Building capacity in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan

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Supervisors

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ABSTRACT

Civil society's role and influence in peacebuilding has increasingly been recognized globally. As such, substantive attention has been given towards strengthening civil society capacities, especially in countries experiencing protracted conflicts. This thesis focuses on building the capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns to transform socio-economic and political conflicts in South Sudan. Despite, limited civic space, repression from local authorities and challenges of limited capacity, South Sudanese have demonstrated their audacity to challenge entrenched power and that they are by no means a passive people. The study establishes that the civil society, employees of public and private sectors have on several occasions implemented the techniques of nonviolence. However, South Sudanese campaigns lack strategic focus, have not been sequenced, carried out systematically and in coordinated manner to change the worsening political, economic and social conditions. Following an action research approach, qualitative data was gathered using focus group discussions, interviews, questionnaires and structured observations. This was used to develop a nonviolent action training curriculum and the subsequent training of 24 participants. The short-term outcomes of this study indicate that the action research participants not only learned together, shared information and established sustainable networks, but also used tactics of peaceful marches, petitions, press statements, sit-ins, political non-cooperation and other forms of nonviolent campaigns to advance social, political, and economic change. The study concludes in that supporting civil society with technical skills, knowledge in nonviolent campaigning and coherent peacebuilding and financial resources is critical for building safe, democratic and prosperous country. The CSOs also need to focus on building social and political conscience of society's members to value, appreciate and consider nonviolent responses to conflicts in order to reduce the culture of violent insurrection in South Sudan.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis is my original work and has not been previously submitted for any degree at any other university or higher institution of learning. In confirmation of my declaration, I hereby append my signature.

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Moses Monday John

Date: 16 June 2021

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to female and male nonviolent campaigners for doing what others claim cannot be done in South Sudan, and to their courage, commitment and resilience in resisting violence without weapons and making a difference. Your legacy will continue to inspire the current and future generations to build a just, safe and democratic country.

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ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMDISS	Association for Media Development in South Sudan
AMWISS	Association for Media Women in South Sudan
ANC	African National Congress
AR	Action Research
AFPREA	African Peace, Research and Education Association
ARCSS	Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
ARPs	Action Research Participants
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CS	Civil Society
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CWSS	Crown the Women South Sudan
DUT	Durban University of Technology
DC	District Commissioner
EAC	East African Community
EHAHRDs	East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders
EVE	Eve Organization for Women Development
FBGs	Faith-based Groups
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FSI	Fragile States Index
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GPS	Global Peacebuilder Summit
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
HLRF	Higher Level Revitalization Forum
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICNC	International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IFOR	International Fellowship of Reconciliation

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPDSS	Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies
IPRA	International Peace and Research Association
JCC	Juba City Council
JMEC	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MMR	Mixed Methods Research
MSCA	Most Significant Change Approach
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCP	National Congress Party
ND	National Dialogue
NDSC	National Dialogue Steering Committee
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NLC	National Liberation Council
NIF	National Islamic Front
NPSS	Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan
NT	New Tribe
NVA	Nonviolent Action
NVC	Nonviolent Campaign
ONAD	Organization for Nonviolence and Development
PIMI	Peace Implementation Monitoring Initiatives
POCs	Protection of Civilian Sites
RPF	Regional Protection Force
RTGoNU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SONAD	Sudanese Organization for Nonviolence and Development
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – In Opposition
SPLM-IO-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – In Opposition-In Government
SPS	School of Public Service
SRF	Sudan Revolutionary Front

SSCCs	South Sudan Council of Churches
SSCC	Southern Sudan Centre for Census
SSCSF	South Sudan Civil Society Forum
SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSHRC	South Sudan Human Rights Commission
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
SSPRC	South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
SSuNDE	Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections
SweFOR	Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation
Taskforce	Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement
TCRSS	Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TNLA	Transitional National Legislative Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCR	United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
UNOCHA	United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WRI	War Resisters' International
WV	World Vision

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

1.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the introduction and overall background to the study. It highlights the research context, examines South Sudan's civil society sector and its role in peacebuilding, discusses the research problem and explains the aims as well as the objectives of the thesis. The chapter presents the rationale and motivation for the study, the theory of change and a summary of the research methodology used, design, data collection methods and analysis, as well as ethical considerations. This chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis structure.

This study employed an exploratory action research approach based on qualitative data. It revolves around three inter-related and pertinent objectives. The first objective involves assessing the effectiveness and capacity of the South Sudanese civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns between 2011 and 2017. The second objective focuses on the exploration of the nonviolent campaigns that CSOs have implemented in some selected countries in their efforts to transform socio-economic and political conflicts. These insights were needed to draw inspirations and lessons from other contexts in order to tackle the third objective, which focuses on designing, implementing and evaluating the short-term outcomes of the nonviolent action training program. The overall training aims to build the capacity of 25 NGO workers, university students, faith-based groups and other members of the civil society, to develop and implement nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan.

The evaluation of the nonviolent action training program (reported in Chapter 9) reveal that participants not only learned together but also used nonviolent campaigns such as peaceful marches, petitioning and political non-cooperation, as well as peacebuilding techniques such as dialogue, negotiation and mediation to resolve, prevent and manage conflicts. The study has also

contributed to new knowledge production and dissemination through conference papers, short articles, and a special report on nonviolent action in South Sudan, to mention a few.

1.2 Background to the study

The Republic of South Sudan is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa. It is bordered to the east by Ethiopia, to the north by Sudan, to the west by the Central African Republic, to the southwest by Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the south by Uganda and to the southeast by Kenya. The country attained its hard-earned independence from Sudan on 9th July 2011, following a referendum held in January the same year (Mulla 2018: 6). South Sudan became a sovereign state after more than 50 years of struggle for emancipation and freedom from social, economic and political domination by Sudan. The political history of many countries is often associated with armed struggle for freedom and independence. Freedom narratives typically support the common belief that violence is indispensable to obtain freedom from foreign subjugation, and ignore the power of civilian-led nonviolent resistance and the historical role that it has played in many national quests for liberation (Bartkowski 2013: 1).

South Sudan is administered through a decentralized system of governance made up of three tiers of government, which encompasses the national government, state governments and the local governments. A decentralized system was preferred so that political and economic powers were granted to the lower level of government in order to facilitate delivery of social and development services to the people. However, the decentralized system has not met this expectation and political power and financial resources are centralized. The constitution, it should be noted, has defined roles, responsibilities for each level of the government as well as separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary (The Republic of South Sudan 2011: 15).

South Sudan is among the richest countries in Africa and is endowed with immense natural resources, including oil, fertile land, extensive hardwood

forests, large amounts of fresh water and minerals and a wide variety of livestock (GOSS Ministry of Environment and Forestry 2018: 9). Despite its agricultural potential, the country's economy is largely dependent on oil revenue, which contribute about 98% of South Sudan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The post independent era has witnessed successive challenges that have resulted in protracted violent conflicts, corruption and poverty. For instance, when the country attained its independence in 2011, it joined the ranks of the world's least-developed countries, with 50.6% of the country's population living below the poverty line (National Bureau of Statistics 2009: 4). Only 27% of adults are literate, 73% are illiterate (Southern Sudan Centre for Census 2010: 48). Furthermore, the country has the highest maternal mortality rate of 2,054 per 100,000 live births (Southern Sudan National Bureau of Statistics 2012: 7). Sufficient reliable sources of evidence exist that suggest that the South Sudanese people have suffered from acute poverty and underdevelopment, largely inherited from years of political and economic marginalisation of Sudan's southern region. This situation of hardship experienced under the Sudanese regime was sufficient justification for a series of conflicts involving armed resistance and the subsequent secession in 2011. However, not much has changed since independence.

Despite the immense human and natural resources, South Sudan remains economically poor and underdeveloped due to systemic corruption within the public sector. Corruption contributes directly to poverty and violence. According to the World Bank, corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It distorts the rule of law and weakens the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends (World Bank 2013). In many fragile and conflict-prone countries, corruption has been a major driver towards poverty and violence. However, starting from around 2010-2011, people around the world have raised their voices against corruption. Taking inspirations from the Arab spring and the Middle East, several movements emerged in Spain, and the United States such as the occupy Wall Street

campaigns. The latter proclaimed, “We are the 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of 1%” (Beyerle 2014: 7).

South Sudan’s history of resistance dates back to the early sixteenth century Islamic sultanates (1504-1821) and the nineteenth century (1821-1885) with the Turko-Egyptian occupation of Sudan, the Mahdist State (1885-1898) and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium colonial rule (1898-1956), to the independence of Sudan in 1956 (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 2016: 7). The Islamic rule of Mahdiyya made conditions worse, as it raided and forcefully conquered some parts of South Sudan (Johnson 2016: 2). In August 1955, merely a few months to independence of Sudan, a civil war erupted in Torit, which lasted for 17 years (Nyaba 2000: 14-21). In 1972, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was signed between the Anyanya One Movement and the Khartoum government. Ten years later, the agreement was dishonoured, yet another example of an agreement being dishonoured by Khartoum regime (Alier 1990: 2).

The violation of the agreement, coupled with continued economic, social and political marginalisation led to the second civil war in May 1983, led by Colonel Dr. John Garang de Mabior, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). He mobilised a diverse group of rebels into a fairly unified movement, but many atrocities were committed in the process (Ashworth 2014: 36). He called for a united Sudan on new principles, blaming the central government for policies that discriminated people on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity, gender and economic status. These principles attracted many Northern Sudanese from marginalised areas, particularly from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, into the Movement.

On 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the National-Congress Party (NCP) led government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, which among others gave the people of Southern Sudan the right to self-determination (Nyaba 2013: 10). Individuals and groups suffering from marginalisation and different forms of injustices can employ a variety of

methods ranging from violence, to conventional politics, to nonviolent tactics (Cunningham 2013: 1).

In December 2013, tensions within the ruling SPLM party led to the outbreak of armed conflict between the SPLM and the opposition movement that became known as the SPLM-IO. The conflict continued in July 2016 after the clashes in Juba between the government and the opposition SPLA/IO forces, which led to collapse of the peace deal signed in August 2015. The violent conflict has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern times. Many lives and properties were lost. Many youth and children have been forcefully engaged into violent conflicts. Most of them have witnessed brutal murders, rape or the maiming of their loved ones, or have themselves participated in committing those atrocities (Tsuma 2012: 126).

In 2017, South Sudan had an estimated population of 13 million, which is rapidly growing at 2.052 per cent per annum (GOSS Ministry of Environment and Forestry 2018: 5). Youth comprise the largest proportion in the country as well as in the world. Nearly 600 million of these young people live in conflict-affected or fragile states including South Sudan (UNDP 2014; Mueni 2016). The people of South Sudan are exclusively Negroid, consisting of about 64 ethnic groups. They are divided into three major ethnic groups: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and the Western Sudanic (Kacuol 2008: 9). The largest group is the Dinka, making up about 35.8% of the population, followed by the Nuer (15.6%) (Central Intelligence Agency (2011).

On 12 September 2018, the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (RARCSS) was signed between the government and opposition parties. This peace deal called for a permanent ceasefire, the training and reunification of armed forces as well as resource, economic and financial management reforms. However, its implementation is facing many challenges, including a general lack of funding to carry out reforms and to reintegrate armed groups into a unified army and ongoing clashes with holdout armed opposition groups (Zaremba 2018: 1). The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and its state and local government

institutions have largely failed to deliver social and development services to its citizens. Consequently, the CSOs and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are rendering most social and development services.

While stories of violence dominate the public discourse in South Sudan, CSOs have for long had a critical role in violence prevention and peacebuilding. For example in January 2014, the women of the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) organised a prayer to denounce the war, which had broken out in late 2013. Peace and anti-war monthly marches of civil society have increased pressure on the government and opposition groups to accommodate the will of the people (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 9). Mass participation increases the effectiveness and longevity of nonviolent political struggles, particularly when women are involved (Principe 2016: 4). South Sudanese rural women have played an active role as peacemakers. An anecdote from the 1980s reveals that Kachipo and Murle women succeeded in stopping the communal fighting by refusing to have sex with their husbands until the men of the two rival tribes made peace. Similarly, in 1994, women in the former Upper Nile state put pressure on their male relatives to resolve the conflict over fishing and grazing rights. At an individual level, a woman peace activist refused to milk the cow that her husband had stolen (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2017: 8). In addition, churches and the New Sudan Indigenous NGOs facilitated the Wunlit people-to-people peace dialogue, which reconciled the Dinka and Nuer communities as well as the SPLM/A leaders (Ashworth 2014: 158). More of CSOs' contribution in peacebuilding is discussed in Chapter 4.

CSOs have been instrumental in provision of goods and services such as health care, shelter, education, nutrition, agricultural production, peace building, conflict mitigation, civilian protection, and environmental conservation. Their services are mostly in response to urgent humanitarian needs (Civil Society Sustainability Index for South Sudan 2019: 7).

South Sudanese CSOs typically have limited opportunities to strengthen their capacities to undertake peacebuilding efforts. This is because many CSOs training focusses on organizational development and financial management

rather than on thematic program areas like ‘peacebuilding’. According to the Civil Society Sustainability Index for Sub Sahara Africa, South Sudan (2019: 8) training in proposal writing, projects, financial management and reporting as well as development of financial, procurement and human resources policies are common and favoured. There is next to no capacity-building training in nonviolent campaigning and peacebuilding programming aimed to strengthen the capacity of CSOs to be more effective. As emphasized by Wilson (2014: 23), local actors should be empowered through training to take a lead in local peace building processes.

Accordingly, this study sought to build the capacity of CSOs to effectively develop and implement nonviolent campaigns to transform socio-economic and political conflicts in South Sudan. The study examined effectiveness and capacity of South Sudanese CSOs in Chapter 4 and provided a training needs assessment in Chapter 6. The research explored the literature on nonviolent campaigns that CSOs have implemented in selected countries. This was important in order to draw lessons and inspiration for future engagement. The study provided an opportunity for 25 members of CSOs to acquire skills and knowledge as well as to test the theories of nonviolence as a peacebuilding tool. The study documented the experience of South Sudanese civil society in implementing nonviolent campaigns and working in collaboratively. This tested Lederach’s argument that one of the most important needs for peacebuilders is to ‘find ways to understand peace as a change process based on relationship building’, without which peacebuilding collapses (Lederach 2005: 35).

An action research approach was chosen because it bridges the gap between the theory and practical problem solving through implementation practice. Besides, action research has increasingly emerged as an effective way of tackling real life problems by engaging the community members who are directly affected by these problems to take transformative action.

1.3 Violence in South Sudan between 2011 and 2017

Armed violence is a real threat to the future of South Sudan. The availability of firearms at the hands of civilians, particularly cattle camp youth, has caused havoc and immense human suffering. In December 2011, about 6,000 armed youth from Lou Nuer launched a series of systematic attacks and exerted coercive control over the Murle settlements of Pibor and Likwangole, killing, burning down homes and looting for nearly 12 days. The attack was considered a response to earlier cattle raids by members of the Murle tribesmen in the Akobo, Uror, Duk, Nyirol and Twic East counties which claimed the lives of up to 1,000 Lou Nuer inhabitants and caused the loss of over 100,000 heads of cattle (Duke and Rouw 2013: 11). In response to the Lou Nuer attack, smaller groups of armed Murle youth launched a series of retaliatory attacks on Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka, beginning in December 2011 until February 2012, leaving several hundred people dead and hundreds more heads of cattle raided (United Nations Mission in South Sudan 2012: 1).

In Juba, the most frequently reported violent crimes include armed robbery, home invasions and car hijackings. There is also a prevalence of sexual, gender-based, and structural violence. For instance, even though women are meant to hold a quarter of government decision-making posts, gender disparity and inequality continue to exist in public and private life. Besides, in South Sudan, it is not only guns that kill; a lack of access to a basic means of life, dignity and enjoyment of rights can be as destructive as weapons. In the south, there are significant challenges in terms of allocation and management of resources to expenditure priorities. Revenues generated from oil and non-oil sources are not being channelled to address poverty issues (Okwaroh 2012: 27).

The cycle of recurrent armed violence in South Sudan requires critical analysis to understand the nature and pattern of violence, its drivers and consequences. The understanding will then inform an appropriate peacebuilding and conflict management approach which should aim to not only halt violence but also to

address its root causes and effects as well as set the right foundation for building a nonviolent, peaceful and prosperous country (John 2014: 67).

The nature of violence ranges from armed political resistance to communal violence and criminal activities. Armed violence is more often characterised by side-switching, changing loyalties and incentives, as actors respond to opportunities generated by peace deals and security reforms (Schomerus and Taban 2016: 7). Communal violence is characterised by ethnic revenge killings or 'tit for tat', cattle-raiding and the abduction of children and women often perpetrated by armed groups with political backing. Gender-based violence, such as forced and early marriage, is influenced by poverty and unfavourable culture practices where bidding is practiced to win the hand of a girl for marriage. Corruption and impunity are common as public institutions, justice and accountability systems barely function.

There are no reliable records to assess the extent of violence in South Sudan. However, the scale and extent of violence has displaced more than two million people and, as stated earlier, the country has been qualified as being the largest source of displacement in Africa. According to the latest estimates of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, over 2.2 million South Sudanese citizens have fled the country in search of refuge and asylum in neighbouring countries. Another 2.3 million are internally displaced, including nearly 300,000 people living in UNMISS Protection of Civilians sites (United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees 2017). The bulk of refugees are being hosted by Uganda, while others have fled to Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Kenya. Most South Sudanese refugees in the region are women and children. According to Human Rights Commission on South Sudan report (2017: 6) approximately 36,000 South Sudanese children are unaccompanied or separated from their parents, while the majority of them are not enrolled in school, creating another "lost generation". Reports from aid agencies indicate that over 5.5 million people (about 45% of the population) have food shortages and are facing extreme hunger (World Vision 2017).

Power struggle, corruption, patronage and impunity are the major drivers of violence in the world's newest country. The political power wrangle within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which manifested during the party's national liberation council meeting, triggered the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013. Since South Sudan's independence, the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth. The country's wealth was controlled by a rotating set of elites from the ruling SPLM party who move seamlessly between positions in government and the frontlines of the rebellion, as political situations change (De Waal 2014: 13).

Most of these individuals had played leading roles in the country's economic and political decisions in the post-independence government, and after being pushed out of the government, many joined a political opposition bloc which soon developed into an armed opposition. Meanwhile, the conflicting parties have sought to consolidate power around their loyalists, particularly those from their particular ethnic group. In addition, South Sudan has been crushed down by corruption patronage and impunity; a case in point in this regard is that which occurred in 2012 where President Salva Kiir accused 75 ministers and officials of having stolen $4 billion from state coffers and demand the money to be returned, but according to news reports, only 1.5% of this sum was effectively recovered (Aljazeera 2014: 1).

Present-day internal conflicts and civil wars take a heavier toll on civilians than inter-state wars. Civilians have increasingly been targeted by the combatants as a strategic objective. Even humanitarian workers operating under Geneva's rules of war suffer heavy losses, are denied access to victims in conflict zones, or are themselves attacked or killed. Societies living in conflict zones have paid a massive toll in the loss of human life and economic, political and social benefits. Women and children in particular suffer the most in armed conflicts. In the past decade, according to one estimate, up to two million of those killed in armed conflicts have been children. Three times as many have been seriously injured or permanently disabled, many of them maimed by landmines,

and millions were psychologically scarred by the violence (United Nations 2001: 205).

In South Sudan, thousands of lives were lost in inter-communal revenge killings. Salter referred to this as “depressingly sad” to read news of tit for tat “revenge killings”. Family members also hold grudges against others, waiting for the opportunity to take revenge (Salter 2011: 23). The cycle of inter-communal violence often results in high death tolls including many women and children, the massive displacement of civilians and the loss of several hundreds and sometimes thousands of cattle (Duke and Rouw 2013: 11). The outbreak of violence in December 2013 and July 2016 left thousands dead, almost two million internally displaced, more than a million refugees in neighbouring countries, and over five million out of an estimated total population of 12 million in need of humanitarian assistance. The war also caused significant damage to the country’s infrastructure (IMF 2017: 4).

The social fabric was broken and the number of hate speeches increased. State negligence in allocating reasonable funds to deliver basic services resulted in a high poverty rate, low life expectancy at birth due to poor health system and services. South Sudan’s economy has largely collapsed as a result of the war. Government revenue has significantly decreased due to disrupted oil production. Coupled with increased military spending, national budgets continue to have severe deficits. Hyper-inflation has led to increased fuel prices, and manufacturing costs have risen markedly, increasing market prices for basic items (Oxfam 2015: 1). **The armed conflict resulted in the forced recruitment of an estimated 16,000 children** since the crisis in South Sudan first began in December 2013 **(UNICEF 2016: 1).**

Insecurity and conflict in multiple locations negatively impacted humanitarian operations and the delivery of aid to the needy. Violent incidents – including physical assaults, ambushes, armed attacks, threats, intimidation, harassment, looting and robberies – continue to be reported. In May 2017, a vehicle transporting vaccines in Wulu in Lakes was ambushed, leaving a driver and health worker wounded. In the first five months of 2017, more than 390

humanitarian access incidents have been reported in South Sudan, compared to 317 during the same period in 2016. Thus far this year, 253 aid workers have been relocated through 21 incidents, as compared to 138 through seven incidents reported by the same time in 2016. At least 19 incidents involving the looting of humanitarian supplies have been reported countrywide since the beginning of the year, as compared to 12 incidents reported by the same time in 2016. Nearly half a million have fled as refugees (UNOCHA 2017: 3).

The ongoing insecurity and mass displacement of civilians led to shifts in donor priorities particularly from financing development and peacebuilding projects to supporting the dire humanitarian crisis. This shift has negatively hindered the contribution of CSOs lack adequate technical and financial capacity to prevent the ongoing violence and build peace at community and national levels.

Much as it is necessary to conclusively study and understand the problem of recurrent violence in South Sudan, it is critical to assess the effectiveness and the challenge of limited capacity within CSOs as the main problem in prevention of violence and peacebuilding in the country. This study sought to build the capacity of CSOs through training in nonviolent action in order to strengthen their capacity to resist violence, manage conflicts and build a lasting peace.

1.4 South Sudan's Civil Society Sector and Its Role in Peacebuilding

Ever since the 1960s, CSOs have emerged as key players in the effort to prevent violence, manage conflicts and build peace in South Sudan. Despite their relative importance in peacebuilding, democratization and service delivery throughout the years of struggle (1955-1972, 1983-2005), CSOs' contribution remains largely unknown due to a lack of documentation. As argued by Ekiyor (2008: 33), CSOs in Africa are mainly activity driven and rarely take time to reflect and document their achievements and challenges. This study has documented some of these contributions (see sections 3.1, 4.4 and 4.5). That said, CSO work gained recognition following December 2013 conflict as they

engaged in civilian protection, advocating against the senseless war, and ensuring that the peace processes are inclusive. Since then, the main question is no longer whether civil society has an important role to play in peacebuilding, but how it can enhance its capacity to be more relevant and effective in helping shape the country's socio-economic and political landscape.

As of 2017, there were over 5000 registered NGOs in South Sudan (Centre for Conflict Resolution 2017: 9). This study focuses on CSOs working on peacebuilding, which are themselves quite diverse in their activities and their philosophy. A few are committed to nonviolence out of principle, others are committed out of pragmatism and others are not aware of nonviolent strategies in peacebuilding.

The concept of civil society remains elusive, complex and contested in scholarly circles *over* different interpretations given to the term civil society. According to Paffenholz (2010: 66), civil society includes traditional and faith-based organizations, unions, associations, sports clubs, self-help groups, social movements, NGOs, communities…etc. That is, civil society consists of a huge variety of mainly voluntary organisations and associations that maintain different objectives, interests and ideologies (Spurk: 2010: 6).

From these definitions, it is clear that CSOs constitute a space occupied by ordinary people performing activities intended to fill the gaps left or created by the state, family and the business sector. As argued by Barnes (2005:7), CSOs are formed to give an expression and direction to the social, political, spiritual and cultural needs of community members. Civic space allows members to engage, organize and take actions to shape their social, economic and political lives. Notably, CSOs often emerge in response to problems or injustices that confront them. Thus, nonviolent action training, civil courage, awareness raising and peacebuilding workshops are essential capacity building opportunities to prepare the ordinary people, individuals and civic groups to act effectively. Nonviolent campaigns are legitimate democratic rights of citizens to express their rejection or support to a cause, advise and put pressure on their

government or any opponent to accommodate their views, needs and aspirations.

Spurk and Paffenholz (2010: 67) have explained that CSOs can play seven major functions in peacebuilding across different contexts and phases of conflict, namely protection, monitoring, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialisation, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation and service delivery. The available literature confirms that CSOs in South Sudan have demonstrated resilience and commitment in undertaking such peacebuilding functions.

According to the Global Development Institute (2018), CSOs play a constructive role in the search for peace and stability, public policy formulation and implementation, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, information dissemination and delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to needy populations. CSOs also play a key role in the promotion of justice, human rights and social cohesion, as well as informing citizens of their responsibilities in alternative dispute resolution (International Development Law Organization: 2015). As just one example, in 2018, the South Sudan Chapter of Defend Defenders issued a statement protesting about several incidents of arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention of civilians in both rebel and government-controlled territories. The human rights' network called for protection of civilians from the crossfire during clashes between the state and rebel groups (Defend Defenders 2018).

Whilst the concept of peacebuilding is now more widely used than ever, there is still some confusion as to what exactly it means in practice and what is included in the concept. According to Schirch, peacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform, and help people recover from violence in all forms, including structural violence that has not yet led to massive civil unrest. She further argued that peacebuilding is strategic when resources, actors, and approaches are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues for the long term (Schirch 2008: 6). Thus, peacebuilding addresses conflict at the community, regional, or national level through participatory processes that involve dialogue, principled negotiation, mediation, and collective problem

solving (Bloch and Schirch 2018: 10). This study is more focused on theories and practice of nonviolent actions and the campaigning component of peacebuilding, with special reference to the work of CSOs in South Sudan.

Despite the relative importance of South Sudan's civil society sector in peacebuilding, CSOs have struggled to make significant improvements to the socio-economic and political conditions in the country. This is because they face significant internal and external challenges. Internally, most CSOs working on peacebuilding lack capacity or are not even aware about the potential of nonviolent techniques in peacebuilding. There are also challenges related to poor coordination and documentation of CSOs actions to influence power dynamics in the country. Externally, CSOs face deliberate harassment, intimidation, and sometimes detention of activists by state security apparatus. Thus, CSOs in South Sudan operate within a fragile, risky and limited civic space to discharge their legitimate roles and responsibilities in the society.

This research project will assess the capacity of CSOs in developing and implementing nonviolent campaigns in order to identify what training needs and capacity gaps would likely benefit them. Training, whether for CSOs, diplomats, conflict parties, military, police and security forces or other stakeholders in the field is a key need in peacebuilding and development contexts. This is because, many practitioners still lack some of the core competencies for engaging effectively in peacebuilding (Hallward & Hoger 2019: 237).

1.5 Research Problem and Aims

Despite the plethora of CSOs working on violence prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding in post-independent South Sudan, CSOs continue to have a quite limited impact. This is partly the result of their limited knowledge of nonviolent campaigning and the specific skills this involves. General knowledge of the principles, methods and strategies of nonviolent action and its relationship to peacebuilding is limited among South Sudanese. Recent examples of nonviolent action campaigns launched by CSOs have lacked strategic focus (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 2). Besides, there is

the challenge of poor coordination of activities between CSOs, particularly those relating to campaigning to reduce people's vulnerability to different forms of violence and building peace. Furthermore, relations between CSOs have tended to be characterised by competition in a context of resource scarcity and dependence on external funding (Centre for Conflict Resolution 2017: 4). Peacebuilding is much more likely to be strategic when resources, actors, and approaches are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues for the long term (Schirch 2008: 6).

In addition, there is almost no documentation on nonviolent resistance of ordinary people in South Sudan exists (Johansen 2009: 69). The documentation of violence has resulted in the potential of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan being sidelined, despite the empirically proven efficacy of nonviolent actions (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; 2011). This was a major motivation for me to embark on this research. Given the context and impact of protracted violent conflicts in South Sudan and the limited capacity of the country's CSOs, it seemed imperative to explore nonviolent methods and strategies to transform, manage and resolve conflicts and to develop capacity in the use of such methods and strategies.

This study, then, seeks to build the capacity of CSOs to effectively develop and implement nonviolent campaigns to transform socio-economic and political conflicts in South Sudan. The thesis further contributes to the body of knowledge by unveiling the experience of members of the CSOs who participated in action research project and building the capacities so as to help achieve the project's short-term outcomes.

1.6 Research Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were:

1. To assess the effectiveness and capacity of the South Sudanese CSOs in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns between 2011 and 2017. This is reported in Chapter 4.

2. To explore examples of nonviolent campaigns that CSOs have implemented in some selected countries in their efforts to transform socio-economic and political conflicts. This is reported in Chapter 3.

3. To design, implement and evaluate the outcomes of a nonviolent action training program with a sample of 25 NGO workers, university students, faith-based and other members of the civil society. These are reported in Chapters 6-9.

1.7 Significance of the Study

Research on nonviolence has never dominated the academic field of peace research, particularly in Africa and South Sudan. Much has been studied about people's armed conflicts and very little attention has been paid to the contributions of unarmed resisters. Evidently, many library shelves are filled with books on wars in people's history and almost no documentation on nonviolent resistance of the ordinary people in South Sudan exists. Even in the modern media, a story is not worth covering if it does not involve violence. The result is meagre coverage, documentation and dissemination of nonviolence literature (Johansen 2009: 69).

There is almost no documentation and credible literature on the contributions of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan. A lack of documentation on nonviolence experiences has further marginalised the potential and history of nonviolence in the country (Schock 2004: 6). This study is significant for its uniqueness in unveiling the experiences of unarmed civil resisters who, according to Sharp, resist powerful opponents powerfully using nonviolent techniques as an alternative to armed rebellions (Sharp 2011: 4).

Building the civil society's capacity through nonviolence training, one-on-one coaching and networking will undoubtedly create communities that are capable of accepting their challenges and working to address them through peaceful and democratic processes (Schirch 2004: 56). Training in nonviolent action can empower CSOs and grassroots actors to use nonviolent methods strategically in conflict situations so as to shift power relations. Once power is more balanced

between the parties in conflict, peace processes are more likely to find just and sustainable outcomes (Block and Schirch 2018: 18). Burrows and Stephen (2015) found that strategic choices and skills determine movements' trajectories and outcomes and not the conditions and factors prior to the nonviolent conflict. It is noteworthy that over the past century and more, nonviolent resistance movements have been twice as successful in achieving their aims as resistance movements, due to a long-standing tradition of preparing communities to take safe and strategic nonviolent action (NVA) through education and training (Bloch 2016: 2). These theories of nonviolent campaigns are further supplemented with the researcher's own 'nonviolent action theory of change'. The theory affirms that:

> If members of the civil society of diverse gender, age, ethnic and geographic backgrounds are trained in nonviolent action then their capacities and confidence are built to take nonviolent actions to transform their socio-economic and political situations and build peace at micro, meso and macro levels. Once members of civil society know and regain their rightful positions in society, they are encouraged, inspired and able to mobilize a sufficient number of citizens with a clear goal to positively shape their future.

Well-designed training on nonviolent action is limited in South Sudan, particularly those targeting civil society actors. This study will fill this gap by providing opportunities to 25 action research participants to critically analyse violence and injustices in their communities, and to practice different tactics and strategies of nonviolence to tackle their problems as alternatives to the recurrent cycle of violence. These skills will be imparted through the introduction of practical context-specific exercises which will provide opportunities to participants to practice different nonviolent action skills to tackle violence and injustice. Analysing individual, group and movement alternatives to violence has not, however, received adequate academic attention as has violence. This is partly because violence is assumed to be more interesting and sexier than nonviolence ("if it bleeds, it leads"), but it also reflects the fact that even in the richly normative discipline of peace and conflict studies, one tends to be much more concerned with pathology than with the cure (Clements 2015: 2). The primary reason for engaging in action research is to support the "the interested stakeholders" in improving their capacity to tackle their

community problems. The action research training further tested the theory of change and built the participants' relationships, increased their contacts, sharing of information through networking.

Previous study of nonviolent conflicts has largely focused on methods and efficacy of nonviolent campaigns. In their book *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,* Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) developed a unique dataset on major violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006. Their analysis shows that nonviolent campaigns are more than twice successful to achieve their stated goals compared to violent insurrections (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008; 2011) and that the choice of nonviolence strategies means, in cases of regime change, that the resulting regime is more likely to be democratic. Hedman (2019: 17) reached a similar conclusion but Celestino and Gleditsch (2013: 397) emphasize that there is no automatic causal pathway between nonviolent action and democratization. Similarly, Pinckney (2018: 44) argues that the impact of nonviolent resistance on democratization is indirect.

To my knowledge, no previous research has been carried out on building the capacity of CSOs to develop and implement nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan. My study fills in this gap and contributes a body of knowledge in this under-researched area by documenting the short-term outcomes of a nonviolent action-training programme with members of the country's civil society.

1.8 Research Design, Methodology and Data Collection Instruments

This study will fundamentally employ the action research approach. It encompasses four components: exploration, devising and implementing an intervention, and evaluating its outcomes. Action research is one of the few research approaches that embraces the principles of participation, reflection, empowerment, and emancipation of people and groups interested in improving

their social situation or condition (Berg 2004: 195). It aims not only to identify social problems but engages the society in proactively contributing to resolving the prevailing problems. The concept of action research can be traced to the works by John Collier (1890-1947) in the 1930s. However, the more systematic and methodological work on action research is linked to Kurt Lewin, who first used the term *action research* in 1944 and later published a paper titled *Action Research and minority* in 1946. Lewin believed that it was possible to conduct an experiment in a real life situation with the aim of achieving a specific goal that had a bearing on problem-solving and social change (Bloor and Wood 2006: 10). The action research approach has "a cyclical inquiry process" which incorporates diagnosing a problem, planning action steps and implementing and evaluating outcomes (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53). It allows for the collection of in-depth data from the small action team and the evaluation of both human actions and their perspectives (Babbie and Mouton 2002: 270). The AR approach is unique in that it helps the researcher to go beyond the traditional methods of scientific inquiry to those methods that are more context-specific, practical and effective.

As part of the exploration, I conducted four focus group discussions targeting the total of 32 key informants. Face-to-face interviews was held with 25 respondents including 15 participants from those who attended the FGDs and 10 respondents from among the prominent nonviolent activists in South Sudan. Data was also gathered through an observation, literature review and questionnaires. Primary and secondary data enable the researcher to better understand the nature, drivers and the consequences of violence as well as the existing capacity gaps within the South Sudanese civil society in using nonviolent campaigns between 2011 and 2017. To contrast and identify the gaps in the South Sudanese peace movement, it is imperative to explore the literature in order to gain insights on how non-state actors in other parts of the world have employed the tactics and strategies of nonviolence to tackle their socio-economic and political conditions, hence addressing the first and second objectives of the study.

I sought the assistance of the local NGO (ONAD) and recruited three co-researchers who joined me in the assessment exercise of nonviolent-action training needs as reported in chapter 8 as the basis for the development of the training manual devising and implementing an intervention. A three-day nonviolence training program of five hours per day was planned, targeting 25 participants including seven NGO workers, six university students, six members of faith-based groups and six members of women and youth groups. As this is an action research project, the researcher does not know in which direction the intervention will proceed before the actual training occurs, as the researcher is under the control of the participants. This is because the participants in participatory action research often decide on what to do to address prevailing problems in their communities in an attempt to change their individual and collective conditions.

Three evaluation exercises was conducted. The first two evaluations used pre- and post-training questionnaires. The questionnaires was used to assess the level of knowledge and skills before and after the training. The third evaluation will be held after a period of nine to 12 months, after the participants have reported to their respective communities and have engaged in practical peacebuilding work. The outcome evaluation is vital to achieve the third objective of the study, which will form an integral part of this study.

This study employed a combination of exploratory action research and qualitative approaches, which guided the overall data collection, analysis and presentation. The study collected primary data from action research participants through Focus group discussions, structured interviews, observation and questionnaires. Secondary data was gathered through literature review. Data collection represents the key point of any research project (Bryman 2016: 5).

The study was carried out in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The location was preferred as it was convenient to the researcher in terms of access and costs. Besides, the plethora of CSOs based in Juba meant that I could readily sample them as key-informants and members of the action

research team. In this study, the sample population meant selected individuals from CSOs working on peacebuilding.

Purposive sampling was used to interview 25 key informants and to select 32 participants for the four FGDs with approximately eight persons per FGD. For this study, the sampling frame included individuals aged between 18 and 72. In addition, I observed the attitudes and behaviours of action participants, particularly in physical places where events of violence and nonviolent campaigns took place; the actors involved in each event; the results and consequences of actions taken; and the relevant nonviolence training activities of NGOs, students, faith-based groups and other civil society groups. Objects such as relevant training materials and manuals was also observed.

I commissioned the participants to keep diaries of their personal field experiences and the phenomenon under study. According to Alaszewski, diaries include not only a record of activities and/or events but also a personal commentary reflecting on roles, activities and relationships, and even exploring personal feelings (Alaszewski 2006: 2).

Qualitative 'raw' data comes in various forms ranging from verbatim transcripts of interviews or discussions (or audio files if they have not been transcribed), to observational notes, diaries, reports of written documents, video recordings etc. The process of analysing hundreds of pages of transcript material can seem rather intimidating. Thus, it was necessary to organise and manage the data to foster easier analysis and data interpretation (Miles, Huberman and Saldana 2014: 296).

In this study, the data from FGDs, interviews and questionnaires was analysed thematically to generate qualitative information. As Kvale proposes, the process of data analysis effectively begins in the field. He points out that the earlier the researcher starts to identify emerging themes, the better it is. This involved reading interview notes word-for-word and underlining ideas or major concepts that will be mentioned repeatedly and also assigning codes to each

idea in particular paragraphs (Kvale 2007: 132). Thereafter, similar ideas falling in different paragraphs was brought together under one theme (Dey 1993: 31).

I conducted pre-testing of data collection instruments. The exercise aimed to ensure quality control and the effective use of FGDs, interviews, questionnaires and observation guides. Participants involved in pre-tests was informed in advance of the pre-testing exercise and were asked to explain their reactions to the format, wording and order of the questions as advised by Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2004: 109-130).

The scope of the study is limited to the members of the civil society comprising NGO workers, university students, members of faith-based groups and other members of the CSOs, as mentioned earlier in the study's third objective.
The data collection and conduct of an action research training program were expensive in view of DUT's research financial support. Data collection through FGDs and interviews often causes concern among security agents in fragile and conflict-prone areas. This misconception and suspicion of security apparatus often arises from the fact that during conflicts, a number of human rights violations are committed by parties to the conflict. Thus, any data collection is easily misconstrue with human rights documentation. To reduce any negative external impeding factors, I worked closely with the gatekeeper (ONAD), sought the necessary advice and mobilised support of the relevant stakeholders before the commencement of the research intervention.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the collected data, I used triangulation to cross-check multiple data sources and collection procedures to evaluate the evidence and conclusions reached, and to evaluate the extent to which all the evidence converges. Validity is that which can be defended as sound because it is conceptually and empirically well-grounded (Dey 1993: 228). Reliability deals with issues of measurements that ensure consistency, quality and integrity are addressed in any scientific research. While reliability is concerned with the replicability of scientific findings, validity is concerned with the accuracy of scientific findings. Thus, establishing validity requires careful attention to determine the extent to which conclusions effectively are tied up with empirical

data obtained and analysed by researchers to measure human experience under study.

I assigned a research team member to observe AR action participants during the follow-up and evaluation meetings to independently check whether or not the interpretations of the researcher's findings are correct. The value of scientific research is partially dependent on the ability of individual researchers to demonstrate the credibility of their findings. Regardless of the discipline or the methods used for data collection and analysis, all scientific methods of attaining knowledge strive for authentic results. In all fields that engage in scientific inquiry, the reliability and validity of findings are important (LeCompte and Goetz 1982: 31).

1.9 Overview of the Thesis

This thesis covers ten chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the introduction and background to the study. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 cover the theories of nonviolence, nonviolent campaigns and understanding of civil society and its role in peacebuilding. The chapters highlight nonviolent actions implemented by the CSOs in South Sudan between 2011-2017 and the existing capacity gaps. Chapter 5 discusses details of the research methodology, study instruments, sampling procedures, demographic data and the plan for the action research team. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss the analysis, findings and outcomes of the FGDs and interviews conducted with action research participants. Chapter 8 reports on devising and implementation of nonviolent action training program. Chapter 9 evaluates the short-term outcomes of nonviolent action training and discusses sustainability of its outcomes. To conclude the study, Chapter 10 highlights conclusions and makes recommendations for further studies and the improvement of civil society capacity to develop and implement nonviolent campaigns.

PART TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF NONVIOLENCE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses theories of nonviolence in an attempt to broaden the understanding of the theories and how they work in practice. By exploring the relevant literature, I gained insight and indications of the overall study trend, providing guidance for writing the thesis. The chapter explores the concept, definitions, types, principles and methods as well as strategies of nonviolent action. The chapter provides the rationale for the use of nonviolent campaigns, and examines misconceptions and criticisms of nonviolence.

2.2 Definitions and Concepts of Nonviolence

The word *nonviolence* has different meanings for different people. Scholars, practitioners and ordinary people define the word in different manners. While nonviolence often refers to the rejection of the use or support of violence based on moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, it may also mean nonviolent action. It is a difficult and confusing concept to define. For example, May (2015: 33) has used the term nonviolence as a shorter way to refer to nonviolent political action. Theories of nonviolence were developed in the late eighteenth century. Since then, it is being practiced in many different conflict situations across the globe. Inspired by many activists and authors, the understanding and practice of nonviolence is on the increase.

Different scholars have expressed different thoughts and ideas on nonviolence. Gandhi viewed nonviolence more as a religious belief, value and principle to transform human hearts through love and commitment to truth and justice. He stresses that “We can only win over the opponent by love, never by hate. Hate is the subtlest form of violence” (Gandhi 1971: 96). This primacy of love is also found in the words of Martin Luther King Jr. who agrees that at the centre of nonviolence stands the principle of love. However, Chenoweth and Stephen later found that nonviolent campaigns don’t succeed by melting the hearts of

the opponents. Instead, they tend to succeed because nonviolent methods have a greater potential for eliciting mass participation; on average, they elicit about 11 times more participants than the average armed resistance (Chenoweth and Stephen 2011: 39).

Moreover, nonviolence not only concerns resistance against injustice and oppression in the world. It also concerns building up social conscience and supporting democratic governance systems and reform initiatives. Buying ecological food and initiating a model peace village such as the Holy Trinity Peace Village, in Kuron, South Sudan. The village demonstrates how enemies can live together in harmony, are typical example of nonviolence. Defending human rights and pro-democracy civic activism, among others, are further examples of nonviolence.

In almost all languages, nonviolence is a negation – it is composed of the word *violence* with a negation. This is also the case in the Arabic "la-unf" and in the Swedish "ickevåld". In Sanskrit, an Indian language, it is referred to as *Ahimsa*, meaning 'non-injury', nonviolence or non-hurtfulness, which is probably the original word that first described nonviolence. *Ahimsa* is first mentioned in Indian philosophy in the Hindu scriptures called the Upanishads, with the oldest dating to approximately 800 BCE (Semjeback, Joseph and John 2006: 10). It was *Mohandas Gandhi* who popularised and spread the use of *ahimsa* – nonviolence. Mohandas Gandhi, the most famous nonviolence activist and strategic thinker whom the world has ever known, led the Indian people in the struggle for independence and freedom from the British occupiers in the 20th century. For Gandhi, *ahimsa* meant a lot more than just the absence of violence. It meant love and respect for each and every one, and resistance towards that which was oppressive and violent.

Terchek observes that "Gandhian love", which encompasses enemies, is founded on an openness that enables a person to reach out to and find a unity and mutuality with others (Terchek 2001: 242). According to Gandhi, love is not only an interpersonal emotion, that is, a feeling that exists between two people, nor is it something soft or sentimental. Key to Gandhi's concept of

nonviolence is his belief in love as perhaps one of the most powerful forces for social change: “Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment and the other by acts of love”. Gandhi argues that “power based on love is a thousand times more effective and permanent than the one derived from fear of punishment” (Gandhi 1925: 15). It is evident for those who have followed and scrutinised Gandhi’s life, leadership style, speeches, writings and actions, that all these have demonstrated his devotion and commitment to the cause of peace and nonviolence (Joseph *2016*: 20).

Sharp defines nonviolence as a method and nothing else. He writes: “nonviolent struggle is identified by what people do, not by what they believe in”. He adds that nonviolent action is a technique of action by which the population can restrict and sever the sources of power of their rulers or other oppressors and mobilise their own power potential into effective power (Sharp 2016: 2). According to Cortright (2006: 3), nonviolence is more than merely a method of social action. It is a philosophy of life, that which he terms as a radically different way of “being” and not just “doing”. He argues that nonviolence is not only a pragmatic option but a strategic choice, a concept of profound importance to the future of progress and the survival of mankind. Cortright agrees with Gandhi in that nonviolence is a way of life that starts with individual proponents and not merely a method of action or a strategic choice.

Vinthagen defines nonviolence as a two-sided phenomenon i.e. without violence + against violence = nonviolence. He argues that nonviolence is more than action without physical, psychological and structural violence, because not everything carried out without violence is nonviolence. It has to have an element of resistance against violence to be called nonviolence (Vinthagen 2015: 12).

Barbara Deming, an American feminist and nonviolence activist, explained nonviolence as being similar to the use of two hands:

> She elaborates that on the one hand symbolized by a hand firmly stretched out and signaling, ‘Stop!’ I will not cooperate with your violence

> or injustice; I will resist it with every fiber of my being. And, *on the other hand* symbolized by the hand with its palm turned open and stretched toward the other I am open to you as a human being. Often people have one or the other, but nonviolence claims that one can have both at the same time. Deming argues that the strength of nonviolence lies in its dual-natured approach, not only opposing that which is violent and unjust but being ready for dialogue and reaching out to the adversary and reconciling (Deming 1985: 8).

Different nonviolent activists define nonviolence in different manners, and their focus is at different levels of human existence, from person to person to national, regional and global politics.

In addition, nonviolence and peace organisations do not have a common definition for nonviolence. Nonviolence, according to the Centre for Nonviolence and Social Change, is a powerful philosophy and strategy for social change which rejects the use of physical violence. The practice of nonviolence calls for peaceful active behaviour in the midst of conflict. At its core, nonviolence embodies respect and even love for one's opponents. The practice recognises and utilises the importance of dialogue without the use of physical threats or coercion in negotiating and problem-solving. "At the center of non-violence stands the principle of love". Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. argues that nonviolence means avoiding not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. He adds, we will not hate you (oppressors) but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws (King 2011: 213). The basic principles of nonviolent resistance encompass an abstention from using physical force to achieve an end, while at the same time engaging in resisting oppression, domination, all forms of injustice and that which inflicts suffering in human life.

War Resisters' International defines nonviolence as "either (1) the behaviour of people who in a conflict refrain from violent acts; or (2) any of several belief systems that reject violence (both physical and structural) on principle, not just as impractical". These comprise a desire to transform authority relations and public configurations, bring about an approach of respect for everyone or human life, or even promote an idea of life or a premise of social exploit (War

Resisters' International 2009: 9, 144). According to Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006: 1) nonviolence has been defined as a philosophy that discounts the use of brutal exploit in a divergence over power to achieve social and political intentions, but nonviolence is also multifaceted and has diverse denotations.

In Gandhi's analysis, nonviolent social change concerns establishing "a new society in the shell of the old, which he termed constructive programme". It is closely linked to the broader resistance manifested in social impartiality, economic self-sufficiency and environmental harmony. The constructive program for Gandhi assisted in the training for civil noncompliance, incorporating disobedience and giving it a chance to instil the skills required to establish a new society (War Resisters' International 2009: 40-41).

2.3 Types of Nonviolence

From the analysis of how individuals and groups define nonviolence, it is apparent that many draw their understanding of nonviolence from religious sources, traditions or faith in God, or a philosophical or political conviction, or all of these combined. Thus, the overall concept of nonviolence is generally divided into two schools of thought: principled nonviolence and pragmatic nonviolence.

2.3.1 Principled Nonviolence

"Principled nonviolence" refers to the approach that advocates the recourse to nonviolence resistance for religious, moral or philosophical reasons or, in other words, by conviction rather than by expediency. Violence is condemned because it causes unnecessary suffering, dehumanises and brutalises both the victim and the executioner, and only brings short-term solutions (Boserup and Mack 1974: 13).

Gandhi (Hindu), Martin Luther King (Christian) and Pasha Khan (Muslim) had a strong belief in nonviolence as a matter of faith and principle. Gandhi observed that nonviolence is an issue of principle and a moral requirement

because hostility, subjugation and exploitation are evils which must be opposed (Martin and Varney 2003b: 80). Nonviolence was preferred because it brought about an authentic transformation of attitudes and contradicts violence which avoids dialogue and causes injury. Fired by this conviction, Gandhi halted the Indian campaigns of 1922 after the Chauri Chaura riots, because they had failed to commit themselves to moral purity and the use of nonviolence (Greg 1960: 68-69). Thus Gandhi was the leading proponent of principled nonviolence in the twentieth century, and he was the inspiration for many who followed him as individuals. Many peace movements were also inspired in active nonviolence as a result of his campaigns in South Africa and India (War Resisters' International 2009: 18). This was due to his persuasive and emphatic commitment to nonviolence as a principled method of struggle, despite the fact that he was neither a systematic theorist nor a scholar who tapped into any research findings (Martin 2005).

Gandhi saw nonviolent action as a search for truth. He used the term *satyagraha*, literally meaning 'truth force', "which is often translated as nonviolent action" (Martin and Varney 2003b: 81). Gandhi noted that *satyagraha* means moving progressively on the road to discover the truth and change the antagonist into a companion in the process. In other words, it is not used *against* anyone, but is carried out *with* someone. It is hinged on the philosophy that the ethical appeal to the heart or conscience is more useful than an appeal based on threats, inflicting physical pain, or on brutality. Gandhi stated that it had to be a doctrine, a way of life, to be absolutely effective (Weber and Burrowes 1991).

2.3.2 Pragmatic Nonviolence

The second type of nonviolence is commonly referred to as pragmatic, tactical, or strategic nonviolence. Gene Sharp, one of the principal advocates of strategic nonviolence, argues that "nonviolence is what people do, not what they believe. Nonviolence is an alternative weapons system" (Sharp 1973: 110). Due to this philosophical position, strategic nonviolence focuses mainly on articulating and promoting a wide range of nonviolent protest tactics,

including the withdrawal of cooperation or non-cooperation (with private and public sector actors), and civil disobedience to unjust customs, norms and laws.

The theory of pragmatic nonviolence is hence founded on the idea that the power of a ruler is dependent on the consent of the people being ruled (society), meaning that the sources of power are based on the acceptance of the ruler's right to rule ('authority') over economic resources, manpower, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, police, prisons, and courts etc. which are the instruments of power. The effectiveness of these sources of power depends on the extent of collaboration, compliance, obedience and support that the ruler is able to get from his subordinates. This reliance makes it feasible, under certain conditions, for the people being ruled to reduce access to these bases of power or to subvert them completely, thereby weakening or leading to a total collapse of the ruler's power (Sharp 1980a: 23). All bureaucratic structures need the collaboration of people at every level, from the bottom workers to the top hierarchy, and if a significant number remove their obedience and support for a length of time, the authority of the power structure collapses (Power and struggle 1997). Withdrawal of obedience and consent from the government through non-cooperation help people wrest power from the government (ruler) back to themselves in the quest for equality and redress of whichever injustice that the people may be seeking to correct.

The pragmatic approach to nonviolence does not rely only on conversion, but proposes a range of methods of persuasion and nonviolent coercion to which a shared meaning is not central (Martin and Varney 2003a: 221). The merit of pragmatic nonviolence is that it ensures the use of any one of the four apparatuses of alteration which embody conversion, accommodation, coercion, and disintegration, and that these methods can bring about the kind of transformation desired by the aspirants by transferring power from the rulers to the governed (A comparison of practical and principled nonviolent action theories 2013). This means that pragmatic nonviolence does not limit the use of any tactic, and that the means and ends are separate.

The two approaches of principled and pragmatic nonviolence are ideological rather than empirical. The imperative point to note here is that both approaches view nonviolence as an efficient instrument and an ethical means for dealing with conflict and political strife as it tries to minimise damage and casualties. The greatest differences between the two approaches lie in the nature of the commitment of its proponents, the assumed relationship between means and ends, the approach to conflict in general, the attitude towards the opponent with the assumed way of how nonviolence 'works', and the mentioned issue of nonviolence as a way of life.

On the one hand, elements of coercing the opponent can be found in campaigns of principled nonviolent leaders such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. On the other hand, many defenders of the pragmatic approach might profess an ethical foundation for themselves but believe that they should not impose their convictions on others. The proponents of pragmatic nonviolence argue that life is not a choice between violence and no violence. It is a choice between violence and less violence, with the latter sometimes expressed through the medium of nonviolence (Irenees 2017: 1).

Table 2.1 elaborates the differences between pragmatic and principled nonviolence.

Table 2.1: Comparison of principled and pragmatic nonviolence.

Principled nonviolence	Pragmatic nonviolence
Rejects all physical violence as wrong	Rejects physical violence as too costly or impractical
Grounded in morality – nonviolence as a way of life, the "right" way to be human	Grounded in politics – nonviolence as a tool, method, strategy to choose among many possibilities
Sacred, spiritual, or religious base	Secular base
Idealistic, radical – dissatisfied with "armed peace"	Practical, pragmatic – embraces improvements and negative peace
Question: What is right?	Question: What will work?
Nonviolent means are an end in themselves – means-oriented	Nonviolent means are a path toward an end-goal oriented approach
Struggle to end violence is good in itself – expect, even welcome, suffering in this morally correct work	Struggle and suffering is acceptable if it is likely to achieve goals or end an intolerable situation
Aims to end all violence	Aims to improve this particular violent situation
Focuses on root problems	Focuses on specific problems
Seeks subjective pay and material pay-off	Seeks objective, material pay-off, with little or no interest in subjective pay-offs
Uses persuasion, cooperation, avoids coercion	Uses coercion as needed
Practitioners train their minds, their inner selves to guide their actions	Practitioners train their behaviours, their actions
Committed participants, e.g. *satyagrahis*	Willing participants and temporarily mobilised groups
Aim to transform self and opponent to create "the loving community" (Gandhi) and "heart unity" (Martin L. King Jr.)	Aim to coordinate activist groups and their permanent and temporary allies to defeat an adversary
Seeks to change behaviour and heart of adversary – make them a better person without harming them emotionally or physically	Seeks to change behaviour of adversary – willing to harm them emotionally and economically (but not physically)
Compassion, sacrifice – seek to love enemies	Calculation of practitioners – be stubborn to enemies
Alternative to fighting	A superior way of fighting
The form is merely an expression of the spirit within. We may succeed in seemingly altering the form, but the alteration will be mere make-believe if the spirit within remains unalterable" (Gandhi).	Nonviolence is what people do, not what they believe in. It is an alternative weapons system.
e.g. Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr.	Gene Sharp

The classification of nonviolence into the two approaches prompted further academic research. One of the first to examine these two approaches was Judith Stiehm. In her social analysis, she argues that what she renamed as

"conscientious" and "pragmatic" approaches to nonviolence are quite distinct (Stiehm 1968: 23-30). However, writers who followed her analysis later suggest that these two approaches are instead connected as sequential stages, with the phase of principled nonviolence emerging after practice in a strategic or pragmatic phase (as was the case, for example, with Martin Luther King Jr.). In his contribution, Thomas Weber offers a third position, that these are not different approaches as such but rather two different perspectives on the same territory such that, as Weber concludes, rather than debating the merits of each approach, they can be seen as indicating alternative paths to the traveller who does not want to use violence (Weber 2003: 250-270).

2.4 Nonviolence in different Religious Beliefs and Traditions

Religion occupies a central part in the lives of millions, if not billions, of people around the world. It is a human resource of significant importance. Religion affects the way people think, act and understand the world in which they live as well as permeating the cultures and fabrics of their societies (Oden 2016: 9). Religion also has an important contribution in shaping world affairs. Thus, in every major world religion, one finds sacred teachings, values and practices that encourage nonviolence (Nepstad 2015: 24). Nevertheless, nonviolence does not require adherence to any particular religious or ideological orientation, as it is presented in secular forms as well.

However, great and successful nonviolent campaigns in the past and contemporary history have been built on a religious belief, a strong moral and ethical conviction that nonviolence is superior to violence and is the correct approach. Different religious groups have frequently used their constituencies to mobilise people at the grassroots level to resist injustices and demand for peace, justice and freedom. For example, the greatest nonviolent campaign leaders such as Gandhi (a Hindu), Martin Luther King Jr. (a Baptist Christian Minister), Badshah Khan (a Muslim Sheik), and many others, have all been inspired by and used their religion in nonviolent struggles. Their lives, beliefs and teachings have inspired millions of their followers to voluntarily join nonviolent actions throughout history. Millions of Gandhi's followers

emphasised the moral dimensions of civil resistance, including seeking truth and transforming the opponent's heart (Nepstad 2015: 417).

Nevertheless, just as religions have been used constructively to achieve noble ends, almost all world-known religions have also been abused by their followers. In the Western world, extremist Muslim terrorist individuals, groups or organisations have largely used Islam to fight and achieve their political, social and economic rights. According to Infid (2018: 4) report, international attention began to focus intensively on terrorism ever since the World Trade Centre in US was bombed on September 11, 2001. The world was appalled by the single terror incident that took the lives of about 5, 700 civilians. That incident has generally portrayed Islam as a violent religion or as being associated with terrorism. The use of *jihad* has further been abused by some Muslim Jihadists to perpetrate violence. Although greater *jihad* is meant to be the struggle to be a pure and good Muslim, the lesser *jihad* indicates armed struggle. This misconception of Islamic *jihad* was abused to wage violent struggle, as is the case with Islamic movements such as *al-Qaeda* in the West, *al-Shabab* in Somalia and Eastern Africa, and *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. As Zogby (2019) recently argued that the abuse of religion to foster extremism is not limited to Islam but is a universal phenomenon. He criticized for example that when Americans express concern about religious extremism and violence, they almost always are thinking about Islam. However, he emphasized that some Christian evangelical movement's too belief that Israel's conquest of Palestinian land and oppression of Palestinians was justified by biblical prophecy.

2.5 Common Misconceptions and Critiques of Nonviolence

Despite the empirical evidence and potential advantages of the nonviolent approach to the violent approach, there are still many misconceptions, sceptics and critics regarding nonviolence. Some critics address pertinent concerns while others' concerns are simply grounded in misconceptions (Nepstad 2015: 14). By reading through different sources of literature, it is apparent that nonviolence faces a number of misconceptions, criticisms and dilemmas, even within the peace movements. Some criticisms are based on misunderstandings

of what nonviolence is, while others simply doubt the ability of unarmed and suppressed people to organise themselves and challenge powerful opponents (Chenoweth and Stephen 2016: 1).

The use of the techniques of nonviolence has been criticised, especially in situations of unbalanced asymmetric conflict where the oppressor is the state, and the attitude of many towards pacifists and advocates of nonviolence is that they are hippies who declare peace and love as their motto but who are not really aware of the reality of life. Atiri (2009: 12) argues that comparing the costs of using nonviolent campaigns are not always the same. While the nonviolent activists in the US and other Western countries somewhat have the luxury of preparing to break the unjust laws and go to jail, knowing that they have access to fair legal representation, popular protests and faith in the rule of law, activists in countries living under brutal military regimes know that any opposition to government, whether violent or nonviolent, often and quickly lands people in jail without any recourse to legal representation. Very often, such demonstrations and actions will cause the latter to be arrested or even killed. The international community may mourn the victims briefly and then return to its usual business.

Furthermore, the social scientific analysis of the terms *nonviolence* and *nonviolent campaigns* have been surrounded by the numerous misconceptions that people have regarding what nonviolence is, how it works, where and when it is used, and by whom it is implemented. The word *nonviolence* itself, in almost all languages, is a negation and literally means ‘no or without violence’. This contributes to misconstruing nonviolence with pacifism in all its forms. However, proponents of nonviolence are not necessarily pacifists. As Lakey (1973: 57) notes, “most people who do practice nonviolent resistance are not pacifists”.

Other misconceptions and criticisms evolve around the legality, costs and consequences of using nonviolent campaigns. A major factor contributing to these misconceptions has been the misinterpretation of the concept and practice of nonviolence in different contexts by different groups, both secular

and religious (Burrowes 1996; Sharp 1973; Wink 1992: Chapter 13). Many misconstrue acts of omission as inaction. Nonviolent action often involves an act of omission – 'doing nothing' – or the refusal to carry out an action that is expected, such as employees' sit-in strikes. In this case, it does not mean inaction, does not amount to submissiveness, and is not to be misconstrued as passive resistance. In fact, nonviolent action is a direct means for prosecuting conflicts with opponents and is an explicit rejection of inaction, submission and passivity (Sharp 1973).

Another misconception is that people often consider that which is not violent to automatically be, or somewhat to be, nonviolence, while the truth is that not everything that is not violent is considered to be nonviolent action. Nonviolent actions refer to specific actions that involve risk-taking with wisdom aimed at invoking pressure or nonviolent coercion in contentious interactions between opposing groups. Nonviolent action is not limited to state-sanctioned political activities. It may be perceived as legal or illegal. While nonviolent activists use civil disobedience to deliberately defy unjust laws for a collective social or political purpose as a fundamental type of nonviolent action, the state may consider that as a violation of the law. Schock argues that nonviolent action is an unswerving determination to confront adversaries, and an open rebuff of inaction, compliance and passivity. Nonviolent action does not depend on moral authority, the "Mobilization of shame" or the conversion of the views of the opponent in order to promote political change. It aims to force the opponent to make changes by undermining the opponent's power (Schock 2005: 7).

Some Christians misunderstand Jesus' teaching of nonviolence in which according to St. Mathew Chapter 5 verse 39 he referred to as "Turn the other cheek" as impractical idealism. Many have interpreted the verse to imply a passivity that has made the Christian way of nonviolence seem cowardly and complicit in the face of injustice and brutal regimes. Such groups of Christians further back their argument with the St. Mathew Chapter 5 verse 39 stating "Resist not evil", which seems to break the back of all opposition to evil and to counsel submission. In the same way, 'going the second mile' has become a platitude, meaning nothing more than 'extend yourself' and appearing to

encourage collaboration with the oppressor. Jesus' teaching, viewed in this way, is impractical, masochistic, and even suicidal – an invitation to bullies and spouse-batterers to wipe the floor with their supine Christian victims. However, Walter Wink (Wink 1998: 98-111) professor of biblical interpretation, disputes that Jesus never displayed this kind of passivity. He argues that whatever the source of the misunderstanding and misinterpretation, such distortions are clearly neither manifested in Jesus nor his teachings. The problem lies in the traditional interpretation of the Holy Bible verses such as "do not resist an evildoer" which has been interpreted as nonresistance to evil – an odd conclusion, given the fact that on every occasion Jesus himself resisted evil with every fiber of his being.

On the other hand, while the Holy Quran has numerous messages of nonviolence, and nonviolent campaigns were employed by the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, and by his followers to settle disputes, there are still challenges of misconceptions and the misinterpretations of messages of the Holy Quran, as well as the actions of individual Muslims and groups such as *Al-Qaida*, ISIS, *Alsabab*, *Boko Haram* and others. The activities of these groups and continued terror attacks have largely influenced the attitudes of people in misconstruing Islam as a violent religion, particularly in the West. This misconception is mostly related to the misinterpretation of the concept of *jihad* among the radical Muslim groups.

While critics argue and support their argument that the Holy Quran itself permits and has contradictory positions regarding violence, there is less emphasis on the greater *jihad*, which stresses self-purification rather than 'fighting for the just cause'. *Jihad* of the heart, against one's own weaknesses and inner evil, is often described as the "greater jihad", while the "lesser jihad" is fought against external enemies. On the contrary, the recent development and successful implementation of nonviolent campaigns in Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt, which are predominantly Muslim-majority countries, indicates that nonviolence works in Muslim-majority countries.

The anarchist, Gelderloos (2007), claims that nonviolence is ineffective, racist, statist, patriarchal, tactically and strategically inferior, and deluded. These claims, according to Martin (2008), are a sign of the misunderstanding of nonviolence and are made without evidence. He argues that Gelderloos demonstrates a lack of awareness of the pragmatic approach in nonviolent action, misrepresenting it as comprising only protest and persuasion, and omitting the more forceful methods of non-cooperation and intervention. In addition, he attacks principled nonviolence from a standpoint in which the ends validate the means. He castigates nonviolent action campaigns on the basis of a number of premises which logically exhibit double standards.

Nonviolence advocates also face dilemmas on using nonviolence as a result of no or little consensus on certain critical principle matters. A prime example is abortion. Many feminists use nonviolent methods to support the use of abortion as women's right to choose, but there are also male and female opponents of abortion who use methods of nonviolent action such as picketing and boycotts. Not all supporters and opponents of abortion can be neatly pigeon-holed in terms of their beliefs. Some oppose all wars but support abortion as part of their feminist beliefs; others oppose all forms of violence and consider abortion to be violence against unborn children (Martin 2009: 432).

2.6 Nonviolent Methods

Nonviolent struggle has occurred in widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political conditions. It has occurred in the West and in the East. Nonviolent action has occurred in industrialised and non-industrialised countries. It has been practiced under constitutional democracies and against empires, foreign occupations, and dictatorial systems (Sharp 2005: 15). In his book entitled *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Sharp identifies 198 different methods of nonviolence (Sharp 2000: 119-423). However, Sharp and many other scholars acknowledge that the list of Sharp's nonviolent methods is not exhaustive, as new methods are constantly being invented by people across the globe (King and Miller 2006: 73). Accordingly, Sharp constructed three main categories for the methods of nonviolence: protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and

intervention (Sharp 2005: 19). Sharp, a leading scholar who has studied the methods of nonviolence the most extensively, observes that these methods have been used to address social, economic, ethnic, religious, national, humanitarian, and political matters which range from the trivial to the fundamental (Sharp 2005: 15). The methods of nonviolent action have been used all around the world to build up more justice and democracy. Table 2.2 summarises Sharp's three main methods of nonviolent actions and a constructive program coined by Gandhi.

Table 2.2: Methods of nonviolent action and their examples.

Nonviolent action	Examples
Protest	March, flash mob, petition, street theatre, political education
Non-cooperation	Boycott, strike, refusal to follow law or community taboo or system, halting or calling off a boycott, occupation, blockade
Intervention	Blockades, sit-ins, occupations, stopping arms shipments, TPNI: Third Party Nonviolent Intervention – protection and accompaniment work
Constructive Program	Starting alternative institutions or governments; needle exchanges; building underground civic schools; delivering free AIDS medication; desegregating lunch counters with sit-ins; Indian Salt March; Nonviolent Peacekeeping

Source: Bloch and Schirch 2018.

2.6.1 Protest

In broad terms, protest is a statement or action expressing disapproval or an objection. Thus, nonviolent acts of protest and persuasion are symbolic actions performed by an individual or group of concerned people to show their disapproval of a matter. The goal of this kind of action is to bring public awareness to an issue, persuade or influence a particular group of people or the government, or to facilitate future nonviolent action. The message can be directed towards the public, opponents, people affected by the issue, and the government or any other organised entity. Methods of protest and persuasion

include speeches, public communications, petitions, symbolic acts, art, peaceful marches or processions, and the writing of protest letters. It can also take the form of signing *protest lists* – to express dissent with a certain unfair decision, policy, law or politics.

Mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square in Egypt succeeded to unseat President Hosni Mubarak and led to the collapse of his repressive government in a mere 18 days. It did not work a few decades ago at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, where protesters employed the same tactics but were instead massacred by tanks (Buckingham 2013). While peaceful marches can be effective, they cannot be guaranteed as each context is unique. It is imperative for protesters to carefully study each context and the available relevant nonviolent options, including the use of persuasion as the first attempt before taking to the streets in protest. Meeting with or writing letters to the concerned authorities or politicians to explain a problem with proposals of actions to take, could work.

2.6.2 Non-Cooperation

Methods of non-cooperation are the broadest of the nonviolent methods which directly target the sources of power and the pillars of support of an opponent or target group (Sharp 1990: 10). When individuals or groups refuse to cooperate and obey whoever holds oppressive power, power vanishes. Thus, Helvey argues that "non-cooperation is the most powerful category of nonviolent methods available to opposition movements", as it can effectively undermine and remove the sources of power from the opponent (Helvey 2004: 35). Meanwhile, Sharp is of the view that the impact of different types of rebellious behaviour depends largely on the number of people involved and the extent to which the opponents rely on the persons and groups that are refusing to collaborate (Sharp 2005: 54). The goal of non-cooperation is to halt or hinder an industry, political system, or economic process. Methods of non-cooperation include labour strikes, economic boycotts, civil disobedience, tax refusal, and general disobedience. For example, the Egyptian midwives assigned to Hebrew women in the Holy Bible's Book of Exodus 1:15-19 were ordered by King Pharaoh to kill every Hebrew boy right from the birth stool and allow girls

to live. In the face of an order from the ruler to perpetrate genocide, the midwives disobeyed and allowed the boys to live. When Pharaoh questioned them, they convinced the king through a fabricated creative story that Hebrew women are so vigorous and quick that they give birth before the midwives arrive. By using civil disobedience and creative resistance, the women aborted unjust male orders and power.

Social non-cooperation refers to the refusal to continue upholding regular social relationships, either particular or general, with individuals or groups considered as having committed some wrong or injustice, or having unfavourable and socially-unaccepted attitudes and behaviours or practices (Sharp 2005: 55). The methods of social non-cooperation are many, but relatively few are discussed at length in any of the sources of literature. Non-cooperation is reflected in the withdrawal of individuals; non-participation in social events, customs and institutions; or pulling out of the social system as ways of showing opposition (Sharp 2005: 400). Methods of social non-cooperation have been widely used in South Sudan. These include the refusal to rent facilities, allotting residential or farmlands, or accepting marriage proposals from certain ethnic groups who are believed to be hostile.

Economically, this means boycotting or refusing to buy a commodity, merchandise or a service to show dissatisfaction with the one selling it. The boycott of commodities or services or both are typical examples of economic non-cooperation. The Black South Africans have boycotted shops and the products of Whites as a form of protest and economic non-cooperation.

In South Sudan, butchers from pastoral ethnic groups who are perceived to be hostile were historically forced out of farming regions, as the local population refused to buy their cattle meat. The farmers mobilised their community to boycott the meat slaughtered by pastoralists. This is because the presence of the pastoralists in farmlands is associated with the presence of cattle which often feed on farmlands, destroying crops and bee cells. Moreover, some, if not all, pastoralists use firearms, are often aggressive, and show very little respect for farmers' communities (John 2012: 16).

Political non-cooperation implies the withholding of collaboration, political support, allegiance or conformity with the accepted or required standards of behaviour in political offices or systems. Sharp notes that the goal of nonviolent action may be to attain a certain limited objective, or to transform the nature or composition of a government, or even to bring about its breakdown. In his view, political insubordination includes rejection of authority, citizen non-cooperation with government, citizen alternatives to obedience, action by government personnel, domestic governmental action, and international governmental action (Sharp 2005: 60, 443).

In October 2007 in Sudan, the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) pulled out of the ministerial positions in the Government of National Unity in Khartoum as a political non-cooperation action to protest for undermining the full implementation of the CPA. This nonviolent action increased international and regional political pressure on the Khartoum government, forcing the government, dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP), to negotiate with the SPLM to resume their political office and implement the CPA (Sudan Tribune 2007). Political non-cooperation encompasses the refusal to give or compromise political support.

2.6.3 Direct Interventions

Nonviolent intervention, as compared to protest and non-cooperation, is a more direct method of nonviolent action. Intervention is often more immediate and effective than the other two methods but is also harder to maintain and riskier to those involved. Nonviolent intervention methods are actions essentially designed to interrupt or disrupt a given activity, policy or process of the opponent (Sharp 1990: 10). The methods include “fasts, sit-ins, blockades, nonviolent obstruction, the establishment of new social patterns, stay-in strikes, alternative economic institutions, the seeking of imprisonment, work-on without collaboration and parallel government” (Sharp 1990: 10). Weber and Burrowes add that it involves setting up alternative political and socio-economic institutions including “non-hierarchical cooperatives, markets, ethical

investment groups, alternative schools, energy exchange cooperatives as well as parallel media, communications and transport networks" (Weber and Burrowes 1991). This is that which Gandhi refers to as the *constructive program*. Methods of nonviolent intervention can be negative or positive and may disrupt, even destroy, or otherwise establish new behaviour patterns, policies, relationships or institutions.

Methods of intervention include occupations, such as the 10-day siege of oil company facilities in the Niger Delta Region in 2002. The more than 2,000 women between the age of 30 to 90 seized control of the Chevron-Texaco oil terminal, airstrip, docks and stores which provide the only entry point to the facility, disrupting the production of approximately 450,000 barrels of crude oil each day that the protest lasted (Miller 2006: 42-46).

The methods of nonviolence have been used all around the world to build up more justice and democracy. However, nonviolence not only concerns resistance against injustice and oppression in the world. It also concerns building up and supporting good systems and initiatives. Accordingly, Zunes, Kurtz and Asher have summarised Sharp's three categories of nonviolence methods into the following:

> In the first category of nonviolent protest and persuasion, protesters name what they think is wrong, point out fingers at it and try to help others understand. This category would include such tactics as petitioning, picketing, demonstrating, and lobbying. The second category is nonviolent non-cooperation. By these actions, they say that we deliberately fold our hands and turn our backs, refusing to participate in the wrong we have named. This category would include such tactics such as boycotts, strikes, and tax resistance. The third category is nonviolent intervention. With these actions we face the wrong we have named, the wrong we have refused to aid, and we step into the way, interfere, block. This category includes such tactics as physical obstruction, blockades, civil disobedience, and sit-ins (McAllister 1988: 21).

Nonviolent actions support and reflect the mechanisms of nonviolent change. The methods of nonviolent action that are available for use by the opposition against an opponent are both extensive and varied. A point to note is that

creative thinking is encouraged to tailor methods for specific situations. The selection of the proper methods of nonviolent action depends upon the objectives sought by their use. Sometimes a movement, or organisations, might select a method based upon a preference or known capability, and then may or may not select an objective for the nonviolent action. Such an approach 'puts the cart before the horse'. Ideally, one should first examine the objectives and then review the menu of methods to select those that provide the most appropriate means to further the strategic and tactical objectives (Helvey 2004: 34-92).

2.7 Strategies of Nonviolence

The term *strategy* was first used in the military service. Thus, to this day, the term has a military connotation. Nevertheless, strategies have been widely used in the NGO, business, peacebuilding and other sectors. With this in mind, Sharp stresses that "the development of a sound and effective strategy for a nonviolent struggle depends upon the careful formulation and selection of the grand strategy, strategies, tactics and methods" (Sharp 2010: 45). Nonviolence does not just occur spontaneously but depends on good planning and good strategies. If the nonviolent campaigns are to have the best possible effect, the strategy must be adapted to the specific context in which the actions are taking place. The strategy must also be clear to everyone involved across the different phases. Are plans B and C present in case plan A does not work? This helps to imagine the different outcomes for what could happen when one uses different nonviolent methods to ensure that one is more prepared beforehand for different counter actions. This works better when the group prepares joint training or preparation meetings (John 2014: 29).

The use of nonviolent methods requires relevant strategies, timing and resources. The organisation of peaceful demonstrations is valid and more relevant where all other attempts to persuade the oppressor have failed or have been proven ineffective. Protesters need to observe nonviolent discipline and, where possible, involve respectable personalities whose presence underlines the significance of the cause. This makes it difficult for the opponents to

conclude that the protesters are just troublemakers (Wilson and Andrews 2006: 6). Another example involves one's neighbourhood school introducing a policy of severe penalties for speaking in class. Students and parents might think that this policy is unfair and applied capriciously. To oppose the policy, they might organise and institute a campaign of ostracism of the teachers, non-cooperation with all school policies, and fasts outside the school entrance. These are powerful methods of nonviolent action, but are they necessary? It might be easier to first seek a meeting with school officials and negotiate a solution. Gandhi initiated dialogue with his opponents as a first step in his campaigns (Martin 2009: 434).

Studies have found that mass participation that draws on diverse segments of society tends to empower and co-opt reformers while cutting off hard-liners from sources of support (Chenoweth and Stephen 2016). The key contributing factors to the victory of nonviolent campaigns are the use of relevant, sequenced and diverse methods and strategies used by the activists and their supporters as well as massive participation that originates from all age, ethnic, religious and gender groups. Furthermore, strategic planning, proper organisation, coordination, the effective use of media and leadership are vital to the success of nonviolent campaigns. Accordingly, these renowned scholars who carried out research on the strength of violent and nonviolent campaigns made the following conclusions. Sharp argues that "however, the formulation and the application of strategy in large-scale nonviolent struggles are more complex than in military conflicts. This is because the factors contributing to success and failure in nonviolent struggles are more numerous than in military struggles", since the former involves many institutions of the society and a greater number of people as opposed to only having the military forces as combatants, as is the case with the latter. Supporting this, Chenoweth and Stephan note that nonviolent campaigns have a higher chance of success as compared to violent campaigns. The strength of the regime makes very little difference to the success of the campaign (Sharp 2005: 444).

2.8 Communication in Nonviolent Campaigns

Communication is essential for the success of any nonviolent action. Researchers dealing with mass communication have developed many sophisticated and insightful means of communication, varying from analogue to digital. The level of communication being used varies greatly among nations depending on the level of the socio-economic development of the country. Communication is vital for planning, mobilising and educating the public about the aim and objectives of the nonviolent campaign. It also aims to change public opinion about the injustice, habits, attitudes and behaviour of the public in relation to the issues at stake. In the 2011 "Arab Spring" protests, social media networks played an important role in the rapid disintegration of at least two regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, while also contributing to socio-political mobilisation in Bahrain and Syria. Mobilisation of the multitudes of protesters within a short time in Tunisia and Egypt was largely due to the initial mobilising effects of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and social media networks. The protests were launched by a Facebook campaign run by the opposition "April 6 Youth Movement", which generated tens of thousands of positive responses to the call to rally against government policies (Stepanova 2011: 2).

The Tunisian government blocked certain routes and singled out specific sites that coordinated protest actions. The response from the Egyptian government was rather harsher, perhaps as they learned from the contribution of the Internet in civil resistance and Tunisia's history in particular. Thus Egyptian authorities blocked Twitter and Facebook, and ordered all major telecommunications providers to block Internet access. As a result, 93% of Egypt's Internet addresses and networks were shut down. Nonetheless, the Internet shutdown and cell-phone service disruptions were major hindrances to Egypt's economy and debt rating (Stepanova 2011: 2).

According to Martin and Varney (2003b: 6), communication is critical in both sustaining and damaging a repressive regime's legality, in organising or disturbing opposition, and in communicating with adherents in other parts of the

world. There are at least three main target audiences. Firstly, there is the membership and supporters; these refer to persons who back one's movement either energetically or inactively. Secondly, there is the wider audience including antagonists and their followers, and passive groups who may find one's nonviolent campaigns appealing. Thirdly, prospective allies exist (the entire opposition, as well as every socially-active faction that shares similar principles and commitment to the nonviolent strategy and practice).
The potential allies may encompass worldwide spectators, regional and international peace and human rights NGOs, the media, other governments and the business community (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 60-61). However, communication not only concerns the conveying of words, pictures and videos; nonviolent actions such as non-cooperation potentially strongly communicate to the audience the purposes of the actions (Arsenijevic *et al.* 2011: 193). Thus action speaks louder than reported news articles. Activists should therefore treat communication issues as fundamental and draw lessons from every action to improve and achieve greater impacts. Gandhi was not a systematic theorist, but rather developed his ideas in conjunction with his campaigns, first in South Africa and then in India. Gandhi's writings and practices provided much of the inspiration for the later development of nonviolent action theory and practice (Gregg 1966; Shridharani 1939).

Communication systems are crucial since they are often used by contending parties in their efforts to win allegiance from the populace. It is important both in overcoming censorship and in countering elite perspectives and government propaganda to dismiss, shame and weaken activists by impounding records, suppressing information, pressurising the media, disseminating gossip and fabricating stories (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin and Varney 2003a: 229). Stories covered by journalists, photos, video tapes, eyewitnesses' reports, public lectures, and newsletters have all played a significant role in generating outrage against repression in various parts of the world. Digital photographs exposed the torture and abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Decentralised communication technologies, in the form of networks that are controlled by the Internet, better serve movements that are pitted against repression (Hess and Martin 2006). Above all, alternative communication

strategies have had to battle for attention against the dominance of newspapers, television and the radio (International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict 1998).

As mentioned earlier, communication does not only involve words but actions as well. Non-cooperation also creates meanings amongst observers and explanations that help to clarify the purposes of the actions (Arsenijevic 2011: 193). More importantly, using the media in nonviolent campaigns "... is like picking up a double-edged sword: the media can both support and destroy good campaigns" (War Resisters' International 2009: 49). The media should be approached with caution and a good understanding of what activists expect to gain from that interface.

The experience of recent civil uprisings in Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia indicate that governments target and shut down Internet services to obstruct social and other forms of media in their attempts to prevent activists from exposing their human rights violations on dissenting voices. Thus, activists must be aware of possible, deliberate communication shut downs and other barriers. Nevertheless, activists must be creative to explore and use alternative channels of communication to realise movement objectives.

2.9 The Role of Leadership in Nonviolent Campaigns

In nonviolent struggle, one often assumes the existence of a leadership group that understands and directs the action. However, it is important to widely spread knowledge about nonviolent struggle. The more people know and understand this nonviolent technique, the more difficult it will be for the opponents to "behead" the movement by imprisoning or killing the leaders. To be a leader is to serve as a spokesperson, and to help people find, offer, organise, and implement solutions to problems. Leadership can exist by a group, committee, individual, or a combination of these (Sharp 2013: 55).

Much as Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and others are influential and charismatic pioneering leaders, the success of their nonviolent movements did

not lie in their influence and charisma but in their ability to communicate movement objectives and strategies as well as mobilise, support and inspire the members to act towards achieving the objectives. This however does not underestimate the need for individual or group leadership to possess skills such as charisma; intellect; the ability to make quick, sound and wise decisions; observing discipline; and providing clear strategic directions for the movement. For example, Gandhi did not become a successful leader because of his personal charm or rhetoric skills, but due to his steady campaigns which urged Indians at all levels of society to take control over their own lives and then gradually separate the British from the country (Hakasson 2007: 33). This takes time and resources.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has examined broad theories of nonviolence, its concepts, definition, methods and strategies and how it is being used to advance peaceful social change. The exploration of the theories of nonviolence was a deliberate attempt to discuss and broaden the understanding of the theories of nonviolence to clarify different misconceptions and criticisms that have been labelled against nonviolence as well as the role of religion and religious communities in the fight against injustices and bringing about just and peaceful conditions. The chapter has highlighted that despite the fact that nonviolent campaigns have been empirically proven as more than twice as successful as compared to the violent campaigns, the practice reveals that one cannot guarantee its success, as every context is unique and there is no one-size-fits-all method of nonviolent action. Furthermore, the experience of Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, shows that nonviolent campaigns can sometimes fail to achieve their intended goals. The next chapter will discuss nonviolent campaigns in more detail with reference to how they have been used in different continents and countries of the world.

CHAPTER 3: NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS

3.1 Introduction

Despite the assumptions made in recent years that violence can bring results, organised civil resisters have successfully used nonviolent campaigns, including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organised non-cooperation to exact political concessions and challenge entrenched power. A nonviolent campaign, as the name implies, refers to a series of organised and observable tactics that are repetitively directed to prevent, transform or address a specific injustice to achieve a desired goal. A campaign is not an event, but a series of actions employed to put pressure on the opponent to achieve specific results (Mandikwaza 2016: 24).

A campaign can be violent or nonviolent depending on the means being used. A nonviolent campaign does not involve physical violence against human beings and their properties. Individuals or groups take actions in pursuit of social, economic and political objectives without violence. To this end, it is important that activists in social movements maintain a nonviolent discipline as a matter of principle and virtue as some members of the movement may be tempted to lose their temper and become emotional or even violent. Any use of violence by the social movement can give the opponent justification to use aggressive force against campaigners. Not using violence helps the movement attract and win sympathy and public support.

Nevertheless, the practice often shows that labelling one campaign as nonviolent and another as violent is difficult as both often overlap. Moreover, any modest nonviolent campaign without violence being used by protesters may attract repression from those who feel that the campaign tempers with their interests or power. Furthermore, there have been many cases in which violent struggles have switched strategies to become nonviolent – and they have found greater success (Dudouet 2014).

Nonviolent action refers to the application of unarmed civilian power using methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention to address grievances and to shift power in conflicts without inflicting or threatening physical harm (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 2). According to Schirch, nonviolent action is an intervention or action aiming to raise awareness and win public sympathy and support to balance power by convincing or coercing those who own the most power to accept the needs and desires of all (Schirch 2004: 28). Thus, nonviolent action is often manifested in strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, sit-ins, among hundreds of other methods.

Other terms used to refer to nonviolent action include people power, civil resistance and nonviolent collective action. These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. Nonviolent conflict is yet another terminology which has recently emerged. Chenoweth and Stephan define nonviolent conflict as a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means, without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008).

There is a large body of empirical evidence that suggests that nonviolent campaigns are more effective methods for social change than violent means. In a study of nonviolent and violent campaigns and outcomes between 1900 and 2006, Chenoweth and her colleague, Stephan, collected data on 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns. The findings indicate that nonviolent campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their counterparts. In other words, nonviolent campaigns have a 53% success rate and only approximately a 20% rate of complete failure. Violent campaigns were only successful 23% of the time, and complete failures occurred about 60% of the time. Violent campaigns succeeded partially in about 10% of cases, again comparing unfavourably to nonviolent campaigns, which resulted in partial successes over 20% of the time (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 7-44).

A recent study found that nonviolent campaigns are ten times as likely as violent struggles to consolidate democracy five years after the conflict has ended

(Chenoweth and Stephen 2012: 7). In the face of regime repression, nonviolent campaigns were six times more likely to be successful than violent campaigns, and twelve times more likely to attain concessions (Chenoweth and Stephen 2008). The ability of peace movements to maintain nonviolent discipline in the face of repression helps attract popular support and may contribute to loyalty shifts – and even defections – within the governments and security forces to attain concessions.

In order to fulfil the study's first objective, I had to explore the literature to assess the effectiveness and capacity of the South Sudanese civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns between 2011 and 2017. My prime aim for the assessment was to better understand which capacities could be built upon prevailing knowledge and skills in nonviolent campaign-making, and which obstacles still exist in the way of consolidating individuals and civil society syndicates with similar goals into a national nonviolent movement.

As shown in Table 3.1, it is apparent that South Sudanese non-state actors and citizens have used nonviolent tactics on several occasions, despite severe repression, including the use of live bullets by the government security forces. The chronological events of implemented campaigns also indicate that faith in peaceful means to political transformation is on the rise.

Table 3.1: Assessment of nonviolent campaigns implemented by in South Sudan between 2011-2017.

Years	Nonviolent action	Objective(s)	Results	*Strengths*	*Weaknesses*
2011	Hundreds of thousands of young men and women marched throughout 2010 to early January 2011 mobilising and educating citizens for a peaceful referendum.	Educate citizens about their civil and political rights to finally decide the fate of the region from Sudan's long history of marginalisation	The total of 98.7% voted in favour of secession which led to independence of the country six months later.	The marches attracted thousands of participants, were held regularly (every 9th of month) and in all major cities and towns in South Sudan.	Many civic and faith-based groups went partisan and emotional mostly advocating for secession. The space for minority voices calling for unity was limited.
2012	South Sudanese civil society youth took to streets of Juba against 75 corrupt politicians who were accused by President Kiir of stealing $4 billion from the nation's coffers.	Increase accountability for good governance	Only 1.5% of this sum was actually recovered	Corrupt officials were exposed	The protest did not continue for long due to repression from those implicated.
	In December 2012, over 1,000 angry citizens peacefully demonstrated on streets of Wau protesting the relocation of Wau County Headquarters to Bagare outside a state capital.	Increase citizens participation in public policy and decision-making processes	Protesters their opposition and resistance to government's unpopular plan. Their action was documented and widely disseminated	The action continued for about a week despite the use of live bullets and the killing of about 10 protesters	The government suppressed the group and went ahead with its plan and relocated the Headquarters to Bagare.
	The University of Juba Staff Association went on strikes for poor salaries and working conditions after the University was relocated to Juba from Khartoum after independence.	Improve salary grades and working conditions	The strike continued for nearly six months	Teaching staff salaries were increased	The leadership was threatened and some prominent members were forced into exile for safety reasons.
2013	In 2013, over 2,000 people marched across Juba carrying two dead bodies, symbolising the catastrophic effects of gun violence.	Improve security services for all	Security ministers were summoned in the parliament. This led to	Media was used to expose catastrophic effects of gun violence.	Few civic groups established community policing and continued dialogue to

			somewhat improved security in Juba		improve protection and safety of people
2014	The South Sudan Council of Churches' (SSCC) women desk launched monthly peace march in Juba. The march called for dialogue to resolve grievances between parties in conflict.	Increased public demand for peace through raising public awareness regarding the deadly effects of conflict.	Cessation of hostilities signed but not fully honoured by the parties.	The march was regularly held every month and in many cities and towns.	The march attracted few thousands of women. It would have been good if the prayers were conducted in public squares rather than in churches to mobilise mass participation.
2015	Bishops and clerics under SSCC issued a statement of intent calling the war senseless and appealing for an immediate ceasefire.	To renounce violence and announce the SSCC action plan for peace.	SSCC launched action plan for peace	The statement was strengthened with regional advocacy	Much as statements from church leaders are often strong, the statements nevertheless have little influence to bring political change.
2016	In October, a group of 32 civil society organisations petitioned the national parliament to revoke a ministerial order that cancelled old vehicle number plates issued by South Sudan states.	Ensure the ministerial order is revoked	The order was revoked by the national parliament	The petition has a strong legal basis, was submitted by CS leaders and was widely covered by the media	Although the ministerial petition was revoked, the Ministry of Interior went ahead to process new vehicle number plates
2017	In May, judges and magistrates went on strike, demanding pay increases, an improvement in working conditions, and the removal of the Chief Justice from the bench.	Improve working conditions and standard of living for judges and magistrates.	Increased public outcry of the prevailing economic hardship in the country	Judges and magistrates made their voices heard.	Protesters were divided and about 13 judges were dismissed. These, among others, weaken the protest.
	In May, University of Juba students marched from campus to the National Parliament to call upon the government to address the deepening economic crisis and the high cost of living.	Improve costs of living		Students openly demonstrated their frustration towards government failure to recover the economy.	Security crackdown on student leaders and lack of media coverage before the action hinder its success

	In December, thousands of South Sudanese women and men took to the streets of Juba with their mouths covered demanding an end to war and all forms of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV).	Increase pressure and popular demand for peace and accountability for SGBV crimes	35% women representation at all levels of the government was achieved as part of RARCSS	The march was complemented with women coalition lobby and advocacy meetings	No follow-up march conducted as tens of activists, mostly women leaders, were summoned by the national security following the march.
	The #SouthSudanIsWatching campaign was launched on 15 December 2017 as a social media campaign where campaigners put on a pair of glasses with national flag with hashtag #SouthSudanIsWatching.	To mobilise thousands of South Sudanese from around the world to pressure the government and armed opposition groups to end war and restore peace	Millions of South Sudanese rallied behind HLRF and IGAD peace talks which resulted in the signing of RARCSS on 12 September 2018.	Billboards (in Juba) and face-to-face meetings with the government and armed opposition leaders were also used to complement social media campaigns.	No peaceful marches were organised, otherwise the campaign would have attracted mass participation and had a greater influence.

Source: Author's field assessment note 2019.

From Table 3.1, it is clear that the South Sudanese from the civil society and public sector have used nonviolent campaigns and actions on several occasions in the recent past. The methods used were mostly protest tactics and did not involve much non-cooperation and interventions. As the context of South Sudan is highly militarised with a higher level of impunity, the nonviolent campaign experience of the South Sudanese must also be treated as unique with all its successes, shortcomings and weaknesses. As Rashler (2017) argues, nonviolent protest campaigns should be studied as dynamic and complex phenomena, rather than as a single case comprising various attributes such as size, scale, and scope, which are then compared with other cases. Protest campaigns have increased all over the world during the past few years with more scholars devoting more time and resources to studying them using both systematic quantitative and qualitative data and analytical tools and methods.

In the past, people power or civil resistance were used to topple the Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, which led to the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. Similar tactics were employed in ending Apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s. The resignation of President Suharto of Indonesia was largely due to popular pressure in 1998, among other successful stories of political changes brought about by the use of nonviolent campaigns (Ackerman and DuVall 2000).

Although civil resistance seems capable of transforming and ousting the most intransigent regimes, there are also examples of nonviolent campaigns that have been less successful or have even failed to achieve their objectives, such as the crushing of civil resisters in China. Despite the fact that the students and workers occupied Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, calling for democratic reforms and respect for human rights, the Chinese government cracked down on peaceful protesters, massacring about three thousand people (Nepstad 2015: 109). Similarly, the movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi to overthrow the Burmese military regime, failed (Schock 2005).

Nonviolent struggle calls for mass participation as it depends on popular support coming from the complaint cluster, third parties and also from the opponent's cadres and supporters (Sharp 1990: 14). Research shows that mass participation increases the effectiveness and longevity of nonviolent political struggles (Principe 2017). By creating linkages between women and youth's organisations and leveraging diverse tactics such as prayer vigils and mass demonstrations, movements are taking important steps in mobilising citizens and raising awareness to positively influence public opinion for justice and peace – critical ingredients for building a strong national movement.

Violent struggles rarely involve the participation of many ordinary members of society, as is the case with nonviolent campaigns, due to the central role that military forces play (Martin 2008). Building on the study by Hove (2016: 35), Table 3.2 provides examples of successful nonviolent campaigns, underscoring the advantage that civil resisters often have over the violent approaches.

Table 3.2: Examples of successful nonviolent campaigns.

Continent and Country	Year	Commentary
Africa		
Sudan	2019	In April 2019, Sudanese protesters ousted Arab military dictator Omer Elbeshir after nearly 30 years of repressive rule. This came after more than four months of continuous peaceful marches, sit-ins and civil disobedience supported by professional and political groups. Earlier, the popular October Revolution of 1964 and uprising of April 1985 are hallmark examples of the successful use of civilian-based nonviolent action to bring change. The October revolution and the April uprising brought down the two dictatorships of presidents Ibrahim Abboud and Gaffar Nimeri, respectively (Berridge 2015).
Zimbabwe	2017	In a week-long mass demonstration supported by the military, President Robert Mugabe was finally forced to resign after more than 39 years of oppressive rule. This result was achieved after Zimbabweans built up movement infrastructure and launched a series of nonviolent campaigns such as the #ThisFlag and Tajamuka/Sesjikile movements which added to the pressure that ultimately forced the resignation of Mugabe.
Tunisia	2011	In January 2011, thousands of civilians took to the streets to protest against the deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of political freedoms and rights in Tunisia. In response to the unrest, the regime imposed a curfew but few protesters complied with it. However, when Army Chief Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot civilians,

		Ben Ali fled to Saudia Arabia on 14 January, bringing to an end his rule (Kirkpa 2011).
Egypt	2011	Inspired by the success of the Tunisian movement, Egyptian civil resisters mobilised in response to deteriorating economic conditions, corruption and political repression. After a series of nonviolent actions, President Hosni Mubarak was removed from office on 29 February 2011 after 30 years of dictatorial rule (Maciej 2013: 125).
Madagascar	2002	Nonviolent action through massive protests, strikes, demonstrations and legal pursuits was initiated following a disputed 2001 election outcome where both President Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana were claiming victory. The runoff election declared Ravalomanana as the winner and new president of Madagascar in May 2002.
South Africa	1990	The abolition of Apartheid in South Africa was largely due to effective mass nonviolent action which pressured the government to release political detainees and negotiate a new political arrangement that guaranteed democracy and equal rights (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 18).
Asia		
India	1947	Strategic nonviolent struggle led by Mahatma K. Gandhi since 1916 led to Indian independence from the British Empire. Gandhi mobilised thousands of civilians and led mass non-cooperation and established institutions outside British control, undermining its dominance, which pressured the British to quit (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 18).
Philippines	1986	Philippines despot Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown through 'people power' (Martin 2005) when during the struggle, among their numerous actions, the nonviolent resisters safeguarded soldiers who withdrew their loyalty from the regime (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 19).
Indonesia	1998	The stepping down of President Suharto owed much to popular force (Martin 2005). Protests encouraged many people to join and participate while the regime's open repression against the protesters backfired against it (Martin and Varney 2003b: 28-29).
Thailand	1992 and 2006	A military dictatorship was removed from power in May 1992 by people through nonviolent struggle of widespread strikes and protests. The Thai Prime Minister was again forced to resign in early 2006 by a nonviolent movement as there was a wide belief that he was corrupt (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 19).
Lebanon	2005	Nonviolent action following the death of former prime minister Rafik Hariri saw the occupation of Martyr's Square by hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people in anti-Syrian protests leading to the resignation of the pro-Syria Prime Minister Omar Karami and his cabinet, although they temporarily remained in office in a caretaker role waiting for replacements (Peaceful Revolutions n.d.).
Europe		
Ukraine	2004-2005	Pro-democracy nonviolent campaigns resulted in defections by the military and police leading to the fall of the dictator (Merryman and DuVall 2006: 3), bringing about the success of the Orange Revolution where orange flags, shirts and tents were the symbols for the protesters which were spread throughout the streets where masses of citizens were encamped (Deats 2009: 9).

Georgia	2003	A corrupt and unrepresentative regime led by Eduard Shervadnadze was dethroned through nonviolence in the Rose Revolution where the clenched fist symbol was replaced by a hand holding a rose (Deats 2009: 9).
Nazi Germany	1943	The Rosenstrasse protest by Aryan wives in the heart of Berlin for the release of their Jewish husbands is one among other examples of successful nonviolent resistance in Germany and shows that nonviolence can be successful even against ruthless opponents (Celeste 2012).
Eastern Europe	1989	Following the collapse of communism in Poland, the legitimacy of one-party systems disappeared in eastern Europe as people in country after country took to the streets demanding regime change. Nonviolent movements successfully undermined the one-party systems, and put pressure on the political leadership leading to democratic changes in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in 1990 (Peaceful Revolutions n.d.).
Poland	1989	Fall of socialist systems in Eastern Europe in countries like Poland was made successful by a decade-long nonviolent struggle waged by the Solidarity organisation. Consequently, Solidarity was invited for negotiations by Poland's communist president, paving the way for free and fair elections (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 19).
Soviet Union	1991	A coup in the Soviet Union was prevented by strategic nonviolent action where people resisted it by strikes, stay-aways, among other means, and even saw soldiers ordered to shoot demonstrators sympathising with protesters (Martin and Varney 2003b: 31-33).
Tajikistan	1991	Among other matters, the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to strong support and nonviolent civic influence in independent countries. Nonviolent action, in different forms, contributed to the gaining of independence of other countries from the Soviet Union in 1990 like Mongolia, Lithuania and Moldova, and in 1991 in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia (Peaceful Revolutions n.d.).
Kyrgyzstan	2005	A corrupt and authoritarian regime led by President Askar Akayev was dethroned in the Tulip Revolution which was led by Kelkel, a student movement, following the parliamentary elections in February and March 2005 through mainly nonviolent action, although there were some violent incidents during its initial days (Peaceful Revolutions n.d.).
Serbia	2000	The fall of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic was triggered by mass movement led by Otpor (Martin 2005, 2008).
Americas		
United States of America	1765-1775	The *American* people have used three major nonviolent campaigns against British rule particularly against the Stamp Acts of 1765, the Townsend Acts of 1767, and the Coercive Acts of 1774. Those campaigns contributed to the subsequent independence of USA from Great Britain (Conser 2013: 299-315).
El Salvador	1944	Popular nonviolent campaign toppled the dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez despite being a US client state (Martin 2008).

Sources: Hove 2016; John 2019

3.2 The Experience of Nonviolent Campaigns in Africa

The methods of nonviolence have been used in Africa before Gandhi and other proponents were born, as Gandhi himself confessed “nonviolence is as old as the hills and mountains”. The review of different past and contemporary literature in Africa reveals that peoples from across the continent have employed nonviolent campaigns in their everyday life before and during colonial times or as anti-colonial struggles for liberation and self-rule, to independence and post-independent Africa. The tactics were used to transform socio-cultural, economic and political injustices. During colonisation, traditional African chiefs throughout the continent refused to pay certain taxes and engaged in economic non-cooperation through strikes and boycotts. Since independence, strategic nonviolent action has been credited with preventing or ending violent conflict in Nigeria, Liberia, Burundi, Senegal, and Zimbabwe (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 3). The nature of African nonviolent campaigns and resistance varied between countries, even within the British-colonised countries.

For instance, in Uganda, the traditional ruler of Buganda, Kabaka Mustsea II, led political non-cooperation and opposition against British plans for an East African federation (Clark and Randle 2013: 86). In 2000, women in Moundou, Chad, faced increasing attacks from street criminals and bandits. Market women in particular were robbed and molested. This prompted the Women’s Union for Peace to file an appeal against the increase in street violence and crimes. All the local women associations, including Muslim and Christian women’s groups, signed the appeal demanding for better protection. This action resulted in relatively improved security for all (Christopher 2006: 42-46).

While in Southern Sudan, Chief Girima Lorola of Lanyi (present-day Amadi State, South Sudan) successfully unseated the District Commissioner (DC) in Amadi after protesting against his exploitative labour policies. He walked from Amadi to the present Mangalla (about 120 miles) and launched a complaint against the DC for being responsible for the death of about tens of people who died while mining whitewash and those who died from famine. The government

policy, which forced the population to cultivate cotton instead of food crops, resulted in famine in the area (John 2014: 36).

In 2011, the Arab Spring unseated the dictatorial regimes of Bin Ali and Mubarak of Tunisia and Egypt, respectively. The popular protests inspired other civil resisters in the Arab world outside Africa such as in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and fundamentally reshaped the nature of politics in the region (Aday *et al*. 2012: 3). The following are some of the selected impressive cases of nonviolent campaigns in Northern and Southern Africa.

3.2.1 Republic of Sudan

The contemporary experience of nonviolent resistance in Sudan can easily be associated with the recent ouster of president Omer Elbeshir in April 2019. However, the Sudanese people have a long history of using nonviolent collective actions to bring about political and economic changes. In April 2019, thousands if not millions of protesters used peaceful marches, sit-ins and mass civil disobedience supported by professional and political groups as well as the military which eventually toppled Beshir's 30 years of repressive rule.

Although the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 was largely attributed to Tunisia as 'the first Arab revolution' to force a dictatorial military regime out of power, the reality indicates that the first Arab dictator to fall to a nonviolent resistance was not in Tunisia in 2011, but in Sudan in 1964. Since 1945, Sudan has experienced three successful nonviolent civil uprisings – in 1964, 1985 and 2019. These campaigns are notable because all three targeted and toppled the military regimes of Aboud, Neimeiri and Beshir, respectively, who are known for their repressive and dictatorial administrations (Naimark-Rowse 2017). Thus, the Sudanese people are not new to the use of nonviolent collective actions or popular uprising. The three campaigns were typical examples of the successful use of civilian-based nonviolent action to bring about political change using strikes, boycotts and organised non-cooperation (Berige 2015).

During the rules of Aboud, Numeiri and Beshir, Sudan experienced severe economic deterioration, sanctions and increased debt, leading to rising food prices and food shortages, and a general decline in living conditions throughout the country. The government increased the price of the essential commodities under the auspices of austerity measures. There was a general dissatisfaction with the performance of the government. This sparked widespread strikes led by university students, workers' trade unions, professionals and the general public. The former Sudan established a democratic system of governance after the fall of Neimeiri, which again did not last long. In 1989, Omer Hassan Ahmed El-beshir took over power through a military coup and ruled for almost 30 years. In April 2019, he was ousted following a series of nonviolent campaigns which started in December 2018.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, brought to an end the longest civil war in the world. The agreement succeeded to a large extent to halt gun violence between the principle parties but did not succeed in stopping political disputes between the signatories over the implementation of the peace deal which narrowly collapsed. In response, on 7 December 2009, thousands of residents, members of civil society and opposition parties demonstrated peacefully on the streets of Khartoum, demanding a peaceful transition to democracy and full implementation of the CPA. This action, coupled with international pressure, resulted in the Parliament's approval of the Referendum Bills for Southern Sudan and Abyei and the Popular Consultation Bill for Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile States. Before the demonstration, participants were educated in not using violence. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) then Secretary General, Pagan Amum, who was one of the fiercest rebel commanders, told demonstrators earlier not to use violence under any circumstances. He stated that "tomorrow we are going to exercise nonviolence through peaceful demonstrations and I repeat, it is peaceful demonstrations, if a person is not able and ready for this exercise better not participate". On the day of demonstration, the SPLM Secretary General disarmed his personal bodyguards such that they would not act violently in case of any clash with the police forces. Many nonviolent activists joined the demonstration. As one activist stated:

> We knew some of us would be beaten, arrested and tortured. But we decided to join anyway because we have a tool more powerful than the gun: Nonviolent methods. True, many were beaten up by the police, arrested and jailed. Fortunately, it did not last long to see the outcome of the action.

On 13 December 2009, the National Parliament passed the Referendum Bills for Southern Sudan and Abyei and the Popular Consultation Bill for South Kordofan and Blue Nile State in one day. Commenting on this progress, Mr Pagan Amum declared that "after four years we have discovered that the solution is in the Sudanese street (Korayi and Elias 2010: 43). Earlier, in 2007, the SPLM pulled out of the government of national unity in Sudan in protest to the NCP's lack of political will to fully implement the CPA. This action triggered regional and international pressure, resulting in the NCP recommitting to the implementation of the CPA.

In 1983, Mahmud Mohammed Taha and his followers resisted and campaigned against the imposition of Islamic Sharia Law in Sudan, arguing that it would fragment the country and its social fabric. In September of the same year, president Neimeri, with the support of the National Islamic Front (NIF), imposed Islamic Sharia law as the main source of legislation in Sudan's constitution. The law impacted negatively on non-Muslims and women of all faiths. Islam became the religion of the state and other faith groups were not only marginalised but pressured and persecuted. Muslim leaders who were opposed to the imposition of Sharia law were arrested and others were executed. For example, Mahmud Mohammed Taha was publically hanged on 18 January 1985 (Friday Muslim's worship day) at Kobar prison in Khartoum for campaigning against the Islamic Sharia laws, popularly known as "September laws", and advocating for a liberal Islam where Muslims and Christians could co-exist. In Republican Brothers and Sisters, Taha's organisation women had the same rights as men, *purdha*, separation of women from men is rejected. His organisation followed the nonviolent interpretation of the Holy Koran. He was known as the Gandhi of Sudan, also referred to as "Ustaz", Arabic for 'teacher'. Following his execution, mass resistance

increased against Neimeri's military regime. He was toppled in April 1985 (Mart and Aganwa 2011: 297).

During Beshir's dictatorial regime beween 1989-2019, the Christian minority in Sudan faced much repression, marginalisation and discrimination from attempts to crush the Christian faith in the Muslim-dominated country. Thus, church leaders were arrested, while others were falsely accused and forced into exile. Churches were demolished, lands and properties were confiscated, particularly in Khartoum and North Sudan. For instance, the Catholic club in Khartoum and the Headquarters of the Episcopal Church of the Sudan (ECS) in Omdurman were confiscated.

Notwithstanding these hurdles, churches mobilised and remained active in resisting government injustice and persecution towards Christians. Pastoral messages, statements, petitions and prayer vigils were held. For example, on 11 February 1998, Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir Wako of Khartoum Archdiocese issued a public statement explaining the truth about the confistigation of the Catholic Club opposite the Khartoum International Airport changed to NCP's Headquarters (Diocese of Rumbek 2001: 339-346).

The ECS, in collaboration with other faith-based groups, organised fasting and prayer vigils and also petitioned Khartoum state government authorities protesting the confiscation of its church land. The petition demanded, with immediate effect, the return of church properties and respect to religious freedoms and rights. Churches in Sudan also used group lobbying and peace diplomacy to wage pressure on the government. The visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carry, in 1994, and the subsequent visit of Pope John Paul II to Sudan ten years later, among other events, aimed to place pressure on the government to respect the rights of the Christian minority group and to return their properties. Consequently, the headquarters of Khartoum Diocese in Omdurman was later partially handed over to the ECS administration, but the Catholic club was transformed into the headquarters of the ruling NCP.

During the 1980s and 1990s up to the signing of CPA in 2005, President Omer Beshir bombed civilians in the oil-rich Upper Nile region to allow oil companies to operate and generate revenue to sponsor civil war. In 1999, ecumenical church delegations from the south travelled internationally to lobby boycotts of oil companies working with the Khartoum regime. The campaign gained momentum as the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) released its research report with findings confirming atrocities and human rights violations committed by the Sudan government and multi-national oil companies. The report further called on oil companies to suspend their operations as their activities exacerbated war and contributed to international crimes (Ashworth 2014: 178). In 2003, the Canadian Talisman Oil Company withdrew and seized its operations in Sudan. Oil was discovered in the Western Upper Nile in the 1970s by Chevron, an American oil company. Some political analysts argue that the discovery hastened the abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, as President Nimeri wished to control oil revenue from Khartoum without interference from the semi-autonomous southern regional administration in Juba (Ashworth 2014: 176).

In April 2007, the civil society and citizens of Kajbar Area in Northern Sudan marched peacefully against the Sudanese government and Sinohydro, a Chinese company planning to build the Kajbar Dam on the third cataract of the Nile. Local populations were not consulted and what actions to take with regards to the affected community remained unclear. Consequently, the security forces brutally cracked down on peaceful protesters, killing four and wounding more than 20 people. The special report by the UN Rapporteur on Sudan spoke of “excessive force” and “arbitrary arrests and prosecutions to stifle community protest”. The brutality of state machinery has caused many activists physical and psychological harm. Most of the cases remain unreported.

In 2011, Safia Ishaq, a political activist, broke the culture of silence after she was gang-raped by allegedly three agents from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) while in detention in Khartoum. In her Youtube video campaign, she exposed the shame (Human Rights Watch 2016). Safia’s civil

defiance and public testimony was widely supported in Sudan. She was applauded for her tremendous courage to expose the human rights violation and culture of impunity. Her family, groups of political leaders and rights activists who visited her faced intense intimidation and threats, and others were interrogated and arrested by the police. Nevertheless, her nonviolent campaign through a video campaign exposed gender crimes and human rights violations, weakening the ability of the state and its organs to continue such crimes with impunity. It also demonstrates the capacity and commitment of Sudanese women to speak out and demand justice and accountability (Gorani 2011: 1).

Women have historically faced the threat of sexual violence during or after participating in nonviolent action. This threat exists in some contexts to intimidate and discourage women from participation in public discourse. Exposing and shaming such patriarchal and system behaviours, as human rights abuses being committed with impunity, increase public awareness and condemnation of such behaviours and mobilise people to bring about the required change. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, acknowledges how conflicts affect women differently than men. The resolution addresses the critical role that women can play in peace and security processes and called for their meaningful participation in conflict resolution, management and sustainable peace.

3.2.2 Arab Republic of Egypt

Egypt has a long experience of civil resistance against the colonial administration which continued as part of the people's struggle in post-independent Egypt. The 1805 revolution and the 1881 Orabi movement are typical examples of nonviolent actions that led to Egypt's formal independence from the British in 1922 (Abdalla and Arafa 2013: 125). In 1919, Egyptians undertook months of civil disobedience against British occupation, centred in Cairo and Alexandria. Students and lawyers went on mass strikes followed by workers in the postal, telegraph, tram and railway services. These nonviolent campaigns forced the British to partly recognise Egyptian independence (Zune 1999: 42).

The most recent success of Egyptian nonviolent resisters started on 25 January 2011 with thousands of protesters marching to the streets demanding an end to Mubarak's regime. This came as an inspiration few days after the Arabs' Spring in Tunisia who had successfully overthrown their autocratic ruler, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, with a popular uprising on 14 January 2011. As in Tunisia, the main drivers of the unrest in Egypt have been poverty, rising prices, social exclusion, anger over corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, and a demographic bulge of young people unable to find work. The protesters' cries were "The people want the fall of the regime", "Mubarak, go", and "Illegitimate, illegitimate". The protests have grown and included people from all sectors of society, but youth played a significant role (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011).

President Mubarak responded by violent repression, arresting and killing hundreds in the process. Despite the repression, the peaceful demonstrations continued, gaining momentum and eventually winning the support of the military, leading to the resignation of President Mubarak on 11 February 2011. The parliament was dissolved by the military leading to the total collapse of Mubarak's regime after nearly 30 years of rule (Kanalley 2011). The protests were coordinated by civil society activists and political figures with no single or unified leadership.

On 25 January 2013, the same protesters marched peacefully against President Morsi for the lack of economic development, democratic change and social inclusion of minority groups. The protest, which started with hundreds of thousands, increased to millions of civil resisters across the country. This put pressure on the government and on 3 July 2013, the Egyptian military removed Morsi from office and arrested him (Associated Press 2013). When Morsi was removed from power, there was a period of political crisis in the country. The political unrest was only contained in January 2014.

3.2.3 Tunisia

In January 2011, thousands of business communities, lawyers, teachers and the general public took to the streets to peacefully protest against the deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of political freedoms and rights in Tunisia. In response to the unrest, the regime imposed a curfew but it did not work as few protesters complied with it. Despite widespread strikes and peaceful demonstrations, Ben Ali did not resign. Protests continued and gained momentum and the support of the populace across the country. The government responded with increased repression of the protesters. However, when Army Chief Rachid Ammar refused orders to shoot civilians, Ben Ali realised that he had no means of enforcing his rule and thus he fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011 (Kirkpa 2011). The uprising was triggered by the suicide of a young vegetable vendor after his cart was confiscated by the police for not having a license to operate. However, the citizens were already frustrated with the regime in the first place. The Tunisian experience inspired activists in other northern African countries and the Middle East.

3.2.4 Libya

The popular uprising in Libya, which started in Benghazi on 15 February 2011, was triggered by the arrest of human rights activist, Fethi Tarbel, who has worked to free political prisoners, as reported in the Quryna newspaper (Reuters 2011). Prior to the Libyan revolution, the Qadhafi regime systematically silenced, paralysed and destroyed many civil society and political parties in Libya. There were essentially no independent trade unions, youth and women associations, or even parent-teacher organisations in Libya before the revolution. Given the absence of the civic space, nonviolent campaigns in Libya did not last long. The protests developed into full-scale internal armed conflicts between the Muammar Gadaffi regime and the rebels, unlike the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt, where mass protests never descended into sustained violent conflict (Aday *et al.* 2012: 19). As there were no civil society organisations, Libyans turned to their family and the tribes for individual and group politics and support. The result was a fragmentation of the

society – it will take time to revive the society and establish genuine civil society organisations and democratic institutions in the post-Gadaffi era.

Despite more attention being given to the successes of nonviolent campaigns in North Africa and the Middle East, Davies (2014: 299-313) notes that there are many lessons to be learned from the failures of nonviolent struggles in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria. He argues that in each of these struggles, nonviolent action might have contributed to its own failure. Specifically, he argues that in Bahrain, nonviolent action made resisters vulnerable to repression; in Egypt, the nonviolent campaigners' strategy of alignment with the military facilitated subsequent military repression; in Libya, the repression of nonviolent resisters generated international outrage, making external military intervention easier to justify; and in Syria, nonviolent action contributed to splits in the military, encouraging a transition to armed struggle. Davies' analysis is well-informed in terms of nonviolent action theory; in particular, he looks at the process of political jiu-jitsu, a process by which violent attacks on peaceful protesters can generate greater support for the protesters, analogous to the martial art of jiu-jitsu (Sharp 1973: 657-703). Davies draws on numerous commentaries on the four cases, providing an especially useful overview of international factors. Despite these strengths, there are some questionable aspects to Davies' analysis and conclusions.

However, Schock (2005), in consideration of the first mode of failure that nonviolent action can make resisters vulnerable to repression. This risk is greatest when using methods of concentration, such as rallies, where large numbers of protesters are in specific public locations, making them prime targets for attack by police and troops. In such circumstances, nonviolent action strategists recommend switching to methods of dispersion, including strikes, boycotts and symbolic methods such as turning off the lights at a particular time. Davies (2014: 308-309) further argues that these types of methods reduce the physical risk to protesters while enabling a continuation of the struggle. Davies refers to "widely dispersed nonviolent action, with protests in locations encompassing population centres from Al Dair to Dar Kulaib, Alexandria to Aswan, Zawiya to Tobruk and Daraa to Qamishli".

Another case of nonviolence in the Middle East was evident during the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza. There were obvious elements of civil resistance in the *intifadah*, which began on 9 December 1987 (Roberts 1991: 6). However, the *intifadah* was blamed on the grounds that it was using a combination of nonviolent and violent actions. Particular references are often given to the stone-throwing and the killing of those perceived as 'collaborators'. The *intifadah* failed to end the occupation itself but succeeded in keeping the occupation on the international agenda (Roberts 1991: 6-7).

3.2.5 South Africa

In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) carried out unarmed resistance for nearly 40 years. Chief Albert Luthuli, the sixth president of the ANC, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a member of the Zulu ethnic group, was inspired by Gandhi's writings and became a champion of non-violence. Although the ANC was unable to sustain its non-violent struggle in the face of the brutal Apartheid regime, it partly resorted to guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, the heart of the resistance movement was classic nonviolent resistance where nonviolent tactics were used including rallies, marches, petitions, boycotts, education, prayers, fasts and civil disobedience (Deats 2010: 13). The armed struggle would have been much more difficult and prolonged had students, industrial workers, religious leaders, youth and women's organisations not joined in nonviolent resistance to the racist regime. The state repression was faced by strikes, as in Durban in 1973, and the popular 1976 Soweto students' anti-Apartheid uprising gave birth to the Black civil resistance (Niefetagodien 2014).

Thus, the liberators of the Blacks in South Africa were not only the guerrilla fighters, but hundreds of thousands of men, women and children, shop assistants, and workers living in shanty towns who consciously or unconsciously adopted methods that Gandhi and others had used. These actions forced President Fredrick de Klerk to institute reforms. He eventually

legalised the African National Congress (ANC) and released Nelson Mandela, who had been in prison for 29 years. In 1994, the first open elections in South Africa's history were held in an amazing manifestation of a whole nation peacefully voting for revolutionary change, moving from a White racist regime to multiracial democratic rule. Mandela's passion for freedom and justice for all was expressed by him reaching out to his former enemies and working with them.

The South African anti-Apartheid movement brought electoral victory to Nelson Mandela and the ANC but has not yet succeeded in reducing poverty for millions of South Africans (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 207). Originally, the use of civil resistance against Apartheid was based on Gandhian ideas, which originated in South Africa in 1906 when Gandhi was a lawyer working for an Indian trading firm. Soon the ANC, founded in 1912, became the major force opposing the Apartheid system of oppression of the 80% non-European population of the country. Using mostly legal tactics of protest during its first four decades, the ANC became more militant in the early 1950s and began using nonviolent direct action.

White South Africans (Afrikaners) monopolised control over the state and the economy, including rich natural resources such as one third of the world's known gold reserves. The Afrikaners developed an explicit theology and philosophy of White racial superiority and a legal and economic system enforced by a modern military and police force which deliberately excluded non-Whites from economic and political power. Nevertheless, the system became increasingly reliant upon non-White labour and isolated from international diplomacy and trade. Discouraged from the lack of results from their nonviolent campaign, Nelson Mandela and others called for an armed uprising, creating the *Umkhonto We Sizwe* ('Spear of the Nation') which paralleled the nonviolent resistance. This too failed to tear down the Apartheid system and finally, a concerted grassroots nonviolent civil resistance movement, in coalition with international support and sanctions, forced the White government to negotiate.

On 17 March 1992, two-thirds of South Africa's White voters approved a negotiated end of the minority regime and the Apartheid system. Nelson Mandela was elected as the president of the new South Africa in the first free elections by the entire population. The decades of struggle saw the ebb and flow of a wide variety of strategic actions within the anti-Apartheid movement. American theologian Walter Wink (1987: 4) suggests that the movement was "probably the largest grassroots eruption of diverse nonviolent strategies in a single struggle in human history."

3.3 The Asian Experience of Nonviolence: India and the Struggle for Independence from the British

The Indian nonviolent struggle for independence, spearheaded by Mohandas K. Gandhi, was perhaps a unique case example of nonviolence practice of the twentieth century. He (Gandhi) employed tactics of strikes, boycotts and protests to force the British government to eventually grant independence to India (Gandhi's politics: The experiment with nonviolence n.d.: 7-8). Thus, the emancipation of India largely accomplished through nonviolent means, inspired many people across the globe to replicate similar if not the same experience in their struggle for independence, democracy and accountable governance (Ahmad 2001: 28). Gandhi was the greatest exponent of the doctrine of *ahimsa* or nonviolence in modern times, but he was not its author. *Ahimsa* has been part of the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist religious traditions for centuries. However, it was Gandhi who transformed what had been an individual ethic into a tool of social and political action. He also introduced *satyagraha* (holding on to truth) and the constructive program as nonviolent methods until he successfully reached an agreement with the South African government in 1914 and left for India. Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 for refusing the British terms of independence which divided the Muslims and Hindus into Pakistan and India. He was an extraordinary and fascinating leader who dominated politics in the 20th century.

Nevertheless, Gandhi was criticized as a racist and supporter of British colonial power (Desai and Vahed: 2015). This accusation in my view, could be related to professional dilemma lawyers are often trapped in as they defend the interests of their clients. For Gandhi, he was hired by the wealthy Gujarati Muslim merchants and Indian community in South Africa to legally fight for their civil status. Gandhi therefore, defended his clients to be treated as British Imperials. His legal argument was that Indians came to Natal as British subjects and were entitled to equal treatment on the basis of Queen Victoria's 1858 proclamation, which asserted the equality of all imperial subjects. He also petitioned the British colonial regime and secured the third entrance for Indians. Those actions branded him as promoting racial discrimination. Despite the criticism on Gandhi's lifestyle, ideas and actions, his teaching and strategies of nonviolent action have greatly influenced the likes of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr (King 2010: 41), a Muslim Sheik Abdul Jafar Pashah Khan from Paskistan (Easwaran 2002:154).

Many African leaders during the independence struggles particularly in Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, and Ghana cited Gandhi as an inspiration (Ettang 2014). He influenced the activities of liberation movements, civil rights movements and religious organisations in all five continents of the world. In recognition of his legacy, the United Nations (UN) on June 15 2007 adopted a resolution declaring October 2 Gandhi's birth day as International Day of Nonviolence (The United Nations 2007). Gandhi was an ordinary man born in 1869 to Karamchand Gandhi and Buthi Bai. He grew up like any human being also did mistakes and wrong things. But he always felt guilty for any wrong, confessed and repents (Kovai 2017: 6). While in School, Gandhi was an average student and was never intelligent (Kovai 2017: 13). Nevertheless, he grew up and became a universal figure. His life inspires ordinary people to make a difference.

3.3.1 Syria

Inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrians mobilised against Assad's dictatorial rule. On 26 January 2011, a citizen set himself on fire, imitating the scenario that had sparked the Tunisian uprising. The incident indeed triggered peaceful demonstrations but they were quickly crushed by the military. However, protesters re-organised themselves and in late March 2011, hundreds of thousands protested in a number of cities across Syria. In response, President Bashar al-Assad used the military force to crush the protests. The result was the killing of thousands of protesters since the uprising emerged (Van 2011). This repression was also faced with yet another form of civil disobedience from within the military, especially those who sympathised with the killing of unarmed civilians. Thus, a number of troops defected in the summer of 2011 (Chulov 2011). Others sought asylum abroad, while others have been publicly executed by the Syrian state (Oweis 2011; Karam 2011).

During this phase of the struggle, although the majority of protesters were Sunni, members of minority groups, including Christians, Kurds, Druze and Alawites (an off-shoot of Shi'ism and the sect of the ruling Assad family), protested in disproportionately high numbers. The Syrian uprising, as in the case of Libya, had less than one year before a brutal regime crackdown, and a shift to armed insurgency by opposition elements overturned the nonviolent resistance (Kahf 2013: 1-2).

Under ideal situations, the average nonviolent campaign lasts approximately three years to run its course (Chenoweth 2016). Nonviolent resistance did not succeed in achieving its objectives, mostly due to immense repression which resulted in the killing of activists and their imprisonment, which forced the remaining activists into hiding and exile (Kahf 2013: 22). The military intervention of the US and allies from Libya, Afghanistan and other countries in support of the Free Syrian Army strengthened the military option to the nonviolent resistance. In light of the fact that most of the military still have allegiance to President Assad and have remained loyal to his regime, the nonviolent uprising has had little chance to succeed. Nevertheless, the

experiences of Sudan and Zimbabwe reveal that the will of the people cannot easily be crushed by dictators. Nonviolent movements often regroup to re-strategise, mobilise and seize particular moments of economic and political crisis to continue resistance. Moreover, government repression can sometimes backfire leading to defections within the ruling elites and the military, which can shift power and strengthen the chances for the movements to succeed in the long run.

3.3.2 Bahrain

Encouraged by the success of nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, mass demonstrations erupted from 14 February 2011 to 16 March 2011 in Bahrain. The Arab Spring generally awakened people across the region and uncovered to them the importance of voicing their grievances as they demanded accountability and transparency from the government, and the protection of human rights and civil liberties (Saban Center 2012: 4). Protesters in Bahrain demanded political and economic change in the country. However, Fattahi (2012: 3) argues that the Bahraini nonviolent movement's failure to unite the Sunni and Shiite sects crippled its ability to fully maximise individual and collective participation in demonstrations against the rule of the al-Khalifa dynasty. The success of a nonviolent action strategy rests on the ability of organisers to maximise the participation of individual and collective actors in the demonstration process. Participation increases the probability of overcoming the state's pillars of power, chiefly its security forces. Maximising and managing participation is best achieved by building upon and sustaining the three pillars of a nonviolent action strategy: nonviolent unity, planning, and discipline (Fattahi 2012: 1).

3.3.3 People Power in the Philippines

Unlike dozens of similar successful civil resistance movements in South Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe, the Philippines "people power" revolution remains one of the most impressive in terms of the numbers of people involved, the level of nonviolent discipline and the way it captured the imagination of observers and people around the world (Zunes 1999: 129).

The mass protests followed the February 1986 elections which many believed had been manipulated in favour of the sitting President Ferdinand Marcos who had ruled the country since 1972. Many factors contributed to the success of the nonviolent campaign, known as 'People Power', that overthrew the Marcos government in early 1986. These include pressures from foreign governments, electoral fraud, a deteriorating economy, and governmental human rights abuses, the threats posed by communist and Muslim insurgents, the murder of Benigno Aquino, and the defection of key military figures (Boyd 2010).

In February 1984, Hildegard and Jean Goss-Mayr, non-violence trainers with experiences in promoting nonviolence in Europe and Latin America, visited the Philippines on a fact-finding mission (Sider 1987: 9). In the summer of the same year, the two nonviolence trainers from the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) returned to the Philippines and held seminars on the gospel and active nonviolence. These seminars lasted six weeks and included one with 30 Roman Catholic bishops (Wink 2003: 97-98). Goss-Mayr ran another seminar for leaders of the opposition political parties attended by Butz Aquino, labour unions, peasants, students, and the church (Sider 1987: 59). Later, Richard Deats conducted another three weeks of nonviolence training, primarily for Protestant leaders. From these seminars, AKKAPKA (*Aksyon Para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan*, 'Action for Peace and Justice') was founded to continue the training and organisation of the people. Within the year, AKKAPKA, under the leadership of Father Jose Blanco and Tess Ramiro, held 40 nonviolence seminars in 30 provinces, with the cooperation of many Filipino bishops, clergy, nuns, and lay leaders (Wink 1987: 138-139). These trainings had a ripple effect as participants shared their new skills with others. As stated by Blanco and Dawn (1987: 110):

> Many of those who had taken the seminar on active nonviolence formed various groups and joined the rallies and demonstrations. They used techniques of dialogue with the police and military. They went on fasting and prayer to prepare themselves internally.

Consistent with these teachings, a coalition of approximately 500 organisations, with a combined membership of nearly 1.5 million activists, formed to conduct nonviolent actions (Zunes 1999: 134). Thus Zunes (1999: 129-130) points out that "the successful use of nonviolent action in the overthrow of the Marcos regime was not wholly spontaneous, but a culmination of years of preparation in the methods of nonviolent resistance."

3.3.4 Nonviolent Campaigns in Thailand

In May 1992, a military dictatorship was removed from power by people who used widespread strikes and protests. A similar experience was replicated in 2006 when the Thai Prime Minister was again forced to resign through nonviolent action. He was toppled on corruption charges (Popovic *et al* 2006: 19).

3.4 European Cases of Nonviolent Actions

People across continents have been engaging in developing and implementing nonviolent actions for centuries. In Europe, multiple countries have engaged millions of citizens in rallies, boycotts, strikes and other actions. In many of the conflicts that have taken place in the history of mankind, the advocates of nonviolence have argued that violence was not only immoral but a less effective means of achieving certain objectives (Martin 2008). The conviction exists that nonviolence, like violence, is very active in the sense that it is a means of persuasion to achieve certain objectives using tactics such as boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, street theatre and demonstrations, to mention a few.

3.4.1 Ukraine's Orange Revolution

In Ukraine, civil resisters popularly known as the Orange Revolution, launched pro-democracy nonviolent campaigns which resulted in defections by the military and police, leading to the fall of the dictator (Merryman and DuVall 2006: 3). The success of the Orange Revolution was dependent on the mass mobilisation of people and the use of campaign media such as orange flags, shirts and tents where the protestors encamped (Deats 2009: 9).

3.4.2 Nonviolent Struggle in Poland

Mindful of oppressive socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and Poland in particular, civil resisters protested and succeeded to topple the socialist regime in Poland. The struggle was made successful by a decade-long nonviolent campaign waged by the Solidarity organisation. This organisation started by using strikes to establish a free trade union, and went on to use underground activities which challenged the government and made the government illegitimate during martial law. Consequently, Solidarity was invited for negotiations by Poland's communist president, paving the way for free and fair elections (Popovic *et al.* 2006: 19).

3.4.3 Germany: Women Protesters demand their Jewish Husbands

Even in the most repressive and dictatorial regimes, such as Hitler's regime, nonviolence has demonstrated its success, as was the case of women protesters in Germany. The Rosenstrasse protest by Aryan wives in the heart of Berlin aimed at releasing Jewish men who had married German women. The success of the campaign reveals that nonviolence can be successful even against ruthless opponents (Celeste 2012).

3.5 Nonviolent Campaigns in the Americas: The Case of the United States of America

The year 2011 has witnessed the resurgence of popular nonviolent actions in the modern history of the USA. The actions range from 'Occupy Wall Street' to 'Flood Wall Street' to 'Black Lives Matter' to 'Standing Rock'. The recent protests started in November 2016, where many Americans in nearly every major city participated in opposition to Donald Trump's election or to counter-protest in its defence (Chenoweth 2016). However, the actual history of nonviolent actions in the US can be traced back to its years of struggle for

independence from the British, and to the civil rights campaigns of African-Americans and American Indians.

Martin Luther King Jr. was greatly inspired by Gandhi's teachings and his theological reflection, interpretation and practice of active nonviolence. As Ash recommends (2009: 375), in order to redistribute power with the Whites who held the power, the Civil Rights Movement demanded the rights of the African Americans to vote as equal citizens in the United States of America. At a meeting between King and President Lyndon Johnson, King explained to the president the subsequent steps to be taken for equal rights. The president agreed to the demand but argued that it was politically impossible to make this change in less than five years. He argued that King and his team should be patient. King rejected the call for patience and, as he was departing the White House, stressed that "We have been patient for 300 years. We won't wait any longer". After persuasion had failed, the civil rights movement went ahead and arranged the popular march from Selma to Montgomery, and five months later the Voting Rights Act was passed. By taking the power in their own hands, the protesters achieved the seemingly impossible (Organization for Nonviolence and Development 2014: 2).

In 1942, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was formed by Houser and Bayard Rustin to champion change. In 1947, CORE recruited eight Whites and eight Blacks to sit in the 'wrong' section of segregated buses to defy the law. Martin Luther King Jr. joined CORE to fight against racial discrimination. In the early 1950s, CORE was transformed into the civil rights movement led by Rustin, A. J. Muste, and Martin Luther King Jr. The cohort was widely known for its civil disobedience and its major nonviolent campaigns and collective weapon for freedom, justice and equality for all (Beckwith 2002: 75).

In December 1955, Rosa Parks (a Black woman) refused to surrender her seat to a White passenger in protest of racial segregation. This action sparked bus boycotts in Montgomery and Alabama, which ultimately led to an alternative transportation system and ended finally with the desegregation of the entire bus system (Albert 1978: 4). King championed and trained his followers on the use

and practice of the nonviolent methods. “Thus, the African Americans once a helpless and segregated community, has grown up politically, culturally and economically” (King 2011: 11). Similarly, when the Europeans invaded North America, the Cherokees (American Indians) first adjusted their lifestyles to suit the invaders but everything changed when gold was discovered on their land, leading to the 1830 ‘Indian Removal Act’. In response, the Cherokees took legal action and Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in favour of the plaintiffs stating that the act was illegal (Zinn 2003: 117-119).

The nonviolence experience of Americans is not limited to the struggle against racial segregation (African and Indian Americans) but the Americans have a rich history in the use of tactics of nonviolence. Before and during the American war of independence, many nonviolent actions were employed. In response to the Stamp Act, which was passed in 1765, the colonists staged a series of demonstrations throughout the colonies. In other states such as South Carolina, 2,000 demonstrators protested by burning effigies and then staging a mock funeral for the death of ‘American Liberty’. The end result was that the stamp officials were required to quit in every colony with the exception of Georgia (Zinn 2003: 53-57). Nonviolence was strengthened by a boycott of British goods and within a year the Stamp Act was repealed. The Townsend Act was introduced in 1766 in order to tax imports indirectly. Americans mainly resorted to nonviolence in the pre-independence war days when, as a sign of protest, women weaved cloth by hand rather than buying fabric from British mills.

Many Americans protested against America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, which the government described as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ (Mariani 2011: 213). The role played by the media in exposing the shame of the US government, coupled with continued mass protests, forced the Americans to eventually pull out of Vietnam. At the individual level, A. J. Muste, in January 1948, refused to pay his taxes in protest of the US nuclear program which had obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Danielson 2004: 1-9). Muste was brought in for a trial after three years but nothing was done since he did not have a bank account and property.

Nonviolence was also effective in removing authoritarian regimes in Mexico and Argentina. For example, in 1977, a group of 14 women gathered at Buenos Aires's Plaza de Mayo in front of the government building, the Casa Rosada, to protest against the ruthless and brutal Argentinian government (Guembe and Conte 2004). The women, who called themselves Las Madres Plaza de Mayo, mobilised tactics such as using newspapers and circulating petitions. The more ruthless the government became, the larger the group and their allies became. While many factors contributed to the downfall of the Argentinian regime in 1982, this group of women are credited for starting the process that led to the demise of the dictatorship (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 113).

Another remarkable case of nonviolent action took place in the US in 1989, when the United Mine Workers of America protested against Pittston Coal Group over health and disability rights that had been revoked (Mccown 2009). The strike also drew in non-miners and the use of nonviolent civil disobedience was widespread. In order to force the authorities to address their grievances, workers employed nonviolent tactics such as picketing, mass rallies and demonstrations, occupations of Pittston property, and mass sit-downs at mine entrances, coal processing plants, and company headquarters (Beckwith 2002: 76).

With the increasing incidences and impact of civil resistance, it is important to examine which factors determine its outcomes. As Ackerman and Merriman (2014: 2) question, do the conditions prior to the commencement of the conflict determine whether a movement or authoritarian ruler will win? Or is victory for either side determined more by the strategic choices and skilfulness with which they wage the conflict? In the findings of their study, Stephen and Burrows (2015) found that skills are relatively more important than conditions in determining movement trajectories and outcomes. Their conclusion confirmed the findings and conclusion of a study conducted by Freedom House in 2008, in which the organisation examined various structural factors and their influence on civil resistance in 64 transitions from authoritarian governments between 1975-2006.

> The conclusion highlights that neither the political nor environmental factors examined in the study had a statistically significant impact on the success or failure of civil resistance movements...Civic movements are as likely to succeed in less developed, economically poor countries as in developed, affluent societies. The study also finds no significant evidence that ethnic and religious polarization has a major impact on the possibilities for the emergence of a cohesive civic opposition. Nor does regime type seem to have an important influence on the ability of civic movements to achieve broader support (Marchant *et al.* 2008: 1).

3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is imperative to note that nonviolent campaigns played an influential role in shaping the socio-economic and political lives of people across the globe. Central to these successful records is the importance of training, strategic planning and mass participation. These confirm the experience of Martin Luther King Jr., who championed and trained his followers on the use and practice of nonviolent methods (King 2011: 11). Similarly, with regards to the case in the Philippines, Zunes (1999: 129-130) concludes that "the successful use of nonviolent action that toppled the dictatorial regimes of President Marcos was not wholly spontaneous, but a culmination of years of preparatory training in the methods of nonviolent resistance".

As for mass participation, research indicates that no campaign that attracted the active participation of at least 3.5 percent of the population has ever failed in its demands. Nevertheless, some cases demonstrate, numbers alone do not guarantee victory in resistance campaigns. Thus, a high number of participants does not automatically translate into success. For instance, the anti-communist campaigns in East Germany in the 1950s (boasting about four hundred thousand participants) and the anti-Japanese insurgency in China during the 1930s and 1940s (with over 4 million participants)—failed miserably (Chenoweth and Stephen 2011: 39). Mass participation matter in nonviolent movement, but they are insufficient to guarantee success. Movements should pay attention to the diversity of the resistance participants and the methods being used, strategic and tactical choices being made by the opposition—may be as important as the quantity of participants.

CHAPTER 4: NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH SUDAN, 2011-2017

4.1 Introduction

Although the use of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan is overshadowed by violent resistance, there are many historical and contemporary examples of successful nonviolent campaigns employed by South Sudanese non-state actors to advance social, political and economic change. This chapter discusses the importance and rationale of why nonviolent campaigns matter. It compares the cost-benefit analysis between nonviolent and violent campaigns, defines and highlights the role of civil society in peacebuilding, as well as assesses and documents past and contemporary examples of nonviolent campaigns implemented in South Sudan between 2011-2017. The chapter concludes with an assessment of capacity gaps within the South Sudanese civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns.

4.2 Why Nonviolent Campaigns?

One answer to why nonviolent campaigns should be used is their effectiveness: nonviolent campaigns achieve their objectives at least twice as often as violent movements. Research covering major nonviolent campaigns employed between 1900 and 2006 has scored a 53% success rate in achieving their objectives, whereas violent resistance achieved a 26% success rate (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 8). The ability by nonviolent advocates to alienate the military from the regime influences the military to betray the regime, thereby enabling democratic revolutionaries to succeed before the regime uses the military to rout the democratic opposition (Katz 2003). Thus, nonviolent campaigns have great potential to win the support of the military leading to loyalty shifts, particularly when the regime violently cracks down on a popular nonviolent movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 50).

The experience of the Sudanese, Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings indicated that state brutality and repression can sometimes lead to defections within the military, which can further cause loyalty shifts from the government to the people. This is because nonviolence largely aims to redistribute power, with most nonviolent strategies aiming to deprive power-holders from the major sources of their power, outflanking their more visible coercive instruments (Ash 2009: 375). Thus, nonviolent movements often seek to question blind obedience and the consent of the ordinary people as a means of initiating socio-economic and political change (Atack 2006: 89):

> If an authority enjoys power, he enjoys power to the extent to which obedience is rendered. But the moment the obedience goes off, the moment the laws are disobeyed, the moment the command of the powerful are not obeyed, their power vanishes (A force more powerful film documentary on Gandhi and independence of India).

In addition to its mobilising capacity, many individuals and groups choose nonviolent resistance because it is consistent with their worldview, and religious and secular ideology (Smithey 2013: 43). However, not all will embrace and adhere to the Gandhian level of nonviolent discipline and commitment, as Gandhi himself has weaknesses as do all human beings. As Losurdo notes, Gandhi himself approved of some use of arms in certain circumstances (Losurdo 2010: 96).

For many of those who opt for nonviolent campaigns, violent means are feared to result in violent ends. The conclusion that many have reached is that violence creates more problems, and when it appears to help, it simply delays the problem for a later time. Thus, in most social movements, there is not even a discussion about violent means; the only interesting topic is which nonviolent techniques are appropriate for the current campaign. Another frequent argument in favour of nonviolence is that the activists are fighting problems rather than persons. Violence can hit humans but not ideologies, decisions and policies. The roles of individuals in political conflicts have a tendency to be exaggerated. When individuals in the central positions are replaced, the systems seem to survive and continue more or less as before (Johansen 2009: 143-144).

Sharp observes that while it is commonly alleged that nonviolent action takes longer to have an impact than violent resistance, this is not always the case as nonviolence has, at times, been victorious in a few weeks or days (Sharp 1990: 9). The Zimbabweans, in a week-long peaceful demonstration, backed by the army, forced President Robert Mugabe to resign, bringing to an end more than 37 years of rule, and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was toppled in a mere 18 days when millions of civil resisters took to the streets amidst violent police opposition. The protest eventually forced President Hosni Mubarak to step down (Heiss 2011: 2). Violent struggles rarely involve the participation of many ordinary members of society, as is the case with nonviolent campaigns, due to the central role that military forces play (Martin 2008). In other words, violence limits involvement. Able-bodied men dominate in conventional and guerrilla forces. The concealment associated with guerrilla forces restricts participation. Moreover, nonviolent resistance provides limited impediments to ethical and physical participation, information and education, and challenges (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

According to Weber and Burrowes (1991), nonviolence is often used because it is accessible to everyone and does not alienate antagonists or third parties, and because it fractures the sequence of brutality and counter-hostility. It makes room for change, draws attention to the challenge as opposed to violence, and is much more likely to attract public sympathy and support.

Gregg (1960: 100) further argues that nonviolent resistance is more cost-effective than war because it costs far less in terms of money, the loss of lives, and human suffering, as it usually permits a large part of the agricultural and industrial work of the people to continue. He cites the example of the Indian struggle for independence, during which probably not more than 500 Indians received permanent injuries and not more than 8,000 were killed or died later from wounds. On the British side, not a soul was killed nor wounded. He further declares that, given the long time that the conflict lasted, the casualties were much lower than they would have been if the Indians had used violence against the British. In support of this argument, Mattaini observes that during Gandhi's

Salt *Satyagraha* campaign, only two protesters died and 320 were hospitalised. In the deadly massacre at Jalianwala Bagh, nearly 400 were killed and over 1,100 wounded, according to the most common estimates (Mattaini 2003: 152).

In Latin America, nonviolence is referred to as the weapon of the poor. This is because planning a peaceful march, strike, vigil, or boycott of goods or services costs less money as compared to the costs of buying military hardware, training and meeting other logistics (Schirch 2004: 29). The human cost of lives is often less in nonviolent actions than in armed conflicts. Many pacifists value life as sacred. Some restrict this to humans, while others consider all forms of life, including that of animals and other living creatures, as sacred and as having an ultimate value.

Sharp also points out that casualty numbers are generally much lower in nonviolent campaigns than in conventional or guerrilla wars (Sharp 1990: 9). Nonviolent resistance creates more effective peace as it does not leave a sense of frustration, whereas violence inevitably breeds hatred, revenge and bitterness. Nonviolent resistance acts more quickly than war. Thus nonviolent resistance certainly produces less ill-effects, if there are any, than war does, and this reduction of ill-effects benefits both the users of nonviolence as well as the opposing side and the world at large (Gregg 1960: 101).

4.3 Understanding Civil Society and its Role in Peacebuilding

Civil society is widely considered an important actor in peacebuilding, democratisation and all development processes. As such, substantive focus has been given towards building and strengthening civil society, especially in countries experiencing or emerging from situations of armed conflict (Paffenholz 2009: 2). For instance, in 2014, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum directing agencies abroad to take additional steps to engage and support civil societies (The Whitehouse 2014).

While there is much contention in scholarly circles regarding the meaning of the term *civil society*, many scholars who use the term argue that, in spite of its shortcomings, with the proper specification it is a useful space to grapple with complex issues involving the relationship of individuals to the public sphere (Eastwood 2013: 1). Paffenholz describes civil society as a wide range of actors including professional associations, clubs, unions, faith-based groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as traditional and clan groups (Paffenholz 2016: 2). According to Spurk, civil society is a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private and economic spheres yet it is oriented towards and interacts closely with them (Spurk 2010: 9). Edwards agrees with Spurk in that politicians and thinkers from left, right and all perspectives in between see civil society as a solution to social, economic and political problems (Edwards 2004: 2). Civil society has been broadly defined as the "area outside the family, market and state" (World Economic Forum 2013: 8).

> I define civil society as diverse formal and informal groups of people pursuing common, interrelated or complex interests to improve the welfare of their society. Civil society therefore, encompasses more than just formally constituted non-governmental organizations. They include civic, faith and community-based associations as well as professional unions and networks.

However, the definition of civil society is dynamic as new actors and roles emerge. For example, VanDyck (2017: 3) defines civil society as an ecosystem that include social movements, online activists, bloggers and others.. Thus, with the increasing roles of the social movements across political borders using technological developments, definitions of civil society, its roles and operating environments will no doubt keep changing (Jezard 2018; World Economic Forum 2013). The term civil society became popular in the 1980s when it was identified with the non-state protest movements in authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Jezard, 2018).

Since then, civil society actors across the globe have used nonviolent tactics to address fundamental issues with the state authorities including corruption cases as well as handling communal and other forms of conflicts within the

communities. The use of nonviolent methods against the state often attracts repression, ranging from minor to moderate and extreme repression. This repression includes beatings, arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, executions, and mass slaughters. Despite such repression, when the resisters have persisted in fighting with only their chosen 'nonviolent weapons', they have sometimes triumphed. The issues at stake in many conflicts have been diverse:

> They have included social, economic, ethnic, religious, national, humanitarian, and political matters, and they have ranged from the trivial to the fundamental. Many cases of the use of nonviolent action have had little or nothing to do with governments. Modern cases include labour management conflicts and efforts to impose or resist pressures for social conformity. Nonviolent action has also been used in ethnic and religious conflicts and many other situations, such as disputes between students and university administrations. Important conflicts between the civilian populations and the governments where one side has employed nonviolent action have also occurred very widely (Sharp 2005: 14-15).

Civil society often constitutes a large part of social movements across the world. A social movement, according to Merriam, is any group of people standing up against injustices or seeking to promote particular rights, issues or interests (Merriam 2016). Nonviolent movements are civilian-based; involve widespread popular participation; and alert, educate, serve, and mobilise people in order to create change. According to Porta and Diani, social movements differ from general social processes in that they have mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action (Porta and Diani 2006). Similarly, civic movements are distinct from the NGOs, which donor agencies often collaborate with, though both fall under the umbrella concept of civil society.

Collective citizen mobilisation – social movements – comprises a wide range of entities with certain common characteristics. They use collective action. They have change-oriented goals. Their methods are extra-institutional and may involve confrontation with power-holders, that is, they open up new democratic spaces. They have some degree of organisation. They have a certain degree of continuity over time, even if their specific goals, leaderships, and collective action methods change (Davi *et al.* 2004). As one social movement expert noted:

> Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organizations, networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by participation in challenges and collective identities through which participants define the boundaries and significance of their groups (Whittier 2002).

NGOs, by contrast, are typically more established organisations, often registered with the government, making it easier for donor agencies to partner with them. To satisfy donor concerns regarding corruption and the misuse of funds, recipients must be able to demonstrate a high capacity with respect to accounting and reporting standards. When such capacity is lacking, donors invest in teaching these skills as well as how to pursue further funding in order to sustain the budgets needed to maintain programs and a professional presence – offices, staff, utility bills, computers, and automobiles (Stephen *et al.* 2015).

There are diverse actors working on peacebuilding, governance and delivery of life saving humanitarian assistance in South Sudan, including civil society, the government, regional and international organizations. This study focuses on CSOs doing peacebuilding work. As discussed previously, peacebuilding is any activity that aims to tackle different forms of violence and injustice using nonviolent methods and strategies to peace and relationships that foster long-term transformation of socio-economic and political conditions. Meaningful peacebuilding empowers individuals, groups and their constituencies with skills to undertake nonviolent actions to balance power, reinforce dialogue and peaceful settlement of conflict.

The idea of building peace in human history is not new, as different societies have used different mechanisms, approaches and structures to achieve peace (Boege 2006). However, Paffenholz (2010) argues that the concept of peacebuilding differs in terms of approach, scope of activities and time-frame. Notwithstanding these differences, there is consensus among scholars that the concept of peacebuilding was popularized in the United Nations 1992 *Agenda for Peace* report (Paffenholz 2013, Ryan 2013). However, the term

peacebuilding was first coined nearly two decades earlier by Galtung in his publication on three approaches to peace research (Galtung 1975).

CSOs have increasingly become vital forces in discourses, initiatives and programmes that foster peace and security across the world. However, there is scarcity of academic literature on the contribution of African civil society in peacebuilding, particularly in east and sub-Saharan African (O'Driscoll, 2018). CSOs have a strong history of being at the forefront of movements that dislodged entrenched authoritarianism to introduce democratic governance on the African continent (Ekiyo: 2008: 27-28). In the Sudan, during the 1940s and 1950s, trade unions were strong and led the anti-colonial struggle. The Sudanese Women's Union appeared in 1952 as one of the main civil society organizations of the time and called for women's education and equal pay. Civil society organizations particularly professional and student unions were instrumental in toppling Aboud's and Numeiri's regimes in October 1964 and April 1985 respectively. Thus, the role of civil society in political change in Sudan cannot be underestimated (Assal 2016: 7).

In April 2019, the CSOs in collaboration with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) ousted Omer Beshir, another military dictator. In Sudan, it was extremely difficult to draw a clear line between political parties and civil society after Beshir's military coup in 1989. This was so because the regime was instrumental in manipulating civil society to advance its own political purposes. The regime interfered directly in selecting the leadership of independent organizations ranging from sporting clubs to the Sudanese Red Crescent Committee (Abdel Ati 2006: 69–70).

Meanwhile in South Sudan, student unions, faith-based groups and traditional authorities was active in resisting the colonial administration to the independence of Sudan in 1956. During the years of struggle (1955-1972, 1983-2005), various CSOs played significant roles in campaigning against human rights violations and the general political and economic marginalisation in the southern region (see sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). This history demonstrates

that organized citizens' movements with knowledge and skills in nonviolent campaigning can play pivotal roles to change klotecracy and dictatorial regimes that so often breeds and sustains violence. Moreover, once ordinary people are empowered with skills and tools to peacefully utilize express their opposition against or support for the prevailing conditions, they can indeed shape their economic, social and political conditions.

CSOs' scope of work, interests and coverage exist at every level of society, ranging from the grassroots to the national, regional and international arenas and there is a distinction between local and external CSOs. The distinctions have implications for the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions. As the name implies, local CSOs are those organic and homegrown non-state actors, while external CSOs refer to the civil society or NGOs from outside the country or region. The role of external CSOs are generally supportive and enabling roles important to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives (Barnes 2005: 7). External CSOs have limitation and restrictions in their mandate. For example, they cannot take to the streets to protest an injustice or a bad policy without heavy consequences as their participation can easily be labelled as meddling in the country's affairs. Thus, external actors as outsiders cannot make peace for indigenous people, as societies must create their own systems for resolving their differences. Lederach argues that sustainable peacebuilding requires empowerment of local actors as a matter of principle:

> The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily 'see' the setting and the people in it as 'the problem' and the outsiders as the 'answer'. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting (Lederach 1995: 212).

Empowerment of local actors in peacebuilding is critical to prepare, facilitate and ensure local ownership. The rationale of propagating local ownership is to obtain greater efficiency and sustainability in peacebuilding activities (Mateos 2011). With local ownership, peacebuilding activities are expected to encounter

minimal resistance by the local actors. In addition, solutions that come from within are likely to be appropriate for application to specific local conditions (Van Brabant 2010). Peacebuilding reform has been criticized for its lack of sovereignty. Critics argue that the activities are controlled by outsiders and imposed on post-conflict nations (Donais 2009). Local ownership with its moral notion of respecting self-determination thus comes very much to the rescue from this accusation. Similarly, capacity building driven by external actor itself is in potential contradiction with the notion of local ownership (Pearly 2013: 51).

Despite the importance of capacity building of local actors in peacebuilding, the role of external CSOs, particularly in providing financial and technical support, is important. Funding provided by external donors allows civil society to implement related interventions. Experience shows that when donor support is reduced or halted altogether, the ability of CSOs to reach out to the wider grassroots and sustain peacebuilding work becomes limited.

4.4 The Struggle for Independence

South Sudan has not been colonised as a country since its independence from Sudan in 2011. However, the people and the region were colonised by the British as part of Sudan. During the colonial period, the people of Southern Sudan, through their traditional authorities, used different nonviolent tactics to resist colonial policies and exploitative practices. Thus, chiefs throughout the country refused to cooperate with and pay taxes to the colonial administration, facilitate free movement of their expedition forces and assisting their administrators to settle. As the civil resistance grows, the British administration resorted to winning the confidence of the southern people by gifts, peaceful displays of power, protection or sometimes posing threats (Kacuol 2008: 21). Individuals and the local ethnic groups also resisted forced recruitment of labour, humiliation and harsh working conditions.

In the early eighteenth century, Chief Girima Lorola of Lainyi, present Amadi State protested against the British District Commissioner (DC) of Amadi for forced recruitment, exploitation and poor working conditions of those engaged

in farming and the mining industries. He walked from Amadi to Mangalla (more than 120 miles) and launched a complaint to the governor of the then Equatoria region. He particularly emphasised death due to hunger, as people were forced to cultivate cash crops (cotton) for exports instead of consumable crops, and the death of miners on whom the hole collapsed while digging whitewash (John 2014: 36). This action resulted in the dismissal of the DC and Chief Lorola himself. The DC was fired for failing to win the political support of the local chiefs and people, while Chief Girima was replaced by the DC in Amadi for fear that if such a personality is tolerated, he would soon mobilise popular resistance against the colonial regime (Tingwa 2006: 27).

The fact that mining was initially the backbone of the economy, until agriculture surpassed it in the second decade of the twentieth century, meant that labour was desperately needed by the colonial regimes in many developing countries as was the case in Zimbabwe and Sudan (Chadya and Mayavo 2002: 12-26). Realising the potentials of the people's power, during the colonial period the imperialists employed the divide-and-rule policy to control the population. Southern Sudan was also isolated from Northern Sudan as part of the closed districts policy. The indigenous people were reluctant to offer labour due to the lack of financial incentives, life insurance and farming cash crops which they did not eat.

While the popular Torit uprising of 18 August 1955 was largely considered as a violent mutiny, the analysis of the situation and events in Southern Sudan before the uprising indicate that the South Sudanese used several nonviolent campaigns such as peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience and political non-cooperation to resist British and Arab domination. These methods were used in the pursuit of a federation and the region's independence. The call for a federal system of governance was triggered by the widespread political marginalisation of the Southern Sudanese in decision-making processes at all levels of the government.

For instance, Professor Tingwa in his email conversation (18 August 2018 with morunyefo) emphasised that as part of the Sudanisation of senior posts in the

administration, police, military and prisons, out of approximately 900 senior positions, only four went to the South. The rest were all Northerners, except for a handful of Southerners who were mostly junior administrators. Thus the Southerners were disappointed and therefore unprepared for independence with the Northerners, fearing that the Northerners would mistreat them and bring back the days of slavery and colonisation. This led to massive civil campaigns calling for a federation in the South ahead of Sudan's independence in 1956. Thus, the aim of the Torit uprising was to either delay the impending independence of Sudan, which the Southerners detested in general, or to declare the outright independence of Southern Sudan.

Around May 1955, a crowd of South Sudanese gathered in front of the post office in Juba to peacefully protest the arrest of their sons working at the Juba post office, who were suspected of having stolen an anti-federation telegram sent by the Prime Minister, Ismail El Azhari, and widely disseminating it. The telegram was indeed secretly accessed by a South Sudanese, translated into English and widely circulated throughout the South, exposing the rejection of the Prime Minister to calls for a federation and directives to suppress and mistreat those who advocated it. The protesters were dispersed by the police using tear gas. This incident heightened the nascent anti-North domination sentiment among the officials and the general public. On 25 July 1955, another crowd of approximately 700 protesters staged a demonstration outside the court in Yambio, protesting the verdict against the Member of Parliament Eliya Kuze, who was sentenced by local chiefs to two years of imprisonment for publically advocating for a federal system of governance.

As the tension grew and gained momentum, the workers at the Spinning and Weaving Factory at Nzara, present Western Equatoria, staged yet another follow-up peaceful demonstration over the dismissal of 300 of their colleagues, and demanded for a federation. They shouted anti-North domination slogans directly in front of their senior management who were Northerners. When the protesters refused to disperse, the Northern officer in charge, Muatassim Abdel Rahman, ordered the army to open fire and 14 persons were shot dead. Those were the first Southern lives to be lost in the unarmed struggle for self-rule.

> On 18 August 1955, South Sudanese soldiers in Torit refused to be transferred to Khartoum and declared civil disobedience. As they resisted the departure, the officer commanding the parade, Captain Salah Abdel Magid, who was to lead the convoy, ordered his driver to enter the car, but the driver refused. Treating it as disobedience, Salah shot him dead and the parade broke into chaos. The soldiers ran amok, broke into the armoury and began to kill their Northern officers and civilians in Torit (Tingwa 2018).

Since then, the struggle for the independence of South Sudan continued using a combination of violent and nonviolent means between 1955 to 1972 which briefly ceased with the Addis Ababa peace accord. When President Nimeri abrogated the accord, a new rebellion emerged in May 1983, which came to an end in 2005 with the CPA finally granting the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and the subsequent independence in July 2011.

To ensure the success of the referendum in favour of independence, youth groups and civil society organisations led nation-wide nonviolent campaigns to educate and mobilise citizens across the country to participate in large numbers and determine their political destiny. The campaigns also aimed to discourage, prevent and abort potential violent clashes which the enemies of independence had planned to instigate ahead of the *referendum to sabotage it*. The key messages used included: here comes our time, determine your political destiny through ballot papers not guns. Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLA/M, stated:

> I and those who joined me in the bush and fought for more than twenty years have brought to you CPA in a golden plate. Our mission is accomplished. It is now your turn, especially those who did not have a chance to experience bush life. When time comes to vote at referendum, it is your golden choice to determine your fate. Would you like to vote to be second class citizens in your own country? It is absolutely your choice (Arou 2009).

The referendum of 2011 united the people of South Sudan against the rule of Khartoum's government. This vote would have failed to take place had it not been for the people's power as emphasized by Korayi and Elias (2010: 43). The approval of the bills into Acts provided the legal framework and mechanism for the conduct of the referendum, where more than 98% voted in favour of independence.

Since independence, however, South Sudan has seen little stability, and activists have faced increasingly severe repression with limited space to operate. South Sudan's constitution in theory recognises the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (Republic of South Sudan 2011: 8). However, the reality reveals that protesters have often been assaulted, arrested, tortured and even killed under Kiir's government.

4.5 Nonviolent Actions in South Sudan, 2011-2017

Over the past several years, the people of the newest country of the world and their civil society actors have employed diverse nonviolent campaigns to bring about peace, justice and democratic reforms. In 2012, thousands of civil society activists marched to the national parliament against 75 corrupt ministers and government officials. Protesters demanded the immediate lifting of immunity from the accused and asked them to face justice and recover the stolen money. The protest followed President Kiir's accusation of 75 ministers and top government officials of having stolen four billion United States Dollars in state funds. In his letter addressed to the 75 accused officials, he ordered the money to be remitted into the specified accounts, but only 1.5% of this sum was recovered (Al Jazeera 2013). In addition, the accused were not brought to book.

Corruption and impunity continue to cripple the ability of the government to generate revenue, deliver basic services and undertake development projects. A lack of access to basic services and infrastructural developments have led to profound suffering. In addition, there are significant challenges in terms of allocation and management of resources to expenditure priorities. Revenues generated from oil and non-oil sources are not being channelled to improve working conditions including the regular payment of salaries, rendering quality basic social services, or addressing hunger and development needs, but are rather largely directed towards military expenditures. Public revenue streams continue to be hampered not only due to a reduction in global oil prices and

insecurity in the oil-producing regions, but also, in a large part, due to corruption (Enough Project 2015).

On 31 October 2012, hundreds of students protested against a suspected land-grab of Juba Day Secondary school property by a private investor. Eyewitnesses accused the South Sudanese police of firing live ammunition at students. At least one female student and one male teacher were injured. The police denied shooting at students or teachers but acknowledged that they had fired in the air to control the protesters, who they claimed had burned building materials and thrown rocks at police (Holland 2012).

In December 2012, citizens of Wau took to the streets, protesting the decision of the state government to relocate the headquarters of Wau County to Bagare, outside the capital. At least ten protesters were shot dead after South Sudanese troops opened fire on them for demonstrating against government action. According to Liam McDowall, the UN peacekeeping mission spokesperson, four people were killed in the town of Wau during clashes in one day, while six more were shot dead on the following day (Aljazeera 2012).

In August 2013, hundreds of residents in Juba took to the streets of the capital and protested against the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the country. The demonstration followed the killing of two brothers by unknown gunmen in Hai Tarawa. Protesters marched across Juba with two dead bodies, symbolising the catastrophic effects of gun violence. In the national assembly, protesters were addressed by the speaker who later summoned the Security Ministers and requested them to enrol plans to improve security in Juba and across the country. This action resulted in relatively reduced insecurity and rampant gunfire in Juba (Sudan Tribune 2013). In 2013, more than 1,000 students from the University of Juba also marched to the Ministry of Higher Education, protesting the killing of their fellow scholars in Khartoum.

Despite increasing state repression, the people of South Sudan continued to march undeterred. In January 2014, thousands of the victims of war and civil society leaders marched to and petitioned the TNLA and called for an

immediate ceasefire, unhindered access of humanitarian assistance for the needy, and a commitment to peacefully resolve the conflict through IGAD-led peace talks. Youth marched to the same location in 2015 to protest against their unemployment and deteriorating social services.

The ongoing conflict has paralyzed the ability of the South Sudanese government in delivering basic services and meeting its social and economic obligations such as the creation of jobs and the payment of employees (including foreign mission salaries). Social services such as education, health, water, sanitation and infrastructure remain a challenge. Youth, in addition to experiencing a lack of employment opportunities, have been impacted severely, as **an estimated 16,000 children** were forcefully recruited into the different armed groups since the crisis began (UNICEF 2016).

South Sudan's civil war continued into 2016 despite the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), which was signed in August 2015. As of November 2017, approximately 75% of the transitional indicators of the peace agreement have gone unmet (The Taskforce 2017). Cycles of violence are typified by political and ethnic-based rivalries.

In December 2017, hundreds of South Sudanese women and girls taped their mouths and marched throughout the streets of Juba, demanding for an end to the four-year conflict in South Sudan. This time, the march was organised by approximately 40 South Sudanese women organisations. Some men from the civil society and those from the streets of Juba also joined the women, carrying placards with messages such as "we are ALL women, when it comes to marching to STOP war in South Sudan". The march commenced from Buluk playground to the Presbyterian Church at Amarat in Juba, where protesters prayed for peace and listened to the speeches from female parliamentarians and other leaders of women groups (Juba Monitor 2017: 2). Mass participation increases the effectiveness and longevity of nonviolent political struggles, particularly when women are involved (Principe 2016: 4).

Despite there being many South Sudanese civil resisters willing to take to the streets despite government crackdowns, they have not limited themselves to this tactic alone. The South Sudanese have successfully used the tactics of petitions, press statements, creative arts and campaigns to transform conflicts and build a common vision for a desired country.

In October Dawn Newspaper (2017: 2) reported 32 civil society organisations of having petitioned the national parliament to revoke the implementation of the ministerial order number 25, which cancelled all vehicle number plates issued by South Sudanese states in exercising their constitutional mandates and rights. The petition questioned the lawfulness of cancelling valid driving licenses and the imposition of penalties charged by traffic authorities. This represented an opportunity for the South Sudanese to be heard, as the petition prompted the national parliament to study the order and they directed the Ministry of Interior to delay its implementation.

On the other hand, efforts to persuade political and military leaders have yielded very little progress if any. In their statement of intent, the church leaders, under the auspices of the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), explained their frustration:

> [W]e have consistently tried to help our nation to move to the right direction by offering guidance to our leaders before and after the December 2013 conflict but all our guidance has been ignored. To fulfill our mandate, we must cease to be “guide dogs” and become like “watch dogs”. Not only will we warn our leaders and our people to renounce wickedness and evil ways, but we will take nonviolent actions to bring about peace and reconciliation (South Sudan Council of Churches 2015: 2).

As mass protests from youth, women and faith based groups increased, so did government response with repression. Alternatively, activists resort to using creative arts to communicate their opposition, mobilise the marginalised people to protest injustice, and demand justice and freedom through open and mobile street theatre, poetry, songs...etc.

4.6 Mass Strikes in 2017

As the conflict intensified in many parts of the country, the ability of the government to meet its obligations was paralyzed. The reaction involved not only civil society actors protesting against government failures but public servants, particularly judges and teachers, also protested. In May 2017, judges, primary and secondary school teachers were on strike, with all demanding better salaries and improved working conditions. The judges also demanded the resignation of the Chief Justice. Independent media advocacy organisations, who are perpetually harassed, have also formed umbrella pressure groups and are developing alternative means of disseminating the news even when state crackdowns abound. As observed in many other contexts around the world, increased state repression called for an opportunity for external donors to provide more direct and less conditional funding support to movement actors engaging the grassroots to support their efforts for reform (O' Regan 2019: 2). The Juba University Staff Association has been organising strikes in academia for more than two decades, including a strike over the past two years that led to salary increases for the university faculty staff.

Teachers in South Sudan have employed 'doing nothing' and strikes in protest of poor working conditions and low wages, as the local currency lost its original value to the hard currency, which triggered a higher market price increase in the country. These nonviolent actions have further weakened the education sector and brought most government institutions to a standstill. Many of these actions have been met with repression, sometimes with a barrage of gunfire (Amnesty International 2017). Despite the fact that South Sudan's security organs are among the world's most feared and repressive entities, the favour for nonviolent action remains high among citizens of the young nation.

4.7 Impacts and Consequences of Nonviolent Campaigns

It was apparent that nonviolent campaigns of the South Sudanese have yield fruit, and in some cases, did not or are yet to produce results. Nonviolent activism has existed in South Sudan before and since its independence in 2011. The student protest against a fees hike in the University of Juba did not take

long in making the president revoke the decision of the Vice Chancellor in December 2017. Teachers' strikes led to increased salaries. The march against the growing insecurity resulted in relatively improved security as the Ministry of Interior introduced more police posts in hotspot zones within Juba. The civil society statement persuaded the president to distance himself from being a patron on the national dialogue. These, among others, are clear results of nonviolent campaigns.

Many of these actions have been met with repression, and sometimes with a barrage of gunfire. South Sudan's government is highly militarized and so is the country's politics. Most of the cabinet ministers are ex-rebel fighters who have participated in decades' long armed struggle and perceived no consequences for their actions (John 2019: 1). For instance, students' protest against suspected land grabbing in Juba Day Secondary School (Holland 2012) and the peaceful demonstration in Wau (Aljazeera 2012) were all met with live bullets killing tens of protesters. Even in the difficult context of South Sudan, many nonviolent campaigns are being employed by individuals, and youth and student groups such as '#Ana Taban', '#the SouthSudanWeWant campaign', and '#Haggna campaign' (Arabic for 'it's ours') – a campaign aiming at building national ownership on the consensus for the future of the country.

4.8 Capacity Gaps in Development and Implementation of Nonviolent Campaigns

While the nonviolent campaigns and peace movements of the South Sudanese citizens have proven their endurance by outliving the atrocities exacted by their opponents, their dedication must be supplemented by more effective movement-building and nonviolent political strategies. In the recently-conducted research on nonviolent action in South Sudan, most respondents who were activists, when asked to score their success, ranked the impact of their efforts as very low, mostly citing repressive conditions as being the principal prohibiting factor (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 9). On the contrary, a study of 323 major violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900

and 2006 found that not only were the nonviolent campaigns twice as successful as the violence campaigns, but regime violence neither prohibited the emergence of nonviolent campaigns nor their success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2015). This finding suggests that those who are disciplined and determined to end war and build peace and democratic systems in South Sudan can increase their ability to do so with additional knowledge and skills in building movements and strategic nonviolent action. Thus, three quarters of those interviewed indicated a need for more training on nonviolent action (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 9). This insight shows the tremendous willingness among South Sudanese peace advocates to build the internal capacity of peace movements, which are persevering against the normalisation of the abuse of human rights. One crucial gap in the strategies of South Sudanese activists is a feeble understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent action and how actors and their methods create synergies over the course of a political struggle.

A primary gap in the nonviolent campaigns and strategies of South Sudanese activists is the absence of a common vision and objectives for the nonviolent movement. The political theorist, Hannah Arendt, aptly describes power as corresponding “to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together” (Arendt 1970).

Hence, isolated one-off decisions to behave differently from militarists do not automatically synergise into a peace movement, as many of the respondents assume, but a more deliberate coordination could build and sustain such a movement. Secondary gaps include limited coordination, coherence and joint actions. The keys to victory are the methods and strategies used by the advocates and a wider participation that cuts across all age groups. It is important to note that proper organisation, relevant methods and large numbers of participants are vital to the success of a nonviolent campaign. Among the most common methods of nonviolent action used by the South Sudanese are petitions, press releases, traditional lobbying, fasting and prayers, marches, dialogues, community education, position papers, dramas, and legal support.

These methods, on their own, have done very little to change the political dynamics in the country.

Sustained and wide-scale tactics of non-cooperation, such as boycotts and strikes, are mostly absent from the South Sudanese peace movement. This has had an adverse effect on the movement's ability to leverage power for an end to war. Civil disobedience and confrontational direct-action tactics have only been sporadically practiced by individuals as unplanned reactions to opponents' aggression or abuse. There is a need to select and sequence more creative and strategic tactics that target opponents' sources of power, such as regional political legitimacy or the profits from oil reserves currently being pawned off to Chinese companies. In the past, ecumenical church delegations have travelled internationally to spur boycotts of oil companies working closely with the Khartoum administration.

4.9 Conclusion

Despite the contributions of non-state and state actors in achieving a *peaceful referendum* and the attainment of independence for South Sudan, there has been no well-coordinated and coherent civil society plan and action to jointly develop and pursue nonviolent campaigns to address post-independent challenges and tensions. This weakness has been exploited by South Sudanese political leaders who instead co-opted civil society leaders into their own political dealings. When negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Dr. John Garang managed to present himself to Western audiences as more accommodating to South Sudanese grassroots peace initiatives than the government in Khartoum. In reality, however, he managed to circumvent the demands made by these processes, to co-opt their leaders and turn them into instruments for consolidating the SPLM and his position as a leader (de Waal 2014: 13).

Although there is no single formula for achieving success in nonviolent campaigns, success is more likely if the resistance group has a strategic plan, and organises and implements sequenced actions that are culturally and

politically relevant to the context to achieve short-, medium- and long-term desired outcomes. Nonviolence training that focuses on skills development in planning and implementing nonviolent strategies and methods to transform socio-economic and political conflicts are pivotal in awakening and engaging the populace as instruments of change in South Sudan.

PART THREE: RESEARCH METHODS

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design, methodology, and instruments that were used in this study. The chapter highlights the action research process and phases which include:

- Exploring: Literature review, holding of FGDs, interviews with AR participants, use of questionnaires, observation and participation in NVA training and related civil society functions
- Devising: Designing and planning NVA training and implementation of a planning meeting
- Implementing nonviolent action training and an implementation planning meeting with 24 action research participants
- Evaluation of the short term outcomes

The chapter discusses the exploratory component action research and methods of collecting and analysing the qualitative data used in this study. The chapter concludes with the ethical issues and procedures that were followed in an effort to ensure the validity of data presentation and the credibility of the research findings.

5.2 Phases of the Research

This study was guided by a research plan which encompassed four phases. The first phase covered the identification of the study problems, which were used as the basis for formulating the study aim and objectives as well as the justification. The second phase focused on exploration, which included a review of related literature on the concepts of nonviolence and its approaches. Special emphasis was given to exploring the understanding, methods and strategies of nonviolent action and how they have been employed by the South Sudanese civil society. This review enabled the researcher to assess the

extent to which South Sudanese non-state actors understood, developed and applied nonviolent campaigns. I observed and participated in related nonviolent action training and stakeholder consultative meetings organised by ONAD and its partners. Attending the training and meetings, which were held within and outside the country, provided the researcher with more practical insights and an opportunity to better understand the best prevailing practices and existing gaps. I also reviewed the literature to gain a better understanding of how civil society in the neighbouring countries and region as well as internationally employ nonviolent campaigns to advance social, economic and political changes. These insights were particularly helpful and guided me during the entire study design, the implementation of the action research project and the evaluation of its outcomes.

The third phase covered data collection through FGDs with 26 action research participants. The preliminary findings were validated through one-on-one interviews with 15 action research participants until the researcher reached the level of saturation. In order to assess the capacity of the South Sudanese civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in the past, I interviewed 10 prominent nonviolent action activists or at least those who claimed to have taken nonviolent actions. Thus, through the interviews, I was able to document contemporary examples of nonviolent collective actions employed by South Sudanese civil society actors, capacity gaps and challenges as well as lessons learned and recommendations for improvement. These insights guided me in the preparations of the action research training aimed at developing the capacity of the civil society to better develop and implement nonviolent campaigns.

Phase four of the study focused on devising, designing and planning a nonviolent action training program. The training design was based on the findings of the previous exploration phase. I used a purposive sampling technique to identify 26 action research participants who, except for two participants, attended the training. Those sampled were 18 years of age and older. They were informed of the voluntary nature of the study and their consent sought. Respondents were also informed of the confidentiality of the process,

except for the training, where a participant would be known to other participants, co-researchers and the support team. Since participation was voluntary, participants were assured that they could withdraw at any time without the need to excuse themselves. As part of the implementation of the training, a two-and-a-half-day training in nonviolent action was conducted with 24 action participants.

5.3 Research Design

Research design has been defined in different manners by different scholars and authors. It is the "glue" that holds all of the elements in a research project together (Kombo and Tormp 2013: 70). The most common definition refers to a research design as "a plan or blue print of how a researcher intends to conduct the research" to provide answers to the research questions or objectives in the best scientific way possible (Mouton 2012: 55). It must be noted that any scientific study commences with a purpose and research objectives or questions followed by the research design. This study used an action research approach and collected qualitative data, as detailed in section 5.5, in order to fulfil the study's aim and objectives two and three, as detailed in section1.5.

5.4 Research Methodology

A cardinal prerequisite of successful research lies in the careful selection of the research methodology to achieve the study's aim and objectives, given the available time and financial resources. Qualitative research is any data gathering technique that generates narrative data rather than numerical data (Monsen 1992: 73). The five major approaches in scientific inquiry include quantitative research, qualitative research, mixed methods research, arts-based research and community-based participatory research (Leavy 2017: 10). As the name implies, quantitative research deals with elements that can be counted, and it often uses the statistical manipulation of numbers to process data and summarise results (Locke, Silverman and Spirduso 1998: 123). Quantitative research is weak in understanding complex social interactions or settings in which people talk, and the voices of the participants are not directly

heard or captured. Qualitative research compensates for this weakness (Cresswell 2007: 9).

Researchers who use mixed methods research (MMR) collect and analyse both qualitative and quantitative data within the same study. Creswell and Clark (2007: 5) note that purposeful data integration enables researchers to seek a more panoramic view of their research landscape, viewing social phenomena under investigation from different viewpoints and through diverse research lenses (Allison and Joanna 2017: 74). A mixed methods design is appropriate for fulfilling research objectives that neither quantitative nor qualitative methods could answer alone (Ivankova 2006: 18). Despite the benefits of using MMR in scientific inquiry, no research method comes without its weakness. For instance, Wisdom and Creswell (2013) argue that the process of mixing methods within one study can add to the complexity of conducting research. It often requires more resources in terms of; time, personnel and technical skills in sample selection, data collection, data analysis and data integration. Taking into consideration challenges of a mixed methods research, I chose a qualitative design.

My study involved the gathering of qualitative data through FGDs, interviews, observation and questionnaires. I analysed pre and post training questionnaires qualitatively rather than quantitatively. This is because I was interested in understanding, in depth, the participants' ideas, perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards violence and nonviolence, and the extent to which they understand and use nonviolent campaigns. This helped me to identify knowledge and capacity gaps which I used to design the action research training program to fulfil objective 3.

Qualitative methods demonstrate a different and unique approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. The former provides more comprehensive designs ranging from data collection, analysis and interpretation to report-writing. A qualitative design is unique in that:

- it allows for the collection of text, image and audio-visual data in the natural setting where participants experience the issues or problems under study (Creswell 2014: 184)
- the approach recognises that everybody is capable of constructing knowledge, meaning that disadvantaged groups, though poor and voiceless, are capable of authoring knowledge if given a chance (Mugenda 2003: 201)

- it provides “a means of understanding the complexity of a situation by exploring the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social problem” (Creswell 2013: 44)

- it allows for the collection of in-depth data from a small number of action research participants using instruments such as face-to-face interviews, FGDs, observations etc

- it provides for inductive and deductive data analysis. In qualitative design, researchers build their patterns, categories, and themes using a bottom-up approach by organising the data into clearer units of information. The inductive process illustrates working back and forth between the themes until the researchers have established a comprehensive set of themes. The researchers then look back deductively at their data from the themes to determine if more evidence can support each theme or whether they need to gather additional information (Creswell 2014: 184).

5.5 Action Research

This study used an action research approach because it is a disciplined process of scientific inquiry that engages the researcher *with* concerned group of people such as the civil society who share or have common interest to address and find solutions to their socio-economic and political problems. The primary reason for engaging in action research was to connect and test theories with practices. The approach helped the researcher to turn away from the traditional methods of scientific inquiry that produces theoretical solutions to those methods that are more practical and effective. As Kaye and Harris have argued:

> Research has to produce *more* than just a book. Without people's participation in developing a solution, the solution is more likely to fail as whatever is proposed has to be done *with*, not *to*, the people involved. People are capable of understanding and participating in change. Action research is intended to focus this understanding and then to expand it with the aim of change and improvement (Kaye and Harris: 2017: 11).

Action research was preferred as it aims not only to identify social problems and make recommendations to different stakeholders, as is the case with many academic studies, but it engages the participants and society to proactively contribute to resolving the prevailing problems. Human beings are reactive in nature. When faced with injustices and oppression – ranging from exclusionary policies, institutionalised discrimination, or systemic corruption – people have different options for responding. They can do nothing, they can turn to armed resistance or terrorism, or they can wage conflict non-violently (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 2).

In the past, many researchers have followed the traditional path in undertaking and/or supervising scientific studies that have focussed almost entirely on exploring a problem and added, at the very end, a list of recommendations for the relevant authorities to consider. As Harris (2018: 261) recalls:

> I guess I always knew that the authorities were extremely unlikely to read what I or my students had written and were even less likely to change policy as a result. I also realised that policy change is an

> extremely slow process. I assumed or hoped that our contributions to knowledge would eventually contribute to shifting policy and planning in desirable ways and thus bring about change. In recent years, the imperative that the understandings gained from researching a problem needed to be translated into action became more important. Happily, I became aware of the potential of action research to help achieve this and I now insist that my postgraduate students in peacebuilding write theses based on action research to contribute in building some peace at community level.

Thus, the most obvious benefit of action research is that AR participants are able to identify potential practical steps and post-training actions aimed at exploring a problem, devising and implementing an intervention and evaluating its outcome.

Figure 5.1 depicts an overview of the action research plan and Figure 5.2 depicts the action research process.

Figure 5.1 An Overview of the Action Research Plan



Source: Author's design 2019

Figure 5.2 Depicts of the Action Research Process



Source: Author's design 2019

5.5.1 Exploration

As part of the exploration and in fulfilment of the first and second study objectives, I explored related literature to better understand the concepts and practice of nonviolence and nonviolent campaigns. In addition, I observed nonviolent campaigns that took place in 2017, and attended relevant civil society stakeholder meetings and nonviolent action training organised by ONAD and its partners. This training and the meetings enabled me to assess the capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan. They also connected me with relevant campaigners and experienced national and international trainers and researchers.

As part of the exploration, I conducted FGDs and interviews and carried out a thorough literature review on the study topic and research methodology. These enabled me to better explore the nature and extent of the research problem. It further broadened my understanding of the drivers and the consequences of violence in South Sudan. I was also able to assess and identify the capacity gaps within South Sudanese CSOs with respect to nonviolent campaigning.

As the popular phrase goes, 'publish or perish'. This phrase is well known in the academic world. It applies not only to graduate researchers but also to professors who want to obtain recognition for their contribution to knowledge production and dissemination (Rucker 2016). In pursuance of this goal and as part of the exploration, I wrote, participated in and presented a paper entitled *Bridging nonviolent action and peacebuilding*. *The experience of a PhD action research preliminary findings in South Sudan.* The paper was presented on 3 September 2018 at the Global Peacebuilders Summit (GPS) hosted by Paretz Academy near Berlin in Germany. The conference was a trivial opportunity for sharing experiences and mutual learning. In the paper and based on preliminary findings, I agreed with Bloch and Shirch that combining nonviolent action and peacebuilding is not a new idea. The practice reveals that nonviolent action tactics such as protest, non-cooperation and intervention are often

combined with dialogue and negotiations and other peacebuilding techniques (Bloch and Shirch 2018: 9).

This presentation highlighted the extent to which South Sudanese non-state actors understand and engage in nonviolent action and peacebuilding activities. In my presentation, I emphasised the importance of action research in peacebuilding at the community level, challenges encountered by nonviolent campaigners in South Sudan, the prevailing capacity gaps in people's movements, lessons learned and recommendations. The researcher's presentation was unique in that it clearly connected peacebuilding with nonviolent actions. It unveiled the potential of nonviolent campaigns against violent actions as empirically proven by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008; 2011).

The presentation lasted for only 30 minutes as the intention was to allow ample time – approximately one hour – for reflection and the sharing of experiences. Participants from Israel and Palestine, Nigeria, South Africa and Germany, among other countries, highlighted their experiences as well. As part of the feedback, a participant commented: "I am happy to hear about your insights on how nonviolent action and peacebuilding can be combined! I also like the idea that you collected experiences from other conflict regions in this session". Additionally, a participant from Israel disagreed that nonviolent actions are often more successful than violent means. She argued with regards to the case of Israel and Palestine, where the nonviolent campaigns of Palestinians did not succeed to effect significant political changes.

The summit has generally enriched my knowledge and increased my personal network connections with the renowned civil society activists and scholars such as Dr. Monika Hauser of Medica Mondiale, who co-researched the consequences of war, rape and coping strategies of survivors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Medica Zenica and Medica Mondiale. 2014); and Dr. Martina Fischer of the 'Bread for the World' in Germany. I further interacted with the Honourable Ottmar von Holtzin, Member of Parliament and head of the conflict mitigation committee in the German Parliament, who was the guest of honour. In his keynote address at the closing of the summit, he acknowledged the

important role being played by non-state and state actors in conflict mitigation and peacebuilding and emphasised the importance of collaboration, coordination and joint endeavours between peace stakeholders to realise greater impact.

Among other practitioners with whom I interacted were the internationally-recognised pastor, Dr. James Wuye and Imam Dr. Muhammed Ashafa of Nigeria. Both were once archenemies and militia leaders who turned into peacebuilders. Following their reconciliation, they co-founded Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) in Kaduna. The IMC is a non-profit, non-governmental faith-based organisation working to prevent violence and promoting trust and relationship-building between different faiths and ethnic groups. Their work in particular engages Christian and Muslim leaders in nonviolent conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Interfaith Mediation Centre 2018).

Another moving experience was that of Dr. Nava Sonnenschein, director of the School for Peace in the Jewish-Arab village of Neve Shalom / Wahat al-Salam in Israel. She has developed and piloted dialogue encounters between Palestinian and Israeli youth which culminated in bridging the gap between the two communities. An example of their ongoing nonviolent action is the letter of intent entitled *Jews and Arabs refused to be enemies* (Shbeta 2014). Comparing these experiences and notes enriched my learning and helped me to discover new ideas and approaches in peacebuilding.

It is worth noting that the Global Peacebuilders Summit (GPS) is an activity of the Global Peacebuilders Network (GPN), a network of over 30 peacebuilding practitioners and scholars from around the world. The network offers a unique opportunity for mutual learning, inspiration and empowerment to have a positive impact on the world. The network, through the Culture Counts Foundation, Germany, organises an annual summit for its core group members with an annual increase of three new participants in order to cover all relevant conflict regions. The network was initiated in 2016 to enhance the role of civil society in peacebuilding across conflict regions.

In the same vein, one year ago (September 2017), I participated in the international conference and global campaign against arms trade, which was organised by WRI in London. Insights obtained from the two conferences helped me to better design and implement a nonviolent action training program.

5.5.2 Devising and Implementing a Training Intervention

In order to design, plan and organise the action research training, I recruited four research team volunteers, including two experienced nonviolent action trainers for the content preparations; one logistician, who handled catering, venues, stationery and the photocopying of materials; and one secretary, who was assigned to secretarial work. The gatekeeper was particularly instrumental and helpful in assisting me to identify co-trainers who provided substantial input for the training needs, agenda and content development (manual).

With the findings and insights obtained from the FGDs, interviews and observations, the research team planned and designed a nonviolent action training program for 24 action research participants. They included NGO workers, university students, lawyers, media personnel and members from faith-based groups and civil society fraternities. Each participant was requested to fill in a pre-training questionnaire to evaluate his/her individual level of knowledge and skills prior to the training. Each participant was also accorded a special code generated by using the first three letters of the surname and a figure in researcher's list. This code was used to distribute more or less the same questionnaire as a post-training questionnaire. This helped me to gauge and assess the knowledge and skills acquired during the training.

Being an action research project, I did not know the precise direction that the intervention would take in terms of timing, the number of days and the content before the actual training, as this was under the control of the participants. Thus the originally-set five-hour training per day was voluntarily extended to eight hours to allow for in-depth discussion and practice in order to gain skills in planning, organising and implementing nonviolent campaigns. The use of experiential learning techniques and interactive training methods such as

exercises, role plays and plenary discussions, often take time and are critical in having an impact on skills and knowledge. This necessitated the voluntary allocation of more time than had been planned. As most participants were interested, it was not difficult to extend the time with the emphasis that each participant reserved the right to depart the training if deemed necessary. The eight hours included 45 minutes for a lunch break and 40 minutes for breakfast and afternoon tea.

Participants agreed to establish WhatsApp and Messenger groups to share information, coordinate and support each other to implement the skills and knowledge that they had acquired after the training. This outcome was not surprising because in action research, participants often decide what to do as individuals or as a group to pursue their socio-economic and political needs and grievances.

5.5.3 Evaluation of the Training Intervention and its Outcomes

Evaluation has many meanings in academia, development, cooperation and projects in general. Similarly, there is no agreement on the standard definition of the evaluation of an action research project. However, *validity* and *reliability* are criteria commonly used to evaluate action research that uses the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Khan and Tzortzopoulos 2016). These criteria were developed by quantitative researchers to test the methodological rigour of quantitative research and have been used as the basis for criticising qualitative research, especially case study research and action research, as lacking rigour and containing bias due to the subjective nature of the data collection and analysis employed (Robson 2002; Yin 2009).

Thus, AR has been criticised for its lack of rigour by applying quantitative criteria for rigour. Dick argues that rigour can be compromised if quantitative criteria are applied too rigidly to AR (Dick 2014). This criticism has raised concerns among qualitative researchers on the practicality of using quantitative criteria to evaluate qualitative research, so much so that there is a growing body of literature in qualitative research in general, and action research in particular,

that encourages the use of context-relevant criteria other than those used in quantitative research. This is because qualitative action researchers who propose the use of different criteria considered the practical relevance of their AR study as more important than its methodological rigour, thus in the absence of a convention for evaluating AR, they developed their own framework for evaluating the effectiveness of AR study, based on its context-specific and practical relevance.

There are no standard indicators for measuring the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns as each study context is unique and different from the others. My study used a context specific theory of change (see section 1.7) and indicators to measure the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns. The study perceived the training as a civic space that provided an opportunity for participants to better analyze their socio-economic and political conflicts by sharing their concerns, fears, and feelings of prevailing injustices in society. The training prepared individual participants to identify and practice methods and strategies of nonviolence that can be used to transform the conflicts. The training provided skills and builds self-confidence within participants to organize, launch, participate and sustain campaigns. The goal of nonviolent action training was empowering the participants to engage more effectively in collective action (War Resisters' International 2014: 21).

This study anticipated a situation where members of civil society involved in the intervention could demonstrate enhanced capacity to wield power using methods of nonviolent action. The indicators focussed on concrete actions taken by AR participants, including

- Demonstrated actions such as press statements, peaceful marches, political non-cooperation and intervention…etc taken by participants or their organizations.
- The frequency of action or campaign

- Number of new coalitions, networks and social movements established who are actively engaged in planning, organizing, coordinating and implementing collective actions.
- Participants' testimonies of changed attitudes and behaviour towards nonviolence compared to violence.

These indicators could be verified through daily news articles, discussions on social media and reports of follow up meetings. The evaluation questions attached in appendix 13 were designed to gather data to verify and validate measurement for documenting short-term training outcomes.

In this study, four evaluation exercises were conducted. The first two evaluations were carried out as part of pre- and post-training assessments where questionnaires were administered to 24 action research participants. The results revealed that the participants' knowledge and skills of nonviolence, nonviolent action and campaigns increased after the training, as reported in Chapter 9.

The third type of evaluation was held at the end of every training day as an ongoing assessment and feedback on the training process, content and methodology being used as well as the logistics for improvement. The fourth evaluation was held in July 2019 to fulfil the third objective of the study, i.e. to evaluate the training outcomes after the participants had had a chance to report back and implement the training plans in their respective communities and contribute to peace. Participants reflected on their personal experiences in terms of what the training meant to them, which nonviolent campaigns they were able to implement, what worked well, and what did not and why? The outcomes evaluation further focused on empowering participants to overcome challenges and sustain both their campaigns and skills gained from the training project.

5.6 Selecting the Participants

Purposive sampling was used to select 26 action research participants drawn from JCC and the nearby Rajaf, Luri and Nyarkenyi counties of Jubek state. Purposive sampling techniques were used due to the flexibility that they give the researcher in terms of choosing participants who can provide the best available and relevant information (Kurebwa 2013: 177). The nature of the action research design method adopted in this study also influenced the choice of using purposive sampling. Thus, 26 sampled participants comprising NGO workers, women and youth organisations, university students, lawyers, media personnel, members of the community and faith-based groups were identified. A small group of action research participants was preferred because qualitative research puts more emphasis on the quality of data that the informants can provide rather than on the quantity, which matters less in qualitative research. For this study, the sampling frame included individuals aged between 18 and 72.

I used snowballing sampling techniques to engage five participants who reviewed and tested the quality and soundness of the FGDs and interview guides. The pre-testing of data collection tools was a deliberate exercise aimed at ensuring quality control and the effective use of data collection instruments. Participants engaged in the pre-testing of study instruments were informed in advance that the exercise was a pre-testing one and that they were requested to explain their reactions to the questions with regards to flow, format, wording and order.

5.7 Data Collection Instruments

Research is a methodological and systematic inquiry through which specific instruments are used to collect data in the pursuit of valid knowledge (Brynad *et al.* 2014: 3). Thus, data collection represents the key entry point of any scientific research project (Bryman 2016: 5). However, each data collection instrument has its strengths and weaknesses. With this in mind and in order to minimise the weaknesses and maximise the strengths of each data collection tool, before designing the research instruments, I thoroughly explored the

literature which guided him in the selection of the best and relevant tools to obtain the required information. This study largely collected primary data from action research participants using focus group discussions, interviews, questionnaires and observation. Secondary data was obtained through a literature review. I spent one year (the entire 2017) exploring related literature on nonviolence and nonviolent campaigns in an attempt to collect secondary data, which has informed Chapters 1 and 2 of this study. With insights obtained from the literature review, I planned and, in consultation with my supervisor, developed data collection tools. Primary data collection and analysis continued for nearly one year of 2018. In my experience, data collection, triangulation and analysis were the most daunting and time-consuming parts of the research.

However, having ample time and staying focused and persistent allowed me to enjoy the process more than the output. This process cannot be rushed. It was an investment of time and learning, not a burden. After I had gained insights from the literature review and watching nonviolent action films and documentaries, I designed guides for the FGDs and interviews. I used the data collection methods tabulated in Table 5.1 to gather data.

Table 5.3: Overview of the Data Collection Process.

Data collection method	**Date**	**Location**	**Number of partici-pants**	**Techniques used**
Focus group discussions	11 April 2018	School of Public Service, University of Juba-Juba	9	The researcher delivered a brief introduction highlighting the purpose of the study, and introduced his research team. To create rapport, participants also introduced themselves. The researcher then asked each question and invited participants to share their views. The researcher sought the participants' consent ahead of the discussions and engaged a logistician to take care of refreshments.
	15 April 2018	ONAD offices at Kololo Road, Juba Nabari	6	
	17 April 2018	Institute of Peace, Security and Development Studies, University of Juba-Juba	6	
	23 April 2018	ONAD offices at Kololo Road off US Embassy	5	

		Street, Juba Nabari Block 4		
Interviews	18 May to 4 June 2018	In Juba at different locations considered safe and appropriate by respondents	15	The researcher recorded interviews using an audio recorder and/or took notes as preferred by respondent(s). Interviews were done on a one-on-one basis which targeted two categories. The first group comprised 15 participants who attended the FGDs. Their interview questions were structured in order to validate the preliminary findings of the FGDs. The second category comprised 10 respondents who had been involved in nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan.
	11-19 June 2018	In Juba at different locations such as NGO premises, schools, universities and homes considered safe and appropriate by respondents	10	
Observation	22-24 February 2018	ONAD office, Juba	21	The researcher observed the AVP basic workshop supported by Quaker Service Germany.
	23-25 May 2018	Mauna Classic Hotel, Juba	24	The researcher attended and observed a three-day basic nonviolence workshop organised by ONAD in partnership with the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation.
	26 June to 1 July 2018	Brakenhurst Hotel, Limuru, Kenya	30	The researcher observed nonviolent action training organised for the leaders of civil society and faith-based groups. The training was organised by ONAD in collaboration with the USIP.
	3-5 June 2018	Azure hotel, Nairobi, Kenya	15	The researcher further observed the training of trainers to 15 selected participants who participated in the previous training (basic).
	2 October 2018	Embassy of India in Juba, South Sudan	200	Attended Gandhi's 150 years and international day of nonviolence celebration. The researcher delivered a keynote address on what Gandhi means to him.
	9 December 2018	Buluk playing ground to the Ministries and Airport Roads	Over 1,000	The researcher participated in a women's silent march demanding an end to war.

Source: Author's data collection plan.

5.7.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus group discussions provide participants with an opportunity to freely share their experiences on a particular topic of interest in a specific context and space where participants are allowed to agree or disagree with each other. FGDs enable me to explore how an individual group member thinks about an issue from different perspectives in order to discover the inconsistencies and variations that exist in a particular community in terms of experiences.

Four FGDs were held. Each FGD targeted five to eight participants, and a total of 26 participants were consulted using structured questions. The participants were drawn from NGO workers, youth and women's organisations, university students, lawyers, media personnel and members of faith-based and traditional groups. Consent letters were first delivered to inform the participants of the study's aim and objectives. As mentioned earlier in Section 5.2, it was clarified that the participation was voluntary and that each participant could withdraw at any time from the study as he/she wished. Data collected from the FGDs was analysed and preliminary findings were drafted. In the process, I learned that the smaller the FGD, the better the chances of a researcher in obtaining information. This is because a FGD involves allowing the group members to share their experiences on the issues being discussed. Large groups allow limited time for individual members to exhaust sharing their experiences, or some members may end up listening more than speaking, as participants risk competing for opportunities to speak.

5.7.2 Interviews

Interviews are conversations between a researcher and a respondent. An individual face-to-face interview has a structure and a purpose designed to elicit the interviewee's knowledge or perspective on a specific study topic. Individual interviews are useful for exploring and documenting an individual's beliefs, values, understandings, feelings, experiences and perspectives of an issue. Interviews – as compared to FGDs and questionnaires – are more powerful in eliciting narrative data which allows researchers to investigate people's views

in greater depth (Kvale 1996, 2003). In a similar vein, Dörnyei (2007: 140) further elaborates that a 'good' qualitative interview has two key features: "(a) it flows naturally, and (b) it is rich in detail".

In order to translate the reliability and validity of this study into practice, I used structured interview questions and interviewed 15 participants who attended the FGDs. The questions were essentially a follow-up to validate the preliminary findings of the FGDs. A key feature of one-on-one interviews is that they allow for in-depth interactions and detailed investigations of each person's perspective on the issues being studied (Lewis and Nicholls 2014: 56). To attain this goal, I acted more as a listener during the interviews than a speaker. It works well when a researcher limits his or her role to guiding the conversation.

My major tasks and contribution involved the preparation for the interviews. In this regard, I designed and pre-tested the interview questions, bought a voice recorder, and provided bottled water and chairs for the interview sessions. In addition, I consulted with the interviewees and established an appropriate meeting location and time, and ensured that a conducive atmosphere was created for each interviewee to feel more at ease and thus talk freely. Structured questions allowed the participants to share their personal experiences in relation to the findings, whether being in agreement or disagreement, as well as conclusions.

To draw on the experiences of prominent nonviolent activists, I selected 10 nonviolent activists using snowballing sampling techniques. Questions such as the following were asked:

- What nonviolent campaign did you or your organisation organise?
- What inspired you to take nonviolent action?
- Did you succeed in achieving the desired objectives?
- What challenges did you face?
- What lessons did you learn?

- What are the gaps in the South Sudanese nonviolence movement and how can they be addressed?

Those interviewed were members of the civil society who were directly involved in carrying out nonviolence-related actions.

Although the process of interviewing is a powerful way of gaining insights into interviewees' perceptions, the instrument has been criticised (Alshenqeeti 2014: 43) as being time-consuming with regards to both data collection and analysis, as these need to be transcribed, coded and possibly translated, as was the case in this study. Thus, Mugenda (2003: 83) has interestingly reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of interviewing. Table 5.2 compares the advantages and disadvantages of the interviewing process.

Table 5.4: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Interviewing Process.

Advantages	**Disadvantages**	**How the researcher managed the disadvantages**
Provides in-depth data which could not be secured using other tools	Time-consuming and more expensive as it may require a researcher to travel and meet respondents	For this case, the action research targeted only the civil society in Juba. Though local transport was required, it was manageable.
Yields a higher response rate	It requires a higher level of communication skills to document responses which some researchers might lack. Hence this may lead to potential errors or bias	The researcher took notes and used a voice recorder where appropriate to gather information. As the researcher analysed the data, he kept referring to the raw data for cross-checking purposes and to ensure that the triangulation was solid enough to avoid errors or bias.
Interviews guard against confusing the questions since the interviewer can clarify them leading to a relevant response	Interviews tend to be misused to obtain factual responses which could be obtained more accurately through other methods	The researcher interviewed 15 respondents out of 26 participants consulted with through FGDs until he reached the level of saturation. In this way, the researcher was able to validate the information obtained.
Can expose reality and obtain very sensitive information	Responses may be influenced by the respondents' reaction to the interviewer	As part of a one-on-one interview, the researcher always reminded each respondent to be honest in his or her response and that it was

through honest and personal interaction		not compulsory to answer questions.
Relatively flexible as compared to other tools	Often involves smaller samples, as targeting a large sample may become a constraint	The researcher sampled 15 out of 26 respondents who attended the FGDs. The researcher gave more time where an interviewee was willing and enthusiastic to express himself or herself.
Controlled answering order	Potential for subconscious bias	Preliminary findings were validated by sampled participants.

Source: Mugenda (2003: 83)

To reduce the disadvantages of the interviewing process, I used other instruments, such as an observation, as a supplement to collect data on in-depth information about participants' experiences, inner values and actions. For instance, using observation as a supplement to interviews and FGDs allowed me to investigate and assess participants' external behaviours and internal beliefs with regards to nonviolence. Therefore, the relevance of research instruments is largely significant in informing the findings of any scientific research.

5.7.3 Observation

Observation, as the name implies, is a means by which a researcher and respondent can collect data through observing related events and activities in a specific study area(s). This implies that observation is only possible to use within the research setting using images, note-taking and/or voice recordings. Advantages of the observation data-collection method include direct access to research phenomena and areas. At the same time, observation as a tool has its disadvantages, including the potential influence of an observer's presence which may influence the behaviour of the sample group as well as the temptation of letting in observer's bias in the interpretation of the phenomena under observation. Thus, it is important to note that researchers should follow and adhere to ethical standards during observations. However, observations are meant for both a researcher and action research participants.

As a researcher in this case, I observed the attitudes and behaviours of the action research participants during and after the training program. For example, during the training, some participants expressed doubts regarding the potentials of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan, while a few others expressed optimism. On 10 December 2018, I participated in a women's march where three of my action researchers played a pivotal role in its organisation and implementation. For me, being on a street with placards alongside my action research participants condemning the rape of 150 women in Bentiu, and calling for the protection of women and the immediate impartial investigation and holding of perpetrators accountable for their actions, was my greatest joy in the study. I could also sense that my action research participants felt encouraged and inspired to implement a nonviolent action after the training. It is inspiring for me to be physically present in the places where events of nonviolent campaigns are taking place, and to observe the people involved and the consequences of the actions taken and their outcomes.

As the march was organised alongside the international day of human rights with the presence of the media, there were no cases of arrest but a few policemen, policewomen and security personnel were present. The protesters were addressed by the Minister of Gender and Social Welfare and the speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Following the women's march, the government formed a higher level committee headed by the Minister of Gender to investigate the alleged rape of 150 women. The findings of the investigation committee are yet to be made public. In January 2019, I participated in submission of a petition to the Minister of Information regarding poor mobile telecommunication networks by over 100 civil society leaders (Radio Tarmazuj 2019). I distributed diaries to action research participants to help them note and document places and actors where nonviolent or violent campaigns had taken place during the period of the study.

5.7.4 Questionnaires

Questionnaires are a popular tool for gathering information on public opinion, knowledge and perception in scientific research. They are convenient in that

one can collect useful comparable data from a large number of individuals or groups, such as the AR participants. However, questionnaires can only produce valid and meaningful results if the questions are clear and precise and if they are asked consistently across all respondents (Mathers, Fox and Hunn 2009: 19). Questionnaires are practical, cost efficient and they reduce interviewer bias as well as temptation to influence respondents. This is because in administering questionnaires, the respondents are often required to answer the questions on their own.

Nevertheless, despite the advantages, questionnaires like any other data collection instruments have their weaknesses and disadvantages too. For instance, a questionnaire cannot fully capture respondents' feelings, honesty in responses and there is a chance that some questions will be ignored or left unanswered (Debois 2019). Exploring such insights helped me to carefully design, pre-test and administer the questionnaires. I ensured that questionnaires are administered on face-to-face basis with the sample of AR participants to assess their knowledge about nonviolent action and campaigning before and after the training as detailed in appendix 9 and 10. This approach allowed me to observe facial expression, emotional reactions or body language.

5.8 Diaries

I commissioned the action research participants to keep diaries of their personal field experiences and phenomena under study. According to Alaszewski (2006: 2), diaries include not only records of activities and/or events but also personal commentaries reflecting on roles, activities and relationships, and may also explore personal feelings. Participants are expected to use their diaries to document their experiences and observations. This will be reported on at the end of the study evaluation program.

5.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data analysis and presentation followed the qualitative design chosen for this study. Qualitative 'raw' data comes in various forms ranging from verbatim

transcripts of interviews or discussions (or audio files, if they have not been transcribed), observational notes, diaries, reports of written documents, video recordings etc. The process of analysing primary data which was obtained largely from FGDs, interviews, questionnaires and observations was both challenging and rewarding. It was challenging because I obtained huge raw data which were analysed manually and thematically, using thematic content analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). The process of analysing raw data was rewarding because I was prepared and gave special codes to emerging ideas and topics, including those which were surprising and those which were not anticipated at the proposal-development phase. I used notable quotes in order to communicate how participants articulated the issues being discussed and the expression of the participants' attitudes towards the study topics.

This is particularly important as qualitative data analysis pays special attention to the spoken word, and the consistency and contradictions of different comments made by the respondents. In order to filter relevant and irrelevant data in an attempt to reduce and manage the useful data, I employed two approaches. One approach was to examine themes relevant to the study aims and objectives. This framework analysis approach allows a researcher to focus on particular relevant answers and abandon the rest. The second approach used involved thematic network analysis, which took a more exploratory perspective which allows a researcher to code all data, allowing for new impressions and perspectives to shape the study (Attride-Stirling 2001).

As part of the data analysis and interpretation, I used triangulation in the data interpretation and presentation to ensure that different sources of information were thoroughly examined to justify and build coherent themes. While there is much scholarly contribution on the theories of triangulation, not many written materials exist on how triangulation is effectively carried out in practice. Thus, in my experience, triangulation is difficult in practice, given that it involves the back-and-forth cross-checking of different data sources to reach an interpretation or conclusion.

To validate the findings and outcomes of an action research project, I used the same constituency (AR participants) to cross-check the accuracy of that which I observed during the monitoring process and that which the participants themselves reported in follow-up and evaluation meetings. As Creswell has emphasised, the use of member checking to determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings by taking the final report or specific preliminary themes back to the participants for verification, scrutiny and validation, can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study (Creswell 2014).

All respondents were informed of the aim and objectives of the study. Participants were informed in writing, and all signed that no one would be quoted by name. Anonymity is important because an individual, group or organisation not assured in advance of non-identifiability may provide biased data (Mile, Huberman., and Saldana. 2014: 57). Participants were also informed that the names of the action research participants would be known as they attend the training together and form a networking group. I also saved the raw data, analysis and reporting of the findings in a manner that does not expose the identification of participants in relation to their statements, i.e. which participant(s) made which statement(s). The data is only accessible to me as a researcher.

5.10 Limitations and Delimitations

Almost all scientific studies face shortcomings, unfavourable conditions or influences that researchers cannot control. In the case of this study, I took time to reflect on potential challenges that were likely to hinder the study and planned in advance on how to minimise their negative impacts on the research. The scope of this research is limited to the action research participants who are drawn largely from the civil society sector based in Juba. Nevertheless, the study did not attempt to target all members of the civil society actors in Juba or the entire country for impractical and budgetary reasons, though some sampled respondents have wider operations across the country.

Thus the study findings cannot be generalised but should be considered as the views of the sampled 24 AR participants, aged between 18 and 72, who are predominantly residents of Juba. The selection of a small sample of respondents was also influenced by an action research design which focused on collecting qualitative data from a specific group. This approach was also preferred because it was cost-efficient, given that the study was conducted in the time that the South Sudanese economy was facing considerable hyperinflation with increased market prices, and could fit within the approved DUT research budget. Thus, the prime reason of using a sample of subset of civil society population is to save costs and time.

The study was carried out following the outbreak of conflict in July 2016 which led to the collapse of the ARCSS, signed in August 2015. In addition, certain regions and areas of South Sudan are completely inaccessible, which can make sampling difficult and generally very expensive, requiring high levels of human and financial resources (Mohmand *et al.* 2017: 18). The renewed conflict led to a restrictive and limited space for civil society, and an increased level of insecurity, mistrust and suspicion within civil society and between state and non-state actors, making it difficult for the researcher to proceed with data collection, without mobilising local stakeholders' support and giving much time to clarifying the purpose of the study.

I therefore had to ensure that the gatekeeper, its staff and volunteers understood the purpose of his study, and informed and mobilised the support of other relevant academic and peace stakeholders to secure their buy-in. These processes consumed a considerable amount of time and financial resources needed to facilitate internal transport. In some instances, I used phone calls to fix meeting appointments. I also met with relevant academic and peace stakeholders and solicited their support.

To delimit constraints, it was helpful to secure the support and buy-in of the University of Juba, SPS, IPDSS, SSPRC and other relevant stakeholders. In South Sudan, face-to-face meetings with heads of institutions are regarded as a sign of recognition and respect to them, thereby making their approval for

support more likely. It was important to coordinate with the gatekeeper and seek the necessary advice and approval of other influential government actors before commencing the actual intervention.

To respond to the higher market prices in comparison to the allocated financial support of R15,000 from DUT, I covered the deficit through in-kind donations and savings. For instance, much of the stationery was donated by Democracy International (DI), the Civic Engagement Centre in Juba. I also procured a free training hall as an offer from ONAD and SPS, and I used my savings to finance additional costs.

To limit mistrust and avoid fear of the unknown, I took more written notes during the FGDs and face-to-face interviews than voice recordings. This was because most respondents preferred note-taking to voice recordings to avoid security implications and risks.

5.11 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are central concepts and requirements in any scientific research. To ensure the reliability of this research, the examination of trustworthiness was treated as crucial, particularly in addressing issues of data quality and integrity. I examined the data collection instruments through pre-testing of the FGDs and interview questions. I further used triangulation to cross-check multiple data sources and collection procedures to evaluate the extent to which all the evidence converged. Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for improving the validity and reliability of research findings. Mathison (1988: 13) elaborates this by stating: “Triangulation has risen as an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation of study outcomes [in order to] control bias and establish valid results”.

For instance, one-on-one interviews were conducted with 15 participants who attended the FGDs. The interviews were deliberately intentioned to cross-check and validate emerging issues and preliminary findings drawn from data obtained through FGDs. A member was assigned to observe and meet with

action research participants to independently check whether or not the interpretations of the researcher were correct. To ensure validity, multiple approaches such as triangulation, taking back data to the participants during the study to check with them if their responses were correctly captured, spending a prolonged period of time in the field, and peer reviewing, among other approaches, were used (Creswell 2013: 250-253).

5.12 Ethical Considerations

This study was undertaken in accordance with the guidelines set by DUT's Institutional Ethics Committee. The research proposal for this study, as well as the data collection instruments, were also reviewed and approved by DUT. Thus the issues of informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality and anonymity of the process were addressed from my first contact with the respondents. This is because a researcher has the responsibility to inform and protect respondents from any present or future potential harm, both physical and psychological, in a timely manner.

All participants who participated in this study were informed and their consent was sought in advance. The consent letter contained all ethical issues that a participant was required to read and sign as an acknowledgement of his or her informed consent to voluntarily participate, including the right to withdraw at any time (for details refer to appendix 2 and 4).

Participants were also assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of the study process particularly during FGDs and interviews. However, during the training, participants were informed that they would be able to meet and interact face-to-face with other participants, co-facilitators and the research team. The names of the participants in the action group will be known for record purposes but will not be shared with anybody except DUT as part of accountability for transport re-imbursement. Confidentiality will also be ensured by restricting access to raw data, storing all data securely, and reporting findings in a manner that does not allow for the identification of participants.

CHAPTER 6: TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATIONS

6.1 Introduction

As this action research training project was not an end in itself but a means to an end, I took time, in advance, to explore the participants' training needs as well as to explore the whole concept of and aspects of capacity building. The assessment was a deliberate attempt to avoid mistakes that many researchers and trainers commit by simply planning the training on the assumptions of their experiences, claiming to know the training needs of participants. This common mistake often leads to a training program becoming ineffective in that it does not respond to the felt needs, expectations and aspirations of participants. A further matter is that it reduces the training as an end in itself.

This chapter discusses the overall concept of capacity building and training, the importance of training needs assessments and how I obtained data to assess the needs and capacity gaps of action research participants. The chapter highlights findings of the assessment and criticisms of the training approach, and concludes with proposed training content and logistical preparations.

6.2 Concept of Capacity Building and Training

Rather often, the notion of capacity building is associated with the idea of training, education and mentorship aimed at increasing the skills and competencies of individual members of the community, staff and volunteers of a given working group or organisation. However, capacity building is a much broader concept which should be considered from a systemic perspective, which involves different clusters, as individuals, organisations, institutions and society. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *capacity* refers to the ability of individuals and institutions to make and implement decisions and perform functions in an effective, efficient and sustainable manner:

- At the individual level, capacity building refers to the process of changing attitudes and behaviours, imparting knowledge and developing skills while maximising the benefits of participation, knowledge exchange and ownership.
- At the institutional level, it focuses on the overall organisational performance and functioning capabilities, as well as the ability of an organisation to adapt to change.
- At the systemic level, it emphasises the overall policy framework in which individuals and organisations operate and interact with the external environment. Hence, specific and targeted capacity building initiatives need to take into consideration the different levels of capacity needed to be enhanced (UNDP 2015).

However, the common purpose for traditional training is to transfer new knowledge and skills in a specific field of interest such as nonviolent action to effect positive change in participants' lives. Most processes of change require training and support to ensure effective implementation. A focus on training as a capacity-building approach is a necessity in empowering people to make changes by providing them with a deeper, practical and context-specific learning experience to motivate actions. Thus the starting point for any training is to find answers to the 'What?', 'Why?' and 'How?' etc. questions in relation to a specific training subject. What are the participants' needs and expectations towards the training? How do those needs and expectations relate to the training aim and objectives? Which methodology can be used to ensure that participants acquire relevant new ways of acting to address their needs, expectations and grievances during and after the training? What potential challenges and gaps are there? How can those challenges be minimised?

To answer these questions, I had to consult with my action research participants, other prominent nonviolence trainers and literature to gain insights in order to better prepare for the training. Training interventions in action research are generally assumed to be participatory in nature, as they involve the voluntary participation of participants. The participation guarantees a sense

of ownership of the process, which eventually contributes to the implementation of new skills and its sustainability. It also acknowledges that participants are key contributors to the success and outcomes of the research, and not merely subjects of the research (McDonald 2012: 39).

6.3 Training Needs Assessment

Training needs assessment serves as a diagnostic tool for determining which training needs need to be taken into account. FGDs and face-to-face interviews were used to gather data in order to determine which training needs the individual action research participants required in order to accomplish their goals and objectives in life, particularly those pertaining to social, economic and political life. The assessment helped me to understand the needs of and identify the prevailing gaps in South Sudanese nonviolence movements. The assessment findings also form the benchmark for determining the effectiveness of the training to justify or measure outcomes, as reported in Chapter 9. The model of training needs assessment was helpful in planning data collection, analysis and reporting, as depicted in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1: Steps in a training needs assessment (Source: *Steps in a training needs assessment*. Available: https://hr-survey.com/TrainingNeeds.htm).

6.4 Findings

Drawing on the data obtained through FGDs and face-to-face interviews, the study established the following findings:

- AR participants have a limited understanding of the concept and practice of nonviolent action as compared to their knowledge of conflict, violence and peacebuilding in South Sudan. Many defined nonviolent action narrowly as any action taken without the use of physical violence.

- The study revealed that action research participants have a limited experience of planning, organising, coordinating and implementing nonviolent collective actions. The need for training in nonviolent action was expressed by approximately three quarters of the respondents. Those who favoured the training approach argued that the training is needed to clarify the concept, methods and common strategies being used to undertake collective actions.

- Few respondents, however, argued that training is not the only useful way to impact skills and knowledge to undertake nonviolent actions; mentorship, reading nonviolence materials or watching related film documentaries, exchanges, and conference and dialogue programs can also empower individuals and groups to use nonviolent campaigns.

Although it is not the intention of this study to overemphasise the importance of training in nonviolent movements, special attention was accorded to respondents who did not see the importance of training in capacity building. Those respondents who expressed reservations about the training approach cited poor training quality due to inadequate or a lack of preparations, and the repeated targeting of the same participants, resulting in community and civil society members becoming saturated from training.

Having noted such constructive criticisms, I paid very careful attention to the preparation of training contents, methodology, materials and how best to connect the training with the context realities and the subsequent steps. This is because the training intervention developed in this study was intended to be unique by aiming to engage the participants beyond the training in applying the acquired skills and contributing to building peace at the community level and beyond.

6.5 Past and Contemporary Examples of Successful Training Outcomes

Although nonviolence training is not a pre-requisite for individuals and a group of activists to undertake nonviolent action, training gives the participants the advantage to analyse issues, envision nonviolent alternatives, draw demands, develop campaign strategies, and plan and evaluate actions to increase their impact. A review of past and contemporary literature indicates that properly-designed training in nonviolence has proven its contribution in many countries by supporting the success of peace movements in achieving social justice and other forms of political change.

For instance, the earliest training in the US took place in 1941 to prepare Black and White students to challenge racial segregation which was often met with violence. In 1959, in Nashville, James Lawson began weekly workshops on nonviolent methods, which became participatory with stories of nonviolence, role plays and discussions. Their three-month campaign, which was preceded by six months of training, was a success, and the restaurants and stores of Nashville were desegregated. Hence, Nashville became the model for campaigns and trainings (War Resisters International 2014: 18-19).

As nonviolent movements become more effective, harassment and security activities increase. Activists must explore and establish secure communication channels within the movement as the opponents, particularly the government, has the capacity to monitor, disrupt and even close communication channels and/or infiltrate the movement. The best protection that many suggest is to train activists on what to say, what not to say, and more importantly, which messages to communicate; how, when and with whom to communicate them; which channels to use during communication etc. This will prevent and potentially deny and limit the opponents from obtaining sensitive information about the movement's plans (Popovic *et al.* 2006: 66).

Realising the need to better support activists to better utilise communication facilities, the USIP, in July 2014, hosted a workshop to identify the key challenges and opportunities in using technologies to support nonviolent civic movements in the twenty-first century.

The civic activists, policy makers, technologists, NGO leaders, and education professionals participating in the workshop noted the power of training to support movement-building, the development of appropriate skills and knowledge, planning and innovation, and access to materials (McKone *et al.* 2015: 2). Peer-to-peer capacity-building training, participatory workshops, locally-based clinics, and mentoring were identified as robust elements of an approach emphasising civil society engagement (Maria *et al.* 2015: 2).

In 2005, nonviolence training was introduced in Sudan by the Sudanese Organization for Nonviolence and Development (SONAD). The focus was on imparting nonviolence skills, building a sustainable network of allies, strategising and taking nonviolent actions. The training on different nonviolent methods included simulating violent incidents in order to practice nonviolent interventions. It included the practice of principles while handling conflicts at different levels. Many activist groups such as Girifna, youth and pro-democracy professional associations in Sudan, acknowledged that training in nonviolence has empowered them with practical tools for peaceful social change (Korayi and Elias 2010: 46).

6.6 Overview of Nonviolence Training Program

When planning to undertake a scientific action research study that involves training in capacity building, it is imperative to realistically highlight that which the training is expected to cover within the given hours or days. The overview guides the researcher, co-facilitators and indeed the entire research team to plan the training content, and to choose the right and relevant methodology to accomplish the desired ends. Bearing in mind that two days of five hours each are not sufficient for all the needed skills and knowledge to implement nonviolent actions, and that many individuals and groups have taken to the streets or have used nonviolent resistance without undergoing training, the researcher was inspired to carefully design the training within the limited time and with the available financial resources.

6.6.1 Curriculum Content

The curriculum for participatory nonviolent action training is vital for learning new skills for dealing with fear, brutal and oppressive power in the society, and developing coping mechanisms, different strategies and techniques (WRI 2009: 13). The goal of the nonviolent action training was to empower the participants to engage more effectively in resisting violence and all forms of injustice and building peace. Thus, the training curriculum was centred on impacting the knowledge and skills in analysing violence and conflict, exploring past and contemporary examples of successful nonviolent action implemented in South

Sudan since its independence. To make use of the training needs assessment findings, the researcher included the following themes in the design of the training curriculum:

- Understanding the difference between violence and conflict
- What nonviolent action constitutes and what it does not
- Methods, principles and strategies of nonviolent action
- Understanding power and its dynamics in nonviolent movements
- Tools for the analysis of violence and injustice
- Dealing with fear
- How to plan, develop and implement nonviolent campaigns
- Networking and sustainability

6.6.2 Training Methodology

An interactive and participatory approach will be used throughout the nonviolent action training. Two-way participant-facilitator feedback sessions will be employed each day to monitor and gauge the training for possible improvements and adjustments where possible and necessary. New concepts and topics will be introduced through short exercises of five to 10 minutes or with brainstorming, case studies or documentary films such as *A force most powerful*, *Pray the devil back to hell*, and others. Facilitators will adopt experiential learning techniques to ensure that local experiences and examples are given paramount attention. The use of local examples will be particularly encouraged for a better understanding of the concept and how it works in practice. The sharing of experiences will enable the participants to obtain knowledge and acquire new skills at the same time, not just from the facilitators but from each other as well. Other methodologies that will be used include exercises, role plays and group discussions.

A recap of the previous day's discussions will be encouraged to offer a fresh start and continuity. There will be a space for open questions and answers as well as comments for participants to relate the discussions with their lives and contexts. Attention will be paid to participants who have language barriers, thus

translation will be provided. Participants will be encouraged to offer support services such as energizers in between sessions, particularly in the afternoons and after lunch where the body becomes dizzy or the weather becomes hot.

6.6.3 Training in Principles of Nonviolence

The use and practice of nonviolent campaigns have recently raised many questions within scholarly circles and among scholarly practitioners. A central question in the study and practice of civil resistance is how nonviolent movements can maintain nonviolent discipline among their members. Which factors encourage and sustain nonviolent discipline in the face of violent repression? While several scholars have suggested answers to these questions, the answers remained vague unless they are systematically tested in practice. However, the comparison of three civil resistance campaigns from the post-Communist Colour revolution in Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, suggest that:

- Repression consistently lowers nonviolent discipline, reinforcing the need for campaigns to carefully strategise their responses to it.
- Nonviolent discipline also falls significantly following government concessions offered to resisters, possibly due to campaign over-confidence or movement splits.
- Non-hierarchical campaigns with observable internal debates, opposing schools of thoughts, and even conflicts are better at maintaining nonviolent discipline (Pinckney 2016: 5).

In 2003, the US invaded Iraq where millions of lives were lost. The killing of innocent people occurred when the claim of weapons of mass destruction had not been proven. This experience was a lesson to be learned by the proponents of nonviolent action, that it is imperative to connect methods with principles of nonviolence to prevent or limit harm. Principled nonviolent actions are governed by the principles of connectedness, empathy and love for fellow human beings, including adversaries. Thus, training in the methods and

practice of nonviolent campaigns should introduce participants to principles as well.

On the other hand, the use of strategic planning in nonviolence encompasses principles built on the pragmatic approach professing an ethical foundation, which tends to argue that life is not a choice between violence and nonviolence but rather a choice between violence and less violence; the latter acknowledges the difficulty of separating violence and nonviolent means as they often overlap (Irenees 2007: 1). This again emphasises that the use and practice of nonviolent discipline is critical. Thus, nonviolent movements have developed a number of ethical, principled and pragmatic principles of nonviolence. Some of these include:

- Search for the centre of conflicts – nonviolence calls for action, not for passivity. We are called to act where people are suffering under violence, oppression and injustice. King advises that nonviolent resistance is not a method for cowards... It is the way of the strong. [and] is not a method of stagnant passivity. Second, it does not seek the humiliation or defeat of the opponent but, rather, understanding and the awakening of a sense of morality (King 1999: 101). It is aimed at defeating the evil that one is trying to expunge, not the evil doer.

- Show respect to one's adversaries as much as one respects oneself and others – treat all people in a conflict as equals. The more one respects others, the more effectively one can persuade them to change. Never use humiliation as a tool – or accept humiliation from others; this degrades everyone. "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" (King 1963). Remember, nobody can degrade one without one's permission. Gandhi argued that it was possible to hate the sin, not the sinner (Nagler 2012: 1).

- Remember that everyone can change, and that there is something good in all people. In nonviolence, one does not seek to be a winner, or rise over others; one seeks to learn and to make things better for all.

- Ends and means have to be compatible, e.g. if one wants peace, one must pursue it in a peaceful way. One of Gandhi's popular quotes stated that peace is the road not only the goal.

- If suffering is unavoidable, one must take it on oneself, rather than harming someone else. The cycle of violence stops with oneself. Nonviolence involves risk-taking. Thus, resisters must be willing to take risks when necessary and prepare to suffer any consequences to transform injustice (King 1999: 101).

- No one has monopoly on the truth – the challenge is to bring one's own and one's adversaries' truths together.

These insights educated me in becoming aware that nonviolence training may be specifically designed to increase activists' capacity to use a variety of nonviolence principles, tactics and strategies. Targeted skills may include power and context analysis, methods and principles of nonviolence, the effective use of communication and social media, legal aid, strategic planning, consensus building, recruitment and leadership. Planning sessions also help activists to determine appropriate tactics and identify the stage in a campaign when and where a tactic could be most effectively deployed (Bloch 2015: 14). The collective analysis of power dynamics, issues and the political context is key to developing a shared vision and theory of change for a given country or region. This also helps in deciding which nonviolence methods and strategies can best work, as well as when and why. Joint training and planning enhance effective campaigns, ensure a higher possibility of success, and give insight on how to deal with obstacles as they occur.

Role-playing of various kinds is common in NVA workshops. Role-playing allows for the rapid development and troubleshooting of logistics. The sessions may be designed to practice escalation and de-escalation tactics in a confrontation scenario, to try out peacekeeping tactics (in response to both

internal and external provocations), or to retain focus during a confrontational situation. Familiarity with the use of such tactics helps to develop leaders' comfort under stress, gives them practice in a non-binding setting, and gives the experience of decision-making under stress:

> Practicing different skills through role-playing for possible eventualities helps participants develop courage and preparedness and move toward collaborative and team-building work. Training for American civil rights activists helped them strategise and prepare for specific actions, such as lunch counter sit-ins, marches, and even incarceration. The training was critical not only to develop the best tactics but also to support individuals in overcoming their fears and retaining strong self-discipline in resisting the temptation to respond to provocations or to fight back (Bloch 2015: 14).

6.6.4 Methods of Nonviolence

Building on Sharp's 198 methods of nonviolent action, originally documented in the second volume of *The politics of nonviolent action*, the training will introduce participants to the different methods. This will include the focus of the three broad categories: nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation (social, economic, and political), and direct intervention. Although some readers often misconstrue that Sharp actually invested in the development of the list of the 198 methods of nonviolence, the truth is that he merely documented approaches that had already been practiced by others across the globe (Engler 2017: 14). The researcher will further explore and use new creative methods that are being used in South Sudan.

6.6.5 Strategic Planning

As the popular saying goes; "planning is everything, the plan is nothing and not having a *plan* is worse". I subscribe to the view that, planning is a very important aspect in life leave alone in a peace movement. Thus, strategic planning is crucial for the success of nonviolent or violent campaigns. Building on the fact that any context is unique, the application of nonviolent strategies must be informed by the socio-economic and political history, ethics, culture and traditions of the groups implementing the technique. In other words, strategic planning cannot be carried out by outside actors or parties external to

the dispute. Though external actors may support the planning process, the major responsibility and choice of strategy falls solely on the shoulders of the individuals and groups who have made the decision to fight with nonviolent methods (Miller 2006: 42). In the development of effective strategies, activists must identify the issues and challenges at stake, consider from where they originate, generate a dream of what the group wants, articulate its main objectives, and devise a strategy to collectively achieve these objectives (War Resisters' International 2009: 35).

Therefore, as part of an action research project, I incorporated elements of strategic planning sessions to empower beneficiaries to analyse their socio-economic and political context and develop their own relevant strategies for campaigns.

According to Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006: 72), a campaign is "a strategically planned and executed set of nonviolent actions aimed at a targeted group". Strategically, Popovic (2016: 175) urges that the experience reveals that the choice of a mass demonstration comes as the last step, not the first. He adds that activists mobilise the masses to march on the streets when they know that they have sufficient masses on their side and when they have carried out the necessary preparations, including training, to bring the campaign to public. The Egyptian activists had organised for nearly two years, used several leaflets and street theatres, and won many small battles before taking to the streets and rallying the troops to Tahrir Square, which eventually forced Mubarak out of office.

Long-term strategic planning is required to enable a nonviolent resistance group to find the most efficient methods for ending coercion, to evaluate when the political circumstances and popular disposition are ready for action, and to decide how to begin the nonviolent operation and how to widen it as it progresses, while challenging the opponents' suppression and new counter measures. Strategic planning also empowers the nonviolent struggle cluster to grow powerful because of its awareness of potential harms, opposition, and responses that the resisters will probably meet (Sharp 2005: 443).

Thus, planning helps a campaign to stay organised and therefore the 'how to' has to be brief and precise for every level of planning from the strategic to the tactical. Nonviolent movements have to structure them in a standardised format which ensures the clarity of the objectives, actions to be taken, and the assignment of different responsibilities (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 52). The same authors identify the following as the most important questions that need to be asked to carry out such an exercise:

- What is the current environment in which the planned actions will take place?
- What is to be done (planned activity/activities)?
- How are the activities going to be achieved (concept of operation)?
- Which tasks and assignment of responsibilities have to be identified?
- What information is essential regarding support and communication?
- What might your opponent do in order to try and stop you? (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 52).

During the nonviolence training, participants will be requested to reflect on these questions in order to develop a sound and simple plan for their movement.

6.6.6 Environment

Establishing a conducive training environment that enhances learning is a critical logistical responsibility to realise desired training outcomes. A welcoming, safe and wide enough space to accommodate participants and allow for exercises and role plays, are critical. The researcher therefore set the criteria mentioned below to guide his choice of selecting a training environment that would create the best learning environment for his AR participants. The criterion includes:

- Security and safety of participants to freely interact and learn new skills without intimidation, distractions and noise

- Availability of electricity for PowerPoint presentations and screening related documentary films. Availability of water supply services within the facility was equally imperative to the power supply.
- A hall with a reasonable size to accommodate a minimum of 30 participants, including co-facilitators and a support team, bearing in mind that a training hall that is too large can be as ineffective as one that is too small
- Public clean washrooms in the venue for women and men and a space for exercises, group role plays, and socialising during break times
- Location is appropriate for participants to reach it through public transport and private means with parking loads
- The training hall can either be offered free of charge or can be offered with a subsidised charge.

When short-listing options for training venues, it is important to consider the rooms and indeed the entire compound environment and that which they offer.

I did not consider good quality and comfortable chairs, effective air conditioning, plenty of power sockets etc. as necessary room requirements, as such services are often obtained in costly hotels which the researcher could not afford. With these criteria in mind, ONAD was chosen as a training venue. The organisation was a gatekeeper and was co-founded by the researcher in 1994. However, participants were largely drawn from other civil society sectors to avoid bias. IPDSS and SPS were used for holding FGDs. These venues are relatively secure and were less difficult to secure given that the researcher was a post-graduate student of IPDSS and taught working groups and conflict management in SPS. In South Sudan, social capital and relationship pay.

In South Sudan, activities of civil society and public institutions, such as higher institutions of learning, are monitored and subject to security approval. However, holding training programs within an NGO facility does not require security approvals, as such activities are considered as a normal part of NGOs' programming which may or may not attract security checks or questioning. To

clarify any security questioning and eventualities, I obtained letters of introduction from DUT and conducted action research training under the nonviolence and peacebuilding program of ONAD. The participants' letter of information also clearly indicates that the training was purely for academic purposes and meant to test the theories of nonviolent action and its outcomes as requirements for the award of the degree of philosophy in public administration peace studies.

6.6.7 Follow-up, Monitoring and Evaluation

Although the main objective of the follow up, monitoring and evaluation is to track AR participants' progress or outcomes, monitoring helps me (a researcher) to judge progress being made towards attaining study goal. I therefore held one-on-one follow-up calls and, where possible, face-to-face meetings with the beneficiaries. Observation of news articles and events were used to monitor and evaluate short- to medium-term outcomes of the training. In July 2019, I conducted a one day evaluation meeting of AR participants to assess and document the overall study progress.

I used an action research evaluation design to evaluate the training outcomes. It is a context-specific, careful and objective review and assessment of an action research project that aims to generate an opportunity for reflection, feedback and learning to determine the outcomes of the project and its sustainability. In this evaluation, I followed the ethical principles of confidentiality, validity and reliability, aimed at protecting the identity of the action research participants, reducing the researcher's bias and generating credible outcomes and learning. I was careful not to confuse evaluation with monitoring, as the two terms are complementary but not the same. While the actual evaluation was carried out on 12 July 2019 with 18 participants out of 26 who attended the training, monitoring was carried out throughout the year using observation, Messenger/Facebook groups, phone calls and face-to-face follow-up meetings held in February 2019. The data obtained through monitoring was processed as the draft preliminary training outcomes, which were presented for validation during the evaluation meeting. Thus the evaluation was not merely

an event but a range of complex and interrelated processes in which I analysed and contrasted the data received through regular monitoring activities and with that which the participants had reported during an evaluation meeting. Meeting most of the action research participants after a year was a rewarding experience. I was able to reconnect and interact with them. It was also an opportunity to reflect on how the study project outcomes, campaigns and positive learning could be sustained and replicated in South Sudan and beyond.

Open-ended questions were used to collect qualitative data to support the evaluation. The questions included:

- What are the most important things that you personally have gotten out of the nonviolent action training?
- What nonviolent campaign(s) did you or your organisation implement?
- How do you plan to sustain the knowledge and skills you have gained for yourself and for your organisation?
- How are you going to sustain the benefits of the campaigns in which you were involved?

These questions were used to guide the conversations in which participants shared their stories in small groups, and reported back to the plenary that which they considered as the most significant training benefits, outcomes and learning. In doing so, the participants were directly engaged in the harvesting and validation of outcomes using the Most Significant Change Approach (MSCA). The MSCA is a monitoring and evaluation technique used for evaluating intervention impacts. It uses a qualitative, participatory approach, with the stakeholders involved in the project being evaluated, and is therefore a shift away from conventional quantitative expert-driven evaluation methods towards a qualitative participant-driven approach, focusing on the benefits and impact of interventions on the beneficiaries. In essence, MSCA involves the generation of significant change stories by various stakeholders involved in the intervention (Davies and Dart 2005: 27). These stories of significant changes are then selected by the stakeholders and subjected to in-depth discussions to

filter and validate which changes are truly and directly associated with the intervention.

6.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, understanding the entire concept and aspects of capacity building and training is critical to planning a sound training program. In the same way, the starting point for planning a capacity-building training program is a participants' needs assessment. This study documented the extent to which civil society actors in South Sudan understood nonviolent action and their capacity gaps which formed the basis for the development of the training curriculum and content. The use of interactive and participatory methodologies was also emphasised to increase the capacity of non-state actors to effectively employ nonviolent actions, and to document and incorporate other known approaches to strengthen their capacity.

PART FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

CHAPTER 7: EXPLORATION: ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE

7.1 Introduction

Drawing on data obtained from FGDs, interviews and observation as part of the exploration phase, this chapter discusses the key findings. It provides an analysis of the attitudes of the respondents towards conflict, violence and nonviolence. The chapter examines the common forms of violence in South Sudan, and its prime drivers and consequences. This was a deliberate attempt to assess and introduce AR participants to the problems that this study seeks to tackle. The chapter traces past and contemporary examples of nonviolent collective actions used by the South Sudanese during the colonial and Sudanese rule up to the gaining of independence of South Sudan. The chapter concludes with the challenges encountered, lessons learned and existing gaps in South Sudanese peace movements.

7.2 Attitudes towards Conflict and Violence

Gauging the participants' attitudes and perspectives towards conflict and violence is very crucial in qualitative research. This is because the key idea behind the qualitative research design is to learn about the problem or issues being studied from the participants' points of view, since they are the ones who will tackle those problems. Thus in my role as a researcher, I had to collect data on the attitudes of the participants towards violence and the injustices that threatened their lives. Theoretically and in some cases, conflict does not have to be violent and not all conflicts are negative, depending on how individuals or groups respond to them. Most respondents misconstrue conflict as violence. One young participant stressed that:

> In South Sudan, slight political differences, misunderstanding or sometimes cabinet reshuffle often trigger communal conflicts and attract gun violence or outright rebellion. This attitude and behavior have negatively influenced the mindset of many South Sudanese that conflict and violence is the same thing.

Violence is a global phenomenon and is not restricted in any way to one country or region. It is often used by individuals, and political and religious groups and movements to achieve specific motives. In this study, most respondents cited communal violence and civil war, sexual and gender-based violence, poverty, homicide, bad governance, armed robbery and car hijackings as common forms of violence in South Sudan. These forms of violence were repeatedly emphasised. While most respondents emphasised direct forms of violence such as communal fights and revenge killings and their psychological effects, a few respondents, who are mostly higher degree holders, emphasised indirect forms of violence which encompass corruption, bad governance, ethnic and ideological exclusion, marginalisation, impunity and structural forms of violence. The study recorded no mention of religious and political extremism and radicalisation as forms of violence in South Sudan. One respondent stressed:

> Despite the growing level of violence in South Sudan, there are no religious and political extremism in the country. Our people are open when it comes to religious beliefs and nobody or group fights another because of religion. However, we have bunch of militia groups who fight to regain political and economic power. These armed groups are largely comprised of unemployed youth who are being misled and supported financially and logistically by power hungry individual elites who hold higher political and military positions in the country. This practice has been tolerated for too long and if not addressed has the potential to drag the country into the Somalia experience that will undermine the country's independence.

Most respondents stressed that communal violence resulted in the loss of lives and livestock, the abduction of children and women, revenge killings and hatred, while civil war is caused by zero-sum game, power greed, the uncontrollable eliciting of firearms, political patronage and corruption. The history and decades of violent struggle have also influenced the mind-set and behaviours of many South Sudanese towards the use of violence (Jok 2013: 2).

South Sudan has experienced violent conflicts for much of the last 60 years. As the southern region in the former Sudan, it endured two civil wars against

the North from 1955-1972 and from 1983-2005. The second civil war ended in 2005 with the CPA, which paved the way for a referendum and subsequent independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011. After South Sudan gained independence, pre-existing political and ethnic-based armed and militia groups quickly turned into a political tool for power and economic prosperity. As a result, new community protection and armed groups not only emerged but increased drastically in all the three regions.

This situation encouraged the flow of elicit arms into the villages which were used for intra- and inter-communal conflicts and revenge killings. In December 2013, what appeared to be a leadership and governance crisis within the ruling SPLM turned violent and became the first ever civil war after the country won its independence two years earlier. Thus, communal violence and civil war have been the prime forms of violence which have caused hundreds of thousands of deaths.

Approximately a quarter of the respondents have different views on that which constitutes violence in relation to selected South Sudanese cultures, customs and traditions. For example, while most participants agree that girls' elopement, bidding for marriage, child and forced marriages and marriages for dead family members are typical forms of cultural violence, a minority of the respondents insisted that girls' elopement, bidding and forced marriages are not gender-based violence but rather acceptable cultural practices and traditions in most rural communities in South Sudan. Elopement is usually understood as a situation where a young person runs away from home with a lover for the purpose of getting married. In the context of South Sudan, a girl's elopement refers to an act of kidnapping or hijacking a girl, teenager or a woman by a man's friends or relatives for marriage, often without the consent of the eloped. There are a few cases where a girl can opt to run away with or to a young man to avoid being forced to marry an elderly rich man. The practice is culturally accepted in some Nilotic and rural communities.

Thus, sexual and gender-based violence takes many forms including girl elopement, child and forced marriages, men bidding to win the hands of women for marriage, ghost marriages, giving unfavourable names to children and

women born outside of marriage, rape, and men beating their wives, to mention a few. Approximately 76% of primary-school-aged girls in South Sudan are not receiving education due to the conflict and unfavourable cultural norms and perceptions. There are deep-seated and prevalent attitudes around prioritising boys' education over girls, especially at rural settings and during times of economic hardship. Families often see the value in sending their boys to school, but many prefer to keep their girls at home to do housework or to help them find food. It is also common for them to be sold into early marriages in exchange for cattle.

Another contentious issue is the marriage to a dead family member (also referred to as a ghost marriage). It is interesting to note that this type of marriage is planned and is mostly executed by females instead of men. The practice, in most cases, commences with a woman befriending a girl or a woman of their choice and proposing that she enters into a marriage with a family member, usually a brother who died before getting married. If the girl or woman agrees to the proposal, marriage will be arranged and dowry will be paid. The woman will then be assigned to another male family member to bear children in the name of the deceased:

> I was married to the dead and now with seven children. It all started with a woman befriending me who later on proposed to marry me to her brother whom I later learned was her dead brother. With pressure from my family, I accepted the marriage. One of their brothers then showed up and with him we bore seven children in the name of the late. I suffered living with someone I did not love (ONAD 2014: 8).

On another note, the nature of some marriages in some Nilotic customs attracts bidding for the girl's hand in marriage and the highest bidder 'wins' the girl. This kind of marriage depends on the highest bidder rather than on the consent and choice of the woman. For instance, in 2018, this type of marriage was shared on Facebook and went viral. The story took many people across the world by surprise. Generally, SGBV is present in the home, public institutions, social and community settings, workplaces, and it is even reported in businesses and religious institutions.

One practical implication of girl elopement is the potential loss of the economic value of the eloped or impregnated women, as a girl who is impregnated before marriage loses value in terms of the bride price. Consequently, the families of the eloped girl and the man who has eloped with the girl often fight and revenge killings occur (Taflinski 2011: 18). This cultural practice does not often take the consent of the eloped girl into consideration. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan recognises the right to found a family but the legal age for marriage is not explicitly defined. The constitution states that:

> Every person of marriageable age shall have the right to marry a person of the opposite sex and to found a Family according to their respective family laws, and no marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the man and woman intending to marry (Republic of South Sudan 2011: 5).

In the absence of family law to regulate marriage, including the age for marriage and the lack of a credible civil registry system at police units, the assessment of age certificates is largely being abused. One respondent highlighted that:

> [The] South Sudanese have increasingly been experiencing a situation where rich elites marry young girls below 18 years but acquire assessment of age certificate for the underage with say 20 and above years to justify the girl is actually of age.

A handful number of respondents attributed SGBV to acute poverty, unfavourable cultural norms, armed conflicts and impunity. A higher rate of illiteracy among parents was and is also a significant barrier to girls' education and early marriage. In South Sudan, with an estimated population of 13 million people as of October 2019, about 73% of adults are illiterate, of which 84% are women. The prevailing social norms in South Sudan fail to challenge the male-dominated status quo and this contributes to a culture of gender inequality**.** There is a need to encourage, establish and promote positive gender relations to transform the way communities perceive men and women. This might facilitate behavioural change amongst antagonist parties i.e. perceptions, behaviours and attitudes that drive violence against girls and women.

Corruption and bad governance are viewed by most respondents as two sides of the same coin. Corruption, mismanagement of public resources and impunity are typified forms and results of bad governance, or structural violence. Southern Sudan was historically marginalised and neglected in post-independent Sudan. The region saw little or no development and independence dividends such as roads, electricity and basic infrastructure, functional schools, health facilities and other social services due to marginalisation, corruption and bad governance under the Sudanese regime. The under-development of Southern Sudan was a major justification for a liberation struggle. When South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, there were very large financial resources mostly from the oil sector. These resources were mostly wasted or not managed for the common good.

High levels of corruption within the government sectors were reported. For example, in 2012, the president accused more than 75 top government officials for embezzling $4 billion (United States Dollars) from state coffers (Aljazeera 2013). Weak institutions, comradeship, tribalism, impunity, a weak civil society and media capacity to hold the government accountable for its actions are cited as major drivers of corruption and bad governance (Enough Project 2015).

When asked why corruption is rampant in South Sudan, more than half of those consulted concluded that perpetrators are not afraid of and perceive no consequence for their actions. The proponents of this view argued that political and military leaders in South Sudan act as comrades above the law. As one respondent added:

> If you are or you have a higher-ranking relative in the Police, the Army, the National Security or an influential politician in the ruling party, you cannot be hold to account. If you are condemned by law and put in prison, you still have a chance to get released using your relationships or bribe.

Consequently, corruption has crippled the ability of the government to pay the salaries of employees, render basic services, etc. This, among other factors, has led to increased armed robbery, tax hikes, homicides and economic collapse.

Homicides can be better understood in the broad context of violence as acts of intentional killing, murder or assassination of a human being leading to unlawful death. In the context of South Sudan, it includes shooting to death a person or group of individuals in broad daylight or during night hours, kidnapping, forced disappearances and the killing of a person/s by unknown gunmen and men in uniform.

The prevalence of firearms, low and delayed salaries, alcoholism and drugs are cited as drivers of homicides in South Sudan. One respondent argued that unknown gunmen are being used for politically-motivated targeted killings of opponents. The consequences range from the loss of lives and properties to forced exile of opposition figures.

Armed robbery and car hijackings, as with SGBV, have attracted more debate among FGD participants, particularly regarding whether or not they constitute violence or are simply a crime. Most respondents shared the view that an act of any kind that threatens the life, comfort and property of a person directly or indirectly is violence. With regards to that which constitutes a crime, participants had consensus over a legal principle that states that “no crime and penalty without a law” meaning a crime is only a crime if prohibited by law. There are no official reliable armed robbery and car hijacking violent crime records in South Sudan. However, an unrecorded number of cases of death have occurred as a result of the acts. Violent crimes such as murder, armed robbery, home invasion and occupation, cattle raiding, children and women abduction, car hijackings, road ambushes, banditry etc. are common in Juba, along the highways, and other towns.

These violent crimes are directly attributed to political instability, low and delayed salaries, hunger, economic hardship and poor infrastructure. Perpetrators are mostly men in police or army uniform. They can harm or even kill victims if resistance is shown. However, road ambush perpetrators use force to threaten and rob victims at gun point more often than killing (United States Embassy 2017). Car hijackers often target NGOs and government

Toyota Landcruiser Hardtops as those cars are marketable and have the capacity to endure unfavourable road infrastructure in South Sudan.

7.3 Attitudes to Nonviolence

While stories of violence dominate the discourse in South Sudan, there have been instances of nonviolent collective action in the country's past and present. This chapter attempts to trace and discuss this experience. It draws upon contemporary examples of nonviolent resistance that have been used by civic and faith-based groups in South Sudan to compel the government to address economic, security and political grievances. The chapter further discusses the role of prominent civil society organisations, academia and faith-based organisations which employ nonviolent tactics, campaigns and their movements' contribution to restore peace and stability to the country. The chapter concludes with the challenges encountered by nonviolent campaigners including the response from desperate politicians and military commanders, identified capacity gaps in people's movements, lessons learned and the potentials of nonviolent campaigns to restore just and sustainable peace in South Sudan.

7.3.1 Nonviolent Actions before Independence

The use of nonviolent collective action in South Sudan is largely overshadowed by the violence and armed struggle. Thus, it is pivotal to look back at the country's past experience of nonviolent activism in an attempt to recover, document and share those stories as inspirations for movement-building. As part of Sudan, there are many examples of nonviolent resistance against colonisation where traditional chiefs throughout Southern Sudan refused to pay certain taxes and engaged in economic non-cooperation, civil disobedience, strikes and boycotts. For instance, Chief Girima Lorola of Lanyi, present-day Amadi State, mobilised his community not to pay taxes to the colonial regime. He later succeeded in unseating Holland Bey, the then British District Commissioner (DC), for bad governance. He walked from Lui to Mangalla in the current Jubek state protesting against V. R. Woodland, the Governor of Equatoria province, that the Amadi DC forced farmers to dig white wash and

cultivate cotton instead of cultivating food crops, which resulted in hunger and the deaths of innocent people. On hearing the complaint of an influential Chief, the Governor dismissed the DC for failure to gain popular support (John 2018: 328). Lorola's legacy of civil courage has positively influenced the attitudes and behaviour of his Moru people who, until recently, have been regarded as a nonviolent and peaceful people in South Sudan.

South Sudan is no newcomer to the use of nonviolent action. In the unified Sudan, the popular October Revolution of 1964 and uprising of April 1985 are hallmark examples of the successful use of civilian-based nonviolent uprising which toppled presidents Ibrahim Abboud and Gaffar Nimeri, respectively (Berridge 2015: 1). Unfortunately, the role played by the South Sudanese in unseating Abboud and Nimeri is not well-documented, primarily because of the absence of first-hand information before, during, and after the events, but both leaders were largely opposed by the South Sudanese for imposing Islamic Sharia law on the entire population of the Christian-majority Southern Sudan (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 5).

In 1971, an enemy plane was forced to land in Mundri, but the crew's lives were spared. The then rebel commander of the Anyanya Movement in the area ordered the population and his force to serve the survived military Arab officers with food instead of killing them. He argued that the Moru culture required the people to treat enemies as guests when they are at community's end. He added that "we can still fight them when we meet in the battlefield. God knows we are peaceful people that is why He allowed the plane to forcefully land in our region to protect lives." The enemies enjoyed the hospitality and were peacefully escorted to Rokon, the nearest Khartoum-based enemy garrison, and were flown to their relatives (as narrated by a respondent in 2017). The community's culture was compatible with the nonviolence principle and biblical teaching pertaining to 'love of the enemy and leading by example'. Thus, the murder of enemies in cold blood is considered to be a result of *evil spirits and therefore is against the Bible teachings* and the African philosophy of *Ubuntu*, which acknowledges the "I am because we are' meaning, i.e. I can only be a person through others" (Pillay, Subban and Govender 2013: 106).

In 1992, I participated together with thousands of students in Juba against the government's imposition of the Arabic language as a compulsory subject in the Sudan School Certificate Examination (SSCE). The South Sudanese earlier resisted the imposition of the Arabic language by deforming the classical Arabic with its own version of a pidgin or jargon Arabic (not understood by the Northern Sudanese) commonly known as Arabi-Juba or 'Juba Arabic'.

In 1999, ecumenical church delegations from the south travelled internationally to spur boycotts of oil companies working closely with the Khartoum administration. They campaigned against oil companies fuelling war in Sudan (#Buying oil from Sudan kills people) citing aerial bombardments of civilian targets, forced displacement and other human rights violations (John 2014: 178). This lobbying, among other factors, influenced the largely Christian Western countries to finally support the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan, which was adopted in the CPA signed in 2005.

The referendum of 2011 almost failed to take place. However, nonviolent activism, mainly in the form of protests and mass demonstrations, played a consequential role in Southern Sudan's pursuit of independence as argued by Korayi and Elias (2010: 46). The nonviolent demonstrations were supported by the international community, which increased pressure on the government in Khartoum to allow the referendum to proceed (John, Wilmot and Zaremba 2018: 5). In February 2010, when the then Secretary General of the UN, Ban-Ki Moon, in an interview expressed a desire for a united Sudan and that "the UN Mission in Sudan would work hard to avoid a possible secession", the South Sudanese in Bor, Jongeli State, marched at a UN Mission base in Bor to demonstrate their disagreement with the UN Chief (Aleu 2010).

Similar to the South African ANC's experience of how nonviolent and violent strategies have been used to defeat the Apartheid regime, the civil society and faith-based organisations in Southern Sudan took it upon themselves to fight without weapons to achieve the same liberation goals. From this junction, I can argue that, in as much as violence has played a dominant role in forcing the

Khartoum regime to negotiate with the SPLA/M, the collective civilian-based nonviolent actions that were employed to target the Khartoum regime's sources of power or oil revenue, the campaign against civilian bombardments, and the human rights violations eventually weakened the ability of the Khartoum regime to finance war and convinced them to pursue peaceful negotiations.

In 2005, the CPA was signed, bringing to an end the longest civil war in Africa. The deal, among other factors, called for the establishment of a semi-autonomous government in Southern Sudan, general elections in 2010, and the holding of a referendum on 9 January 2011 for the people of Southern Sudan to choose between unity or secession.

By using this experience in comparison to the South African example, I conclude that both violent and nonviolent means were used to finally achieve South Sudan's independence. As Stephan and Chenoweth argue (2008: 16), labelling one campaign as 'violent' and another as 'nonviolent' is difficult because often both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist side by side among the opposing parties.

7.3.2 Nonviolent Action in South Sudan, 2011-2018

Preliminary findings from the FGDs and follow-up interviews revealed that most respondents who were consulted in this study had a limited understanding of nonviolent action and campaigns as compared to their knowledge of conflict and violence in South Sudan. Most view nonviolence and nonviolent action simply as any action carried out without violence or with the absence of violence. Some related nonviolent action to negotiations, dialogue, shuttle diplomacy, nonviolent conflict management and peacebuilding. This limited understanding of nonviolence and nonviolent campaigns have limited the use of nonviolent action as a political tactic and strategy to balance power and achieve social justice. Nonviolent action is often manifested in strikes, boycotts, marches, and demonstrations, among hundreds of other methods. Other terms that are also used to refer to nonviolent action include "people power", "civil resistance", or "nonviolent collective action" (Bloch and Shirch 2018: 2).

Nonviolent action should not be confused with ‘nonviolence’. Nonviolence often refers to the rejection of the use or support of violence based on moral, ethical, or religious beliefs. Nonviolent action is not attached to a particular belief system; rather, it is a collective action to challenge injustices and bring a desired social, economic and political change. Nonviolent actions become campaigns when organised and used regularly be campaigners to address a specific injustice in a given context. In light of the above definitions of the terms, contemporary examples of nonviolent actions and campaigns are highlighted below.

In 2011, citizens of the Kiir Adem region in the northwest of South Sudan, near the present-day Sudan border, marched against the orders of police in Juba, leading to their region’s inclusion in the newly-formed nation. However, since independence, activists have faced an increasingly shrinking space, repression and government crackdowns on nonviolent campaigners, including the use of live bullets. Nevertheless, the South Sudanese persist in using nonviolent tactics and have an increased faith in nonviolent means. For example, in December 2012, thousands of Wau residents peacefully demonstrated against the seat of Wau County being moved to Bagare outside a state capital despite use of live bullets (Aljazeera 2012).

In December 2017, hundreds of unarmed civilians mostly women and girls marched through the streets of Juba, demanding an end to the conflict in South Sudan. The march increased pressure on the government and opposition groups to reach a peace deal in August 2018 (The Juba Monitor 2017: 2).

7.4 Attitudes Towards Civil Society, Faith-Based Organisations and Nonviolence

All participants who were consulted through FGDs and interviews for this study cited a number of NGOs, faith-based groups and grassroots social movements as examples of institutions in South Sudan that undertake nonviolent campaigns. These organisations include the arts-based #AnaTaban (Juba Arabic for #I am tired), the Organization for Nonviolence and Development (ONAD), the Eve Organization for Women Development and Crown the Women. For example, #AnaTaban carried out street theatre performances, hosts concerts, and comedy and poetry activities to amplify the voices of citizens against the war and hate speech, and demand for peace. The group has more than hundred thousand followers on Facebook and organises the annual #Hagna -#ours festival as a platform to express fatigue with violence and mobilise the masses for peace. #AnaTaban coordinates with the OKAY Africa Foundation and mobilises hundreds of youth to clean Juba City under #Nadafa LeBeledna (#Cleaning our country) as a form of a constructive program. This campaign enables the youth to collect trash to physically demonstrate the cleaning of a country by community members in the absence of the regular collection of garbage by city council authorities. This monthly campaign is also a protest to the government's failure to deliver basic services following years of civil war (Stephen and Zaremba 2018).

ONAD was founded in 1994 and strives for a nonviolent, peaceful and democratic country through training, research and advocacy in nonviolence and peacebuilding, civic and human rights education, community empowerment and gender and networking. Since its establishment, ONAD and its partners have carried out nonviolent campaigns such as peaceful demonstrations, vigils, joint press releases, used various forms of constructive programs, and built up sustainable networks (Organization for Nonviolence and Development 2018: 6).

Using historical events such as the international day of nonviolence. The event in 2016 provided an opportunity for students and teachers to march on streets

of Juba demanding quality education, improved working conditions for teachers and support to address and prevent bullying, hunger and gender-based violence in schools and higher institutions of learning. Demonstrators also carried placards with messages such as ‘stop corruption’, ‘bring back the stolen money’, ‘save my future’, ‘improve the quality of education’, and ‘increase teachers’ salaries’. The protest was organized by peace club members, patrons and matrons. ONAD supports peace club activities in more than 36 primary and secondary schools in Juba and Renk (Organization for Nonviolence and Development 2016: 7).

Through the participation of community leaders, local government and South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) in the community-police dialogues, ONAD empowered grassroots communities to engage with security service providers, creating opportunities for building relationships between the communities and authorities, instilling a sense of shared responsibility, coordination and cooperation for collective conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Community engagement with the police and local authorities led to increased access to security services. This is because the trained Community Action Group (CAG) members worked side-by-side with Police leading to reduced level of criminal and GBV incidents in Munuki, Gudele, Mauna, Nyakuron and Kator Residential Areas of Juba. Improved police-community relationship fostered mutual sharing of information regarding hotspot areas and crimes (ONAD 2017: 8).

ONAD coordinates the activities of the New Tribe, a nonviolence social movement which incorporates all of South Sudan’s 64 tribes. Founded in 2017, the New Tribe (NT) operates through member organizations to bridge tribal divisions using nonviolent collective actions to pursue just and equitable peace in South Sudan. The NT has released press statements, petitioned the government to lift restrictions on civic space, demanded release of political prisoners, held peaceful demonstrations and online campaigns to end war, child and forced marriages (New Tribe 2019: 4).

Report of an external evaluation of ONAD conducted in 2018 indicates that the organization plays a pivotal role in South Sudanese civil society, being one of few organizations with a clear non-violence approach in peacebuilding and having the capacity to engage with the grassroots, national and international levels. The evaluation also shows that ONAD's work is integrated and that activities feed into both overarching strategic plan of the organization, creating internal synergies between activities and projects, and external systems such as the judiciary system, peace negotiations and international human rights reporting, pushing for stakeholder responsibility and long term change (Ferretti 20018: 60).

Similarly, the Eve Organization for Women Development (Eve) has played a leading role in organising a women's march in December 2017. The organisation hosts the Women Coalition for Peace and Development, a coalition of more than 40 women-led civil society organisations in South Sudan. In 2018, the coalition lobbied for an increased quota of women in all political and administrative levels of the government, resulting in the increase of women affirmative action from 25% to 35%, as endorsed by the RARCSS and signed in September 2018 (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2018: 19).

In May 2018, the South Sudan Women Coalition for Peace and Development convened a summit called Sawa South Sudan (Together South Sudan) to raise awareness among the South Sudanese diaspora to build international awareness and support. The summit drew prominent world leaders such as Moussa Faki, the chairman of the African Union Commission; former Liberian president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf; and former Irish president, Mary Robinson, who streamed the voices and ideas of South Sudanese women leaders to an international audience. The summit ended with a communique demanding that: (1) the peace process must prioritise the ordinary South Sudanese as opposed to the ambitions of political leaders; (2) the leaders of political parties and armed groups must show love for their country; (3) the women have a central role in the peace process; (4) the leaders of the region must stop the flow of arms and contribute to a peaceful South Sudan; (5) the perpetrators of violence in South Sudan must be held accountable; and (6) all African heads of state must

actively engage to help resolve the crisis and press for the establishment of a hybrid court (Sawa South Sudan 2018).

South Sudanese Women's groups have engaged in coordinated nonviolent actions and traditional lobbying. For instance, since 2014, the South Sudanese Council of Churches (SSCC) National Women's Desk has been organising monthly women's marches for peace. The group displays billboards across Juba with messages such as: 'STOP WAR' and 'Women Strive for Peace' (John et al 2018: 9). Apart from the SSCC Women's Desk, Crown the Women South Sudan is advocating against child and forced marriages and other forms of SGBV (UNFPA South Sudan 2019). The nonviolent campaigns of women groups in South Sudan are gaining attention and recognition.

While there is no single formula for how a women's movement might achieve peace and long term stability, demonstrations such as the monthly marches and prayer vigils, combined with other forms of coordinated nonviolent campaigns could help push people's aspirations and demand for change. Research shows that mass participation increases the effectiveness and longevity of nonviolent political struggles, particularly when women are involved. This is because participation is a crucial factor, though not a sole one, that make a movement successful (Principe 2017: 4).

For example, coordinated civil society groups and academia such as the Peace Implementation Monitoring Initiatives (PIMI), work together to expose violations of the signed peace deal by the parties and recommend punitive measures. Such reports and statements are being used as the voice of the voiceless by influential faith-based leaders and other peace stakeholders, to hold parties accountable for their actions and exert pressure to realise stability and sustainable peace in South Sudan.

Despite these successful examples of nonviolent collective actions, the application of nonviolent campaigns is still fairly limited among South Sudanese civil society actors, as many of the campaigns have been launched as isolated

actions and have not been carried out systematically to address the social, political, and economic grievances that have fuelled South Sudan's civil war.

However, by creating linkages between women and youth led organisations, both secular and faith-based, in coordinating, organising and undertaking tactics such as prayer vigils, mass demonstrations, petitions, strikes and other forms of nonviolent campaigns, the South Sudanese non-state actors are raising awareness and mobilising citizens for building a national nonviolence movement. Successful movements often start small and use limited tactics such as fasting, prayers, vigils and protests. However, in the long run, they the potential to transform into a political social movement capable to employ diverse tactics such as sit-ins, blockades, economic boycotts, and other forms of radical tactics to pressure the government to realise people's aspirations.

7.5 Challenges of undertaking Nonviolent Campaigns

The South Sudanese have demonstrated their ability to nonviolently challenge power and demand protection, accountability, justice and good governance. They have also demonstrated courage and resilience to march despite limited space, repression, the use of teargas and sometimes live bullets. However, the South Sudanese experience has revealed a limited use of the techniques of nonviolent action, involving mostly protests and not much with regards to non-cooperation and more radical forms of tactics of nonviolent interventions such as blockades, sit-ins, and the occupation of facilities and important installations.

For example despite the fact that SSCC National Women's Desk continued to hold monthly marches, the demonstrations did not succeed to attract tens leave alone hundreds of thousands of participants. Nonviolent campaigns have a greater impact when they attract mass participation in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. In addition, based on my observations the marches were not consistent and continuous but rather once-off events with limited follow-ups. Numbers matter in nonviolent movements. Several political scientists and sociologists argue that mass participation of a large cross-section of society is considered a primary requirement in realising the success of a

movement (Principe 2017: 3). One of the impeding factors that limit the participation of South Sudanese non state actors is the state repression.

In theory, South Sudan's Constitution recognises the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (The Republic of South Sudan 2011: 9). However, protesters have often been harassed, assaulted, injured, detained or killed since South Sudan won its independence in 2011. For instance Amnesty International in 2017 in its report entitled; "If men are caught they are killed and if women are caught, they are raped" has documented several cases of murder and rape of civilians (Amnesty International 2017). A UN 2018 report revealed that more than one hundred activists and journalists have been killed, arrested, or shot at since mid-2016 (The United Nations 2018). However, protests by government syndicate organizations are often condoned, political and economically supported by the ruling SPLM party or government. As one young AR participant stressed that:

> Peaceful demonstrations organised by the government or its syndicate organisations are always condoned, publicised and praised by the government and its supporters. If citizens or non-partisan civil society groups organised similar actions to express their grievances, discomfort and opposition against an injustice, the protests trigger repression including arrests, use of tear gas and live bullets which sometimes lead to loss of life.

Protests that target opponents' sources of power often attract severe repression. As one veteran journalist echoed:

> You can criticise the government on anything but the moment you exposed its corrupt practices and individuals involved you risk your life. Civilians and individual military leaders put road blocks, collect illegal taxes from traders and the money never reaches government coffers. The illegal tax collection is being practiced in broad day light with impunity.

Journalists and independent reporters have, on several occasions, suffered unlawful arrests and detention despite the UN Security Council Resolution 1738 adopted on 23 December 2006, which condemns attacks against journalists and media personnel during armed conflicts. The government, and at times armed groups, continue to harass journalists with impunity. A lack of

punishment and accountability for perpetrators of violence against journalists and media personnel causes the violence to persist and increase. To manage and limit the risks, national and international media, civil society and human rights actors network, lobby and advocate for rule of law to ensure that perpetrators are held to account for their actions to deter further abuse.

Another respondent, who is also a journalist, reported that the mobilisation of government-sponsored marches can be manipulated. For example, while covering a protest march organised by a pro-government civil society group in Juba to denounce the US unilateral arms embargo on South Sudan, protesters gave contradictory views as to why they were on the streets. Many stated that they were protesting against the US decision to take over the administration of South Sudan. Other protesters knew what the march was about.

Despite the pivotal role that the media plays in society, South Sudanese media personnel and institutions face a shrinking space and operate under difficult security challenges. In August 2015, the South Sudanese journalist, Peter Moi, was shot dead in the Jebel area, while John Gatluak, another journalist, was singled out from among his colleagues and shot dead in Terrain hotel during the July 2016 incident in Juba (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders 2016). A respondent reported:

> I used to receive threatening messages on mobile phone often warning me to stop reporting on what they call sensitive security issues. If the government can send its security apparatus or agents to shoot and kill opponents right in their houses or get opponents kidnapped at broad day light what impact will nonviolent action make? Without protection of activists from extra-judicial killings and holding perpetrators accountable for their actions, it will be difficult to weaken state's sources of power.

Civil society, community and student activists have also been victimised for expressing their opposition against the government and elites. For instance, ten protesters were shot dead by government forces in Wau, following resistance to relocate the headquarters of Wau County to Bagare outside the state capital (Aljazeera 2012). A student and teacher were also wounded by the police over a suspected land-grabbing protest in Juba (Holland 2012).

Finally, close to half of the respondents expressed fear, repression, and security risks in undertaking nonviolent campaigns. Some argued that nonviolent campaigns can work best in democratic countries than in volatile and fragile states such as South Sudan, citing impunity and a lack of protection of the law. One middle-aged respondent echoed that:

> Nonviolent campaigns aimed at bringing political changes cannot succeed in South Sudan because the country's legal system is corrupted with impunity. Besides the country's population, its military and other organised forces are divided along ethnic lines. There are also higher level of illiteracy and poverty in the country. If the population is less educated to know their civil and political rights and are not economically empowered, they can do very little to contribute in shaping a positive future in their country.

The recent waves of people's power were successful partly due to the crucial role played by the army. However, their role was complementary to the citizens' central role. For example, in the Arab Spring, there were great differences in the nature of that role and its overall impact, which depended on various factors: force cohesion (a high level of cohesion in Egypt and Tunisia versus a lack of cohesion in Yemen and Libya); the nature of recruitment (professional in Egypt and Tunisia versus ideological, tribal or sectarian in Libya, Syria and Yemen); and the degree of the army's involvement in political life before the Arab uprisings (uninvolved in Tunisia versus playing a key role in Egypt, Syria and Yemen). The more professional and cohesive the army, and the less entangled it is in the political dynamics of the country, the more positive the role it can play in preserving the state and moving towards democracy. Preserving cohesive and politically-neutral armies in the region is essential, not only for security objectives, but also for preserving a horizon for state-building and stability where conflict and turmoil are now rampant.

An old female respondent added her voice, acknowledging that risk-taking is part of the game:

> In my view, there is no nonviolent action without risk taking. Nonviolent activists must actually know, calculate and expect risks involved as well as prepare to limit and manage them. Fear comes

> from lack of knowledge and skills to tackle risky situations. We need to empower activists to carefully analyse the context and creatively choose the right strategy and tactics. Activists also need to plan for self-care, legal aid, relocation strategy and have psycho-social support packages.

The South Sudanese are not the first to face regime repression and violence in response to their nonviolent activism; most nonviolent campaigns across the globe and throughout history have faced repression.

7.6 Reflections on Responses

Building on the insights of the respondents regarding their understanding of nonviolent action and considering the experience of ONAD and its partners in South Sudan, it was pivotal to combine training on nonviolent action and peacebuilding. These two concepts are often seen as separate concepts, but the practice reveals that bridging the two concepts is not a new idea. Another lesson learned is that organising nonviolent campaigns as isolated activities with the limited participation of the masses, often hundreds if not thousands of people, this does not shake power holders. Nonviolent campaigns must be sequenced, well-coordinated and organised one after the other to gain momentum and attract thousands, if not millions, of people to make an impact. John and Rosen (2017: 12) quoted Chenoweth and Stephan in their study findings that no campaign that has attracted 3.5 percent of the population has ever failed in its demands. This means that the principle of mass participation and using diverse tactics are needed to strengthen the South Sudanese movement.

The most prominent nonviolent activists interviewed for this study mentioned their inspiration to use nonviolent action as a result of attending ONAD's nonviolence and nonviolent action training, watching films such as *The force most powerful*; the popular Liberian women documentary entitled *Pray the devil back to hell*; and the reading of related nonviolence literature. A few respondents cited creativity, such as that being used by #AnaTaban and other youth organisations. Many respondents reported emulating inspirational figures on nonviolent action such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr.,

and Mohandas Gandhi, all of whom are deceased males from movements of the previous century. African peace movements of the present century are characterised by more decentralised leadership structures, a broader participation of females, and bottom-up grassroots organising championed by women and youth. This finding provides evidence that local examples of nonviolent activism have not been adequately studied and disseminated.

This chapter reveals that the South Sudanese are not new to the application of nonviolent campaigns. The practice has existed though with a limited understanding of the concepts, strategies and use of tactics. Nevertheless, faith in using nonviolent means to manage conflicts is on the rise. Attempts to study and disseminate the experiences of nonviolent resisters will one day uncover the potential of nonviolent campaigns in the country.

CHAPTER 8: DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING NONVIOLENT ACTION TRAINING

8.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on the preliminary findings of CSO capacity gaps identified and reported in section 4.8. The chapter presents the findings drawn from data collected through focus group discussions and interviews as well as pre-training and post-training questionnaires to specifically address the third objective of the study. Questionnaires were distributed to 24 action research participants with the aim of gauging their level of understanding of the concept and practice of nonviolence before and after training. The distribution of the pre-training questionnaires and the data gathered revealed a limited understanding of the concept of nonviolence, nonviolent methods and the practice of nonviolence among the participants as compared to their knowledge of violence and conflict in South Sudan. This chapter concludes with the preliminary results of the participants using the acquired skills to manage family grievances.

8.2 Training for Nonviolent Action

In order to fulfil the third objective of the study, a two-and-a-half-day training session in nonviolent action for 24 action research participants was planned and implemented in Juba. The training was designed based on preliminary findings of capacity gaps or weaknesses identified in the South Sudanese CSOs in their experience in planning and launching nonviolent campaigns, as reported in section 4.8. The training was expected to increase participants' ability to critically analyse the root causes, extent and consequences of the prevailing violence that they seek to address by envisioning and practicing nonviolent tactics, drawing demands, developing campaign strategies, and organising and taking actions. The evaluation of the training short-term outcomes was dependent on the participants' voluntary initiatives to develop and apply the acquired tools and skills. Thus, historical records underscored the importance of training in equipping and preparing the participants to carry out nonviolent campaigns and contribute to building peace. For example, the

success of the civil rights movement in the United States was greatly attributed to the training in the theories and practice of nonviolent action (Bloch 2016: 3). Just as soccer players – who intend to improve their performance to score goals and win – practice different kicks for perfection before facing the competing team, the same is true with regards to undertaking nonviolent campaigns. Training is an integral part of human development and capacity building which aims to ensure that individuals' knowledge base, skills and abilities are strengthened.

The necessity of training was echoed by more than three quarters of those reached through focus group discussions and interviews as a need to bridge the capacity gap within the civil society to develop and implement nonviolent campaigns. Some respondents argued that the understanding of the concept and popular practice of nonviolent methods and strategies are still limited in South Sudan. This insight was expressed by almost all eminent nonviolent activists. One activist noted:

> Training in nonviolent action is critical to build movement's internal human resource capacity to train others who reach out to the grassroots population, inspire frontline nonviolent and human rights activists to connect their local peace activism to national peace movement and consolidate people's power.

Training is important in educating participants on how to sequence and use diverse nonviolent methods and strategies to bring about a political change. There are needs to develop relevant campaigns to change unjust power relations between men and women as well as the government and the governed. The training is also critical to developing context-specific tactics and supporting individuals in overcoming their fears and retaining strong self-discipline in resisting the temptation to respond to provocations or to fight back (Bloch 2016: 14).

Some respondents suggested alternative training methods such as mentorship, seminars, reading nonviolent campaigns' related literature and watching documentary films, using creative arts and theatre, community and political dialogue, movement-building conferences and exchange programs as equally

potential avenues, tools and opportunities to build the capacity of civil society to implement nonviolent campaigns.

For instance, one respondent commented:

> Most training is often conducted with insufficient preparation and with no or less follow-up strategy and is not connected to specific ultimate change objectives. Training is often perceived as an end by itself rather than a means to an end. Thus, many community practitioners and researchers rush to organise training, to keep attendance sheet and training photos as evidence to justify training has taken place. This attitude and abuse of training approach have disappointed some community members to dislike training events.

This constructive criticism informed the researcher to critically prepare the training intervention in such a way to respond to the participants needs, aspiration at the community level and beyond.

8.3 The Plan

When preparing for any training, it is often crucial for the trainer or researcher to plan in advance to ensure that the training goal and objectives are achieved. The preparations include socio-economic, cultural, legal and political context analysis to better understand the research context. This is particularly important because nonviolent action training can be more effective when it is adapted to the socio-cultural and political context and needs of the people in a given society. Connecting the training with society's cultural and spiritual values will undoubtedly make it more relevant and sustainable. The plan guided the researcher on when to recruit co-trainers and participants as well as developing the training agenda and curriculum. Support staff had to be assigned to draw the training budget, procure stationary and make arrangements for meals and refreshments. Table 8.1 indicates the tentative overview of the data collection and training plan that was used

Table 8.1: Tentative overview of the data collection and training plan.

Activity	Why	When	How long	Response achieved
Meeting nonviolence and peacebuilding officer, other heads of departments and ONAD management.	To inform, learn from and secure the support of the gatekeeper and its relevant department for the success of the study.	The meeting was planned for 20 February 2018 but was actually held two days later due to busy schedules.	1 day	ONAD offered its training hall at no cost and assigned a nonviolence and peacebuilding officer to support the researcher with coordination and organisation of the training. The finance team pledged to support budgeting and logistics.
Meeting Deans of SPS and IPDSS in the University of Juba	To inform, learn from and mobilise buy-in of University of Juba and lobby for their in-kind support including resource books, venue, internet and electricity when needed. The university is also a long-time academic partner to the gatekeeper (ONAD).	4 March 2018	1 day	The Dean of the SPS was thrilled as the researcher was one of his part-time lecturers of working groups and conflict management. He directed the registrar to log in the researcher's laptop to access free WIFI and space to hold focus group discussions. The Dean of the IPDSS also offered space for the FGDs and introduced the researcher to use the library.
Briefing chairperson and commissioner in the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC)	Solicit the backing of the Commission as the highest government institution charged with the responsibility of overseeing and facilitating peacebuilding work in the country.	5 March 2018. The researcher met with the commissioner instead and the chairperson was out of the country.	1 day	The commissioner welcomed the researcher, and invited him to attend monthly peacebuilding stakeholders' coordination meetings to stay updated. Some reading materials on peacebuilding were also offered, including the strategic plan of the SSPRC
Pre-testing of FGDs question-and-interview guides	To validate the soundness, relevance and correctness of the data collection instruments and improve the tools where necessary	1-5 March 2018.	5 days	Five respondents were selected to pre-test the study instruments. The exercise revealed that simplicity should be a guiding principle to improve the questions. The same applies to translating the tools into simple Juba Arabic rather than classic Arabic.
Hold FGDs and interviews with 26 AR participants	FGDs and interviews were crucial to gain insight into the extent to which AR participants understood the study problem and their attitudes	6-21 March 2018. This lasted until 1 June 2018.	More than 2 months	Preliminary findings were drawn and validated through interviews with 15 AR participants. Ten nonviolent activists, who claimed to have implemented some nonviolent campaigns, were also interviewed. This helped the researcher to identify the gaps

	towards nonviolence.			as the basis for developing the training curriculum and agenda.
Identify and recruit co-facilitators	To identify and voluntarily recruit two experienced nonviolence trainers, two support staff each for logistics and secretariat to co-plan and organise action research training for nonviolent action	26 March-2 April 2018. The recruitment occurred in April 2018.	7 days	Two nonviolence trainers were identified as co- facilitators. One logistician and one secretary were recruited and engaged in the planning and implementation of the action project.
Nonviolence training curriculum development	To ensure training content, methodology and learning objectives are planned in advance.	22 March-5 April 2018. Agenda and curriculum development was completed on 2 June 2018.	14 days	The research team of five including a researcher, two co-trainers, one logistician and one secretary held two meetings to review training agenda and logistics in advance. The training budget was reviewed and ways to cut costs were suggested.
Invitation of action research participants	To invite participants as per detailed categories in the study proposal. Ask the gatekeeper to draft release letters for participants who need a release.	26 March-2 April 2018. This did not occur until 3-12 June 2018	7 days. This practically took more than a month.	26 participants who attended FGDs were invited and only 24 attended the training
Sharing of training agenda with the researcher's supervisor and other trainers for comments	To seek feedback, clarify and ensure the methods to be used are relevant to impart the skills and knowledge for nonviolent action.	5-7 April 2018. This practically occurred between 1 May-25 July 2018.	2 days. However, this took more than two months	Feedback received from the researcher's direct supervisor, two co-facilitators, USIP nonviolent action trainer and ONAD experienced trainers such as power exercises and the creation of follow-up mechanisms such as the WhatsApp and Messenger groups were included in implementation planning.
Purchase stationery, materials, inspect the venue and handle other necessary logistics	To ensure training materials and venue are arranged in time.	8-10 April 2018. This was practically handled in July 2018.	3 days. It took more than a month as the researcher had to borrow money.	To cut the budget, the researcher wrote to DI JCERC for in-kind assistance. Thus, two flip chart papers and marker pens were offered for free. Democracy International photocopied training materials for the 24 participants at zero cost.
Hold a two-day nonviolent action training. Pre and post training assessment was	Introduce the concept, methods, and strategies of nonviolent action and how it can be	12-13 April 2018. The training was convened between 26-27	2 days. It lasted for two and a half days as	24 participants attended. Two did not make it due to individual life circumstances. Participants were assured that they could

conducted using questionnaires	employed to transform conflicts in South Sudan. To carry out pre- and post-training assessment to gauge participants' level of new knowledge and skills obtained	and part of 31 July 2018.	participant s required more time	leave the training at any time they wished.
Hold a one-day training focusing on participants' home-based projects regarding 'what participants plan to do with their constituency'	To allow the participants to come back and present their plans. The researcher will also introduce the use of diaries and observation notes so participants can use the tools to document their post-training actions	14 April 2018. The one-day implementatio n planning meeting was held on 31 July 2018 for half a day	1 day	The total of 21 participants, as 3 did not make it for health and other personal reasons. However, the researcher did update 3 participants who could not attend based on their request.
Regular follow-up	To ensure the researcher engages with the participants to encourage, inspire and support them to implement their action projects and use diaries to document the outcomes.	15 May 2018-15 January 2019. This took place between 1 August 2018 to 19 February 2019	9 months. The researcher was engaged in regular follow-ups, learning and monitoring for nearly one year	The researcher and participants remained engaged through Messenger and WhatsApp groups. Peaceful march to the national parliament to protest the alleged rape of about 150 women in Bentiu, as well as a protest to address negative impacts of environmental pollution in Upper Nile region. Other nonviolent campaigns included: # MaMara Sakit (Not just a women, she is everything).
Hold a one-day evaluation meeting	Report back and share how participants have practiced nonviolent methods and strategies in their respective constituencies.	16 January 2019. This was rescheduled for 12 June 2019	1 day	The total of 24 action research participants and the research team will be invited for reflections and evaluation of the intervention and document its outcomes.

Source: Author's data collection and study plan

A plan is one matter, but the implementation of the plan is often another experience. The data collection phase of this study was originally planned for one month, but it took four months. This is because the timing for data collection is dependent on the availability of the respondents rather than the

researcher. The FGDs were preferred to precede key informant interviews for logical and obvious reasons. For instance, it is easier and logical to use interviews to validate preliminary findings of FGDs than the opposite. This modification was adopted after the consultation between the researcher and the supervisor.

Focus group discussions require much time to group participants according to the constituencies that they represent and the preferred language. While the original plan was to target approximately six to eight individuals for a one-hour conversation, in practice, one FGD was attended by nine participants for obvious reasons. However, participants did not have much time to exhort what they wanted to discuss. Thus, the lesson learned was that the fewer the number of participants in the FGDs, the more time they will have to share their experiences. To implement this lesson learned, the researcher deliberately reduced the number of participants in the subsequent three FGDs to five to six participants, and this allowed more time for discussions.

The training days were also adjusted from two to two and a half days, which allowed the participants to cover the planned content. The adjustment was carried out in a consultation between the co-facilitators, the research support team and the participants. The extension enabled covering the planned agenda and responding to participants' queries.

Although the emphasis of this study is to hold a one-day evaluation of the action research project after nine-to-twelve months, it was necessary for the researcher to remain engaged with the action research participants through WhatsApp and Messenger groups to share information and inform and support the implementation of the participants' plan. This engagement proved to be useful in reminding the participants of their commitments.

8.4 Selection of Participants

All but two of the 26 participants who attended the FGDs and interviews went on to become action research participants. To clarify and manage participants' expectations, each participant was requested to sign a consent letter acknowledging that he/she was aware that no participant would be paid for participation nor would they be requested to pay co-researchers. The study topic and the training aim and objectives were also communicated in advance, as with the training days.

Drawing from interactions with the participants to understand the demographic dynamics of the respondents, Table 8.2 displays the participants' representation based on their civil society category, and Table 8.3 indicates the number of participants according to gender.

Table 8.2: Number of participants according to their civil society affiliation or representation.

Civil society affiliation / category	Number of participants	% of representation
NGOs workers	7	27
University students' Association	6	23
Independent media	2	8
Advocates and independent legal consultants	2	8
Faith-based groups	5	19
Community-based and traditional authorities	4	15
Total	**26**	**100**

Source: Author's data collection field records.

Table 8.3: Number of participants according to their gender.

Gender	Number of participants	% of representation
Female	16	62
Male	10	38
Total	**26**	**100**

Source: Author's data collection field records.

8.5 Study Findings

The action research team, comprising the three co-facilitators and the two support staff, were also introduced to the participants in an attempt to build trust. Recruitment of experienced co-facilitators was decided upon in consultation with the gatekeeper who gave permission to the researcher to voluntarily co-opt one of her nonviolence trainers, with the other coming from the Alternatives to Violence Project Facilitators Forum South Sudan (AVP FSS). The selection of trainers was carried out after a careful analysis of a variety of factors such as the power balance between male and female trainers as well as regional representation. Identification of experienced female nonviolent action trainers was considered as crucial in the male-dominated society of South Sudan. It was also viewed as a way to inspire gender mainstreaming and encourage women's participation in the peace movement. The Dean of the School for Public Service (SPS) in the University of Juba assigned the Registrar to assist the researcher as a logistician, as another volunteer offered to do the secretarial work.

Training was convened at the training hall of ONAD. The venue was offered at no cost by the gatekeeper as part of her contribution to the study. In addition to the venue being free, it was also viewed to a large extent as a secured place, as it does not require security approval to conduct the training. It is worth noting that all activities being conducted in public facilities such as hotels, schools and even universities are subject to and attract security checks and clearance. The researcher had obtained letters of introduction from DUT and the gatekeeper ready to clear any suspicion should the training be questioned. Fortunately,

there was no security interference. The fact that the gatekeeper had a valid certificate of operation from the relevant authorities (South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) and that the researcher had been officially admitted as a researcher in the organisation with a formal introduction letter from DUT was helpful to mitigate any eventuality. To cement the cooperation, the researcher, as the tradition demands, invited the ONAD administrator to officially open the training. In his opening remarks, he welcomed the participants to the training and re-assured the participants that the training was purely for academic purposes and that the organisation encourages studies on nonviolent action as a peacebuilding technique which has thus far received little attention in the country.

8.6 Pre-Training Questionnaire

Pre-training questionnaires were administered before the training to assess the extent to which the participants understood violence, conflict, nonviolence and nonviolent actions. Five questionnaires were translated from English into Arabic for Arabic speakers. The data collected from the completed questionnaires indicated that

- All respondents were aware of conflict and violence. Close to half of the respondents argued that violent means could be more effective in South Sudan than nonviolent tactics, given the military background of the ruling elites and their harsh responses to peaceful protests.
- Almost all respondents defined nonviolence as the absence of violence and the peaceful way of handling conflicts without harm. Most respondents misconstrue nonviolence as nonviolent action and have a limited understanding and practice of nonviolent methods and strategies to shift power. Five participants acknowledged that they did not know about nonviolent action, its methods and strategies.
- All respondents have expressed having limited experience in planning, organising, coordinating and implementing nonviolent campaigns.
- Three quarters of participants doubted the effectiveness and potentials of nonviolent campaigns to address socio-economic and political

conflicts citing repressive responses and a lack of democracy. One participant decried “Nonviolent action can best work in a democratic and less repressive context than in a very violent and repressive country like South Sudan”.

- Almost all participants are of the view that power lies with leaders who have political, military and financial resources rather than with citizens. The idea that power is a property of a group, that it can only be enjoyed with the consent of individual group members, and that it can be withdrawn at any time was not understood by most participants. Most respondents viewed power as the privilege of leaders. However, two respondents had different views. One respondent argued that both a leader and the citizens have power and power means the ability to voluntarily influence decisions without coercion, while another respondent emphasised that power lies in education for liberation and critical self-awareness and empowerment.

8.7 Overview of Training Content and Methodology

The two-and-a-half-day training in nonviolent action covered three broad themes including what nonviolent action comprises, how nonviolent action works, and how one can use nonviolent action. Different methodologies were used ranging from brainstorming, role plays, exercises, case studies, group discussions, documentary films, questions and answers etc. The available time, uniqueness and relevance determined the use of the different methods.

An overview of highlights from the training, the contents covered and the methodologies used are presented in the sections that follow.

Day One: What is Nonviolent Action and why use it?

Prior to addressing the main theme of understanding nonviolent action, the training commenced with words of prayers, introductory remarks from the co-facilitators and support staff, and an official opening from the ONAD administrator. This was followed by a round of participants’ introduction and affirmation exercise, where every participant shared one unique aspect

(attitude, behaviour or talent) that he/she loves about himself or herself. The exercise helped to create a sense of trust as everyone felt that he/she had something unique of which to be proud.

Participants then completed the pre-training questionnaire in either English or Arabic. This is because five participants are Arabic pattern students; they can follow the discussions in English but can best express themselves or write in Arabic.

The research team then took the participants through a buzz groups' process to establish the training community golden rules, and outline what they expected to gain from and share with the training participants. This preliminary session was covered in two hours to allow participants to interact, create rapport and fill in the pre-training questionnaires. This was followed by a 20-minute tea break. The break was necessary as some participants came from the outskirts of Juba City and some might have missed their morning tea in order to arrive on time.

To introduce the participants to the concepts of nonviolence and nonviolent action, the researcher took the participants through an ideal village game. The participants were divided into three groups of eight. Each group was named after a fruit (Orange, Apple and Banana). The researcher instructed each group in not more than 15 minutes to draw (on a large flip chart paper) a picture of an ideal village that they dreamed of seeing in South Sudan.

When the groups' depictions of their villages took shape with rivers, trees, schools, market places, recreational centres etc. on the paper, the facilitators transformed into CEOs of a multinational corporation interested in extracting something from the community (water, fossil fuels, land, etc.). Each of the three facilitators made several visits to each community, admiring the village and offering to use the land in return for money, jobs, electricity etc. On the third visit, each facilitator escalated the conflict by taking some parts of the village, by actually tearing off some of the community map for a factory, coffee plantation, mall, or other entity. This action angered the Orange and Apple

village members to protect their village violently using firearms and traditional weapons against the investors. The Banana village was unfortunately destroyed by the so-called investors. The game ended in chaos.

To unpack the game, the researcher involved the participants in a debriefing session where the researcher questioned the participants on what their feelings were when the investors visited the village; what actually happened (facts) – did the communities win or lose; whether they tried any tactics; if there was a strategy; what had worked and what had not; and what lessons or experience could one learn from this game for the future.

In response to these questions, the participants were able to comprehend that in conflict situations, people respond either violently or non-violently or a combination of the two. One of the researcher's co-facilitators then introduced to the class (in ready-written placards) the definitions of nonviolence and nonviolent action, and their principles and methods. These definitions, principles and methods have been developed and experimented with by peace movements and researchers over time, some of which are presented in Table 8.4.

Table 8.5: The principles of nonviolence and nonviolent action.

Principles of nonviolence	Principles of nonviolent action
• Search for the center of conflicts – nonviolence calls for action, not for passivity. We are called to act where people are suffering under violence, oppression and injustice (King 1999: 101). • Show respect to your adversaries as much as you respect yourself and others – treat all people in a conflict as equals. Remember, nobody can degrade you without your permission. Gandhi argued it was possible to hate the sin, not the sinner (Nagler 2012: 1). • Remember that everyone can change, and that there is something good in all people. In nonviolence we do not seek to be winners, or rise over others; we	• Support mass participation: successful nonviolent campaigns choose tactics that enable more people to participate. Larger numbers of participants strengthen the power and legitimacy of a nonviolent campaign and make it more difficult to crush. The 3.5% rule of mass participation (Stephen and Chenoweth 2008) • Maintain nonviolent discipline: successful nonviolent campaigns use tactics that leverage power while maintaining nonviolent discipline. Keeping actions nonviolent increases participation and reduces the potential for repression by authorities. If repression does happen, it often backfires in favour of nonviolent

seek to learn and to make things better for all. • Ends and means have to be compatible, e.g. if we want peace we have to pursue it in a peaceful way. Gandhi stated that peace is the road not only the goal. • If suffering is unavoidable, take it on yourself, rather than harming someone else. The cycle of violence stops with me. Nonviolence involves risk-taking. Thus, resisters must be willing to take risks when necessary and prepare to suffer any consequences to transform injustice (King 1999: 101). • No one has monopoly on the Truth – the challenge is to bring our own and our adversaries' truths together (John *et al.* 2005: 17).	activists in the form of loyalty shifts or defections from the authority's supporters. • Invest in planning: Successful nonviolent campaigns and movements engage in ongoing strategic planning that harnesses assessment, sequencing, escalation, and innovation of tactics to lead to a successful end game. Planning encourages creativity, imagination, connectivity, and sustainability (Bloch and Shirch 2018: 9). • Unity of protesters and campaign leadership

Building on Sharp's 198 methods of nonviolent action, the researcher introduced the participants to the four broad categories of: nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation (social, economic, and political), direct intervention and constructive programs. These methods and more had already been practiced by others across the globe (Engler 2017: 14). The researcher connected methods of nonviolent action with the village game as potential options that the participants could have used or could use in any future violent conflict that they were likely to experience in their day-to-day lives.

To connect the use of nonviolence principles and methods, the researcher organised a brief presentation in which he explained the importance of using nonviolent methods with principles to prevent and limit harm.

After a 40-minute lunch break, the participants embarked on a context and power analysis. Common forms of violence and injustices were identified. To address the injustices, a co-facilitator took the training through "Almighty finger" power exercise. To energise the participants after lunch, this exercise was performed in a circle outside the hall. The facilitator gave the following instructions: form a circle; one person gets the 'almighty finger' to silently or

non-verbally give orders by pointing at any person in the circle to act such as ‘sit down’, ‘go out’, ‘look up’ etc. After three minutes, the participant with the almighty finger hands over to another participant who too will use it. In the exercise, most participants obeyed orders, while a few disobeyed. To understand the exercise, the researcher debriefed by asking the participants: What happened? What did the almighty finger do/ask? Why did you obey? Should we be disobedient sometimes? Why? Were Jesus and the Prophet Mohammed disobedient sometimes? Why? What effect did it have?

8.8 Response from Participants on Authority and Power

Most participants attributed an obedient response as a reaction to fear of sanctions. The subjects obeyed because they felt threatened by the power holder. Two participants disobeyed because they were not happy with the way the authority was used, which they described as unfriendly. When the authority or person with power was challenged, he asked for more volunteers to support the authority, but this again failed as more volunteers were unwilling to cooperate with authority when they were ordered.

This exercise clearly communicated to the participants that power is never the property of an individual. It lies with the people and once the authorities’ power is disobeyed or challenged, power vanishes.

After a 15-minute tea break, a 30-minute questions-and-answers session was held. This allowed the participants to share their experiences and feelings about what they had learned, and what they would like co-facilitators and the support team to do differently on the days to follow. Suggestions for improvement were also provided. These included: arrival on time, being precise and avoiding repetition to allow for more participation and to save time. The participants requested handouts which were provided.

Day one was concluded with prayers and participants were paid their daily transport re-imbursement worth SSP 500 (a mere five hundred South Sudanese Pounds), the equivalent of approximately USD 2.5.

Day Two: How can we plan and implement Nonviolent Campaigns?

The second day began with prayers and a summary of what was covered or learned in the previous day. Participants cited the village game and the almighty finger exercise as the most creative methods that introduced nonviolence methods and principles as well as the understanding of power. Most participants acknowledged that they then knew different methods of nonviolent action which they could use to manage and confront injustices when they occurred.

To explore how individuals and groups plan and implement nonviolent campaigns, an episode of *A force most powerful* documentary of South Africa's economic boycotts was screened and debriefed. Questions used included: Which methods of nonviolent action were used? Did it work? Did the organisers stick to nonviolent discipline? What else can we learn from the South African experience?

The researcher then facilitated a session where he divided the class into three groups as national (South Sudan), regional (Africa) and international (Asia, Europe and the Americas) teams. Each group was tasked in 20 minutes to briefly write down nonviolent action experiences that they know of in their specific context. After the groups were mostly done with their assignment, the researcher directed each group to hang their flip chart paper on the wall and assigned one representative to report back. In a world cafe style, participants toured the three different groups and were introduced to different experiences, and individuals from other groups were allowed to add unreported nonviolent action experiences. After the session, a summarised handout of contemporary stories of nonviolent action in South Sudan was handed over to the participants as a reference. The researcher also encouraged participants to search for online sources to gain more knowledge on how nonviolent campaigns are being planned and executed in other countries of the world.

To practice skills in creating nonviolent campaigns, the researcher's co-facilitator divided the class into three groups. She directed each group to

engage in a brief conversation and identify a violent scenario or injustice at home, in the workplace or in the community that had not been challenged or resolved. By using creative role playing, each group would then plan, prepare and act using nonviolent methods to address or transform the injustice. Scenarios that were identified encompassed early and forced marriages, armed robbery and corruption. The role plays demonstrated the participants' ability to plan and carry out nonviolent campaigns. This session lasted for one hour and 45 minutes, as more time was required to plan, rephrase and present the different role plays and debriefings.

After a 45-minute lunch break, a co-facilitator introduced the class to the pyramid of strategic planning in developing and implementing nonviolent campaigns. The pyramid includes: the vision and core values, mission, assessment, setting SMARTT goals, taking strategic steps, and implementing plans and tactics (Bloch and Shirch 2018: 51). This session was complimented with a brainstorming session on how strategic planning supports activists in building a just and sustainable peace. As Yogi Berra's famous saying goes, "If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you." It was clarified that much as participants may individually work to plan and execute specific injustices, it is advisable that participants work in groups and coordinate their actions with credible organisations, peace movements and networks to have a greater impact. The class was also divided into two groups and was taken through a lion, a hunter, a rabbit and a mountain exercise. This exercise enabled the group to exercise how to strategise for nonviolent action. In the session, the participants also brainstormed on how to deal with fear and state-engineered repression. Day two was concluded with the distribution of training and New Tribe background handouts.

Day Three: What next?

Day three focused on the practice of nonviolent action. To gauge whether or not participants were able to put their knowledge and skills, acquired within the last three days, into practice, participants were requested to share their most recent experience where they had used nonviolent action to resolve conflict and build peace. From the reported experiences, a female participant confessed

that the training empowered her and as a result, she approached her husband and resolved family grievances. She reported:

> It all started with coffee taking over the weekend. I chatted with my husband, remembering the old good days following our marriage. I then requested if we can talk about a concern that has been bothering me which my husband quickly accepted to listen to. I narrated to him how I felt irritated and bad when he insults me before the children and abuses me when drunk. I spend most of my time crying and regretting our marriage. Before I finished, my husband broke into silent tears. He responded, I did not know that I have offended you that much, he then apologised for the bad behaviour and promised to love and respect me. He too appreciated the way I approached him. Since that time our relationship improved and love to each other increased.

She added that persuasion is an effective method of nonviolent action which she had learned three days ago. Other participants shared stories of intervening to resolve conflicts in public transport and the workplace, and initiating mediation to resolve a domestic conflict. Although the stories demonstrated the immediate result of this action research project, more outcomes are yet to be harvested. This experiment revealed that participants are capable of applying the methods of nonviolent action to change their lives and that of their communities.

The second part of day three evolved around planning the application of nonviolent campaigns, networking and sustainability. The researcher led the class through a simple planning session where the planning and the plan were defined. As Simon Sinek has noted, “Planning is everything and the plan is nothing.” To help each participant with that which he/she wanted or intended to work on and contribute to tangible peace, the researcher introduced simple planning questions which included: What – for the activity? Why – for the objectives? Where – the location? When – for time? With whom – for establishing who else would be involved? And how – for establishing which methods and strategies would be employed?

Each participant was given 35 minutes to prepare and present, in not more than five minutes, the post-training implementation plan. The plans were subjected

to questions for clarity and further improvement. Planning is almost everything in life. Nevertheless, having a plan does not necessarily translate into achieving concrete results unless the plan is put into practice. Thus, planning is crucial to guide the participants in implementing the skills learned to employ nonviolent campaigns. Though the plan was developed in a participatory manner, the co-facilitators may, at no cost, encourage and technically support the implementation process, but the major implementation responsibility and choice of methods and strategy fall solely on the shoulders of the trained participants, as argued by Miller (2006: 42). In the development of effective strategies, activists must identify the issues and challenges at stake, consider where they come from, generate a dream of what the group wants, articulate its main objectives, and devise a strategy to collectively achieve these objectives (War Resisters' International 2009: 35).

With regards to networking, the researcher's co-facilitator posed questions to the class: Do you think it is necessary to stay connected after the training? Why and why not? How can we stay together and for what? In answering these questions, most participants voluntarily agreed to stay connected through WhatsApp and Messenger groups to share information, mobilise, organise and support each other in implementing nonviolent actions and campaigns. Two social media groups were preferred because not all participants have Messenger or WhatsApp accounts. It was also agreed for the groups to be for closed members only, to be used to share related follow-up and application information, and to be named 'PhD AR Parts' as a shortened version of 'PhD action research participants 2018'. Two training participants voluntarily agreed to assist the researcher in establishing the network groups.

After this, the participants were given copies of diaries to use to record their stories as they occurred. It was announced that there would be a follow-up meeting after six months, and one day would be allocated to an evaluation workshop to be convened in 2019. The exact dates would be communicated through WhatsApp and Messenger groups.

The researcher's co-facilitator then distributed post-training questionnaires to 18 participants who were available at the closing time. The remaining participants had left as they had other commitments. Those who did not fill in post-training questionnaires would be required to do so during follow-up and evaluation meetings.

8.9 Feedback and Training Evaluation

Most participants rated the participatory approach as the best methodology used by the co-facilitators throughout the training. Facilitators adopted experiential learning techniques in which participants reflected on and learned from their experiences and not merely from the co-facilitators. The use of contemporary local examples of nonviolent action connected the theory to practice. The use of the village game, the almighty finger, role plays and the use of a film documentary, *The Force Most Powerful*, were liked the most. Case studies of how nonviolent actions had been successfully employed in other countries of the world were commented on as not having been exhausted by facilitators.

The morning review of the previous day's discussions refreshed and reminded the participants to connect different sessions. It also informed the participants who had missed some sessions for obvious reasons. The translation of questionnaires and some handouts from English to Arabic was viewed as helpful, as were some limited energizers used in between the sessions, particularly in the afternoons and after lunch, which kept the training lively. The food and refreshments were rated as good. One participant expressed environmental concern over the use of bottled water and suggested jugs instead.

The provided handouts were appreciated but fell short of participants' expectations as some materials, such as successful stories of nonviolent actions in other countries, were not provided.

Three participants expressed concerns over the training hall which they generally rated as good but lacking air conditioning (the hall was equipped with fans). Participants' transport re-imbursements were rated as poor as most participants were using motor-cyclist transport which was charging twice as much as the daily transport re-imbursement being paid.

8.10 Post-Training Assessment

Each participant was assigned a unique code comprising the first three letters of his/her surname and a serial number. This code was only known to the researcher and was deliberately used to ensure that the researcher was able to assess each participant in terms of the level of knowledge and nonviolent action skills before and after the training. Thus, the same questionnaire that was used for the pre-training assessment was distributed to the participants according to their codes three days after the training program, in an effort to gauge the short-term outcomes of the training. The data collected and analysed indicated the following findings:

- Almost all participants understood that violence and conflict are two different concepts. They are identical but not the same.
- Almost all participants understood the concept of nonviolence and were able to clearly differentiate between nonviolent action and nonviolent campaign as well as its principles, methods and strategies.
- More than half of the participants had gained optimism and expressed faith in using nonviolent tactics to address injustices and conflict, citing empirical evidence as documented by Erica and Maria. One young participant commented that he is 100% confident that nonviolent campaigns remain the only hope and means to defeat violence and restore a just peace in South Sudan. He added that "we have used violent means for more than fifty-five years in Sudan and South Sudan and it has not worked. The only means that we are yet to popularly try is nonviolent campaigns. If they have worked in other countries, I do not see why they cannot work in South Sudan. You never try, you never know."

- More than three quarters of participants were in agreement that power lies with the “group of people” or citizens at large and can only be enjoyed by a leader based on voluntary consent of the governed. If group of people or citizens, for any reason, choose to withdraw their power and disobey a leader, power vanishes.
- A handful of the respondents have appreciated the knowledge and importance of planning, organisation and coordination in implementing nonviolent campaigns.
- Close to three quarters of the participants appreciated the different methodology used by co-facilitators to introduce different themes. Role plays, exercises, documentary films on the force most powerful were graded higher as useful in internalising concepts and theories with practice. Role plays on tackling specific real-life scenarios were liked by many.

8.11 Participants’ Implementation Action Plan

Campaign development is a crucial step to achieve objective three of this study as highlighted in Section 1: 5 of this thesis. Thus, the need to allow participants to share their stories on how they plan to apply nonviolent campaigns to prevent, resolve and manage conflicts in their respective communities, workplaces and at the domestic level. Each participant presented their post-training action plan. The planning meeting ended with participants giving constructive feedback to each other to further improve their plans. It was agreed that WhatsApp and Messenger groups would be established to share useful information. I gave each participant a diary notebook and provided clarification on how to use it to document and report related events and activities which were to be shared with the researcher as part of the evaluation. I also took notes of the participants’ draft plan as an important follow up and monitoring tool to encourage, support and inspire their no-cost implementation projects.

Planning sessions helped participants to identify the types of prevailing violence and injustices against which they wanted to campaign. Using the why, when,

where and with whom questions, participants were able to set objectives, times, locations, the target audience and allies. Nonviolent tactics could be more effective if planned strategically. Collective analysis of power dynamics, issues and the political context is key to developing a shared vision and theory of change for a given society. This also facilitated the decision on which nonviolent methods and strategies could best be employed, as well as when and why they could be employed. Joint training and application planning enhance effective campaigns and ensure a higher possibility of success, as well as informing how to deal with obstacles as they occur (Bloch 2016: 14).

8.12 Conclusion

This training has specifically been designed to increase the participants' capacity to envision how they can use a variety of nonviolent tactics and strategies as well as to coordinate with like-minded peace movements to build peace at community level. Thus, the targeted skills included planning to develop and launch nonviolent campaigns, power and context analysis, methods and principles of nonviolent actions, strategic planning, and effective use of social media and networking were covered.

CHAPTER 9: EVALUATING THE SHORT TERM OUTCOMES

9.1 Introduction

This chapter features the short term outcomes of the nonviolent action-training program that was implemented to fulfil the third objective of this study. The chapter highlights the major short term outcomes, training benefits and sustainability of nonviolent campaigns. The findings were drawn from qualitative data gathered from action research participants who, in July 2019, shared their experiences in developing and implementing nonviolent campaigns after the training. The data gathered through monitoring, follow-ups and observation throughout the year were also validated in an interactive one-day evaluation meeting where participants, individually and in small groups, shared their stories.

The evaluation findings reveal that participants not only learned together but were able to undertake nonviolent campaigns, such as peaceful protests, petitioning, political non-cooperation and traditional lobbying, to change their conditions. Notably, three quarters of the respondents acknowledged that the training positively shaped and changed their worldview towards nonviolence, connected them with like-minded civil society actors and helped them to improve their peacebuilding and civic education curricula.

The prime purpose of this evaluation was to review, document and communicate the outcomes and learning that had been achieved following the nonviolent action training program. The evaluation engaged the action research participants in sharing their experiences on what they had learned and applied to transform their socio-economic and political conditions. In order to fulfil the third research objective, it was necessary to evaluate the training outcomes and to explore how to sustain the training benefits beyond the research project, as well as to provide realistic recommendations to guide and improve future action research projects with similar aims and objectives.

Effective evaluation often requires careful planning to decide which data to collect, and from whom, when and how to collect it. With these in mind, the researcher designed an overall evaluation process composed of four phases, which are summarised in Figure 9.1.



Figure 9.1: Action research evaluation process.

9.2 Short Term Outcomes

9.2.1 Personal Benefits of the Training

Almost three quarters of the participants acknowledged that the training had positively shaped their worldview, attitudes and behaviours towards nonviolence. It connected the participants with like-minded civil society partners leading to the exchange of contacts and information, increased coordination, better organising skills and joint actions. This project has bridged the coordination and learning gaps between civic and faith-based groups. They emphasised that civil society can do very little without joint coordination,

organising and actions that consolidate people's power to make a greater impact. An elderly respondent confessed that "the training was an eye opener" for him. He added that:

> Nonviolent action is not actually new. Our ancestors have used its tactics severally without knowing it. The training helped me gained insights on how nonviolent action can be used strategically to shift power in conflict situation in order to set parties to dialogue and negotiate in good faith to address their grievances.

Another respondent acknowledged that the training had helped him to be a nonviolent disciplinant:

> I learned that people sometimes use violence out of ignorance or lack of knowledge about alternatives to violence. I used to beat my children thinking beating was a way of discipline. I was wrong and ignorant that it was actually violence. After the training, I changed to using nonviolent ways of discipline such as cleaning the compound and dishes, writing a story about what had happened and watering flowers. I also show my children love, care and respect. I always explain to them, I want them to be good and responsible children to become successful in life. This way, I gained love and respect of my children. If one of them wrongs, he or she can report, seek forgiveness and promise never to repeat the wrong.

The participants also learned from related events. For example, many participants reported having been inspired by the recent pro-democracy civil uprising in Sudan, which, in April 2019, finally ousted president Omer El-Beshir after more than four months of continuous protests. Live bullets were used against peaceful protesters but the peaceful protesters continued the resistance until the army sympathised with the protesters, leading to a loyalty and power shift and the subsequent collapse of Beshir's dictatorial regime.

A few participants reported having incorporated nonviolent action training components into their peacebuilding, human rights and civic education interventions. Four participants underwent the advanced training of trainers in nonviolent action organised by local and international partners in Juba and Nairobi.

9.2.2 The Most Significant Outcomes

Outcomes, as the term implies, are changes that can be directly attributed to the action research project. It is determined by that which the participants did differently as a result of the training, and the consequences that would not have occurred without the training. Building on the participants' testimonies and experiences, the training generally had a positive impact on most participants and their constituencies. The participants not only learned together but were able to more confidently undertake nonviolent campaigns after the training to change their conditions using various methods of nonviolent action ranging from peaceful marches, stand-up and sit-in protests, petitioning, social media and offline campaigns aimed at bringing about change. These outcomes are presented in summary form in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1: The most significant short-term outcomes of the study.

Outcomes, contribution of action research participants and their organisations in addressing the problems being faced			
Title of nonviolent action	**Which problem, violence or injustice was addressed?**	**Contribution from action research participants and/or their organisations**	**Outcome story**
Protesters marched to the Ministry of Gender and the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) against alleged mass rape in Bentiu	Systematic and mass rape of women as a weapon of war has been commonly practiced with impunity in South Sudan. Most of these actions are being committed by men in uniform. In 2016, more than 6 civil society organisations wrote and submitted the first ever South Sudan Universal Periodic Review report to the Human Rights Council in Geneva. The report highlighted more than 200 recommendations to improve human rights, including protection for vulnerable groups such as women, children and the aged during conflicts.	Five action research participants were part of a women coalition tasked to prepare and commemorate 16 days of activism against gender-based violence. They seized this global annual event to launch a nonviolent campaign against rape and other forms of gender violence. They raised awareness through Radio talk shows and social media to keep campaign participants and supporters informed about the alleged mass rapes.	More than 1,000 protesters, drawn mostly from over 40 women organisations and other civil society and faith-based groups, on 10 December 2018 marched to the Ministry of Gender and the Parliament TNLA protesting the alleged mass rape of about 150 women and girls in Bentiu (UNMISS 2018). The protesters, in white t-shirts with placards with messages such as #HearMeToo, #we need accountability etc., marched and held sit-ins in front of the TNLA main entrance and demanded the government to immediately investigate the incident, identify the culprits and hold them accountable for their actions. Before the march, they held a series of Radio talk shows and social media campaigns where women leaders condemned the mass rape and called for human rights bodies to ensure justice for the victim.
Civil society launched a campaign #MaMaraSakit (Juba Arabic for #NotjustAwoman, She is everything)	Women's contribution is often undermined in the families, community and the entire South Sudanese society. This negative perception and stereotype has gone unchallenged for too long. This violence is motivated by a cultural belief which, in turn, causes pyschological disturbances	Eight AR participants and their organisations were involved in planning and implementation. The researcher attended the launch. Radio talk shows and social media, especially Facebook, were used to mobilise campaigners and the campaign for the recognition of women's potentials and positive roles in the South Sudanese society. This campaign is still ongoing with many	More than 60 civil society organisations launched a nonviolent camapign #MaMaraSakit, Juba Arabic for #NotjustAwoman, She is everything. The launch took place at Logali House in Juba. The campaign was launched on 6 December 2019, aimed at correcting societal negative perceptions and attitudes towards women.

	and trauma to women and young girls.	billboards installed in Juba carrying the campaign message.	
Civil society petitioned the Minister of Information for poor telecommunication services	Poor and limited communication and internet services are major development constraints in South Sudan. Access to reliable and timely information is a basic right which is barely being enjoyed by every citizen.	One action research participant provided input to the petition, and mobilised other civil society organisations to sign the petition. The researcher joined civil society leaders to hand over the petition and held face-to-face discussions with the Minister.	Over 100 civil society organisations from across South Sudan, on 9 January 2019, petitioned the Minister of Information, Telecommunication and Postal Services for poor telecommunication services (Radio Tarmazuj 2019). This action came after the government closed down the operations of the leading VIVA CELL Telecommunication company in the country over non-payment of accumulated taxes. The closure put pressure on the two prevailing MTN and Zain companies, leading to poor call and internet services.
Students peacefully held stand-up protest against tuition fee hike leading to its suspension.	Taxes and tuition hikes are common responses to fix the collapsing economic situation in the country where most civil servants, including university professors, are underpaid and do not regularly get paid. The economic crisis has increased the burden on common men and women, including students and their families. As one of the action research protesters wrote on a placard “All of us are facing the same economic challenges that the university administration is complaining about. The salaries of our parents and guardians cannot put food on the table for three days, let alone covering fees hikes.”	Four action research participants, in collaboration with the students union and other students’ associations, planned, organised and implemented the campaign. A respondent reported: “Because of heavy presence of the police and security in the university campus, we did not march. But we strategised to come to the campus as individuals as usual in order not to raise an alarm as we were warned already not to organise any student function or protest. At 10:00 AM we quickly assembled in front of VC’s office carrying placards demanding revoke of tuition hike.”	Students of the University of Juba, on 12 March 2019, staged a peaceful stand-up protest after the University had increased tuition fees. The fees hike was drastic, for example, the faculty of medicine rising markedly from 8,000 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) per course to over 85,000 SSP, an increase of almost 400%. The students who defiled the Vice Chancellor’s band of students political functions within the campus launched the nonviolent campaigns, demanding that this decision be revoked. The students, as part of the campaign, met members of the TNLA, the Minister of Higher Education and senior staff in the office of the president.

Campaign lobby to prevent environmental pollution and its consequences in oil rich Upper Nile region	Many human beings and animals have reportedly died due to the dumping of expired chemicals in the bush, leakages of oil pumps, and smoke pollution of oil and gas industries. The pollution is caused mostly by the negligence of oil companies uncovered recently.	Three AR participants, in collaboration with other civil society members, the University of Juba and the Parliamentary Committee on Wild Life, Forestry and Environment, held a series of lobbying and awareness meetings on the impacts of pollution in the oil-rich region. Civic groups later mobilised, formed a coalition of civil society on land and natural resources to advocate for environmental safety, transparency in the oil sector etc.	In August 2018, civil society activists peacefully lobbied TNLA to impose a penalty on oil companies that did not follow environmental safety standards in the oil-rich Upper Nile region. This lobby campaign followed a report in which oil companies were accused of disposing chemical waste recklessly. This negilligence led to the death of children, animals and increased suspected mischarges in the oil region. A training was organised in the TNLA by ONAD a local civil society organisation to expose the issue and its devastating impacts. Peace club members also came to the TNLA to express their solidarity with the victims of pollution and demanded immediate redress and fundraising to support the victims.
Women achieved 35% women quota as representation ration in all levels of the government in South Sudan. The increase from 25% to 35% was achieved as the results of nonviolent campaigns around peace negotiations	Women, like youth, have always been under-represented in decision-making processes at family, community and government levels. This campaign has realised increased quota. The challenge is now for all political parties and women groups to ensure that right women leaders are appointed in the right positions to deliver and make a difference in public life.	AR participants joined other women organisations and lobbied throughout the year demanding for affirmative action to raise women representation at all levels of the government by 50%. On 12 September 2018, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (RARCSS) was signed in which parties committed to 35% women quota for representation in all levels of the goverment.	In 2018, women groups held grassroots, national and regional meetings in Entebe, Uganda campaigning for increase of 50% women representation and participation in decision-making processes in all levels of the government. Media, workshops, radio talk shows and lobbying was used to mobilise the general public and negotiating parties to increase women's participation. Faith-based groups, such as the South Sudan Council of Churches Women Desk, held regular monthly marches in Juba and other major towns in South Sudan, demanding for the war to stop, to observe a ceasefire and revitalising the collapsed peace deal signed in August 2015.

9.2.3 Other Outcomes

Early and forced marriages have been widely practiced in South Sudan. This has caused many female children to drop out of schools. The practice has prevented many girls and women from rising to and achieving their full potential in order to participate effectively in the socio-economic and political development of their community and country at large. A new report entitled *Born to Be Married* by the British charity Oxfam found that more than 70% of girls in Nyal are married off before the age of 18. The report warns that another generation of girls in South Sudan will miss out on education, face high health risks during childbirth, and be more likely to face sexual and domestic violence unless the country takes more steps to eliminate forced marriages (Oxfam South Sudan 2019).

In an effort to contribute to resisting early and forced marriages and their devastating impacts on girl child education, an AR participant launched #Back to school campaign targeting school-girl dropouts. She used community-based organisations and churches to educate the community, raise awareness of the short- and long-term impacts of the practice, and encourage dropout girls to re-enroll and continue with their schooling. The result was an increased enrollment in local schools. Reporting during an evaluation meeting, the participant stated: “I know of at least nine girls who reported back to school as a result of our campaign”. The campaign targeted Magateen Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Juba. In a related development, another male participant reported having blocked a marriage of a 16-year-old school girl in Kopeta. The girl was forced into marriage to a 48-year-old businessman. Using family members, friends and an influential community elder, the participant persuaded the family to keep their daughter for at least two more years until she was able to make an informed and mature decision to marry the man or not.

Not all participants were optimistic about the power and potential of nonviolence. Some were pessimistic but with time, learned to appreciate that nonviolent action works. A younger respondent reported:

> I did not believe that nonviolent action will work in South Sudan but I tried it. I together with more than two hundred family members blocked politicians from addressing funeral prayers held on 4 March 2019. This political non-cooperation succeeded. We insisted to just hear the word of God from the church leaders with no opportunity for political leaders to address the masses as usual. We did that as a protest for the government failure to pay salaries of civil servants for the last six months. Political non-cooperation with policymakers who do not commit and fulfill their obligations and duties is the way to resist their injustices. The training helped me to think and act differently.

Some participants reported that they had resolved disputes in the family and workplaces, and offered free legal services to the victims of gender-based violence. Conflict management and peacebuilding approaches have often worked with nonviolent resistance to restore broken relationships and build a just peace. As argued by Dudouet (2017: 10), the ideas and practices of civil resistance and peacebuilding strategies are complementary to each other, as both strategies oppose violence in all its forms, and seek to pursue a just peace by peaceful means. She highlights:

- the crucial importance of civil resistance as a violence prevention/mitigation instrument and as a pre-negotiation strategy for oppressed groups, enabling them to wage necessary conflicts through nonviolent means, thereby putting pressure on incumbent elites to redistribute power equitably;

- the usefulness of peacebuilding's conflict mitigation methods to translate civil resistance gains into mutually-acceptable negotiated outcomes and to reconcile polarised relationships in the wake of nonviolent struggles; and

- the need for sustained civil resistance in post-conflict or post-war societies in order to prevent and oppose autocratic backlashes, to resist anti-emancipatory and 'neoliberal' tendencies within post-war peacebuilding operations, or to put pressure on all stakeholders to

implement their commitments to progressive state reforms and social justice.

In Table 9.2, Dudouet (2017: 10) provides a more systematic comparison of the main areas of convergence and divergence between civil resistance and peacebuilding, both seen as conceptual approaches and practical strategies of conflict intervention.

Table 9.2: Similarities and differences between civil resistance and peacebuilding.

	Civil Resistance	Peacebuilding
Means and ends	General orientation: Just peace by peaceful means a. Normative end goal: explicit value-bias in favor of positive (behavioral, attitudinal, structural) peace b. (Principled or pragmatic) opposition to physical violence as a means of achieving social and political change	
Ethical orientation toward conflict parties	Pro-justice stance, ethical bias towards the empowerment of marginalized groups	Impartial or pro-stability stance
Conflict intervention methods	Contentious, extra-institutional methods of (nonviolent) conflict intensification (such as protest, civil disobedience or self-organizing)	Conventional methods of conflict mitigation (such as dialogue, negotiation, reconciliation, institution-building, structural reform)
Agents of change	Bottom-up approach: grassroots activists, institutional 'allies', third-party accompaniment and cross-border solidarity networks	Multi-track approach: international and national leaders, civil society and grassroots bridge-builders

A respondent, who is a lawyer, reported that the training inspired him to offer free legal advice to six cases of girls, women and one young boy who were sexually abused by men. Two cases were concluded in which the offenders were penalised and the victims compensated. The remaining four cases are still in the higher court. There are victims and survivors of gender-based violence who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to defend them. The defending of human rights is part of a nonviolent response against injustice and all that causes suffering to humanity. Thus, this study has contributed to building peace in different ways.

9.3 Resistance and Challenges

As is the case in many countries in the world, implementing nonviolent campaigns often trigger repression from those who hold power or feel that their power is being tampered with. The context of South Sudan is particularly difficult for activists, involving brutality and repression, including the use of live bullets against peaceful demonstrators. Nevertheless, despite the difficult operating environment, South Sudanese non-state and state actors continue to face and endure risks, implementing marches and other methods of nonviolent action. Although most of the campaigns implemented by the participants have been peaceful with no cases of arrests, two organisers reported to having been harassed and arrested by the police in connection with the tuition hike stand-up protest in the University of Juba. They were, however, released without charges. South Sudan's constitution, in theory, recognises the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association, however protest has been effectively criminalised under Kiir's government.

9.4 Sustainability

The sustainability of the research outcomes and outputs (skills and knowledge) was built into the design of the action. As Chigas and Wooddrow argue (2018: 166), significant progress towards sustainable peace can be achieved through more effective alliances such as the consortia, networks, platforms etc. where multiple stakeholders, including local civil society organisations, NGOs, INGOs, governments, multilateral organisations, and private sector entities can

coordinate and supplement each other's work. Thus, the establishment of AR Messenger and WhatsApp groups, as well as coordinating and networking with like-minded civil society networks such as the New Tribe and the South Sudan Human Rights Defenders' Network, among others, are attempts for sustainability. Continuous engagement of AR participants with ongoing campaigns, and the transfer and exchange of practical skills on nonviolent campaigns will solidify and enhance the capacity of CSOs to achieve sustainability. Connecting with development, human rights, justice, and nonviolent action modalities are imperative for coordination, mutual support and protection. Such spaces can also be utilised for dialogue and advocate for improved donor policies and practices that encourage collaboration for greater long-term impacts.

This study has given considerable attention to scaling up and sustaining the benefits of nonviolent campaigns as well as the skills and knowledge acquired from the training program to serve more people for longer periods of time and not merely for the purposes of the study. To scale up the benefits of the campaigns, close to half of the respondents have already joined and are working closely with the New Tribe movement and syndicate organisations pursuing ongoing campaigns using diverse tactics and approaches including creative arts, street theatre and social media. Some action research participants have already proceeded to undertake the advanced training of trainers in nonviolent action and are connected with national and regional like-minded nonviolence movements and partners. Notably, three of the nonviolence trainees planned, designed and facilitated Synergizing Nonviolent Action and Peacebuilding (SNAP), a nonviolence training curriculum being used in South Sudan. In the final evaluation program, the AR participants resolved to maintain the use of AR Messenger and WhatsApp groups for sharing information and continuous learning, networking, coordination and to facilitate joint actions.

9.5 Inspiration and Learning

The 10 December 2018 women's march to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly moved the government to form a higher level committee to investigate the alleged rape of more than 150 women in Bentiu. It also inspired the action research participants, as one of them reported:

> At first, I was afraid to join the march but was encouraged and so, I joined. When we started the march from the Rainbow playing square in Munuki, Juba, I could observe the presence of the police and some suspected security officers or informants. Nevertheless, I told myself let us just do it. It is the right thing to do. That moment, I threw away fear and shouted, "real men don't rape women", #Hear me too etc. as we march.

Another very active participant, who planned and participated in the successful implementation of nonviolent campaigns, reported:

> My experience indicates that success in implementing nonviolent campaigns begins with individual change of attitudes towards nonviolence. It all starts with personal conviction that nonviolent action is the right thing to do and that it works. The next is a decision to just do it. Do not allow fear to control you but develop coping mechanism to control your fear of consequences. Be prepared to even get arrested if you cannot avoid it. Risk taking is part of the game. If possible take actions as a group. Start small, gain breath, draw lessons, modify your group strategy if necessary, mobilise more supporters and continue the campaign. Observe nonviolent discipline and with practice and time nonviolence will become part of your life style.

After several attempts, the Sudanese people with support of the Military finally ousted the president Omer El-beshir after nearly 30 years of dictatorial regime. The Sudanese people had prepared through training in nonviolent campaign making, tried and failed many times to finally reached a state of people's power and an equilibrium beyond which no dictator cannot rule without the consent of the citizens. By creating civic-conscious and an educated society that has regained its rightful position and used its collective power to the benefit of all the Sudanese people.

The Sudanese uprising started in December 2018 and it was triggered by the higher cost of living, bread and fuel, as well as liquidity shortages. The protests in Sudan did inspire the emergence of the Red Card Movement (RCM) a social media campaign in South Sudan. According to Amnesty International (2019) news article, RCM planned to launch a nation-wide protest on 16 May 2019 to coincide with the SPLA annual celebrations. However, the government prior to 16 May threatened protesters with deadly consequences if they took to the streets as planned. The authorities carried out a door-to-door search targeting suspected members and supporters of the Red Card Movement (RCM) as well as deployed troops in Juba ahead of planned protest day. The RCM largely used social media campaigns initiated by the South Sudanese in diaspora. The group mobilised masses and succeed to held peaceful marches in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, demanding the resignation of President Kiir. As has been the experience in Sudan and other parts of the world, the use of social media has been helpful and supportive in mobilising, coordinating and sustaining campaigns.

PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the overall research aim and objectives. It tackles a brief discussion of the three main objectives as a deliberate attempt to revisit, review and summarise the study's conclusions and recommendations. It is also an attempt to examine whether or not the study has strengthened the capacity of civil society to better develop and implement nonviolent campaigns to positively change their socio-economic and political conditions. Insights gained were used as the basis for concrete recommendations to future researchers, civil society, academics, the national government, and the regional and international community.

10.2 Discussion of Research Aim, Objectives and Results

The prime purpose of this study was to build through training the capacity of civil society actors to effectively develop and implement nonviolent campaigns to transform socio-economic and political conflicts in South Sudan. This goal was accomplished through the training of 24 action research participants who were able to implement a number of actions, as reported in Chapter 9.

The specific objectives of this study, as stated in section1.6, were

1. To assess the effectiveness and capacity of the South Sudanese CSOs in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns between 2011 and 2017. This was reported in Chapter 4.

2. To explore examples of nonviolent campaigns that CSOs have implemented in some selected countries in their efforts to transform socio-economic and political conflicts. This was reported in Chapter 3.

3. To design, implement and evaluate the outcomes of a nonviolent action training program with a sample of 25 NGO workers, university students,

faith-based and other members of the civil society. These were reported in Chapters 6-9.

Chapters two and three of this thesis and table 3.1 in particular analysed and assessed the capacity of South Sudanese civil society in development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan between 2011-2017. The assessment found that nonviolent activism has existed in the country before, during and after its independence in 2011 to 2017 and beyond. The study established that nonviolent campaigns were used not only by civic and faith-based groups, but also by public and private officials such as judges, university teaching staff and teachers. Cross-section of South Sudanese have largely protested the government's failure to meet its social contract and state obligations towards its citizens.

Despite the fact that the South Sudanese have proven their ability to nonviolently challenge power amidst repression, they have used limited tactics, and had deficits in coordination, planning and a common vision for the countrywide nonviolence movement. The civil society in South Sudan commands respect among the citizens and has the potentials to effect change but they have also been criticised for having a limited capacity to being relevant and effective in bringing about a lasting political change.

To gain a better understanding of the theories and application of nonviolence in different contexts of the world, I explored various sources of literature for one year as reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. Insights obtained indicated that nonviolent campaigns are more than twice as successful as violent means. The findings further revealed that past and contemporary examples of successful nonviolent movements have largely been spearheaded by non-state actors particularly religious leaders, women and youth. Some resistance movements have succeeded in achieving their goals, while others have failed. It was crystal clear from almost all the cases in the world that nonviolent actions often attract negative reactions from those in power, leading to repression. However, repression can sometimes backfire and may lead to

loyalty shifts and disintegration within the opponents' structure which may lead to their weakness and the success of the peace movements.

As part of the third research objective, I designed, implemented and evaluated the short-term outcomes of the nonviolent action training program attended by 24 participants. The evaluation found that the participants not only learned together, shared information and established networks but were able to apply nonviolent campaigns such as peaceful demonstrations, petitions, press statements, prayer vigils, sit-ins and use of other forms of collective actions. These campaigns are directly attributed as training outcomes, which contributed somewhat to social, economic and political change. It was apparent to note that nonviolent action training is more relevant, appealing and effective if designed, adopted and implemented to suit the socio-cultural, economic and political contexts of a given society.

In addition to the training outcomes, nearly three quarters of the participants acknowledged that the training has positively shaped their worldview, attitudes and behaviours towards nonviolence. They argued the training was practical and relevant in addressing everyday life situations. The training has also contributed to improving the peacebuilding and civic education curricula of the AR participants.

10.3 Challenges encountered and Lessons learned

The research established some challenges that the AR participants faced in their roles and contributions towards social justice and peace. Some protesters, as was the case with the tuition fee hike in the University of Juba, were arrested, detained and harassed by the police but were later released without charges. Other challenges experienced by activists included the limited and restrictive civic space for the civil society to do its work, intimidation, unlawful arrests, and other forms of repression from the government security apparatus. These challenges were experienced in a time that the South Sudanese civil society had a limited capacity in risk assessment and management, the absence of self-care and protection mechanisms for

nonviolent activists, and limited funding. These challenges are not new in emerging peace movements.

Lessons learned in this study show that civil society actors play important roles in shaping the socio-economic and political conditions in their respective settings. Training can inspire, encourage and capacitate volunteer participants to better plan, organise and undertake actions to bring change. However, nonviolent campaigns are not always successful because some might fail for obvious, pragmatic or even principal reasons. Thus, nonviolent campaigns in a fragile country like South Sudan must be based on principles and not just pragmatism. There is need for civic and international community to pressure the government to ensure the different arms of the government enjoys balanced power through checks and balances to prevent abuse, impunity and other forms of corruption. This will also limit the ability of the government to harass activists and target their organisations to silence dissenting voices that call and work to bring about socio-economic and political reforms. The experience of the past and contemporary examples of nonviolent campaigns implemented in South Sudan since 2011 have been partly successful due to the prevailing higher level of repression, including the use of firearms against peaceful protesters.

The study found that risk-taking with wisdom is part of the process and that the South Sudanese are not the first to face regime repression. On a positive note, repression often backfires and can potentially lead to loyalty and power shifts which can weaken the opponents' sources of support and strengthen the position of civil resisters. However, nonviolent campaigners need to creatively utilise and leverage repressive situations to achieve movement's success. The effective use of audio, written and other forms of social media can increase public awareness of the injustice and mobilise supporters to join nonviolent campaigns.

Just as Gandhi's nonviolent resistance in South Africa and India inspired members of the Civil Rights Movement in the US, the recent 2019 Sudanese uprising inspired some South Sudanese youth movements. Some AR participants reported having been inspired by taking part in practical nonviolent

campaigns, as reported in Chapters 8 and 9, which enhanced their capacity, built trust and gave them courage to apply nonviolent methods. As one respondent reported:

> You cannot learn to swim by simply reading books about how to swim. You need to jump into water and begin to swim in order to experience it. The same way it applies to use of nonviolent tactics to transform conflicts.

This study reveals that seizing important historical and political events, such as the 16 days of activism against GBV to launch nonviolent campaigns, is more effective way to limit risks and leverage people's power. This is because most if not all political events have an international connotation and attract media attention. The government will be additionally cautious to suppress nonviolent campaigners to avoid implications on its human rights records and regional and international relations. This study further underscored the importance of early preparations and the division of roles and responsibilities before, during and after campaigns. Protection volunteers, legal teams and media often play supporting roles for successful campaigns. Participants in nonviolent campaigns feel more assured of their safety when they know and prepare to manage the associated risks with their actions and what to say and do if arrested or intimidated by the opponents and their agents.

10.4 Personal Reflection

The deeply-rooted socio-economic, cultural and political violence in South Sudan cannot be overcome by military action. Different forms of violence are driven and motivated by different underlying factors, needs and interests. They originate from deeper roots and are often influenced by past experiences in society. On the other hand, nonviolent campaigns do not simply concern taking deliberate, sequenced and repetitive nonviolent collective actions – they are about developing a social and political conscience, convictions and commitment for campaigners to carry out and sustain those actions to transform their economic, social and political conditions. Nonviolent campaigns work better when designed to suit the socio-cultural and political context of a given

society. It takes time and financial, moral and technical resources, as well as participants' commitments, to achieve the desired outcomes.

Nonviolent campaigns are not projects (as every project has a starting and ending time) but are social movement encounters. Activists are often empowered by nonviolence, peacebuilding and civic organisations which their work is being regulated by government, donor and audit policies and standards. While these requirements are necessary for accountability and curtailing corruption, it can limit activists' ambition to achieve peace. For example, a participant reported that their donor supported them to organise nonviolent action training but declined to support their follow up campaigns. They had to mobilise their own local resources to implement the campaigns. Thus, activists, donors and peace movements must transform the projection of nonviolence into somewhat flexible but accountable social movement encounters.

Universities and higher institutions of learning in South Sudan mostly use the traditional research approaches that focus on drawing findings and recommendations for the various stakeholders. These studies often end up at university libraries and are rarely published into books or journal articles for wider reach to positively influence the society. Research must produce more than just new knowledge and books but also help to engage the respondents into practical actions to transform their situations into more peaceful and just ones. The use of action research to tackle economic, social and political problems that affect the life of common citizens is crucial for nationbuilding.

Action research projects, as part of a postgraduate degree, take time and are an earning investment and not a waste of time. They allow for more practice, reflections, learning and gaining new knowledge for the participants and the researcher. In the case of this study, it was possible to carry out the evaluation in one year, as the training was conducted earlier. Follow up, Monitoring and Learning (MEAL) through Messenger and WhatsApp groups, as well as field observations and face-to-face contact, help AR participants and the research team to gather information, learn and document AR project outcomes.

10.5 Key Recommendations

Based on the analysis of this study's findings, challenges and lessons learned, the key recommendations that follow would be crucial to boost building the capacity of the civil society to develop and implement nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan.

10.5.1 Recommendation to the Researchers

Researchers have crucial roles and responsibilities to enhancing the capacity of civil society to effectively employ nonviolent campaigns to advance a just and lasting peace. Thus, efforts should be made to study pertinent socio-economic and political problems and issues that affect the lives of common citizens. Researchers should therefore prioritize the following:

- Conducting scientific studies on pertinent issues such as corruption, homicides, oil and non-oil revenues and its impacts on basic service delivery and development growth in South Sudan, salary structures and sky rocking market prices...etc. Generating evidence based findings and recommendations on these pertinent issues will no doubt inform, strengthen and aid the work of nonviolent campaigners, media personnel and activists.

- Action research projects on nonviolent campaigns, contextualized training curricula and related literature should be widely disseminated to educate diverse members of the civil society, political parties and the public to promote the culture, discipline and practice of nonviolent struggle for peace and justice.

- To increase the impact of action research projects, researchers should allocate at least a one-year period to allow sufficient time for beneficiaries to apply the theories before evaluating the impact, learning and training benefits for sustainability. Applying new concepts and tools such as nonviolent actions in short periods of time may be pedagogically difficult. I recommend a minimum of three days of training of at least eight hours per day (24 hours for the whole nonviolent action training)

to cover the content and to allow sufficient time for the participants to interact, clear their fears and doubts, and practice skills.

10.5.2 Recommendation to Civil Society and Academic Institutions

The civil society must undertake the following;

- Encourage not only collaborative work to make greater impacts but pay special attention to improving internal systems to facilitate peaceful social change. Nonviolence social movements such as the New Tribe should improve its coordination, communication and capacity building mechanisms, and plans to reach wider grassroots population, syndicate partners and the Diaspora to build an inclusive peace movement.

- Diversify and increase financial resources to continuously improve human resource and technical capacities for sustainability. Priority should be given to developing culturally-sensitive nonviolent action training manuals/materials, increase grassroots outreach, networking and movement building. Besides, civil society should proactively engage their partners and donors into a dialogue aiming to correct and avoid the projectisation of nonviolence but rather understand it as legitimate social movement encounters.

- Women and youth rights organisations should improve, sequence and diversify nonviolent tactics that target opponents' sources of power to achieve nationwide socio-economic and political change.

The Catholic University of South Sudan has, in 2018, included nonviolence principles and approaches as a course in its Justice and Peace Institute's bachelor's degree. The Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies (IPDSS) in the University of Juba can similarly broaden its conflict, peace and development studies to review its course outlines to integrate topics such as nonviolent methods and strategies in peacebuilding. Engaging academic

institutions through action research projects may result in building more peace through research than merely producing research documents and books. It is necessary to conduct studies on environmental pollution and the effects of a global warming system, the efficacy and potential of nonviolent actions to violent means etc. as potential topics for further research. The findings of these studies will undoubtedly inform the public opinion and mobilise them to limit the vicious circle of armed rebellions in the country. To this end, apart from the USIP's special report on resisting violence, growing the culture of nonviolent action in South Sudan in 2018 and this doctoral thesis, there has been no higher level of scientific study conducted on nonviolent campaigns in the country. Thus this study is recommended for publication into a book to serve as a relevant reference for academia, practitioners and the ordinary people.

10.5.3 Recommendation to the Government

The government of South Sudan should recognise civil society as peace and development partners rather than labeling them as enemies, troublemakers and allies of foreign agencies. Brutality and repression, including regular use of live bullets on peaceful demonstrators, unlawful arrests, detention and torture only brands the government as dictatorial. Extreme repression often damages image of a sitting government and encourages options for armed rebellions, which are costly to sustain. The government should therefore consider the following:

- Respect freedom of expression and assembly enshrined in the national constitution and improve on its response to peaceful resistance and encourage constructive dialogue with dissenting voices from the civil society and other political forces.

- Reform governance and security sectors to ensure better rule of law and accountability.

- Undertake rapid economic and political reforms to deliver basic social and development services to the people in fulfilment to its social contract.

10.5.4 Recommendations to Regional and International Community

To strengthen the peace movement in South Sudan, external regional and international actors, including foreign governments, should prioritise increase direct financial and technical support to civil society groups and academic institutions that promote nonviolent campaigns. The support should include massive nonviolent action training programs, develop and use contextualised curricula, hold regional exchange programs, and offer protection services to activists and journalists who are reporting on state-sanctioned violence against protesters.

The sub-regional, regional and international bodies should recognize and support people's power movements to minimise armed rebellions and peacekeeping operations which are more expensive and constitute a financial burden on the regional and international community. For instance, the African Union and the United Nations in 2019 supported a call for civilian-led transitional government in Sudan following overthrow of President Omar El-Beshir (Aljazeera 2019). The UN should exert political and economic pressure on leaders responsible for sustaining war, including their neighbouring and international allies. Perpetrators of widespread human rights violations should be held accountable for their actions and should not be tolerated to accommodate regional and international interests. Strategic partnerships with the people and government of South Sudan should be built upon principles of good governance, nonviolence and regional stability.

10.6 Overall Conclusions

This study affirms that South Sudan's society is highly militarized and so is the country's politics, making the context among the world's most difficult for activists. Nevertheless, despite widespread violence and difficult operating environment, South Sudanese have demonstrated their audacity to challenge power and that they are by no means a passive people. The study found that

civil society actors in South Sudan are not new to the use of nonviolent campaigns. However, their strategies are limited to the use of protests and not much of tactics of noncooperation and intervention. It is necessary to explore and use diverse tactics of political non-cooperation and intervention such as civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes, occupation of important facilities, blockages and sit-ins to shake opponents' power sources and bring political change.

The study establishes that although the South Sudanese grassroots peace movement is young, they are self-organising and building up a people's movement. The AR outcomes reported in Chapter 9 confirms that if members of civil society of diverse ethnic and geographic backgrounds, are mobilised and their confidence and capacities are built through training, direct nonviolent campaigns and access to media, syndicate partner organizations and key decision-makers, they are then encouraged, inspired and enabled to resist injustices and build peace. Once they are empowered, they become agents of transformative change and drivers of their own peace and development agendas. Building the capacity of civil society helps to develop their skills to claim and occupy public spaces which they can utilise to transform their socio-economic and political conditions.

The study concludes in that enhancing civil society capacity should not be limited to a training program alone, but it should encompass mentorship aimed at building social and political conscience of society's members to value, appreciate and consider nonviolent responses to conflicts in order to reduce the culture of violent insurrection in South Sudan. The findings of this research support the contention that the culture of violence in South Sudan can be transformed through long term training and education programs that promote nonviolence. Thus, supporting civil society with technical skills, knowledge in nonviolent campaigning and coherent peacebuilding is an important contribution to building a building safe, democratic and prosperous country.

Building the capacity of civil society should be considered as a priority long term investment for development growth, given that it will take decades to finally

realize its impacts. In addition to these conclusions for future research, the question of why some opposition groups in South Sudan use violent means while others employ nonviolent political resistance is an important research question, which researchers should consider for investigations particularly those ones in countries emerging from long civil wars.

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Appendix 1: Introductory letter

DUT
DURBAN
UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY

24 February 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I write as head of the postgraduate programme in Peacebuilding at Durban University of Technology. All of our students carry out projects which involve them directly in building peace.

Moses Monday John is a full-time PhD student in the programme working under my supervision. His research concerns developing the capacity of people to bring about change nonviolently.

I would be grateful for any assistance you can give him, including library access. By all means contact me with any questions geoffreyh@dut.ac.za

Geoff Harris

Professor & Head

Peacebuilding Programme

PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME
DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

Appendix 2: Letter of information (in English)

LETTER OF INFORMATION

Dear Participant,

Thank you for taking an interest in my research. My name is Moses Monday John. I am currently doing a PhD studies in Management Sciences (Peacebuilding) at Durban University of Technology. I wish to provide information of my study so that you have a clear understanding of what it is about.

The title of my study is building capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan.

Nonviolent campaigns encompass the use of the creative methods of nonviolence such as; protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and intervention. It aims to transform violent responses to conflicts and achieve peace through nonviolent means. I want to find out the effectiveness of these methods and how they work in South Sudan.

If you choose to be part of the study you will:

1. Be interviewed.
2. Participate in a focus group discussion (FGD) of 7-8 participants to further discuss the issues raised in the questions guide and then develop and implement the training programme with me.
3. You may be part of a group as a volunteer participant during the implementation of the training programme.

Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative impact should you choose to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study. The interview will be done at a time convenient to you or the gatekeeper and will take about thirty to sixty minutes. The focus group discussion will last for approximately one hour and the nonviolent campaign training programme will take three days of five hours a day.

I will not use your name when reporting on the focus group discussions. Your answer will only be seen by me. However, if you participate in the action research to develop and implement the nonviolent campaign empowerment training programme then you will be known to other participants and co-researchers or facilitators.

Please, do not hesitate to contact me on: Email mosesjoa@gmail.com or mobile number:+211 925174532. You can also reach my direct supervisor Prof. Geoffrey Harris through e-mail: geoffreyh@dut.ac.za , Telephone:+27 5609 or contact the Institute Research Ethics administrator on: +27 31 3732900 for any query and concern. Complaints can be reported to the Deputy Vice Chancellor: Technology, Innovation & Partnerships **Telephone: +27 31** 373 2375 **Fax:** 0866 851 845 au dvctip@dut.ac.za.

Yours sincerely,

Moses Monday John

Appendix 3: Letter of information (in Arabic)

معلومات عن دراستي

عزيزي المشارك

شكرا لك عل الاهتمام ببحثي. اسمي موسيس جون. أنا حاليا على درجة الدكتوراه في العلوم الإدارية (لبناء السلام) بجامعة ديربان للتكنولوجيا.

أود أن أقدم لك معلومات عن دراستي بحيث يكون لديك فهم واضح

عنوان دراستي هو بناء القدرات في تطوير وتنفيذ حملات اللاعنف بجنوب السودان

وتشمل هذه الدرسة حملات اللاعنف, استخدام الأساليب الإبداعية للاعنف مثل: الاحتجاج والإقناع، وعدم التعاون والتدخل. ويهدف إلى تحويل الاستجابات العنيفة للصراعات وتحقيق السلام من خلال

وسائل اللاعنف

.اريد ان اتعرف على فعالية هذه الطرق وكيفية عملها في جنوب السودان؟

اذا اخترت ان تكون جزءآ من هذه الدرسة سوف نقوم بالاتي: -

١-اجراء مقابلة معك

٢-المشاركة في مجموعات نقاش يتكون من ٧-٨ مشاركين لمواصلة مناقشة القضايا المثارة في دليل الاسئلة ومن ثم تطوير و تنفيذ برنامج التدريب (FGD)

٣-قد تكون جزءا من المجموعة ،كمتطوع مشارك خلال تنفيذ البرامج التدريبي

مشاركتك طوعية ويمكنك الانسحاب في أي وقت ترغب فيه. سوف لن يكون هناك أي تأثير سلبي إذا اخترت الانسحاب من الدراسة. لن يدفع لك اي مبلغ مقابل المشاركة في الدراسة ولن تدفع انت أي شيء للمشاركة في الدراسة. سيتم إجراء المقابلة في وقت مناسب لك وزلك سوف يستغرق حوالي ثلاثين دقيقة.و سوف تستغرق مجموعات المناقشة .حوالي ساعة تقريبا ، وسيستغرق برنامج التدريب لحملات اللاعنف ثلاثة أيام بمعدل ثماني ساعات في اليوم

لن أستخدم اسمك في تقارير مجموعات المناقشة, سيتم رؤية اجابتك من قبلي فقط. بينما، إذا شاركت في البحث الإجرائي لتطوير وتنفيذ برنامج التدريب لتمكين حملات اللاعنف, سوف تكون معروفا للمشاركين الآخرين و الباحثين المشاركين أو الميسرين

من فضلك لا تتردد في الاتصال بي هاتف ٠٩٥٥٤٧٣٧٥٧ او عبر البريد الالكتروني

(mosesjoa@gmail.com)

يمكنك ايضا الوصول الي مشرفي المباشر البروفيسور جيفري هاريس من خلال البريد الالكتروني (geoffrey@dut.ac.za)

موسيس جون

Appendix 4: Consent letter (in English)

CONSENT

Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, **Moses Monday John,** about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: _____,
- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

_____ _____ _____ _____

Full Name of Participant **Date** **Time** **Signature/Right Thumbprint**

I, **Moses Monday John** (name of researcher) herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

Moses Monday John _____ _____

Full Name of Researcher **Date** **Signature**

_____ _____

Full Name of Witness (If applicable) **Date**

Signature_____ _____ _____

Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable) Date **Signature**

Appendix 5: Consent letter (in Arabic)

بيان اتفاق للمشاركة في الدراسة البحثية

- بهذا أقر بان الباحث موسيس جون قد ابلغني عن طبيعة وسلوك وفوائد ومخاطر هذه الدراسة – رقم تخليص اهداف البحث: _____،
- استلمت ، وقرات وفهمت المعلومات المكتوبة أعلاه (رسالة المشارك) بشأن الدراسة.
- أنا على علم بأن نتائج الدراسة، بما في ذلك التفاصيل الشخصية المتعلقة بالجنس والعمر وتاريخ الميلاد سيتم الحاقها في تقرير الدراسة .
- في ضوء متطلبات البحث، أوافق على أن البيانات التي تم جمعها خلال هذه الدراسة يمكن معالجتها في نظام محوسب من قبل الباحث.
- يجوز لي، في أي مرحلة، دون إخلال، سحب موافقتي ومشاركتي في الدراسة.
- أتيحت لي فرصة كافية لطرح الاسئلة و (بإرادتي الحرة)أعلن عن نفسي على استعداد للمشاركة في الدراسة.
- أدرك أن اهمية النتائج التي تم تطويرها خلال هذا البحث والتي قد تتعلق بمشاركتي سيكون متاح لي.

_____	_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Participant	**Date**	**Time**	**Signature/Right Thumbprint**

I, **Moses Monday John** (name of researcher) herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

Moses Monday John	_____	_____
Full Name of Researcher	**Date**	**Signature**

_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Witness (If applicable)	**Date**	**Signature**

_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable)	**Date**	**Signature**

Appendix 6: Focus group discussion guide

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIN (FGD) GUIDE

Dear Participant,

My name is Moses Monday John, I am a PhD student at Durban University of Technology (DUT), South Africa. I conduct a research on "Building capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan." You are selected to provide information on the study topic. The information will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes. I appreciate and thank you for accepting to participate in this study.

1. What does violence mean to you? What type of violence is common in South Sudan? How often does it occur? What do you think are its drivers? What are the consequences of violence you have seen in the country?
2. Have you ever/ someone/ group used nonviolent campaign or action to transform socio-economic and political conflict in your community, university, place of work or country? Did it succeed? Why or why not?
3. What does nonviolence mean to you?
4. What methods of nonviolence would you recommend for use in your context and why?
5. What challenges do you think are experienced in using nonviolent campaigns?
6. Do you think training in nonviolent campaign is necessary to promote use of nonviolent methods, strategies and principles? If yes, why? If no why not?

Appendix 7: Interview with FGD / action research participants

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Dear Participant,

My name is Moses Monday John, I am a PhD student at Durban University of Technology (DUT), South Africa. I conduct a research on "Building capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan." You are selected to provide information on the study topic. The information will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes. I appreciate and thank you for accepting to participate in this study.

1. Around quarter of participants engaged in FGDs argued that cultural violence such as girls' elopement, cattle raiding, and marriage to the diseased…etc are normal regardless of their harm as they are part of the culture of concerned communities. What is your take/view on this? Can you think of any allowable cultural violence in your community or South Sudan?
2. Most participants argued that corruption and impunity (structural violence) are the major drivers of gun violence and civil war in South Sudan? Explain your opinion..
3. In the focus group discussions held, most participants understood nonviolence as simply any action done without violence or physical harm. Could you think of another way of defining nonviolence?
4. What methods of nonviolence would you recommend for use in your context and why?
5. What challenges do you think are experienced in using nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan?
6. Training in nonviolence that focuses on power analysis, strategic planning, movement building and dealing with fear are cited as the most relevant and needed missing capacity gaps in South Sudan. Can you think of another capacity gap/s?

Appendix 8: Interview questions with prominent nonviolent activists

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Dear Participant,

My name is Moses Monday John, I am a PhD student at Durban University of Technology (DUT), South Africa. I conduct a research on "Building capacity of civil society in the development and implementation of nonviolent campaigns in South Sudan." You are selected to provide information on the study topic. The information will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes. I appreciate and thank you for accepting to participate in this study.

1. What would you say are the major forms and drivers of violence in South Sudan? What are the consequences being experienced?
2. What is your understanding of nonviolence and nonviolent campaign?
3. Did you attend any nonviolence training or read books/articles on nonviolence or watch a nonviolent action documentary that inspired you? How did this support you?
4. How have you used nonviolent action? What was the objectives of your campaign or action? Did you succeed? Why or why not?
5. What challenges did you face? How do you plan to overcome these challenges?
6. What lessons did you learn? How can your efforts be supported more effectively?

Appendix 9: Pre-Training Questionnaire

NONVIOLENT ACTION PRE-TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Action Participant,

Thank you for accepting to fill-in this questionnaire before and after the training. The information will be used to compare and assess knowledge and skills acquired before and after the training. Your answers will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes. As this IS NOT exams, its ok to write, "I do not know" to any question you do not actually know its answer. I appreciate your honesty and willingness to participate in this study.

*Action research participant special code#:*_____

7. Do you think conflict and violence is the same thing? Briefly explain.....
.....
8. To me nonviolence means:----------

1.b Nonviolent action is:----------

1.c Nonviolent campaign is:----------

----------Nonviolence principles include;----------

People use different methods of nonviolence to transform socio-economic and political conflicts. These methods are many including;----------

3.a: ----------

3.b: ----------

3.c:----------

Frankly speaking, I know nonviolent action/ campaigns is more effective than violent means because.....OR

I am pessimistic or have doubts about the effectiveness of nonviolent action/ campaigns to violent means because.....

5. Who has power; a leader or citizens? _____.In my opinion power means----------

6. Why is strategic planning important for addressing conflict or injustice?

_____

_____

7. What motivates me to use nonviolent action is----------

8. ----------

Appendix 10: Post-training questionnaire

NONVIOLENT ACTION POST-TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Action Participant,

Thank you for accepting to fill-in this questionnaire before and after the training. The information will be used to compare and assess knowledge and skills acquired before and after the training. Your answers will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes. As this IS NOT exams, its ok to write, "I do not know" to any question you do not actually know its answer. I appreciate your honesty and willingness to participate in this study.

*Action research participant special code#:*_____

9. Do you think conflict and violence is the same thing? Briefly explain.....
.....

10. To me nonviolence means:----------

----------1.b Nonviolent action is:----------

1.c Nonviolent campaign is:---------- ----------

----------Nonviolence principles include;----------
---------- ----------
-People use different methods of nonviolence to transform socio-economic and political conflicts. These methods are many including;----------

3.a: ----------

3.b: ----------

3.c:----------

Frankly speaking, I know nonviolent action/ campaigns is more effective than violent means

because.....
.....OR
I am pessimistic or have doubts about the effectiveness of nonviolent action/ campaigns to violent means
because.....
.....
.....

4. Who has power; a leader or citizens? _____.In my opinion power means----------

6. Why is strategic planning important for addressing conflict or injustice?

---

9. What motivates me to use nonviolent action is----------

What is the most important thing you have got out of the nonviolent action training?

Appendix 11: Observation guide

Observation guide دليل المراقبة

The following will be observed in the field

- The attitudes and behaviour of action team
- The physical place where events of violence and nonviolent campaigns are taking place, etc.
- Actors: people involved, results and consequences of actions taken.
- Events: relevant nonviolence trainings and events or activities of NGOs, students, the communities, churches and mosques.
- Objects such as training materials and manuals.
- Feelings: emotions felt and expressed by the people and participants who took part in action research.

دليل المراقبة

ستلاحظ ما يلي في

الميدان

مواقف وسلوك

فريق العمل

المكان الفعلي الذي تحدث فيه أحداث العنف وحملات

.اللاعنف، إلخ

الفاعلون: الأشخاص المشاركون، النتائج ونتائج

.الإجراءات المتخذة

الفعاليات: تدريبات اللاعنف ذات الصلة, وفعاليات أو أنشطة المنظمات غير الحكومية

والطلاب و

المجتمعات ،و الكنائس و المساجد.

مواد

.التدريب والكتيبات

المشاعر: عبر الحضورعن مشاعرهم وأعرب عنها الناس والمشاركين الذين شاركوا في

.البحوث الإجرائية

Appendix 12: Diaries

Dairies السجلات اليومية

The following can inform content of your dairies or daily field records of events that unfold:

1. Violent action/ incident that occurred in your community, university, place of work..etc: What happened? When? Who are the actors involved? What is the motivation? What is the result and consequences?

2. Nonviolent action/ incident that occurred in your community, university, place of work..etc: What happened? When? Who are the actors involved? What is the motivation/objective? What is the result and consequences?

3. Is the action/ event in 1 & 2 above reported in any media outlet (radio/ TV/ Newspaper/ blog/ website?

4. Any personal feeling and comment?

السجلات اليومية

ما يلي يمكن أن تبلغ محتوى السجلات اليومية و السجلات الميدانية اليومية والتقارير
للأحداث التي لم تكشف

احداث العنف الذي وقع في مجتمعك، جامعة، مكان العمل .. الخ: ماذا حدث؟ متي؟ من هم الجهات الفاعلة, المعنية؟ ما هو الدافع؟ ما هي النتائج والعواقب ؟

احداث اللاعنف الذي وقع في مجتمعك، الجامعة، مكان العمل .. الخ: ماذا حدث؟ متي؟ من هم الجهات الفاعلة المعنية؟ ما هو الدافع / الهدف؟ ما هي النتيجة والعواقب؟

هل الاحداث والحملات في المجموعة 1و2 اعلاه وردت في اي من وسائل الاعلام التالية(راديو, تلفزيون, صحيفة, بلوق, موقع؟

أي شعور
شخصي اوالتعليق؟

Appendix 13: Questions for evaluation of the short term outcomes of nonviolent action training.

1. What nonviolent campaign (s) did you or your organization implement?
2. What are the most important things which you personally have got out of the nonviolent action training?
3. How do you plan to sustain the knowledge and skills you have gained for yourself and your organization?
4. How do you plan to sustain the benefits of the campaign (s) you were involved in?

Appendix 14: Nonviolent action training tentative agenda

NONVIOLENT ACTION (NVA) TRAINING FOR THE ACTION RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS IN JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN.

Day One: 26th July		**Topic: Understanding nonviolence and nonviolent action/campaign?**		
Time	**Activity**	**Methodology**	**Why**	**Who is facilitating?**
08:30- 08:59 09:00- 09:30	Arrival of all participants Welcoming, official opening and introduction.	• Participants register or signs against their names • Opening prayers and welcoming remarks from ONAD management • A word from the researcher and introduction of co-facilitators and support staff • Housekeeping and logistics • Introduction of participants, name, Institution/Community...etc. What a participant like the most about yourself and what she likes the least about herself?	• **To confirm who has arrived.** • To welcome participants, co-facilitators and support team. • To get to know one another, build rapport and training team.	
09:30 -09- 45	Filling pre-training questionnaire Assessment of participants' expectation and fears	Each participant fills-in pre-training questionnaire **Buzz groups**: Divide participants into pairs to briefly share their expectations and fears. Using stick-in notes ask participants to answer and report on the following questions:	To assess participants' knowledge and skills before commencement of NVA training. • To know and understand participants' expectations and fears • To clarify what this training can and cannot offer	

		1. What do you expect to take away from this training? 2. What can you give or offer to this training? 3. Do you have any fears for the training or something you think may interrupt your participation such as family, work, studies or other obligation etc?	• To introduce and review training objectives and agenda.	
09:45 -09-50	Setting group golden agreement	Ask open questions in plenary to enable participants propose and agree on group golden agreement. What can we do and not do in order to benefit from the training?	• To reach consensus on guiding agreement for the training community. • To create conducive learning and trust building environment.	
09:50-10:30	Conflict and violence are different things	Short role play on "Fist exercise" to demonstrate human needs, conflict and violence. What is conflict? What is violence? Types of violence. Plenary inputs, questions and comments	• To introduce participants to know the difference between conflict and violence • To clarify what violence is and it's types and consequences	
Tea break 10: 30 – 11: 00 AM				
11:00-12:00	Introduction to nonviolence and nonviolent action	The ideal village game. Participants are divided into three groups of say; orange, apple and banana. Each group will be given a task to draw an ideal village of their own.	• The game introduces the participants into real life situation where nonviolent or violent actions are likely to be used. • Define nonviolence, its types, principles, nonviolent action and nonviolent campaign. • Why nonviolence? Empirical studies of efficacy of NVA	
12:40 - 01-00	Value game on violence and nonviolence	Ask participants in small groups to reflect on methods of nonviolence that they or others have used in S.Sudan	To enable participants differentiate between violence and nonviolence	

Lunch break 01:00 – 02: 00 PM				
02:00 – 02:40	Context analysis	To identify common forms of violence or injustice, its root-causes and consequences in the country.	To engage participants in analysing their socio-economic, cultural and political context.	
02:40-3:30	Understanding power and nonviolent action	The Almighty finger exercise. Obedience and dis-obedience. Why obey?	To ensure participants know and understand where power comes from, pillars of support and why obey? How nonviolent action shifts power	
Tea break 03: 30 – 03: 45 PM				
15: 45-16:00	Plenary discussion	Question and answer session		
16:00-16:30	Feedback and closing of day one	Open Questions: what do you like the most about the day? What needs to be done differently/improved? Any suggestions from the participants. Closing prayer	To make participants share their feelings about the day's activities and make recommendations for improvements. The feedback is expected to guide facilitators improve and adjust training agenda and needs as appropriate.	
Day Two: 27th July 2018			**Topic: How to plan and implement nonviolent action/campaign**	
Time	**Activity**	**What & Methodology**	**Why**	**Who is taking a lead**
08:30-08:59 09:00-09:20	Arrival and housekeeping Morning welcome and recap	Check in, questions and participants share in the plenary the followings 1- How was your night and how do feel this morning? 2- What did you learn yesterday?	1- To welcome participants and summarize what they learned in day one. 2- Check in help facilitators to understand the general mood of participants and include energizers where needed to boost and maintain the energy level.	
09:20 - 10:30	How nonviolence works:	Participants watch the force most powerful documentary-India/South Africa or USA episode.	To inspire participants to use nonviolent methods to transform violence and build peace.	

		Participants in plenary reflect on the documentary: What methods of nonviolence have been used in the documentary? Did it work? Why and why not? What else have we learned from the film?		
Tea break 10: 30 – 11: 00 AM				
11:00 - 11:20	Successful stories on nonviolence	Share summarized stories of nonviolent actions in South Sudan and the region.	Bridge theories with practice and remind participants that nonviolence is identified with what people do rather than what they believed in. Sharp.	
11:45 -1:00	Nonviolent campaign making	Divide the class into three groups: 1- Ask each group to identify a violent or injustice scenario at home, workplace, community or country that has not been a challenge. In a roleplay; each group should prepare and apply nonviolent method to transform the violence.	To practice how to plan and implement nonviolent action/ campaigns	
Lunch break 01:00 – 02: 00 PM				

2:00 -03-00	Strategic planning on NVA	Introduce participants to the importance of strategic planning in developing and implementing nonviolent campaigns (using strategic planning pyramid). Refer to the Otpur experience. Present a brief sample of vision statement, core principles and mission statement of a local or South Sudan nonviolence movement. NVA pyramid of strategic planning	To engage participants in discussing how their plans will contribute in the overall achievement of the nonviolence movement in South Sudan.	
03:00:03 - 30	What next? Develop and implement nonviolent campaigns	Participants individually or in pairs identify what each one wants to work on, develops a rough plan (what? Why? Where? When? With whom? And how?) to implement nonviolent action. After 30 minutes, all participants will do market survey to familiarize themselves with what each one wants to do after the training. Plenary questions, comments and reflections	To introduce participants to begin developing their action plan for implementing nonviolent action as part of next follow up meeting.	
Tea break 03: 30 – 03: 45 PM				
03:45 -04-00	Filling post-training questionnaires	Each participant fills-in post training questionnaire	To compare the pre and post training questionnaires for each participant as the basis to	

			evaluate whether new knowledge and skill have been acquired.	
04:00 -04-30	Training evaluation and closing	Open Questions: what do you like about the day? What needs to be done differently/improved? Any suggestions and feedback from the participants. Closing prayer	1. To make participants share their feelings about the day's activities and make recommendations for improvements. 2. The feedback helps facilitators mirror the day and adjust the workshop agenda where necessary.	