provide a clear explanation of the term which taps directly into the direct attitudes of the local people towards migrants, as they explained that *makwerekwere* has nothing good to offer to SA, stating that "the smelly, hungry, poor, illiterate and subcultural makwerekwere from poor Africa is judged as guilty, taking our jobs and women".

While the term *kwerekwere* is common in Southern Africa, especially in SA and Botswana its original context refers to non-citizens or people speaking a different language. Moreover, Isike and Isike (2012) demonstrated the reason why migrants are uncomfortable and unhappy when referred to as *kwerekwere*. Thus, the researcher understood that that which frustrates migrants when referred to as *kwerekwere* is the fact that the local people have taken the word

to another level, which means that the word is not only linked to language or foreignness but is also used by many people in the community in an uncomplimentary way of showing their resentment towards migrants. It is in the same vein that Mario Matsinhe (2011) explained that the ideology of *makwerekwere* in SA is an illusion of the foreign body that has its roots in the socio-emotional complexities of colonial groups' relations in SA, which has influenced the relationship between the local people and migrants.

Furthermore, in the recent years, the term has always been associated with extreme violence or rejection towards migrants. While the local participants who attended the dialogue confirmed that they often call a person who speaks a different language in a fast way *kwerekwere*, and because the migrants' languages fall under that category, this has resulted in them being called or referred to as *kwerekwere*. However, Mario Matsinhe (2011: 295-313) shares an indirect view as he provided that it is not about the language as there are white migrants speaking a different fast language who are not labelled as "makwerekwere", and they are rather referred to as tourists, which means that in the South African context, a black migrant is a *makwerekwere*, while the white migrant is a tourist. In supporting this argument, he states that:

In SA's imagination, the word foreigner is an emotionally charged signifier for African foreign national, whereby African bodies become literal texts on which some of the most graphic and scrutable messages of aversion are written. Bodily looks, movements, sounds and smells are legible as evidence of imagined citizenship and foreignness (ibid).

However, migrants who have been in the country for more than ten years are of the same view as the local people, as a migrant from the DRC who has been in the country for more than 15 years explained that:

South Africans use the term *kwerekwere* to refer to any language that is foreigner. They don't only refer to refugees or asylum seekers as one might think. Even Sotho people when they move to KZN they will be referred to as *kwerekwere*, or people speaking *kwerekwere* (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 26 November 2019).

This view was also supported by Theogene Haguma who explained that:

South Africans have been using the term *kwerekwere* before Burundians, Congolese or Zimbabwean started making their way to this country. They were not using it to describe the latter as *kwerekwere*, they were using it to describe each other after apartheid. The Zulus will call the Xhosas *Kwerekwere* and vice versa. They were using the word because of the difference in their languages. Further, in my experience working in the rural communities and villages, when they have to introduce me, they usually say "we are blessed to have our brother today who speak *kwerekwere*". Which

means in the village the word *kwerekwere* is not an insult but here in CBD it is an insult (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 26 November 2019).

The derogatory name calling is affecting migrants as many participants were not comfortable with the fact that they are referred to as such in a country that was supposed to accommodate them. However, while some have rejected it, some have accepted it although it reminds them of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic violence. Thus, being in a position of weakness in a country that does not want their presence, migrants must live with it as it is a word that the local people have been using for years in referring to people speaking a different language and they are not changing that any time soon.

(d) *Speaking the local language won't help you baba!*

As mentioned earlier, migrants are referred to as *amakwerekwere* by the local people due to their inability to speak the local language or since they speak a language that is fast as compared to the local language. During the research, the researcher thought that migrants who spoke the local language were safe during xenophobic violence, as there might have been a form of leniency towards them based on the fact of them showing an interest in the local language and trying to integrate themselves. However, the researcher was surprised during the field work when migrants revealed that the most vulnerable people during xenophobic violence are those who speak the local language, as when they try to camouflage, they can be easily located and be punished hard by the mob during the violence. Thus, in a FGD with migrants, **KK**, a refugee from the DRC, questioned the language hypothesis by stating that:

If you say that speaking Isizulu will put you in the safe position, it means to me that you don't know these people my friend. Because if language was to save someone from xenophobic violence, then why is it that during the 2008 xenophobic attacks, those that were mostly attacked are migrants from Zimbabwe? The latter are direct brother of South Africans as their languages are similar, but they were killed, and beaten. So, let me tell you that even if you speak all the local languages of this country, you are not safe in this country baba! (FGD with migrants, 15 August 2019).

Although the participants gave a clear example of how those speaking the language are vulnerable, another study conducted by Brits, Kaschula and Docrat (2020) revealed that some migrants have forced themselves to learn the local language to camouflage themselves during the attacks. Thus, the researcher understood that being safe during xenophobia in SA does not depend on the language spoken, whether one speaks the local language or not, for as long as one's physical features differ and one's accent is different, one will always be a target. A simple example is seen in the police raids, as when they stop a migrant who does not have an ID but can speak a fluent local language, they always ask the latter questions that are

related to the human body such as elbow or eyebrow in either Isizulu or Xhosa in order to determine if that person is truly a South African, since those body parts are difficult to know or pronounce in either isiZulu or isiXhosa if one is a migrant (Mathebula 2019).

(e) *They are not part of us*

Integration plays an important role in a community or in the country as a group might feel accepted or rejected in the hosting country. Thus, in the South African context, the study found that the local people have developed a feeling of exclusion towards migrants. The local people feel that migrants are not part of them, not only because the latter have different physical features or speak a different language, but because the latter are failing to show interest in the community or people living in the community. This means that migrants living in the communities have distanced themselves from the community activities. Furthermore, migrants running businesses in the townships and informal settlements are often accused of not showing interest in getting to know people living in the community nor to learn the cultures of the local people. This alone has shaped the exclusion attitude against them in the community.

Thus, during the investigation, the local people revealed that they are shocked to see that once migrants have settled in the community, they only focus on themselves and their businesses. This was explained by **NK**, a South African participant, who stated that:

These people not only they do not attend the community meetings as they are busy running their shops, but I'm always sad to see that they don't also attend funerals on the street where their businesses are located. There is a tuck shop run by a Somalis next to my house. I was shocked when their landlord lost his husband, the latter were busy running their shop, they never come to cry with the family nor sitting with the family for at least 10 minutes. They were busy making money. To me that means that these people are here just to make money, we can't call them brothers because brothers support each other and cry together (**NK**).

While many local South Africans live with the *ubuntu* state of mind, they feel like they are not the ones excluding migrants. It is rather migrants excluding themselves and making themselves vulnerable in the community. A few people emphasised the importance of attending community meetings which take place at the end of each month. Coupled with this, there is the fact that in most of the special cultural celebrations in the country, such as Heritage Day or Freedom Day, or in community protests etc., migrants living in the townships do not attend, while these events are known to be the places where people get to know each other and learn about each other.

However, the language barrier still plays a large role in excluding migrants indirectly from the community's activities. Brits, Kaschula and Docrat (2020) state that the local people's



languages exclude migrants from the community activities; they further suggest the 'de-stigmatisation' of migrants' languages and give them a safe environment where they can learn the South African languages as an integration strategy. However, the study also found that the language barrier is not the only factor that plays a role in excluding migrants from the community activities. There is also religion, which in a way distance the two groups. This means that migrants who run businesses (tuck shops) in the community are Somali and Bangladeshi nationals. Thus, the latter are Muslim practitioners, and they revealed in the dialogue that their religions prohibit them from associating with non-Muslims. However, they emphasised that they have a moral obligation, which always motivates them to give their contributions in a form of an envelope to the family that is mourning.

Furthermore, migrants are limited in terms of participating in the community protests, as they fear being arrested or deported if they have expired permits, or fear being reported by the members of the community if they are not in order with their papers. This was revealed in the survey conducted in 2010 by Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton (2013: 37) which revealed that a number of South Africans are likely to report a suspect or irregular migrant. Coupled with this is the fact that the media can publish a wrong narrative in the tabloid, once they find that migrants were amongst the protesters (Dialogue observation at Emmanuel Church, 28 August 2019). This means that as much as migrants would like to participate in different protests, they are always reminded of the effects of it if they get arrested, bearing in mind that they are the scapegoats of all the economic problems that the country is facing. However, it is not all migrants living in South Africa who are victims of xenophobia and harassment, and some are in fact protected and have formed a strong bond with South Africans in the community – this is explained well in the following sub-section.

*(f) Not part of us but exceptional migrants*

It is well known that whenever there is a rule, there is also an exception. This means that although the majority of the local people are not comfortable with the presence of migrants, some local people are comfortable living with migrants and consider the latter as their African brothers. This means that some migrants have managed to successfully integrate themselves and make themselves accepted in the communities without any problems. Thus, the latter are always protected in their community during xenophobia. These are the people who have introduced themselves in the community when they came to the country or moved to the community. The study found that migrants who had introduced themselves in the community were protected by their neighbours and lived peacefully as compared to those who failed to introduce themselves or make efforts to make themselves known in the community.

The local people have been living in the community together for a long time and the majority of them know each other, and this has created some form of a family bond, trust, and security. Thus, they feel insecure when there is a new member in the community, whether a local South African or a migrant. The study found that the same experience that migrants face when they fail to introduce themselves to the community is similar to the local experience. Thus, when the local people living on a particular street see a new person moving into the community, they have to be cautious as they do not know that person and it is worse when the person is a migrant. This was made known to the researcher in the FGDs with South Africans, as a South African couple shared that:

We know the people living in my community, I trust them because I have been living in this community for 15 years. I can go out and leave my door open and I know that nothing will happen. I let my children play outside, because I know that it is safe. But, when a new guy, who is not a South African comes in the community, and after a month there is a house breaking, or a crime taking place, who am I going to suspect first? I will think of the obvious (FGD with South Africans, 18 May 2018).

Those who have managed to introduce themselves in the community are a step away from xenophobic violence as compared to those who have not – this was revealed by a local migrant in the mixed FGDs who stated that:

My neighbour is from Nigeria, when he came to my community he came to knock on my door and introduce himself to me and my husband. He explained to me his story and the reason why he moved to my community and to SA. Since he did that, we are like one big family because sometimes if he doesn't have electricity, we give him that, sometimes my children play with his children and his wife on a weekend always teach me how to cook their food, and sometimes we eat at his place as if we were all South Africans (FGD observation with a mixed group, 5 August 2019).

The fact that migrants have often failed to introduce themselves when they have settled in the community is one of the stumbling blocks to promoting social cohesion in the community and they become an easy target to the people living in the community, and this is also demonstrated in the Somali spaza shops. During the investigation, the researcher observed that those who were comfortable living in the townships were those who were familiar with the people living next to them, and those who took the time to meet the people in the community, whether at the local church or during the community meetings. This fact alone constitutes the first step in promoting social cohesion and transforming xenophobic violence. Thus, there is a necessity for the groups to know each other's cultures and religious beliefs as this helps to break the stereotype and intolerance that is gangrening the mind of many local people, and this can only be possible if migrants make the first move.

#### 7.2.4 South Africa: An Economically Unequal Nation

Since the end of the apartheid regime, SA continues to be affected by the high level of poverty, since a government survey of 2015 reported that 13.8 million were living in poverty as compared to 2011 when there were only 11 million people living in poverty (South African Government 2017). Deprivation and inequality are explained as factors in the failure of the new government to break the barriers between different social classes, as the middle class is almost non-existent, which means that black South Africans have limited economic opportunities in the country as the wealth of the country is still controlled by the Whites (McLennan, Noble and Wright 2016: 254-274). Thus, the few economic opportunities that the government makes available to black South Africans are not enough, as the latter have to fight for those against the migrants, who are accused of benefitting from and enjoying those opportunities.

During the investigation, the researcher found that many local people are of the view that there is not enough opportunities for migrants in the country, and as a result, the government cannot continue to allow migrants to have businesses in the country while many local people are struggling to start their own businesses. This means that migrants should stop coming to the country and find another country to which to relocate to allow the government to focus on its people first (Dialogue observation at Emmanuel Church, 22 August 2019). However, migrants have a different view as **MR**, as refugee from Rwanda, explained during the interview that:

If you look at how the wealth of this country is distributed, you will see that the wealth of this country is in the hand of the White as they control the economy of this country. After the Whites, comes the Indians and Coloured who are also controlling a reasonable portion of wealth in the country. After this group, we have now the black South African who are controlling a very small portion of wealth that they are controlling. Now, after 1994 we (foreigners) came to this country as refugees or asylum seekers which means that we have to find our way to benefit from the small portion of wealth that black South Africans are fighting for. Because it is so small, and there is not enough for all of us, they are now attacking us and accusing us of having more benefit compared to them. But, if you look closely at this, you will see that we are not the real competitors here, because we are all Africans. That means that we have to find our way to sit together and see how we can claim a big portion of wealth from the Whites and Indians whom are not even African! (Interview with **MR** at Emmanuel Church, 12 April 2018).


The view expressed above by **MR** taps directly into the Inequality Trends Report launched on 14 November 2019 by Stats SA and the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town, which revealed that white people are likely to find work, and once they do, they also earn better salaries. Between 2011 and 2015, a white

person earned R24,646 per month on average, more than three times the R6,899 of their black counterparts (See in Webster 2019b). Coupled with this is the recent study conducted by Anna Orthofer, a Stellenbosch University economist, which revealed that economic inequality in SA is shocking. The wealthiest 1% own 67% of all the country's wealth. The top 10% own 93%, and the remaining 90% of South Africans own an insignificant 7% of the country's wealth (ibid). This explains that xenophobia in the country is also a result of economic inequality, as black South Africans still feel that they are not benefitting from the wealth of their country, despite the many promises made to them by the government since 1994, which only raised a few people while the majority are still living in poverty.

#### **7.2.5 Xeno-Prejudice: Haunted in the past and tormented in the present**

It has been established in the literature of this investigation that xenophobia in SA is more of a prejudice as it is based more on the preconceived attitude of the local people towards migrants than a fear of the latter, which automatically excludes some scholars' arguments in referring to xenophobic violence in South Africa as Afrophobia or black-on-black racism, the reason being that the violence that migrants face in the country is far from being regarded as xenophobia. This means that if one takes a closer look at the definition of xenophobia and that which is happening in South Africa, one will see that there is no match. From the definition, one can clearly see that xenophobia denotes the fear of foreigners because 'phobia' means fear (Mbecke 2015; Misago 2016b). Taking this definition into account, one will see that South Africans should be running away from migrants, because they fear them and they should not be near them, but a contrary scenario is present as those who are supposed to be the victims are the perpetrators. Thus, that which is being witnessed in South Africa is completely out of the context of xenophobia.

Furthermore, in the South African context, xenophobia is a result of a long and strong negative attitude exhibited by the local people towards migrants since the 1990s (Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni 2011: 129-142). This means that all the negative narratives that the local people have heard about migrants during the end of apartheid have now escalated into uncontrollable intolerance which often leads to extreme violence resulting in the death of migrants and local people, as explained in the section above, and internal mass displacement. Figure 8.1 demonstrates that xenophobia is a consequence of a long-lasting negative attitude that the local people have had towards migrants, which could have been prevented a long time ago before reaching the level of extreme violence that characterises the present time.



**Figure 7.1:** From negative attitudes to violence, adapted from Gordon Allport's book on *The nature of prejudice* published in 1954.

Based on Figure 8.1, it is clear that the first stage, which involves negative attitudes, plays an important role in including and excluding a group. Thus, in the South African context, the attitude towards migrants is disavouring them, especially refugees and asylum seekers, as they are always at the centre of the violent attacks and are often excluded from many economic opportunities. Moreover, this negative attitude is based on an erroneous belief of the migrants. The negative attitudes exhibited by the local people towards migrants were limited to a certain category of migrants during the 2008 xenophobic violence, while those from Southeast Asia, such as the Chinese and Bangladeshis, were not targeted. However, during the 2015 xenophobic attacks, shops owned by the above-mentioned groups were also looted (Shai and Mothibi 2015: Ibid). This shift in terms of the attacks changed the 'Afrophobia' arguments provided by scholars.

During the investigations, migrant participants pointed to the government for shaping the negative attitude towards them – this was revealed during a dialogue where a migrant from the DRC openly shared that:


In 1997 when we first arrived in this country, these people were telling each other that "kwerekwere" eat people, and many people living in the townships believed that information. That information was being spread in the community meetings (Dialogue observation, 26 November 2019).

Despite the fact revealed above, it must be mentioned that many local people were not ready to see a flux of people from other African countries making their way to SA (Nyamnjoh 2006: Ibid). As a result, this created jealousy which was expressed in different forms of stereotypes such as accusing migrants of stealing jobs, women, spreading HIV/AIDS, etc. (Landau 2010: 213-230), and it was in this vein that many South Africans were promoting the idea of closing the border to African migrants and deporting all migrants back to their home countries (Landau 2012; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). Between 2003 and 2008, the negative attitude that the locals had towards migrants reached the level of intolerance based on different stereotypes provided in the section above. It was during that period that migrants were accused of all the socio-economic problems that the country was then facing, and this gave birth to the violent actions witnessed in 2008 which is labelled as xenophobia. This extreme violence has reached a high level, as currently in the country, SA is still witnessing extreme violence towards migrants which often claims the lives of both local South Africans and migrants, as explained in the sections above.

From Figure 7.1, one can effectively see that xenophobic violence in the South African context is the result of the combination of the long-lasting negative attitude towards migrants, which opens a door of intolerance as South Africans have demonstrated their intolerance towards migrants and decided to take violent action to get them out of the country (Choane, Shulika and Mthombeni 2011; Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013; Bekker 2015). Action, which implies violence, is manifested in different ways, ranging from tension and violence to the destruction of property, hostility, and abuse, beating, burning, ejection, displacement and dispossession, dehumanisation, loss of human dignity, looting, rape, torture, and other forms of violence.

#### *Adapting Xenophobia in South Africa to the Scale of Prejudice*

The xenophobic violence that took place in SA in 2008 and 2015 can be linked to the scale of prejudice provided by Allport, Clark and Pettigrew, as they provided factors that push people to have a negative attitude towards the others and to attack the latter later physically (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: 49). Allport, Clark and Pettigrew provide five characteristics considered to be rejective, namely: antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination, as depicted in Figure 7.2.



**Figure 7.2:** Five rejective characteristics, adapted from the scale of prejudice by Gordon Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015).

Having a closer look at Figure 7.2, one can see that it is effectively portraying the reality of migrants' lives in SA. The first stage on the scale presented in Figure 7.2 is 'antilocution' which means different stereotypes with which migrants are portrayed in the country and coupled with this is the name calling such as *amakwerekwere* or *amagrigamba* which the local people mostly use in reference to migrants in a mocking or serious manner, which is also regarded as despising migrants in the country (Bostick 2012; Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013; Dassah 2015). Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 14) explain that antilocution takes place when a person talks about the prejudice that he/she has. This means that antilocution occurs verbally and it is the lowest in the scale of prejudice, as can be seen in Figure 7.2. This first phase is not harmful *per se* as it is the one that the local people had during the transition period when migrants started making their ways to SA. This phase has been described in the previous section as the moment when the negative attitude was developed by the local people, and the antilocution phase is still prevalent in the country.

The second phase of 'avoidance' has been witnessed by many migrants as this phase comes in as a result of the first phase. This means that once the antilocution fully takes place, the hosting community will, by all means, avoid migrants. Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 14) argue that "if the prejudice is more intense, it leads the individual to avoid members of the

disliked group, even paraps at the cost of considerable inconvenience". Thus, in the South African context, the local people are avoiding migrants and they do not want to associate themselves with the latter, with the reason being that they have been hearing negative stories about migrants and this has resulted in them not associating with migrants. On a few occasions during the investigation, the researcher saw local people living together with migrants, but in most cases, the stereotypes against the latter have polluted the local people's minds, and this phase leads directly to the third stage which is 'discrimination'. At the avoidance stage, there is only a small chance of physical harm towards the disliked group (ibid). Moreover, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015) posit that "the bearer of prejudice does not directly inflict harm upon the group he disliked. He takes the burden of accommodation withdrawal entirely upon himself" (ibid). Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015: 14) argue that:

[D]iscrimination takes place when the prejudiced person makes detrimental distinction of an active sort. He undertakes to exclude all members of the group in question of certain types of employment, from residential housing, political rights, educational and recreational opportunities, churches, hospitals, or from other social privileges.

Thus, discrimination is among the unfavourable experiences that migrants are facing in SA, as they explained that the government allowed them in the country but denied them access to many opportunities due to their foreignness (Dialogue observation at Emmanuel Church, 24 November 2019). While most migrants are facing discrimination, asylum seekers are the most vulnerable as compared to those who have been recognised as refugees. An example can be seen when an asylum seeker wants to rent a flat, and the asylum seeker faces difficulties in accessing houses due to the fact that they do not possess the proper paperwork. In most cases, they do not have bank accounts because most banks do not open accounts for them, and they do not have payslips because they cannot procure decent jobs which results in their applications being denied. They also face discrimination in terms of gaining access to employment and other social benefits (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005). This was confirmed during the interview with VT, a 40-year-old asylum seeker from the DRC, who stated that:

When my husband and I came in this country, we were living in St George. when that apartment was sold in 2012, we had difficulties in finding another apartment because we didn't have the proper documents to give the agents and my husband is a working as a car watch. Because we were limited in terms of the paperwork and financially, a sister in my church assisted us with a place to stay in Mayville (VT).

Based on the statement provided above, Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015) posit that discrimination occurs when the rights of people are denied by another group. Scholars have argued that migrants, especially asylum seekers, face many challenges and discrimination in

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accessing their rights to housing, social protection, and legal documents. Furthermore, scholars have reported that migrants struggle to renew their documents to be legal in the country. In most cases, they face arbitrary arrest and humiliation from the police officers if their documents are not yet renewed (Masuku 2020; Ueda 2020).

The fourth stage is 'physical attack' against migrants. According to Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (ibid), "under conditions of heightened emotional prejudice may lead to acts of violence or semi violence". Thus, in the South African context, scholars have explained that physical violence is a result of jealousy and self-entitlement exhibited by South African men as they perceive migrants as lesser humans and everything that they do in the country is at the mercy of the local people (De Jager 2013). Thus, the latter are entitled to do anything that they want because it is their country (FGD observation with South Africans, 18 April 2018). The physical attack here takes place gradually as before the mass xenophobic violence of 2008 took place, different civil societies and scholars had been reporting on the attacks on migrants throughout the country (Bekker *et al.* 2008; Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). However, before the physical attacks take place, there are several steps that have made the way for violence to break out. Some of the steps include long periods of prejudgement and growing discrimination (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015: 16).

The last phase of the scale is known as 'extermination', and extermination is an act of mass killing against a particular group of people. Allport, Clark and Pettigrew (2015:16) state that "Lynching, pogroms, massacre and Hitlerian program of genocide mark the ultimate degree of violent expression of prejudice". Thus, in the South African context, extermination is directed towards migrants into that which is called "xenophobia" as it involves killings, burnings, and the physical harassment of migrants (Dassah 2015: 127-142). Extermination became visible in the 2008 mass xenophobic violence, and it is still present in the country. There are multiple phases before extermination takes place. For example, there is a significant factor that supports extermination, which is a poor level of law enforcement in society (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 2015).

During the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic violence, scholars and civil societies have always blamed law enforcement agents for failing to take necessary measures to protect migrants against xenophobic violence, although they were fully aware of the local people's plan to attack migrants (Misago, Landau and Monson 2008; Landau 2012). However, it must be clarified at this stage that during the 2008 xenophobic violence, the locals did not have the intention to create a holocaust type of situation in the country, but they wanted all migrants to leave the

country, thus they had to use violence to express their anger regarding the presence of migrants.

### **7.2.6 Summary**

This section demonstrated that xenophobia in the South African context is more about prejudice and the country's inequality that led to the violence against migrants. Thus, there is a strong negative attitude exhibited by the local people towards migrants and these attitudes have been witnessed in the country since the end of apartheid. The section demonstrated that the negative attitudes exhibited towards migrants are a result of different stereotypes towards the latter such as that they are job stealers, they spread HIV/AIDS, and that they are involved in criminal activities. Thus, the accumulation of the stereotypes towards migrants is the reason behind the violence towards the latter, as scholars have explained that an explanation of xenophobic violence by the local people often resorts to the blame of the victim. Furthermore, the attitudes that locals have towards migrants have set a difference or a barrier between the two groups, as the local people view themselves as different to the migrants in terms of their physical traits, language, and culture. However, the economic inequality in the country has also shaped the attitudes of the local people towards migrants, as different reports have demonstrated that white South Africans enjoy more privileges as compared to black South Africans, while migrants are prejudiced. Thus, the fights for economic access have made migrants the scapegoats of all socio-economic problems in the country. It was in this vein that this section argued that that which is being termed *xenophobia* is more as plain prejudice than xenophobia, that it is followed by extreme violence, and that it has changed the entire concept of xenophobia.

## **7.3 Xenophobia in SA: 'A blame game situation'**

Since the end of the apartheid regime, local people have always dreamed of a better life, as they believed that after apartheid, they would finally have of piece of the good life which means accessing good job opportunities, living a good life, having financial securities which they could not have during apartheid, etc. However, the post-apartheid period brought a different reality as many have seen no changes nor have their lives improved as expected, as the government was and still is unable to provide basic service deliveries such as employment, free houses, and free education. Coupled with this is violent crime which has not been repressed, HIV/AIDS, and the squatter communities, and millions of Blacks have seen little or no improvement in their lives (Myre 2014). This has frustrated many people living in the townships and informal settlements.

The purpose of this section is to provide a clear discussion on the underlying causes of xenophobia in the country, which are mostly stereotypes that are attached to migrants, namely, criminality has increased as a result of the presence of migrants, there is job scarcity because migrants are skilled, and the legal status of migrants in the country. Coupled with this is the position of the media regarding migrants and the role of the government. This section connects the views and observations of both groups during the data collection process.

### **7.3.1 Criminals are in our midst**

With regards to SA, being one of the most dangerous countries in the world, migrants are being blamed for most crimes that take place in the country. The local participants were of the view that prior to the post-apartheid period, there was no crime in the country. However, the influx of migrants has changed the safety of the communities, as migrants are involved in the most dangerous crimes that the country is experiencing, from cash heists to kidnapping and killings, robberies, drug trafficking, and assault (Observation in a dialogue, 19 July 2019). A survey conducted by Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton (2013: 3) revealed that while in 2006, 64% of the local people believed that migrants relocated to SA to engage in criminal activity, a 2010 survey showed a decrease in the statistics as it showed that 50% of the local people had that same belief. This means that migrants are scapegoated for different crimes taking place in the country, and this view is not only observed amongst the participants but is also visible among different political leaders, who continually paint a negative narrative on migrants, especially the undocumented ones as they are accused of different crimes that have been mentioned above. Moreover, this view was at the centre of the 2019 xenophobic violence that took place in the Gauteng province (Human Rights Watch 2019b).

While there are different groups of migrants in the country, each national group is linked to a particular category of crime that takes place in the country. For instance, Nigerians are linked to drugs, and this was demonstrated in the recent xenophobic violence which started in Gauteng (Pretoria) from 1 to 5 September 2019, which was the result of the frustrations of the locals against the fact that migrants (Nigerians) are selling drugs to the youth, while the law enforcement agents are not arresting them (Stuurman 2019). Coupled with this is the fact that migrants run illegal businesses in the country, which means that they do not have the appropriate documents or authorisations from the government, and they are selling expired foods to the communities – these are mostly Somalis and Bangladeshis (Khumalo 2018). It must also be mentioned that migrants from Mozambique are cited among those who steal cars, while Zimbabweans and Nigerians are accused of being murderers.

While migrants are accused of taking part in those crimes, migrants, whether Nigerians or Mozambicans, represent a minority in the country; this is demonstrated in a 2016 statistics report which stated that approximately 30,000 Nigerians live in South Africa, and this is the opposite of some surveys posted on Twitter claiming that there are 800,000 Nigerians living in South Africa (Kiewit 2019). Thus, a crime is a crime, and it should not be painted or attached to any particular country or nationality. While acknowledging that there are migrants involved in criminal activities in South Africa, it is important to acknowledge the fact that South Africans are also involved in those criminal activities.

For instance, while there are Nigerians involved in drug trafficking or Zimbabweans involved in crimes, one must also look at Nigerians working in the country as medical doctors or professors in different universities within the country, or Zimbabweans working as engineers or in the academic sectors in the country. Thus, during the investigation, the researcher observed that there is more attention on the wrongdoing of migrants than on their good deeds and works. This means that both migrants and local South Africans play a role in the criminal activities that affect the country. It was important to have a small dialogue with Nigerians to understand their views on the stereotypes against them.

(a) *Nigerians versus South Africans*

Nigerian nationals are more targeted than other migrants, the reason being that the local people regard Nigerians living in South Africa as the most dangerous criminals in the country and threats to South Africans' physical and economic security, as they are always accused of being behind dangerous crimes taking place in the country. However, Segatti (2012: 5) argues that the local people mostly rely on the state sources over any other source of direct information. Thus, the stereotypes against Nigerians are not evidenced quantitatively of the average involvement of Nigerians in criminal activities. Moreover, over the past twenty years, neither quantitative statistics from the police and correctional services nor qualitative research among the police justify claims that Nigerians are over-represented in criminal activities. It is in the same vein that during the investigation, the researcher found that many South Africans still regard Nigerians as drug lords or kidnappers living in the country. Notably, drugs are always associated with Nigerians in SA. It is not only the local people who associate Nigerians with drugs, and this view has also been shared among migrants from other African countries, as they believe that Nigerians are over-trafficking drugs in the country, which has a negative impact on migrants.

The study found that although Nigerians are blamed for drug trafficking in the country, they are not the only people doing this, as the participants identified different nationals trafficking

drugs in the country, including South Africans, and the researcher was surprised during a workshop to see that Nigerians were number four after Russians, Brazilians, and white South Africans (Workshop at Emmanuel Church, 18 August 2019). This means that although some Nigerians are involved in drug trafficking, most of them work for the top three nationals' groups mentioned above. However, the problem with Nigerians being linked to drug trafficking in SA is based on the fact that the Nigerians are loud as compared to other groups, and they are over-trafficking drugs, selling them in public places where everyone can see (Observation from a dialogue with Nigerians, 10 April 2019).

The majority of South Africans are linking drugs to Nigerians forgetting that other nationals, including the local people, are connected in that criminal activity. In a discussion on the topic with a small group of Nigerians, they revealed that being loud, showing off, flashing money, and driving fancy cars is more of a cultural aspect to them than that which people think. The Nigerian group revealed that they were taught to live in this way whether they have money or not. According to them, it is better to show off when you have money than to be quiet, the reason being that not showing off money if one has it been regarded as selfishness to them and people will tend not to associate with such a person. While they are accused of being involved in criminal activities due to their lifestyle, a 2012 SAMP study reported that although more Nigerians seem to be incarcerated as compared to South Africans – there are 2.9% of Nigerians in SA for an estimate of approximately 15,000 Nigerians versus 0.33% of the local people – such a discrepancy does not indicate the difference in statistical terms and may also reflect police harassment (Segatti 2012: 5).

Regarding the fact that the Nigerians are always sitting on the street to sell drugs, the Nigerian participants revealed that it is a lifestyle that they have developed from back to their home country. They referred to that as a “base” which means a particular place where they meet their friends to socialise and update themselves on any news, be it soccer or politics (Dialogue observation with Nigerians, 10 April 2019). Thus, from the information collected, they explained that the “base” is very important as it helps to identify, locate, and qualify a person. This means that those involved in drug activities have their own base where they sit together and easily locate each other, and the same applies to non-criminals (Dialogue with Nigerians at DUT Steve Biko campus, November 2019).

Based on the revelation provided above, the researcher understood that the behaviour exhibited by Nigerians in terms of showing off, being loud, and sitting on the street has more to do with their upbringing than that which people have in mind, but which does not exclude the fact that some are taking advantage of that to be involved in criminal activity. Thus, this

behaviour frustrates the local people as they consider Nigerians as drug dealers making money in the country by destroying the youth of this country. However, while the local people have not yet understood that part of Nigerians, during the investigation, the researcher was surprised to observe that other migrants do not see Nigerians as the 'big deal' as South Africans are perceiving them.

During the workshops, a migrant from the DRC advised South Africans not to mind Nigerians as the latter, even when they do not have money, will act as if they have millions in their pocket, while they are also struggling in the country in the same way that both groups are suffering (Workshop observation at Emmanuel Church, 24 October 2019). However, the media has played a role in publishing articles that tarnish Nigerians' reputations, and the Nigerian group pointed out the fact that the media never tell the local people about the number of Nigerians living an honest life in the country, as those involved in criminal activities represent a minority group, while the majority of Nigerians are working in the medical sectors in the metropolitan areas and in the villages, and they are in the academic, Information Technology (IT), and engineering sectors. However, the media has never actually mentioned the lives that they save or the accolades that they have received in the country (Dialogue with Nigerians at DUT Steve Biko campus, November 2019).

*(b) Effort of the Police in tracking down Criminals*

While the government is trying by all means to put an end to drug trafficking and other crimes affecting the country, the police are assisting in ensuring that the streets of South Africa are free from drugs and are safe. In 2018, the South African Police Minister, Bheki Cele, and the national commissioner jointly launched a 'High Density Stabilisation Intervention' to combat crime. The plan focuses on cash in transit heists, car hijacking, kidnapping, murder, house robberies, and gang and taxi violence (Faull 2018). The strategy derives from a multi-year surge in armed robbery and a recent spike in robberies targeting cash-carrying armoured vans. The 'High Density Stabilisation Intervention' involves the deployment of desk-based officers on the streets, especially in 'identified hotspots', while specialised detectives track down and arrest criminals (ibid). However, with criminal activity such as drug trafficking, being an industry that gives opportunities to generate easy money, the police are deviating from their role in putting those involved in drug trafficking into prison. This was discussed during the investigations as both South Africans and migrants blamed the police for being corrupted and supporting and protecting criminals, and this explains the fact that they are still unable to arrest the drug dealers (Dialogue observation, 23 November 2019).

An example of the failing law enforcement agents was given during the dialogue in reference to South Beach as a participant explained that:

If you go to South Beach or to Saint George, you will see these police officers going to ask money to each Nigerian's shop, and sometimes they deliver drugs to them so the latter can sell and share the money with the police. Further, when they arrest someone with drugs, they don't take that person to the station, they just confiscate drugs and let the person walk free, so they can then give it to Nigerians to sell it for them (Dialogue at Emmanuel Church, 19 September 2019).

This attitude that the police have towards people involved in criminal activities, especially drug traffickers, has discouraged the local people, as they do not believe in the effectiveness of their interventions in that matter. This explains the reason why during xenophobic violence, the people often do not wait for the police to act or intervene, and they tend to take the law into their own hands, believing that the police will not do a good job since they are corrupt. Coupled with this, the law enforcement agents have the power to eradicate the drug pandemic that is affecting SA within a few months as they know all the drug dealers living in the country, but they are failing to do that since they are benefitting from drug dealers, thus they have to protect the latter (Dialogue observation, 19 September 2019).

(c) *Corrupt Law Enforcement Agents*

Corruption is one element that is affecting the good governance of SA, as it is witnessed from the higher level to the lower, resulting in frustration for the local people. A Corruption Watch report revealed that corruption among law enforcement agents, especially the police officers in SA, has escalated and has, for the first time, overtaken other sectors such as schools, health, and local government (see in Cengic 2019). Moreover, an analysis of 1,440 reports received by Corruption Watch revealed three types of corruption from police and the statistics, namely, 33% revealing bribery within the police, 23% of abuse of power, and 18% of failure to act (Motala 2019). Migrants are also accused of corrupting the law enforcement agents, and moreover, the allegations that they corrupt law enforcement agents constitutes one of the causes of the negative attitudes towards them.

Thus, the local people are frustrated that corruption is witnessed among the police officers as they are unable to put criminals behind bars. This was revealed by the result of the Transparency International's 2019 Global Corruption Barometer for Africa, which found that 40% of South African respondents believed that some officers are corrupt, and 30% believed that most of them are corrupt. However, 19% believed that all the police officers in the country are corrupt (See in Motala 2019). Coupled with this is the fact that the participants revealed that for drugs to arrive in the country, they pass through the border checkpoints, giving

opportunities to the law enforcement agents to stop it from entering the country – unfortunately the latter are unable to stop it based on the fact that some agents work for the drug lords, which means that corruption is not only limited to the police officers, but is also witnessed among immigration officers (Workshop observation at the Bar Centre, October 2019). Furthermore, corruption in the country has played an important role in allowing those without the proper legal documents to be in the country, which means that certain migrants are in the country through bribery at the country's entry points, which has resulted in the presence of illegal migrants in the country (Eisenberg 2019).

### **7.3.2 Job Seekers versus Job Snatchers**

Unemployment is one of the major problems that SA is facing. Notably, it is referred to by President Ramaphosa as a “deep and serious crisis” as it stood at 29% in June 2019 (Dahir 2019). As the majority of South Africans are facing unemployment, they have resorted to stereotyping migrants as job stealers. It was in this vein that Crush and Pendleton (2004: 12) posited that the majority of people will always see migrants as a threat to jobs, and that perception is always based on half-truths and misleading stereotypes. The study found that although migrants are blamed for unemployment in the country, the exclusions, and discriminations that they are facing forces them to take jobs at a lower paying rate. Coupled with this, there is also the fact that most employers take advantage of migrants as they are not going to pay them at the normal paying rate fixed by the government, which will not be the case if they hire South Africans (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Misago 2016b). Due to the fact that the migrants do not receive any support from the government, they have to lower their wages as a surviving strategy in order to afford a living in the country.

The fact that migrants can negotiate and work for lower wages frustrates the local people as they perceive migrants as job stealers. However, the participants highlighted that while migrants are considered to be taking jobs belonging to the locals, there is a situation where migrants are regarded as hard workers and ready to do any type of jobs to survive, while some locals are rejecting or are not comfortable with and keen to do certain jobs. Certain people are qualifying them of being lazy (FGD observation with migrants in Chesterville, 18 July 2018).

While the above-mentioned paragraph argued that migrants are running out of choices and have to accept lowering their wages to survive, one must also look at the type of jobs that the migrants are doing in the country. In the data presentation of this research, it was seen that the majority of migrants are either working as security guards, car watchers, or informal traders (entrepreneurs), and for these types of work, one does not need a qualification, as anyone can do these jobs. However, the problem dwells on the fact that most of these jobs are hard



to do and the wages are very low. Thus, most local people, when they get to do those jobs, especially being car guards in different shopping centres' parking, always quit as there is too much pressure and the working conditions are very poor, while migrants, being in a foreign country, do not have any other choice than to accept and work under difficult conditions. It was in this vein that Salaff (2002 cited in Kalitanyi and Visser 2010: 376-390) argued that although migrants are educated and possess work experience, they find work only with great difficulty, and they are highly exploited. Moreover, studies conducted by Crush and Pendleton (2004) and later by Crush and Ramachandran (2013) revealed that over 60% of respondents in SA have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a migrant.

Migrants have also developed trading skills (entrepreneurship skills) as most of them are working as informal traders, running tuck shops in the communities, repairing phones and computers, being tailors, etc. Although they are running their own businesses, Rogerson (1999: 14) states that they face several problems and endure considerable xenophobic hostility directed towards them and their businesses (See in Kalitanyi and Visser 2010: Ibid). During the investigation, the researcher found that the migrants understood that they would be limited in terms of accessing decent jobs in the country based on the fact that they are outsiders, thus they have decided to do something that can help them have money in order to survive. As a result, some of the informal traders have hired the local people in their shops to attract customers. This was also found in a study conducted by Crush and Tawodzera (2017: 1) which revealed that migrants resort to entrepreneurship as a result of desperation as they are unable to find a job, while the local people become entrepreneurs because they are not willing to work for someone or they are not satisfied with the salaries. This means that migrants are motivated to join the informal sector because of the need to survive, and they have little alternatives, while the local people see the opportunities for economic advancement and prefer to work for themselves.

Local people enjoy most privileges of running informal businesses as compared to migrants, which means for instance that 50% of the local people run their businesses rent-free as compared to migrants since there are only 5% of migrants enjoying that privilege. This means that around three quarters of the local people do not pay rent for their premises, while over 80% of refugees do. Coupled with this, refugee entrepreneurs also pay a higher monthly rent (Crush and Tawodzera 2007). Moreover, the study conducted in Limpopo and Cape Town by Crush and Tawodzera (2017) revealed that the two groups' businesses are similar but different in terms of that which they are selling, which means that South Africans are highly represented in food retail, as there are 70% of entrepreneurs selling fresh produce and cooked food, whereas 70% of migrants sell most types of personal and household products, and the latter

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dominate in the sectors of hair cutting, braiding, as well as car repairs and IT, whereas the local people are more present and dominate in shoe repair, transportation, and car washing and guarding (Crush and Tawodzera 2017: Ibid).

However, some participants were not agreeing with the stereotypes of migrants stealing jobs, as they regarded and viewed that blame of being inaccurate, stating further that there is just a problem of a lack of business knowledge. This was also shared in the mixed FGD as **Zama**, a 38-year-old South African, explained that:

The Somalis buy the goods in bulks and share it after, because it is cheaper that way and they can negotiate the price with the supplier shops. They are always united in terms of the business, which means they support each other, they are disciplined and committed in what they are doing. But, us South Africans don't have that mentality of doing business and there is no trust among ourselves, that is the reason that we are not succeeding in running spaza shops (Mixed FGD with locals and migrants at Emmanuel Church, 28 May 2018).

In a study conducted by Crush and Tawodzera (2017), it was revealed that strategically, both groups have similar strategies in terms of offering credit to customers. However, migrants have developed more strategies such as significantly higher odds of keeping business records, selling goods more cheaply than competitors, purchasing in bulk with others, and negotiating prices with suppliers.

The fact that someone has to be blamed for unemployment in the country has made migrants scapegoats, while the latter have given up their hope on finding employments that fit their educational backgrounds since most of them come to the country with university degrees. As a result, they have learned to find alternative means of surviving in the country. However, since the migrants are doing well financially in terms of whatever job or business that they are doing, the locals have always concluded that they are taking jobs that the government created for them, while in fact the migrants are creating jobs, as the study found that most Ethiopians working in the CBD and in some tuck shops in the communities have hired local people.

Migrants do not see themselves as job stealers, and notably they see themselves as job creators (Kalitanyi and Visser 2010: Ibid) such as hiring the local people and contributing to the economy of the country through the businesses that they are doing as they pay rent for the space used to run their businesses, and they pay taxes and support the communities with affordable foods. It was in this vein that a survey by Crush and Tawodzera (2017: 3) reported that 60% of migrants paid rent to a South African landlord and 13% paid to the municipality. Moreover, the study also found that almost half of the refugee entrepreneurs who participated in the study admitted to having paid employees as compared to only 21% of South Africans.

This means that the refugees of that study provided three times as many jobs as the South Africans. However, refugee and South African enterprises create jobs for South Africans at roughly the same rate (ibid).

Some migrants are very skilful in terms of entrepreneurship, as they come from countries where their entrepreneurial skills are part of their cultures, while South Africans were not given the privilege of developing entrepreneurial skills during apartheid. The former Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, compared migrants to the local people in terms of informal entrepreneurs, and insinuated that:

The local people were largely inept and should learn from the business practice of their migrant counterparts who were better at running shops than the local owners ... is in their blood ... from the moment they born, they are introduced to trade. Their mothers, uncles, everyone trades. As a result, they operate in the same communities in which we fail (Crush and Tawodzera 2017: 7).

While the statement above is self-explanatory, it is clear that for the local people to learn entrepreneurial skills from migrants, they have to approach them and foster a relationship with them. Unfortunately, this is quite difficult since both groups do not have much contact, as has been explained in the section above. This means that as long as there is a rejection from the ingroup towards the outgroup, it will be impossible for the outgroup to learn important strategies used by migrants to maintain their businesses.

It is important to mention in this research that the question on migrants being regarded as job creators is debatable, as it depends on the nature of the business and the size of the business. Scholars have argued that immigration has a very small positive impact on South African employment in general. A Ground-Up study revealed that employment created by migrants is extremely small in magnitude (Chaskalson 2017). Moreover, the study by Chaskalson (2017) concluded boldly by stating with certainty that migrants are not taking employment from the locals overall – in reality, a best-case scenario indicates that they are creating a limited number of jobs in places where they settle. Nonetheless, looking at a particular job category, there is a slight, negative employment effect for workers in better-skilled job categories. This conclusion taps directly into the feedback of participants, as the majority of them had a similar view. However, it must be mentioned that the jobs created by migrants are not helping in curbing the unemployment rate in the country.

### **7.3.3 Illegals in the country and running Illegal Businesses**

There is a strong perception of migrants living in the country of being illegal. This has also been acknowledged by different government officials who have publicly condemned the

presence of illegal migrants. However, there is no accurate estimate of the rate of undocumented migrants currently living in SA. While there are undocumented migrants in the country, it is also important to mention that the majority of migrants living in the country have their legal permits, especially refugees and asylum seekers. However, the narrative of migrants being illegal in the country is always painted by local politicians especially when the country is heading towards national or provincial elections and coupled with this is the fact that migrants are accused of running illegal businesses. Mwiti (2015) posits that the answer to the number of migrants living in SA depends on the person to whom the question is directed and his/her political affiliation. For instance, in 1998, the DHA released an exaggerated number of illegal/undocumented migrants living in the country, claiming that there were approximately five million undocumented migrants in the country.

The figure provided above was backed up by the HSRC, which also claimed that there were between four and eight million illegal/undocumented migrants. Thus, these figures dominated for years as politicians used them as a defence strategy to stereotype migrants. However, the official estimate from Stats SA revealed after the 2011 census that there were 2.2 million migrants living in the country, but from that number, the organisation revealed that the survey of illegal/undocumented migrants was between 500,000 and 700,000 illegal migrants (Mwiti 2015). The majority of the local people are unhappy with the fact that migrants living in townships have managed to run successful tuck shops instead of venturing into other businesses in order to allow the local people to also fit in the tuck-shop businesses, as the majority of tuck shops in townships and informal settlements are run by migrants.

This was demonstrated in the FGD with the local people, as some participants questioned if they could go to other countries and run illegal businesses (FGD observation with the locals). The local people have often failed to maintain the businesses as migrants do, and this has always triggered the attacks towards migrants' shops, as they are accused of being illegal since they do not possess the authorisation to run businesses, and it was in this vein that in 2018, a xenophobic attack directed towards migrants' businesses was witnessed, and moreover, during xenophobic violence, migrants' tuck shops are the first targets.

The frustration over migrants running successful tuck shops or businesses is not only seen in the typical people in the communities, but it is regrettably witnessed amongst some government officials. An earlier example can be traced in the then Minister of Water and Sanitation who did not hide her frustrations by lashing out on social media in 2015 that "Almost every second outlet (spaza) or even former general dealer shops are run by people of Somali or Pakistan origin in a yard that we know who the original owners were" (Ukwandu 2017: 43-

62). This is not the only statement made by a government official against migrants' businesses, and coupled with this statement, there is a statement made by the then Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, who stated that "Foreign-business owners in South Africa's townships could not expect to co-exist peacefully with local business owners unless they shared their trade secrets" (See in Bekker 2015: 241). She further stated that "Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to the people of this country first and foremost" (See in Bekker 2015: 241).

Taking these statements into consideration, it is clear that the local people feel that migrants are taking over their townships by taking control of the businesses once owned by local people. However, it is not all South Africans who are against migrants running businesses in their communities, and during the investigation, the researcher found that there is also a majority of South Africans who are appreciating and supporting the effort and assistance of migrants in the communities. The locals recalled the fact that migrants are generous towards the people in the community as they often give people food on credit and expect the payment later, which can take up to a month depending on when the person has money to pay, and this is something that the local business owners do not do. Coupled with this is the fact that they open their shops early in the morning allowing those who could not buy bread or sugar to buy prior to going to school or work (Observation from FGD with South Africans, 18 July 2019).

### **7.3.4 The Media Reports versus Migrants**

The media plays a large role in reporting different matters that are taking place in the country. However, being a power force in the country, the media can shape a positive or negative attitude towards migrants. Moreover, the media can be used as a platform of promoting peace during the violence. However, in the South African context, the media has been accused of playing a critical role in creating and propagating images about migrants. Different research studies on the role of the media coverage on migrants have revealed that the media coverage of immigration and migrants' issues in SA indicates a persistent negative bias (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 4). This means that the media has been accused of playing a role in lighting a candle of violence through their tabloid titles, which is mostly witnessed when a political leader makes a statement addressing the presence of migrants in the country. This means that in some instances, the media quotes the speech or statements as a wakeup call to the local people.

In some cases, local participants accused the media of altering statements made by government officials in newspapers (Mixed FGDs, 5 February 2019). Participant FN confirmed this by stating that:

If you look at the speech of President Ramaphosa on foreigners establishing businesses without proper business licence, you can actually see that the president targeted only illegal businesses ran by foreigners, but the tabloid framed it in a way that it looked like he was saying that all foreigners coming to SA are establishing illegal businesses in townships. While President Ramaphosa is not rational to know that there are foreigners in townships running legal business helping people in the community. That is to indicate that the tabloids always frame the speeches and statements of government officials so they can sell stories, especially the Daily Sun, if they don't do that they will not sell (Interview at DUT Steve Biko Campus, 19 August 2019).

Furthermore, a study by McDonald and Jacobs (2005 cited in Gordon 2016: 1-17) accused the media of flaming the 2008 xenophobic violence, and the research revealed that during that period the print media portrayals of migrants were strongly negative, as the tabloid framed migrants to be linked to social problems such as drug trafficking and unemployment. It was in this vein that Smith's (2011) study argued that the media coverage and negative stereotyping of migrants was widespread. This means that a large portion of newspaper coverage has been uncritical, prejudicial, and having sentiments of anti-migration, which has led to influencing and shaping the attitude of the local people towards migrants (ibid).

In the previous section, it was stated that a crime is a crime whether committed by a local or a migrant. However, the attitude of the media in reporting crimes committed by migrants is biased, harsh, and promotes stereotypes towards the latter as compared to crimes committed by the local people. This means that crimes committed by migrants, be it drug possession or trafficking, or murders, makes the news highlight, especially in the tabloid compared to those committed by locals, and they are reported in ways to portray migrants as the bad people from other African countries taking advantage of the law of South Africa, while crimes committed by the local people are regarded as a *déjà vu* situation (Dialogue observation, 26 November 2019). This manner of reporting plays a large role in terms of promoting stereotypes and stigmas against migrants, and it has explained the reason why the majority of local South Africans are not comfortable being associated with migrants and they believe that all African migrants, especially those from Nigeria, are criminals.

However, it must be mentioned that unlike the 2008 attacks, where the media was accused of promoting a negative attitude towards migrants and promoting xenophobia, the media is now reserved in terms of reporting news that might trigger xenophobic violence. Coupled with this

is the fact that the media has also denounced the statements that are likely to trigger xenophobia and reporting on the violence taking place in different parts of the country.

### **7.3.5 Xenophobia: An Attack without a Valid Cause**

From the discussion and statistics provided above, both South Africans and migrants are affected by the same problems. While there are different stereotypes towards migrants, this research did not dispute that, which means that this research validates the fact that migrants are involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, drug dealing, fraud, and other crimes, and it is also true that migrants have relied on their own individual ingenuity and entrepreneurial abilities to survive in the country and are often out competing for jobs and business with the locals. However, one can never generalise nationality to crime (Rassol 2019). This means that not all migrants are criminals or job snatchers and coupled with this is the fact that the different statistics presented above have demonstrated that instead of looking at the fact that migrants are taking the jobs of the locals, one must also look at the perspective that they are also generating small employments in the community where they have settled.

Moreover, unemployment in the country is not only limited to South Africans alone, as migrants are also affected by unemployment, and coupled with this, they face different forms of unfair discrimination due to their foreignness, as migrant participants explained in Chapter 7 of this research. Furthermore, both groups have people who are disregarding the law of SA by being involved in criminal activities and those people on the migrant side represent a minority, and there is no available data to support those allegations either quantitatively or qualitatively (Segatti 2012; Crush and Peberdy 2018).

Taking a closer look at the different causes that trigger xenophobia in South Africa, one can clearly see that all the available causes of xenophobia are in fact erroneous and are based on misinformation and the lack of information. Misinformation, due to the fact that all the channels available to provide people with relevant information regarding the problem that they are facing, is shifting the blame to migrants, instead of giving people the correct information that will help them understand the socio-economic realities of the country. Thus, blaming migrants for crimes or job scarcity is unjustifiable due to the fact that if all migrants from the African continent leave the country, the situation in terms of unemployment and crime will still be unchanged, with the reason being that the country is facing economic problems that can only be solved if the government manages to attract investors and fight crime and corruption.

The above-mentioned reasoning is supported by the fact that during different incidences of xenophobic violence that have taken place in the country, migrants have been witnessed

leaving the country either by force or through logistical government interventions in providing transportation means for migrants to leave the country. However, one can never see any company advertising vacancies left by migrants, nor a decrease in the unemployment rate. Thus, fixing the economy of the country will also alleviate crimes in the country, as people are involved in criminal activities since there are no available job opportunities. Hence, based on the argument presented above, the main question is to identify who is truly behind xenophobia or who are the masterminds of such acts in the country. To answer this question, one has to look at the attitude of the government towards migrants, which is presented in the following section.

### **7.3.6 Summary**

This section demonstrated that xenophobic violence against migrants is based on the wrong perception of the lives of migrants. The section demonstrated that both groups are facing the same challenges and struggles. However, migrants, being skilled, have managed to develop different coping strategies for survival which does not only benefit them but also the communities in which they settle, even though the local people have a feeling that they are being robbed in their country by migrants. This means that while both groups are struggling to obtain employment, migrants are the most affected as they are discriminated against due to the fact that they are outsiders, which pushes them to lower their wages and to work under inhuman conditions in order to survive. Moreover, both groups have people involved in criminal activities, which is a responsibility of the law enforcement agents to track down people involved in criminal activities.

## **7.4 The Position of the Government on Migrants**

Post-apartheid SA, governed by the ANC since 1994, has embraced the pan-Africanism approach which entails an inclusion of African migrants in the country to promote the African identity (Zondi 2018). This has explained the reason of drafting a constitution that protects all the people living in the country and guaranteeing them the necessary basic human rights. However, the economic circumstances in a sense shifted them away from the pan-Africanism ideology which the former leaders of the ANC, namely Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, promoted. This means that while the government allowed migrants to make their journey into the country and opened the border to refugees and asylum seekers, they never anticipated that they would have a large number of refugees demands in the country. Finding itself overwhelmed by the presence of refugees, the government has turned a blind eye and deaf ear towards migrants. The government's attitude is usually observed during xenophobic violence as the government is always late to intervene and, on many occasions, its

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interventions have proven to be ineffective, as it has been reported by Misago *et al.* (2015). Shenilla Mohamed, the Executive Director of Amnesty International South Africa, stated that “There is a lack of political will on the part of the government to deal with the issues of violence and xenophobia in a sustainable way” (Amnesty International 2018a).

While the South African government can be applauded for having a very good accommodative Refugee Act, the government has developed a negative attitude towards migrants in the country, which is witnessed every time a government official has to comment on the presence of migrants in the country, as in many cases, those comments are always followed by xenophobic violence. This means that while one is trying to identify that which triggers xenophobic violence in the country, one also needs to look at the role of the government before and after xenophobic violence. One cannot identify the potential force that triggers xenophobia without having a look at the position of the government towards the violence. It is important to recognise the power and capacity of the government to completely end or eradicate xenophobic violence in the country within a few months and implement strong policies that will prevent xenophobia from occurring in the near future. This power and capacity to end and prevent xenophobia from taking place is completely different to NGOs as they are limited in their duties due to the fact that they depend on donor funding in order to address the issue of xenophobia.

#### **7.4.1 The Attitudes of the Government vis-à-vis Migrants**

The role of the government is to protect the lives of people living in the country, thus, the South African government is doing good work in protecting the lives of everybody living in the country, as it is a constitutional right of people living in the country, as from the moment they step into the country, SA belongs to them, as per the preamble of the 1996 constitution (Constitutional Assembly 1996). In protecting people living in the country, the government tends to neglect refugees and asylum seekers and they use them as scapegoats for all the socio-economic problems affecting the country and to justify their failure to deliver services promised to the local people. However, certain government officials always exhibit a negative attitude towards migrants before the violence erupts in the country, and this is better explained in the following sub-section.

##### **(a) *Attitude of the Government before Xenophobic Violence***

While the government's attitudes can influence the local people's perception and attitude towards migrants, it is sad to witness the government also demonstrating a strong negative attitude towards migrants. This is seen through different public statements and speeches

made by the government officials, as a result, those speeches are always followed by uncontrollable xenophobic violence or discrimination towards migrants from the African continent. This means that when one looks closely at different incidences of xenophobic violence that have taken place in the country in the past year, one can effectively see that they are attached to a particular statement made by a government official. The government officials' statements or speeches against migrants either promote violence against migrants or stereotypes and stigmas against the latter. A recent example is seen in the speech of the then Minister of Health, Aaron Motsoaledi, who accused migrants of burdening the South African health system by stating that:

Our hospitals are full; we can't control them. When a woman is pregnant and about to deliver a baby, you can't turn her away from the hospital and say you are a foreign national ... you can't. And when they deliver a premature baby, you have got to keep them in hospital. When more and more come, you can't say the hospital is full now go away ... they have to be admitted, we have got no option – and when they get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control start failing (Mbhele 2018).

This statement alone is a clear promotion of discrimination against migrants in accessing medical assistance. From the statement mentioned above, many migrants might be turned down when trying to seek medical assistance or might feel dehumanised in hospitals based on the fact that they are in the country to profit from the good medical attention reserved for the local people alone. However, in making a good analysis on this statement, one can actually see that it is erroneous in all its forms, as statistically, migrants represent the minority in the country; all migrant women cannot go to hospital on the same day to give birth to premature babies. From the statement above, one can clearly see a minister blaming migrants for his failure to build new hospital facilities and to purchase the necessary medical equipment or materials to help the people living in the country.

While the statement above could trigger discrimination, one statement notably resulted in severe violence against migrants, which is the statement made by President Ramaphosa during the electoral campaign in Alexandra in 2019, as he was caught stating to the public gathering that “Everybody just arrives in our townships and rural areas and sets up business without licences and permits. We are going to bring this to an end” (Selema 2019).

As simple as this statement is, a deadly xenophobic violence erupted soon after the president's speech. Coupled with this was the fact that many migrants running businesses in townships and in the Johannesburg CBD saw their businesses being looted, be they legal or illegal. To this statement one can add the Zulu King statement made in 2015, which has been quoted in the literature review. However, these are not the only statements triggering

xenophobic violence, and it is worth adding that in 2017, the country saw a deadly xenophobic violence which emerged as a result of the statement made by the former mayor of Johannesburg, Mr Herman Mashaba, who recklessly insinuated that undocumented migrants were responsible for the rampant crime in Johannesburg, and then went on by mentioning that he had informed different embassies that their residents live in Johannesburg criminally (Nicolson 2017).

These statements, coupled with the ones that have already been provided in the previous sections and in the literature review, clearly show that the government is playing a large role in triggering xenophobic violence through a public negative attitude exhibited.

*(b) Attitude of the Government after Xenophobic Violence*

The government is being accused by different scholars of not taking xenophobic violence seriously. In the past years, the government was seen taking a different approach in mitigating xenophobia. One of the most regrettable attitudes of the government is the fact that the South African government is in denial regarding xenophobia in the country, and this attitude was witnessed since the 2008 mass xenophobic violence. Moreover, different approaches adopted by the government have proven to be ineffective in the aftermath of xenophobia (Crush and Ramachandran 2014: 1-44). A recent example is the launch of 'Operation fiela' which aimed at tackling and preventing crime in different crime hotspots in Johannesburg. While many people expected a change through Operation fiela, especially NGOs working closely with migrants, the latter were surprised to see that Operation fiela resulted in arrests and deportations of illegal migrants in the country. This taps directly into the argument provided by Misago (2015) stating that the government is making the wrong interventions in responding to xenophobia.

It is important to mention that although the government has been seen adopting different policies dealing with migrants and xenophobia in different aftermaths of xenophobic violence, these policies are regarded as short-term interventions, as thus far, most of the policies adopted by the government are non-existent, which means that they last only during the period after the attack. For instance, the inter-ministerial committee dealing with xenophobia, Operation fiela, and the world conference against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance held in Durban are completely inexistent as no member of the government has ever referred to it (Misago 2016b: 443-467). This simply means that the government is not taking xenophobic violence seriously.

#### 7.4.2 The Government's Approach on promoting the Pan-Africanism Ideology and Ubuntu

The South African government is known as being at the epicentre of the pan-Africanism ideology, as the African National Congress (ANC), which is the ruling party, is mainly dominated by people who have faced the struggle of apartheid and through that period they learned the pan-Africanism ideologies – coupled with this is the fact that the end of apartheid saw the birth of *ubuntu* as a slogan for the new SA which is always linked to the pan-Africanism ideologies (Cilliers 2008). While xenophobia is known as a fear of strangers, *ubuntu*, which is an isiXhosa proverb, implies the integration of strangers regardless of their origins, which means that as long as *ubuntu* is regarded as a state of mind in the lives of many South Africans, xenophobia should not be taking place in the country. On the other hand, the pan-Africanism ideologies are known for originating during the struggles of Africans against slavery and colonisation, and this concept is known for its goal of unifying Africans in the world and connecting those who are of African descent to the African continent (Zondi 2018).

##### (a) *Post-Apartheid South Africa connected through the Pan-Africanism Ideologies and Ubuntu Principle*

To understand the connection of the pan-Africanism ideology and *ubuntu*, one must look back to the first generations of the ANC leadership, as during the apartheid period, the late president Nelson Mandela had to seek the assistance of pan-Africanist founders to support the country during the apartheid struggle, which took place in 1962 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), meaning seven months prior to Mr Mandela's arrest. The purpose of his trip was to accelerate the liberation for the struggling South Africa. Thus, in his speech, Mr Mandela called on the four countries, namely, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, and Sudan to enforce diplomatic and economic sanctions against SA through an active campaign by the member states of the commonwealth (Zondi 2018).

In addition, Nigeria also petitioned to get SA expelled from the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Zondi 2018). This trip to Ethiopia gave access to some African states to intervene and support the fight against the apartheid regime. This was then followed by international pressure and sanctions on the country. Soon after a victory on the apartheid regime, the country had to go through the process of reconciliation and nation building. In the process of building a new nation, the ideology of *ubuntu* was born, where *ubuntu* means 'a human being is a human being only through its relationship to other human beings'. Originally, it brought to life a sense of hospitality, which is a necessary precondition for survival in

communities, especially in the townships and informal settlements which are dominated by poverty (Marx 2002: 49-69).

Thus, the principle of *ubuntu* was broadened to include different aspects such as a Christian and ethnic aspect. These characteristics of *ubuntu* are attributed to Archbishop Desmond Tutu who, through the Christianisation of *ubuntu*, incorporated the element of compassion. The reason is that, firstly, one can only see oneself through the other person through compassion. Secondly, there is the aspect of ethnising *ubuntu* of proclaiming the African heritage (ibid). This means that post-apartheid South Africa is effectively built on two strong African ideologies exhibiting the African heritage, namely, pan-Africanism and *ubuntu*. With these two concepts established as the foundation of the new South Africa, there is no possible justification or explanation of xenophobia to take place in the country.

(b) *The Government's Failure to promote Ubuntu and the Pan-Africanism Ideologies*

The government has shown negligence in promoting *ubuntu* and the pan-Africanism ideologies since the end of apartheid. While the rest of the continent was expecting a sermon of unity from the South African government, it appeared that the latter was preaching unity on paper while the reality involved the exclusion of African migrants in the country. The possible channel that was available to the government to promote *ubuntu* and the pan-Africanism ideology was education and the enactment of new legislations and policies.

(c) *Promotion of Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism through Education*

The failure of the government to promote *ubuntu* and the pan-Africanism ideologies through education has resulted in migrants labelling the local people as uneducated. It is well known that education plays an important role in the country, as education empowers people with the necessary general knowledge whether political history, economics, or geography. The apartheid policy has affected the majority of black South Africans, as the latter did not have access to a proper educational system. They were exposed to the Bantu education system, which only provided manual training to the majority of the local people. The Bantu education system deprived the local people of having access to the Westerners' type of education (Ndimande 2013). This opportunity was only given to the born-free generation. Thus, during the investigation, the researcher found that the local people are aware that there are migrants in the country, but they do not have knowledge of the circumstances of the pushing factors of the migrants, nor knowledge on the fact that during the struggle of apartheid, they were assisted at the regional level and were also accommodated in those countries. This lack of knowledge has shaped the negative attitude and perception of the local people towards

migrants. This was observed during the dialogue as **MR**, a refugee from Burundi, explained that:

If you look at these people past history, you will find out that they are uneducated and they know nothing about us, nor how our countries played a role in fighting apartheid, but today we have become their enemies (Interview at Emmanuel Church, 15 September 2018).

Although the born-free generation has access to better education, during the investigation, the researcher observed that they have little knowledge about the African continent, as they only know about countries bordering SA. When it comes to other African countries, they know them because they meet nationals from those countries, but they are unable to locate the geographical position of those countries on a blind African map (Workshop observation at Emmanuel Church, 15 September 2018). This was evident to the researcher as during the workshops, the researcher showed the local participants a blind map of the African continent and asked them to name ten countries and point to their geographical location on the map. The researcher was surprised to find that unlike the migrant participants, the local participants struggled to show on the blind map where a particular country was situated on the map (Workshop observation at Emmanuel Church).

This exposed the fact that the newly elected party (ANC) failed to change the curriculum to fully explain the African narratives and geography to the local people other than that which they had been exposed to in the Bantu education. Thus, this has become a stumbling block to pan-Africanism and *ubuntu* in the country, as the local people do not believe in the principle of '*One Africa, One people*' which means unifying Africans, and explaining the role that African nations played during the struggle period. This alone has resulted in the intolerance of migrants in the country, as scholars have reported that the local people are intolerant towards African migrants as compared to Europeans (See in Neocosmos 2008; Misago 2016b). Thus, the transition period was the perfect time for the government to conscientize and educate people about the pan-Africanism ideologies, and to remind them about the assistance offered by their African brothers. However, the government failed to do so, which made local South Africans question the presence of migrants from the African continent, as they had never heard of them nor of their support before and during apartheid.

The failure to explain the pan-Africanism ideology and to include it in the curriculum during the period of transition has made the application of *ubuntu* towards migrants difficult. This means that while *ubuntu* consists of the inclusion and tolerance of all humans regardless of their origins, in the South African context, it is only applied and limited to South Africans. It does not extend to migrants since the latter are unknown or outsiders. Moreover, this failure has

made South Africans more tolerant towards their previous executioners, and tolerant towards the citizens of countries that they directly know that supported SA or suffered with South Africans during the apartheid period, namely those from Swaziland, Lesotho, and Namibia; and intolerant towards those who assisted them from a far distance, especially the North, Eastern, and Central African countries that the government never publicly acknowledged. This explains the fact that during xenophobic violence, Whites are not targeted, migrants from the three above-mentioned countries are never targeted, while those from other countries such as Nigeria, the DRC, Somalia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are the victims of the attacks.

(d) *Failure to prosecute the Perpetrators of Xenophobic Violence*

The government's position towards perpetrators of xenophobic violence is inexistent. This means that during xenophobic violence, the people motivating the attacks and those perpetrating the violence are not prosecuted. This reality always leaves migrants not only helpless but also hopeless, the reason being that the latter have no other place to go in order to seek justice for their loss, and notably, since the 2008 mass xenophobic violence onwards, there has not been any serious arrest or case against the perpetrators of the violence. Civil societies, namely, the HRW and the South-African-based African Diaspora called on the government to investigate and prosecute people believed to be behind xenophobia in the country instead of merely condemning the attacks (Shabaan Abdur 2019). Moreover, Vusimusi Sibanda, the chairperson at the African Diaspora Forum, stated that:

Apart from its call for an end to attacks on foreign nationals, the South African government has done little to ensure the arrest and prosecution of those responsible. Strong action is needed to show there are consequences for such before there is another round of violence against vulnerable foreign nationals (ibid).

Keeping the principle of *ubuntu* and pan-Africanism in mind, it is evident that an African cannot attack another African for economic reasons, with the reason being that those two principles emphasise African hospitality. This means that any attacks perpetrated towards migrants need to be prosecuted harshly, to send a direct message that will discourage others to attack migrants. Unfortunately, it seems as though the government is viewing xenophobia as a petty crime or a crime of opportunity, while people are losing their lives, properties, and businesses. This fact explains the reason why at the time of writing this research, many migrants were appealing to the UNHCR to relocate them to other countries since they were feeling helpless in SA. This means that the promotion of *ubuntu* and pan-Africanism must entail a strong prosecution of the perpetrators of xenophobic violence regardless of their social or political position.

(e) *Failure to integrate Migrants*

The integration of migrants in the country or community can play an important role if applied effectively. However, it appears that in the South African context, the integration of migrants is inexistent in the government policies. This means that there is no guideline available on the integration of migrants. However, instead of implementing policies and strategies that deals with the integration of migrants in the country, government only implemented legislation that deals with the protection and acceptance of asylum seekers such as the Immigration Act of 2014, and the Refugee Act of 1998. This explains the fact that migrants are still not accepted in the communities and are regarded as outsiders. Thus, the integration of migrants must take place from the moment they enter SA, and the government must find a way to introduce them and allocate them in the communities through a process of teaching them the culture of SA and the main language of the country, which will enable them to communicate with the local people, which will also play a large role in promoting *ubuntu*.

Unlike Kenya and Uganda, the government's approach to allow migrants into the country is quite unique, the reason being that in Kenya and Uganda, migrants are forced to live in refugee camps, which is not the case in SA, as has been explained in the literature. However, in Uganda for instance, the process of integrating migrants entails empowerment and auto-sufficiency of the latter, which means that once allowed in the country, the latter are given a portion of land to grow crops on it and sell the goods to the local people. Thus, this approach cannot work in the South African context, the reason being that land is still a large problem in SA as the country is still battling for the land, due to the fact that white South Africans still own almost all the land in the country, leaving the black South Africans with a small portion of land. Thus, giving land to migrants as a way of integrating them in the country will create chaos which will result in deadly attacks against the migrants.

Thus, the proper integration that the country can adopt to have migrants being accepted in the communities is to teach the latter the culture and language of the country, which constitute a great barrier in building peace, promoting social cohesion, *ubuntu*, and the pan-Africanism ideology.

#### **7.4.3 The Government as Migrants' Saviour**

As explained in the section above, there are no organisations in the country that can effectively prevent xenophobia without the assistance of the government. The only organisation that can combat xenophobia in the country successfully is the government, due to the fact that it has the capacity for mobilising people from all over the country and has the financial means of



organising a strong campaign on social cohesion and preventing xenophobia from taking place in the country. Hence, most migrants look up to the government to protect them and to put an end to the xenophobic violence that prevails in the country. This was revealed during the interviews and dialogues as both participants (South Africans and migrants) acknowledged the capacity of the government of filling a stadium just to promote social cohesion and to advise the local people to stop the violence against migrants (Dialogue with migrants and South Africans at Emmanuel Church).

However, the government has not stepped up its efforts in preventing xenophobic violence from occurring, and in the cases where the government intervenes, it only provides a short-term intervention to the violence, which will see the violent erupting again in coming months or years. Shenilla Mohamed, the executive director of Amnesty international South Africa, states that:

There is a lack of political will on the part of the government to deal with issues of violence and xenophobia in a sustainable way, and the consequence of this inertia has resulted in continuing sporadic bursts of violence which often end in deaths, injuries, and damage to property ... it has been almost 10 years since a horrific wave of xenophobic violence swept the country leaving over 60 people dead. Since then, the government resolved many times to address the issue and there have been numerous inquiries, including one conducted by former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, which made a number of recommendations. But nothing concrete has been done to combat impunity for xenophobic violence and other related longstanding human rights violations (Amnesty International 2018a).

This means that while migrants are expecting the government to play a role in combatting xenophobia, the latter has distanced itself from assisting and protecting migrants. This attitude of the government can easily be seen as an encouragement towards the violence. Thus, due to the fact that the government is not effectively providing assistance to the victims of xenophobia nor showing efforts in combatting xenophobia, the researcher identified the South African government as a cause that triggers xenophobia. Moreover, Bornman (2019) posits that “by insisting that the recent spate of violence in South Africa was just a crime and that migrants are to blame for the country’s ills, politicians and commentators spread the hate that sparks pogroms”.

#### **7.4.4 The Government as a Force that triggers Xenophobic Violence**

Stating that the government of SA constitutes one of the causes of xenophobia might seem absurd, but this argument is based on the fact that if one looks at the evolution of xenophobic violence in SA and public statements made by official representatives which have been

debunked in the section above, one will realise that the government is a force that motivates the local people to attack migrants, and which often shows negative attitudes and frustrations towards the presence of migrants. Hanekom and Webster (2009: 91-117) have accused the government of being reluctant to address the persistent xenophobia among the general population due to its own xenophobic beliefs.

In addition, taking a look at different public statements made by the government officials, which have been provided in the sections and subsections above, it is obvious that the government is playing a direct role in triggering the violence against migrants, and this motivation is witnessed at all levels within the government. This means that xenophobia in the South African context is not only about the local people being frustrated about the presence of migrants, but in fact, the attacks are engineered by government officials who trigger the violence and play the role of fire fighters after the damages have been caused – this explains the difficulty in preventing the violence and arresting the perpetrators, as some government officials are running the risk of being prosecuted.

Hence, instead of acknowledging that migrants are victims of serious violent attacks, the government is minimising the extent of the violence by denying the violence as xenophobia and stating it rather as being a crime – this argument has been denounced by scholars and civil societies, stating that “xenophobia denialists should be held culpable” (Bornman 2019). This statement directly accuses the government of masterminding xenophobia indirectly. Furthermore, the South African government has shown itself as hostile to migrants living within the country, by promoting and fostering xenophobia, rather than taking action to protect the interests of those who are already the most marginalised in the country (Hanekom and Webster 2009: Ibid).

This reasoning clearly supports the argument that the government is the third force that triggers xenophobia in the country. Unlike the local people who are seen in the frontline attacking and harassing migrants, the government is also participating in such actions indirectly – this has been explained by Hanekom and Webster (2009) who state that the government’s hostility towards migrants has taken on a variety of forms, including public xenophobic statements made by its representatives and the refusal or the inability to give documents to non-nationals. To make the matter worse, the apartheid-era methods that have been used in arrests of undocumented migrants have created the perception that migrants are criminals devoid of rights in SA (ibid). It is worthy to mention that the deadly attacks against migrants often take place when the country is heading towards the elections, whether at the national, provincial, or municipal levels, with the reason being that during this period, those

who are already in power blame migrants for benefitting from the opportunities reserved for the South Africans which has resulted in the local people not having that which was promised to them.

Thus, the reason for stating that xenophobia is a 'demon without the *raison d'être*' in SA is based on the fact that different scholars, provided above, have clearly demonstrated, qualitatively and quantitatively, that the causes of xenophobia are based on myths and are erroneous due to the fact that the local people do not get the correct and accurate information about migrants and their coping strategies. Thus, the government, which is identified as a 'third force', plays a large role in bringing that demon back to life and feeding it by using migrants as scapegoats for different socio-economic problems to justify their failures of service delivery expected by the local people.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

Xenophobia in the South African context goes against all the African values and hospitalities for which the continent is known. Although the local people have identified migrants as their competitors, the presentation of this chapter demonstrated that both groups are experiencing the same challenges in terms of economic opportunities, with the local people having more privileges as compared to migrants. Thus, it is the responsibility of the government to address the economic difficulties that the country is facing. The failure of the government to address the real problems that affect the country has built a strong negative attitude towards migrants as they are not only perceived as the outsiders or outgroup, but they are regarded as the enemies of SA and its people. Coupled with this is the fact that the government has shifted the blame to migrants, making them scapegoats of the country's social ills. After analysing and discussing all the causes that trigger xenophobic violence in the country, this chapter argued that the attacks against migrants do not fit into the criteria of xenophobia due to the fact that in the South African context, one is witnessing a victim becoming a perpetrator based on the definition of xenophobia, which means that there is no fear of migrants, but persecution perpetrated against them. Thus, the chapter argued that the violence in the South African context must be regarded as xeno-prejudice or simply plain prejudice.

Furthermore, the chapter explained that while the government is perceived by migrants as being the saviour of their lives, that same government constitutes a cause of xenophobic violence since it is playing an indirect role in the hostility against migrants. This argument is based on the observations made of different incidences of xenophobic violence that have taken place in the country, as it has appeared that the violence is triggered by either the

national, provincial, or municipal government officials. Thus, this explains the fact that the latter are always in denial regarding xenophobia in the country and are failing to implement policies and legislations directly penalising the perpetrators of xenophobia regardless of their social status.

## **Chapter 8: Prevention of Xenophobia through Workshops and Dialogue Engagements**

### **8.1 Introduction**

According to O'Brien (2001), AR starts with the identification and setting of the problem. Thus, this study identified xenophobia as the major problem affecting SA and the strong negative attitude that the local people exhibit towards migrants. Hence, to plan and implement an intervention, the diagnosis of the problem was conducted, as demonstrated in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, which shows that the causes of xenophobia are plain myths regarding the perception of migrants, which empirical studies have identified as causes of the violence which are always related to the socio-economic challenges, as already explained in Chapter 8 above. It was in this vein that the research team identified the importance of dialogue to promote social cohesion and curb the scourge of xenophobia in the country. Thus, in order to plan and implement an intervention that aimed at preventing and combatting xenophobia in SA, a diagnosis of the problem was conducted through interviews, FGDs, dialogues, and workshops. These approaches connected empirical studies to the current research and tailored a way of an appropriate intervention by grouping the findings of empirical studies which mainly constitute the causes of xenophobia into two groups.

On the one hand was the socio-economic group which mainly links xenophobia in SA to poverty, unemployment, and hikes in the prices of commodities which cause the continuation of the violence in the country; and on the other hand was the historical group which links xenophobia to the past history of the country (apartheid), which results in strong negative attitudes towards migrants as they are regarded as the unknown, extreme violence and harassment, economic inequality, exclusion, and group division. It was in this vein that the research team tailored its activities based on the causes of xenophobia to test whether they tap into the current situation. Thus, this was quite challenging due to the fact that the research team was using AR which leaves the participants to identify the issues that they are facing, and being challenging, it also helped the team in balancing different studies and reports on xenophobia in order to have an effective action plan. It was in this vein that the research team identified and adopted social cohesion as an appropriate strategy to tackle xenophobia, which emerged from different civil societies' reports and conferences to support conflict transformation. This has been supported by Chan *et al.* (2006 cited in Abe and Katsaura 2016: 55-73) who state that "Social cohesion is largely a 'catchword' for incorporating the most

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pressing social issues of the day: unemployment, poverty, discrimination, exclusion, disenchantment with politics, together with any problems that a policy maker sees fit”.

Xenophobia in SA is not only about the violence, but it also divides Africans in their own continent as they describe themselves as ‘*us*’, which refers to the South Africans, versus ‘*them*’ or ‘*these people*’, referring to the migrants. The activities undertaken in this research focused on breaking that cycle of stereotype and stigma which affects both groups. Coupled with this is the fact that there are many wounds that xenophobic violence has left in the lives of many migrants. Thus, an end to xenophobic violence is possible through a conflict transformative approach, as it starts by transforming the mindsets of local South Africans from prejudice and rejection to empathy, tolerance, acceptance, integration, and respect. For these to be effective, narratives were at the centre of the AR process, the reason being that narratives are an important tool for developing and writing up AR experiences (Toledano and Anderson 2017), and moreover, a good AR narrative acknowledges the past course of events that have shaped the present practices (Heikkinen, Huttunen and Syrjälä 2007: 5-19), thus narratives were used throughout the workshops and dialogues.

## **8.2 First day of the Workshop**

### **8.2.1 Identifying Participants and achieving the same Purpose**

Prior to conducting workshops and dialogues, the researcher conducted interviews with participants in both Chesterville and Mayville, and the prime questions were around the extent and prevalence of xenophobia, the economic challenges that the youth are facing, different forms of violence affecting the community, and crimes and security issues in both communities. This was done as the first process of AR which consists of identifying the problem, thus for the researcher to make it efficient, the researcher had to work with external facilitators in the field to assist in collecting the information (Dickens and Watkins 1999: 127-140). This was a starting point of the research as it prepared the team in terms of its expectations and the type of participants that the team was about to have. Thus, during the first encounters, it was important to start the sessions with a short explanation of the research to all participants to enable them to have knowledge on the research and that which they could expect during the research process. Thus, it was important for the researcher to inform them that:

- They were going to be the co-researchers as all would be working as one team on the research to find appropriate strategies to curb xenophobia. This was important to explain to them since the majority of them had the idea that the researcher was just

going to use them for data and leave once the researcher had collected all the information that was needed.

- They were going to be responsible for designing and implementing the interventions, as this did not depend on the researcher, which means that the researcher would have the role of researcher, but they were the ones who would own the research.

Furthermore, the researcher had to explain the AR process to all the participants and the role that the researcher would be playing in the research. The researcher emphasised that although he was the main researcher, they effectively owned the research due to the fact that they would be playing a role in designing and implementing the intervention. Thus, the researcher's role in the research process was not that of a manager, but rather that of a facilitator, and the researcher would be actively involved in the research process. This was important due to the fact that the participants had to know their expectation from the research and the type of research in which they were involving themselves, and moreover, the researcher had to explain the capacity of AR to empower, involve, and actively engage all the stakeholders in important innovations. Thus, the participants had to understand that their contributions to the topic were likely to be accepted and implemented in the communities. Hence, it was necessary to promote a culture of collaborative inquiry and teamwork, in order to have an effective study (Mubuke and Leibowitz 2013: 30-33).

Due to the fact that it was the first time that the participants were meeting, it was important for the researcher to propose that the day would be started by introducing themselves properly in the best way possible, which meant giving one's name and surname, the meaning of one's name, and the name of the places/countries of origin. Moreover, due to the fact that xenophobia in SA concerns the negative attitude that migrants are experiencing and the possible hatred that both groups might have towards each other due to the extent of the violence, the researcher had to explain to the participants that the research process would be long and that there might be sensitive issues that might arise, which might result in chaotic conflict with both groups blaming each other. Thus, the researcher appealed to the participants to share their views or concerns in a very respectful way to avoid any conflict or misunderstanding between them.

It was considered necessary to start the first activity with a game which was used as an icebreaker and which Mr Theogene Haguma<sup>5</sup> had prepared for the occasion. The game was

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<sup>5</sup> Theogene Haguma is a field officer from Zoe Life. He was working with the researcher during the research process, especially during the field work as he has been running dialogues and workshops

simple as it involved counting from one to seven, tapping one's hand to either one's left or right shoulder in counting order to designate the person to state the next number, but when the count reaches seven, the seventh person must not state 'seven' nor tap his/her shoulder, but he/she must rather make a hand signal above the head designating the next person who should start counting from one. Failing to follow the instructions resulted in disqualification, as there must be two people as winners. While this game was regarded as an icebreaker, its purpose to the participants was to appeal to their attention on the importance of being their brothers' keepers and knowing the people sitting or living next to them. This game changed the atmosphere in the room as the participants were happy and they were laughing at those who were eliminated. It was in this vein that the research team explained to the participants the importance of knowing the person sitting next to them or living next to them. It was emphasised that those who were disqualified were paying attention to something else while they were supposed to be watching whether it was their neighbour's turn and in which direction, he/she was going to tap his/her hand.

Due to the fact that conflict becomes inevitable when people from different places and backgrounds meet, the research team had to establish a common set of values that all were called to agree on and respect.

### **8.2.2 The Importance of working with the Team and establishing the Common Set of Values**

In order to have an effective AR study, it was necessary to form a research team which was called the Action Team (AT) and which consisted of people having experience in working closely with migrants and South Africans; while there were few participants with experience working with both groups, it was necessary to give special attention to those who had experience in designing workshops and dialogues – this was very important to the researcher and to the research as well since the researcher did not have much experience in designing workshops, dialogues, and FGDs. It was in this vein that people with experience in designing workshops and dialogues availed themselves to assisting in terms of designing the activities based on the objectives of the study. Although this group had knowledge on designing workshops and dialogues, they did not have knowledge on the AR process. It was in this vein

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with migrants and refugees for more than five years in different townships and rural areas within KZN. He is originally from Rwanda and came to South Africa during the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994.



that the research team and participants had to work collaboratively to foster change in the group (Dickens and Watkins 1999: Ibid).

Coupled with this group there were also people that had experience and exposures in working with both groups, and this group was important as they were involved in organising the meetings, sending calls out to people in both the communities, and playing an important role in selecting the participants. However, it is important to state that in being a researcher, the researcher had many responsibilities and had to take a key role in encouraging social change. Although the researcher separated the research team into two groups, both groups worked collaboratively in order to address the important points that were likely to change the xenophobia situation. This was important since they both had to engage in empowering participation and in co-creating dialogue between migrants and the local people (ibid).

It is important to mention that prior to the first activity, the research team had a meeting to reflect on the first set of data that had been obtained from the diagnosis of the problem that was done, and critically reflect on the objectives of the study and the causes of xenophobia based on different empirical studies (ibid). Hence, the research team understood that they were dealing with two different groups of people who had different languages, different backgrounds, and probably different religions. Thus, the research team understood that they might have a language barrier, since the researcher personally does not speak the local people's vernacular, which means that the team had to have one common language of communication to accommodate all the participants. While the idea was for all to have one language of communication, this position did not sit well with some local participants, as some of them insisted that the activities take place in the local language (Isizulu), otherwise they would have no other choice than to leave the research process. One local participant did not hesitate by stating in Zulu that:

I cannot accept to bow to foreigners, they are the ones that come to our country, and it is their responsibilities to learn our language. This is a free a country and I'm free to speak my language, if they are not fine with that they can just go back where they come from (Workshop observation at Emmanuel Church, 20 May 2018).

This view was also supported by another participant who explained that:

Us South Africans have compromised a lot in our own country for foreigners. they must also make an effort to accommodate us, we cannot accommodate them all the time. Sometimes we too have problem communicating in English, we feel free when we communicate in our language (ibid).

The above-mentioned statements from the local people did not sit well with migrants, as the latter were also retaliating with their own excuses. Although this altercation came at an early

stage, the research team had to address it appropriately by showing its respect to all the languages that people used and again emphasised to the participants the importance of working collaboratively. It was in this vein that they proposed to have people within the teams that would be working as translators to both groups. Thus, the team had to choose a migrant who was very fluent in Isizulu and Swahili and French to translate for the local people, and the team also had to choose another translator capable of translating from Isizulu to English to help the migrants. While the team did not anticipate a conflict or misunderstanding to emerge at an early stage, the team was however aware and ready for a potential conflict that was likely to arise, since the team was dealing with a topic that was sensitive to both groups. It was in this vein that the team had to set the common set of values, asking each participant to suggest a value, explain its meaning, and explain why it was important to him/her. Thus, the group provided the following values:

- Respect (culture, background, language, and religion)
- Integrity
- Tolerance
- Openness
- Truthful to each other
- Punctuality

It must however be mentioned that the group suggested many values that were important to them, thus the team had to break them up into categories to have a list of the values on a paper chart that was placed in the venue that was being used such that all could refer to it.

### **8.2.3 Putting God at the Centre of the Research Process and Unity with the Group**

For the team to be effective, the team had to respond to each group's caprices and ensure that its process ran smoothly without leaving any group's desires or the team's wishes behind. This means that although the team was working with two different groups, some participants amongst the groups were divided in terms of religion, especially migrants. While some members of the action team, who were pastors (Christians), suggested to the group that they start the activities with a prayer and a short sermon of encouragement and close the activities with a prayer, this suggestion did not sit well with the Muslim participants, and they opposed the suggestion stating that:

You cannot impose us your religion, all of us are not Christians so you cannot tell us to participate in prayer with you while we have our specific time of prayer. This thing that we are doing here is about xenophobia, finding

a way of living in peace with our South African brothers, not about coming here to pray with you (Workshop observation, 25 May 2018).

While the suggestion of a devotion saw a division between migrants, especially those from the DRC, Zimbabweans, and Rwandans who were Christians, and Burundians and Somalis who were Muslims, the research team had to find a way to accommodate all the members of the groups in terms of their respective religions. It was in this vein that the action team proposed that the Muslims could step aside when the Christian group were having their devotion time, and the latter were asked to come to the activities ten minutes before they started to allow them to have their time. The Muslim participants did not have any problem with this as they agreed to step aside during devotional time and to leave before the end prayer.

Since the meetings often lasted four to five hours, the research team had to find alternative ways of finding foods that would be suitable for both groups. This means that the team understood that for the Muslim participants, the team had to offer them halal meat, which was not the case for Christians. It was in this vein that the team had to negotiate with the Christians if they could tolerate that the team order foods from a Muslim colleague who was also a member of the action team, and who offered the team a lower price of purchase. The latter did not mind, as they understood that the team was limited financially. From that day onwards, the team and participants started and closed the day with a prayer, and the team asked each participant to prepare a song in his/her own language and to teach it to the group and to explain the meaning of the song.

Different tensions and misunderstandings that erupted at the early stage of the research process did not come as a surprise to the team, and notably, they confirm Lederach's views on conflict as he regarded it as a natural part in human's relations, however, that which matters in a conflict situation are the abilities to develop and engage in the process of change at the interpersonal, inter-group, and socio-structural levels (Lederach 2003: 5).

### **8.3 Self-Reflection and Team Collaboration**

Due to the fact that several scholars and civil societies' reports have concluded quantitatively that there is little knowledge of the presence of migrants amongst the local people, the research team understood that in order to move forward with the research and to have an effective strategy to curb xenophobia, the team would need to examine the way of engaging participants on their knowledge of migrants. This meant that the team needed the local people to reflect on how often they interact with migrants, and if they have knowledge of the type of migrants in the country and the pushing factors of the latter, and the migrants also had to reflect on their interactions with the local people. Though this might seem of little importance

in this research, it was a good starting point, since (Dickens and Watkins 1999: Ibid) state that “AR participants begin with little knowledge”. Thus, the team believed that it was the little knowledge from the participants that would help the team to move forward in the research. It was in this vein that the team asked the participants to have a truthful reflection and open answers to the following questions, which the team believed played a large role in shaping the attitudes of both groups:

- Who is a refugee?
- Where are refugees coming from?
- Why are they in South Africa?
- What are they doing in South Africa?
- When are they going back to their home countries?

The team asked the participants to reflect on the above-mentioned questions. The team anticipated a detailed narrative of the journey of a migrant to SA, and coupled with this, the migrants were also encouraged to share their journey after reflecting on the questions above. It was in this vein that some local participants acknowledged the fact that they had little knowledge of refugees, as one participant revealed that “I know that there are refugees in the country, but I never knew their reason of coming to South Africa”. Moreover, some participants also acknowledged the fact that they did not actually pay attention to refugees as that which they saw were the reports of the damages that they were doing to the country (Workshop observation, 25 May 2018). It must be mentioned that when the research team asked the group to reflect on the above-mentioned questions and to openly share their experiences and knowledge, the researcher noticed that there was a degree of confusion among the local people. It was in this vein that the researcher advised the facilitator to anticipate with a narrative to explain to the group who a refugee is and the process of becoming a refugee in SA.

#### **8.4 A Journey of a Refugee to South Africa**

Having realised that the participants were grouping all migrants in the country as foreigners, which they are, they did not have a proper understanding of refugees. It was in this vein that the team decided to share a story of a narrative of a refugee with the participants, and the purpose of that narrative was to get the local people to understand the reason of the presence of migrants in South Africa, and to open room for discussion in order to explain more on refugees, the process of their integration in the country, their livelihood activities, and the challenges that they face once in South Africa – this was done in order to build communities

of people committed to change the situation and division between them (Dickens and Watkins 1999:). Thus, that narrative on the knowledge of refugees was the first lens of conflict transformation, as provided by Lederach and Maise (2003), to transform the conflict and prevent xenophobia.

Mr Haguma, a refugee from Rwanda, had to explain his journey from Rwanda to South Africa to the participants:

I was born in one of smallest country in Africa called Rwanda, I grew up in a happy family and I had 8 siblings, I was in high school, and life was very good for us until 1994 when the war broke out which is known internationally as the Rwandan genocide which entailed one tribe killing the other which is Hutus killing of the Tutsi<sup>6</sup>. People dying, women were raped and other were running for fear of their lives, because of the conflict both my parents were killed and five siblings. I decided to run for my life. Without knowing where I was going to, I remember of South Africa being one the safest country in Africa, plus I studied the history of SA and how they fought apartheid, I said to myself that I need to go to SA, maybe there my life will be safe, moreover, I said to myself that maybe if I go there my human right will be respected because they have been through my situation and will understand my case and protect me. These are the things that pushed me to come to SA.

As you might know, a refugee does not have a passport because when war broke out you don't have time to look or apply for either a passport or a visa. So, I decided to take the road and hitch hike, I did not have any money on me, I was lucky that different truck drivers were giving me lifts, and the last one helped me cross the border and drop me in Emangusi (Kwazulu-Natal) on the road. Without knowing where to go or what to do, I decided to start walking again until a bus driver saw me and stop his bus, when he opens his the door I was surprise to see an old man who just looked at me told me that I looked like someone who is coming from a far country. You know in Rwanda we were speaking French and not English or Zulu, we tried to communicate, and the man took me to his house, where he was living with his wife and children, his name is Mr Mngomezulu.

That man did not only give me a lift, but I told him my story and he took me with him and gave me a shelter in his house, where I had to live like one his children. That is why I always say that Ubuntu is still there, and I'm against those that are saying all South Africans are bad, because I was living in a house with people that I don't know for years without paying rents nor foods. After 4 months, I decided to go to Home Affairs Durban and apply for an asylum seeker to avoid being illegal in the country, since I was a victim of an armed conflict, I was given a 6-month asylum permit, which I had to renew every 6 months. Since I am living with Mr Mngomezulu as one child, that old man did not want me to work, he just wanted me to sit at home and

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<sup>6</sup> The Rwandan genocide took place in 1994, it is known as the most horrible tribal conflict which saw the death of 100.000 Tutsi killed by Hutus.

doing nothing. But where I was coming from there is no such a thing. I had to go out and get myself a job.

For me to get some money, I started going in community walking doors to doors cutting people's grass and weed so they can pay me. After 6 month I get some money, so I decided to buy a tent and a hair clipper machine to run a barbershop. After 8 month my saving was about ZAR 6,000, back in the day ZAR 6,000 was a lot of money. Having that money motivated me to learn refrigeration, which means fixing fridges, oven, and microwave. I found one college in town, and they charged me ZAR 5,000 for the full course. That course helped me fixing fridge in Jozini, but after fixing all broken the fridges in Jozini there was no businesses for, I had to move from Mr Zulu's house and find a place in Durban. In 2005, I was blessed to open a shop where people were coming in numbers to get their fridges fixed, and some where even calling me. Sadly, in 2008 when the xenophobic violence erupted, my shop was torched because of the violence.

The narrative mentioned above stimulated the curiosity of the local people, as most of them had a different understanding of refugees, as according to their understanding of the refugees, they call them *isifikanomtwalo* in isiZulu, which means people arriving with the luggage, and from that they did not know the pushing factors. After sharing the story, the local people looked shocked, and there was a sense of sadness among the local people upon hearing the story. It was in this vein that the local people asked migrants to share their journey with them such that they would know the people with whom they were working. It was in this vein that the research team had to pair them in groups to allow migrants to share their experiences with the locals. This request was welcomed by the migrants as they attested that it was the first time that they were asked by the local people to share their journey. The purpose of pairing them in groups and giving migrants an opportunity to narrate their journeys was to enforce contact between both groups – as has been explained in the literature review, contact reduces prejudice. This means that the first activity was a starting point of creating an environment where both groups could have contact.

Thus, migrants narrated the circumstances of their pushing factors, the types of lives that they had in their home countries, and they explained their experiences of being victims of armed conflict (DRC and Somalia) or humanitarian/economic crises (Zimbabwe and Malawi) which had led them to leave their countries. Some participants, when sharing their journey, brought indirect trauma, especially to women from the DRC who had been victims of rape and those who had been abducted or forced to join the rebel movements. Some participants were crying while sharing their journey, which also saw people in their group encouraging them to share or crying with them. While there were people with experience in counselling, those who were traumatised while sharing their journey revealed that they had beaten that pain, as reflecting on that which had happened to them was part of that which they always considered as a

healing process. There were also those who had lost all the members of their families and those who were attacked indirectly, which means that their family members were victims, or they had a chance to run before the attacks had reached their villages.

It is important to note that it is not all migrants who chose to speak. Some were just listening; however, the research team's attention was more on how both groups could respond to each other's narratives. Thus, since the local people have a different perception of migrants, they responded with much attention, compassion, and comfort, as they became closer to the migrants and hugged those sharing their journeys. The local people did not hide their feelings, as a local South African explained in isiZulu that:

What I had in mind about foreigners and what I'm hearing is completely different because I will never imagine that these people had to run and leave their family behind just to be safe in South Africa. Instead of protecting them and looking at them as our brothers, we chased them away, we attack them. I believe that we were doing it from ignorance. From today, I will see these people differently.

The local participants not only showed empathy towards the migrants' journeys and integration process in the country, but they also understood the language barrier with which migrants struggle and how the latter struggle to get papers at home affairs – this was explained by a South African lady who stated that:

It is not easy to leave your family behind and coming to a country where you don't have a family member, you speak a different language, but you must survive or travel to renew your paper. We must accept each other as Africans.

Furthermore, the local participants acknowledged that they were judging migrants based on different stories that they had heard about the latter and based on the behaviour exhibited by the latter. However, after hearing different stories, they understood that xenophobia is not a good image that South Africans are showing to other countries. It was at that point that the participants identified narrating migrants' experiences as one of the strategies of combatting the negative attitudes that the local people have towards migrants. Thus, after the first session, the team sat down to reflect on the activities that were run and planned for the session.

## **8.5 Using Language and Culture as a Tool to address the Negative Attitude**

Language plays an important role as it can show a person or group belonging, as explained in the previous chapter, and language in the South African context is one of the determinant factors that plays a role in identifying migrants and attacking them. However, in this research,

the research team identified language as a scissor and glue, which means that it can divide people and, at the same time, connect them. It is important to mention that every cultural community has its own vernacular language for conflict and conflict resolution, along with its own set of common values, principles, and norms that give meaning and validity to the concept of peace (Funk 2012: 391-408). It was in this vein that the team identified this workshop as one where language could be used for building peace in the South African context. While the local people are frustrated about migrants' spoken language which they referred to as *kwerekwere* and based on the misunderstanding and tensions that the research team had witnessed in the previous session regarding the use of a common language, the researcher proposed to the team to look at the way in which language (African language) could be used as a bridge to connect the participants and break the attitude of exclusion based on their languages. It was in this vein that the researcher had to sit first with the research teams to discuss the commonalities that exist within the African language before bringing it to the participants. The purpose of that activity was to reinforce the promotion of social cohesion and transform the conflict by emphasising the concept of '*We are all African*' thus the principle of *ubuntu* should apply to all regardless of the country of origin.

Transforming xenophobic violence and promoting social cohesion in the country requires a clear explanation of the different people living in the African continent, the problems that their countries are facing, and the languages that they speak. Thus, for the research team to have a successful session on breaking the negative attitudes between groups, the team had to start by concluding the previous session, which has been provided in the section above. While the focus was on the attitudes, the research team would open a group discussion based on the following questions:

- How do you feel if you are in the taxi with people who are not speaking your language?
- What is your reaction when someone tells you to speak in English because he doesn't speak your language?
- Do you trust people who do not speak your language?
- Do you feel safe when you are surrounded by people who do not speak your language?

The purpose of having the group reflect on these questions was to see how they would behave in front of people who speak a different language. It was in this vein that the local participants revealed that they do not feel comfortable nor safe *vis-à-vis* people who do not speak their language, whether in the taxi or the neighbourhood, while the migrant participants' report was quite fair as they revealed that they often keep quiet when surrounded by people speaking a different language. Thus, the team had to open the discussion on language, which most



participants welcomed as there was an incident/tension regarding that topic. Hence, the team had to identify the similarities and commonalities that existed between both groups. For this activity to be effective, the team asked each participant to state three things that the team showed them in their own language, which were: hair, chicken, and water.

Both groups were surprised to find that there were many similarities that they shared in terms of the language, as provided in Table 9.1. To place more emphasis on the language, the research team asked all to count together in their own language from one to ten, and this alone amazed the participants who were shocked and surprised. The researcher was surprised to see the person who insisted on having the work in Isizulu apologising to the group, stating that “I did not know that our language is related, please my brothers from the other African countries, forgive me your brother from the South” – this was welcomed in the group as it changed the atmosphere in the venue. It was in this vein that the last part of the workshop had to focus on the similarities in terms of the culture. The participants acknowledged that although their physical features are different, that which they have in common is beyond their physical appearance and that is something that they have to cherish as an African heritage.

The purpose of having a group discussion was to draw out the similarities that exist between groups, although scholars have stated that local cultural beliefs and values do not simply determine the operational meaning of peace in political discourse, but they do include a litmus test through which local populations evaluate the authenticity and quality of the process (Funk 2012). Moreover, when people become self-conscious of their cultural heritage, they can be understood and engaged as resources rather than barriers, obstacles, or as an unchanging whole to be protected at any cost (ibid).

**Table 8.1:** Similarities and commonalities in the African languages as a first step in identifying social cohesion.

English	Isizulu	Swahili
Hair	Zinwele	Nywele
Water	Amanzi	Maji
Chicken	Izikukhu	Kuku
Goat	Imbuzi	Mbuzi
Two	Ezimbili	Mbili

Sleep	Lala	Lala/Kulala
With you	Nawe	Na wewe

Through this activity, the team managed to break the barrier that was obstructing the promotion of *ubuntu* and pan-Africanism and the team identified a potential strategy of curbing the negative attitude that existed between the groups, as both groups understood that *ubuntu* was only limited to South African tribes, but it can be extended to migrants, because they are one people. One participant stated that:

We never know, I might be sitting here with my niece that I never met, but because of lack of necessary knowledge we are fighting forgetting that the person that you are attacking might be your cousin that you might never know.

While some locals were surprised and amazed to see the similarities with migrants which they had never foreseen, they opened their hearts by openly sharing that which was holding them from opening their doors to migrants, as a young local man who had a negative view on migrants since the beginning of the investigation explained that:

When I decided to participate to this research process, I thought it was one of those activity where they told us not to attack foreigners because it is bad, they are our brothers, then they gave us foods and dismiss the session. I never anticipated that we have a lot in common that we never know of. The reason being, us and the foreigners we never have a chance to sit in one room and share our cultures and languages. What we did today is so amazing, and I will never forget it. I must ask my brothers to forgive me, because I was one of those people that never like them because of what I heard in the community, now we are brothers and we are all Africans.

Both the local and migrant participants welcomed that activity as they advised to try it in the community or in the community meetings which often take place at the end of each month to see how the people will react, as the activity alone showed a positive outcome to the team.

## 8.6 Changing the Negative Attitude through Still Images

Preventing xenophobia in South Africa requires different approaches and techniques, and moreover, since AR is used as a paradigm of this research, it requires a concrete and practical strategy to trying out some new ideas as a way to solve and address the original problem (Mertler 2009: 36). It was in this vein that the research team could not rely on one activity and call the process a success, and the team had to use different approaches, hence the group advised using different strategies to tackle the issue of negative attitudes that exist between

the two groups. Amongst many that were proposed, the group decided to try out the image theatre, which they believed would appeal to the local people, since sharing the story was important. Thus, the team had to improvise on the use of artistic games and imaging strategies, with the purpose of protecting, cultivating, and reshaping the attitudes that both groups have towards each other. While the idea of an image theatre was welcomed by the majority of the group, the research team had to explain the process and give an example of an image theatre to the participants. However, due to the fact that both groups are affected during xenophobic violence, the research team had to carefully find the appropriate themes for the groups to present on, and these themes emerged from different interviews conducted. These allowed the team to discuss the following issues prior to the presentation:

- The team had to know the type of image theatre on which it was going to focus (topic given to the group on which to present).
- The team had to emphasise the message that it wanted to give to the people in the community.
- The team also considered how it should go about it to avoid any sensitive or negative outcome.

Due to the fact that the xenophobic violence that migrants are facing is a result of a long-lasting negative attitude exhibited by the local people towards migrants, as explained above, the research team had reflected on how to appeal to the people's perception of migrants in order to beat the prejudice and different stereotypes framed towards them. Thus, the following questions were discussed by the research team before explaining the process to migrants:

- How to narrate or show their lives back in their home countries, to the pushing factors and showing their integration and coping strategies in South Africa?
- What can the team use to describe the attitude of the local people when they meet migrants?
- What are the perceptions of the local people towards migrants?

It was in this vein that the participants were divided into five groups to develop a creative presentation that showed their realities. Moreover, each group had to have a group leader who was also referred to as a 'joker' and whose job would be to facilitate the discussion on the presentation – he/she played an important role in terms of regulating and shaping the discussion from their respective group's presentation (Adam Perry 2012: 103-119). It was in this vein that the first group explained that:

That was our experience showing how we had everything back home, all of the sudden armed conflict erupted. Along the way we lost brothers, sisters, but we managed to make it to South Africa. Being in South Africa, we thought we will have peace and forget about what we have lost. As you saw we started working and having a happy life again. But soon after settling in the community, one group just came from nowhere with sticks, knives, and started to beat and kill us. That brings back the memories that we once forget. But we don't have any other choice and we don't have a place to go.

This image presentation showed the realities of migrants, and how xenophobia always catches them by surprise resulting in their deaths, looting of their businesses, etc. However, the local people had a presentation that demonstrated their frustration towards migrants and that often resulted in their attacks, as they explained that:

That was a presentation of a peaceful community, which had no criminals or drug dealers. But after a certain period, we saw some people tall and dark coming, we did not have a problem with that. But, after a certain time we noticed that the youth were smoking drugs, the girls were kidnapped and forced into prostitution. Coupled with that, every place that we went to look for a job, we are told that the position is taken, or they will give us a job with a lower wage, if you don't want, they will give it to another person. Who you saw coming and accepting to take the job for a lower wage and celebrating. So, we gathered in the community, and we started chasing those guys in the community, and in the country with the hope that we will get the jobs and clean the street from drugs and crimes.

Using theatre is a useful strategy in preventing and transforming a conflict, the reason being that theatre contributes positively and immensely to peacebuilding, not only by changing and transforming the conflict, but also by changing the attitude of the parties involved in the conflict. Theatre creates an environment that allows the parties to bring closure to their personal experiences of the conflict and their deep emotional wounds inflicted by the past conflict (Bleiker and Premaratna 2010: 376-391). Thus, both groups appreciated the image that they painted on their perception of one towards another and their journey, as in the group plenary discussion they reported that the theatre was useful, as it provided them with a forum to express their fears and concerns, increasing and changing their perception, and expressing their stereotypes and stigmas that they usually do not share when sitting in a room. Both groups acknowledged their frustrations over crimes as they acknowledged that it is bad for both the local people and migrants, and the challenges that they face in terms of employment, as they revealed to each other that unemployment is a serious problem in the country.

Based on the fact that the local people pointed out their frustration towards crimes affecting the country, especially the issue of drugs which they attributed completely to migrants, the research team had to reflect on how to have a dialogue that would address the issue of drugs in the community. Drug trafficking and unemployment, being among the causes for which the

local people always blame migrants, the team could not close its eyes and put that topic under the carpet. It was in this vein that the team had to organise three days of intensive work on dialogue and workshops that would assist in addressing those issues.

#### **8.6.1 Knowledge of the Neighbours and the Community**

The aftermath of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic attacks has contributed to a public focus on the need to promote social cohesion between local people and migrants. It was in this vein that the research team acknowledged the ignorance of the people towards each other in the communities which often resulted in the killing of certain local people due to their physical appearances which are more inclined to migrants; and that is the worst when there is a migrant involved in the community because there is no effort made in the community to get to know the person. Thus, the purpose of the first workshop was to get the people to discuss their knowledge of the people living in the community and the community itself, and this was important as the team understood that it is difficult to promote social cohesion in a community where people do not know each other, as that cannot be a barrier in the prevention of xenophobia. This approach was important due to the fact that the team understood that no society is fully cohesive, but social cohesion needs to constantly be nurtured, improved, and adapted (European Committee for Social Cohesion 2004: 4). Thus, the research team identified the following questions to take into consideration in the session:

- What knowledge do the local people have of the migrants living in the communities?
- What contact do both groups have in their everyday lives?
- How do the local people perceive migrants in their communities?
- Which factors can reduce the interaction between both groups?

The activities presented above were divided into two parts, which means that the team allocated twenty minutes to the group to discuss the topic, and five minutes to each group to present their discussions, which was then followed by a twenty-minute open discussion with all the groups to find a feasible strategy to prevent and curb xenophobia. The first activity revealed that although people know each other in the community, they actually do not pay attention to who their neighbours actually are, what they are doing and, to some extent, where they are working. Moreover, the researcher noticed that there was little knowledge on migrants and the contact between both groups was inexistent as, to some extent, the contact was limited to business. The participants in the workshop did not hesitate to blame the language barrier as a gate that stood between both groups. It was in this vein that **KK** stated that “How can we interact and bond with our brothers if our languages are different?” (10 September 2020). This question directly highlighted the factor that divides the interaction between both

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groups. However, a local participant did not hesitate to blame the attitude of migrants of not showing interest in the local language, which means that they are not paying attention to communicating or giving attention to the local language.

Furthermore, while social cohesion is referred to as an extent of connectedness and solidarity among groups in society (Bateman *et al.* 2017), little connection and solidarity was observed between both groups as it appeared that each group was comfortable socialising amongst themselves instead of reaching or extending their social network to migrants. This attitude was observed in different activities that were carried out, as the local people were comfortable sitting in their own groups and leaving migrants in theirs. This attitude makes it difficult for both groups to communicate or socialise, while the migrant participants revealed that they often make moves to reach out to the local people, but that the latter are not willing to open up to migrants. It was in this vein that a Congolese participant revealed that her neighbour does not speak to her since she told her that she does not speak isiZulu, and notably, she does not even reply to her greetings when they meet (BAT centre workshop, 10 September 2019).

Upon having the discussion with the group, the participants not only appreciated the activity, but they proposed to have time to walk in the room to properly introduce themselves to each other. In other words, the participants requested more time to introduce themselves and have a chat with each other, but not in their own respective country groups and they had to get to know the other participants who were not South Africans, and it was in this vein that the researcher also had to avail himself to the local people to approach him and ask questions about his origins and language etc. since the researcher is a migrant. This last activity enlightened the participants as they proposed to take that activity and try it in the community. Moreover, the research team proposed that they take that same activity to the Heritage Day celebration, since the national Heritage Day was two weeks away, in order to foster social cohesion and break the barrier that was standing between migrants and the local people. The purpose of taking that activity further was to decrease prejudice through contact between the ingroup and the outgroup (European Committee for Social Cohesion 2004: Ibid).

### **8.6.2 Protecting the Community by being a good Citizen**

This workshop was important as the research team had to address the issue of crimes that affect the country. Thus, the group was asked to collaboratively design a discussion on the issue of drugs in the country that would be used as a follow-up session on the role that both groups have to play in the community. Thus, it was agreed to start by discussing the character of good citizens regardless of the origins. The purpose of this workshop was to address the responsibility that all have as residents and citizens of South Africa, as in most cases, one can

expect much from the government while one can also take responsibility for protecting the communities. Thus, it was necessary to start the session with a reflection on the previous session, and that which the participants had learned from it, which means that the research team allocated each person three minutes to explain:

1. what he/she had learned from it,
2. what captured their attentions the most, and
3. the memory that he/she would cherish the most from the previous activity.

The above-mentioned questions served as an introduction to the session and as a reflection for the previous activity, and they also helped to see the ability of the participants to have a focused mind in the research process. It was in this vein that the first activity with which the team had to start in the session was to ask the participants, as an icebreaker, to discuss the following question: what are the requirements to be a good neighbour and citizen?

As simple as this question may seem, the team was expecting some reports from the participants that would help in engaging on the issue of drug trafficking, and how people all have a role to play in dealing with this issue. It was in this vein that both groups' reports had similar themes on that question, namely: a good citizen must avoid being involved in criminal activities, accept, and understand people's cultures, be an active member in the community, and report on the wrongdoing in the community. The above-mentioned themes set a scene for the next activity which directly addressed the issue around drug trafficking in South Africa. Thus, the research team had to allocate the participants to groups and ask them to discuss the following questions:

- What are the types of drugs?
- Who are the sellers/traffickers?
- Who are the buyers?
- What is the impact in the community?
- What are the law enforcement agents doing about that?
- Why Nigerians = Drugs?

Based on the questions above, the participants had to identify the real problems that were related to drugs in the country. Thus, identifying the sellers and the traffickers was the starting point to different stereotypes that one faces in the country. It was in this vein that different nationalities, including South Africans, were cited by the participants, as discussed in Chapter 7, however the main question was regarding Nigerians as they are always named every time there is a report on drug dealers or traffickers, but the participants revealed that there are

different people involved in drug trafficking, due to the fact that there is a strong negative attitude against Nigerians as the latter are always blamed for trafficking drugs.

However, although the team anticipated the negative feedback on Nigerians from the local people, Mr Haguma prepared an open dialogue with the participants on the role that the Nigerian government played during the apartheid struggle through a policy known as the Southern African Relief Fund, also known as the *Mandela tax*,<sup>7</sup> throughout the country to support the then South Africa. Furthermore, it was important to explain to the group that it was not all Nigerians living in the country who were drug traffickers, as the team explained to them that some are law-abiding citizens as one will find them working as lecturers, engineers, medical doctors, etc. This discussion enlightened the participants on the role that some African nations played during apartheid. The team had to conscientize the public on their role in reporting any criminal activities conducted by the latter, as an obligation to all good citizens and neighbours. This open dialogue was an eye opener for the participants as it is something that they do not often hear from the government or those who benefitted from the Mandela tax. It was in this vein that the research team identified the importance of sharing events of which the local people do not hear from the media or the government.

## 8.7 Understanding Dialogue

Different scholars have provided clear explanations of dialogues, thus it is important to analyse dialogue since the team identified it as an effective approach to prevent the occurrence of xenophobia in the country if undertaken at the national level, since this research presents the findings of a small sample of participants. Dialogue is regarded by Langmead (2009: 2) as respectful conversation in engaging two or more parties that share what they believe in while being open to learn from each other. However, dialogue is not only about sharing the groups'

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<sup>7</sup> The Mandela tax was a fund established by the Nigerian Government to help the victims and refugees of apartheid oppression and to promote their education and welfare. Through that fund, it was compulsory for all the government's employees to pay a tax from their monthly salaries in order to help and assist South African refugees during the apartheid struggle. It is reported that the fund generated USD 61 billion towards the effort. Available at Vuuren, V. J. 2017. Nigerians are not our enemies. *News 24* Available: <https://m.news24.com/columnists/Ulrich-Janse-van-Vuuren/nigerians-are-not-our-enemies-20170228> (Accessed 17 April 2020).



beliefs, and the groups also demonstrate the intention of learning from each other's experiences (Knitter 1985: 207).

The encounters of participants through engagement play an important role in a dialogue as they create a mutual action that will promote humanitarian goals and mutual understanding between the participants, thus for a dialogue to be effective, encounters between the parties are necessary and the latter must show empathy towards each other, for without these two elements, the dialogue will result in being unfruitful (Vroom 1989: 29). The research teams understood that adopting dialogue in this research, as a strategy to prevent xenophobia, would enable the participants to learn about each other, showing empathy towards one another, and they would learn how to not allow the socio-economic situation and political motivations against migrants to overshadow that which they have learned in the dialogue and their peacebuilding capacity and resources based on the fact that they are one people (African) regardless of their origins. Furthermore, the team acknowledged that from their experience working in the field, there is no direct contact between migrants and the local people, thus having dialogues and workshops would enhance the connection and build friendship between the two groups.

Thus, for the team to have a full three days of dialogue and workshop, the team had to work on different topics that had to be discussed, find a better venue that could accommodate the sessions, and find the financial means to be able to have lunch with the participants. However, the biggest challenge was the fact that the research team did not want to have a limited number of participants, that is, a small rate of attendance, and the plan was to have at least thirty participants, preferably youths representing both groups, with that the team could hold an open dialogue on the socio-economic and security issues that constitute the causes of xenophobia. It was in this vein that the research team appealed to the team that was in charge of sending out calls to invite people to participate. However, it must be mentioned that the idea of having a three-day dialogue and workshop was brought to the researcher's attention by the action team, as they advised that it was going to be effective to obtain views from other people in an open place on the topic being studied, such that more strategies could be identified. While the researcher's main concern was financial limitations, the management of Hand in Hand organisation availed themselves to support the team in terms of the venue and lunch, including transport for those who might be in need.

It was in this vein that the research team had to make arrangements at the BAT Centre located in Victoria Embarkment in town. However, this process was made possible through the assistance from Hand in Hand, as they were also planning on running a similar project as a

result of the 2019 xenophobic attack that took place in the country. Thus, the researcher had to work with their field officers to promote social cohesion, which was the main topic of the workshop. The workshops had to be run for three hours, starting at 0900hr to 1200hr, as it was necessary to start with a breakfast, and at 1200hr, lunch was served and was named 'meal of reunion'.

### 8.7.1 Unpacking Frustrations through Workshops

This research sought to strengthen the relationship between the local people and migrants by promoting trust, friendship, and *ubuntu* which are almost inexistent between the two groups. It was in this vein that from the previous activities, namely, the interviews, FGDs, and personal observations, the researcher understood that that which often leads to violence between the two groups are the socio-economic and security frustrations that have resulted in acts of extreme violence. Thus, during the above-mentioned activities, the participants shared the same view that the scourge of xenophobia that is being experienced in the country is the result of the following:

- Unemployment
- Physical security and crime rate (murder and drug trafficking)
- High price of household commodities
- Metropolitan areas being overcrowded by the migrants

These views not only frustrate the local people but also trigger violence towards migrants, and it was in this vein that **PJ**, a participant, revealed that:

The reason why we are fighting foreigners is because we are suffering because of them. we cannot get jobs because they are there to fight for those opportunities with us. We are not feeling safe because they are selling drugs to our kids, which is now contributing to violence, robberies and murders in our communities. Why can't they just go back where they come from? (Workshop, 9 September 2019).

The statement provided above clearly states the motivations behind the attacks towards migrants, and some scholars have generalised that negative attitude are a factor due to the fact that different quantitative studies have supported it. Thus, the research team had to break down the sessions into different aspects that frustrated the participants. However, while the local people were sharing their frustrations towards migrants, the researcher noticed that although migrants agreed at some point with the local people, they were also expressing the same frustrations over these above-mentioned issues as they see themselves being unfairly discriminated against and excluded from many socio-economic opportunities and being scapegoated for behaviours exhibited by a minority group within them and which are now

being generalised. This was expressed by **HA**, a Burundian participant, in response to **PJ**'s concern, as he explained that:

We foreigners cannot blame South Africans for accusing us of certain things that we are doing in this country such as crime. But what I want to tell my sister (**PJ**) is that, when we came to this country we found crime in this country, drugs were already being sold in this country, and physical security was a problem, but you could get rob and being killed in a broad daylight just because of a Nokia 3310 (telephone). Now for us to integrate in this country, we have to work hard because everything for us is expensive as some landlords take advantage of us including employers. What I want you to know is that the problem in this country is not foreigners, it is the system of the country itself which is the problem (9 September 2019).

The above-mentioned views demonstrate that both groups were not seeing the problem that was affecting them with the same perception, which means that while one is accusing the other for being the cause of his/her frustrations, the other one is rather seeing himself/herself as a victim of the system that is trying to integrate himself/herself. These two views gave birth to different topics that the participants had to discuss in groups. However, the main concern that the research team had as a group was to get the participants to see issues from the same perspective instead of being divided or pointing fingers at each other. It was in this vein that the team asked the participants to identify possible canals that would generate possible solutions to the frustrations that the groups are facing. In other words, each group had to develop the strategy or solution to the frustration that would then be discussed by all the participants.

### **8.7.2 Unemployment Frustration**

Unemployment is one of the major problems with which most of the youth are struggling, and moreover, the youth are known to be the most affected by it. In 2019, it was reported that the unemployment rate stood at 29.1%, which means that millions of South Africans are unemployed (TRADING ECONOMICS 2020). It was in this vein that the research team had to address the issue of unemployment, which also directly addresses the fact that migrants are portrayed as job stealers. The purpose of that session was not only to mobilise the participants to work together and to support one another, but also to encourage those with the necessary skills to help those who did not have the skills but who were ready to learn. Throughout the investigation, the researcher noticed that in most cases migrants and the local people do not work together, especially in terms of running businesses, with each group running their businesses on their own. Thus, the fact that one group seems to succeed while the other struggles always create some form of jealousy and fights between the groups, as migrants often face threats of closing their businesses in order to let the local people run the business.

Coupled with that, there is the fact that migrants are accused of taking lower wages, causing denial of employment to the local people. It was in this vein that the group designed a dialogue on addressing unemployment and promoting collaboration within the two groups.

Since that was the last session, the team started it with a reflection on the previous session, and asked the participants to individually explain the following:

1. How the previous session changed their perception towards migrants?
2. What did they learn from that session?
3. What message are they going to share in their communities?

The purpose of starting the sessions with a reflection was not only to see if there is a change of attitude and perception towards each group, but also because reflection is the '*sine ne qua non*' for change in AR, which means that no AR occurs without reflection (Luttenberg, Meijer and Oolbekink-Marchand 2017: 88-102), and it was in this vein that the team had to start the sessions with a reflection such that the team could see which aspect of the research needed improvement. While some participants were fully contributing to the reflection, others were just observing, but the researcher's role was to motivate those who were not stating anything to engage. However, it is important to mention that the energy in the room on the last day was positive as the participants were addressing themselves as friends and were expressing their minds freely.

While the majority of the participants were expecting to get employment from the government, the action team had to encourage them to find alternative opportunities of income instead of waiting and doing nothing. Thus, the team had to ask them to identify the potential opportunities that are available in the communities that people can rely on in order to survive instead of looking for jobs, especially those without the appropriate qualifications. Each group had to think about that which they need the most in their communities. In order to motivate them in seeing beyond a job that the government has promised to them, Mr Haguma invited people who were working as informal traders to explain to the participants how they started their businesses and where they were at that particular moment.

It was in this vein that the person to share his story was a migrant from Burundi who explained to the group that:

When I came to this country, I had nothing, I was working as a security guard in Durban North and the money that they were paying me was so little. So, I noticed that every time in my community people especially the Congolese like cassava leaves as they eat it as vegetables, plus to get is very hard. So, I had one friend who was working at the farm in Jozini, and in his farm they

had a lot of cassava leaves that they were throwing because they did not know what to do with it. I spoke with him and make arrangement if I could start coming to pick it up. He agreed, and I went to the Congolese community, I spoke with Congolese ladies who sell Congolese food, they agreed to buy from me. So, I was going in Jozini every Friday to pick the cassava leaves and I will bring it on Sunday morning. I was selling it to them for R50 back then. Since I was getting it for free, I was saving that money to buy a bakkie to bring more cassava leaves. After 7 months, I managed to buy a second hand bakkie which helped me get there often and bring more cassava leaves. I was making a lot of money, I decided to send my wife to school, at UKZN to study nursery, in 2009 she completed a degree. Now she is working as a nurse at Addington Hospital. From the cassava leaves I managed to open a lot of businesses.

This story motivated the participants in a way that they stopped seeing each other as job competitors, but as people who can empower themselves to accomplish something in the community, as they acknowledged in the plenary that “there is always something that one has to offer”. Based on this story, the research team had to ask for those who needed skills empowerment to meet the community needs, such that they could be trained on the appropriate skills based on the arrangement that the researcher had with Mr Haguma. It was in this vein that the team had to select those who needed to be trained on sewing and those who needed training to start working as informal traders. Thus, the research team enrolled those who needed to be trained as tailors in the Hand in Hand school of leadership, where there is a specialised team training people to sew clothes, and those who needed skills to work as informal traders were enrolled in a program run by the UNHCR which aimed at training and financially supporting people who needed to start their business.

## **8.8 Unmasking Economic Inequality**

It is understood that most violence taking place in South Africa is the result of economic inequalities and frustrations amongst South Africans. The researcher suggested to the research team to address the economic inequality that is prevalent in the country. While the challenge was on how to carry this out with the participants, it was necessary to give time to the research team to brainstorm on the activities that could lead the dialogue. To address the economic inequality effectively with the participants, the team had to take into consideration different groups/races of people living in the country. The research team had to pay particular attention to white South Africans, black South Africans, and migrants, including Indians and Coloured, although these last two groups were not actually weighed on the scale of economic benefit. The research team had to develop the proper strategy that would allow both groups to participate fully in the discussion, and it was in this vein that **VK**, a member of the action


team, presented a drawing of a climbing tree<sup>8</sup> to which the researcher referred as the tree activity, which shows how some people get to the top easily while others are struggling. Moreover, the research team had to allocate them to groups, representing their racial or group belonging in order for both groups to express their perceptions towards each other in the community. It is important to mention that the purpose of that session was to explore the economic inequality that is affecting the country and to address the different forms of stereotypes that are prevalent in the country, and lastly to introduce social cohesion and that which it entails.

Figure 8.1 was given to each group for them to select numbers that they thought best represented their economic position in the country, colour it, and explain to the plenary the reason for selecting the particular number by supporting it with examples if possible. While each group was discussing the appropriate number that applied to them, they both responded to the activity by acknowledging that they were both fighting for issues that they do not control and stating that the economy of the country benefits white South Africans as compared to black South Africans, leaving them with few opportunities available which they often dispute with migrants. However, while the groups were discussing the economic challenges that they faced, they acknowledged the fact that migrants are hard workers as compared to the locals.

However, the team had to challenge the groups on the motivation of the attacks while both groups are still victims of economic inequality. It was in this vein that the local people acknowledged that migrants are skilled and have higher qualifications as compared to the local people, and that is a factor that exposes them to more job opportunities as compared to the local people.

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<sup>8</sup> An example of a tree activity presented by the South African group – from the tree, the group expressed through numbers what they think about themselves as citizens of the country and how they feel about being black South Africans in terms of having access to socio-economic opportunities.



**Figure 8.1:** The tree activity developed by VK, a DUT master's student.

Furthermore, during the discussion, both groups of participants acknowledged the fact that they are both vulnerable, hence there is no need to fight each other for economic opportunities that they do not have. However, not all participants had that view, as some local participants were still of the view that there are not enough resources for South Africans to share with migrants, especially in the metropolitan areas. The locals were of the view that migrants should not be allowed to live in the metropolitan areas, as that is where all young South Africans go to look for job opportunities, proposing that migrants should go in the villages and establish their businesses there.

However, that view was disputed by other local people and migrants arguing that the problem was not about living in the villages within the country, but rather living together as one people peacefully. It was in this vein that certain participants acknowledged the entrepreneurship skills that migrants possess and proposed that migrants should be keen to teach them or to associate with the local people in their businesses, which would help curb the unemployment frustrations which will then play a role in alleviate xenophobic violence, acknowledging that few local people have the business mindset of migrants. Having noticed that some participants

were still not comfortable with the presence of migrants in the country, it was important to plan a session where the team would emphasise the fact that everyone was as one people, speaking one language in different manners, and living on one continent, and that session also had to emphasise the importance of social cohesion and how it can be promoted in order to change the negative mentality that still views migrants as outsiders.

## **8.9 Promoting the Integration of Migrants in the Community**

Integrating migrants in the community is very important and is a very challenging process as participants had to identify potential ways of integrating migrants in the community without having to rely on the government or counsellors. Although participants from the latter would constitute an advantage in the study's research process, the research team did not see any importance for it to include them in the study, but that which the team could do was to present them with the findings of the projects for them to see how they could take it further. However, the team's purpose was to foster social cohesion in the community, and to find possible strategies to integrate migrants in the community.

Hence, the researcher had to remind them on the importance of working in small groups for them to brainstorm on the activities that were necessary to be undertaken in the community. It was in this vein that the action team and all the other research team members had to create a WhatsApp group that was called 'School of Social Cohesion', which served all the participants to bring ideas on the activity that would be effective in fostering social cohesion and the integration of migrants. In other words, the research teams were given time to discuss on WhatsApp that which needed to be done to take action in the community. Encouraging the local people to participate in the brainstorming was a way to give them a platform to express their concerns about migrants and that which they would love to see migrants doing in the community.

However, due to the fact that the government officials were excluded in the research process, the action team advised the other research team members to look at different channels to involve other institutions in the community such as churches to facilitate the integration and based on the fact that the majority of the people living in the community are Christians. The researcher must admit that this was one of the biggest challenges as the researcher had to observe that which the research team was planning without having an input since they were the owners of the research, and they knew their community better than the researcher thought he did. While the research team extended and included some churches in the dialogue process, the team also had to include the migrants' churches as the team believed that they



could also contribute to integrating the people in the community. While the researcher was afraid to see this process not succeeding, the researcher later understood that churches, especially church leaders, were at the centre of social cohesion since both groups identified themselves from their connection to a particular church. However, it must be mentioned that the researcher was not able to work with any mosque due to the fact that there were no mosques in the community.

Although the researcher was merely watching the research team planning the appropriate action, the researcher's job was nonetheless to advise them to take into consideration different activities that they had previously done and that had produced a positive result. It was in this vein that the group identified storytelling as a potential technique of integration and as the starting point of integrating migrants. In other words, migrants had to narrate their journey and experience of leaving their countries of origin and coming to SA. While the researcher was not keen on that idea, they spoke to the researcher and explained that due to the fact that many local people did not have a clear understanding of migrants' presence in the country, they were advising that it was important for all participants to share their stories in the community starting from the church to the community meetings as these are the places where people in the community attend in numbers. The local participants believed that the same way in which they were touched, many people would also be touched. The purpose of using 'storytelling' was to show empathy from the locals towards migrants, and to appeal to their consciences on their treatment of migrants, and to promote *ubuntu* within the community.

## **8.10 Unifying Migrants and Local People through Cultural Celebration**

Funk (2012) acknowledges that:

[T]he important part of peacebuilding projects is balancing cultural innovation with cultural continuity ... there is a need for change, but it must proceed on an authentic and locally valid basis or rationale. It must discover new meaning, relevance, and applicability in known values.

It was in this vein that the research team acknowledged the importance of addressing xenophobic violence at the cultural level, which means sharing migrants' culture with the local people. It is well known that xenophobia in SA is based on the negative perception and attitude towards migrants, leading to both groups identifying themselves as 'us' and 'them', and it was in this vein that the research team had to break that cycle and use the South African principle of 'united in our diversity' which promotes the principle of *ubuntu* in the country. Thus, the research team advised all migrant participants to take part in the cultural celebration known

as Heritage Day which took place on 24 September 2019 in Wyebank, since it was the area selected by the provincial government for the year 2019.

The purpose of all the participants, especially migrants, to attend the Heritage Day celebration was also to help them share their culture with the local people. Further, the team had to build a genuine respectful and productive partnership which was to be informed using cultural empathy as a tool for strategizing on the appropriate ways and means of reducing prejudice and combatting xenophobia (Funk 2012). It is important to mention that due to the fact that in the past session, the team had discovered that there were similarities in terms of the cultures of both groups, it was important for the participants, especially the migrants, to attend and share their culture with the local people. Coupled with this is the fact that culture does not have a static, monolithic, or deterministic structure (ibid). Thus, **PJ**, who was a member of the action team, was familiar with the organisers of the event and negotiated on the team's behalf such that the team could have a fifteen-to-twenty-minute presentation to exhibit migrants' cultures and to use the opportunity to share the narrative of the pushing factors of migrants to SA. Since the celebration was about celebrating the African heritage, the migrant participants were asked to dress in their cultural attires.

Since the team was given an opportunity to share the migrants' culture with the local people at such a big event which is highly respected in the country, the group had to identify one person who could represent them by speaking on their behalf. It was in this vein that Mr Haguma, who was a member of the action team, was selected to speak on behalf of the group. It must be mentioned that Mr Haguma was selected because he has been working with both groups for many years, and he has an ability to speak in different African languages including IsiZulu and a little IsiXhosa since he has been in SA for more than 15 years.

While the team was just invited to speak on social cohesion, the team did not anticipate that many people would be interested in hearing about the promotion of social cohesion and preventing xenophobia in the country, as they demonstrated an interest in that which was narrated to them. It is important to mention that during the brainstorming of the presentation, the participants came with the idea of also having one migrant share his/her experience from leaving his/her country of origin. It was in this vein that **GK**, a Congolese refugee, agreed to share her story from the armed conflict that affected her region in the DRC and how she witnessed her family being killed by the rebels. The purpose of sharing the journey was to appeal to the empathy from the local people and to indirectly tell them that migrants need safety and protection in SA and that they are not the enemy.

It must be mentioned that while the team just went to assist and introduce themselves to the people of different communities who attended the event, the team was however approached by the residents from another community, Umbumbulu, to go and speak to them as well on social cohesion. However, since the team was limited in terms of transportation, the team could only take five people, which means that three migrants and two local people amongst the participants were taken. It was noted that the Umbumbulu community was welcoming to the research team, as many people were expecting the team, since the team was promoting social cohesion, and the people in that community decided to cook South African dishes for the team as a way of showing unity and *ubuntu*. The purpose of going there with three migrants and two South Africans was to allow the people to ask migrants questions based on their culture and background, since those topics are the ones that the research team decided to share with them, and the researcher's role in that community was that of an observer.

The team's activities both in Wyebank and Umbumbulu tap directly into Funk's (2012: 391-408) views on culture and peacebuilding, as he stated that:

[I]n many respects, peacebuilding is a process of cultural introspection and reconstruction, a process of generating social dialogue that encourages critical reflection on existing realities, the re-evaluation of present value priorities, and the initiation of new, shared projects that reduce the gap between the real and ideal.

Thus, the research team members had to have an informal dialogue to reflect on the outcomes of both the above-mentioned activities and to identify the team's action for the research based on the success of the team's activities.

## **8.11 Identifying a Peace Action**

Identifying the appropriate peace action was quite challenging as the team had formal workshops and informal group discussions to discuss the appropriate peace action. Thus, after having a reflection with the group that the team had in previous sessions, the research team decided that it was time for them to take that which was being done in the workshops and dialogues into practice or action to now include all members of the community to test whether it was successful or not. Hence, the researcher understood that for the research team to have an effective action, the researcher had to motivate the participants on the importance of group collaboration, teamwork, and tolerance. Thus, the objectives of the meetings were to identify the appropriate action that would be effective in preventing xenophobia, find possible ways of changing the negative attitudes that are exhibited towards migrants, and promote social cohesion and *ubuntu* between both groups. Moreover, the researcher had to appeal to the participants regarding the importance of developing an activity or activities that would

foster communication, engagement, and socialisation within the community – this was important due to the fact that the team was dealing with people from different cultures and backgrounds, and the team had to find an action that did not affect or exclude any group. Thus, it was important for them to have time to brainstorm on different activities that the team could take into consideration. Moreover, the action had to be something that the people in Chesterville would enjoy and from which they would learn.

Since there was a group of participants that had already started their training as part of skills empowerment, the team had to wait for them to complete their training since they were already writing their exams, such that they could also share their experiences from the training before the team sent in the second group, as there was a certificate that was issued. It was in this vein that different propositions were made from the participants, as they first proposed to have a soccer game with the migrants' team playing against the local people. The researcher must acknowledge that promoting peace through sport is always something that peacebuilders adopt, and it has proven to be successful as it unites people from different backgrounds, and it allows them to bond. While the majority agreed that soccer would be a useful peace action in the community, women were not comfortable with the idea, as they also wanted to take part in the action, while soccer would exclude them since only men would be playing, unless the team found females in Chesterville willing to take part in the activity.

However, the researcher was not supportive of the idea of playing soccer as a peace action, with the reason being that while sport, especially soccer, can bring people together, it can also trigger violence, especially if it involves a wrong losing team. Moreover, one team member revealed to the group that in the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic violence that took place in Durban, the provincial government organised a boxing game between an international Congolese fighter based in Germany against a South African boxer. While the game was supposed to promote social cohesion and though it brought some joy between both groups, the end of the fight that saw a Congolese boxer winning the game by Technical Knock Out (TKO) did not sit well with the local people, which means that while the government's intention was to promote social cohesion, they saw themselves being caught in another unprecedented violent conflict. This idea of having a soccer game divided the participants as some were not keen on the idea.

While soccer was a good idea, the participants had to think about the aftermath of the game, in case one group was not happy with the result. It was in this vein that the team had to think of an alternative action. Since the contact theory was borrowed in this study as a theoretical framework, the team had to avoid any activity that would result in competition and non-

cooperation between participants. Hence, some were proposing planting peace trees in the community to show that the people in the community had learned about each other and that they had accepted to live with each other peacefully. While planting peace trees is recognised as well as being one of the most important aspects in building peace, the participants were limited with regards to the particular space where they should plant those trees, as there might be no one to take care of those trees, which would make all the effort void. It was in this vein that the migrant participants proposed to showcase their home dishes to the local people based on the fact that they felt connected to South Africans after being welcomed in Umbumbulu, and the food that they had eaten there was very touching and similar. It was in this vein that the team adopted cooking and sharing meals with the locals as a peace action.

## **8.12 Planning on showcasing Migrants' dishes to the Local People**

After identifying the peace action, the team had to plan on how that should happen, which means whether the team should go there with cooked foods or buy groceries and cook there. Thus, it was decided that it would be better to buy different migrants' foods and cook them there such that the local people could see how it was done. In talking about cooking, it does not mean that the migrants were cooking and the local people were watching, rather it means that migrants were teaching the local people about their foods and both were cooking together, which means that the local people, especially the members of the research team, would be assisting the migrants as they would be cooking and translating for the people in the community or neighbourhood regarding what they were cooking, such as the spices that they were using, the name of the dish, etc. Thus, the team had to decide on what to buy and choose the people to cook the foods.

During the planning, the research team had to find a place that could accommodate it such that the team could cook what it had and invite people in the community to come and taste the food. All the participants agreed to put their effort in making it successful and to devote their times. However, while the main action was to showcase different migrants' dishes, the men agreed to incorporate some South African perspectives in the action, which was to include some braais in the activity to attract the youth in the community. Cooking and sharing meals in the community was guided by the principles borrowed from the contact hypothesis to which scholars have referred as theory, that had to be presented through a space that does not create unequal relationships between migrants and the local people, and that had to promote and encourage members of the community to work as a team in non-competitive ways during the cooking and sharing activity.

### 8.13 Cooking and sharing of Foods as One People

Throughout the entire process, showcasing migrants' food and sharing it with the local people was quite challenging, as the researcher's worries dwelled on the fact that the local people might negatively criticise the migrants' foods or that they might take it from a negative angle since the team bought only migrants' foods in South Beach and St George, which are places where migrants' foods are sold. The team also identified the importance of showcasing the vegetables that migrants eat, and it was in this vein that Mr Haguma availed himself to provide the team with cassava leaves from his garden. For the action, the team decided to cook a variety of foods, namely: salty fish, dry fish, cassava leaves cooked with palm oil (red oil), pap and plantain, and *izinkukhu* (feral chicken in isizulu) cooked with migrants' herbs and spices, and to add to these foods, the team had to make the food for the braai or barbecue. To have this type of food variety, the team had to wait for three weeks to procure the financial means to buy the quantity that could accommodate everybody. To set the morale high, the team decided that regardless of the result of the outcome, the entire process was to be fun, to let people know about migrants, and to break the stereotypes by exhibiting the commonalities and similarities that both groups had.

The researcher was surprised to see the local people showing their happiness when migrants were cooking their foods and coupled with this was the fact that they looked surprised at the type of food that migrants eat. As the researcher was observing and taking note of the entire process to see the reactions of the local people, the latter were surprised by the smell of the foods that the migrants were cooking as they were all stating that the smell of the foods while being cooked reminded them of either their mothers' or grandmothers' dishes, and some were also stating that the smell reminded them of their villages. The researcher must however admit that when the research team started cooking, the researcher noticed that some people in the community were looking at them with disdain, but the more the food was boiling and the smells of that which the team was cooking were expanding, the researcher observed the changes in their previous attitudes, as they got closer to see that which was happening and they then opened up by asking questions. Moreover, the researcher saw the people in the community, especially the ladies who attended, taking note of the dishes that were being cooked.

It was in this vein that the researcher realised that social cohesion is very important in connecting both groups if it is used in the right way, as that which the researcher saw during the action was something completely different from the violent side of South Africans that was seen during xenophobic violence – the researcher saw curious South African men and women sitting together and laughing as if they had been friends for years, and the researcher saw

South Africans teaching migrants a few words in isiZulu. However, it must be mentioned that the action was not only limited to cooking, and the researcher proposed to the research team to have a small dialogue with the people of the community that would attend, where the dialogue was to discuss the integration of migrants in the community and to finally allow migrants to narrate their journeys to SA and to share their experiences in SA regarding xenophobia, discrimination, and their coping strategies in the country, such that the local people could start seeing them from a different perspective. The importance of having that dialogue was to avoid having pauses or periods of inactivity while others were cooking, thus the team had to use those who attended as a channel for transformation in the community.

It was important for all to pray before sharing the food and ask the feedback from the local people after eating, which was very positive as the majority of those who came wanted to see that type of activity taking place in the community. To ensure that people living in the community have set aside their negative perceptions towards each other, the researcher had to make different visits to the community to observe how people were behaving, since there was also a group that had to start the training at the school of sewing.

## **8.14 Conclusion**

This chapter showed that the complexity of xenophobia in SA dwells on the fact that the violence is based on people who have much in common and have more to offer to each other, but due to the fact that they have never actually sat together and become acquainted with each other, they have turned themselves into enemies based on that which they have heard about each other, thus making the prevention of xenophobia challenging and requiring patience. This chapter demonstrated that to promote social cohesion, sometimes one does not need to look far for the solution, as it is always good to start at the basic level to identify different actions that can be adopted, however, going the extra mile becomes an option when the basic steps are not effective. This chapter demonstrated that the researcher looked at the basic elements of promoting peace and preventing xenophobia in the country, which means that the researcher introduced both groups to each other and saw how they would respond, and from there different activities took place. However, since inequality is affecting the country, and based on the fact that the local people need entrepreneurial skills, the researcher identified the potential ones and sent them to be trained. Knowing that some people often drop out from the empowerment training or on starting their own businesses, it was important to evaluate those groups and see further how the participants were living in the community.

## **Chapter 9: Evaluation**

### **9.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides the success of the interventions in transforming the conflict and promoting social cohesion, which has been discussed in Chapter 9. While xenophobia is affecting the lives of both the local people and migrants, the engagement of both groups through dialogues and workshops has proven to be effective in preventing and combatting xenophobia, the reason being that it gives both groups the opportunity to face each other and share their problems and frustrations to find a solution. While different scholars have provided multiple definitions of evaluation, in this study, the researcher borrowed the definition adopted by the OECD (2008: 5):

[Evaluation is] an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implantation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilments of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors.

Based on the above-mentioned definition, it is not mandatory for the evaluation criteria to have an international norm, however, it is worth adopting it due to the fact that people working in the humanitarian and peacebuilding sectors have a tendency to use it, especially the ones provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), namely, relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and coherence, which can also be seen in the definition provided above (Scharbatke-Church 2011: 460-480). In peacebuilding, researchers and scholars use both formative evaluation, which is conducted during an ongoing project to identify progress and opportunities for improvement, and summative evaluation, conducted at the end of the project to understand the changes achieved (Scharbatke-Church 2011). Moreover, the OECD criteria of evaluation can be used in different types of developmental intervention, whether it is a project, a program, or a country program. However, it is not necessary to use all the five criteria in certain programs, as that depends on the purpose, the form, and the timing of the evaluation.

### **9.2 The Importance of evaluating a Peacebuilding Research Study**

According to Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz (2008), evaluation in peacebuilding is needed to respond to a set of interrelated needs and purposes. First, the results of the evaluation of single peacebuilding interventions provide the intervening actors and stakeholders with the



information on how to improve the intervention design and target the intervention more to its respective goals. Second, evaluation of peacebuilding, especially those conducted in the participatory way involving owners and stakeholders of the intervention, help strengthen the accountability of the intervening organisation *vis-à-vis* its respective constituencies. Third, evaluation of peacebuilding interventions holds intervening organisations accountable to their donors. Fourth, evaluations can support a culture of reflection and learning among the involved stakeholders. Fifth, evaluations enhance the general learning in the peacebuilding. Lastly, evaluations help practitioners and scholars refine their theories about the causes and dynamics of conflict, thus enabling them to refine their approach to peacebuilding.

Although it appears that evaluation plays an important role in the peacebuilding field, there has always been a resistance in terms of using evaluation by certain actors, as they fear that the goals of achieving peace or transforming a conflict are not measurable due to the fact that they are not technical issues. This means that evaluation is applied in a quantitative project where the measures are quantifiable, whilst in the field of peacebuilding, the transformation of the conflict is not quantifiable (ibid). However, there is a certain character or aspect of peacebuilding that requires an evaluation, and especially a research such as this one required an evaluation.

Furthermore, since this study used the AR component, evaluation was very important due to the fact that the results of the evaluation provide the researcher with information on improving the intervention design and targeting the intervention more to its respective goals. Coupled with this, evaluation supports a culture of reflection and learning among the involved participants, and it enhances the learning of peacebuilding (Gürkaynak, Dayton and Paffenholz 2008). This research adopts some criteria borrowed from the above-mentioned OECD's criteria as an evaluative framework.

### **9.3 Short-Term Evaluation of the Intervention**

This study adopted a short-term evaluation process carried out between migrants and South Africans, the reason being that this research had to be conducted in a specific period, that is, from mid-2018 to the end of 2019. This gave the researcher time to collect data through interviews, FGDs, dialogues, and workshops. However, after the intervention phase, it was important for the researcher to run a post-research interview and dialogue, to gauge the effectiveness of the intervention. This means that the researcher had to spend another month in the field with the participants. While xenophobia is a complex issue in SA, requiring the researcher to implement a long-term intervention and evaluation, this was impossible due to

the fact that the study was limited to a doctorate degree which has a specific timeframe to respect.

### **9.3.1 Breaking the Barrier between Migrants and Locals**

Dialogue has the capacity to unite people, as it opens the possibility to share a common experience of listening to one another with people from whom one might be very different (See in Théry 2016: 10). Thus, in the context of this research, dialogue and other activities promoted the engagement and interaction between both groups. While the fear was that they might be uncomfortable being in one room and sharing their stories, the outcome was the opposite of the fear that the researcher was anticipating, as both groups responded well to the dialogue. The process was as an eye opener for both groups that allowed them to see each other differently as compared to their previous attitudes. It was in this vein that as a result of dialogue, participants explained that:

I have always had a negative attitude towards migrants, as I never hear anything good from them. But now from the dialogue we get to know each other, and we are in contact with them (post-study interview with a local in Chesterville).

I learned a lot from the dialogues, and I'm regretting the attitude that I had towards migrants. My prayer is for the government to have a mass dialogue between migrants and us, so what I have learned from migrants, my brothers in the community can also learn. While I was seeing migrants as outsiders, I have realised that these people are our brothers; we share many similarities with them (Dialogue feedback from a local at Emmanuel Church).

This demonstrates that dialogue played an important role, and while other means of the study could also have been important, the dialogue process carried out in this study supports Allport, Clark and Pettigrew's (2015) view on dialogue, as they regarded it as opening a room for participants to share face-to-face their narratives as a way to attenuate prejudice due to the fact that both parties involved get a chance to know each other. Coupled with this is the fact that dialogue allowed the parties to address their socio-economic challenges and frustrations which is always at the centre of the attacks. Thus, having the participants addressing those issues not only changed their attitudes and perceptions towards each other, but it empowered them with the knowledge that they share more similarities than that which they had thought of previously.

While at the beginning of this study there was no connection between both groups, the team had different activities such as workshops and sharing lunch together, and the researcher witnessed a decline in the negative attitudes and barriers that were exhibited by both groups. This means that the participants could blend and talk together as though they had known each

other for years. Through these processes, the participants understood that they were not enemies, but that they were all African brothers. It was in this vein that the participants encouraged the team to have more dialogue in the community to prevent xenophobic violence and break the barrier and the myth that surround migrants in the country.

While both groups have been living in separation and did not want to associate with each other due to the lack of trust amongst them, this study managed to break that barrier with the participants as explained above. Although the study was conducted at the grassroots level with a sample of small participants, the latter demonstrated that there is still hope that both groups can live and work together if this type of research and activities are conducted at the national level. This was demonstrated by a participant who stated that:

I don't have a problem working with South Africans, as I'm always of the view that we are all struggling, but this dialogue has shaped my thinking on getting closer to them and see how we can work together, since I don't have a proper paper to start a business, I can find a local partner to work with in the community, as a way of integration.

However, while the researcher observed during the study process that migrants do not have a problem working with the local people, the researcher had to speak with the local people to see whether they were comfortable living with migrants. The locals supported the view provided above, as a local participant revealed that:

For me I don't have a problem living and working with foreigners, because I understood that we are brothers and from the dialogue I have heard that they are also suffering. We are brothers and we must work and live together, not killing each other.

Through this study, the researcher saw trust being built between both groups, as the participants above were not seeing each other as threats but as potential business partners or colleagues, which means that both groups realised that they could accomplish more together if they work as partners than by killing each other if they still see each other as enemies. Whereas xenophobia and socio-economic inequality has caused division between migrants and the local people, this study revealed that there is a possibility of uniting both groups through different activities.

Thus, it is important to mention that since December 2019 until the present, the WhatsApp group created by the team for the participants is still working as participants are still sharing business ideas and potential xenophobia violence that is likely to take place, including job opportunities and scholarships for the local people. This explains the fact that although the number of participants was limited, the outcomes of the study were effective, and if the process is applied at the national level, there is a possibility that it might produce the positive results.

The reason is that since xenophobia in the South African context is about the negative attitudes against migrants, which are never addressed by both the government and different organisations, face-to-face engagement with both groups will enlighten the minds of the local people and will transform the negative attitudes into positive ones.

### **9.3.2 The 'us' versus 'them' situation**

During the first phase of this research, the researcher noticed that the participants were referring to each other as '*these people*' or '*us*'. This way of referring to each other was demonstrating that both groups were not ready to work together and to see each other as one people, and this was not promising a successful intervention as it was showing that no one was ready to take the blame. Thus, as the study proceeded, there was a change in the way that they were referring to each other. It must be mentioned that those who were against the use of 'us' and 'them' were the local people. During the dialogue, **PG**, a South African team member who was assisting the researcher with the translation, made a point by stating that:

How are we going to promote social cohesion if we keep on saying that these people are doing this or that? Why don't we see each other as Africans and say us Africans, which means we are also part of this, and we must take responsibility. Because if we say these people, it seems to me like foreigners are not Africans or they are different to us, while we are all brothers.

This statement appealed to all the participants as they acknowledged the importance of referring to all the participants as 'us', the African people, or all the people living in SA. Every time that the participants were using the term '*these people*', there was a sense of accusation and justification from one side. The use of 'us' broke that aspect between the participants, as they acknowledged the importance of taking responsibility on both sides since xenophobia is affecting the image of Africans in general and South Africans in particular.

### **9.3.3 Victims with similar Socio-Economic Challenges**

Throughout the different activities that took place during the research, especially the one dealing with the socio-economic inequality in the country, the participants understood that they are both facing the same challenges. While the locals had in mind that migrants were making money and benefitting from the wealth of the country, the locals were surprised to find that migrants do also struggle and face the same challenges in terms of employment and socio-economic opportunities. Thus, during the dialogues and workshops, both groups stressed those challenges and saw the importance of supporting each other and realised that they were both victims of the same situations, therefore it was necessary for them to work collaboratively in the community. Coupled with this is the fact that throughout the study, the locals showed

empathy and tolerance towards migrants. In the follow-up interviews, a South African participant explained that:

I know that migrants also do struggle, but I never thought that they are struggle is worse compared to what we are facing. I was accusing them of stealing our jobs, but now I know that they are being taken advantage of because they are not in the position of negotiation. We need to work closely so they have a lot to teach us, because although they are struggling, they are surviving, and we are seeing them moving forwards. So that means they must show us how they do survive.

The fact that the attitudes of the local people shifted from the negative attitudes against migrants to showing empathy and collaboration was a good sign of transforming xenophobia conflict, as Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou (2008) explain that the showing of empathy by the conflictual party towards its adversaries is a good sign, as it shows that they are ready to think about the possible solution. It was at that point that the participants had to work on identifying different channels of intervention.

In the post-research interviews, the participants did not hide that which they had learned from being face-to-face with migrants and stated the importance of not seeing each other as enemies. However, the researcher owes the success of this study to different perspectives that the team borrowed from scholars. For instance, the team took into consideration the conflict transformation technique provided by Jean Paul Lederach (2003) to gain a clear understanding of xenophobia in the South African context. This means that from Lederach's technique, the team had to give particular attention to the immediate causes of xenophobia, while also looking at the historical disputes that might be the causes of xenophobic violence and that might play a role in implementing sustainable peace between migrants and the locals (Lederach and Maise 2003).

Having a look at the immediate events in terms of xenophobic violence, the participants acknowledged the necessity of cleaning the community and city from drugs, where they pointed to migrants as being the cause of drugs and unemployment. However, they also questioned the role and functions of the government in dealing with criminal activities. Looking at the historical events, the participants looked at how apartheid affected SA and the role that other countries played in assisting SA. While conflict transformation is about looking and seeing, a thorough discussion on the issue of drugs and unemployment changed the attitudes of putting migrants at the centre of criminal activities in the country or grabbing jobs that belong to the locals. To reach that point, the team had to make use of the lenses of the pair of glasses highlighted by Lederach and Maise (2003) who posit that:

First, we need a lens to see the immediate situation. Second, we need a lens to see past the immediate problems and view the deeper relationship patterns that form the context of the conflict. Third, we need a lens that helps us envision a framework that holds these together and creates a platform to address the content, context, and the structure of the relationship. From this platform, parties can begin to find creative responses and solutions.

Thus, the participants had to analyse the most immediate cause of xenophobic violence at all levels, that is, the municipal, provincial, and national levels. This taps directly into the elicitive principle which suggests that people in the conflict community can identify and naming the realities of the conflict that they face (Graf, Kramer and Nicolescou 2008: 4). It is important to mention that while both groups of participants acknowledged the necessity of working closer together and collaboratively since they face the same challenges, the researcher must however point out that some were also pessimistic about migrants, due to the fact that for years they had been exposed to negative narratives about migrants. Thus, associating or befriending them might take a rather long time.

#### **9.3.4 Promotion of Identity through Language**

According to Lederach and Maise (2003), "identity is best understood as a rational dynamic that is constantly being redefined ... while it is rarely explicitly addressed, identity shapes and moves the expression of conflict. At the deepest level, it is lodged in the narratives of how people see themselves, who they are, where they come from and what they fear they will become". Thus, in the South African context, xenophobic violence is justified by the fact that migrants are the unwanted outsiders who move to SA just to benefit from the socio-economic opportunities reserved for the local people. It was in this vein that the team had to have a dialogue on the similarities and commonalities that both groups share. This means that the team had to open spaces and processes that motivated the participants to address and articulate a positive sense and connections that they have in terms of their identity in relationships with others, and this was done through identifying the similarities and commonalities in cultures and languages due to the fact that they were both African.

It is well known that identity is the root cause of social conflict (Lederach and Maise 2003), thus having a discussion on the similarities in the languages that both groups speak according to their countries of origin was very relevant as it was also connected to the sharing of different cultures. This discussion brought success in the research as both groups realised that although they looked different, they were connected in one way or another. It was in this vein that a participant revealed in the follow-up intervention that:

It is amazing to see how we relate to our African brothers in terms of the languages and the culture. I always call myself a proud Zulu man, because

in my mind my language is unique and beautiful. But, seeing that my language is connected to Swahili and other African language was new to me. The foreigners that I have always called kwerekwere are connected to me.

This feedback demonstrated that the research was moving forward, since the above-provided feedback came from a participant who, at the beginning of the study, was persisting that to have peace between the local people and migrants, the latter must leave the country. Moreover, the majority of the local participants showed an interest in learning migrants' languages and cultures. The fact that they discovered that they also have some commonalities in terms of the cultures captivated their attention the most and drew them closer than they were before. Connecting both groups through language similarities was relevant as that intervention took place at the time of the implementation of Kiswahili in the education curriculum in the country.

## **9.4 Evaluating the Dialogue Experience**

The outcomes of this research demonstrate that dialogue played an important role in building peace between the local people and migrants, promoting social cohesion, and transforming xenophobic conflict. This is explained by the facts that, through dialogue, both groups were given the opportunity to engage face-to-face to address and understand their problems, frustrations, and interests. This engagement was done in a way that led them towards adopting decisions that would change their attitudes and future relationships. Thus, promoting social cohesion is not only limited to changing the negative attitudes that both groups have towards each other, but also to changing their personality and reshaping their identity to allow them to see each other not as enemies but as one people, 'Africans', living with the principle of *ubuntu*. The following discussion provides ways through which dialogue was necessary in promoting social cohesion and transforming xenophobic violence.

### **9.4.1 Promoting Contact Theory between Migrants and Local People through Dialogue**

Contact theory, as explained in the literature review, plays an important role since it encourages conditions that promote equal status; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and support of authorities, laws, or customs, as was the case in this study (Hewstone *et al.* 2014: Ibid). The research team understood that the platform available for the team to create contact between migrants and local people was having different dialogue sessions with both groups to allow them to work together. However, the research team had to take the moderated factors into consideration to avoid making the participants uncomfortable, and this included the

contact setting, target group, dependent measures, and majority versus minority group status (ibid). The team understood that the contact between the two groups is inexistent and limited to either business or work, and further, the team understood that xenophobia is prejudice, and the contact theory is related to eliminating and reducing prejudice as it has been demonstrated empirically.

This was demonstrated in the study conducted by Pettigrew (1998) which stated that prejudiced people may avoid contact with the outgroups. This was also discovered during the data collection process as Chapter 9 revealed that it is not only the local people who avoid migrants, but the latter have also distanced themselves from the local people. Thus, creating a point of contact between both groups working together would lead the research team to positive change. The researcher must however mention that empirical studies have suggested nothing regarding the process by which contact changes attitudes and behaviours, it only predicts the reasons of the ways in which the change occurs and when it will lead to positive change (Pettigrew 1998). Thus, the purpose of the dialogues was not only to combat and prevent xenophobia, but also to reduce prejudice and build friendships between migrants and the local people by applying the contact theory.

Moreover, based on Pettigrew and Tropp's (2008) study on separate meta-analyses which provides three mediators of intergroup contact, the research team had to make use of those mediators, namely increased knowledge between both groups since in the first phase of the data collection process, the team noticed that there was little knowledge between the two groups. Although the local people have little knowledge on migrants, Pettigrew (1998) asserts that new information about the outgroup can improve the attitudes. He further suggests that ignorance promotes prejudice. This first mediator was used in different activities that the research team organised, which means that whenever the team had a formal dialogue or workshop with other people, the team always started the activity with information about the outgroup to promote social change, reduce prejudice, and prevent xenophobia. Secondly, there was anxiety reduction; and lastly, enhanced empathy, which the team identified as being important due to the fact that the team had to appeal for empathy from the locals by empowering them with the knowledge and challenges that migrants face in SA and their previous experiences in their home countries – this also helped in reducing anxiety (Pettigrew *et al.* 2011a: 271-280).

#### **9.4.2 Relevance of Dialogue with the Locals and Migrants**

Dialogue is known as an inclusive process that brings people from different backgrounds together, and it consists of learning and not merely talking (UNDP 2009a: 1-6). Thus, the use



of dialogue with both groups was very important as a strategic approach to prevent xenophobia, due to the fact that both groups did not have a full knowledge of each other's ways of life, nor their pulling and pushing factors. It was in this vein that different discussions that took place in this study revealed that the possible way of getting both groups together, such that they learn from each other through sharing their stories, frustrations, challenges, and getting them to know each other, was dialogue. Thus, the relevance of dialogue helped the researcher in promoting social cohesion and transforming the xenophobic attitudes that both groups had towards each other. This is well explained in Chapter 9, as both groups (participants) showed a welcoming attitude and tolerance towards each other through the use of dialogue.

#### **9.4.3 Engaging with the Others**

In the previous chapters, it has been explained that xenophobia in SA has divided both groups, as one group perceived the other as a danger to the socio-economic opportunities, while the other viewed the former as violent and dangerous. These attitudes have left both groups in isolation from each other, as they only meet in limited occasions which are either for work or business purposes. Thus, since xenophobic violence has affected both parties, it was necessary to put both groups at the table and let them engage. Lederach (1997: 26) posits that reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimise the conflicting groups' affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans in a relationship. This means that failing to give these two groups an opportunity to engage and address their problems will see xenophobia still taking place in the country, leaving migrants as the "soft targets". Thus, based on Lederach's above-mentioned arguments, dialogue was an effective strategy that would allow migrants and the local people to come together and engage in their relationships through reconciliation.

Dialogues were the first steps into initiating the contact theory between both groups, which was provided by Gordon Allport in his book entitled *The nature of prejudice* which was published in 1954 which was edited and reprinted in 2015. Different experimental studies have demonstrated that creating a zone of contact plays an important role in reducing prejudice. Due to the fact that this research has argued that xenophobia in the South African context is plain prejudice, relying on the contact theory as a means of addressing stereotypes and scapegoats, the research team believed that prejudice against migrants would be reduced. This was supported by a study conducted by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) involving students from different ethnic backgrounds which revealed that after some weeks varying between 6 to 9 weeks of long hours of friendship activities, the "participants paired with partners of a

different ethnicity were more likely to initiate interactions with people of different ethnicities after the weekly activities than those who had been paired with partners of the same ethnicity as themselves". Thus, dialogues facilitate both groups to have an opportunity to be in a room meeting face-to-face, promoting a better understanding of their cultures and enabling them to effectively communicate.

As a result, the research team agreed on having prolonged dialogue sessions with both groups, which was appreciated by the participants as they revealed that they enjoyed the experience of being together and communicating, which demonstrates the positive outcomes of the dialogue as meetings and communication between the two groups were strictly limited due to different stereotypes and stigmas. It was in this vein that a migrant from Burundi stated in the post-research interview that:

I meet South Africans only for business or work, I never thought that I will be sitting with them and communicate with them as friends. Because our relationships were very bad before, there is always two groups whenever I go, which is a group of South Africans and a group of foreigners. Now it is completely different. The perception that I had about them was all proven wrong, from this dialogue, we are in touch almost every day. They send us joke or warn us if there is a potential xenophobic attack.

The statement above demonstrates how dialogue can impact people's life and perceptions and build their relationships by putting the conflict and prejudice that has affected them behind them. Moreover, the face-to-face engagement of both groups reduces incorrect assumptions and conflicts as both parties develop a better understanding and appreciation of the other. While at the beginning of the study, some local participants had strong negative attitudes and perceptions towards migrants, through dialogues, those perceptions were almost inexistent in the participants' attitudes. This was explained by a local participant in the post-research dialogue as follows:

My fear was that migrants are going to take over our country one day. Our sons and daughters will marry their children and they will control our country, but during this dialogue, especially the session where we were discussing about the language and culture, I realised that we are one people, we share a lot in common with them than I never thought of. In fact, since we had that dialogue, I'm closer with migrants and I can tell my South African brothers and sisters that these people are very good, and they are really ready to help you ... I'm not saying this to flatter anybody in this room, but I thank you guys for having this dialogue with us. Can we please have more dialogues.

The above-mentioned view shows that the misinformation that the local people have heard for years against migrants, which has been the cause of multiple incidences of xenophobic violence in the country, was quashed through dialogue. This means that where both groups

were seeing each other as potential enemies, friendships were born as a result of dialogues, and social cohesion was promoted.

However, dialogue alone is not sufficient to prevent and combat xenophobia in SA, although it played an important role in connecting both groups. Moreover, dialogue was useful to break down past stereotypes and prejudices, and then allowed for working together to take place. Due to the fact that this research used the AR paradigm, the research team had to identify the appropriate 'action' or 'doing' activity for this research, and it was in this vein that through dialogue, the research team and the participants had to identify an activity of value to both groups that would be helpful in promoting the integration of migrants in the community, which constituted an important part of this research due to the fact that dialogues and workshops alone are not enough to prevent and combat xenophobia through the AR paradigm.

#### **9.4.4 Embracing Tolerance**

Dialogue does not exclude or deprive participants from sharing their views on the conflict affecting the community, and it gives the opportunity to all the participants to express their views and work together, while forgetting their differences, to find a peaceful approach to the conflict. This means that in this research, dialogue drew all the participants together for them to adopt a suitable approach to transform the conflict, their relationships in the community, and promote social cohesion by preventing negative attitudes that other people who did not participate in the research process might have towards migrants, which might influence the entire community.

For tolerance to be effective, the participants had to let go of their past situations which meant forgetting the past violence that had affected them to accommodate those who were once the perpetrators in the dialogue process. This means that the victims of xenophobic violence who were migrants developed an attitude of tolerance towards the local people, and the latter had to also tolerate the migrants to promote social cohesion and reconciliation. Coupled with this is the fact that the local participants were given a task to share good narratives of the migrants with those who did not participate in the study. The participants did not hide in sharing their sentiments as a result of the dialogues, which is provided as follows:

I never anticipated what I learned during the dialogue and workshops. I don't know about the others, but to me the dialogues really touched me, having heard the other side sharing their journey with us. When I attended the first dialogue, I thought that it will end badly as in my mind foreigners were trying to get away with the little opportunities that we South African have. But, as we were talking about the refugees' struggles and challenges, I could not believe it in my eyes. These people are also suffering like us! (Local participant's view in the post-research interview).

The dialogue was very good, can you imagine, each one of us in the dialogue were counting from one to ten in our own language. It turned out that we were saying the same thing. My brother we are one, we need to have a lot of these dialogues (post-research interview with a local participant).

From where I come from, I could not be in a room talking with foreigners. I never imagine that them and I would ever sit and talk except for business or work. But now, I'm tolerant towards them since we are facing the same challenges and struggles (post-research interview with a local participant).

The above-mentioned feedback from the participants demonstrates that a safe platform was created for both groups to have an open discussion on their future desires and interests in the community. Through dialogue, trust was established between migrants and local people, and cooperation between the two groups was promoted. Although tolerance was demonstrated in a small group, it is important to mention that this study was limited to one community, while xenophobic violence is a national problem taking place in different provinces within the country. Thus, in the peace study sector, it had much meaning, and it demonstrates social change.

The researcher observed that during the first two dialogue sessions, participants were sitting in groups based on their country of origin, which means that the local participants were always sitting next to each other and talking only to each other during lunch time or group discussions, and the same was also the case for migrants, where the latter were sitting according to their nationalities, which means that those from the DRC would sit and communicate only amongst themselves, and those from Burundi and Zimbabwe were also doing the same. However, as the dialogue sessions unfolded, the participants were able to sit and communicate with other people regardless of their origins and were able to discuss any topic or trending news, from politics to economic opportunities before or after the dialogue. This was a very positive sign for tolerance and reconciliation. This change of attitude is supported by Mhandara (2018) who argues that "Tolerance enables people to appreciate each other and discover the possibility of common and shared perspectives and values".

## **9.5 Promotion of Social Cohesion through Workshops**

It is well known that during xenophobic violence, those seen at the frontline of the attacks are the youth and the majority of migrants living in SA are youths. Thus, the research team had to have the youth and church leaders and community leaders from different places to address different challenges that frustrate them, and how these issues can be solved without resorting to violence. The workshop came as a way of campaigning on the importance of promoting social cohesion between migrants and the local people and changing the negative attitudes

that both groups have towards each other. It was in this vein that the team had a world café which allowed the participants to have an in-depth discussion on xenophobia in all its forms, from discriminatory attitudes to violence, and the causes of the violence. After the world café session, there was a discussion on the entrepreneurship mindset of migrants and a possible way of promoting skills transfer. Lastly, the team had to talk about social cohesion and the role that each person within the community plays to have a sustainable peace. Figure 10.1 shows the social cohesion workshop at Emmanuel Church, with participants having discussions in small groups.



**Figure 9.1:** Social cohesion workshop at Emmanuel Church, with participants discussing in small groups.

## **9.6 Skills Empowerment Evaluation**

The frustration of job scarcity in the country constitutes one of the causes of the violent attacks that migrants face. Thus, in the discussion on the findings of this study, it was established that the majority of migrants are entrepreneurs as they have given up on looking for employment, resulting in them running informal businesses in the country, whether in the city centre or in the community. It was in this vein that it was important in this study to select the local people and migrants and empower them with the sewing skills as a first phase of skills empowerment. This training was to help them establish their business, as at the end of the training, they would not only get a certificate but also financial support and follow-ups on how they were doing in business. To avoid bias in this process, the team had to give preference to the local people

since the majority revealed during the session that they did not possess the necessary skills to start a business. Figure 10.2 depicts the sewing training for the Tuesday group at Hand in Hand school of sewing.



**Figure 9.2:** The sewing training for the Tuesday group at Hand in Hand school of sewing (Photo by the Author).

Figure 10.2 shows the participants getting ready to start their class. They were sharing their happiness of being part of that training with the group on WhatsApp. They did not hide that in the interview as they stated that they would never trade that which they had learned from that school and from the dialogue. However, it must be mentioned that due to the fact that the venue could not accommodate all the participants, and because of the language barrier, the team had to separate them into groups. This means that the local people had to attend their training on Tuesday and migrants had to attend theirs on Thursday. Moreover, due to the fact that the team had a low number of sewing machines, separating them into groups allowed the team to ensure that each person had his/her own sewing machine at the table instead of sharing. It was in this vein that a participant revealed that:

This training means a lot to me and the certificate that I will get from it, I did not get the opportunity to broaden my study due to financial limitations, but this training support that I received from this place and what I have learn

from my fellow African brothers from other countries means a lot to me and I will never forget that.

The researcher must mention at this stage that skills transfer is not always well regarded by those working on promoting social cohesion, as the researcher was advised that some participants might just use the resources and not be productive after the training, while others are desperately in need of the training. It was in this vein that the research team had to ensure that they selected the appropriate people for the sewing school, since it is a programme that is run by Hand in Hand organisation which also has its own students. Those who attended the training had already started establishing small places where they were working in the community as tailors.

## **9.7 Cooking Migrants' Food in the Community**

The promotion of social cohesion through dialogue was very important in transforming xenophobic violence by peaceful means, thus the team had to identify the appropriate intervention, in other words, 'action' that could foster equality between participants, help them in having common goals, foster intergroup cooperation, and promote support of authorities, laws, or customs (Pettigrew *et al.* 2011a; Hewstone *et al.* 2014). Moreover, it was important to emphasise that the activity had to have some form of cultural curiosity towards the local people to bring all of them together and appeal to their empathy and *ubuntu* that as Africans, they are to be shown respect. Further, the activity had to motivate the people in the community who did not participate in the study to gain an understanding of migrants' culture, their journey to SA, and understand that there is only one population in Africa which is the "African population". As the research team was identifying the possible action to implement in the community, the researcher's role in that process was to assist them with the logistical support if needed, as Mr Tito Haguma was also involved in that process, to ensure that the action that they would adopt would be practical and successful.

The aim of letting the participants identify the appropriate action to take in the community was to see how they could work collaboratively and plan the activity together regardless of their origins and to test the effectiveness of the contact theory. The researcher had to step aside and observe how they were planning the activities, if there was any conflict or misunderstanding between them, and ensure that the action that they proposed was not grandiose due to the fact that the team had a limited time. This was the opportunity for them to develop something that would draw them closer than previous activities that were done. However, the researcher must mention here that this was not the first activity that was done as a group, as the team and participants tried to plant trees previously which were then

uprooted in the space of a few weeks. Although other trees were re-planted, there was no one to look after them. The team planned a soccer game which was cancelled due to being limited in terms of the players and the activity was excluding women as they could not play soccer.

Thus, in that process, the participants were well determined to identify an activity that would impact the community, that would have a cultural aspect, and that would require the full participation of all of them. Due to the fact that migrants were surprised and happy when they discovered the local cuisine, as they found a connection between the South African cuisines and their own cuisines, they identified preparing meals and eating together with the local people in the community as a potential activity that would promote the people's curiosity about them and would show similarity and commonality between both groups. It was in this vein that the local participants were doing a beneficial job of being at the front in the community to find the appropriate place that could accommodate the team's activity, and their full participation in the 'action' of this research was much observed, as the team had to ensure that their efforts met the condition of reducing prejudice, as provided by Gordon Allport (1954).

Thus, in order to ensure that there was equality between participants, the local people were at the forefront of the activity in the community asking people in the community if the research team could use any house that was spacious from the people that they knew in the community, inviting people to attend the event, and also assisting in ensuring that there was a smooth communication and cooperation between migrants and the local people in order to foster the integration. While dialogue is perceived as a strategy that helps people to engage, it also helped them in working together, forgetting the prejudice that dominates among them. This was demonstrated in the action activity that the participants identified and planned. It demonstrated that they did not only see themselves as 'insiders' and 'outsiders' or enemies, but as a team, and as a result they showed teamwork effort. However, it must be mentioned that although cooking and sharing meals might be seen as an easy activity to adopt in this research, cooking and sharing food has a cultural value worldwide, and moreover, since the study used the contact theory, cooking together validates one of the contact theory's points, that working together has to be based on everyone contributing to the effort with no one being better than the other.

#### **9.7.1 The Significance of cooking and sharing Food in Divided Communities**

Phil Champaign, the International Alert's director of Emerging programmes, acknowledged the importance and influence of food culture as engines for conflict resolution. In different countries, especially in the Middle East, food culture promotes forgiveness and reconciliation through sharing meals between perpetrators and victims (Thevathasan 2017). Although the



preparing and sharing of meals seems to be a simple task as an action, it has a very large impact on peace in Africa and in different communities. This is explained by the fact that preparing meals and sharing them shows a sign of togetherness and unity, as it is only people who are living together who can share and prepare a meal together. Enemies are never seen cooking, sharing, and eating together without an escalation of a fight. Thus, sharing food shows a sign of love as there is love when people are sharing that which they have. Sharing food also symbolises a family and a celebration, which means that the participants and the people in the community realised that they are one big, united family, thus they must celebrate together and show off their cultures.

While food is known to be the basic necessity and an everyday presence in people's lives, the offer to cook and share food is a gesture much deeper than is often realised, especially when the groups are presenting their national cuisines which are often flavoured with history and seasoned with culture that is both captivating and educational. Thus, it is one of the easiest ways towards inciting cultural diplomacy, the exchange of ideas and values, traditions, and other aspects of cultures or identity (Thevathasan 2017). Thus, cooking and eating has a unique way of breaking down the prejudice that exists between people, and it inspires unity (Sedacca 2018). Moreover, the notion that there is a need for personal connection for food to transcend people's cultural stigma derives from the work of Gordon Allport (1954) who argues that the integration between members of different ethnic groups may be sufficient in reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict (See in Hewstone *et al.* 2014).

### **9.7.2 Connecting Conflictual Nations through Food in Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding is about gathering people and working together, talking together, and eating together, and this is how strong bonds are made. Thus, cooking and sharing food has been proven to build strong bonds or connections between communities. In the research action, cooking and sharing food embodies the thinking for a better SA through enhanced civil engagement using as a medium. Thus, Pettigrew *et al.*'s (2011) study confirmed that intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice. This was demonstrated in different studies conducted in communities where people have a long history of war and conflict. Different studies have been conducted on reducing prejudice through the sharing and cooking of food. For instance, the artist Michael Rakowitz created the Enemy Kitchen in 2007, which had a purpose of using food to open critical dialogue around war in Iraq. His project encouraged students and adults to cook and share a meal together, all of which was made using recipes from his Jew-Iraqi mother. He stated that the tradition of eating together encourages all sectors

of the community to take part in the conversation, and as such, becomes “a public act that enlists an audience as vital collaborators in the production of meaning” (Thevathasan 2017).

The notion of food as a bond between people and communities has been well recognised in many cultures. In Afghanistan, for example, the phrase “I have had water and salt in your home” means that through food eaten together, people are connected to one another through eating and sharing food (Ibid). This has proven that food binds people regardless of their differences. Thevathasan (2017) further states that food is a powerful peace broker, and it is used as a source to resolve conflicts in many villages across Afghanistan. However, cooking and sharing is not only limited to Afghanistan or Iraq. A report from The *Haaretz*, an Israeli newspaper, revealed that through the cookbook *jam session*, which features recipes from Israeli and Palestinian mothers who attended the Parent’s Circle Forum, many of them had lost their children to violent conflict between the two countries. However, the report revealed that since attending a series of the *jam sessions*, the women connected with each other through the exchange of family recipes, and many understood the opposing cultural community not as villains, but as humans just like themselves (Sedacca 2018). Thus, through the team’s action, friendship was built between the participants and other people in the community who attended the event.

### **9.7.3 Reducing Prejudice through Culture**

Analysts of grassroots social peacebuilding have gradually acknowledged that peace has a cultural dimension (Funk 2012: 391-408). This means that when involved in the promotion of peace between two different groups from different backgrounds, it is important for the researcher to look at the possible similarity in the cultures to reduce prejudice. Thus, culture should not be regarded as a constraint or afterthought, but rather as a resource to understand peace as locally constructed, and the outgroup should be regarded as the most likely to make a positive contribution by working as facilitators or midwives rather than as supervisors (ibid). It was in this vein that the team had to ensure during the action intervention that the selected migrants would work as facilitators and not as enforcers to avoid any conflict from escalating in the last activity.

Thus, the team had to work on the way that migrants should address the local people and present themselves to the community. Furthermore, after the publication of Lederach (1995) work entitled *Preparing for peace*, scholars and international peacebuilding practitioners have shown a growing support of the idea that “understanding conflict and designing effective models of peace-building would have to be embedded in, and must respect and value, people’s cultural experience” (Funk 2012: 2012). It was in this vein that in the action

intervention, the local people had to inform the team of their culture and food that is regarded as having cultural meaning, and this was important as it helped the team in avoiding the buying of foods that they often consider for ritual ceremonies – this is supported by Quintero-Angel, Mendoza and Quintero-Angel (2019) who state that “choosing what is good to eat is determined by the cultural norms of each society”. Thus, since the main focus was on reducing prejudice to curb xenophobia, the team avoided having food that was not eatable by the local people.

#### **9.7.4 Cultural Influence of Food in reducing Prejudice**

From an anthropological point of view, food is defined as a social act, a part of people’s personal life that goes beyond nature, that is interrelated with society, and that is a bio-cultural phenomenon (Quintero-Angel, Mendoza and Quintero-Angel 2019: 75-83). Moreover, food is an international cultural aspect that helps people to better understand different people and cultures through the secret ingredient which is known as ‘empathy’ (Sedacca 2018). In this research, the team understood that food alone constitutes an essential element among community members, since sharing food reinforces the ties that promote social cohesion and cooking and sharing it in the community constitutes a symbol of unity between migrants and the local people (ibid). The team understood that one of the many approaches that would be helpful in reducing prejudice was to identify a point of commonality between both groups, and from the team’s visit in Umbumbulu, the team noticed that food is an integral aspect of culture in society on a broader scale, thus in having a session of cooking and sharing food with the local people, the team’s expectations were on the positive outcomes that would be generated when both groups were eating together.

Moreover, the action team believed that food could be a strong weapon for building peace and promoting social cohesion, due to the fact that sharing food would promote empathy, enlighten the local people with migrants’ cultures that are similar to the local people, and would get both groups to communicate, but beyond all the expectations, the team believed that cooking and sharing food has the capacity to build strong relationships between migrants and the local people in the community (Elianna Bar El 2016; International Alert 2020). While the contact theory has been hailed globally by scholars as the best strategy to reduce intergroup prejudice, this theory fitted well in this study due to the fact that there is a division between the local people and migrants, and the reason for their division is mainly based on socio-economic, socio-security, and socio-political frustrations which have affected post-apartheid SA, as the local people are accusing migrants of being the reason behind their economic conditions (Monson *et al.* 2010; Misago 2016b).

Through the contact theory, this study managed to reduce prejudice and promote social cohesion through cooking and sharing food with both groups, as through that activity, the team promoted equal status between the local people and migrants, and the team established the common goals which saw both groups of participants working together at the community level, achieving intergroup cooperation, and building lasting relationships between migrants and the local people which constitute the core strategy of preventing and combatting xenophobia, as both groups worked as a team without any conflict between them. However, while scholars have argued that food is not always a source of unity, as it can divide communities as a result of the intense national narratives with which it is often imbued, and that intergroup contact does not work (Thevathasan 2017), this study argues that based on Gordon Allport's contact theory, cooking and sharing food with the local people managed to promote intergroup cooperation, promote social cohesion, and build relationships between migrants and the local people (Pettigrew *et al.* 2011a: Ibid).

Clark posits that "culture may seem unfamiliar to a person, but after that person discovers the way people from unfamiliar cultures prepare their food, the way they eat, somehow they understand it" (See in Sedacca 2018). It was in this vein that the team wanted to show to the local people the connection between their culture in terms of food and that of the migrants, in order to mitigate preconceived prejudices by reducing the local people's anxiety of threat and increasing their capacity for empathy towards migrants (Tropp 2011). Moreover, a study by Kaitlin Woodley, an assistant professor at Cornell University, and Ayelet Fishback demonstrated how special food can be important in building a social bond. Their study found that eating the same food fostered a sense of trust and cooperation more strongly than wearing the same-coloured shirt or eating different foods. The authors then concluded their study by emphasizing that "people can immediately begin to feel camaraderie and develop a bond, leading to smoother transactions from the start" (Sedacca 2018).

#### **9.7.5 The Effectiveness and Impact of cooking and sharing Meals**

The cooking and sharing of meals were a valuable lesson observed by both groups, as it not only showed their ability of working together regardless of their origins, but also brought their sense of unity as Africans due to the fact that they both found similarities in different dishes that they cooked, and that attracted more people in the community who did not participate in the study to taste migrants' foods and learn from them. To the participants of the study, the cooking and sharing of meals empowered them with appreciated lessons as it drew them closer together than before, and it gave them the opportunity to learn different aspects in different languages during the cooking process as both groups were asking about a particular

element such as salt or a cup in other people's languages. To the members of the community who did not take part in the research process, it was an opportunity for them to see the similarities that they share with migrants. This was demonstrated by a non-participant of the research who, after smelling and tasting the food, stated that "These people's food is similar to the food that I use to eat at my grandmother's house, it is so nice, and it smell like in my grandmother's food".

This type of statement was also observed among the participants of the study. This demonstrates that cooking and sharing meals not only promoted social cohesion between migrants and the local people, but it also uplifted the principle of *ubuntu*, as many local people were now identifying themselves through migrants' dishes as they saw that they shared many similarities. Reddy and van Dam (2020) posit that "cooking and sharing food often bring back memories, as eating food brings back memories that will shape the individual current identities". Thus, through the intervention, the team managed to demonstrate to the local people how they were connected to those whom they perceived to be the unknown or *makwerekwere*. Moreover, the above-mentioned feedback from participants revealed that cooking and sharing food is a great storytelling tool that promotes and inspires people to engage in a conversation, and engage and learn from other people's thoughts, history, and experiences (Thevathasan 2017). Moreover, Allen views that "the heightened associations" that people have with universal qualities in food will strengthen emotional connections (Sedacca 2018).

However, the researcher must mention that some people in the community (non-participants) were reserved towards the cooking and sharing of meals as they were not used to seeing migrants cooking in an open space in the community, especially at the beginning of the process. However, as the team carried on with the process, the non-participants were encouraged to join and to eat a small portion by the local people (local participants). Thus, being encouraged by the local people to join and eat and seeing the local people (participants) sitting and eating together with migrants, motivated them to join the group.

Thus, after observing how the participants organised everything and the way in which the people in the community responded, the researcher can state that the intervention was effective as it contributed to peace and united the two groups that always saw each other with negative attitudes which were followed by xenophobic violence. Coupled with this is the fact that with the little financial means and study limitations that the team had, the participants managed to sacrifice their time in planning and implementing the intervention, which helped them build friendships between themselves as they had time to share their journeys and

experiences, and to listen to their stories, challenges, and frustrations. Those who participated in the study requested for the group to keep the dialogue process alive, and take it to different communities:

I really enjoy what we have managed to do, we came to this study as two people that hate each other, but now we are cooking and eating together like a big family. I will ask you if we can keep on doing dialogues in different communities, because I believe that the way it helped us here, it will also help other people in different communities (post-research interview with a Burundian participant).

Eating food cooked by the other group is not actually an indicator of whether both groups are going to get together or that someone is trustworthy. Without empathy, food from the other group can only have a subtle impact (Sedacca 2018). It was in this vein that the team had to resort to sharing the emotional journey of migrants in the community when the groups were eating, and this came as a way of allowing the people to talk and ask questions.

#### **9.7.6 Building Sustainable Peace through the Research Action**

Building sustainable peace constituted one of the purposes of this research, and it was in this vein that the team had to use different strategies to ensure that sustainable peace was efficiently built through the intervention. While Funk (2012) has emphasized the need of a collaboration with local and international partners to create a sustainable peace, this research focused more on the direct empowerment of the local people rather than relying on the support of local and regional organizations. Weighting on the local people has gained much support in different peace studies research, and it has been supported by scholars for its ability to allow new themes to emerge which create new agendas for identifying peace and the appropriate activities to be conducted with the local materials and resources, and in a way that triggers hidden cultural energies, creates a genuine sense of ownership and empowerment, and enhances the possibilities for sustainable peace (Funk 2012).

For the intervention to be effective to build sustainable peace, it was important to work on the inclusiveness of the participants in the process, thus, as mentioned in the sections above, both groups had to work equally and collaboratively, without excluding anyone from the activities. However, it is important to mention that there is no appropriate definition or clear explanation of “inclusivity”, and it was in this vein that Donais and McCandless (2017: 291-310) posited that in the context of peacebuilding:

[T]he term applies to carving out the space within which a broad cross-section of the conflict-affected community, from community-based organisations to ordinary citizens to potential spoilers, can exercise

meaningful voice and agency in the design and implementation of the peace process.

Thus, in this study, the team had to ensure that all the groups that were affected in the conflict would take part in it, including those who played significant roles in the communities by uniting both groups. This is also supported by Roll (2016: 3) who states that for peacebuilding to work, it is important to take into consideration the local matters in the process, all affected parties should be involved, and the politicians should not chair the process. Thus, engaging in promoting social cohesion at the grassroots level was very important for this research in order to build sustainable peace, since the research outcome did not have any political motivation. This also falls into Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) committed to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and accountable inclusive institutions at all levels (ibid).

## **9.8 Conclusion**

This chapter presented the outcomes of this research and showed that the use of dialogue is effective in dealing with xenophobia in the South African context, as through dialogues, both groups were given the opportunities to meet and engage face-to-face instead of relying on the information given in the community about the perception of either migrants or the local people, and the dialogues and workshops facilitated the intervention which aimed at preventing and combatting xenophobia. Thus, through dialogues, the participants managed to promote social cohesion and reduce prejudice through the different contacts that they had. The process of having dialogues not only confirmed that intergroup contact reduces prejudice but helped the participants to see the similarities that they have and that uploaded the principle of *ubuntu*, as the local participants discovered another side of their identity through food cooked and shared by migrants. It was in this vein that the research intervention appeared to be effective, as both groups acknowledged that they were one people. Although the research was conducted with a small sample of participants, the results and the participants' reports demonstrate that dialogue is the proper strategy of integrating migrants, promoting social cohesion, transforming peace, and building friendship between migrants and the local people.

## **Chapter 10: General Conclusion and Recommendations**

### **10.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the conclusion and the recommendations of the research. The study's main purpose was to explore the possible strategies to prevent xenophobia in SA. While analysing xenophobia in the South African context, the study gave particular attention to the attitudes that both groups have towards each other which often led to xenophobic violence, tracing it back to the apartheid period, and the role of the government and different civil societies working closely with refugees in fighting the negative attitudes. It was in this vein that the study used dialogue as a strategy of preventing xenophobia, and this was then followed by an intervention which was then evaluated to determine whether the outcome was negative or positive.

### **10.2 Research Aim and Objectives**

The aim of this research is to prevent and combat xenophobic violence and its manifestation in all its forms by promoting social cohesion between foreign nationals and the local people. The research addressed the following objectives:

1. To examine the historical and current causes of xenophobia in SA
2. To investigate the extent and prevalence of xenophobic attacks and discrimination and to analyse and examine the effectiveness of national law
3. To design and implement a dialogue process involving migrants and locals with the aim to prevent and combat xenophobia, and to implement a training programme of skills transfer with the sample of youth from both communities/groups (foreign nationals and nationals)
4. Evaluate the outcome of the interventions

### **10.3 Summary**

Different scholars in the field have acknowledged the fact that xenophobia in the South African context is a very complex issue as the triggering causes change depending on the time, circumstances, and community needs. Thus, in this study, the research team explored all the possible causes and motivations behind xenophobia using Jean Paul Lederach's model of the pair of glasses in order to comprehend the conflict, and coupled with this, since the study used conflict transformation as a theoretical framework, dialogue was used throughout the research in order to allow both groups to engage with and address the issues that frustrate them.



Some scholars have argued that xenophobic violence should be regarded as a crime, racism, or Afrophobia. This study brought in a different perspective, which means that in the South African context, xenophobia is a crime as it goes in violation of the Criminal Procedure Act, since it entails killings, beatings, and burning and looting migrants' businesses. Although racism is interconnected with xenophobia, the study established that the two concepts cannot be associated as xenophobia is based on the rejective attitude towards people who are perceived as foreigners. However, recently, people have been witnessing many scholars, including government officials, labelling xenophobia as Afrophobia, due to the fact that the attacks target migrants from the African continent.

Thus, based on the work of Allport (1954) on prejudice, this study argued that xenophobia in the South African context should be regarded as plain prejudice or Xeno-prejudice, the reason being that the attacks go beyond race or country of origin, as in the past xenophobic violence, namely the 2015 attacks, it was reported that migrants from Southeast Asia were also attacked. The use of conflict transformation based on the work of Johan Galtung as a theoretical framework was very important in this study, with the reason being that it promotes the relationship of both parties to the conflict through face-to-face engagement and interaction, by uplifting peace at the centre of the negotiation. Coupled with this is the fact that conflict transformation produces changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions of the human experience by highlighting the underlying causes of the conflict.

To add to conflict transformation, the study also used social cohesion due to the fact that xenophobia cannot be prevented without promoting social cohesion between the two groups. It was in this vein that the use of dialogue was very important to allow both groups to finally meet and interact on the issue of xenophobic violence in order to find appropriate solutions to the problem. For this to be successful, the action research paradigm was used, which means that the participants had to find a solution to the problem that they were facing. Coupled with this is the fact that the participants played a role in investigating and changing their socio-economic challenges. Thus, since the study entailed preventing and combatting xenophobia in SA, the use of AR was essential in promoting a practical process of interaction between the local people and migrants.

While AR was used as a design for this study, it is different to the methodology used in this study, as AR was used as a blueprint of this research in reference to Mouton (2001: 55) definition of design. However, as a methodology, the study used a qualitative methodology due to the nature of the topic being investigated, the reason being that xenophobic violence has more to do with the human behaviour and social structure conflict. Thus, qualitative

methodology was a suitable approach, as it helped in exploring the attitudes, perceptions, and feelings that both groups have towards each other, and these could not be quantified. The study used different techniques to collect data such as conducting interviews and FGDs. Different FGDs took place, as the researcher understood that working with two conflictual parties required having separate FGDs prior to having a combined FGD, and from the FGDs, the researcher had to observe the responses and reactions of the participants. This was done to meet the objectives mentioned in the previous section.

### **10.3.1 Objective 1: Historical and Current Causes of Xenophobia**

Xenophobia in SA is not a new phenomenon as it has been reported in the country since the period of transition from the end of apartheid to the start of the democratic SA. Since that period to the present, the causes of xenophobia are essentially still the same with the socio-economic challenges at the top, coupled with the frustrations of the high number of migrants in the country and unemployment which are always connected. This means that many local people are accusing the high presence of migrants as being the cause of the unemployment that is affecting them, as the unemployment rate is still high, leaving the majority of the young people unemployed. Thus, the local people have developed a scapegoating mind as they blame migrants as being the cause of unemployment in the country, as the latter have seemed to be obtaining employment easily while the local people are still struggling.

While these are the causes that are known, the study traces the causes of xenophobia to the period of apartheid, as during that period, the then government separated the people of South Africa internally based on their tribes, and separated them from other African migrants, exposing them only to Europeans, thus at the end of the apartheid regime, the local people had developed tendencies of viewing Europeans as South Africans regardless of their origins, while African migrants were regarded as the outsiders or the unknown. This explains that despite the fact that Europeans are regarded as the creators of wealth in the country, they are also viewed as South Africans, as they have been present in the country, while Africans were prohibited to enter the country, except those working in the mining or agriculture sectors.

However, migrants are also affected by the same socio-economic problems that affect the local people, as the migrants endure discrimination in accessing different economic opportunities that the country offers. Thus, this fact has led them to lower the wages of the jobs that they are doing to survive. The study established that the motivations that trigger xenophobic violence in the country do not have merit, as both groups have suffered from the same problem, be it unemployment or crime.

Thus, the study identified a third force that is benefitting from xenophobic violence in the country, which also represents a cause of xenophobia in the country, and this is the South African government. The study identified the government as a current cause of xenophobia based on the fact that the government is seen triggering and motivating xenophobic attitudes which often lead to violence. The study observed that different members of the government have used migrants as scapegoats to justify their failure to deliver the services promised during the electoral campaign, and such a position frustrates the locals as they have decided to chase migrants out of the country by all means. Other members of the government present false statistics of migrants in the country to motivate people to attack migrants. The study observed that the government plays a role in triggering xenophobic violence towards migrants especially when the country is heading towards elections.

### **10.3.2 Objective 2: Extent and Prevalence of Xenophobic Violence**

Xenophobic violence in SA is still affecting migrants from the African continent as they are the most vulnerable. Since the first mass xenophobic violence that took place in 2008, the country has witnessed a series of incidences of violence taking place in different communities almost every year, as at the time of this study, the researcher witnessed two incidences of xenophobic violence. However, the violence mostly takes place between two provinces, namely, in Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria) and in Kwazulu-Natal (Durban), leaving migrants with no hope of survival. Scholars have argued that the post-2008 mass xenophobic violence has claimed more lives than the mass 2008 xenophobic violence. This means that since the 2008 xenophobic violence, more migrants have lost their lives, properties, and businesses due to xenophobic violence. This has explained the fact that scholars have viewed xenophobia in the South African context as very complex, and which will continue to affect migrants if not properly addressed.

However, although xenophobic violence is a complex issue taking place every year in the country, the government has failed to mitigate it, as different policies and strategies adopted by the government have been proven to be ineffective. The reason is that the government is denying the presence of xenophobia and is regarding the violence as a crime of opportunity. Coupled with this is the fact that the government is failing to arrest the perpetrators of violence. Despite the fact that the country has adopted different legislations at the international, regional, and national levels dealing with hate crime and the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, there is no direct law in the national legislation that deals specifically with xenophobia, and this fact alone has motivated perpetrators to attack migrants as they are always set free after they have been arrested. This means that the national law is ineffective in dealing with the

issue of xenophobia – this discourages migrants as the majority are calling on the UNHCR to relocate them out of SA to a better country. The call of migrants to leave SA saw migrants from all the provinces gathered in Cape Town pressuring the government and civil societies to let them leave the country as they feel unsafe in the country. Figure 11.1 depicts Cape Town refugees calling refugees from Pretoria to join the ‘mass exodus’.



**Figure 10.1:** Cape Town refugees calling refugees from Pretoria to join the ‘mass exodus’, adapted from Evans (2019).

### **10.3.3 Objective 3: Design a Dialogue Process and implement a Training Programme of Skills Transfer**

The study used dialogue as a platform for both groups to engage in the discussion on the issue for which they fight and to identify the potential solutions to remedy that situation. Through dialogue, the participants had the opportunities to meet and share their frustrations and challenges. As they were sharing their frustrations, they came to a realisation that despite the fact that the socio-economic opportunities divide them, they share more similarities in terms of the languages and cultures. The dialogue approach played a role of connecting both groups through the discovery of their African identity and *ubuntu*, which was essential in preventing xenophobia. In this process, the participants had to design an appropriate intervention that would help in combatting xenophobia through transforming the negative attitude that the local people had towards migrants into a positive attitude. Working together

enables participants to not see each other as enemies but as brothers. This was demonstrated in cooking and sharing meals in the community. Since many local people lack entrepreneurial skills, this study adopted a skill transfer as a way of empowering the youth to be independent instead of waiting for the assistance from the government. Thus, a group of the local people and migrants were selected to start a training on learning to sew to become tailors.

## **10.4 Recommendations**

Different strategies and policies have been adopted in the country in order to stop xenophobia from taking place – these strategies have worked in certain areas or communities while in others they have not worked. Through dialogue, this study demonstrated that there is a possibility to mitigate xenophobia in the country. However, preventing and combatting xenophobia in South Africa must take place as a long-term project that needs to take place at two levels in the country, that is, at the provincial level (communities) and national level. Mitigating the attacks will also require the full participation of different institutions and organisations in the country.

### **10.4.1 Provincial Level**

In order to prevent xenophobic violence at the community level, dialogue and skills transfer or empowerment is much needed due to the fact that there is no engagement between both groups as they often do not associate with each other nor learn from each other and coupled with this is the fact that the majority of the local youth are unemployed. Thus, the lack of interaction between both groups reinforces the stereotypes against migrants which have been explained in the literature review and in the discussion. In order to address and challenge these stereotypes and stigmas peacefully with both groups, the municipalities, in collaboration with counsellors, need to design a dialogue process in the community that will take place often with the participation of both groups. Thus, for the dialogues to be effective and credible, they would be conducted by civil societies that have specialties in running dialogues in the community, especially by people who are neutral and who do not show a xenophobic or negative attitude towards the groups.

It is well known that civil societies work with limited funds. Thus, running dialogues in the communities would require significant and continuous funds. The government can support the civil societies running dialogues with the necessary logistics and finances. The reason is that running dialogues requires appropriate and safe venues for the participants, as well as food, as the participants would need to have lunch together, as eating together would promote bonding between them as they would be learning from each other. However, due to the fact

that xenophobic violence is the result of the frustration of youth unemployment, the government, in collaboration with civil societies, would also have to design a training programme of skills transfer which would empower the youth to be entrepreneurs instead of waiting for job opportunities provided by the government.

Due to the fact that xenophobic violence often starts in the local communities, it is important to equip the residents of local communities with the necessary knowledge of the presence of migrants in order to make them agents of transformation, justice, and peace. This can be done through workshops organised with the youth with the purpose of discouraging them from giving into manipulations by politicians and community leaders to attack migrants.

#### **10.4.2 National Level**

Since the 2008 mass xenophobic violence, it appeared that the judicial system was essentially non-existent in dealing with perpetrators of xenophobic violence, as there has not been a trial of or identification of the locations of those arrested during the xenophobic violence. The ineffectiveness of the judicial system in dealing with perpetrators of xenophobic violence has discouraged migrants from taking legal action against the perpetrators, as they see the same people arrested during the xenophobic violence walking free in the community. It is important for the government to pass legislation that deals specifically with xenophobia in the country. Although xenophobia in the South African context constitutes a crime, as it entails severe violations of migrants, a special legislation dealing with this matter will discourage the perpetrators.

Due to the fact that in the past years, one has seen political leaders motivating xenophobic violence in the country, the legislation should also punish political leaders who publicly motivate xenophobia or show xenophobic attitudes. This will discourage the people in the community from taking part in or being involved in xenophobic violence. This legislation must punish and imprison those involved in killing or the looting of properties or businesses belonging to migrants, including the businesses and properties belonging to the local people, as the latter are also affected, especially those who have migrants as business tenants on their properties. This manner of intervention will unite people in the community, as the arrest of perpetrators would not only be based on the fact that they have looted businesses belonging to migrants, but also based on the fact that they have burned a property belonging to the local people.

However, while adopting a legislation on criminalising xenophobia, it is important for the government to take into consideration Landeau's opinion on drafting the legislation, as he

stated that “the legislation should be drafted carefully in order to avoid any conflict of identity of ‘foreignness’ *vis-à-vis* nationals, as that can give birth to a division between the two groups and make migrants more vulnerable to continued xenophobia” (see in Muchiri 2016: 254).

The government must also reinforce and respect different regional and international treaties and conventions dealing with the protection of migrants in the countries. It is known that the country has adopted the most important international conventions that protect migrants; thus, it is important for them to reinforce them. However, due to the fact that the majority of the local people are not aware of the rights of migrants in the country, it is important for the government to run different campaigns and workshops in the country educating people about those rights, and such activities can be done in collaboration with civil societies.

Different activities can be done at the national level to prevent xenophobia, and these would need to be done with the participation and cooperation of different institutions that play an important role in the country such as the law enforcement agents, the media, religious leaders, and schools. The collaboration and participation of these institutions and organisations will promote social cohesion at the national level.

*(a) Law Enforcement Agents*

Different civil societies and scholars have accused the law enforcement agents of failing to protect migrants during incidences of xenophobic violence. Coupled with this is the fact that the local people are accusing them of being corrupt and protecting criminals. Thus, there is a need to discipline police officers involved in working closely with drug dealers and traffickers or those protecting criminals. This means that instead of spending money on creating a new special force dealing with migrants or migration, the government can create a task force unit within the SAPS that can deal with the internal corruption reported by the locals against the police officers. This task force unit would also work collaboratively with the immigration officers in dealing with illegal migrants in the country.

Instead of the local people complaining to the main office station of their community, the local people can lodge their complaint directly to the special task force unit that deals with matters of corruption between migrants and police officers and immigration officers who are accused of accepting bribes at the entry point.

*(b) Integration of Migrants by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA)*

The integration of migrants in SA is inexistent, leaving migrants to find ways of integrating themselves in the community, which often limits them in terms of communication as they are

viewed as 'the other' due to their inability to speak the local language. Thus, the government, through the DHA, must implement a policy that promotes the integration of migrants in the country. This means that after processing migrants at the DHA, the latter should encourage migrants to take classes provided by the government where they would have to learn at least one of the major languages of the country, except English, which is already offered by some NGOs.

The integration of migrants is very important as it will help in breaking the barrier that exists between the two groups and it will equip migrants with the necessary knowledge on the culture of their new home. Thus, the knowledge of the local people's language, culture, and history should play a role in shifting migrants from refugee status to permanent resident status. This will also motivate migrants to learn more about the values and the principles of the local people.

*(c) Religious Leaders*

The church leaders play an important role in the society as they are role models to many people in the community which gives them access to influence and change their attitudes towards xenophobia. Church leaders must, through their sermons, call on people to be united regardless of their origins, and they should promote social cohesion through their sermons and organise events that facilitate integration between migrants and the local people.

## **10.5 Reflection**

The study has been a learning and wonderful process. Throughout the research process, the researcher not only learned about the issue being investigated, that is, xenophobia, but the study broadened the researcher's knowledge of different cultures in Africa and coupled with this is the fact that through this research, the researcher was able to learn the local language spoken in Durban, which is isiZulu. Although the researcher did not master it, being able to understand and communicate was truly a wonderful experience, and moreover, it also showed the researcher's interest in the culture of the country – this alone brought joy to the local people as the researcher could see their happiness every time the researcher was trying to formulate a word and their laughter when the researcher would use the wrong words to state something.

While the lives of the migrants and the local people have been similar to a cat-and-mouse game, the study showed that if the people are given the opportunity to sit together, share their story through direct interaction, and share food and other activities, they will come out of that room not as 'cats' and 'mice' but as friends and family, as they will see the realities with a



unified vision and they will be able to overcome their challenges and difficulties which they could not overcome while living in conflict. Although the unemployment rate is still high, skills transfer is the key to curbing the frustrations regarding this matter. As a result of this study, the researcher took an engagement to carry on with the Varsity of Social Cohesion as a platform to identify potential youth of both groups and train them with the necessary skills that are available to the Varsity, as currently the Varsity is developing a tool of teaching them the reparation of cell phones, which the researcher believes will help them to make a living instead of relying on the government.

## **10.6 Conclusion**

In conclusion, xenophobic violence in the South African context should be regarded as such, the reason being that it goes beyond the definition of xenophobia, racism, or Afrophobia, and coupled with this are the killings, looting, and physical assaults against migrants which constitute a crime in the country. Thus, the attacks against migrants should be regarded as Xeno-prejudice or simply as plain prejudice, as the victims are any persons who look like an outsider. While the attacks against migrants are still prevalent in the country (they take place every year), this study argued that the efforts to combat xenophobia should not be left to the government alone, as the latter constitute a third force that triggers xenophobia. Coupled with this is the fact that different policies and strategies adopted by the latter have proven to be ineffective as they are inexistent in the country, especially when the country is experiencing xenophobic violence.

The study identified dialogues as an effective strategy to prevent and combat xenophobia, the reason being that dialogue gives a platform to both groups to share their stories, frustrations, and solutions to the problems that they face. Thus, it is necessary for civil societies working closely with both groups to run dialogues throughout the country in different communities to prevent and combat xenophobia. While it is well known that civil societies always depend on funding from their partners, especially the UNHCR, and since the government has a mandate to put an end to the scourge of xenophobia, the government will have to find different NGOs and civil societies in running dialogues in the country. This will not only end xenophobia in the country, but it will also promote social cohesion and sustainable peace between migrants and the locals.

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## APPENDIX A

### Letter of information

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Mwamba Nkuanga – Patient, I'm a PhD student in Management Science at the Durban University of technology. I'm currently conducting a research under the supervision of Dr Kaye, titled *Exploring the strategic approaches to prevent and combat xenophobia in South Africa: Case study of refugees and asylum seekers living in Chesterville (Durban)*. As it is well known, xenophobia is an attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community. Xenophobia in South Africa is quite different and violent compared to other countries, as in South Africa the violence is translated into a broad spectrum of behaviour including discriminatory, stereotyping and dehumanizing remarks; discriminatory policies and practices by government and private officials such as exclusion from public services ; assault and harassment by state agents particularly the police and immigration officials; as well as public violence which often results in massive loss of lives and livelihoods. My research seeks to find a way to combat xenophobia through the building of a social cohesion between foreign nationals and locals.

If you choose to be part of the study, you will:

1. Be required to be interviewed
2. You may be part of group of 16 participants as part of a group discussion to further discuss the issue raised in the questionnaire and then develop and implement the empowerment training programme
3. You may be part of a group as a volunteer participant during the implementation of the training programme.

Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no consequences should you choose to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part of the study. The questionnaire will be done at a convenient time to the gatekeeper and will take about 15 minutes to fill in. The focus groups and the empowerment training programme will be done during the day for one hour as not disrupt your own activities.

You will not provide your name in the questionnaire and I will not use your name when reporting on the focus group discussions. Your answers will only be seen by me. However, if you participate in the action team to develop and implement the young man and women's empowerment training programme then you will be known to everyone.

In case you have any problems or queries, do not hesitate to contact me on 0786 566 947, my supervisor Dr. Sylvia Kaye 031 373 2900 or the Institutional Research Ethics administrator on 031 373 2900. Complaints can be reported to the DVC: TIP, Prof F. Otieno on 031 373 2382 or [dvctip@dut.ac.za](mailto:dvctip@dut.ac.za).

Sincerely yours,

Patient Mwamba

## APPENDIX B



### CONSENT

#### Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, Mwamba Patient\_, about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study-Research Ethics Clearance Number: \_\_\_\_\_,
- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

_____	_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Participant	Date	Time	Signature / Right
Thumbprint			

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (name of researcher) herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Researcher	Date	Signature
_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Witness (If applicable)	Date	Signature
_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable)	Date	Signature

## APPENDIX C

### Section 1: Personal information

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Marital status:

Married	Single	N/A

4. Ethnic of origin:
5. What is the dominant ruling political party in this community?
6. Employment Status:
7. a.) Are you originally from Chesterville?  
b.) If Yes, have you ever considered moving? Give reasons  
c.) If not, when did you move/relocate to Chesterville? And what motivated you to move to Chesterville?

### Question on the socio – economic situation

1. What are the main livelihood activities that people in the community rely on as a source of income?
2. Is the community affected by unemployment?
  - Do you have an idea to why many youths are unemployed?
  - There is no available jobs or lack of proper qualification
3. Do you think these sources of income are challenged and compromised by outsiders?
4. Do you think that poverty, unemployment, crime and different tensions are the main challenges in this community?
5. Do you think foreigners are part of the contributing factors to these challenges?

### Question on the perception of the others

6. Do you see yourself as an African first or a South African?
7. How does that make you feel?
  - If you are proud can you explain?
8. Who are the majority population in the township and what is the main language?
9. Which tribe do you think should not be part of the community?



- If any why?

#### Question on the perception of foreign – nationals

10. What do you think about the presence of foreign – nationals in the community?
  - Are you happy/not with their presence? Why?
11. Do you think foreign – nationals have the rights to be in SA?
12. How often are you in contact with foreign – nationals?
13. How do you describe your relationship with foreign – nationals in the community?
14. Do you think foreign – nationals are taking jobs belonging to South Africans?

#### Question on violence in the community

15. What are the main issues that the community are not happy with?
  - Is it unemployment, poverty, crime or service delivery?
16. Are those issues usually result in violence within the community?
17. How often is violence take place in the community?
18. How is the violence organized and mediated in the community?
  - Service delivery protests, taxi violence or violence against foreigners
19. Who do you think are the perpetrators?
20. Who do you think are the often victims of violence in the community? Are foreigners often involved in the violence occurrences?
21. Do you think foreign – nationals and South Africans hate each other's?

#### Question on xenophobia

22. There have been incidences of violence against foreigners around the country? What do you think are some of the reasons behind such violence?
23. What are your views regarding xenophobia?
24. What do you think can be done in order to prevent the attacks?
25. measure do you think should be put in place to address the occurrence of violence in the community?

#### Question on building Peace between foreign nationals and South Africans

26. What is your understanding of ubuntu?
27. Based your view on ubuntu, do you think there a possibility for foreign – nationals and South Africans to live together?

28. In your opinion, what do you think can be done in order to build peace and good relationships between foreign – nationals and South Africans?

## **APPENDIX D**

### **II. Interview for Foreign – nationals**

#### **Question on Information**

1. Name
2. Age
3. Marital status
4. Country of origin
5. Year Spent in SA
6. What identification card are you currently using?
7. Reason for leaving the country of origin

#### **Questions on the integration of foreign – nationals in the community**

1. How do describe your relationship with South Africans
  - Do you feel welcome in the community?
2. How often do you interact with South Africans in your community?
3. Do you think members of your community knows you?
4. Can you describe your relationship with your neighbors?
5. How often do you attend the community meeting?

#### **Questions on the causes and forms of the attacks**

6. Are you currently employed?
7. If yes, how did you get the job?
  - Did you apply through a company or it was a recommendation?
8. What is your job entails of?
9. Do you agreed or dispute the allegations made by South Africans that foreigners are taking their jobs because they work for low wage?
  - Can you please explain your thought about the allegations?
10. Do you think South Africans are not happy with the fact that you are working in their country?
  - If yes, can you please explain why?
  - If no, what do you think are the reasons behind the attacks

## APPENDIX E

### Focus Group Discussion with South African Nationals

#### Key Informant Questions

1. Can you tell me what you think about the presence of foreign – nationals in the community?
2. What do you think of when you see a foreign – nationals working in South Africa or running a business in the country while citizens are unable to work or lack financial means to start a business?
3. Can you tell me if you have at some point support the attacks against foreign – nationals?
4. What are the issues or behaviors of foreign – nationals that you are not happy with?
5. Why do you think South Africans continue to attack foreigners?
6. How are foreigner – nationals viewed in the community?
7. How do you feel when you see a foreign – nationals being attacked? Why?
8. How do you view the role of the government in the communities regarding the violence?
  - Does the government respond to the complaints lodge by the people living in the community?
9. Do you think foreigners have the rights to be in SA and to enjoy their socio – economic rights? Can you please explain?
10. What kind of actions the community should take in order to prevent and mitigate xenophobic violence?
11. How can the community address the needs of both foreign – nationals and South Africans?

## APPENDIX F

### Focus Group with foreign – nationals

1. What are the forms of violence and discrimination that you usually experienced in the country?
2. Can you please explain the attitude of South Africans towards you?
3. How did you integrate in your community?
4. Can you please describe the procedure of integration in your community?
5. Can you describe the relationship with South Africans in the community?
6. Do you participate in the community meeting?
7. Describe your experience in terms of the 2008 or 2015 xenophobic violence? How did it affect you?
8. Were you affected by the 2017 attacks? Can you describe the feeling you had based on your past experience in terms of the xenophobic violence?
9. What strategies have you personally implemented to protect yourself against xenophobia?
10. What has been done in order to mitigate the attacks in the community?

## **APPENDIX G**

### **Observation guide**

- Attitude of both groups towards each other before the peace activities
- Attitude of both groups towards each other during dialogues and workshops
- Social interaction during and after the activities
- Groups' collaboration and cooperation during the teamwork activities
- Reaction of people in the community during the peace intervention

## APPENDIX H

Nature of letter: **Confirmation**

Attention to: Sylvia Kaye

Organization Name: **Lindelani Youth Forum**

**Lindelani Youth Forum LYF (177-507 NPO)** is an organization recognized as a youth organization, it is a team of young, enthusiastic, creative and dynamic professionals with a stream of innovative ideas based in Lindelani.

this letter serve to inform you that the LYF has allow Mr Mwamba Patient to do his research on preventing and combatting xenophobia within Lindelani and Lindelani Youth Forum, to unpack the causes of youth participation in xenophobic violence and what measures have been conducted or implemented to reduce such.

The organization hope that the research project will go on to focus on the potential of youth in peace building, promoting social cohesion through designing, implementing and evaluating an intervention strategy that will reduce xenophobic violence

THANK YOU

Endorsement signatures:

LYF Chairperson

LYF Secretary

M.B Mahlaba

H.L Vilakazi

## **APPENDIX I**

Theogene Tito Haguma

Upskill Africa Initiative

66 Russell Street

Albert Park, 4001

Durban

15 August 2018

RE: gatekeeper letter

Dear Dr Kaye

this letter serve to inform you that Upskill Africa Initiative has allow Mr. Mwamba Patient to do his research on exploring the strategic approach to prevent and combat xenophobia in South Africa, with the group of refugees and asylum seekers that we are assisting in Chesterville, to unpack the causes of youth participation in xenophobic violence and what strategy can be adopted to reduce such.

The organization hope that the research project will go on to focus on the potential of youth in peace building, promoting social cohesion through designing, implementing and evaluating an intervention strategy that will reduce xenophobic violence

Sincerely yours,

Thèogene Haguma

Social Cohesion Expert in UNHCR /Zoe-Life Social Cohesion Project

And Manager of Upskill Africa Initiative



1/2/2022



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