



**REDUCING YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE: CASE
STUDY OF DURBAN**

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy Management Sciences - Peace Studies

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DECLARATION

I, Cresencia Nyathi declare that:

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to Wethembekile Zoey Nyathi and individuals who have suffered xenophobic violence across South African societies.

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I thank the Holy Spirit, as I never thought that I would reach this education level one day based on my background. This thesis has shaped me through building various networks within the South African communities. I owe my sincere thanks to the International Centre of Nonviolence (ICON) at the Durban University of Technology (DUT) for allowing me to further my studies. Most importantly, I would like to thank the Durban University of Technology for awarding me the DUT Scholarship Scheme, without which this study would not have been possible. Thank you specifically to Dr. S. Kaye for her unwavering support. I also appreciate the young people from Africa Unite and Lindelani Youth Forum for their input in this study.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
INK	Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NORBA	North Region Business Association
NPOs	Non-Profit Organizations
PAR	Participatory Action Research

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the role played by youth especially Black young men in related xenophobic violence. Drawing on qualitative research sessions involving young men and women who are citizens, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers living in South Africa, the thesis offers four overarching focal points. Firstly, it contextualizes and critiques historical state structures and attitudes which shape the understandings of xenophobia and xenophobic violence in South Africa. Secondly, it analyses everyday experiences triggering young people to take part in violence labelled as xenophobic. Thirdly, it draws from global cases where xenophobia has occurred to understand the xenophobic phenomenon comprehensively. Fourthly, it adopts the scapegoating theory of prejudice as the basis of the underlying factors triggering the attacks. It also locates various community stakeholders' roles in reducing xenophobic violence in South Africa to offer a framework of understanding and suggestions for meaningful intervention. Finally, it sought to design and carry out intervention strategies to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence. As part of the interventions, it adopted dialogue, skill transfer, and conflict resolution skill training to curb the violence. Using an overarching critical perspective of scapegoating, the researcher argues that contemporary South African challenges are complex. There was no one-size-fits-all theory to fully describe factors leading to various forms of violence experienced by citizens, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The study was participatory action research in nature, and the key findings were that Durban attacks of non-nationals were driven by local Black South Africans in need of controlling the informal economic space. To achieve their interests, young Black men are used as pawns to execute these violent acts against foreign-owned spaza shops in their communities.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introducing the Phenomenon

The increase of migration across the globe has precipitated violence against foreign nationals in some societies (Quinlan 2013; Mlambo 2019). It is perceived as “a symptom of a globalizing world in which people relocate to other countries driven by the imperatives of survival or by the hope that better life is to be found somewhere else” (Hadland 2008: 4). Many foreigners “fled from their countries to seek sanctuary, and South Africa could be the country to offer haven” (Zajec 2019: 48). At the same time, South Africa grapples with the impact of migration. The violence against immigrants, especially Black Africans, is deeply rooted in protracted political, legal, and socio-economic problems. This study focuses on the harmful attitudes and practices against foreign nationals. Xenophobic attitudes or sentiments are not new, nor are they likely to disappear soon (Shindondola 2002; Akinola 2014).

For this study, xenophobia (as an attitude) was not the focal objective of the study. However, it was imperative to define it as xenophobic violence emanating from it. In this study, the following definitions were adopted: xenophobia signifies “negative attitudes towards the ‘other,’ whereas xenophobic violence was just one of many forms of manifestation of those attitudes” (Misago 2016a: 9). Mogekwu (2005: 9) adds that xenophobia is “embodied in discriminatory attitudes and behaviour and often ends in violence, abuses of all types, and displays of hatred, and xenophobes do not have adequate data about the people they hate and, since they do not know how to deal with such people, they see them as a threat.” Historically, xenophobia, as a worldwide phenomenon, is believed to be orchestrated by various factors linked to political, social, and economic conditions where people flee conflicts or search for better economic conditions (Tshishonga 2015: 163; Mlambo 2019).

The study investigated young people’s role in related xenophobic violence, focusing on reducing youth participation in this form of violence, preparing them for peaceful methods of resolving conflicts, and advancing social cohesion in South African communities. The emphasis was on discovering methods of reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence at the grassroots level. Subsequently, the study intends to contribute to knowledge regarding

peacebuilding and address the factors leading young people (mostly male youth) to partake in xenophobic violence and use appropriate strategies.

Generally, the world was “territorially fragmented into socio-political boundaries, epitomizing landscapes of ownership, governance, and management” (Lunstrum 2013: 3). However, migration is a permanent feature of human society, both voluntary and involuntary (Ibrahim 2017). Unfortunately, migrants and refugees face multiple forms of marginalization within the public discourse of social institutions because of their race, ethnicity, and lack of citizenship rights (Georgiou 2012), and more so when asylum-seekers are depicted as bogus and illegal (Fekete 2010). Such negative images and framings of migrants and refugees can be hypothesized through the notion of othering (Ibrahim 2017). Semb (2000) notes that some attacks arise between the state’s claim to sovereignty and competing for normative concerns such as the idea of human rights. Sverdljuk (2014: 127) posits that the other’s construction precipitates social alienation and symbolic and structural oppression of people with an ethnic minority background. Therefore, such creates an opportunity for attacks of immigrants to occur.

The influx of economic and political migrants often “exacerbates or revives ancient divides and rhetorical constructions of otherness” (Fourchard and Segatti 2015a: 7). Furthermore, Dube (2018: 1007) elucidates that “in the literature from Europe or North America, competition for economic resources, ethnic or linguistic differences, cultural affinity, level of education and misconceptions about the actual number of immigrants have emerged as some of the key explanations for xenophobia.” According to Ibrahim (2017), the notion of cultural difference was central to imagining and reproducing the other. Bhabha (2012) traced the problem with the globalized ideas of multiculturalism, in that the question of the cultural factor arises only at the boundaries of cultures, where means and values are misinterpreted, or signs are misappropriated. For example, Wiggen (2012) elucidated that the Norwegian culture and attitudes typically emphasize an individual’s ethnicity and the potential for stigmatized racialization of foreigners.

In Europe, xenophobia seems to be a rising phenomenon due to immigrants and refugees (Ibrahim 2017). For instance, Czechoslovakia has been noted as one of the countries that have failed to accept other ethnic groups, focusing on Roma (Burjanek and Retter 2001). Language is argued to play a role in xenophobia, as Dickstein (2014) asserted that the Norwegian

language was racially coded and that reactions to Breivik attacks implied the potential existence of national xenophobic anxiety within the Norwegian public.

Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005: 386) observe “an increase of ‘autochthony,’ a discourse that focuses on a sharp otherness between the natives and the strangers.” Accordingly, Gullikstad, Kristensen and Ringrose (2016) have provided insightful knowledge in migrant domestic labour, looking at gender equality and citizenship. They argue that racial background and ethnicity cannot be ignored when looking at migration and integration. Other studies on synthesis by Jacobsen and Andersson (2012) in Norway have shown that immigrant youth are constructed as public villains. Interestingly and contrary to expectations, it seems that there was a rise in violence by immigrant youth resorting to it and not on the local youth (Andersson 2002).

Africa has also been the horn of conflict and civil wars, infamous for ousting African nationals through civil wars that dislocate nationals from their land of birth (Tshishonga 2015). Thus, “in fear of their lives, citizens escape their birthplace countries and seek sanctuary in bordering African states, with Europe being the last destination of the ambitions of the majority” (Musuva 2014: 383). Post-1994 South Africa saw an influx of immigrants, including those displaced due to political instability and economic hardships. In post-colonial Africa, Ghana was one of the first African countries to raise xenophobic attacks against Nigerians residing there in 1972 (Monkhe 2015; Osiki 2015). In the 1980s, “it was a reverse phenomenon in which Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria” (Onah 2008: 267). This pendulum moved to Equatorial Guinea in the 1990s, which again saw Nigerians being expelled amid accounts of violence and intimidation. Thus, “the urban space has increasingly become a troubled terrain of xenophobic violence” (Tevera 2013: 9) with the increase of urban informality.

The reasons for xenophobic violence are complex as these attacks come in waves, usually because of conditions that may not have anything to do with the receiving country, such as South Africa. Some countries cause problems for other countries, thus exacerbating migration, but other countries that did not cause the problem in another land suffer from the influx of people (Tshishonga 2015). Even though most African countries gained their political freedom, socio-economic growth has lagged, with poverty, unemployment, and inequalities escalating, and these challenges are notably identified as “evil triplets” or “social evils” (Terreblanche 2012: 101). This was reiterated by Ramphela (2008: 21), who contends that “many African

countries, though politically free, continue to suffer from insufficient economic transformations to reinforce sustainable socio-economic growth.” This situation has resulted in severe migration from countries such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and others into South Africa, searching for greener pastures.

The research was qualitative and exploratory, with a participatory action research positioning. Its theoretical framework is instituted on the scapegoating theory of prejudice. Since this study was exploratory, the data collection process was guided by the study’s objectives, while the theoretical framework was used to discuss the findings. To understand the problem, the researcher chose not to limit the study to only one community but focused on Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (INK) communities. However, because of time and resource restrictions, the scope was limited to four Wards: Ward 38, 40, 43, and 108 in the INK area. The townships and informal settlements in question are in the eThekweni Municipality of Durban in KwaZulu-Natal Province.

1.2 Context of the Study

In South Africa, there has been a mounting violent culture, which has been manifested in many forms of violence, which include service delivery protests, student protests, and xenophobic violence, to mention a few. This was supported by Misago (2016a: 1), who posited that xenophobic violence had become a longstanding feature in post-apartheid South Africa and some scholars also confirmed the view (Cinini and Singh 2019; Dube 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019). A majority of studies on migration, integration, and xenophobia have focused more on South-North migration and less on South-South migration (Georgiou 2012). The researcher believes interventions must be implemented to reduce xenophobic violence, particularly in South Africa. While these studies acknowledge youth’s role (Jacobsen and Andersson 2012; Pieterse 2014) in xenophobic violence (Dodman *et al.* 2013), these studies have not been conclusive. Therefore, there was a need to explore and understand this intersectionality (McCall 2005) of xenophobic violence, migration, and youth (Gullikstad, Kristensen and Ringrose 2016).

According to Misago (2016b: 444), “since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked, or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals.” Moreover, Mlilo and Misago (2019: 3) explain that “violence against foreign nationals did not end in June

2008, but hostility towards foreign nationals is still pervasive and remains a serious threat to outsiders' and local communities' lives and livelihoods." As of 31 December 2018, "Xenowatch had recorded 529 xenophobic violence incidents that resulted in 309 deaths; 901 physical assaults, 2193 shops looted and over 100,000 people displaced" (Mlilo and Misago 2019: 2). Various scholars agree that attacks against outsiders, especially Black Africans, notably foreign shopkeepers and workers, have resulted in an ever-growing number of murders, injuries, threats of mob violence, displacement, looting, and destruction of residential property and businesses (Ukwandu 2017; van Rensburg 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Cinini and Singh 2019; Mlambo 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019). The most affected provinces are noted as "Gauteng, Western Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal; however, xenophobic violence is progressively spreading across all the country's nine provinces" (Masenya 2017; Mlilo and Misago 2019: 3).

South Africa has been fighting persistent xenophobic occurrences since the election of a democratic government in 1994, with critical occurrences in 2008, 2015, and 2017 (Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020: 203). Xenophobia in South Africa placed many lives of both locals and non-nationals in danger. In the 2008 xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa, 213 houses were burnt down, 342 shops were plundered, 62 people died with hundreds left injured, and thousands of especially Black foreigners displaced in just a week (Matunhu 2011: 95; Dzomonda, Tirivangasi and Masocha 2016), and seven people died during the 2015 xenophobic attacks (Amusan and Mchunu 2017). Tirivangasi and Nyahunda (2020: 204), however, contend that "most xenophobic attacks in South Africa are perpetrated against Blacks and Asian immigrants." In addition, these attacks are mostly performed by Black young men.

In South Africa, the xenophobia phenomenon has been violent (Dunderdale 2013; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). Akinola (2014: 56) contends that "in South Africa, xenophobia was not a new phenomenon; instead, it was the extension of other forms of violence and intolerance." However, it seems, "despite its occurrence and manifestations in various ways, the phenomenon of xenophobia remains to be understood" (Tewari 2015: 1), including the reasons leading young people to participate in this type of violence. The study used Durban as the primary case study focusing on Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (INK) areas. Durban was selected as the case study because xenophobic violence continues to recur in the area, as noted that from 2017 to 2020, there have been episodes of attacks, looting, and displacements of non-nationals. Tshishonga (2015: 163) elaborates this "in 2015 when Durban city turned into a combat zone where Afro-hatred was perpetrated with

the intent of causing bodily harm and making expulsion intimidations.” The common feature of these attacks in Durban was that they are based on economic spaces’ contestations. Meaning, local business people perceive foreign-owned shops as a threat to their previously owned economic spaces, especially spaza shops in townships and informal settlements.

In South Africa, post-1994 xenophobic sentiments have seen non-South Africans becoming scapegoats for the former’s social and economic ills (Vahed and Desai 2013; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). It was proposed that the crisis was triggered by several factors such as scarce resources, unemployed youth, poverty, inequality, and prejudices (Kirshner 2012; Friebe, Gallego and Mendola 2013; Mapokgole 2014; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Dube 2019; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Mlambo 2019). Similar studies support this and have also added that the political economy and governance play a role (Misago 2016a; Dube 2019; Hare and Walwyn 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). Valji (2003) also adds that the political power transition brought in a range of new discriminatory practices against non-nationals. On the other hand, Lunstrum (2013: 9) adds that “the ongoing violent attacks against African immigrants in South Africa were a vivid demonstration of the depth of society’s xenophobic attitudes, which are informed by the perceived understanding of the fragmentary governance based on the sovereignty-state-territory triad.”

The xenophobic phenomenon is not a novel notion in South Africa as “there have been many accounts stressing the xenophobic attitude within South African communities as well as documented incidents of public and institutional violence and hostility towards foreigners” (Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019: 186). The republic has been ranked as one of the unequal states due to the “growing inequality between the haves and the have-nots, high unemployment rates, high crime levels, and social-economic ills produced a new wave of anti-black immigrant sentiment in South Africa” (Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019: 186). Most Black communities’ unaddressed socio-economic inequalities and grievances have driven the poor to vent their frustrations on Black immigrants, conveniently used as scapegoats. This was due to that the “perception that the non-nationals who had stayed in South Africa before 1994 had become financially and economically more successful contrasted to their local counterparts, aided to aggravate these tensions and increase hostilities” (Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019: 186).

The intention in the wake of the events differs economically, “based on competition for material resources; sociological, with a link to crime, drug, and marriage; as well as others burdened with a complexity of political and diplomatic issues” (Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019: 186). Such outbreaks occur as an absence of understanding and inexperience of the locals why some Africans migrate to South Africa. Hanekom and Webster (2009: 91) illustrate a full description of such “push factors compressing the refugees and immigrants.” Fleeing “unending wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, complete collapse of states like Somalia, while countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi are going through a serious economic crisis” (Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019: 186). The media has also been criticized and accused of exacerbating xenophobia in South Africa, as reported by Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 2).

Soyombo (2008: 85) notes that it is “not only new migrants or foreigners who may suffer xenophobia but it may also be experienced by groups of people or people who may not be strangers.” In South Africa, “xenophobia is being experienced by migrants, who have been here for long periods and who even know the local dialects because of their long-term interactions with local groups” (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 2). Nevertheless, in the eyes of the indigenous Black people of South Africa, this group remains foreigners. In this context, as noted by Soyombo (2008: 85), the “term strangers are used regarding people who may not be the original inhabitants of a particular locality.” The “disparity between the locals,’ on the one hand, and foreigners, on the other hand, is conceptualized as in-group (locals) or out-group (foreigners)” (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 2). This separates the typical sharp difference among members and non-members of a given community (Masenya 2017). Moreover, it supports the assertion that “xenophobia can be viewed as attitudes, prejudices, and behaviour that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (Masenya 2017: 81).

South African nationals have been “victims of attacks solely because of their language or even physical appearance” (Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010; Masenya 2017: 85). Landau (2011) and Steinberg (2008) mention instances of assaults driven by Mozambicans’ ethnic look. Masenya (2017: 85) gives an example that “ethnic minority members of Pedi and Venda extraction were attacked as foreign nationals solely because of their physical appearance.” South Africans, coming from diverse districts and talking minority languages, may be recognized and handled as non-nationals in the metropolitan areas (Landau 2009; Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010). Kaluba

(2016) and Soyombo (2008) support Polzer and Takabvirwa (2010) and Landau (2009) in that “xenophobia originate from the idea that the ‘other’ is foreign to or simply originates from outside the community” (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 2).

Landau (2011: 8) confirms that the “democratic state has adopted a system similar to that of Apartheid to separate foreigners to the extent that too-dark-skinned people, undocumented people and people belonging to a linguistic minority who are South African being harassed and arrested as if they were foreigners, and even occasionally being deported.” In other words, Montle and Mogoboya (2020b: 75) posit that “even South African citizens are, at times, deported because xenophobia has clouded the judgment of some people in authority.” This underlines the scale of the humiliation against foreigners in South Africa and their vulnerability to unjust treatment.

In South Africa, post-1994 xenophobic sentiments have seen non-South Africans becoming scapegoats for the former’s social and economic ills (Vahed and Desai 2013). It was indicated that the crisis was instigated by several factors such as scarce resources, unemployed youth, poverty, inequality, and prejudices (Kirshner 2012; Friebel, Gallego and Mendola 2013). Similar studies (Misago 2016a) support this and have also added that the political economy and governance play a role. Valji (2003) also adds that the political power transition brought in a range of new discriminatory practices against non-nationals.

Historically, the apartheid system of divide and rule implanted seeds of hate between the tribal groups, which has now turned to xenophobia (Tshishonga 2015). The concept of xenophobia has its origins in the Greek word “*Xeno*,” meaning foreign, and “*Phobos*,” which means fear (Petkou 2005: 165). Whereas xenophobia was reflective of general fear or hatred, Afrophobia was Afro hatred, primarily focused on immigrants of African people. From this understanding, xenophobia is concerned with fear or hatred of the other. Furthermore, those who have xenophobia are crippled by a considerable fear or hatred of a stranger or foreigner, labelled in a pejorative term as *makwerekwere*. The term “*makwerekwere* is derogatory, usually used by South African nationals to mark those who cannot speak local languages or dialects” (Oucho 2006: 61). Therefore, in South Africa, xenophobia can be equated to an infection that will persist except it is tackled.

The Southern African Migration Project on Xenophobia (2008) exposed that most South Africans favoured the government to get tough on migrants and refugees. The Southern African Migration Project stressed that xenophobia is “aggravated through misinformation and prevalent distrust that refugees are not honest; economic threat; steal rather than create jobs, and spread diseases and epidemics such as cholera and HIV/AIDS” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020). For example, in 2008, “xenophobic attacks had fatal and adverse effects leaving 62 people dead and thousands homeless” (Johnson and Jacobs 2012: 330).

In the post-apartheid era, efforts to rebuild and advance South Africa find expression through the view of a ‘rainbow nation,’ as encouraged by Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the late president Nelson Mandela (Mashele and Qobo 2014: 65). Therefore, a ‘rainbow nation’ has become a degree to assess how well people come together in forging a cohesive and democratic society. A rainbow nation’s call to be a uniting strength should surpass racial and ethnic partitions to produce unity in diversity (Cebekhulu 2013: 19; De Jager 2013: 147) and hold continental accord championed by Kwame Nkrumah in his book entitled *Africa Must Unite* (1963). However, the recurrence of attacks of immigrants poses a threat to the unity in diversity.

Under imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid, Africans were forced to be foreigners in their continent. However, currently, the researcher has observed they are turning against each other, yet the only way forward to build a stable continent was for all Africans to unite against colonial and neo-colonial mentality. Nkrumah (1963: 174) proposes that neo-colonialism “...creates client states, independent in the name but in point of fact pawns of the very colonial power which is supposed to have given them independence.” Therefore, the acts of xenophobic prejudice and outbreaks made a mockery of Africa’s idea for Africans. Delving into the democratic shift of 1994, new prejudiced practices and victims have manifested themselves. According to Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 1), such a discriminatory practice was xenophobia, which has become a consistent feature in post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, non-South Africans, especially Black Africans from other countries working or looking for economic opportunities or seeking refuge, are mainly the victims. It can be observed that “the citizens were also attacked when they tried to protect their foreign neighbours or because some foreigners were their spouses, and some were mistaken for foreigners” (Hayem 2013: 80). In the face of such horrific attacks on foreigners, “the rainbow nation origin that South Africa belongs to all who live in it was tested and rejected” (Mapokgole 2014: 4).

Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in South Africa, as it has ancient origins that date back to the colonial era (Tewari 2015). For example, the colonial and apartheid policies in South Africa wanted to divide and rule the Africans using any accessible or prevailing apparatuses, including racial prejudice. The separation of African states through artificial borders disjoined people of the same culture in different countries (Crush, Williams and Peberdy 2005). For its part, as an offshoot of colonialism, the apartheid government deepened the belief amongst South Africans that there was no other Africa except South Africa. This was envisioned to placate South Africans and prepare them to make sacrifices that would sustain their country's isolationism as long as it was in the best interests of White supremacy (Neocosmos 2006). This insight has isolated South Africans' perception of their fellow people from other African states.

Scapegoating was a useful analytical concept for examining and understanding the multiple and different inequalities in contemporary societies that trigger immigrants' attacks (Christensen and Jensen 2012: 121). Thus, rapid urbanization occurs among cities in the Global South, resulting in the escalation of informal settlements and slums (Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Turok 2013). Informal settlements are characterized by overcrowding and contestation for resources, services, and spaces that manifest themselves into otherness, a breeding ground for xenophobic attacks (Pharoah 2012). Regarding migration and integration in general, Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay (2014) and Gullikstad, Kristensen and Ringrose (2016) argue that there was a need to consider racial background and ethnicity as part of scapegoating theoretical framework.

Despite various initiatives to tackle xenophobia-related violence following foreign nationals' attacks in 2008, the researcher observed the xenophobic utterances by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini also fostered xenophobic violence in 2015. After the utterances of the King calling all non-nationals to return to their countries, "xenophobic violence erupted on 30 March 2015 in Isipingo (south of Durban) and swiftly spread to other towns" (Mkhize and Makau 2018: 2). Also, Durban witnessed more attacks from 2017 to 2021. What was unique about these attacks was that they were mainly targeting foreign-owned businesses and workers. Hence, the study found that young people were used to executing these attacks. Despite these attacks' recurrence, the government continues to deny the acts as xenophobic and maintains that these were criminal acts. However, the researcher argues that if these acts are targeting foreign nationals, it shows that they are xenophobic. Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015: 2) contend that "not

every robbery or criminal act by local on foreigner is xenophobic, but when collective violence is specifically targeted at members of a certain group because of their national origin or because they are perceived as outsiders then it can reasonably be assessed as xenophobia.” Xenophobic violence is “a form of hate crime primarily driven by harmful attitudes against non-nationals” (Mkhize and Makau 2018: 5).

1.3 Problem of Study

The problem around which this study turns entails investigating why young people (particularly Black young men) participate in attacks targeting foreign nationals. Xenophobic violence continues to threaten the peaceful co-existence of South Africans and citizens from other countries. One of the chief barriers to curbing of xenophobic xenophobia was that these attacks were based on prejudice, stereotypes, and negative perceptions of immigrants in South Africa. Hence dread, suspicion, mistrust, scorn, and misperception set in, prompting the attacks' recurrence. How to halt these harmful and dehumanizing mentalities and practices while expanding constructive ones and how to conquer separation among ‘us’ and ‘them’ subsequently turned into a complex intervention that was worth pursuing. The study was intended to strategize with the youth from the affected areas of Durban on how to tackle the problem, a persistent challenge worth investigating in curbing xenophobia and in peacebuilding.

In this regard, non-citizens have been used as scapegoats and blamed for the local citizens' social ills. Several studies have shown that the youth are the main participants in xenophobia-related violence (Jacobsen and Andersson 2012). The problem precipitating such violence includes a battle for scarce resources, idleness of youth who are unemployed, and prejudices. In 2008, South African xenophobic attacks on foreigners, symbolized by the burning of a Mozambican national, shook the world, and in 2015, history repeated itself (Misago 2016a). The attacks have continued to recur since 2008, and the most recent attack was in January 2021 where foreign-owned shops were burned in Durban's CBD. Social cohesion has been found at a crossroads in South Africa as its promotion has remained challenging to achieve, although there might be various institutional mechanisms to facilitate peacebuilding and promote social cohesion. Despite the recurrence of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, existing research and interventions have not reduced this phenomenon. The xenophobic event literature has mainly focused on exploring xenophobic attitudes and has suggested policies that can be adopted to

reduce these xenophobic sentiments. This approach, however, overlooks the role played by specific actors, particularly the youth (Black young men) (Kirshner 2012).

In search of interventions that could reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence, the researcher observed the importance of effective peacebuilding and a multifaceted bottom-up approach, as Lederach (1997) recommended. Moreover, the South Africans and non-nationals needed to have spaces to meet and interact. This was because it was fundamental for affected communities to map out “solutions derived and built from local resources, notably the particular role of social arenas, normally understood as autonomous spaces, in a specific context, that limit the options of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and deconstruct the mechanisms of exclusion” (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 222).

Furthermore, it was significant to have a platform “where people get into contact and confront their issues non-violently throughout the process of change, from exclusion to inclusion” (Lederach 1997; Schulz 2008). It is generally argued that the “relational outcomes stemming from the contact between conflicting parties depend upon the circumstances in which that contact occurs, as well as on other factors present in the situation in question” (Allport 1954; Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami 2003; Dovidio, Glick and Rudman 2005). In this context, participants in the study saw it essential to conduct a dialogue, conflict resolution skills training, and a skills-transfer initiative that they would do together. The above considerations led the researcher and the action group to investigate the study problem: knowing why mostly male youth partake in the attacks and how dialogues, skills transfer initiative, and conflict resolution skills training plays a role in reducing xenophobic violence.

The researcher worked with youth because they have been at the forefront of these attacks. Most notably, male youth mostly executed these violent acts against foreign nationals in South Africa as compared to females. One of the reasons linking youth participation to xenophobic violence was the high unemployment rate affecting this group. According to StatsSA (2020), “in the first quarter of 2020, there were 20,4 million young people aged 15–34 years, and these young people reported for 63,3% of the total number of unemployed persons.” Without work or self-income generating projects, youth remain idle and vulnerable to be recruited by gangs and used as pawns to push local leaders’ business and political interests against non-nationals. This was one of the significant findings of this study that male youth are attacking non-nationals as they are sent by local business people in townships and informal settlements to

attack foreign-owned spaza shops and even destroy properties rented out by locals to non-nationals.

When exploring the gendered aspect of xenophobic violence, Ratele (2015) and Gqola (2008) elucidate that “xenophobic violence in many instances takes on sexualized forms, exposing different and myriad layers of intersecting violence re-enactments.” Relating to this, Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 3) explain that “the position that young Black men occupy with specific reference to violence is necessary to understanding the enactments of xenophobic violence and (black) masculinities within this climate.” This was because prevailing “statistics reveal that young Black men are both perpetrators and victims of violence” (Ratele 2013; Langa and Kiguwa 2016). Such findings were important in understanding why young Black men were seen at the forefront of the attacks against immigrants. Hence, youth’s engagement in exploring and understanding their role in xenophobia-related violence as the problem has gone on for some years. Addressing the research question was necessary to understand the phenomenon of xenophobia and its related violence. At the same time, the study sought to provide useful information to policymakers. Therefore, engaging the youth helped identify the causes and understand how best social cohesion can be promoted between South Africans and non-South Africans.

This inquiry was driven by a desire to break the cycle of youth participation in violence within South African communities by adopting a constructive route of resolving the attacks. It must be noted that these attacks are against people who are generally peaceful, who migrated to South Africa because of violence in some of their own countries. Besides, this type of violence against non-nationals was different from the violence during apartheid as it is often irrational or motivated by greed, resentment, and against relatively innocent people. Most notably, Black South Africans executed these attacks against Black Africans (Cilliers 2020; Dlamini *et al.* 2020; Gordon 2020; Magwaza and Ntini 2020). The researcher's interest in this research was to help build youth's motivation and capacity to use effective, nonviolent ways of dealing with their challenges. The pattern that arose in this examination was that key instigators and participants in the xenophobic violence were youthful and jobless Black men. According to Ngcamu and Mantzaris (2019: 7) findings, “the plundering of foreigners' shops pulls people together, but the young people lead the crowds because they have their eyes on the ground and people in the township know what is happening and they do not hide things.” This reveals why it was essential to engage young people in tackling xenophobic violence.

Understanding the factors driving young Black men in the attacks of non-nationals was vital as it offers an opportunity on how youth energy can be diverted to peacebuilding initiatives. The discoveries in this study reveal that the most targeted group in the attacks were Black Africans. It can also be noted that even locals perceived to be foreigners based on their darker complexion have been victims of these attacks. Moreover, Asians have also been attacked. In this regard, a study on reducing youth participation in xenophobic attacks becomes valuable to embark on, and this is what the current research strove to do. Nevertheless, a question may be raised as to why the study leaned towards exploring youth's role in the INK area in this respect? Two justifications are put forth:

Firstly, it is commonly agreed that peacebuilding can be driven by youth (Maringira and Gibson 2020). However, there was little knowledge of why young Black men participated in xenophobia. While there has been a growing interest in curbing xenophobic attacks in various communities, there were still few interventions to reduce the violence, particularly having youth in affected communities devise their interventions as they were the experts of their challenges. Most studies were spent exploring xenophobic violence, while small implementations were executed to address the issue. Academic research has often not adopted participatory action research methods to tackle the studied individuals' problems. Even the interventions implemented miss young people's voices. The researcher contends that interventions crafted by members, affected by the problem, tend to be long-lasting as participants take ownership of the initiative. Oda (2007: 6-7) accentuates that "ordinary people are excluded and disqualified from peace-related responsibilities, which constitutes somehow a vacuum in the area of peace research." This study thus attempted to reduce this disparity.

Secondly, this study's undertaking, focusing on youth in the INK area and the three interventions taken, which included dialogues, skills transfer, and conflict resolution skills training, was motivated by the linkage between these three initiatives and peacebuilding. Local and immigrant youth's contact was significant to clear some of the misconceptions that were the breeding ground of xenophobic violence.

The above considerations emphasize the shortage of knowledge regarding peacebuilding from below and particularly a lack of knowledge regarding the connection between skills-sharing initiatives and peacebuilding. At its conclusion, the research asserts to have shed light on this

problem. The researcher followed a theoretical framework founded on scapegoating because most of the attacks of immigrants are triggered by labels given to non-nationals as the leading cause of the ongoing social ills affecting South African communities. Since xenophobia in South Africa is a multifaceted phenomenon, the scapegoat theory provides a better understanding of how the phenomenon has been unfolding. Moreover, the government officials have played a critical role in enforcing negative attitudes against non-nationals through the xenophobic utterances blaming immigrants for socio-economic problems affecting local communities. Moreover, the theory highlights that contact had a possibility of promoting better relations between hostile parties involved. Hence, this also shaped the interventions that were undertaken to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence.

1.4 Research Aims

The research was aimed at engaging the youths in exploring and understanding why they participate in xenophobia-related violence and to design and implement strategies to reduce xenophobic violence.

1.5 Research Objectives

The research objectives of the study were:

1. To identify how the term *xenophobia* is generally understood.
2. To examine the reasons motivating the South African youth to participate in violence labeled as *xenophobic*.
3. To design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce xenophobia and embark on a preliminary evaluation of its outcome.

The research objectives are closely interrelated. The first objective is concerned with the understanding of what the term *xenophobia* entails. Before finding empirical data regarding the effect in question, an exploration of the term's meaning became paramount. The second objective sought to examine the reasons driving the South African youth to participate in xenophobic-related violence. The objective was vital as it offered a guideline on how best young people can tackle their problems under study. The third objective was the implementation phase, where the researcher and the participants mapped initiatives that sought

to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence. It was important not only to explore the problem but also to find resolutions to the problem and conduct a preliminary evaluation.

1.6 Purpose of the Study

The research was aimed at engaging the youths in exploring and understanding why they participate in xenophobia-related violence and to design and implement strategies to reduce xenophobic violence. Specifically, the study aimed to explore what was generally understood by xenophobia, examine the factors driving the recurrence of xenophobic sentiments within South Africa, explore the factors driving youth to participate in this form, design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce youth (male youth) participation in xenophobic violence.

Prior studies contend that in South Africa, the understanding of the concept of xenophobia has been challenging to attest to since media calls xenophobic attacks as only affecting a specific group of people (Nyamnjoh 2006; Matsinhe 2011; Zvomuya 2013; Sebola 2017). As such, the study's findings helped the researcher and the affected communities to design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce youth participation in violence, as they were the experts of their problems. The next sub-section provides the specific context within which this study was conducted.

1.7 Assumptions

The research was based on inputs from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with youth from the Inanda, KwaMashu, and Ntuzuma and key informants from civil society organizations working in the area. It was assumed that:

- Young people from the three informal settlements would be honest and forthright about their understanding of xenophobic violence and migration in Inanda, KwaMashu, and Ntuzuma communities;
- The interview protocols and data gathering process was secure and confidential and offered a trusting environment, a prerequisite to obtaining relevant xenophobia.

1.8 Research Methods

This research adopted a qualitative method to collect data and relied on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The researcher firstly explored the problem of xenophobic violence in Durban. Exploration helped the researcher unearth comprehensive understandings of the issues triggering young people to participate in this form of violence, thereby meeting the study's first two objectives. The researcher adopted a mixture of secondary literature and primary information produced from 20 in-depth interviews and three focus group discussions to achieve this.

The data were examined qualitatively using thematic analysis where the researcher classified, compared, weighed, and combined empirical data collected from interviews and focus groups on obtaining meaning for an insight of the issue under review in a comprehensible clarification. Briefly, qualitative methods study elements in their natural locations, endeavouring to make sense of, or understand, the phenomenon in terms of the meaning people bring to them (Mfinanga, Mrosso and Bishibura 2019). The researcher utilized a qualitative research design grounded on a triangulation of several research methods. It can be observed that “there is no single way of analysing data” (Renner and Taylor-Powell 2003: 1). In this way, the examination of data obtained started ahead of schedule, during information collection, where the aftereffects of early information examination guided the subsequent information collection. After finishing each interview and focus group discussion, data obtained were analysed to find what should have been discovered straightaway. It was a continuous analysis, and at the end of each interview and focus group discussion, the researcher listened to the recording. This enabled the researcher to know essential notions and themes that came out of the sessions. Nevertheless, the main component of information analysis was performed after data gathering, particularly after the transcription of interviews and focus group discussions.

The data collected from the interviews guided the questions that were used in the focus group discussions. Briefly, the findings from interviews enabled the researcher to get more clarity during the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). During data presentation, the participants' responses were assessed across different interviews, and FGDs were conducted and then combined to describe the findings. Both interviews and FGDs were transcribed and then analysed, which enabled the researcher to identify the themes and bring out conclusions of the study linking with the study's objectives.

Since data analysis was qualitative, the study was not intended to focus on counting or delivering numeric synopses. In the analysis, the findings from interviews and FGDs were broken down into information units analysed together. These were then grouped into themes to attain a comprehensible meaning. In analysing data, the researcher identified how the themes linked together and used exemplar quotes from both interviews and FGDs to present the findings.

The researcher chose Participatory Action Research (PAR) as the research design, as the study's focus sought to amplify the voice of the youth within their communities. Moreover, PAR constitutes an effective method in peacebuilding, as it provides a systematic way of developing a theory, obtaining necessary data, and with the respondents' participation, developing and testing an intervention (Kaye 2017: 3). PAR enabled the researcher to work closely with local participants to identify a problem and then collaborate with the group to test possible interventions. The ten participants, which comprised the action group, were drawn from Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu in Ward 38, 40, 43, and 108. The participants had taken part in the FGDs, and they helped evaluate the interventions that were undertaken to reduce the problem.

1.9 Significance of the Study

The study has repercussions for both theory and practice. First, it sought to contribute to the theoretical understanding of xenophobic violence. As such, there has been an inconclusive understanding of the phenomenon of xenophobia, explicitly xenophobic violence from a scapegoating theoretical perspective, looking at the role of the youth in xenophobic violence. While research has considered the causes of xenophobic violence, it remains inconclusive. Therefore, this research seeks to close this gap. Second, the study has practical implications. Understanding youth participation in xenophobic violence will help policymakers and related stakeholders interested in immigration and integration to develop better response strategies and interventions that are inclusive of all parties involved. It also advances participatory action research as one of the fundamental approaches of bringing about social change, as much research has been passive and not active. Therefore, engaging the youth will unpack the causes and help understand how best social cohesion can be promoted between South Africans and non-South Africans.

The xenophobic attacks provided an ideal opportunity to start rethinking strategies to curb harmful attitudes looking at the current socio-economic difficulties with a more all-encompassing approach and exploring the intersectionality of young Black men's underlying causes of participation in xenophobic violence. Seeing current difficulties in a natural setting will empower us to conquer the transient manifestations of xenophobic violence symptoms more rapidly and empower us to tackle long-term challenges effectively. The uniqueness of xenophobic violence in South Africa, where mainly Black South Africans are attacking Black African immigrants, suggests that Africans must start exploring indigenous or locally relevant solutions and not replicate western approaches that seem to be failing to address the xenophobic problem. Hence, locally developed interventions that promote tolerance must be reinforced, and more importantly, youth programs must be designed that promote knowledge about Africa and its people. This will enable the local youth to understand better the factors triggering African people to migrate to South Africa.

1.10 Delimitations

In the words of Simon and Goes (2013), delimitations of a study are features that occur from limitations in the scope of the study (defining boundaries) and by the cognisant exclusionary and inclusionary choices made during the progress of the study plan. Unlike limitations, which flow from basic features of methods and design, delimitations result from the researcher's exact selections (Simon and Goes 2013). Amongst these are the choice of objectives and questions, the paradigm (qualitative, for this study), the theoretical framework, and the participants' selection. This study identifies two important delimitations:

- The study intended to explore xenophobic violence from the scapegoat theory. The theory was adopted because xenophobia is a complex phenomenon, and the factors of its recurrence are multifaceted in South Africa, and the basis of them has been on the blaming the existence of Black African immigrants as the cause of the problems affecting mainly the Black South Africans.
- The study intended to work with young people aged 18 and 35 based in three informal settlements, Inanda, KwaMashu, and Ntuzuma (INK) in Durban. The areas were selected because they have a history of being affected by xenophobic violence.

1.11 Structure and Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 1 has laid the foundation of this study. The chapter also identified research issues and stated the study's significance, delimitations, assumptions, key terms, structure, and outline.

Chapter 2 focuses on unpacking the two concepts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence to understand how various scholars generally understand these concepts. In addition, the chapter focuses on unpacking various theories proposed by scholars on the causes of xenophobic violence. The theories include the bio-cultural, scapegoating, and isolation hypotheses. Finally, the chapter outlines the global causes of xenophobia and xenophobic violence by exploring various cases across the globe.

Chapter 3 focuses on various researchers' historical and contemporary explanations to understand xenophobic violence triggers in South Africa. Moreover, it explores various approaches undertaken to curb xenophobia.

Chapter 4 unpacks the scapegoating theoretical framework used in the study to understand the triggers of the attacks on non-nationals.

Chapter 5 outlines the process trailed in this study, including the research design, method used, data collection methods and tools, and data analysis methods.

Chapter 6 focuses on discussing the findings from the data collected, on how xenophobia is generally understood, and on the causes of driving youth participation in violence targeting foreign nationals.

Chapter 7 outlines the participatory action research interventions that the study adopted as an intervention strategy to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence.

Chapter 8 deals with evaluating the outcomes of the dialogue, skills transfer, and conflict resolution skills conducted with members from Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu.

Chapter 9 focuses on personal reflection undertaken to observe the factors driving the recurrence of xenophobic violence.

Chapter 10 presents the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

1.12 Conclusion

This chapter established the basis for the following chapters by offering the study's background and framework, the problem examined, aim, objectives, and significance of the study. Thus, the chapter offers a synopsis of xenophobic violence, how it unfolded in South Africa, the role of the youth, and some of the factors triggering the attacks of non-citizens. Most importantly, it also highlights why this study was essential to undertake, and the participants of the intervention took to tackle the problem.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Firstly, the chapter will unpack the concepts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence. Xenophobia focuses on “negative attitudes shown towards foreign nationals, whereas xenophobic violence focuses on many forms of a symptom of those attitudes” (Misago 2016a: 31). Therefore, the discussion in this chapter shows that xenophobia and xenophobic violence are rooted in prejudice. Hence, a holistic approach was needed to change attitudes as violent attacks on foreign nationals depended on attitude first and then behaviour.

It was complex to detach “xenophobia from violence and physical abuse as it was not only an attitude but an action which results in bodily harm” (Banda 2014; Muchiri 2016; Mutanda 2017: 283; Dube 2019). Therefore, a rich grasp of the words and how they were rooted in prejudice was essential to elucidate the investigation’s extent. The subsequent discussion gives a comprehensive conversation of these two notions and phenomena, accentuating their variations and underlying connections.

2.2 Conceptualizing Xenophobia

Xenophobia is a “multifaceted and complex notion that cut across many disciplines such as psychopathology, social psychology, psychobiology, sociology, anthropology, race and racism, nationalism, human geography, history, international relations, law, economics and others” (Omoluabi 2008: 53). These disciplines have a distinct viewpoint on xenophobia. Whereas xenophobia as an attitude was not the focal objective of this research, it was imperative to comprehend its undertones, roots, and scopes. The country’s inevitable xenophobic atmosphere undeniably institutes a “shared mental state’ and raw psychological material, the organization on which xenophobic violence builds” (Bostock 2010: 1). Magwaza and Ntini (2020: 27) explain that “several exclusionary attitudes have been exhibited against African immigrants.”

The term “*xenophobia* is of Greek origin, and it has a mixture of two Greek words, *Xenos*, which implies strange or foreign, and *Phobos*, which entails fear” (Akinola 2017: 9741;

Masenya 2017; Vrsanka, Kovicky and Jangl 2017: 169; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019: 71). Generally, “xenophobia means fear of strangers and of late, it has been extended to include hatred of refugees and migrant people and often associated with the violent acts of hostility” (Field 2017: 3). Saleh (2015: 298) depicts xenophobia as a “deep-rooted dislike of foreigners by the recipient country's nationals.” Other scholars argue that xenophobia in South Africa is “directly related to the Apartheid system of governing which entrenched protection of the white privilege against the majority of Black people and also played a central role of influencing new behavioural patterns” (Minga 2015: 270; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 2). From these definitions, one can observe that xenophobia has been defined based on the intolerance of especially Black immigrants in South Africa, and these intolerances are believed to emanate from the Apartheid era experiences.

Mngomezulu and Dube (2019: 71) explain that in contemporary sociology, “xenophobia is related with inter-ethnicity and it draws a variance between what is considered original and what is supposed as foreign ethnic groups.” Therefore, one can assert that the fear of foreign nationals is linked to the attitude of superiority and ethnocentrism, and in most cases, both locals and foreign residents are affected. Most researchers agree that xenophobia refers to attitudes, prejudices, and behaviour that reject, exclude, and demean people built on the perception that they are outsiders to the community, society, or national identity (Tshaka 2016; Masenya 2017; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). Charman and Piper (2012) also state that “xenophobia is a deep dislike rooted from prejudice caused by nationals of recipient states towards those non-nationals.” In the context of this study, xenophobia is, therefore, “the fear constructed from hatred, disgust towards those seen and labelled as outsiders” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 29).

Xenophobia is also connected to nationalism and ethnocentrism (Monson 2015). Succinctly, scholars agree that xenophobia is connected to the ethnocentric pattern of opinions instituted on national dominance (Mapokgole 2014; Landau 2015). Xenophobia is thus tangled with nation-building. Monson (2015)’s experiential study found that xenophobia is a result of nationalism and nation-building. Given all that, “xenophobia in South Africa manifests from negative perceptions, mistrust, and suspicion, deep dislike, fear and national superiority that result in violence” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 30).

Drawing from a social psychologists' viewpoint, Crush (2008) and CoRMSA (2011) designate xenophobia as anti-immigrant feelings linked with economic and political uncertainty. The "hatred exhibited through violent attacks on foreigners goes way beyond xenophobia, which is viewed as a psychological condition rather than mere fear" (Erasmus 2020: 108). On the other hand, Vromans *et al.* (2011: 2) contend that xenophobia is connected to the "process of social exclusion of foreigners, exposing them to stereotypes and prejudices." With this, the researcher found the term xenophobia relevant in understanding prejudices towards immigrants in South Africa.

Throughout this study, the word xenophobia will be used to denote attitudes of jealousy, negative perceptions that manifest through acts of discrimination and violence towards immigrants (Everatt 2011; Field 2017; Goddey 2017; Kempen 2017; Magwaza and Ntini 2020; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b). The study reveals that "high levels of jealousy and negative perceptions motivate locals to perpetrate violence on Black foreigners concerning competition over scarce resources" (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 30). Thus, the "theoretic investigation of the concept of xenophobia has indicated that xenophobia was a practice that houses relatively numerous discriminatory elements" (Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 33; Muchiri 2016).

Despite its prevalent use, xenophobia remains "an ambiguous and disputed term in general, policy and academic arguments" (Iwara, Obadire and Amaechi 2018). The "interchangeable or complimentary use of equivalent expressions such as nativism, autochthony, ethnocentrism, xeno-racism, ethnic-exclusionism, anti-immigrant prejudice, and immigration-phobia further demonstrates this conceptual vagueness" (Misago 2016a: 32). Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) and Crush and Ramachandran (2010) additionally shows this theoretical ambiguity. Numerous scholars "consider it to be a deep dislike, hatred, prejudice or fear of others" (Valji 2003: 1; Nyamnjoh 2006: 5; Lerner *et al.* 2009; Field 2017: 3); "fear of distinction expressed in persons or groups" (Berezin 2006: 273; Field 2017: 3); "attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in a given population" (Asia-Pacific 2001b; ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001; Adibe 2017: 167); or "hostility towards strangers and all that was foreign" (Stolcke 1999; Banda 2014; Field 2017: 3).

Xenophobia is also seen as "another form of racism that has found fertile ground to spread because of lack of trust on the local South Africans, fearing that other forms of oppression can

gain ground” (Pillay 2017: 8). However, “xenophobia is distinct from racism in that racism implies the racial supremacy of one race over the other” (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 2). Kaluba (2016) observes the two distinct occurrences as interconnecting in multiracial countries and still demonstrates racism as more behavioural, whereas xenophobia is attitudinal. Burlacu (2017: 89) and Akinola (2017: 9471) agree and state that is a much broader context; xenophobia encompasses “attitudes, prejudices, and behaviour that rejects exclude and vilify its targets based on the belief that they are perpetual outsiders and cannot be trusted or assimilated into their social system.” Field (2017) and Adam and Moodley (2013: 21), on the contrary, “differentiate xenophobia from racism in that the latter uses cultural incompatibilities and religion as the basis for exclusion.”

Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 10) explain that South Africa's “relations with its bordering countries and by extension countries in sub-Saharan Africa has been frosty and heightened by numerous issues, such as South Africa's perceived role on the continent and its treatment of African nationals.” Similarly, South Africa's unfavourable relations with numerous African countries are understood to contribute to xenophobic brutality affecting Black African nationals (Magidimisha *et al.* 2017). The xenophobic violence harms the development and partnership of South African regional cooperation in the African region (Tella 2018). This was proven by “the attempted rebellion against MTN and DSTV in Nigeria in 2016” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 10).

In the South African context, xenophobia is being conducted by predominantly Black South Africans, mostly on Black foreign nationals from other African countries (Adibe 2017; Claassen 2017; Masenya 2017; Sebola 2017; Dube 2018; Iwara, Obadire and Amaechi 2018; Dube 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020; Erasmus 2020). Besides, “negative attitudes against Black Africans are manifested in negative perceptions and attitudes, coupled with acts of violence, hostility, and discrimination against foreigners” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 15). Some scholars have argued that in the context of South Africa, xenophobia is the wrong word to use when explaining horrendous attacks on foreign nationals (Tshishonga 2015; Tshaka 2016; Masenya 2017; Ndlovu 2017; Dube 2018; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). This was because Black African foreign nationals were the most targeted (Muchiri 2016). According to Wose Kinge (2016: 18), “white or Asian foreign nationals are not perceived as threats, whereas African foreign nationals are seen as intruders or the other.” Therefore, Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 16) argues that based on the trends of violence against non-nationals in South Africa, “has traces of Afrophobia, a term used to explain the fear and hatred of African foreign nationals.”

Many scholars agree that when violence against foreign nationals erupts, in most cases, it targeted African foreign nationals (Landau 2010; Iwara, Obadire and Amaechi 2018; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Cinini and Singh 2019; Dube 2019; Zajec 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020; Magwaza and Ntini 2020; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b). Despite South Africa being a “destination of different ethnic groups, including large Chinese, the country seems to be having an Afrophobic rather than a xenophobic problem” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 11). This shows that the country is mainly faced with Black on Black violence, but at the same time, it cannot be ignored that other Asian nationals have been targeted in these acts of violence.

In modern South Africa, “xenophobia conveys elements of discrimination and segregation and the killing of non-members” (Banda 2014; Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 30; Muchiri 2016). Due to this practice, “any affected human society tries to cut the offsetting part of locals for preserving them like the other” (Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 30). However, xenophobia's characteristics express themselves “among several possibilities such as social prejudice, gender intolerance, economic bias, and even tribal discrimination” (Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 30). The intolerance of the Black immigrants has escalated, and the socioeconomic problems affecting locals are noted as contributing factors.

Tsheola, Ramoroka and Muzondi (2015: 232) argue that “xenophobia was not a natural state of being for any society.” Instead, according to Misago (2016b: 445), “it was a creation of socialization which becomes excessive with violent abuses of the outgroup immigrants where such conduct was institutionalized through state apparatus.” Therefore, one can argue that xenophobia motivated the action but that is an extremely complex and multifaceted subject, which to the present time is unresolved (Banda 2014; Jolly and DiGiusto 2014: 464). The relapse of xenophobic violence in South Africa is difficult to comprehend because according to Dube (2019: 194), there are prejudices and hostile attitudes that exist between and among various ethnic groups in South Africa not always ending in violence. In sum, there is insufficient understanding as to why foreign nationals, especially those of African origin, have been the focus of the attacks.

2.3 Xenophobia and Prejudice

Xenophobic violence has been assumed to stem from prejudice, and the researcher saw it imperative to explore what prejudice entails. In psychology, prejudice has been deemed by seminal author Allport as a “negative attitude reflecting an antipathy directed toward a group as a whole, or an individual because he or she is a member of that group” (Allport 1954: 9). Dovidio, Schellhaas and Pearson (2019: 1) posit that “contemporary conceptualizations have widened this description to integrate functional and experiential aspects of prejudice (e.g., perceived and experienced conflict, stigma, and group-based advantage or disadvantage).” From this viewpoint, prejudice can be apprehended as “an individual-level attitude (whether subjectively positive or negative) toward groups and their members that creates or maintains hierarchical status relations between groups” (Dovidio and Gaertner 2010: 7).

Prejudice is closely related to xenophobia as prejudice is “an aversive or hostile attitude towards a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to that group” (cited in Krausz 1971: 81). Also, Soyombo (2008: 88) explains that prejudice “is a pre-determined bias that people have mostly about other people before they get to know the other people or have all necessary information about the other people or situation or event.” Succinctly, prejudice is an attitude (a manifestation of a state of thinking), and is typically harmful. Therefore, Soyombo (2008: 88) explicates that “in terms of relation or sequence, prejudice frequently precedes, and regularly leads to xenophobia. Briefly, people are usually prejudiced before they show signs of xenophobia, as in South Africa.

Prejudice is distinct from discrimination. Soyombo (2008: 88) argues that “prejudice is attitudinal, while discrimination is behavioural.” Kornblum (1997: 395) further clarified the variance between prejudice and discrimination, observing that “prejudice is an attitude that prejudges a person, either positively or negatively, based on real or imagined characteristics (stereotypes) of a group to which that person belongs.” On the other hand, discrimination “refers to actual unfair treatment of people based on their group membership” (Soyombo 2008: 88).

Social psychologists have conceptualized prejudice “as an individual-level attitude that has a variety of psychological and material effects on members of targeted groups, it is an intergroup phenomenon” (Dovidio, Schellhaas and Pearson 2019: 2). Corresponding to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and self-categorization view (Turner *et al.* 1987), a person’s awareness of identity differs alongside a variety that extends from the self as a distinct person with personal reasons, objectives, and accomplishments to the self as the expression of a societal group. Therefore, “noticeable group characteristics offer the psychological foundation for discriminating between them and us, and hence for identifying different others as possible targets of prejudice” (Dovidio, Schellhaas and Pearson 2019: 2). Since a prominent grouping identity is profoundly tangled with the varieties of prejudices that grow and how these preconceptions are showed, bias (even when studied as an individual-level attitude) is integrally a societal phenomenon, shared among members of one’s ingroup and expressed between groups (Dovidio, Schellhaas and Pearson 2019). Prejudice is displayed in intergroup feelings, opinions, and discriminatory conduct.

2.4 Conceptualizing Xenophobic Violence

Xenophobic violence generally denotes “any actions of force (by local communities, groups or crowds) directed at foreign nationals or 'outsiders' because of them being foreign or strangers” (Misago 2016a: 9). Black African foreign nationals are targeted in this type of violence (Dodson 2010). The main features of xenophobic violence include “murder, assaults instigating severe physical damage, plundering, robbery, arson attacks (burning of people and property), dislocation, intimidation and threats, harassment and expulsion notifications” (Misago 2016a: 65). Lanre-Abass and Oguh (2016: 31) contend that “it became apparent to the world that xenophobia is armed with many discriminatory tendencies that could cause social disorder and civil unrest in any country.” Sadly, xenophobic violence is usually carried out in South Africa against individuals because they are foreigners and perceived as a threat (Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 31; Dube 2019).

Xenophobic violence is argued to be “actions of violence rather than an attitude” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 30). Charman and Piper (2012) illustrate that xenophobia should not be understood on its own. Dodson (2010) argues that xenophobia needs to be reframed to include acts or practices that include violence, murder, body harm, looting, and physical abuse. Therefore, xenophobic violence refers to the collective action of violence (from local

community members and crowds) towards foreign immigrants. Briefly, xenophobia is not only entitled hatred but also is frustration and aggression that result in the killing of foreigners (Amit, 2010; Abrahams, 2010; Bekker et al, 2008; Dodson, 2010; Davids, 2009; Hayem, 2013; Mapokogole, 2014, Gastrow and Amit 2013, Hickel, 2014 Zagefka et al 2007). Thus xenophobic violence is “a combination of negative attitudes, the frustration that results in violence” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 31).

Misago, Landau and Monson (2009: 13) elucidate that “xenophobia in South Africa translates into a wide range of actions including discriminatory, stereotyping and dehumanizing remarks; discriminatory policies and practices by government and private officials such as exclusion from public services to which target groups are entitled.” They further argue that even the “selective enforcement of by-laws by local authorities, assault and harassment by state agents, particularly the police and immigration officials, and public threats and violence constitute xenophobia” (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 31). Most notably, was that xenophobic violence in South Africa “is not consistently experienced by all immigrants as main victims have been Black foreigners from any state in Africa regardless of regions” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 31).

Due to the nature of the xenophobic violence in South Africa, affecting mainly the Black African inhabitants, Everatt (2011) labelled xenophobic violence as neophobic and Afrophobic. According to Frye, Farred and Nojekwa (2011), the term ‘Afro’ in this context implies African. Regarding Afrophobia, “it refers to the irrational fear or dislike of Black foreigners or Africans from other countries constructed by Black South African citizens” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 31). Therefore, this study uses xenophobic violence as “the collective act of fear and violence committed by a collective group of Black South Africans against Black African immigrants” (Magwaza and Ntini 2020: 31).

Xenophobic violence was one of the countless forms of collective violence. Collective violence generally denotes “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group, whether this group was transitory or had a more permanent identity – against a different group or set of individuals, to achieve political, economic, or social objectives” (Krug *et al.* 2002: 215). Gerring (2009: 3) defines collective violence as an “act that was envisioned to inflict irrefutable harm on a differing political consciousness, and that was performed in a way that leaves no blunder as to its political insinuations.” The aim can be

targeting property, people, or the economy; simultaneously, it does not necessarily need to be ethnic, but it must have some political goal and be violent.

Two rudiments of this definition of xenophobic violence, which are collective and violence, are vital. Collective refers to “a group of individuals with a shared identity, and this common identity can encompass numerous features that include sex, race, ethnicity, income or political ideology, to name a few” (Gerring 2009: 4). This group “does not need to be calculable in size but must be extensively acknowledged as a definable group, and the act of violence can be executed by either a large population from the group or by smaller numbers on behalf of the larger group that supports them” (Misago 2016a: 38). Looking at ethnic riots, for instance, Horowitz (2001: 14) illustrates “that a segment of people carried out such violence and a great many group members are willing to disregard the violence and offer a considerate account of it because it was an extreme expression of their feelings.”

The subsequent component in the description denotes “actual violence, which was the act, whether anticipated or not and it must encompass some considerable human death or injury toll, property damage, or a smaller incident intended to have enormous social and economic repercussions” (Gerring 2009: 4). At times, small intimidations can be detrimental enough to harm society's socio-economic development; hence, xenophobic violence would be appropriate for the connotation given. Similar to other kinds of collective violence, xenophobic violence includes “desire (extreme heights of rage are exhibited, and mayhems committed) and calculation; a combination of heavy and instrumental elements” (Hopstock and de Jager 2011: 121). Whereas it echoes the “inescapable xenophobic environment and widespread negative attitudes to foreigners, and it also comprises portions that may tolerate only an unstable association to such pressures such as instrumental motivations of organizers and the existence of criminals keen to take gain of a violent condition” (Harris 2002: 167). Violence was neither “a perfect crisp dramatization of antecedent conflict nor a wholly autonomous process that bears no relationship to enduring sources of tension” (Horowitz 2001: 14). This helps to illustrate further the difference but also the relationship between xenophobia and xenophobic violence.

Xenophobic violence in South Africa is driven by “prejudice against people from other countries and with this is imperative to admit that this form of hostility is part of a larger history of anti-outsider hostility in South Africa” (Gordon 2020: 104). Studies of xenophobia in the

Republic have usually focused on particular collective violence incidents (Misago 2016b; Gordon 2020). For acts of violence against foreign nationals to be designated overall as xenophobic, “the prejudiced nature of the violent acts must be recognized” (Misago 2016a: 39; Dube 2019; Mlambo 2019). In other words, it must be understood that “the dislike of, hatred of, or negative attitudes towards foreign nationals or outsiders offers the impetus, in full or in part, for the initiators and perpetrators to consolidate and carry out the violent acts” (Gordon 2020: 104). While noting that not all violence executed against foreign nationals is essentially prejudice-driven, studies indicate that the unvarying public violence on foreigners in South Africa is undeniably xenophobic (Misago 2016a; Claassen 2017; Cinini and Singh 2019; Mlambo 2019). The biased nature of these attacks is demonstrated by the precise targeting of groups and individuals because of their foreign origin but also, and possibly more importantly, by confirming that driving ‘undesirable’ foreign nationals out of communities and the country was frequently the aim of instigators and perpetrators” (Misago 2016a: 40). One South African example was in the 2008 xenophobic attacks that began in Alexandra township. Mutanda (2017: 285) writes that they “stimulated the existence of prejudice in South Africa and the violence affected Black Africans and poor and disenfranchised South Africans in the townships.” Such behaviour demonstrates a lack of empathy and love.

In Zimbabwe, by contrast, Zimbabweans have lived for quite a long time with immigrants from countries such as Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia. The “worst that locals could do to foreigners was identifying them employing pejorative labels such as *Mabhurandaya*, *Machawa*, or *Mabwidi* describing immigrants from Malawi whereas individuals from Mozambique were called *Makarushu*” (Mutanda 2017: 285). In South Africa, offensive names such as ‘*amakwerekwere*’ are insufficient as the South Africans have turned to the most brutal methods when dealing with outsiders. They like the culture of ‘necklacing,’ which denotes a mob-justice sentence in which tyres are forced around victims’ shoulders and set on fire (Fihlani 2011). The “tradition had its roots in the 1980s when it became the fashionable technique of sentence amongst the African National Congress (ANC) backers in opposition to those who supposedly cooperated with the apartheid government” (Fihlani 2011). It was also utilized against popular offenders. An Ethiopian was burnt alive in Durban as his store was torched (Longari 2015). Emmanuel Sithole, a Mozambique national, was killed by knife-wielding assailants in full view of Alexandra township residents (Ngcukana 2015). The “images of the burning Mozambican resident Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave in 2008 in the

Ramaphosa informal settlement exposed the general cruelty of South Africans” (Mohamed 2011: 6).

2.5 Case Studies: Global Experiences

There has been a “global rise in fear and hostility toward immigrants” (Peterie and Neil 2020: 23). Xenophobia “exists in both the global North and South, in democratic and totalitarian states alike, in violent and non-violent forms” (Dassah 2015: 129) and may be government-sanctioned or carried out by groups or collections of individuals. Across the Western world, “liberal democracies have implemented punitive deterrence policies” (Mainwaring and Silverman 2017; Peterie 2019b). Miller (2018: 2) asserts that “xenophobia can be found in every corner of the world.” Countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Finland, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland have experienced xenophobia. Across Europe, “as migration increases, some political parties have invoked xenophobic overtones” (Mngomezulu and Dube 2019: 69). These are some of the theoretical explanations of why the attacks occur. Colonialism and apartheid instilled the feeling that violence is routine. Xenophobia was connected to the belief in a hierarchical order where one sees one’s nation-state as superior to others (Miller, 2018). However, the World Bank in 2018 reported that international immigration had a positive effect on local (or ‘native’) employment, labour earnings, and wages (Hovhannisyan *et al.* 2018).

Various social scientists and sociologists researching xenophobic attitudes of foreign nationals have observed how societal hostilities, intolerance, and fears are fashioned at the political discourse level. The major contributing factor to these studies has been noted as the effects of misinformation. Peterie and Neil (2020: 24) concur that “scholars have shown that government and media discourses propagate erroneous information regarding the threat posed by asylum seekers and the legitimacy of their claims.” Besides, government policies have also been revealed to have a communicative role that impacts community attitudes towards foreign nationals (Mainwaring and Silverman 2017). A study carried out in Australia illustrated a strong connection between false beliefs and negative attitudes towards asylum seekers. A study by Markus (2013: 40), for example, “recorded strong negative sentiment against immigrants in Australia, as well as the prevalence of false beliefs concerning this group.” The majority of respondents in Markus study assumed that “asylum seekers were coming to Australia as economic migrants in pursuit of a better life, rather than to escape conditions of danger and persecution.”

Politics are seen playing a central role in migration issues and at the same time fuelling xenophobic attitudes in communities. For instance, “some politicians in Slovakia claim that refugees are economic migrants who should be observed and they spread the idea that these migrants will cost the country much money to maintain and will take away jobs from the locals, increase crime, and bring terrorism, both in Slovakia and across Europe” (Vrsanka, Kovicky and Jangl 2017: 168). As countries like “Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain welcomed migrants without discrimination, some Slovaks were adamant that they would assist Christian migrants only” (Vrsanka, Kovicky and Jangl 2017: 168).

With politics at the centre of migration, political parties tend in various countries to exploit the situation of the immigrants for their political agendas and gains. For example, Mngomezulu and Dube (2019: 70) explains that “in Germany, the extreme right nationalist parties have been instrumental in fuelling xenophobic attacks; however, they were deterred by the government’s intervention in the form of increased police presence and improved prosecution.” Significantly, “government monitored and reported results of crimes against foreigners and how those crimes were prosecuted and embarked on a project to recruit police officers from different ethnic and national backgrounds” (Solomon and Kosaka 2013: 17). The reports helped keep statistics patterns of police brutality against foreign nationals, as highlighted by Solomon and Kosaka (2013: 17).

In a quest to clarify the prevalence of various beliefs about foreign nationals, “researchers have usually pointed to the existence of corresponding tropes in mainstream political discourse and media reporting” (Peterie and Neil 2020: 25). Media play a part in spreading the news to the people. For instance, a study carried out by Pedersen, Watt and Hansen (2006: 120) “matched participants’ negative attitudes towards immigrants with the presence of false beliefs, before demonstrating that these false beliefs corresponded with public comments made by our political leaders.” Recent studies also revealed a close relationship between political leaders’ statements concerning immigrants and media reporting of these issues, showing that media outlets reproduced government narratives that vilified immigrants (McKay, Thomas and Kneebone 2012; Pedersen and Hartley 2015; Pedersen and Hartley 2017; Peterie and Neil 2020).

Pedersen and Hartley (2017: 1) note: “ because very few Australians have contact with immigrants, it is likely that much of the information that they receive and espouse comes from commentators and importantly, from politicians via the media.” This information is “often inaccurate and leads to what some researchers label false beliefs – the acceptance of incorrect information as being true” (Hartley and Pedersen 2019: 59). This study proposes that “political discourses shape media reporting, which may, in turn, influence community sentiment through the dissemination of misinformation” (Peterie and Neil 2020: 25). Also, Hartley and Pedersen (2019: 59) study found an important link between “prejudice against immigrants and false beliefs, which means that if we are looking for a cohesive society, prejudice against any group is negative.”

Succinctly, widespread work has been done, for example, concerning the false beliefs that reinforce immigrant discourses around the Western world (Pedersen and Hartley 2017; Peterie and Neil 2020). This study has emphasized a variety of government and mass media ‘lies’ (Hartley and Pedersen 2019), including the notions:

- a) that “immigrants have broken the law by entering the country without prior authorization, even though seeking asylum is legal under international law” (McAdam 2014; Burroughs 2015; Ogan *et al.* 2018);
- b) that “asylum seekers are economic migrants not genuine refugees in need of protection, even though most arrivals go on to receive refugee status” (Burroughs 2015; McHugh-Dillon 2015) and
- c) that “asylum seekers are dangerous individuals with terrorist affiliations, even though most displaced people are themselves fleeing situations of violence and terror, and few asylum seekers have been convicted of terrorist offenses” (Pedersen and Hartley 2015: 13; Pedersen and Hartley 2017; Ogan *et al.* 2018).

In “foregrounding and attempting to correct these false beliefs, scholars have sought to influence public sentiment and delegitimize the punitive policies that these claims justify” (Peterie and Neil 2020: 25). Some researchers have expanded this method to show that government policies themselves have a communicative purpose. Most notably, researchers argue that detaining immigrants in closed, often prison-like facilities sends a strong message that immigrants are dangerous criminals and would-be terrorists (Peterie 2018, 2019a). As Mainwaring and Silverman (2017: 22) engrave in the European background: “both the evident and subtler manifestations of detention imply the existence of a crisis of unregulated,

undesirable migration; detention thus corroborates the populist impression that an out-of-control, unwanted, and potentially dangerous inflow of non-citizens is amassing at the gates while signalling that the state is working to identify and punish this population.” Detention becomes evidence of (and not merely a response to) the danger posed by irregular migration, thus reinforcing erroneous views (Peterie and Neil 2020: 26).

The world is presently seeing unprecedented amounts of people who have been compulsorily moved from their homes. At the end of 2016, “over 22.5 million refugees and 2.8 million people were seeking asylum worldwide: a number that surpasses post-World War II numbers of forcibly displaced people” (UNHCR 2017). While “the vast majority of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers reside in countries in the Global South” (UNHCR 2017), their influx to countries in the Global North has become progressively debated. Refugees and asylum seekers are frequently encountered with “intolerance, distrust, and contempt by both political leaders and community members of refugee-hosting states” (Hartley and Pedersen 2019: 51).

There has been an enactment of more and more restricting actions by states intended to prevent asylum seekers’ arrival (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014). In Australia, such measures include “the mandatory detention of asylum seekers, intercepting and turning back asylum seekers’ boats from Australian waters, and transferring asylum seekers arriving by boat to offshore detention centres on the Pacific island of Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island with no prospect of being settled in Australia” (Pedersen and Hartley 2015; Pedersen and Hartley 2017; Peterie 2018; Hartley and Pedersen 2019; Peterie 2019b, 2019a; Peterie and Neil 2020). This is in spite of the fact that, by global standards, Australia receives relatively few asylum seekers. In line with these restrictive policies, research has found that “many Australians are hostile to people seeking asylum in Australia” (Hartley and Pedersen 2019: 51). Nevertheless, other Australians believe that Australia’s asylum seekers’ conduct is cruel and defies human rights (Pedersen and Hartley 2015).

A large body of research “highlights several social psychological factors that may drive negative attitudes such as feelings of fear and threat (e.g. Hartley and Pedersen 2015; Mancini, Bottura and Caricati 2018), perceptions of illegitimacy, for instance, asylum seekers are ‘illegal immigrants’ or ‘queue jumpers’ (e.g. McKay, Thomas and Kneebone 2012), demographic and ideological variables (Anderson, Stuart and Rossen 2015), and holding false-beliefs about asylum seekers” (e.g. Pedersen and Hartley 2017; Peterie 2018; Peterie and Neil 2020).

Migration is a very complicated trend and has, in recent years, become a contentious topic. In the “wake of the Syrian Civil War and the crises that it has created, many European states have become protectionist when it comes to migration” (Phakathi 2019: 26). Right-wing political parties in Europe and the United States of America have taken advantage of this negative or xenophobic attitude towards immigration into their countries to bolster their support base (Crush and Ramachandran 2010). Migration is a movement of one person or a group of persons from one region or one country to another. It can be individual, collective, internal, cross-border, or international. Ever since immemorial times, migration has been part of human life. People are continuously on the move. Human beings “have migrated throughout history to such an extent that we are all migrants or descendants of migrants” (Mangu 2013: 281). Migration has become “a global, developmental, security, social, economic and political issue” (Mangu 2013; Mangu 2019: 281).

According to Mangu (2019), people migrate for different reasons, and some people move out to flee violence or persecution. However, some people move for pleasurable purposes and to change the environment. They migrate in search of new adventures, meet other people, and improve their economic conditions and life changes (Mamabolo 2015; Mangu 2019; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Migration can be political, economic, social, or cultural, voluntary, or forced migration and can be forced to migrate by “economic, historical, socio-cultural, climatic, geographical and political factors” (Crush, Williams and Peberdy 2005; Oucho 2006; Ballyn 2011; Mangu 2019; Rugunanan 2020). This was “the case of asylum seekers and refugees who are forced to relocate or leave their usual residence countries for fear for their lives” (Mangu 2019). They become “refugees where they are granted a refugee status allowing them to stay and in Africa, it was reported that migration was primarily driven by underdevelopment and authoritarian rule prevailing in many African countries” (Mangu 2019).

The anti-immigration Front National managed to increase its share of the French Presidential Election second-round votes from 3.7% in 2012 to 8.8% in 2017. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) manufactured a political crisis in Libya and increased emigration from that country to Africa and Europe (Dearden 2016). After the NATO-led bombardment of Libya, which finally toppled the Gaddafi administration, Libya has struggled to achieve peace and stability. The removal of Gaddafi was followed by a civil war that persists. The war led to infrastructure damage, like oil refineries, airports, crucial to the Libyan state’s functioning.

Moreover, it created a window of opportunity for those who traffic in human beings to thrive. Human trafficking has become the third-highest income source for organized crime, after drugs and guns (UNODC 2019). Whereas the “West is embracing the politics of closure when it comes to migration, Africa is trying to find innovative ways of easing people’s movement, goods, and service within the African continent” (Phakathi 2019: 26).

With the increase of migration globally, immigrants have been victimized and subjected to inhumane treatment, as witnessed in the Libyan case of slavery in 2017 (Mafu 2019). In 2019, women comprised slightly less than half of all international migrants worldwide. In North America, women constituted 51.8% of all international migrants; in Europe, they accounted for 51.4%. In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of women migrants was lower at 47.5% (UNDESA 2019). Post-1994, migration streams to South Africa increased with international migrants and refugees from other African countries and South Asia. Sub-Saharan countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe became feeder migration countries (Rugunanan 2017). Studies on “women migrating in the sub-Saharan context have grown substantially in the last few decades” (Rugunanan 2020: 3).

South Africa remains the fifth largest host in the world to refugees and asylum seekers on the continent. The “percentage of Indian migrants arriving in the country remained at 1% from 2011 to 2015” (DHA 2016: 27). In terms of the state of origin, “China accounted for the highest number of applications, followed by Zimbabwe, India, Pakistan, and Nigeria” (DHA 2016: 27). The participation of “foreigners in the South African economy is a sensitive issue given its high unemployment rate and decreasing job creation” (Rugunanan 2020: 6). Historical legacies of inequality in education contribute to the shortages of skilled workers in many sectors of the economy (Rugunanan 2017, 2020). Foreigners’ “access to the labour market has contributed to heightened tensions in the country and noted xenophobic attacks in 2008, 2015, 2017 and more recently in 2019 on foreign nationals” (Rugunanan 2020: 6). Restrictive immigration regulations create undocumented migrants, and while efforts to attract skilled migrants have intensified (Budlender 2014), lower-skilled migrants do not have a visa they can apply for and so have to find other ways to enter the country. Many are also “forced into illegality due to the corrupt and weak Department of Home Affairs structures” (Rugunanan 2020: 6). Migration by Nigerians was conceived and linked to economic factors that can guarantee their relevance to their society. The pursuit for “knowledge acquisition and career development among Nigerians is fundamental to the issue of relevance and has been adduced as the major reason for their

migration” (Oyebamiji and Adekoye 2019: 166-167). Hence, such validates various reasons leading people to migrate.

Post-apartheid South Africa has become an essential destination for millions of migrants from mostly other African countries because of its opportunities as a democratic country and the continent's significant economic and industrial powerhouse. However, “xenophobic violence has become recurrent in South Africa” (Mangu 2019: 46). The victims are mainly African migrants (Olukoju 2008; Akinola 2014; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Anti-migrants sentiments are more robust in some countries than in others and can result in xenophobia. Mangu (2019: 47) illustrates that “they generally derive from some stereotypes or perceptions of migrants, which are false or unfounded.” By discouraging people from moving freely and establishing in the region, xenophobia constitutes a severe threat to economic development and integration (D’Ancona 2016; Goddey 2017; Mangu 2019; Phakathi 2019; Rugunanan 2020). Based on the violence against Black Africans, it seems it is a crime to be a foreigner or a migrant, especially a black migrant from an African country. African migrants are assumed “illegal, criminals, foreigners and denied human dignity on their land in the same way as Apartheid transformed Black Africans into what Neocosmos called native foreigners” (Neocosmos 2010: ix).

A survey notes in a White Papers of Hate (2013), “... events in 2012 and 2013, indicates high levels of xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, anti-Semitism, and hate crimes perpetrated against religious minorities and immigrants in 19 European countries.” The nations ranked from high to low levels of xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, anti-Semitism, and hate crimes are Greece, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Hungary, France, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Finland, Germany, Albania, and Croatia. The study found that half the population in big cities expressed support for the slogan Russia for Russians in Russia. According to Pollmann (2015), xenophobia is rampant in Japan. Following a deadline for permanent residents to switch from aliens’ registration cards to new residence cards, a rumour emerged to the effect that failure to change would lead to loss of residence status and possible deportation. Consequently, an avalanche of calls, letters, and emails went from ordinary Japanese citizens to the Immigration Bureau turning in their ‘illegal’ Zainichi ethnic Korean neighbours who were legal residents.

Xenophobia is widespread in Africa and forms a powerful instrument in politicians' hands (Misago 2016b; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Xenophobia has occurred in stable Pan-Africanist-inspired countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, which have been ground-breaking promoters of African unity ever since the 1960s. Two elements of xenophobia in Africa are noticeable. Firstly, it tends to be Black on Black, that is, violent action was often taken against, or negative attitude was exhibited towards other Africans who are non-citizens in what could be likened to the Cain-Abel (brother against brother) phenomenon (Dassah 2015). Secondly, violent action or attitude may be taken by multitudes of citizens without the government's explicit consent, an occurrence seen in South Africa.

Perhaps the first large-scale government-sanctioned xenophobic action in Africa was that of the Ghana government's Aliens Compliance Order of 1969, which saw the expulsion of migrants from other West African countries (Dassah 2015). The irony of this action cannot be missed by any person with a good grasp of Pan-Africanism. Ghana achieved freedom in 1957, the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1960s, the nation was an appealing destination for immigrants mostly because the then President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, a champion of Pan-Africanism, proclaimed the home for all Africans. Therefore, the Nkrumah government did not take on any radical actions to stem the immigration flow to Ghana by nationals of neighbouring countries. However:

“after the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966, the Progress Party government, faced with growing unemployment and a drop in the world price of cocoa, used the Aliens Compliance Order in 1969 to expel approximately 191,000 foreigners who were mainly from Burkina Faso, Togo, Mali, and Nigeria. Most of them (140,000) were Nigerians” (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 79).

Another significant government-sanctioned xenophobic action occurred in 1983 in Nigeria's well-calculated response to Ghana's 1969 Aliens Compliance Order. With the oil boom of the 1970s and Ghana's failing economy, many Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria. According to Aremu and Ajayi (2014: 14), in 1983, faced with declining oil revenue, a devalued currency, and inflation, the Nigerian government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Right of Residence and Establishment, which was ratified by member states of the Economic Community of West African States in 1980. Using the medium of television, Nigeria ordered more than a million unskilled foreigners to leave the country in two weeks. Aremu and Ajayi (2014: 341) state that “many reasons were offered to justify this action, including ensuring the integrity of immigration laws, reduced foreign exchange

earnings occasioned by the economic recession, the involvement of some foreign nationals in violent religious disturbances, and the participation of some Ghanaian citizens in criminal activities such as armed robbery.” However, Aremu and Ajayi (2014: 341) note that “a covert reason for the expulsion was the frustration of Nigerian policy-makers at not being able to use the platform of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assert the country’s ambition of projecting its leadership of the West African sub-region.”

The third large-scale government-sanctioned nationalistic incident involved Idi Amin’s 1972 decree expelling Asians from Uganda. According to Dassah (2015), before Uganda gained independence, the British colonial government had brought people of South Asian descent to work as clerks or unskilled/semi-skilled manual laborers on construction sites and farms. Many Asians were also in banking and tailoring, and Asians constituted 80% of doctors, lawyers, and teachers. The growing prominence of Indians in the economy prompted the creation of a committee on “Africanization of commerce and industry,” making proposals to limit the role of Indians in the economic and professional spheres. Owing to the Asians’ distrust of President Milton Obote, many did not take up Ugandan citizenship, while some maintained their status as British-protected persons. Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin, who accused him of over-concentrating on politics at the expense of taking care of our economic life (Dassah 2015).

Kersting (2009) offers three instances where the governments of Congo Brazzaville and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) used xenophobia to their political advantage. First, a football match between Congo Brazzaville and Gabon in September 1962 sparked xenophobic violence. The second example is that of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, who, in 1972, granted citizenship to all migrants living in the country since 1950. However, faced with national anti-immigrant sentiment, in 1981, a bill was introduced that attempted to redefine citizenship by stating that only people living ‘on the soil’ since 1885 (the year in which the Berlin Conference was held), which was now deemed to be the year of independence, qualified to be citizens. Kersting's third example was the harnessing of anti-foreign propaganda by President Mobutu, which led to the ethnic cleansing of Banyarwanda in North Kivu in 1993 and an attempt to expel Congolese Tutsis in 1996. Fourthly, according to Kersting (2009: 12), in September 1977, although the Congolese themselves did not exhibit any xenophobic tendencies, 6,000 West African migrants were deported by the Congo government Brazzaville, while their shops and businesses were seized and given to citizens. This was followed by enacting legislation in 2005 forbidding foreigners, particularly West Africans, who are described as “*ndingari*”

literally translated as “ticks sucking blood from the attached cattle,” from engaging in small transport, baking, and street-stall businesses.

Olukoju (2008) traces the background of xenophobia in Africa to the pre-colonial era. The social exclusion started in marriage arrangements in which some people would not marry in individual clans or families. The main reason for exclusion was that some groups were regarded as inferior and viewed with animosity to the clan. He notes that the rivalry for political supremacy was a significant cause for hostility between neighbouring groups. The Mfecane (time of trouble) period in the 1820s and 1830s marks a period where non-Zulu tribes were driven out of South Africa. The Zulu people under Shaka wanted all the ports and fertile land for themselves; hence they waged wars against their neighbours (Berge 2000).

Campbell (2003: 71) explains Botswana's case where the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the acceleration of economic globalization in 1989 coincided with increased interest in Botswana from international labour migrants. Campbell, Kandala and Oucho (2018) add that this interest also coincided with an increasing number of professionally skilled Batswana (citizens of Botswana), a race to localize expatriates' positions, rising unemployment, and fear of economic recession. It can be noted that these events culminated in the growing conflict between the new citizen elite, eager to maximize benefits from a westernized economic structure, and expatriates whose presence was perceived as the main obstacle to the achievement of promising economic prosperity. Attitudes toward immigrants have since taken a new form that may be described as hostile. A peaceful society for refugees had become increasingly intolerant of all immigrants (Campbell, Kandala and Oucho 2018). Moreover, Botswana's refugee situation was different from South Africa, and whites who became citizens experienced less prejudice than expatriates.

The study reveals a low level of tolerance among citizens for labour immigrants and refugees in the country. This study suggests that, while ethnicity may be a significant feature in Botswana, it is not nearly as important as national identity (Campbell 2003). Hence, Batswana were always self-protective, not xenophobic, intent on protecting what they had. This reveals that their situation was different from that of South Africa as the country was never colonized; thus, retaining its cultural values was of paramount importance.

Olukoju (2008) notes that the history of the subjugation or even enslavement of one group by another promoted mutual deep-seated animosity. For example, the Zulus ruled other Xhosa

tribes while the Ndebele, under Mzilikazi, enslaved the Shona. Mzilikazi was a general in Shaka's army but migrated northwest to move far away from the raiding Zulu '*impies*'. These pre-colonial facts informed the negative stereotypes about certain African groups. This also shows that xenophobia has always been part of Africa, with the Xhosas hating the Zulus in South Africa and the Shonas not liking the Ndebeles in Zimbabwe (Olukaju 2008). This hostility between the tribes and the issues regarding one tribe dominating another can pinpoint the origins of xenophobia in South Africa.

Media coverage has also often been blamed for depicting foreigners as the perpetrators of unpleasant incidents. However, recently the media highlighted South African police's physical abuse of a Mozambican taxi driver in South Africa (in 2012), which led to a public outcry. After the taxi driver's subsequent arrest, he died in police custody, fuelling conjecture on foreigners' police brutality. Foreigners have "increasingly become the targets of abuse across all sectors of the society, including the media" (Erasmus 2020: 114). Government officials, media, and the general public suggest that foreigners are generally unwelcome in the South African context. According to Nyamnjoh (2010: 60), "the hatred of foreigners arises from the failure by politicians, media and the academic community to problematize preconceived assumptions that are generally taken for granted." In the words of Nyamnjoh, the media plays a critical role in the production, circulation, and reproduction of attitudes and perceptions of foreigners in South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2010). By so doing, mass media provides the South African public platform to access talk shows and television debates on migration and immigration issues in the absence of foreigners.

2.6 History of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

There has been "a plethora of study into the causes of xenophobia in South Africa and some of the threads that seem to develop post-1994, which include the following links: what constitutes the South African identity, media coverage of incidents, and political suggestions that indicate prejudice" (Manik and Singh 2013: 2). It can be noted that South Africa has experienced "violence against African foreigners since 2008, and it has become an almost chronic problem" (Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019: 2). On the other hand, "the uncontrolled influx of migrants has been categorized over the years as legal, documented, illegal or undocumented" (Bekker *et al.* 2008: 9). These realities have led to what has been termed xenophobic or Afrophobic violence.

During the apartheid era, xenophobia was not noticeable for numerous reasons (Banda 2014). The “white minority government discouraged Black immigration, though thousands of Africans from bordering states came into the country as contract laborers to offer cheap, unskilled labour in the mining and farming industries” (Tewari 2015: 3). The native inhabitants during the apartheid era were, to a lesser extent, hostile to immigrants due to the restricted number of unlawful immigrants, and the concentration was on overthrowing Apartheid, which was the main hindrance to employment and better living conditions (Banda 2014; Muchiri 2016). However, the dynamics transformed brusquely afterward, with the liberation in 1994 (Crush, Williams and Peberdy 2005). Immigrants’ magnitude rose considerably, mainly from North Africa and other bordering states (Croucher 1998; Mlambo 2019).

It has been argued that “the white monopolistic capitalist system which underpinned apartheid remains well-entrenched and alive today in a democratic South Africa” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 12). During its formation in 1910, South Africa, its citizens, and visitors were strictly restricted in movements and allowed to live. These restrictions disintegrated the country’s population. During the apartheid era, as soon as they went outside of their Bantustans or ‘independent homelands,’ Black South Africans became foreigners in their own country as apartheid laws ensured that their presence in urban locations was only temporary (Landau 2010; Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010). Black South Africans were only in the city to build it, nurture white children and care for gardens and pools, and whenever their stay in the town was no longer of use, they were sent back to their homesteads (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 12-13).

Various scholars have maintained that the legacy of the apartheid government has aided in shaping the socio-political structures that precipitated the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa (Neocosmos 2008; Hanekom and Webster 2009; Ng'ang'a 2010; Hayem 2013; Vahed and Desai 2013; Chiumbu and Moyo 2018). Post-1994, xenophobic sentiments against immigrants were broadcasted and cultivated out of constant prevalent language. For example, Muchiri (2016) postulates that the political leaders were catalysts from the start in leading the anti-immigrant movement. This was not new as Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 13) write: “while speaking to the parliament in 1994, Buthelezi blamed foreign nationals of receiving benefits of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) at the expense of South African nationals.” Besides, former Defence Minister Joe Modise in 1997 made a well-published speech which accused immigrants in South Africa of the escalating crime levels in the

Republic. Subsequently, countless hostile and horrifying xenophobic incidents aimed at mainly Black foreign nationals across the country and these range from verbal insults to physical assaults, destruction of properties and killings (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 13). For instance, Muchiri (2012) reported that three foreigners were brutally tossed off a moving train in Pretoria by a crowd of South Africans during an unemployment protest in 1998.

Historically, the apartheid system in South Africa disqualified and discriminated against Black South Africans in the society via racial exclusion. With this, Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 14) claims that this “must have set the basis for the xenophobia that later metamorphosed into Afrophobia.” Nyamnjoh (2006) explains that “as with the present violent attack incidences in other parts of the world, the ones in South Africa are profoundly entrenched in the country’s past and are covered with underlying modern and ancient aspects which have allowed the growth of Afrophobic violence towards foreign nationals.”

The xenophobic violence of 2008 was observed by Everatt (2011: 10) as “caused by a combination of socio-political conditions,” whereas Crush (2008) has labelled anti-foreigner attitudes’ as prevalent and spiteful. Crush and Ramachandran (2010: 6) stated that xenophobia was “rooted in discriminatory practices emanating from negative perceptions about foreigners based on their nationality.” Many scholars have denoted xenophobia “as aggressive” (Crush and Ramachandran 2010: 6; Dube 2018, 2019; Gordon 2020), “tension-based acts of violence” (Hook and Eagle 2002: 170), and “with the potential to cause bodily harm and damage” (Harris 2002: 170; Dube 2019). It is acknowledged that the causes of xenophobic sentiments differ, and they “revolve around perceptions that foreigners are inherently criminals, the fear of competition from foreign nationals, competition over scarce resources and scapegoating of the foreigner to justify the failures of the system among others” (Dlamini 2020: 14-15).

2.7 Profile of those who participate in xenophobic violence

Misago (2017a: 42) provides extensive evidence that “xenophobic violence in South Africa was carried by groups of people, including men and women, young and old.” The execution of violence as a collective action has made the instigators hard to trace and hold accountable (Monson and Arian 2008). On the other hand, Misago (2017a: 42) found that the “faceless mobs or anonymous community members as perpetrators of the violence are often made by locals themselves or their complicit local leaders as a strategy to shield themselves from accountability.”

Black male youth has been observed as the influential group participating in xenophobic violence in South Africa. This can be traced from the fact that historically, Black people under the Apartheid regime have been positioned as inferior, and they remain impoverished and marginalized in contemporary South Africa (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 3). Hence, such conditions of a young Black man have been the basis for anger and frustration as less progress has been made by the democratic government in transforming the disadvantaged Black population's lives. Herewith, Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 3-4) expound that young Black males have adopted violence to resolve their problems and in the process, Black foreign nationals are easy targets to be used as scapegoats.

In South African impoverished communities, there is a sense of insecurity heightened by foreign nationals' presence. To support this, Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 4) expound that "there is a sense of young men's masculinity being under siege due to their being unemployed, hence, their response with a re-imagined masculinity, which is characterized by violence." With this, it was essential to acknowledge the inequalities and socioeconomic conditions experienced every day by most of the young Black males as "if they are not helped to channel their energy into real sources of his frustration, this may be reflected in the form of Black on Black violence" (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 4).

2.8 Most targeted nationalities

Masenya (2017: 82) warns that the "tendency of perceiving all foreigners, particularly Black African foreigners in South Africa as illegal immigrants is a root concern." Such perceptions have created a narrative of othering each other where local Black South Africans execute violent attacks against Black African foreign nationals (Gumede 2015). According to Dodson (2010), the 2008 xenophobic violence was committed by Black South Africans against predominantly Black African foreign citizens residing in economically banished townships, where there was a contest for limited resources. This was not surprising as Black communities continue to face poor service delivery, and the government has not lived to its promises of addressing the inequalities that exist in the republic.

Dube (2019: 194) explains that most research on xenophobia, "nonetheless dividing immigrants from southern Africa and those from the rest of Africa, has tended to treat Africans as a largely homogeneous group." Dube (2017) and Siziba (2014) confirm that, moreover, the

African foreigners (and not those from the Global North) are called by derogatory names like *makwerekwere*, *grigamba*, and *shangane*. Due to Black South Africans' growing xenophobic tendencies, Gordon (2020) contends that Black South Africans are Afrophobic.

When xenophobic violence happens in South Africa, it was observed that those targeted could include nationals, those not belonging to the influential tribal groups like Zulu or Xhosa (Dube 2019). They belonged to minority tribal groups in South Africa. Gumede (2015) and Moge kwu (2005) confirm that they were regarded as foreign nationals by their fellow South Africans. Dube (2019: 194) explicates that "white people are not viewed as foreigners in the context of xenophobic violence", and Moge kwu (2005) exemplifies that most South Africans were attacked based on the perception that they looked foreign since they were viewed as too dark to be South Africans. For instance, Sebola (2017: 90) confirms that "color and the extent of pigmentation have been used in many instances to determine the supposed origin of individuals." South African police have also "utilized phrases like one is too dark to be a South African and often people were wrongfully arrested by authorities because they were seen to be too dark to be South African citizens." Masenya (2017: 85) demonstrates that "local communities continue to perpetuate xenophobia by not accepting their children to get married to foreign nationals because of stereotype perceptions from their elders."

Various scholars have argued that immigrants' attacks were mainly based on groundless or unsubstantiated suspicions, thus stereotyping non-nationals as being the root of social and economic difficulties (Sharp 2008; Solomon and Kosaka 2013; Saleh 2015; Tshabalala 2015; Tshaka 2016; van Rensburg 2017). In South Africa, according to Sebola (2017: 91), "the notion of xenophobia application has been difficult to attest to because that which the media calls xenophobic attacks in South Africa only affected a specific group of people." Instead, others argue that there was a specific group attacked continuously, hence, the definition of xenophobia was not fitting the context of what was taking place in South Africa (Tshishonga 2015; Tshaka 2016; Masenya 2017; Ndlovu 2017; Dube 2018; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020).

While South Africa has been highlighted as one of the most xenophobic countries globally, Sebola (2017: 91) confirmed the above point that "only immigrants of foreign descendants are affected by xenophobic attitudes and attacks than immigrants of other racial groups such as Europeans and Asians in the country." Moreover, in South Africa, scholars and top politicians

have maintained that the framework is misdirected, that people should talk of Afrophobia or Negrophobia rather than xenophobia (Dube 2018; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). However, it cannot be dismissed that “the Bangladeshis and the Pakistanis were attacked in the same fashion in South African townships, thus, disputing the Afrophobia assertion” (Sebola 2017: 91). To support this, scholars have recorded the attacks of non-Black nationals like the Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians (Fourchard and Segatti 2015b), and Black South Africans from minority tribal groups like sePedi and isiTsonga (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ayo 2015; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 126).

2.9 The Status of Youth and their role in xenophobic violence in South Africa

Generally, youth in the sub-Saharan African region “face several challenges, including growing up in poverty, high rates of unemployment, limited educational opportunities and rapid socio-cultural transformations characterized by weakening social controls and breakdown of traditional norms” (Kabiru, Izugbara and Beguy 2013: 1). According to ILO (2014: n.d), youth “have less to spend as consumers, less to invest as savers and often have no voice to bring about change in their lives and communities.” Kabiru, Izugbara and Beguy (2013: 3) add that “a large number of under-educated youth in a context of rapid population growth and poor economies is a threat to development, health and security in the region.”

Youth unemployment remains a key challenge globally as the unemployment rate was noticeably higher amongst young workers than among adults in all regions in 2019 (ILOSTAT 2019). In many countries, the youth labour condition is worrying, making it hard for unemployed youth to participate successfully in-state growth (ILO 2014). The “South African youth population (14–35 years) was estimated to be about 37% of the total population in 2010” (The Presidency 2011) and growing fast. According to the Presidency (2011: n.d), South African youth are confronted with various difficulties “linked to their wellbeing, poverty, social determinants of health such housing, clean water and sanitation, healthy environments as well as food security.” An account of the youth's condition generated by the Human Sciences Research Council delivered a portrait of youth in the “areas of education, labour market participation, inequality, health and disability, crime and violence, and social integration” (HSRC 2005). Succinctly, youth, especially Blacks, remain in a poor peripheral condition.

The Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) outcomes for the first quarter of 2020 suggest that “employment decreased by 38 000 to 16,4 million, and the number of unemployed persons

increased by 344 000 to 7,1 million". Due to this, "the official unemployment rate increased by one percentage point to (30,1%) compared to the fourth quarter of 2019". The rate has been recurrently high over time, with the youth (aged 15–34 years) being the most affected by joblessness. The "youth unemployment percentage in South Africa has decreased to 52.30 percent in the second quarter of 2020 from 59 percent in the first quarter of 2020" (StatsSA 2020). According to StatsSA (2020), "in the first quarter of 2020, there were 20,4 million young people aged 15–34 years, and these young people reported for 63,3% of the total number of unemployed persons." Education in South Africa and around the globe is known as a "vital tool in human capital development and the more educated people are, the more likely are their chances for employment and jobs with the right working conditions" (StatsSA 2020).

The obstinately high youth unemployment percentage has long been one of the most severe socio-economic problems in South Africa. Some of the young work-hunters are not well educated and do not have adequate abilities and prior work experience required by companies in the labour market. Therefore this makes it difficult for young people to find employment, and in the process, some lose hope. In the "first quarter of 2020, 1,9 million young people without work were discouraged from looking for a job" (StatsSA 2020). Some young people have detached from the labour market, and they are also not developing their skills base through education and training. Therefore, they are not in employment, education, or training (NEET). Moreover, "a comprehensive strategy for youth employment, as part of a broader focus on expanding South Africa jobs, is necessary" (StatsSA 2020).

South Africa is established as one of the world's unequal countries, and inequality in South Africa has long been known as one of our society's most salient features. South Africa is consistently ranked as one of the world's most unequal countries, an empirical fact that has its roots in colonization and Apartheid history. In addition to being too high, South African inequality appears to be remarkably persistent. Despite many government efforts to reduce inequality since our democratic transition in 1994, progress has been limited (StatsSA 2019a: 1). Thus, "until economic improvements occur domestically (with hopefully as little interference from negative changes and shocks in the global market), the challenges of inequality stemming from an unjust past will continue to anchor the country to an unequal future" (StatsSA 2019a: 4).

South African youth are even now experiencing the impact of the terrible inheritance of imperialism. Despite the dawn of a democratic system, "they are yet to extricate themselves

from the colonial influence” (Montle and Mogoboya 2020a: 169). Millions of South Africans remain poor and jobless (Muchiri 2016), and the most affected group is the youth. Such a situation, tied with the “upsurge in the race of scarce resources, xenophobic then become a tool of voicing frustrations concerning the government’s incapability to deliver on its promises” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 19-20).

Unemployment is a challenge that needs to be rigorously addressed in South Africa. Despite attaining tertiary qualifications, many graduates are unable to secure stable jobs. Karodia, Soni and Soni (2016: 78) note that “the massive unemployment burden drastically curtails the economy’s growth, lowers the morale of citizens and the youth, and contributes to an already faltering economy.” With this, non-nationals are blamed for high unemployment statistics: Montle and Mogoboya (2020b: 80) explain that “the high percentage of job scarcity causes a high demand and competition for jobs among the locals and foreign nationals.” According to Kosas and Solomon (2013: 7), this has “reared hatred to the degree that resentment towards foreign spaza shop owners is constantly accused attacked by locals for allegedly stealing trading spaces and jobs. Therefore, Montle and Mogoboya (2020b: 80) explain that Black foreigners are seen “as part of the reasons for the high rate of unemployed South African citizens.”

Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 19) explains that the data collected by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) and the Institute for Security Studies reveals that attacks happen in areas surrounding hostels, townships, places where foreign nationals are blamed for the social ills, crime, and unemployment being faced by people. Therefore, the highlighted challenges have become a breeding ground of frustrations over “limited access to basic services such as electricity and water, and these are taken out on foreign nationals” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 19).

In this study, youths are defined according to the South African National Youth Policy 2015-2020 as “those in the age group of 14-35 years” (National, Youth and Policy 2015: 10). The researcher worked with youth from 18 to 35 years from Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (INK) in Durban. Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 3) explain that it was also significant to “analyze the position that a Black man finds himself in a post-apartheid era as in the white supremacist context, Black masculinity is the most marginalized form of masculinity.” Under the apartheid era, “Black masculinity was positioned as inferior to white masculinity, and despite changes post-1994 many Black men, in reality, remain impoverished and arguably still emasculated

(and marginalized)” (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 3). One can argue that this is one of the underlying contributing factors of a young Black man’s anger, which he frequently diverts in the wrong way, that is, in the direction of his neighbours’ Black African men. Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 3-4) expound that “he blames them for his subordinate and marginalized position of being unemployed and living in abject poverty and therefore, uses violence as a means to regain his sense of masculinity, which is played out in xenophobic violence.”

The underpinning and claim of “heteronormative masculinities in much of the discursive explanations for hostility and violence towards Black African immigrants must be understood within the socio-history of gender violence in South Africa” (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 4). This was because most of the youth who participated in xenophobic violence were mostly male youth. Furthermore, the implied connotations of masculinity are connected to economic and cultural interactions of power that are traced from ancient associations of dominance that persist in being reinscribed in modern society. In this background, “power relations are played out between Black masculinities (embodied in Black South African and foreign nationals) through access to women” (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 4). Hence, the statements that non-nationals males are stealing locals wives as reported by various scholars in understanding the causes of xenophobic violence in South Africa (Dodson 2010; Dunderdale 2013; Friebe, Gallego and Mendola 2013; Fourchard and Segatti 2015a; Fungurai 2015; Langa and Kiguwa 2016; Goddey 2017; Masenya 2017; Mkhize 2017; Dube 2018; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Dube 2019; Mangu 2019; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Mlambo 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019).

In South African impoverished communities, there is a sense of insecurity heightened by foreign nationals' presence. To support this, Langa and Kiguwa (2016: 4) expound that “there is a sense of young men’s masculinity being under siege due to their unemployed status, hence, their response with a re-imagined masculinity, which is characterized by violence.” With this, it was essential to acknowledge the inequalities and socioeconomic conditions experienced every day by most of the young Black males as “if they are not helped to channel their energy into real sources of his frustration, this may be reflected in the form of Black on Black violence” (Langa and Kiguwa 2016: 4).

Various risk factors make certain young men susceptible to perpetrating xenophobic violence. The research findings by the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP) in 2008 revealed

youth are consistently exposed to crime and violence in the key institutions of their socialization, that is, in their homes, schools, and immediate social environments (Pelser 2008). Furthermore, the findings revealed that a significant proportion of South Africa's youth has learned and internalized this behaviour and so replicates it. Indeed, there is research that indicates that crime, and often a violent crime, is a primary means for many young South Africans to connect and bond with society, to obtain "respect", "status", and to demonstrate "achievement" amongst their peers and in their communities.

Excluded by the devastating effects of poverty, dysfunctional home environments, poor education, lack of appropriate skills, and unemployment, youth cannot access the dominant or mainstream culture (Young 1999). Lacking access to legitimate pathways of achieving society's normative goals, a significant proportion of South Africa's youth has "normalized" illegitimate means (use of crime and violence) of acquiring the prevailing symbols of "success", to demonstrate cultural compliance, individual status, and "control" over their environments. Thus, for a significant proportion of young South Africans, crime and violence has been normalized, become "culturally acceptable", mainly through consistent experience and exposure in the key institutions of their socialization (Pelser 2008).

2.10 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has focused on unpacking the two concepts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence to understand how various scholars generally understand these concepts. Multiple definitions are offered by different scholars, with some viewing xenophobia as Afrophobia instead. Furthermore, the chapter also focused on tracing the history of xenophobic violence in South Africa, which many scholars highlighted that the apartheid administration was the basis of intolerance and negative attitudes exhibited towards immigrants, primarily black Africans. Moreover, the researcher explored the youth's status in South Africa to understand their participation in violence labelled as xenophobic.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY EXPLANATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

In South Africa, some of the locals have shown high levels of negative attitudes towards Black foreign nationals, leading to xenophobic violence in various communities. The causes of these hostilities towards foreign nationals are deep-rooted in the political, legal, social, cultural, and economic factors (Dodson 2010). Thus, xenophobic violence must be understood within specific historical, cultural, social, political, and economic contexts. Therefore, this chapter examines the historical and contemporary explanations that trigger xenophobic violence in South Africa. Understanding the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments was critical in formulating pragmatic interventions to curb this form of violence's recurrence.

3.2 Historical causes of xenophobia in South Africa

The historical backdrop of xenophobic violence in South Africa has been established in the traditions of politically-sanctioned racial segregation and the disappointments of progressive post-politically sanctioned racial segregation governments in viably obliging outsiders (Hanekom and Webster 2009: 105; Adam and Moodley 2013: 37). Politically-sanctioned racial segregation and its draconian arrangements against the Black people denied them economic advantages, and this way advanced doubt and disdain coordinated at outsiders (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ayo 2015). Xenophobic assaults date back to 1995 when immigrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique living in the Alexandra township were “physically assaulted over several weeks in January 1995, as armed gangs identified suspected undocumented migrants and marched them to the police station to clean the township of foreigners” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 45).

Mabena (2019) argues that xenophobic brutality can be followed back to colonialism and embraced by the politically-sanctioned racial segregation government to separate and rule Black Africans. Additionally, in South African history, “xenophobia did not begin after 1994, it came route before South Africa turned into a majority rule state, and was propagated by the politically-sanctioned racial segregation government, yet was never considered and nobody

ever talked about it” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 10-11). Post-1994, xenophobia has been “executed institutionally, with debasement and uncontrollable, libertarian hostile to foreigner articulations that impel profoundly settled in bias ingrained by the politically-sanctioned racial segregation philosophy, which at that point transformed into the present Afrophobia” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 11).

Several intellectuals have pronounced that local South Africans have “a perception that lawful migrant workers deny them (local people) of occupations and administrations whereas unlawful outsiders supposedly bait the security agents to corruption, this exasperates wrongdoing and kept local people from getting to scant resources” (Crush and McDonald 2001: 7; Bekker 2010; Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Crush and Tawodzera 2017; Kempen 2017; Bornman and Oatway 2020; Chothia 2020). These perceptions have prompted rising disdain coming full circle into an elevated level of antagonism and bigotry towards non-nationals, especially Africans. Questionably, this demonstration can be related “to their encounters of politically-sanctioned racial segregation which led to their sufferings, separation and refusal and any endeavour by outsiders to rival them on benefits accruable to citizens after apartheid would be stood up to” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 45). Noticeably, there have been “disappointments over scant employment positions, and education admissions supposedly lost to non-nationals; nonetheless, the significant concern is the removal of their target against outsiders because of profound established dissatisfactions and outrage” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 45).

The ordinarily notable brutality against immigrants happened on 11 May 2008 in the Alexandra township in Johannesburg. Those assaulted were primarily from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, where two individuals were executed and 40 injured (Neocosmos 2008; Hayem 2013; Vahed and Desai 2013; Misago 2016b; Chiumbu and Moyo 2018). It was additionally announced that in the week, “the brutality spread to different municipalities over the Gauteng territory with riots detailed in a few settlements including Diepsloot, Johannesburg focal, Jeppestown, Hillbrow and others” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 45). On occasion, a man was scorched to death close to Reiger Park on the East Rand. Before the finish of May 2008, more than 60 individuals had been slaughtered, and several thousand were dislodged (Tafira 2011: 114; Hankela 2014: 75).

The post-apartheid era has witnessed the increase of foreigners from different African and Asian countries (Adibe 2017; Rugunanan 2017; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019; Rugunanan 2020). During the politically sanctioned racial segregation system, South Africa caused a massive expulsion of African individuals from the urban communities into Black townships. Most exceedingly terrible still, many driving political dissidents and resistance figures were ousted inside or extradited from South Africa, tormented, executed, or killed (Ballyn 2011). This was “an assault on race sustained by the ruling Whites as Blacks were exposed to each type of human debasement on their land” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 38).

It was seen that the local populace frequently thinks that it is difficult to survive due to outsiders, who move looking for greener fields, and are ready to acknowledge lower compensation for their work and administrations, subsequently, saw as prompting job loss the locals. This regularly starts a cold connection between the locals and the workers, prompting xenophobic assaults as a mode of conveying their distress and dissatisfaction against outsiders (Oni and Okunade 2018: 38). Along these lines, xenophobia is an element of a longstanding existence of control and persecution coordinated by a white minority rule framework and white-black isolation, which exposed the Blacks to each type of misery, forswearing, enslavement, mistreatment, and restraint (Oni and Okunade 2018: 43). Independence from the politically-sanctioned racial segregation system implied that Black South Africans would set up an opposition technique against whoever intended to expose them to another type of neo-politically-sanctioned racial segregation experience. In any case, this obstruction has frequently focused on the African race and not the whites who exposed them to the oppressive Apartheid system.

Tafira (2011) distinguished some slanderous phrasing construct for Black African immigrants in South Africa. For example, non-nationals are known by and given a wide variety of names. These are marks that convey racial, ethnocentric, and xenophobic implications. A portion of these are through debasing; others are facetious yet hostile, regardless. These marks exude from cultural contact, resulting from others’ presence of different characters and ethnic gatherings. Such terminologies incorporate ‘makwerekwere,’ which is the most established name utilized for Black immigrants who communicate in various dialects and have completely extraordinary phonetic sounds as the South Africans. Likewise, “*magrigamba* turned into a name given to West Africa men who are attempted to come into South Africa with no resources and after

some time in South Africa, gotten back to their nations with monies, riches, and properties” (Oni and Okunade 2018: 46).

Idehen and Osaghae (2015: 79) clarify that xenophobia in South Africa is an “upheaval of negative aggregate thoughts, social generalizations and biases frequently masked with the marvel of patriotism.” Moreover, Idehen and Osaghae (2015: 79) contend that there is “no uncertainty that the extremist, forceful sign of patriotism is one of the xenophobia types.” Xenophobia in South Africa has principally been shown as Afrophobia, and it is a methodical stirring of tribalism and identity, two related potent weapons utilized by the colonialists to separate Africans (Oni and Okunade 2018: 48). It continually tests African harmony, mutual personality, and charitable soul. Henceforth, if uncontrolled, it has the intensity of denying Africa and its people of cross-cultural advantages and the genuinely necessary socio-economic and political development (Oni and Okunade 2018: 48).

In South Africa, “prejudice was related to the politically-sanctioned racial segregation system, while xenophobia has become an intermittent issue in the post-apartheid” (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 125). Generally, South Africa was home to migrants, particularly from the Southern African district, looking for profitable business and improved incomes. Its rich regular assets imply that more labour is needed for investigation (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Klotz 2013; Budlender 2014; D’Ancona 2016; Hovhannisyan *et al.* 2018). Migration into South Africa expanded because of the worldwide economic meltdown that influenced most neighbouring nations. Numerous African nations are defied by the uprising, ethnic clash, and terrorism, further expanding relocation into South Africa.

In the South African setting, xenophobia and bigotry show as “Siamese twins against Black foreigners who are exposed to xenophobia by the Black dominant citizens and prejudice by South African whites” (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 125). Fierce assaults on immigrants by the locals can commonly be followed to rivalry for lacking framework and scant assets, while the last is related with prejudice dependent on skin pigmentation and shading (Musuva 2014; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Mutanda 2017; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Albeit South Africa is viewed as a rainbow republic because of its different populaces; however, discrimination among these groups has influenced Black immigrants. Like their South African partners, outsiders of African origin keep on confronting racial separation from

the white minority. Victimization of Black outsiders, in this way, emanates from two unique groups, that is, Black and White citizen (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018).

This investigation places that xenophobia and racism in South Africa exist grounded on the nation's memorable and present-day socio-economic real factors and that this has likewise informed migration policies focused on other African nations. This arrangement of institutionalized xenophobia has been "commanded by the mass of the individuals; however, it could influence the country's economic possibilities over the long run"(Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 126). Resentment against outsiders is controlled by irrational apprehensions regarding limited resources and their distribution (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Mutanda 2017; Mangu 2019). Such contempt can be argued as created by "economic and political irregular characteristics among nations, particularly those in a similar region"(Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 126).

This incites massive displacement from economically unstable nations to those that have figured out how to accomplish economic growth and political soundness. The essential inspiration is financial security, prompting an improved way of life. Notwithstanding, the deluge of outsiders from various nations makes mighty dread and comprises a danger to the host nation's nationals (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 127; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). South Africa has utilized migrant labour since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand toward the nineteenth century's finish (Adam and Moodley 2013). Later, the republic encountered an influx of immigrants from up north, including SADC and other African nations. Black foreigners have been utilized in the mining area since politically-sanctioned racial segregation times, and Black South Africans have consistently viewed them as a danger (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ayo 2015). Thus, this explains why they are consistently blamed for the government's shortfalls in bringing social change. This was because they inhabit Black South Africans' occupations and compete for inadequate urban infrastructure (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 127). Of significance was that this was since these migrants are left with few options and, therefore, acknowledge lower compensation than their Black South African counterparts.

3.2.1 Longstanding xenophobia

The xenophobic phenomenon's unavoidable idea proposes some degree of an institutional collision that will, in general, embroil the South Africa government in xenophobic propensities

horribly. This burns out of “apparent institutional dormancy and resistance to adequately address the issues of institutionalized prejudice” (Idehen and Osaghae 2015: 82-83). Xenophobia has been longstanding across government offices and structures, including the private sector (Valji 2003; Isike and Isike 2012). There are apparent signs of xenophobic inclinations among governments’ organizations and institutions, for example, the immigration administrations and the South African police (Idehen and Osaghae 2015: 83).

Some have contended that the hostility is established in the verifiable difficulties of politically sanctioned racial segregation of the past, though there are places of institutional generalization established in the ordinary South African's inactive discontent. South African police are accepted to be the most armed and fierce security office on the planet (Zondi and Ukpere 2014), with a few instances of severity incited through unjustified arrests, detainments, and murders of foreign nationals viewed as “death because of state cruelty” (Schwikkard 2013).

The administration of previous President Jacob Zuma has been prudent with words concerning xenophobia episodes in South Africa. Be that as it may, there has been a repeat of press articulations criticizing xenophobic violence with the plan of removing the public authority of the day, yet inside the tune of the perspectives lays a few types of institutional solidarity. In April 2015, the attacks were incited by xenophobic proclamations by King Goodwill Zwelithini, the Zulu tribal group’s traditional head, saying African immigrants should “take their things and go” as they probably take the positions and public assets reserved for local people. In 2018, the Mayor of Johannesburg, Mr. Herman Mashaba, announced that non-nationals executed many societal ills. Moreover, The Minister of Health, Mr. Aaron Motsoaledi, in 2019, contended that foreigners were troubling the general health framework and required the re-evaluation of migration approaches to stop illicit foreigners entering South Africa. These cases are instances of a profoundly inescapable and endemic regulated xenophobia in South Africa that invalidate the ‘whitewashing’ presentation of the public authority on the assurance to get rid of xenophobia by arraigning those culprits of violence against non-citizens (Idehen and Osaghae 2015: 83). Those assertions are polemical and misleading.

3.2.2 History of Vigilantism

The history of violence in South Africa has been portrayed as vigilantism. Vigilantism is commonly perceived as taking the law into one’s own hands with no lawful power (Mareš and

Bjørge 2019). On the other hand, Eduardo Moncanda defines vigilantism as “the aggregate use or danger of extra-legitimate brutality because of a supposed criminal act” (Moncada 2017: 408). A few types of vigilantism target (claimed or genuine) offenders inside the network wherein South there is necklacing of offenders in Black townships in South Africa (Kucera and Mares 2015). Out-group vigilantism is coordinated against African foreigners who are considered to be a danger to the network. Such vigilante actions “target whole classes of others, ethnic minorities, and migrants, frequently under the facade of controlling their supposed criminality” (Mareš and Bjørge 2019: 1). A vast piece of such ongoing vigilante exercises identifies with extreme right legislative issues and xenophobic notions. Moncanda likewise comprehends vigilantism as “a group movement; in any case, a few people can do vigilante exercises without commitment in an organizational structure” (Moncada 2017: 408).

In South Africa, when brutality against foreign nationals happens, local people mobilize themselves and assault non-nationals including their shops. This mob violence, in numerous cases, results in the plundering and demolition of the property. Misago (2019: 28) explains that before 1994, “community justice in South Africa was handed down out through People’s Courts or Disciplinary Committees which functioned as kangaroo courts and these continued even post-1994 as the Black communities continued to support local security initiatives and community justice in the form of community vigilante groups.” Vigilante groups, however, provide only temporary relief as solutions should originate from legal and government structures. Attacks against non-nationals or lawbreakers are generally upheld as a self-security system (Misago 2019: 28). Vigilantism focuses on instant justice and, in most cases, coercion and compensation for the distressed. The past experiences of vigilantism, combined with prevalent bias, rampant impunity, and practical political scapegoating against outsiders as lawbreakers, present a mixture of elements that eventually result in targeting of and attacks against foreign nationals in various parts of the country” (Misago 2019: 35).

3.2.3 Culture of Impunity and Violence in Townships and Informal Settlements

Vigilantism stems from conditions in South Africa’s townships, which include oppressive policing, high levels of poverty, and poor service delivery, most of which have continued for years. This in turn has led to elevated exemption levels of criminal conduct (Misago 2019: 35). Lemanski (2004) adds that South Africa is one of the world’s most crime-ridden states, and this has been aggravated by the failure of the law enforcement agents to capture lawbreakers, and in some instances, they connive with criminals to execute crimes. This way, “issues emerge

when the law enforcement agencies like the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) who are entrusted with the obligation to shield the residents from crimes and maintain the law are presently the offenders in the commission of crimes, violently assaulting residents and outsiders” (Konanani and Odeku 2013: 801). Misago (2019: 65) argues that

the absence of pertinent organizations and existence of nonviolent conflict resolution instruments, impunity and absence of responsibility for the agitators of xenophobic brutality, and its absence prompts the development of informal administration groups that utilize violence to further their monetary and political interests.

Xenophobic violence occurs in communities that lack conflict resolution mechanisms, which could diffuse the socio-political pressures inherent in any different and dynamic community. South Africa’s townships have an archived history of utilizing violence as a method for resolving issues. Communities generally resort to violence, vigilantism, and mob justice when pertinent institutions have neglected to address issues of concern effectively. Community members tend to take the law into their own hands because they did not trust the local authorities, leaders, police, and criminal justice system. In some affected communities, violence is fuelled by individuals’ disappointments over the failure or perceived reluctance of local authorities to address communities’ interests (validated or not) about the presence of non-nationals in their communities.

With the local authorities’ inability and reluctance to address community interests, instigators start organizing mass meetings during which attacks on foreign nationals are publicly planned. Thus, “the police and local authorities were aware that the attacks are being organized and doing nothing to prevent them was further evidence of a lack of effective mechanisms to resolve conflicts in communities” (Misago 2019: 65). Lack of response from the local authorities gave the organizers of violence to achieve their goal of attacking non-nationals. Therefore, allowing the local groups to attack non-nationals based on their discontent revealed that South African communities lack useful conflict resolution apparatuses.

According to Misago (2019: 66), impunity facilitated xenophobic violence to occur. Moreover, his finding reveals that a rampant culture of impunity concerning offenders and initiators of xenophobic violence. As suggested previously, foreign nationals have been frequently assaulted in South Africa since 1994, but few of these have been charged and a smaller number sentenced. Government assurances to establish ‘special courts’ to tackle xenophobia-related violations have indeed not emerged as Monson and Misago (2009) have noted. Moreover, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) did not act to hold the instigators accountable. Monson

and Misago (2009: 30) note “a lack of strong determination to hold the perpetrators accountable,” which created an opportunity for xenophobic violence to occur.

Some studies confirm that “impunity is widespread for acts of collective violence when the government structures of control and the population majority are not the primary target or when control organs and representatives of the majority are to a certain degree involved” (Bergmann 2011). With “brutality greeted by impunity, and impunity greeted by indifference, lack of accountability in terms of prosecution and restorative justice (i.e., impunity) provides a favourable opportunity structure for violent attacks on foreign nationals” (Monson 2011: 46). Undeniably, impunity shows an exceptional acceleration action that lessens the antagonistic grouping's xenophobic violence costs. In several communities, lack or weak local power and public leadership lead to the advent of violent substitute authority in the form of informal leadership collections that use xenophobic violence to consolidate their leadership legality and accordingly further their political and economic interests. Perhaps less apparent is that “local governance provides a double opportunity for violence to occur” (Misago 2019: 67).

3.3 The underlying contemporary causes of Xenophobic violence

3.3.1 Community Perceptions

Reasons for the attacks differ, “with some blaming the contestation for scarce resources, and others attribute it to the country’s violent past, inadequate service delivery and the influence of micro politics in townships, involvement, and complicity of local authority members in contractor conflicts for economic and political reasons, failure of early warning and prevention mechanisms regarding community-based violence; and also residents claim that foreigners took jobs opportunities away from local South Africans and they accept lower wages, foreigners do not participate in the struggle for better wages and working conditions” (Mogekwu 2005; Schwartz 2009; Zouandé 2011). Other locals argue that foreigners are criminals and should not access services and police protection. Foreigners are also condemned for their businesses that take away customers from residents and spread HIV/AIDS diseases. Other South African locals simply do not like refugees, asylum-seekers, or foreigners in their communities. Foreigners are used as a convenient scapegoat and mask for individual and government failures (Mogekwu 2005). If the South African government and those involved in the attacks do not take responsibility for their losses, this unfortunate situation is likely to be prolonged (Masenya 2017: 84).

Most of the triggers of the incidents against African foreign nationals are “based on the incorrect assumption that they are in the city illegally and want to compete with locals for jobs in all sectors” (Cinini and Singh 2019: 64). These negative opinions centered on misleading notions lead to resentment, which demonstrates in crimes during outbreaks. Undeniably, xenophobic assaults are typically in violence and plundering aimed at outsiders and their businesses.

3.3.2 Widespread denial of xenophobia

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Monitoring Project has played a pivotal role in monitoring and evaluating the South African government's responses to xenophobia. The 2011 APRM report critiqued the South African government's efforts on combatting xenophobia, designating “little or no progress as initiatives have not been maintained or rolled out” (Gordon 2017: 37). Furthermore, the report recommended an excellent level of denialism of xenophobia by some of the officials. However, this was not a fresh expose, and government denialism on xenophobia had been featured in many academic studies in South Africa (e.g. Desai 2008; Landau 2010; Neocosmos 2010; Hayem 2013). Undeniably, “former President Thabo Mbeki's reaction to the 2008 May attacks is perhaps the most eloquent expression of this denialism, although the current President Jacob Zuma is also somewhat guilty of denialism” (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Gordon 2017: 37).

Given this denialism, it was not shocking that an analysis of government attempts to change xenophobic attitudes indicates that the state's program of action on the issue has been uninspiring (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Gordon 2017). According to Gordon (2017: 38), “between 2008 and 2012, the government has held 49 community dialogues to inspire social cohesion and tackle xenophobia.” The republic's Department of Home Affairs has formed a counteract-xenophobia division and initiated a communication plan to foster cohesion between foreigners and citizens. The National Development Commission has recommended counteracting xenophobia by organizing ongoing campaigns, though specifics on how this would be accomplished are negligible. These actions have been recognized by the 2013 and 2014 APRM reports on South Africa. Nevertheless, “given the level of anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the country's adult public, these measures seem inadequate and, at best, circumspect” (Gordon 2017: 38).

In 2012, “a National Social Cohesion Summit was held to enhance social cohesion in the country, and during the two-day event, government leaders heard strategic initiatives to combat xenophobia in the country” (Gordon 2017: 38). The APRM cited the summit reports on South Africa as “an essential part of the government’s efforts to reduce xenophobia. In a media statement, the Director of the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Loren Landau, stated that anti-foreigner sentiment was evident at the 2012 summit condemning it, many politicians were passive in their response” (Mail and Guardian 2012). In a later newspaper article, “he went further, arguing that national discussions about social cohesion and discrimination almost entirely exclude questions of ethnicity and immigration” (Mail and Guardian 2013).

The authorities' passivity in combatting xenophobia extends to government efforts to punish anti-immigrant violence perpetrators (Gordon 2017, 2020). Hayem (2013: 89-90) reports that “many of those arrested for their participation in the May 2008 attacks were released under pressure from both community and political leaders.” The police have been slow to act during other (lesser publicized) occurrences of xenophobic violence since 2008, and, as Landau (2010) argues, “an atmosphere of impunity often exists in such cases.” Proposals for more rigorous anti-xenophobia actions have been received but not executed. For instance, “the South African Human Rights Commission's proposal to develop hate crime bill and suitable support methods have languished for years with no ruling” (Gordon 2017: 38; 2020).

South Africa has failed to actively address xenophobic violence in South Africa due to government officials’ denial. The prevalence of xenophobic violence in modern society is large because the state government has adopted silences policies (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Mapokgole 2014). This was noted when former President Thabo Mbeki announced at a gathering in tribute to victims of the attacks that it was not xenophobia but rather naked criminal activity; he further blamed the levels of xenophobia on the lack of knowledge that South Africans had on other Africa continents (David 2011; Magwaza 2018: 43).

Monson (2011) explains some politicians’ negative perceptions towards foreigners that have seemingly penetrated grassroots communities. This affirms the argument that xenophobic violence needs to be understood based on a top-down approach (Sharp 2008) as every decision made by those in power penetrates down to communities. Therefore, the author labelled fellow South Africans as agitators as they were easily persuaded to do anything. A primary example

would be words spoken by King Goodwill Zwelithini, which caused many marginalized Durbanites to retaliate and attack black foreign nationals. “We are requesting those who come from outside to please go back to their countries,” Zwelithini said. “The fact that there were countries that played a role in the country’s struggle for liberation should not be used as an excuse to create a situation where foreigners can inconvenience locals. “I know you were in their countries during the liberation struggle. However, the matter is that we did not set up businesses in their countries; he said the Daily News (2015) quoted King Goodwill Zwelithini.

Solomon and Kosaka (2013) argue that there still seems to be a level of denialism among South Africans partaking in xenophobic violence. When we recall these attacks in 2000 and 2008, statistics indicated close to 69 immigrants were killed and 600 injured, and of that 600, it was reported twenty-five South African who were thought to have been immigrants were injured (Monson 2011). An incident of attacks since 2009 has tremendously escalated. SAMP (2015) reports that each year, South Africa witnesses attacks against immigrants. The 2015 attacks that occurred in KwaZulu-Natal resulted in the death of 50 immigrants, and 500 immigrants were injured and displaced from the communities they resided. These numbers are not accurate because cases of xenophobia in South Africa have gone unrecorded and not reported. Openly, one can argue that xenophobic violence reoccurs in communities because perpetrators are not being prosecuted. The government has failed to criminalize these attacks, of which statistics prove that only 20 people were arrested in 2008 and only 15 in 2015. This indicates that the South African justice system faces challenges in prosecuting xenophobic violence perpetrators (Crush and Ramachandran 2010). The Justice Minister stated that this was due to a lack of evidence. Magwaza and Ntini (2020) point out that the South African government addresses xenophobic violence as an ordinary crime. Monson and Arian (2008) confirm that this encourages these attacks against non-nationals rather than addressing them.

3.3.3 Bad governance at the national and local level

In South Africa, some government officers, via unverified accusations, have also generated negative stereotypes of foreign immigrants, basically refuting the government’s position on respecting all immigrants (Dube 2019: 202). For example, in a statement that gained him some notoriety in 1994, the then-minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, suggested that “all Nigerian immigrants are criminals and drug traffickers” (Mail and Guardian 1994). Dube (2019: 202) expounds that “though there are some immigrants involved in illegal activities such as drug trafficking and fraud, it was biased to concentrate only on Nigerians without any

validating evidence (for example, from crime statistics).” Also, Johannesburg’s mayor in 2018 labelled foreign African immigrants as carriers of Ebola, and even if the mayor afterward made an apology, such speeches only provide a breeding ground to exacerbate xenophobic attitudes. Government officials have adopted a tendency of issuing statements that label foreign nationals as a threat to the local economic development of South Africa (Neocosmos 2010; Gordon 2017: 45). The anti-immigration position of the government was self-evident in its labelling of African migrants. Misago (2011) explains his study's findings that participants echoed long-standing state discourses blaming foreigners for the country’s ills, and this was not new, as Landau (2010) had similar results. Even though following ministers have been more sensible in their speeches to the media, it could be contended that “the Department of Home Affairs has not done sufficient to counteract the public's apparent xenophobia” (Gordon 2017: 45). The impression of the ‘foreigner as a threat’ seems to pervade immigration policies and law enforcement even at the local level (Ruedin 2019).

Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan academic and the Makerere Institute of Social Research at Makerere University, said xenophobic attacks manifest feelings of exclusion held by political leaders. Heleta (2018) argues that in a society where violence against foreign nationals is pervasive and xenophobic sentiments are common, irresponsible leaders continue to manufacture an atmosphere of crisis, resulting in xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals. Politicians searching for voters tend to pin the country’s social ills on foreigners by uttering statements such as “foreigners are flooding South Africa and undermining the country’s security, stability, and prosperity.” On the contrary, according to the 2011 census, South Africa is not overwhelmed with immigrants, with some 2.2 million international migrants (about 4% of the population) in the country. Africa Check (2017) explains that this means politicians exaggerate their claims when referring to the number of foreigners in South Africa. Rapley (2004) argues that the fundamental problem affecting South Africa is inequality; South Africa is one of the world’s unequal countries. More than half of the populace resides in poverty. The hardships experienced by Black South Africans are rooted in the country’s colonial and apartheid legacy, as well as the post-1994 failures to transform the economy and society to ensure that majority of the population are involved in the running of the economy, ownership in terms of factors of production and ensure the eradication of societal inequalities (Heleta 2018). Therefore, the influx of foreigners (legal or illegal) is seen as a threat to the people who are even now jobless and dwelling in poverty’s deep shackles.

In the quest to gain popularity and win over voters, many South African politicians have used migrants as scapegoats. Utterances such as migrants are taking South African jobs, involved in the drug trade and prostitution. Unfortunately, they do not contribute to the country's growth and development being welcomed by a society languishing in poverty, unemployment, and increasing inequality levels. The influx of undocumented migrants has been used as an excuse to ensure that migrants are treated as scapegoats (Pérez, 2015). Landau (2015) states that "economic difficulties have given rise up to a perilous period of populist nationalism that has seen right-wing sentiment grip most voters." For example, the former Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba's statement that "as many as 80% of the inner-city residents are undocumented foreigners" has been viewed as an instigator of xenophobia" (Dlamini 2020: 25).

The discourse of South African exceptionalism has been noted at the national level and the local level. For example, the research conducted by the African Centre for Migration and Society (Misago 2011) explicates that rivalry in community leaderships has fortified the advent of populist and violent structures of local leaders who pursue to boost their authority and power by supporting communities' hatred towards what is seen as 'threatening' foreign nationals (Gordon 2017: 46). Moreover, local leaders exploit the notion that "indigeneity is the primary avenue for accessing resources and jobs, manipulating notions of national subjectivity" (Von Holdt 2019: 3). Micro politicians in the country's informal urban settlements adapt "institutionalized xenophobia that particularly dehumanizes foreigners from elsewhere on the continent" (Gordon 2017: 46).

Police officers have been charged with neglect in defending immigrants' rights, especially those from Africa (Gordon 2017). Perhaps what is most surprising about the police's conduct and government authorities is how the older prejudiced theories have continued in the new era (Nyamnjoh 2010; Pillay 2017; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018). State authorities often identify immigrants because they 'look foreign' with dark skin pigmentation, indicating foreignness (Nyamnjoh 2006; Desai 2008; Landau 2010; Gordon 2020). The police specifically target foreign Africans in unique operations, accusing them of crime, and immigrants are frequent police corruption targets. Police have also been "observed failing to intervene during anti-immigrant riots, destroying the identity documents of migrants, and abusing foreigners more generally" (Misago 2011). The "police torture and murder of 27-year-old Mozambican

immigrant Mido Macia in February 2013 is an emotional example of the lack of concern for immigrants' rights epitomized by South African law enforcement" (Gordon 2017: 46).

3.3.4 Poor organization of interventions dealing with Xenophobia

The government, Non-Governmental Organizations and communities, and the like have played a crucial role in devising and implementing various initiatives to deal with xenophobia in South Africa. However, these have lacked the development of a well-synchronized strategy to deal with xenophobic violence. Therefore, IOM (2012) argues that this lack of coordination makes good work repetitive, inconsistent, and futile.

The Refugees Act explicitly allows refugees and asylum seekers to search for and take employment prospects in the country. However, this provision has "never been enforced, and many employers, including the government, could prohibit the employment of refugees in direct contravention of the Act" (Muchiri 2016: 77). Such segregations and violations fuel xenophobia as they make refugees feel unwelcomed in South African working places. Though numerous actions have been assumed to promote social cohesion and reduce xenophobia, CORMSA acknowledges the need for ongoing national coordination (CoRMSA 2011).

3.3.5 Stereotyping of non-nationals

Xenophobic sentiments in South Africa can be highlighted as not only the problem of disadvantaged individuals. Matsinhe (2011) argues that the prevalence of negative stereotyping of African foreigners in South Africa is linked with intergroup relations dynamics during the country's authoritarian colonial period. According to Gordon (2017: 45), "the psychological implications of these dynamics perpetuated the formation of South African identities that attach an otherness" to African immigrants. For Matsinhe (2011), it would be better to comprehend the pervasiveness of black Africans' attacks in the country due to identity formation in the post-apartheid period. With the high prevalence of stereotyping of African immigrants, xenophobic violence becomes inevitable.

3.3.6 No law tailors to fight xenophobia

South Africa lacks a specific law to prosecute xenophobia and other prejudice-motivated crimes. When foreigners are killed or have their property looted in xenophobia-related attacks, the perpetrators are usually charged under the country's general criminal law. The failure to

promulgate a specific rule to address xenophobia and other hate crimes hamper the fight for its eradication (Breen and Nel 2011) and promote a deep-seated sense of impunity amongst perpetrators of attacks on foreigners. It also clouds the justice parameters for law enforcers confronted by reports on xenophobia-motivated crimes and other hated crimes. Muchiri (2012) opines that “the lack of an official hate crime monitoring and reporting mechanism and clouds often conceals the magnitude of South Africa's problem.”

Failure to maintain the rule of law was noted as one of the government's shortcomings in precipitating xenophobic violence (McDonald and Jacobs 2005a; McDonald 2008). However, Masenya (2017: 85) argues that “due to its repeated failures to bring levels of violent crime under control, which contributed to an environment which saw people resort to violence without fear of arrest or successful prosecution, the incidences of xenophobia persisted.” In lacking to sustain the rule of law, Akindès (2004) opines that the government prepared many deprived societies to violent actions. The failure to “safeguard communities from criminal elements and to eliminate those elements permitted criminals to take complete advantage of chaos and disorder to rob rape and loot during the violent uprisings” (Masenya 2017: 85).

3.3.7 Culture of Violence

Xenophobic violence can be linked to the growing culture of violence in South Africa used to resolve problems. Magwaza (2018: 42) confirms that “violent acts are seen as a normal and legitimate solution to solving problems in present societies in South Africa.” Additionally, xenophobic violence cannot be divorced from the culture of violence used during the apartheid period. As literature revealed in Chapter 2, most xenophobic violence occurs in townships; Misago, Landau and Monson (2009) argue that violence has been a persistent feature of townships' life. Scholars also agree that xenophobic violence cannot be deliberated about the current circumstances confronted in South Africa (HSRC 2008; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010; Mkhize 2017). Xenophobic violence can also be a societal movement of those disadvantaged as most of the incidences are carried out in disadvantaged communities by mostly poor Black people residing in townships and informal settlements.

3.3.8 Ineffective Immigration Policies

Literature examines the government's role and its immigration policies as linked to the increase of xenophobic attacks. Muchiri (2016: 78) explains the “relationship between immigration and xenophobia in South Africa, indicating that immigration policies play a huge role in exacerbating or reducing the xenophobic sentiments.” The government has been accused of failing to reform its immigration system to achieve an effective policy to manage immigrants’ admission into South Africa (Aggad and Sidiropoulos 2008). Given the economic disparities between South Africa and other African countries, the country is an attractive destination. South Africa has a long history of attracting migrants, particularly those attracted to the mining industry. The demise of apartheid in 1994 opened the country to foreigners who came in as refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, and students. South Africa is characterized by migrants from many countries around the world. These migrants are involved in both low and high-skilled jobs. Despite this change, the South African migration policy remained fixated. This fixation was manifested in how the Aliens Control Act of 1991 remained the country’s immigration policy for almost a decade despite the advent of democracy. Despite amendments to the country’s immigration policy, the country’s immigration continued to be underpinned by the ideologies of discrimination, control, and prejudice akin to that of the apartheid regime—further amendments in 2003 increase migration restrictions in South Africa (Landau 2005).

The Republic lacks a comprehensible immigration method, which has caused unrestrained immigration, which precipitates frustration and eruptions of violence against foreign nationals. Aggad and Sidiropoulos (2008: 159) back this argument that “regrettably, immigration law remains one of the apartheid legacies that South Africa maintains, with slight changes, from which xenophobic attitudes grow and explode.” For example, Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 11) explains that

the government does not have a clear plan as to how to reduce or eradicate the frequent occurrence of attacks in the country, and finally, the entrenched political rhetoric regarding foreigners within South African politics (especially those from Africa) has fuelled Afrophobic attacks and, in turn, complicated South Africa’s standing among African countries.

Moreover, when these attacks occur, it is argued that the government is taken off guard and uses reactive measures to curb the violence.

During the apartheid era, policies persisted in influencing immigration policies in South Africa (Maharaj 2002; Dodson 2010). Maharaj (2002) explains that white immigrants during and post-apartheid period were offered the first choice in terms of applications for residence permits. Adeogun and Faluyi (2018: 130) asserts that this strengthened racial discrimination; whereas black foreigners are frequently viewed as rogues, illegal migrants, and job snatchers and are seen as threats to the state, economy, and society, their white counterparts are regarded as investors, tourists and a blessing to the nation (Worby, Hassim and Kupe 2008; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 130).

According to Adeogun and Faluyi (2018: 131), “some organizations have forged statistics that show that the presence of both legal and illegal immigrants has become a threat to the nation’s economy in South Africa.” The reason behind this was to provoke the multitudes against foreigners and bolster assaults on black immigrants. For instance, Maina *et al.* (2011) explain that public officials like immigration officers, police, and some politicians mention inflated numbers to remove black foreign nationals from the republic. Moreover, the media also supports these misleading claims. Also, Adjai and Lazaridis (2013: 199) explain that Black immigrants are “screened by the police based on the mode of dress, hairstyles, shape of the head, and accent, and subsequently subjected to racist or xenophobic violence.” Besides, even “lawful non-nationals with residence permits are occasionally arrested by the police, and their passports are destroyed; they hence have no way of proving their status and country of origin” (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 131).

According to Muchiri (2012), South Africa lacks a specific, well-known, official hate crime reporting and monitoring mechanism which can be used to collect data on xenophobic and Afrophobic crimes and encourages the police to record potential bias on hate or violent crime. This has subsequently hindered policymakers from understanding the full scope of the problem and developing adequate responses (Muchiri 2012). Regrettably, the country does not plan how these attacks can be eradicated within society (Hunter 2015). The failure, therefore, has caused a strain in relations with countries in the region and beyond. Jones (2018) also states an excellent need for South Africa to ensure foreigners' safety. However, “the lack of observable policy aimed at stopping xenophobia has portrayed South Africa as an intolerant country with a deep hatred for people with Black skin from Africa” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 22). In South Africa, no by-law openly speaks of fighting xenophobia and other prejudice-driven offenses (Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019), as the Hate Speech Bill is still in the process of being passed

as a law at the time of writing this thesis. According to Dlamini *et al.* (2020: 22), “when property belonging to foreign nationals are attacked, the wrongdoers are commonly dealt with under the country’s general criminal law.” Without a specific law addressing it and other related crimes, the fight for its eradication is hindered, “thus creating and promoting a deep-seated sense of impunity amongst culprits of attacks on foreigners” (Crush and Tawodzera 2017: 22). Reports of xenophobic sentiments “cloud the parameters of justice for law enforcers” (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 22).

3.3.9 Media and Fake News

The media can be viewed as an unconventional tool for disempowering and diminishing non-citizens through misrepresentation. While public broadcasting might have changed in the post-colonial dispensation, “it is still found at the helm of employing inappropriate and discriminatory terminology to describe Black African immigrants” (Nyamnjoh 2010: 69), which has the potential to incite stereotypes and attitudes. Mass media is to blame for the violent attacks related to the hatred for foreigners in South Africa, owing to its failure to preach diversity, culture and, most importantly, highlight the socio-economic experiences of foreigners migrating to South Africa. Although this appears to be a mammoth task for the media, it ought to have played its role in exposing these societal anomalies. However, some media platforms must be applauded for ensuring that these violent attacks are exposed. For instance, many newspapers went as far as clearly describing the nature and reality of foreigners’ attacks. This occurred mainly during the 2015 attacks on foreign nationals. However, political office bearers criticized many media platforms who contended that such transparency paints a dire picture of South Africa in the world’s eyes.

Fake news content has engaged and duped millions of readers across the globe, and it has generated serious xenophobic attitudes concerning the presence of immigrants in host countries. There was “an increasing amount of writing on mis- and dis-information in Africa” (Chenzi 2020: 8). Using South Africa as one of the case studies, Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2019) conducted a survey of how people from the Republic perceived that they were being exposed to mis- and disinformation campaigns. By utilizing information acquired from an online survey taken in 2018 and 2019 from educated South Africans, Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2019: 119-120) discovered that “there was a strong perception from the sample population that they were exposed to disinformation and they also claimed that mobile phones aided the spread of fake news.”

Media in South Africa play a critical role in triggering xenophobic sentiments. Chenzi (2020: 1) explores how fake news and social media influence South Africa's xenophobia phenomenon, and the findings reveal that fake news and social media cause xenophobic sentiments and xenophobia. Research findings by Chingwete, Dryding and Dessein (2018) indicate that while 48% of South Africans maintained that they never get their news from social media, 70% got their information from television, and 56% from the radio. However, it was indisputable that there was an increase in news consumption on mobile devices and that social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp) usage was on the rise. Henceforth, social media was increasingly developing as one of the catalysts of current xenophobic narratives in South Africa, but the influence of fake news was not consistent all over the nation.

For more than a decade, the media and government officials gave South Africans a false image of the size and impacts of migrants (Crush 2001). Such misinformation sustained negative attitudes towards foreigners (McDonald and Jacobs 2005b; Chiumbu and Moyo 2018; Somdyala 2019; Chenzi 2020). These attitudes are manifest in hostility and violent attacks of non-citizens. The media has also been blamed for shaping foreigners' negative attitudes (Kersting 2009; Nyamnjoh 2010). Media coverage of criminal activities in South Africa gives the sense that migrants from African countries are to blame for the rising illegal activities. This media coverage of crimes perpetrated by African migrants has continued to persist even though South African citizens and non-immigrants are involved in criminal activities in the country (Nyamnjoh 2010). Also, the media has been accused of exaggerating the issue of "immigration with screaming and alarmist headlines such as: "Illegals in SA add to decay of cities," "6 million migrants headed our way", "Africa floods into Cape Town," and "Francophone invasion" (Nyamnjoh 2010). These headlines blow the phenomenon of immigration out of proportion. It frames the presence of foreigners in the country as a problem that needs to be addressed, defending the nation against foreign invasion (Okem and Asuelime 2015). Such an attitude runs contrary to South Africa's constitution, according to which South Africa belongs to all who live in it.

According to Chenzi (2020: 1), xenophobic fake news "chiefly manifests in the context of the country's urban settings where both black foreigners and locals live." This was because the urban context has several conditions that make it possible for xenophobic social media fake news to grow. Apart from being technologically ahead, which is exceedingly favourable for

digital social media communication systems, urban locations also house massive numbers of both locals and foreign nationals who, in most circumstances, hold suspicions against each other. There is ample proof to imply that “social media platforms are gradually becoming catalysts in spreading fake news reports, which usually escalates the xenophobia situation within and outside South Africa” (Xinhua 2019). Furthermore, fake social media content about the xenophobic violence in South Africa has been considered one of the triggers of reprisal attacks against South African nationals and South African-owned businesses located in other parts of the continent (Mkandawire 2015; Somdyala 2019).

South Africa is constitutionally compelled to provide legal security to all immigrants who live within its borders, and Pineteh (2017) contends that the violence on foreigners says a lot regarding its politics of inclusion or exclusion. However, various scholars posit that xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa is not a result of fake news. Instead, it was mainly motivated by the broader politics of autochthony, migration, and belonging (Landau 2010, 2014; Pineteh 2017). Landau (2005) also detailed that “xenophobia in South Africa expresses in the form of ‘cosmopolitanism’ whereby foreign-born populations mingle with South African citizens in townships and the country’s ‘forbidden cities,’ – areas once off-limits to South Africa’s Black population.” These urban settings create a ‘deficit of belonging’ against the foreign newcomer’s encroachment on the forbidden cities (Landau and Freemantle 2010). This stand-off between South Africa’s autochthons against the alien ‘other’ was where social media and fake news come into play. Hence, social media-driven fake news, though not necessarily the cause of xenophobia’s current manifestations, acts as a catalyst. Social media platforms manifest as weapons of choice, forging online communities to trumpet concerns of both the autochthons and aliens. These “web-based communities are not immune to fake or fabricated information which has a tendency to find ready audiences who use it to reinforce their own subjective experiences and beliefs which in turn escalate tensions” (Chenzi 2020: 2).

Samanga (2019) also “claimed that the fresh spate of xenophobic attacks in September 2019 towards African foreign nationals living in the central parts of Johannesburg provided fake news with the opportunity to accelerate the xenophobia situation unnecessarily.” On a similar note, Oneko (2019) claimed that fake xenophobia news was also responsible for increasing xenophobic violence against foreigners in South Africa. According to Oneko (2019): “At the height of the September 2019 xenophobic violence in South Africa, WhatsApp messages, announcing dates on which foreigners would be attacked and killed if they did not leave the

country, circulated.” Therefore, attacks on shops owned by people from other parts of Africa spread to various neighbourhoods (Oneko 2019).

Notwithstanding the above, it is essential to note that fake news in South Africa is not necessarily the cause of xenophobic violence. However, its unregulated use by citizens and foreigners intensifies the tension between autochthons and aliens, especially within the urban communities. Furthermore, xenophobic fake news in South Africa was not only in the form of inaccurate stories about xenophobia but, as highlighted above, it manifests in different forms, some of which may be real stories that are taken out of context, ending up misleading the audience to behave negatively. Thus, “fake news manifests in different forms, including but not limited to text messages, videos, speeches, and pictures” (Karrim 2019).

3.4 Socio-economic causes of xenophobia

3.4.1 Poor Socio-Economic Situation of Black South African

A common justification for anti-immigrant feeling, as previously defined, is that poverty and economic underdevelopment are drivers of xenophobia in the country. The recurrence of attacks against non-nationals has been observed in disadvantaged communities characterized by informal settlements, high unemployment and poverty levels, overcrowding, deteriorating services, and competition for scarce resources (Silverman and Zack 2008: 147). Empirical studies have established that socio-economic deprivation is a significant cause of hostilities towards foreign nationals in South Africa (Gordon 2017: 39; 2020). In the African Peer Review Mechanism report (2013: 112), this link was made, the authors of the report stating that “socio-economic circumstances precipitate some resentment towards foreigners who in certain sections of the labour market seem to be favoured by employers because they work hard for much lower wages than are offered to citizens.”

Xenophobic sentiments in South Africa are deep-seated as foreign nationals are perceived as competitors for scarce jobs. They are also viewed as people who bring diseases into the country and place unnecessary pressure on limited government services (Nyamnjoh 2006; Muchiri 2016). Most xenophobic attacks have emanated from informal settlements, and peri-urban centres lend credence to the claim that they result from dissatisfaction with the quality of service delivery in these communities (HSRC 2008). This was why Valji (2003) argues that “an examination of this phenomenon and its manifestation reveals that ‘the foreigner’ has

become a site for the violent convergence of a host of unresolved social tensions.” Moreover, they have been used to cover up the failures of politicians in fulfilling their mandates to the residence of these settlements, which are often characterized by lack of proper housing, absence of adequate water and sanitation facilities, high unemployment, and crimes (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005; Okem and Asuelime 2015: 45).

In South Africa, economic justifications for anti-immigrant sentiment in the country are regularly grounded in understanding the agreed democratic shift. From a system founded on racial tyranny and repression, the nation has shifted to a multiracial democracy has created a variety of new democratic rights for South Africa’s previously repressed population groups. However, this shift has, at the same time, generated a deep contention over the fulfilment of these rights (Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010). In the post-apartheid era, “while people’s expectations have been heightened, a realization that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and indignation are at their peak” (Tshitereke 1999: 4). This was the perfect position for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish (Gordon, Roberts and Struwig 2015; Gordon 2017: 39; 2020). Inequalities in socio-economic resources continue to impede social cohesion in communities; the anxiety of oppression and poverty of South Africans under these conditions have worsened over the years (Magwaza 2018: 42; Magwaza and Ntini 2020). The attacks of foreigners by communities are orchestrated to solve the scarce job opportunities though that does not resolve the issue in the end.

Moreover, it was often stated that foreign nationals work for wages South Africans cannot work for, and this has also become part and parcel of the xenophobic problem in South Africa. Besides, Heleta (2018) argues that any factual evidence does not back up the anti-immigrant crusade as the study indicates that immigrants do not steal jobs from South Africans and that foreigners are not responsible for the high crime rates. The majority of foreign nationals also do not receive any government support, such as social grants, and have to fend for survival. However, despite these, what was clear was that such facts do not matter to South African politicians who continue to see foreigners as a threat to society. In line with Heleta (2018), the South African government sees poor and unskilled African migrants and asylum seekers as threats to the country’s security and prosperity and tries its best to ensure they stay out of the country. Nevertheless, such measures have not been successful. The South African White Paper on International Migration approved by the government in March 2017 separates immigrants into “worthy” and “unworthy” individuals.

Foreigners who have skills and money are welcome to the country and permanently stay in South Africa (Heleta 2018). Poor and unskilled immigrants, who are predominantly from the African continent, will be prevented from coming to and staying in South Africa by any means, and this, to a great extent, can be interpreted as xenophobic sentiments. One cannot deny that South African society was somewhat hostile and intolerant towards foreign nationals from Africa. However, Mamabolo (2015) argues that such was not because South Africa hate or dislike Black Africans, but that inequality, poverty, and unemployment are factors at the centre of xenophobic outbreaks in the country and, regrettably, the government has failed to deal with these attacks when they break out and at ensuring they do not reoccur.

Xenophobia happens more notably when the citizens' collective well-being appears unstable (Gordon, Roberts and Struwig 2015). Unemployment in South Africa "was pegged at 26.6% in the second quarter of 2018" (StatsSA 2018). The "extended classification of unemployment, involving the number of people who have stopped looking for work, rose to 36.7% in the first quarter of 2018, and the number of unemployed people increased to 5.89 million" (StatsSA 2018). The criminality level, the Automated Teller Machines (ATM) bombing, and the cash heist incidents escalated. Severe economic and social problems confront the country, and the blame was placed on foreigners (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 4). Moreover, "competition for the few employment opportunities is high, and often foreigners get them because they are willing to take up low wages and are prepared to work under more impoverished conditions" (Landau 2010). At the peak of the xenophobic attacks in 2008, "many community leaders publicly lashed out at foreigners for their alleged role in fuelling unemployment and crime" (Gordon, Roberts and Struwig 2015: 8).

3.4.2 Economic Competition between nationals and non-nationals

The interests behind attacking and removing foreigners from communities are diverse and not always immediately evident. However, by closely looking at and analysing instigators' motivations discussed above, Misago (2017: 44) research findings show that xenophobic violence was primarily "politics by other means." He further explains that instigators organize the attacks to assert or strengthen the influence needed to further their political and economic interests. Indeed, managing attacks on and removing "unwanted" outsiders has proved to be a highly effective strategy for securing people's trust, gaining legitimacy, and expanding a client base and the revenues associated with it. The finding was in line with the "elite manipulation

theory,” stipulating that elites often strategically mobilize existing or purposely created popular discontent into collective action for maximum political and economic gain (Oberschall 2010).

Post-apartheid South Africa embraced welfarism to cushion the effects of historical injustice on black South Africans; however, this has not significantly improved their lives. The informal sector that enables many locals to survive has also attracted unskilled immigrants, restricting South Africans’ opportunities. This was especially valid for refugees and asylum seekers who cannot obtain formal jobs (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). South Africans who sell the same or similar goods experience declining sales due to the infiltration of the market by foreigners who sell their goods at a lower price (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). This has been one reason for hostilities between locals and ‘outsiders’ (Adeogun and Faluyi 2018: 129).

Many Somali immigrants, who operate spaza shops (informal convenience shops) in the townships and informal settlements, have borne the brunt of violent attacks against foreigners. This violence, which often starts in the form of protests against poor service delivery (a governance issue that has little to do with immigrants), has sometimes been referred to as Afrophobia (Waiganjo 2018). However, as Lawrence Piper and Andrew Charman (who interviewed 107 spaza shopkeepers in Delft, a low area in the city of Cape Town) have argued, this hostility was due to the competition for business between Somalis and South Africans in the township retail sector rather than Afrophobia (Charman and Piper 2012). This was a plausible explanation for Somalis’ hostility, as Black South African township entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward other “outsiders” have shown (Dube 2019: 202).

3.4.3 Poor service delivery

Research findings on the new triggers of xenophobic violence by Magwaza and Ntini (2020) revealed that inefficient service delivery triggered the socio-economic battle between South Africans and foreign nationals, mainly black immigrants living in poor communities. Foreign nationals occupying government houses have triggered recent violence (Magwaza 2018: 72). Nyamnjoh (2006) states that RDP houses were implemented to enable South African citizens to live. However, over the years, RDP houses have been sold and rented out to non-South Africans; thus, South Africans claim foreign nationals exacerbate the shortage of homes. Hence, inadequate services triggered socio-economic violence in South Africa.

These findings are similar to those of Monson (2011), who found that the government's inability to serve the people dutifully has created social division amongst South Africans and foreigners. From the respondents, recent xenophobic violence resulted from the occupation of RDP houses by non-South African citizens. Dodson (2010) reports that South Africans sell or rent out these RDP houses to foreigners, which exacerbates the community's housing shortage. The respondents said that this resulted in community tensions around housing and service delivery, such as electricity, clinics. Hence, South Africans and their perceptions of foreigners occupying RDP houses perpetuate xenophobic violence and competing for health facilities entitled to them. It was evident from the findings that relative deprivation arises from a subjective feeling of discontent in the society based on the belief that one was getting less than one feels entitled to and a gap between aspirations and reality, perpetuating the violence. Reports from several scholars reveal that that socio-economic opportunity should be given first to natives before foreigners. (Mngxitama 2008; Everatt 2011; Matsinhe 2011). The research findings show that South Africans are fighting for their survival because of the scarce resources available for their existence. Such an argument leads to the discourse of entitlement over resources that South Africans perceive to have. These findings illustrate how foreigners are excluded from resources based on South Africans' beliefs first, then foreigners (Magwaza 2018: 73).

South African local leadership has been synonymous with service delivery demonstrations since obtaining democratic power in 1994. The "service delivery protests have been accompanied by images of burnt tyres, looting of goods, destruction of property, road blockades, and violence against foreigners" (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 41). Frustrated local citizens perpetrated these atrocities. The protests give one "an impression that the government fails to deliver essential services to the people, especially at the local government level" (Seokoma 2016). Most South African people expected a new start, a world packed with no violence, prejudice, inequality, and a state where human rights are respected. During the transition period, people foresaw themselves out of poverty and living a better life. The government of South Africa adopted several policies to ensure economic growth and the creation of Jobs. However, the policies remained short of meeting people's needs. This marked the widespread protest for providing the country's services (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 41).

Most studies have shown that the absence of service delivery was due to the local government's inability to deal with service delivery matters (Zama 2012; Mbazira 2013; Mbecke 2014). This is ascribed to a multitude of difficulties in the functioning of the local authorities. The socio-economic problems in South Africa are also fuelling the rate of protest in the country, and most of them result in violence. This has been attributed to several factors: "poor local governance, inequality, and poverty have been identified as the most significant drivers of service delivery protest in South Africa" (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 42). The South African Black population arose from an experience where they were persecuted and isolated by the White apartheid system. The "Government of National Unity (GNU) faced a huge responsibility in 1994 to readdress apartheid policy legacies of poverty, inequality, and racial segregation of service to create a single, efficient public service delivered on the basic needs of all citizens" (Managa 2012: 2).

Over the years, most of these protests have been marked by exceptionally high violence and vandalism levels, as people vent their frustration and anger. This perpetuates the perception, and sadly the punitive experiences, of brutality in the republic. The "attacks on foreign nationals in acts of xenophobia – in the misguided belief that foreigners were reducing job opportunities for South Africans – and the callous response from the police service have resulted in the deaths of many" (Managa 2012: 1). Many of these protests have occurred in informal settlements and townships. This proposes that "communities living in informal settlements with high poverty rates and unemployment on the periphery of metro areas are more likely to demand better service delivery, as they live near a suburban neighbourhood" (Managa 2012: 2).

Political campaign manifestos have also formed disquiet, as politicians make short-term pledges most likely to placate voters during each new election campaign. In so doing, "politicians raise the public's expectations, creating false perceptions that, following the election, communities will receive the services promised" (Managa 2012: 2). Most election manifestos and campaigns of partaking in political parties have shared a sequence of frequent themes since 1994: tackling failing municipalities to improve poor service delivery; improving primary service delivery; improving infrastructure; combating corruption; and generating employment.

Once these pledges are not produced, people start to panic and recourse to demonstrations. One would agree with Thabile Sokuta's declaration that "the South African voting public has been promised much and 'a better life for all' each time a new government was formed after each election" (Sokuta 2011). The circle persists while most citizens grapple with joblessness, starvation, and deprivation while establishing a safer living environment. Poor living settings directly destabilize the constitutional obligation to fundamental human rights and dignity (Sokuta 2011). As a cause of this dissatisfaction, "many South Africans take to the streets in protest, hoping that their voices will be heard" (Managa 2012: 2). High levels of unemployment and poverty worsen discontent regarding poor service delivery, especially in the townships and informal communities, where unemployment and poverty are pervasive (Managa 2012).

The absence of reaction by the needed government departments has been at the centre of the public protest in South Africa. In nearly all incidents, the community members report the relevant authorities' problem, but they take time to be responded. This was "problematic when dealing with communities in need of change" (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 43). Several scholarly works have pointed out that xenophobic attacks were a sheer expression of the locals protesting service delivery in South Africa (Desai 2008; Pillay *et al.* 2008; Desai 2015).

Karamoko and Jain (2011) concur with the opinions stated above when they state that the "extent to which foreigners or their property have been targeted during service delivery protests are difficult to measure objectively." Although the existence of a protest itself or the use of violent force during a protest was overt acts, deciding whether foreigners were precisely aimed at during protests was tougher to measure. They are those cases where the community members assault the foreigners and plunder their supplies; however, it was not definite to say that the damage had a xenophobic motive, as random demolition of the property was frequently mentioned as a manifestation of discontent. People tend to turn violent when they protest; this can be attributed to the culture of violence, anti-foreigners' sentiment within the community, and the high crime rates. Service delivery protests cannot explain the xenophobic attacks or the looting of the shops owned by foreigners. However, due to failure to explain xenophobia, all the protests, which involve the foreigners' attack and looting, have been cited as service delivery protests.

Most protests in South Africa, whether service delivery or some other motivation, have resulted in foreign-owned supplies' plundering. Some of the claims which were raised against the

foreigners comprise “the locals argue that businesses of these foreigners are not registered, and they do not pay taxes; foreign nationals sell products at prices below those that local business owners conclude are feasible and are therefore receiving illegal support; foreign nationals receive unfair privileges from wholesale companies due to shared religious beliefs (Madlala 2016); foreign nationals intentionally open spaza shops within proximity to locally-owned businesses, thereby capturing some of the locals' markets; foreign-owned companies sell fake goods or non-South African products; foreign businesses owners operate their shops for nearly 24 hours every day and even have workers sleeping there” (Hans 2016; Madlala 2016). These are the factors that local people consider unfair to them. The aspects pointed above can be explained as the lack of business insight on the indigenous people. Though, “some felt being a South African citizen by right gives them the power to take what they believed to be theirs and drive foreigners back to their country” (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 45).

3.4.4 Distrust of the Immigrants

The government has gradually passed rules that produce a zero-sum atmosphere where residents have rights and immigrants have none, dispatching a mistrust message (Campbell 2016). These rules misguidedly generate an expectation that citizen rights trump human rights. New visa regulations make it harder for foreigners to obtain a general work visa by forcing employers to not only explain why a citizen or permanent resident could not fill the position but offer proof of its efforts to do so, and even target foreign families, forcing them to carry copies of unabridged birth certificates. Further, “the government motioned a new land bill, which bars foreigners from owning agricultural land in South Africa” (Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016: 44). These are some of the laws that give super treatment to the locals by ensuring that citizens come first in everything.

3.5 Popular explanations on Xenophobic Violence and their Limitations

Many authors involved in the xenophobia studies (Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999; Harris 2002) have projected several elucidations at diverse phases. Xenophobia was best understood within a specific economic, cultural, and political context. Hypotheses, such as scapegoating, isolation, and bio-cultural hypothesis, have been advanced vis-à-vis xenophobia (Tewari 2015: 5). However, these hypotheses do not question xenophobia itself, and they do offer theoretical foundations. It was essential to examine societal interactions and identities. A brief review of each theory is given next.

3.5.1 Bio-Cultural Hypothesis

As noted in Chapter 1, xenophobic attacks predominately affect Black Africans as they have been the immigrants who are at a higher risk compared to others. To explain why xenophobic attacks mainly targeted Black Africans in South Africa, Harris (2002) used what he termed a bio-cultural hypothesis. The bio-cultural theory “locates xenophobia at the level of observable difference, or otherness, that is, in terms of physical-biological factors and cultural differences displayed by African foreigners in the country” (Tewari 2015: 5). For example, Morris (1998: 1125) advocates that the Nigerians and the Congolese “are straightforwardly recognizable as the other.” Tewari (2015: 7) explains that “this is due to their physical features, their bearing, their clothing style, and their incapability to speak one of the native languages; they are overall noticeably different, and local people are easily able to pick them out and scapegoat them.”

Dube (2018: 2) articulates that Black Africans are targeted as they are easy to spot. According to Harris (2002), foreigners are focused upon on the grounds of observable traits. However, xenophobia in South Africa does not affect all foreigners equally, and mainly black Africans are at a higher risk (Dube 2018: 3; 2019). Various scholars agree that African foreign nationals are susceptible to violence and hostility (Hickel 2014; Tshaka 2016; Akinola 2017; Claassen 2017; Goddey 2017; Kempen 2017; Masenya 2017; Mkhize 2017; Mutanda 2017; Chiumbu and Moyo 2018; Dube 2018; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019; Dube 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019). The bio-cultural hypothesis, therefore, unpacks the unequal targeting of African immigrants by the local South Africans.

Also, “the socio-biological theory explains that there are bio-cultural features that can be used to describe the difference among and between foreign and South African nationals”(Tewari 2015: 7). Exponents of this concept contend that “the variance between South African and foreign nationals can be virtually distinguishable based on their characteristics such as hairstyles, accents, language, dress, and physical appearances” (Davis 2010: 10). Although these bio-cultural elements offer “the primary identifiers which assist in pinpointing who was a South African and who was a foreign national, it offers very little explanation for the reason for these attacks” (Tewari 2015: 7).

The shortfall of the bio-cultural argument is, however, visible as “it fails to tell one why other racial groups such as Whites or Arabs (who also have unique racial, physical and cultural

identifiers) are not likewise attacked” (Adibe 2017: 168). Also, the bio-cultural argument “does not offer satisfactory clarifications on how these identifiers lead to connotations that permit attacks” (Adibe 2017: 168). It was argued that there are no recorded instances of White foreigners in the literature, some of whom are in South Africa unlawfully, being victims of xenophobia. Similarly, “very few Asians have been targeted” (Bekker 2010: 34). Biological-cultural “signifiers are implicated in xenophobia as they make it easy to identify specific categories of foreigners for violent action” (Dassah 2015: 138; Dlamini 2018). Still, it was challenging to depend on biological-cultural “indicators of disparity to justify otherness and resultant disproportionate xenophobia, as these descriptors also exist for Whites and Asians, who are somewhat less at risk of xenophobic violence as African Blacks” (Dassah 2015: 138).

3.5.2 The Scapegoating Hypothesis

The scapegoat theory is a theoretic context that was employed primarily in the fields of sociology and psychology. It tracks xenophobia to societal shift and transformation (Allport 1954). The hostility against foreigners was thought to arise because of the inadequate resources such as employment, housing, education, medical services, and other public services, which were entirely the expectation of the people during the transition period (Saleh 2015; Tsheola, Ramoroka and Muzondi 2015; Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016; Cinini and Singh 2019; Mlambo 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Magwaza and Ntini 2020; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Banda (2014) points out that frustrations lead to prejudice, particularly among deprived communities, and in so doing, they find scapegoats who are mostly immigrants. At the start of the democratic system, the black majority had complex expectations of the latest regime. As time went by, they quickly grasped that their anticipations were not going to be achieved (Hickel 2014; Fungurai 2015; Claassen 2017; Goddey 2017; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). This disparity between the hopes and the reality was packed with dissatisfaction (Gomo 2010). This triggered the Black South African residents to turn their fury on the immigrants living in South Africa. Briefly, the immigrants became the scapegoat, and the South African people, instead of turning their anger on the government, fashioned violence against the immigrants as a way of protest.

The perseverance of “unemployment, poverty, crime and poor material conditions have undoubtedly augmented the pressure on foreign Black Africans and deepened the propensity of the local population to blame African immigrants for the lack of order and progress in post-apartheid society” (Morris 1998: 1125). The African immigrants are the ‘other’ who appear to

disturb the social order, contributing to them being scapegoated. Research and historical events have signposted that if a majority group is in a risky economic position, they are more likely to feel threatened by minorities, especially if they are foreign (Quillian 1995). A “mystifying feature in this regard was that the Nigerian and Congolese populations are small, and most are not employed in the formal sector” (Morris 1998: 1125).

Regardless of the differing attitudes towards foreign nationals, the anti-foreigner sentiments are widespread all over the South African society to the Black Africans. There are many clarifications for anti-foreigner beliefs rooted in individual psychology, economic conditions, and South Africans’ historical and political settings (Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019). Immigrants are usually used as a political scapegoat to distract the people’s attention from the government’s faults and failures (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Singh 2005). Scapegoating stems from a relative deprivation and feeling of individuals (native) that foreigners are threats to their jobs, education, and healthcare, to mention a few (Tshitereke 1999; Harris 2002). In other words, a gap between one’s aspirations and reality leads to social discontent, and the insufficiency of resources can then be blamed on the foreigners as they also compete for the same resources (Ruedin 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Mlambo 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Zajec 2019; Chenzi 2020; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). These social discontents instigate people to scapegoat foreigners as the real cause of the problem, resulting in violence.

Morris (1998) stated that a majority group in a perilous economic state could be more prone to feeling threatened by minorities, especially foreigners (HSRC 2013). The psychological interpretation of scapegoating must be managed with socio-economic reality to understand xenophobia (Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019). In other words, this relates to jobs, houses, education, and even women; foreigners are thus scapegoated for stealing jobs, homes, and women. A regression investigation carried out by Ruedin (2017) of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (HSRC 2013) exhibited bright patterns designating that people in susceptible social and economic situations and people with less interaction with foreigners are xenophobic.

Two detailed social motivations for scapegoating foreigners are proposed. The government was prohibited from protecting citizens' civil and political rights to guarantee a range of social and economic services. Citizens thus needed to be given the first choice in providing jobs and other services (Sebola 2017). Secondly, “it was generally claimed that migrants cause local

unemployment and drive earnings down by accepting low wages” (Adepoju 2003: 11). South Africans view the immigrants as direct competitors for state resources (Steinberg 2008).

Foreigners are thus “associated with violent crimes and unemployment” (Everatt 2011: 16). Approximately 48% of South Africans feel that Black foreigners are a criminal threat (Crush and Williams 2003), unlike the white foreigners. Leggett (2003) reported that 63% of inner-city Johannesburg residents mentioned foreigners as the group causing most of the area’s crime. Ngcamu and Mantzaris (2019: 3) argue that “the South African government denied the 2008 cataclysm, blaming it on the criminal element, opposition, and disturbing forces, with the Minister of Intelligence blaming criminals and foreigners for instigating the xenophobic violence.” However, xenophobic violence can be noted as caused by anger and resentment, the spirit of obsessive citizenship, and an anti-outsider sentiment by South Africans.

Furthermore, Neocosmos (2010: 1) posits that “xenophobia was directed against Africans, with Mozambicans and Nigerians being the critical targets as they were perceived as the principal perpetrators of illegal immigration and drug dealing, according to the media.” He contends that foreigners who have reached South Africa for economic or political reasons are perceived to be involved in criminal acts. This means that the perception was created that all the survival activities of foreigners are criminal. Such discrimination was aggravated by the economic and social crisis facing the country. Therefore, Neocosmos (2010: 15) summaries “four theoretical positions on xenophobia: firstly, xenophobia excludes foreigners from communities; secondly, the process associated with exclusion is political, with the central role being played by the state; thirdly, xenophobia was founded on the elimination of foreigners from duties and citizenship; and finally, xenophobia was the result of a relationship between popular and state politics.”

According to Fungurai (2015) and Soyombo (2008), “the economic theory features xenophobic violence to poverty and unemployment (especially amongst the youth), which leads the citizens of a country to become xenophobic.” Xenophobic violence has been linked with a range of triggers, comprising resentment on the part of citizens concerning employment prospects, immigrants agreeing to lower salaries and foreign business successes (Clark 2011; Khosa and Kalitanyi 2014), foreigners’ attraction to local girls as they can afford to spoil them (Dodson and Oelofse 2000; Mnyaka 2003), “encouragement of prostitution (Nkealah 2011: 125), and foreigners being cheap laborers who ‘steal’ jobs from the locals” (Nyamnjoh 2006: 2; Steinberg 2010).

A link was established from the theories of aggression and frustration between relative deprivation, xenophobia, and collective violence. There was no agreement on the claims that non-nationals represent a significant drain on the state's financial resources. Although the scapegoating theory was plausible, it was neither able to explain why the foreign Black, specifically, should be the scapegoat for unemployment, poverty, and deprivation, nor why nationality was the criterion of scapegoating (Harris 2002).

Empirical data, however, proposes that foreigners are a disproportionately small threat. Published statistics revealed that foreigners constitute about 2% of those arrested (Harris 2001: 34). Most foreigners arrested are charged for illegal stay and not violent crime. The presence of foreigners certainly places an additional burden on public services, and the scapegoating hypothesis thus explains people's positive behaviour. However, it was not founded on the correct cause-and-effect relationship to explain why foreigners are scapegoated and why no other societal group is targeted. Scapegoating was wholly based on ignorance and a lack of social pedagogy.

3.5.3 Isolation Hypothesis

The isolation hypothesis was premised on the exclusion inaugurated by Apartheid to South Africans, which prevented their exposure to outsiders who were unknown to them. With the democratic transition, a door was opened to the rest of the world, and South Africa obtained an opportunity to be integrated into the global world. However, this very open border has resulted in the prejudice of immigrants. This theory posits that xenophobic attacks should be understood within the framework of many years of isolation experienced by the South Africans from the international community (Harris 2002; Williams 2008; Davis 2010). Williams (2008: 2) states that most South African citizens continue to see themselves as separated from the rest of the African continent as an outcome of many years of isolation from the international community. Proponents of this theory explain that the collapse of the apartheid system of governance has effectively brought South Africans closer to foreign nationals. The border between the formerly isolated South Africans and unknown foreign nationals generates a space for hostility (Harris 2002).

The democratic transition opened the door to the rest of the world, and South Africa became integrated into the world community. This very open interface has resulted in hostility. Once “a group has no history of incorporating strangers, it may find it difficult to be welcoming” (Morris 1998: 1125). According to Zoe Nkongolo of the non-governmental organization Africa Unite, lack of contact and engagement between communities encourage stereotyping and misconception of migrants and their impact on host communities (Nord and Assubuji 2008).

Moreover, when a group has no past of assimilating outsiders, it may find it difficult to be welcoming (Morris 1998: 1125). The isolation of South Africans during the apartheid years from the rest of Africa (besides Southern Africa) has meant, as the informants continually reiterated, that South Africans are unused to nationalities beyond southern Africa and find integrating them difficult. In the study carried out by Morris, the interviewees felt that inadequate education and South Africans’ isolation from the rest of the continent during the apartheid era was a fundamental explanation for their hostility. The argument was that they had been closed for longer, and they did not know anything about other countries (Morris 1998: 1125).

There was little doubt that the “brutal environment created by Apartheid, with its huge emphasis on boundary maintenance, has also impacted people’s ability to be tolerant of difference” (Banton 1983: 126). People see the difference as ominous rather than as an opportunity (Bauman 1989: 64). In South Africans’ case, the pervasive image of black Africans outside of the southern African region, especially Nigerians, was that they are all engaged in the illicit or immoral activity and are not worthy of inclusion. The widespread stereotype that all Nigerians in Johannesburg’s inner city are drug dealers and criminals was not surprising since it was voiced continuously in the media and by those in positions of power. The information disseminated by the media and those in influential positions has undoubtedly had a significant impact on how the ‘ingroup,’ in this case, South Africans, view the ‘outgroup,’ in this instance, Nigerians living in Johannesburg. As Hagendoorn (1993: 35) has stated, “...selected information results in a distorted image of the outgroup. If newspapers often report on the criminal activities of outgroup members, a criminal image emerges.”

Simply put, the isolation hypothesis for xenophobia stated that being different was threatening and hostility towards Black foreigners was based on them being foreign, unknown, and alien. Convincing as the isolation hypothesis was, Harris (2002) points out that it does not clarify

why 'the unknown' produces anxiety and why it culminates in aggression. However, the theory offers a link between South African Blacks' imposed internal isolation from other racial groups and their external isolation from the wider international community, including African countries, and their suspicion of and hostility towards foreign Blacks. Isolation has left many Black South Africans with very little or no knowledge about the rest of the continent. Therefore, many South Africans tend to depict South Africa as if it were in a different continent in daily exchanges.

The isolation hypothesis offers a highly inaccurate account as it appears to adopt, though erroneously, that migration was a new phenomenon in South Africa. This was a historically incorrect proposition in that the literature on migration points out the fact that Africans from the neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, to mention a few, have had to migrate into South Africa, even during Apartheid, as a source of cheap labour. In this way, they have been encountering ordinary South Africans. Some authors argued that South African citizens had coexisted peacefully with foreign nationals for many years.

Some scholars argue that South Africa's xenophobic violence occurrences echo the nation's past of isolation (Akinola 2014; Bekker 2015; Amusan and Mchunu 2017; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019). It is this isolation that disconnects South Africa from the rest of the region. During apartheid, South Africa's National Party devised numerous regulations, which made visiting or residing in South Africa unpleasant to many, especially those of non-European origin (Tshabalala 2015). Black South Africans have been isolated from the rest of the continent for many years due to their historical past. According to Loren Landau, apartheid policies were explicitly designed to disempower black South Africans, thus rendering them poorer (WorldPost 2015). With the end of apartheid, the blame for poverty was shifted to African migrants. Musewe (2015: 7) explicates that "Black South Africans view other Africans as foreigners, yet they do not label the whites the same." To this end, they have little appreciation of what they can benefit from other African countries. The history of apartheid should be the basis of peace education where citizens are educated on how their country helped from other African countries and how this should translate into co-existence and harmonious living (Mutanda 2017). The fact is that "many South Africans have never exited their country; therefore, they lack an appreciation of the role played by Africans in their struggle against apartheid" (Musewe 2015: 7). For xenophobic violence to be transformed, it was a matter of the government to educate its citizens on what leads to migration and putting measures to deal

with the situation as it arises. South Africans should be encouraged to appreciate that it is not by choice that some people from other countries come to their country. The contemporary “state of affairs in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Somalia, to mention a few, speak for themselves” (Mutanda 2017: 284).

3.6 Approaches to curb Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

With the outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa, various responses have been implemented to curb the violence. Amit (2010) and Sinwell (2011) elucidate that the reactions and strategies executed by the civil society and the government in reducing xenophobia have, however, been short-term and hence, do not offer long-term prevention of the recurrence of the xenophobic sentiments. Magwaza (2018: 45) also explains that “the execution of the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes Bill in September 2016 further suggests the ignorance of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) of South Africa only took a stand to address these attacks in 2016.” Briefly, the law promotes the right-based method by improving victims’ rights and delivering a clear and straightforward message that crimes driven by hate and xenophobia will not be accepted as they were subjected to punishment (Solomon and Kosaka 2013).

Neocosmos (2008) asserts that the government has failed to provide equal resources to all residents, mainly foreign nationals, as this essentially enhances social cohesion, which encourages community development. With this, a new model was needed “whereby a more community-based development approach is utilized rather than the clinical, epidemiological approach” (Magwaza 2018: 45). Several recommendations have been suggested to reduce xenophobia in South Africa. Campbell (2009) recommends a platform that will open an equal dialogue input and representation of both locals and foreign nationals. On the other hand, several scholars contend that community-based educations need to be created by communities for knowledge sharing about foreign nationals so that perceptions and negative attitudes of seeing foreigners as a threat are eradicated (Crush 2008; Everatt 2011; Matsinhe 2011). However, it has been argued that the government officials tend adopting strategies implemented by other nations forgetting that xenophobic violence in South Africa is a unique phenomenon (though not new), which makes it challenging to deal with the problem (Laher

2009; Dodson 2010). Therefore, unique models are needed to deal with xenophobic violence in South Africa that is context-based.

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter offered an insight into the historical and contemporary causes of xenophobic violence in South Africa. The chapter highlighted various triggers of violence that encompass the shortfalls of the justice system, the immigration policies, the role of media, and a few, that enable xenophobic sentiments to thrive in disadvantaged communities. The chapter found a consensus amongst several scholars that political, social, cultural, legal, and economic factors play a pivotal role in fuelling hostilities between the Black locals and Black foreign nationals.

CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Introduction

The causes of xenophobic violence are complex and numerous. Goddey (2017: 42) and Ngcamu and Mantzaris (2019: 2) attributes the roots of the xenophobic violence in Africa to multiple “factors including civil wars and communal crises, poverty and unemployment, cultural and biological differences, contestations on religion, and criminal activities including human trafficking.” The writers additionally mention that “the discrimination faced by foreigners from state security agencies, provocative statements by leaders and divisive media reporting, as root causes” (Goddey 2017: 42; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019: 2). There have been a plethora of authors who have ascribed such events to the dislike or hatred of foreigners by indigenous people (Ramphela 2008; Akinola 2014), cultural and biological differences (Nyamnjoh 2006), stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety (Mothibi, Roelofse and Tshivhase 2015), and scapegoating for social ills in a foreign country. Tafira (2011: 115) terms it as “a culturally based racism aggravated by ethnicity, speech patterns and accents, economic and social inequalities, cultural and ethnic differences, and social and territorial origins” (Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019: 2).

4.2 Theoretical Framework

This study responds to insufficiencies and limits of existing underlying clarifications for xenophobic violence, which has become an established feature in post-apartheid South Africa. The researcher contends that the deficiency of prevailing descriptive models lies in a dual range of investigative blind spots: i) several lack practical support, ii) others are inadequate due to their reductionist style, and iii) all have blindness to their inadequacies. The best of these clarifications can offer a descriptive explanation of the overall socio-economic setting in which xenophobic violence occurs, which, though appreciated, has not been an adequate account of xenophobic violence in some areas, not in others.

For this study, this thesis follows a theoretical framework based on the scapegoating theoretical lens of prejudice. Based on this theoretical lens, it can be argued that xenophobic violence is a multifaceted phenomenon. Xenophobic violence is notably “unpleasant as it displays a

violation of human rights” (Imelda, Xavier and Henrie 2016: 16). Scholars such as Hickel (2014) noted how xenophobia manifests itself, resulting in chaos, which explicates that xenophobia is not right for any society. Immigrants’ prejudice has contributed to the belief that immigrants are involved in criminal activities such as drug dealing within the South African context (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011).

4.2.1 Scapegoat Theory

The scapegoat theory provides the necessary framework “to understand the different mechanisms through which local communities in South Africa direct their anger at those who are seen as foreign to them” (Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020: 207). More crucially, the theory explores the process of ‘othering’ that is mostly associated with the phenomenon of xenophobia. The scapegoat theory’s adaptation in this study helped to tease out the circumstances leading to local South Africans passing out their frustrations on those perceived as the ‘foreign other.’ In this study, the scapegoat theory was used to examine the interplay (intersection) between disillusionment and displacement (anger or frustration). Moreover, the approach provided useful lenses for exploring the role of youth in orchestrating violence against foreign nations in various communities of Durban and finding ways in which young people can reduce xenophobic violence.

The researcher should state at the outset that scapegoating is not being offered here as a new, totalizing theory of xenophobic violence, nor does the researcher propose to suggest that violence against immigrants can be explained only through the specific theory. The researcher focused on the factors driving youth participation in xenophobic violence using the scapegoat theory, acknowledging that the xenophobia phenomenon was complex in South Africa. Therefore, scapegoating theory informs this study in understanding xenophobic violence in Durban.

4.3.2 Origins of Scapegoat Theory

The scapegoat theory is a theoretical framework used mainly in sociology and psychology (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 17; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020: 206), and Gordon W. Allport propounded it. Various scholars also use the theory to explain a wide range of social phenomena such as prejudice, discrimination, and xenophobia (Allport 1954; Tshitereke 1999;

Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). Scapegoat theory is a sociological theory that dissects aspects of bias in a period of change and social transition (Allport 1954). Gordon Allport observed that the term scapegoat derives from the goat's Biblical story that ancient Israelites used to carry their sins into the desert. Interpreting this story and the psychology of blame, displacement through the lens of psychoanalytic theory, Allport argued that scapegoating could occur as a particular case of defensive projection, that is, attributing to somebody else thought or an impulse that is feared in oneself (Allport 1954).

Scapegoat theory has long been relied upon to explain outbreaks of intolerance and repression of minority groups. Gregory (2004: 144) elucidates that "scapegoating is the process by which one finds a substitute victim on which to vent anger." As noted, the term comes from the Old Testament [Leviticus 16:8, 10, 26] and refers to the goat driven into the desert on the Day of Atonement to carry away Israel's sins. It was a way of cancelling the sins of individual Israelites, so they were "wiped off the books." It has since come to mean any substitute receipt of anger or rejection (Gibson and Howard 2007). The process is simple: "when there is tension, and social problems seem insurmountable, find an innocent, weak, and distinctive group to blame and victimize" (Babad, Birnbaum and Benne 1983: 103). Historians, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists have used scapegoat theory to account for outbreaks of prejudice and into portraits of the most egregious.

In scapegoating, the individual or group seeks to symbolically purge their own (mostly implicit) feelings of inferiority, guilt, and self-hatred by perceiving a target individual or an outgroup as immoral or dangerous, and by expelling, isolating, or otherwise punishing that scapegoated target (Rothschild *et al.* 2012). The scapegoat theory proponents posit that people instinctively seek groups upon whom to blame their misfortunes (Marrus 1982). The scapegoat theory holds that "in times of significant national trauma, the host population tends to blame minorities for its troubles (Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020: 207)." Stowe (2012: 188) concurs that "scapegoat theory suggests that difficult economic and political woes cause people to lash out against a convenient outgroup." This sense of intolerance was only heightened if the individual feels that the outgroup is cognitively related to the cause of dissatisfaction (Zawadzki 1948; Demo 2005).

Scapegoating is a procedure that involves lies about a harmless subject. The motive behind scapegoating was mixed, but fear is frequently the highest commonality. Scapegoating is the

“act of blaming and often punishing a person or a group for a negative outcome that is due, at least in large part, to other causes” (Rothschild *et al.* 2012: 1148). Countless scapegoats are compelled to escape their homes, to live private lives to prevent being tortured or killed in severe circumstances. Scapegoating is an old-fashioned tradition whereby a community shifted all their transgressions to an animal or human who was then thrown out or killed. This ceremonial action allowed the society to be re-established or liberated from whatever danger had beset it. More lately, “it has come to mean blaming an individual or a group for the misfortunes befalling a society or community, and scapegoating becomes the ‘necessary’ means used by the community for restoring social order” (Mallan 2013: 65).

According to Tella and Ogunnubi (2014), the scapegoating theory posits that the more powerful groups blame the vulnerable target groups for all societal ills, of which they may not be responsible. Black South Africans “blame Black immigrants for their misfortunes and economic hardships, which include unemployment, limited infrastructure, and the spread of diseases” (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 3). According to Tella and Ogunnubi (2014), scapegoating shifts aggression to another target when the original target becomes inaccessible or difficult. With this, one can assume that prejudice, driven by frustrations, leads to discrimination, mainly from marginalized local groups who identify foreigners as scapegoats (Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). Individuals shift their dissatisfaction onto accessible targets, thus concealing the real triggers of their fear. Hostile attitudes are formed about unmet promises and limited resources, such as housing, education, healthcare, and employment, coupled with high expectations during the transition (Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). These are “ideal circumstances for xenophobic acts to increase through the creation of a frustration scapegoat, who is perceived as the key reason for the local population’s continuous poverty and deprivation” (Tshitereke 1999: 4).

There was a predominant perception of the scapegoat as being innocent, with some scapegoats guilty of a crime or action. The idea of a guilty scapegoat seems a contradiction, an oxymoron. However, as the texts that follow demonstrate, past misdeeds’ history may not be evidence of a suspect’s guilt. Furthermore, scapegoats may not necessarily be individuals or groups of people who are blamed because of their ethnic, religious, or cultural difference from the mainstream community or society. Governments, political ideologies, and movements are also

blamed for society's ills and become scapegoats when they may not be fully responsible for current problems that beset a community (Mallan 2013: 66).

Sacrifice often entails a scapegoat or a victim on whom necessary violence of sorts is enacted for the community's good. This violence can take different forms – expulsion, concealment of the truth, false accusation, stigmatization, and abuse. In all of these actions against the scapegoat, the community engages in deception by concealing the truth or their deep-rooted fears. The scapegoat is both the evil and the cure (Girard 1978), and deception is a means of survival (Mallan 2013: 66). During times of turmoil, “political conflict is exacerbated, the stakes of politics rise, and citizens become frustrated and of unhappiness” (Gibson and Howard 2007: 196).

This theory helped to locate xenophobia within the context of social transition and change. Tella and Ogunnubi (2014) contend that in instances of limited resources coupled with high expectations, hostility can flourish towards foreigners. People often create a “frustration scapegoat” as a target to blame for ongoing deprivation and poverty. Foreigners, in the case of South Africa, often become scapegoats (Bordeau 2009). This was because they are perceived as a threat to education, health care, jobs, and housing. Various scholars concur that if the majority is in a risky economic position, they are most likely to feel threatened by minorities, especially if those minorities are foreigners (Akinola 2014; Bekker 2015; Akinola 2017; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Claassen 2017; Dube 2017, 2018; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019; Cinini and Singh 2019; Dube 2019). Generally, the scapegoating theory explains xenophobia in terms of broad social and economic factors.

Examining “racial prejudice as an accumulation of emotional defense strategies enables one to understand the phenomena as a strategy that brings multiple forces together to define the characteristics and parameters of intergroup dynamics and racial identities” (Dixon *et al.* 2008). Scapegoat theory is firmly attached to the concept of conflict theory; aggression towards the outgroup will occur when the in-group feels a conflict with the minority population for scarce resources (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong 1998). Following Kenneth Burke's writings, C. Allen Carter outlines three elements of the scapegoating process: hierarchical insecurity, a fear of death, and ethical guilt. Hierarchical insecurity can be well-defined as the thoughts of uncertainty that come with being higher on the ladder of influence than others. The meaning of a fear of death is the panic and uncertainty recognizing the certainty of one's downfall.

Lastly, ethical guilt can be “the feelings of guilt associated with not following all of the rules and moral guidelines of society at all times” (Stowe 2012: 189).

While Carter makes obvious and compelling distinctions between how these three elements interact with each other, Stowe (2012: 189) argues that “two of the elements can be attributed to the genesis of one: fear of death.” It does not appear likely to have uncertainty within those at the upper of a hierarchical arrangement without dropping one’s power, and a looming fear of death is coupled with this loss of control. Fear of death leads to uncertainty among those at the top of the hierarchical ladder. This sense of timidity leads the hierarchical privileged to pass regulations and conditions that bound the movement of those beneath them. No one can genuinely abide by every directive established by the powers of society, hence causing a perception of ethical guilt for falling short.

According to Stowe (2012: 189-190), hostility and frustration that are embodied by the majority populous are projected upon a minority community in six different ways:

- “*Indirect Hostility*: This is a roundabout way of projecting aggression, usually by devious means. Common indirect tactics have been shown to include practical jokes and malicious gossip.”
- “*Irritability*: This is a readiness to project negative attitudes with the slightest bit of provocation. This includes the projection of rudeness and exasperation.”
- “*Negativism*: Direct opposition that is most often projected upon authority. This is most commonly seen as a refusal to cooperate that may span from direct to in-direct noncompliance.”
- “*Resentment*: This is known as any sort of projected jealousy or hatred toward others. These feelings of anger usually refer to either a real or fantasized mistreatment.”
- “*Suspicion*: This sort of projection of hostility upon others usually varies from a simple feeling of distrust to a more direct belief of others planning harm.”
- “*Verbal Hostility*: Negative feelings that are expressed in either the style or the content of speech.” “The type of speech would include vocalic strategies such as control over the tonality of voice.” “The content of speech would consist of everything from direct threats of harm to simply being overcritical.”

Xenophobia is postulated in terms of relative deprivation and frustration. At the same time, Afrophobia is seen as the unreasonable distrust or anxiety of foreigners and strangers in one's country of the same race. Many foreigners in South Africa find shelter in informal urban settlements characterized by high housing shortages and poverty. The "competition for already limited resources is extreme" (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 17). This can explain the tendency to scapegoat black foreign nationals as being the source of increased poverty and unemployment in South Africa. Immigrants are seen as mere opportunists, only in South Africa for economic benefits (HSRC 2008). In their primary research carried out in 2008, "the Human Sciences Research Council referred to this situation as relative deprivation, which would explain the relationship between xenophobic violence and socio-economic factors where inequality and poverty lead to feelings of deprivation" (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 17).

Scapegoating stems from a relative deprivation and feeling of individuals (native) that foreigners are threats to their jobs, education, and healthcare, to mention a few (Tshitereke 1999; Harris 2002). In other words, a gap between one's aspirations and reality leads to social discontent, and the insufficiency of resources can then be blamed on the foreigners as they also compete for the same resources (Harris 2002). These social discontents instigate people to scapegoat foreigners as the real cause of the problem, resulting in violence.

In South Africa, the hate or hostility against African descent foreigners is deemed to be caused by limited resources such as employment, housing, education, medical services, and other public services that the natives expected during transitional periods (Tshitereke 1999; Harris 2002). Allport (1954) posits that frustrations lead to prejudice, especially among disadvantaged people, and, in this context, they identify a scapegoat who is usually a foreigner. During the transition into democracy, the Black majority had high expectations of the new government. As time passed by, they quickly grasped that their anticipations were never achieved (Tshitereke 1999). This gap between the expectations and the reality was filled with frustration (Gomo 2010), which turned into anger against the black South African population living in South Africa. The "immigrants became their scapegoats, and instead of directing their anger at the government, they took violence against foreigners as a form of protest" (Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020: 207).

Botha (2012) maintains that many South Africans' heightened expectations include reduced poverty and the equal distribution of wealth and resources; when these expectations are not

realized, people are disillusioned and frustrated. Thus, hostility to foreigners is explained by limited resources. Tella and Ogunnubi (2014) maintain that the economic and political instability are ideal circumstances for xenophobia to prosper and for people to create a 'frustration scapegoat' to blame for their ongoing deprivation and poverty. South Africa's people are "conceptualizing xenophobia in terms of their frustration and relative deprivation" (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 3).

According to Harris (2002), the scapegoating theory was based on relative deprivation, and it was an extension of prejudice. Amid unemployment, poverty, and inequality, the post-apartheid era has raised most South Africans' prospects to live better lives after decades of deprivation. As noted above, "these expectations have not materialized rapidly and substantially enough, and bring to the limelight the uneven distribution of resources wealth that breeds discontent" (Neocosmos 2010: 4). Given this background, hostility towards foreigners can be explained by competition for scarce resources such as housing, education, health care, and employment, as they create a frustration-scapegoat embodied in foreign migrants (Nyamnjoh 2006; Vahed and Desai 2013).

The hypothesis combines socio-economic factors with a psychological explanation of deprivation, which arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one was getting less than one was entitled to (Harris 2002; Dube 2017, 2018, 2019; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). This means citizens compare themselves to non-citizens concerning access to scarce resources, and when they see themselves as relatively deprived, they invent a frustration-scapegoat. Social ills and citizens' frustration and anger with life's difficulties are directed at the frustration-scapegoat, who takes the blame (Vahed and Desai 2013; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020).

Since 2008, South Africa has witnessed continuous xenophobic violence in various provinces, and at the same time, the locals have also been targeted (Landau 2011). With the recurrence of hostilities between locals and non-nationals, the government has taken a denial stance that the violence was xenophobic, blaming it on the criminal element, opposition, and sinister forces. According to Landau (2011: 2), "community leaders, business associations and gangsters attacked and killed shopkeepers." Landau believes that the xenophobic violence of 2008 in South Africa was triggered by anger, the principle of overenthusiastic nationality, and an anti-

outsider attitude. Neocosmos (2010: 1) posits that “xenophobia is directed against Africans, with Mozambicans and Nigerians as the critical targets because they are the key perpetrators of illegal immigration and drug dealing according to the media” (Ncube 2019; Erasmus 2020). Neocosmos (2010) argues that non-nationals who have reached South Africa for economic or political purposes are deemed tangled in criminal actions. This implies that the view is established that all the existing pursuits of immigrants are illegal. Such judgment was exacerbated by the economic and social catastrophe confronting the republic.

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa are associated with “the country’s transition to democracy and the local population’s frustrations” (Neocosmos 2010: 4). Various scholars associate xenophobia with South Africa’s historical exclusion from the rest of the African continent (Olukoju 2008; Tsheola, Ramoroka and Muzondi 2015; Tshaka 2016; Wose Kinge 2016; Pillay 2017; Pineteh 2017; Sebola 2017; Ukwandu 2017; van Rensburg 2017; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Zajec 2019). Neocosmos (2010: 15) outlines “four theoretical positions on xenophobia: firstly, xenophobia excludes foreigners from communities; secondly, the process associated with exclusion is political, with the central role played by the state; thirdly, xenophobia is founded on the exclusion of foreigners from duties and citizenship; and finally, xenophobia is the result of a relationship between popular and state politics.”

Matsinhe (2011) believes that foreigners have become the scapegoat for social ills prevalent virtually everywhere. These social ills include, among others, unacceptable crime levels, unemployment, and the spread of HIV/AIDS (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015; Gordon 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Gordon 2020). South Africa’s government’s inability to deal decisively with these social ills has bred frustration, especially among the poor and the unemployed. Furthermore, Misago, Freemantle and Landau (2015) reiterate that many explanations and common xenophobia hypotheses have emphasized social ills as a fundamental pillar or significant contributory factor to the phenomenon. However, these ills cannot be presented as sufficient justifications for violence as the outbreaks of violence occur mostly in informal settlements and townships (Mkhize and Makau 2018: 13).

Simultaneously, the relative deprivation thesis provides a useful analysis of the emergence of xenophobia, particularly in the post-apartheid context, which is still characterized by unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality. Given the inadequacy and the slowness of the government’s attempts to redress the inequalities of apartheid, dissatisfaction and frustration

appear to have become among the leading causes of the deprived masses venting anger against the foreigners (Matsinhe 2011). Although borders are generally open to allow legal free movement and free trade, people's mobility has long been considered a threat to residents' lives and the socio-economic order (Misago, Freemantle and Landau 2015). At present, "there are large discrepancies among foreign nationals and residents in terms of skills and social networks" (Mkhize and Makau 2018: 13).

Researchers in South Africa have made a collaborative attempt at understanding the anti-immigrant attitude in the country. When examining negative attitudes towards foreign nationals, several scholars have cited public frustrations over poverty, unemployment, and inadequate infrastructure as primary factors (Dodson 2010), who provides an exciting synopsis of the scholarly discourse on xenophobia in South Africa. Scholars such as Neocosmos (2010) contested this discourse, contending that establishing an exclusivist South African nationalism can better explain xenophobia in the country. Neocosmos also places full fault on the country's politically privileged, as well as senior government ministers. He alleges that their public declarations on migration aided in legitimizing an anti-foreigner discourse in the country (Klotz 2013). Nearly "all researchers writing about xenophobia in the country identify the origins of anti-immigrant sentiment in the racism, nationalism, and isolation of the apartheid era (Gordon 2017: 54)."

The xenophobic context of South Africa can be explained using the scapegoat theory of prejudice as locals always blame the foreigners (an outside group) as the cause of their socio-economic problems (Nyamnjoh 2006). Such had precipitated discrimination and even violence against non-nationals. Landau (2005: 127) writes that "foreigners in South Africa serve a dual purpose: as scapegoats, they preserve the post-apartheid project's legitimacy by providing convenient explanations for widespread crime, disease, and unemployment." More meaningfully, a brutalized foreign "other" underlines South Africans' mutual relationship with one another and the national sphere. Firstly, "foreigners become scapegoats, blamed for our own (or the government's) failings; secondly, foreigners become sacrifices – their humanity is sacrificed for our unity" (Cilliers 2020: 44). The scapegoat is a metaphor for sacrifice. Scapegoating is, however, not unique to xenophobia, and in this context, we note black African immigrants in South Africa chosen as the most prominent group chosen as scapegoats, and this has turned to be xenophobic.

In explaining how a specific group can be sacrificed for the unity of a larger or different group, René Girard (1989) explains how internal conflicts in communities are resolved given the existing hostilities and competition for the same resources between the groups. To unite local Black communities, a scapegoat is sacrificed whereby small-scale violence is directed against them. In this instance, the minority group (immigrants) are blamed for instabilities in disadvantaged communities and thus punished. Notably, “this scapegoat mechanism is not recognized as such by those doing the scapegoating. Scapegoating is not a utilitarian ‘sacrificing the one for the greater good of the many,’ recognizing that ‘the one’ is innocent” (Cilliers 2020: 44). Girard (2000: 117) contends that “those who scapegoat do not see their victims as innocent.” Instead, they genuinely consider that their scapegoats are to blame, as “truly responsible for all the disorders and ailments of the community” (Girard 2000: 14). Scapegoating “can only work as long as the victims are alleged as really evil or guilty, and so long as the scapegoats remain unaware of what they are doing” (Girard 1989: 101). Moreover, “Girard sees evidence of this scapegoat mechanism throughout history and indeed considers it one of the foundations of culture” (Girard 1989: 100).

4.3.3 Limitations of Scapegoat Theory

Glick (2005: 244) defines scapegoating “as an extreme form of prejudice in which an outgroup is unfairly blamed for having caused an ingroup’s misfortunes.” Despite his frequent use of scapegoat explanations and willingness to synthesize psychodynamic and frustration-aggression approaches, Allport provided an extensive critique of scapegoat theory (based partly on concerns expressed by Zawadzki, 1948), summarized below:

- a) “Frustration does not always lead to aggression.”
- b) “Aggression is not always displaced [but rather is more likely to be directed at the real source of frustration].”
- c) “Displacement does not relieve the feeling of frustration [because it does not address frustration’s underlying causes]”
- d) “The theory says nothing concerning the choice of scapegoats.”
- e) It is not true that a vulnerable minority is always chosen for displacement purposes [powerful groups are sometimes blamed].”
- f) “Available evidence does not indicate that the displacement tendency is any more common among people high in prejudice than among those low in prejudice.”
- g) “Finally, the theory itself overlooks the possibility of realistic social conflict.”

Zawadzki (1948: 127) contends that “the traditional scapegoat theory explains prejudice entirely from the groups’ stimulus characteristics, but is wrong in assuming that reputations are always accurate or well-deserved.” The new scapegoat theory of prejudice pays attention only to the motivation of the majority group. Frustration generates hostility, which is displaced to a vulnerable minority group and rationalized by blaming the minority for misfortunes, projecting bad traits on them, and stereotyping all members of the minority. The theory fails to explain why certain minorities are chosen for prejudice, while others are admired and why minorities are also prejudiced (Glick 2005: 241). There is a need for an accurate study of the characteristics of each group that antagonizes others. In addition to scapegoating, conscious values and philosophies likely contribute to prejudice.

According to the scapegoat theory, “prejudice or aggression toward members of the outgroup is the result of a displacement of aggression from a powerful frustration to a powerless minority group” (Öğretir and Özçelik 2008: 241). The scapegoat theory assumes that the minority group members serve as targets of such “displaced aggression.” This displacement is rationalized by blaming the minority for the frustration or attributing negative attributes to the minority (Glick 2005: 241). Furthermore, they cannot have explained why different groups become targets of ethnocentrism or the specific content of belief systems developed by ethnocentric individuals.

Theoretical developments since the 1950s suggest that scapegoating ought to be viewed as a collective rather than an individual process (Newman and Caldwell 2005). Subsequent work has accepted the fundamental role of frustration in scapegoating but focusing on the roles of shared (collective) frustrations (e.g., economic collapse, social disorder) that produce social movements with scapegoating ideologies that lead to organized persecution. Frustration’s role thus becomes indirect, with the ideology being the proximal cause of aggression (Glick 2005: 247).

Staub (1989)’s refinement of the frustration-aggression perspective suggests one answer to Allport’s first criticism that frustration (contrary to frustration-aggression theory) does not always turn into aggression against scapegoats. Staub theorized that genocides and mass killings require widespread, too “difficult living conditions” (due to social, political, and economic upheavals) that frustrate a host of basic needs, for physical wellbeing, safety, a sense of belonging, self-and group esteem, and hope for the future. Mundane frustrations are

insufficient to spawn scapegoating movements, which gain adherents by promising to fulfil the heightened needs of a mass of people (e.g., safety and prosperity will be achieved by attacking the “enemy”). Terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Solomon 1999; Schimel *et al.* 1999) proposes that asserting their ingroup’s superiority is one means by which people defend against awareness of their mortality, can be incorporated into Staub’s view. The difficult living conditions that precede scapegoating movements often include widespread disease or wars, making mortality highly salient. Deeply frustrated primary motives can attract masses of people to movements that blame an outgroup for current difficulties, affirm the ingroup’s superiority, and offer the promise of a better future (Glick 2005: 248).

Consistent with Staub’s (1989) viewpoint, social-identity theorists (Billig 1976; Tajfel 1981) have posited that only collective frustrations (those shared by many) lead to organized scapegoating. Based upon social identity’s general critique of Allport’s (and others) individualistic approach to prejudice (as rooted in personality), Tajfel and Billig argued that scapegoating is a group-based process. These theorists highlighted a problem Allport had not articulated – why does the scapegoating of a particular outgroup become socially shared or consensual within a society? Although Freudian psychodynamics or the frustration-aggression hypothesis might explain why a particular individual lashes out against a convenient target, how can this account for mass movements in which a significant portion of a society’s members join together in attacking a specific group? As Billig observed about the Holocaust, “It is too fanciful to imagine that the Germans were kept in an increasing state of emotional arousal for fifteen years, and at the end of this time simultaneously millions happened to rid themselves of these tensions in an identical manner” (1976: 150). The most horrendous examples of scapegoating (from medieval witch-hunts to the attempted genocides of the twentieth century) involve coordinated mass movements (Glick 2005: 248). Allport (1954: 344) imagined that all frustration levels could promote scapegoating, including intensely personal causes. For instance, he noted that a “short stature” could be “a life-long cause for irritation” (Allport 1954: 344).

In contrast, Tajfel (1981) hypothesized that individual frustrations lead people to blame other individuals for their problems, whereas shared (group-level) frustrations predispose people to blame other groups. For example, a woman might blame her boss for firing her if other members of her ethnic group remain gainfully employed, but might blame an outgroup if she loses her job during an economic downturn that affects many members of her (but not of

another) ethnic group. Events that people interpret as applying to their group as a whole (rather than themselves as individuals) arouse group-based emotions (Smith and Mackie 2005).

Tajfel termed the process by which frustration becomes group blame as “social attribution,” situating it firmly within the social-cognitive approach favoured by social psychologists. In attribution theory, (Kelley 1967) posits that people seek to understand the causes of events, especially negative ones. This makes adaptive sense: when bad events happen, people try to diagnose why they occurred, which may indicate how to correct the problem. When goals are blocked, frustration energizes the individual to diagnose and overcome obstacles. Like physical pain, frustration is “an aversive state that indicates something is amiss and motivates the individual to attend to the problem” (Glick 2005: 249).

The classification of individuals as inferior is one of the factors that precipitate scapegoating. It can be observed that “these social categorization consequences facilitate negative stereotyping and dehumanization and often provide system-justifying ideologies that act as catalysts for scapegoating” (Rothschild *et al.* 2012). Furthermore, Glick (2005: 250) elucidates that “group-level frustrations create shared attributions and appraisals that, in turn, lead to scapegoating.” They adequately address Allport’s first criticism that not all frustrations lead to scapegoating, but not the other questions Allport asked: Why are innocent groups targeted? Why is aggression ever displaced? How are scapegoats chosen? Are scapegoats always defenceless and vulnerable?

The analysis of Hannah Arendt’s anti-Semitism and scapegoating examination demonstrates that just identifying the fact that we scapegoat foreigners is not sufficient (Dietz 2000). As Neocosmos (2010: 4) calls attention to, “an outsider in South Africa is the scapegoat and can be the scapegoat due to foreigners’ political weakness.” This was a consequence of the segregation dependent on our view of citizenship. We need to recognize this ‘political shortcoming,’ or the particular situatedness of outsiders, to comprehend why they (and not others) are accused of a particular society’s ills. This additionally marginally shifts the blame of xenophobia from the individuals who execute xenophobic violence to the individuals who make the conditions wherein such violence gets conceivable and in which it will probably not be punished. In saying that xenophobia is a demonstration of scapegoating outsiders, we ought to likewise ask what their alleged violations are and who is blameworthy. Briefly, scapegoating is an act of shifting fault and moving attention away from one’s or deficiencies. In getting

mindful of why we decide to scapegoat a particular group, we likewise become mindful of who should assume accountability for the issues confronting us (e.g., joblessness, violence, crime). Cilliers (2020: 46) explains that “if we want to be anti-xenophobic, we should unmask our denial and the denial of our governments and political institutions (e.g., police forces).”

Arendt cautions that the scapegoating hypothesis may make us oblivious to contextual variants and other prejudices that go with xenophobia. It appears to be practically pretentious to state, ‘they were simply searching for a scapegoat.’ We ought to inquire why xenophobia was aimed at a particular group and not another – why we decide to scapegoat not all outsiders, but relatively just a few. This inquiry is essential in South Africa, where xenophobia is mostly aimed at African nationals and almost exclusively at people of colour. Cilliers (2020: 47) contends that “merely stopping at ‘they needed a scapegoat’ denies the role that race and the country’s turbulent history plays in xenophobia in South Africa, but also the political nature of xenophobia – how nation-building, our understanding of citizenship, and our political institutions contribute to a xenophobic life-world.” Each general public has its scapegoats; however, their identity and how they are picked rely upon the context.

Scapegoating theory also highlights the importance of contact amongst parties that are hostile to each other. It is believed that contact enables clear indifferences and promotes peace. However, speculations about the impacts of contact are hampered by —inconsistencies in conceptualizations (Forbes 1997: 7). Most researchers concur with and even emphasize the point that contact cannot be viewed as a total instrument or a general solution for changing bias or advancing better intergroup relations: just in exact circumstances or under specific conditions will intergroup contact accomplish this end.

One of the focal debates is that contact relies on the circumstance where contact happens, just as on different elements present in the circumstances being referred to. Scholarly research would thus be able to be summarized as follows: contact, under ideal conditions, between people belonging to a hostile group, will, in general, undermine antagonistic and negative relational attitudes and practices toward one another while cultivating positive and more amiable ones (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997). Notwithstanding, as examined in this part, there remains an absence of agreement on whether the conditions delineated by Allport and others, for contact to create positive connections, ought to be viewed as fundamental, or whether they

instead act as encouraging conditions that improve the propensity for positive contact results to arise.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored the global examples where xenophobia took place as a point of departure, and these negative attitudes are mainly based on prejudice, which further leads to xenophobic sentiments. Moreover, the chapter unpacked the scapegoat theoretical framework, which formed the study's basis in understanding the problem. It also explored the limitations of the scapegoat theoretical framework as the researcher acknowledged that although the theory was adopted, it has some limitations. Therefore, there is a lack of consensus amongst scholars on whether contact enhances positive relationships.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the process utilized in this study, including the research design, method used, data collection methods and tools, and the data analysis methods. Moreover, the chapter explores the moral concerns and procedures regulating the study. The exploration is problem-situated and discovers its position in the scholarly space of Peace Research focused on the generation of information and comprehension of youth's role in xenophobic violence. It is participatory action research with a qualitative alignment in data and analysis. The researcher contends that describing xenophobic violence in South Africa requires practical and rational processes that unpack the xenophobic phenomenon's complexity and youth's role in the recurrence of xenophobic violence in Durban communities. Therefore, this research places young people and their experiences at the heart of the exploration, and their experiences form the foundation of this participatory action research.

This chapter discusses the research design as articulated by Birks and Mills (2011: 15): “the blueprint for one’s study.” The design aids the researcher in recognizing the philosophical and methodological positions within the study and the approaches essential to attaining the research objectives. This study assumed a qualitative method of collecting data. Qualitative methods “study elements in their natural locations, endeavouring to make sense of, or understand the phenomenon in terms of the connotation people bring to them” (Koogotsitse 2012: 9). Collecting and analysing qualitative data offered the researcher a platform to interrelate with participants, apprehending their insight into the world and the descriptions they used to illustrate their experience of it. The research design sought to address the significant aim and specific objectives given in Sections 1.6 and 1.7 in Chapter 1 – these are outlined again below.

Major aim:

The research was aimed at engaging youth in exploring and understanding why they participate in xenophobia-related violence and to design and implement strategies to reduce xenophobic violence.

Specific Objectives:

The specific objectives were:

- To identify how the term xenophobia is generally understood.
- To examine the reasons motivating the South African youth to participate in violence labelled as xenophobic.
- To design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce xenophobia and embark on a preliminary evaluation of its outcome.

For this study, xenophobic violence was a basis of concern as a problem of this form of abuse is recurring, and the study places youth experiences at the heart of the exploration, with their skills forming the foundation for this research. This study occurred when various communities in Durban had an eruption of violence targeting Black African nationals in 2017, 2018, and 2019. The attacks involved the burning and looting of foreign-owned shops, killing, and confiscation of immigrants' properties. Cinini and Singh (2019: 51) suggested that "xenophobia can best be defined as a series of crimes against foreign nationals, which are violent and lead to physical beating, killing and the looting of goods as well as the destruction of property owned by foreign nationals."

South African groups "have a history of using violence as a way of resolving issues as violent protests involve physical acts against a person or property that may cause harm or injury to that person or their property" (van Rensburg 2017: 27). Claassen (2017: 2) perceives that "African migrants are the immigrant group most likely to experience the behavioural consequences of xenophobia." The most affected groups have been foreign national running businesses (Hare and Walwyn 2019) in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. Hence, the need for interventions that can build capacity on conflict resolution skills and mend broken relationships within the local level from both locals and immigrants inspired the research.

5.2 Underlying Research Paradigm

Studies, whether quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods, are always guided by a philosophy which informs action, and this is called a research paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln 2008: 245). The four models include epistemology, axiology, methodology, and ontology (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; Mertens 2010). Although research paradigms are essential, it was more imperative to confirm that a research paradigm's confines did not restrict a study. Patton (2002: 39) contends that "rather than believing that one must choose to align with one model or the other, one can advocate a paradigm of choices," the view also held by the researcher. Moreover, "a model of options rejects methodological orthodoxy in favour of methodological appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging methodological quality" (Patton 2002: 72; Molina-Azorin 2016: 38).

A review of the literature on research methods designates diverse comprehensions and explanations of crucial notions in research jargon. The usual outcome was a situation in which the word research design was used with the term research methodology or two different terms. It is crucial to have a clear theoretical understanding of the word research design to prevent the ambiguity that occasionally escorts research jargon. In this study, the word research design is a "blueprint of how one aims to conduct research" (Mouton 2001: 55; Mouton 2011), "as it relates to the entire process of data collection, measurement, and analysis" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblet 2006: 10).

According to Kumar (2019: 84), the "importance of the research design is two-fold: it is the basis upon which an effective plan that links the several procedures and tasks essential to complete the research is devised, and it avails logical answers to a recognized research problem and purpose." To fulfil the objectives underlined in section 5.1 above, the research design that the researcher first explored the problem from work already conducted by other scholars. In simple terms, the researcher's strategy was exploratory, participatory, and based on case studies.

The researcher utilized a qualitative research design grounded on a triangulation of several research methods. The study focused on male and female South African and foreign nationals' youth and leaders of various non-governmental organizations working in the INK area. Being concerned with xenophobic violence, the researcher worked with young citizens, refugees,

asylum seekers, and migrants in Durban. Through this, the researcher stayed conscious of an intrinsic idea of exploration. This mindfulness attracted the researcher to scapegoating the theory of prejudice, which guided the researcher in understanding the status of youth in Durban and the factors triggering their participation in violence targeting Black Africans.

5.3 Research Design

As noted above, the research design can be regarded as a “plan geared towards accomplishing the study's objectives” (Birks and Mills 2011: 15; Rudhumbu 2018: 130). The design generated data that the researcher used to design and implement intervention strategies suggested by the action group and the participants. The research design was a strategy for finding responses to the research problem, and it outlines the measures assumed in responding to issues correctly (Rudhumbu 2018; Blaikie and Priest 2019). It is a scope that directs others to the researcher's choices concerning the study design applied, how information was to be collected, how respondents were to be selected, how collected information was to be examined, and how the research outcomes were presented (Kalaian 2011). Succinctly, strategies to be utilized are plainly stated to build knowledge that will be interpreted and accurate. Therefore, research design must improve accuracy and reduce or prevent biases that can alter the findings.

This study sought to reduce youth participation in violence labelled as ‘xenophobic’ by working with young people to design and implement intervention strategies that would equip them in using nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts. Therefore, the study was exploratory and participatory action research, and these helped design the intervention strategies for dealing with the problem. The researcher chose participatory action research as its use “in peacebuilding research is acknowledged as contributing towards peaceful solutions to social issues occurring at the community level” (Kaye 2017: 3).

5.3.1 Participatory Action Group

The formation of an action group was essential for the participatory action research component of the study, which was to plan and evaluate an intervention. The ten participants (six males and four females) who comprised the action group were drawn from Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu in Ward 38, 40, 43, and 108, and these came from the focus groups. It can be noted that these areas had a history of violence targeting foreign nationals. The youth's non-profit organizations working in the areas helped the researcher to have access to the area. However,

there was a delay in getting the participants as the researcher relied on these organizations as the researcher did not know most of the areas. Moreover, during the research, they were violent attacks in these areas in 2017, 2018, and 2019 which further delayed data collection. In some of the focus groups in Ward 38, we had to keep shifting due to the volatile situation following foreign-owned shops' attacks. However, despite the challenges, the participants did not lose interest in studying and mapping possible solutions to the problem under study.

5.3.2 Exploratory Research

Exploratory research focuses on discovering and is associated with examining a discovered conundrum to collect as much data (Stebbins 2001; Jupp 2006). The researcher used an experimental design to comprehend xenophobic violence's nature and extent (Misago, Landau and Monson 2008) in Durban. The researcher used focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews to understand factors leading young people to participate in this form of violence by exploring the problem.

The literature review helped to examine secondary resources on xenophobia at a global level and in South Africa. The Focus Group Discussions and in-depth interviews as primary resources helped to investigate the views of participants. The secondary resources offered chronological narratives to the problem, while interviews and focus group discussions focus on specialists on the subject matter and individuals affected by xenophobic violence. Gathering vital details on the crisis' degree was imperative before the resolution was designed and executed by the action group. Therefore, the researcher explored the problem as an initial step to achieve the study goal using participatory action research. Participatory Action Research was adopted to bring change (Kaye and Harris 2018) within a context.

5.3.3 Case Study

In the words of Merriam and Tisdell (2015: 40), a case study is “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system.” According to Stake (2013: 3), “qualitative understanding of cases requires experiencing that activity of the situation as it occurs in its context.” Case study research “permits researchers to discover a range of multifaceted matters, mainly when individual behaviour and social contacts are key to understanding a topic of interest” (Stake 2013; Yin 2014; Merriam and Tisdell 2015; Ntetha 2018: 63). The participants who consisted of the action group focused on case examination after exploration and description of a problem.

The action group, composed of ten participants, helped to understand the issues leading young people to take part in xenophobic violence using the scapegoating theoretical framework.

In expounding case studies, Yin (2014: 46) stresses “the nature of inquiry (i.e., scope, process, and methodological characteristics) as being experiential, and the significance of the environment to the case.” Stake (2013: 3) likewise “emphasizes the accuracy and intricacy of the case, and the researcher is coming to comprehend its endeavour within relevant situations.” Merriam and Tisdell (2015) suggested three distinctive characteristics of the case study approach:

1. They provide a full account of the phenomenon under study.
2. They use a heuristic approach that illuminates the new meaning, extends the current definition, or confirms what is already known about a setting.
3. They produce detailed knowledge grounded in context as opposed to abstractions, developed through the participant’s understanding, and generalizable to a population.

The case study permitted the researcher to profoundly explore the result of the intervention on the action group and make public opinions of transmitting of outcomes to other groupings of people disturbed by the problem to be made by the reader. However, although this can be feasible, results from case studies in qualitative research are limited in the degree to which they can be generalized (Flick 2018) because the information is collected via encounters, views, and insights specific to the grouping under study. Similarly, the researcher found it problematic to assert that findings and suppositions derived from the case that she examined (action group) may be relevant to other people in Durban. In qualitative research, “knowledge obtained in one context may not necessarily be relevant to different settings” (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 277). However, participants’ answers were reported in extensive verbatim quotations to be made available for the reader's transferability assessments.

5.4 Participatory Action Research

The researcher chose Participatory Action Research (PAR) as the study's focus sought to amplify the influence of the youth within their communities. Moreover, PAR “constitutes an effective method in peacebuilding as it provides a systemic way of developing a theory, obtaining necessary data, and with the participation of the respondents, developing and testing

an intervention” (Kaye 2017: 3). Coghlan and Brydon-Miller (2014: 2) avers that PAR is “a research paradigm within the social sciences which emphasizes collaborative participation of trained researchers as well as local communities in producing knowledge directly relevant to the stakeholder community.” Therefore, PAR allowed the researcher to work diligently with local youth to discover a problem and then work in partnership with the group to test potential interventions.

When PAR is highlighted, Action Research (AR) is also deliberated. Scholars contend that there is a distinction between PAR and AR, and the difference they give is that AR is empowering. At the same time, PAR is both empowering and transformative due to its participatory nature. MacDonald (2012: 36) states that “action research involves an action researcher and community or organization members who are seeking to improve their situation.” This method is “concerned with more than knowledge creation” (Ngwenya 2018) as it seeks to address societal challenges unearthed by the investigation to bring social change. Most significantly, this technique shifts away from the conventional method of seeing studied persons and societies as informants from which data can be extracted; instead, they contribute to the study as co-researchers (Ngwenya 2014; Kaye and Harris 2018).

PAR encompasses all the appropriate stakeholders joining together to study a shared challenge, formulate strategies to tackle it and execute intervention strategies. Succinctly, PAR is a “joint investigation that typically considers that participants are involved as key decision-makers in the phases of the study” (Cahill 2007: 268). As such, the ends of PAR, according to Coghlan and Brydon-Miller (2014: 2), include “(a) developing and fostering a participatory model in social science field research, (b) preferring a practical form of knowledge-in-action to an empirical form of knowledge-statistic, (c) mobilizing local communities to have a concrete role in solving their problems effectively and systematically, (d) making development policy interventions, (e) advocating for the inclusion of local stakeholders—their experiences and forms of understanding—in socio-economic theory and policy and (f) attempting to correct power imbalances in knowledge and information flows.”

This method can significantly help the researcher identify intervention strategies conducted by the government, civil society organizations, and relevant stakeholders to reduce xenophobic violence, thereby achieving the third objective of the study. Instead of being “studied by an outsider, this method inspires the researcher to become an outsider-insider and treat the

participants as research partners rather than just information sources” (Harris 2017: 139). By using this method, the researcher can also design and employ an intervention plan to reduce xenophobia and undertake a preliminary evaluation of its outcome (Nyathi 2019), thereby meeting the last objective of the study.

5.4.1 Roots and Development of the Action Research

According to Coghlan and Brydon-Miller (2014: 2), the “origins of the PAR paradigm can be traced to Europe, to a climate of critique of mainstream social science research, popular education models and social movements in general.” In 1940, the German social psychologist Kurt Lewin held that social science research must reject the positivist outlook of science, which favours that researchers study an ‘objective’ world separate from the ‘subjective’ connotations understood by agents as they act in the world (Coghlan and Brydon-Miller 2014: 2). Lewin invented the word action research to illustrate “a procedure in which social scientists worked collaboratively with a group, organization or community that had stakes in the issue at hand” (Coghlan and Brydon-Miller 2014: 2; Harris 2017; Kaye 2017; Kaye and Harris 2018). Succinctly, action research stressed a problem-solving style to study and coherent decision-making by a group assisted by an outer facilitator. The fundamental tenets of action research, including “self-reflection and critique through dialogue, collaboration, mutual learning, and action,” formed the basis of PAR (Coghlan and Brannick 2010; Coghlan and Brydon-Miller 2014; Harris 2017; Kaye 2017; Kaye and Harris 2018). Thus, Lewin’s work highlighted practical community input and offered a valuable way of merging theory and practice to accelerate societal transformation.

McNiff (2013: 1) contends that “action research can be sketched back to the Science in Education Movement of the late 19th to the early 20th century and that the use of the term *action research* was popular with social reform scholarship before Lewin.” Nevertheless, there is an agreement among scholars that Lewin’s work offered a comprehensible and rational philosophy of participatory action research (Masters 1995; Greenwood and Levin 2006). The following highlights some of the developments that had an ancient impact on action research, including Lewin’s total contributions, as tabulated by McKernan (1996: 8-10):

- “Bain, Boone, and Buckingham led the Science in Education Movement of the late 19th to early 20th century. Its contribution involved in scientific means employed to education.”

- “John Dewey led the Experimentalists and Progressive Educationists of the 1930s. It contributed to the practical inductive scientific method of problem-solving as an answer to challenges in various disciplines like physics, education, philosophy, and psychology.”
- “Kurt Lewin led the Group Dynamics in Psychology and Human Relations Training of the 1940s. It added to the use of qualitative social investigation to tackle societal difficulties such as racial prejudice, social reconstruction, and ending World War II. Moreover, groupings disturbed by these issues were part of the investigation to discover answers to found challenges. Coordinated action research theory surfaced, and it is comprised of analysis, fact-finding, conceptualization, planning, implementation, and evaluation of an action.”
- “Corey, Taba, Brady, and Robinson led the post-war Reconstructionist Curricula Development Activity from the 1950s to 1960s. Action research was embraced in this movement as a tactic in inventing new programs to deal with difficulties of intergroup relationships and racial contacts.”
- “Stenhouse led the Teacher-Researcher Movement of the 1970s. The teaching methods were developed and designed based on research carried out by teachers themselves to improve practice and learning outcomes.”

Lewin's studies on action research focused on applying concepts into practical efforts to resolve organizational and societal problems. He expanded “an intricate action research theory in the 1940s, centering on the notions of organizational conduct and social psychology” (Adelman 1993: 7). Lewin’s objective was to advance social relations amongst societal groupings to maintain contact and collaboration. Therefore, action research developed the ways of methodical investigation for all participants in the search for better efficiency in groups through equal involvement. In societal frameworks, “Lewin’s investigation aimed for minorities to surmount the powers of abuse and put his opinions on action research through reflective thought, conversation, and action by ordinary people partaking in joint research in plights that they shared (Adelman 1993: 7-8).”

The word *action research* was officially approved and incorporated into the vocabulary of research procedures in 1934. Lewin designated action research as “a spiral of actions linking planning, participation, and evaluation of the consequences of action” (Stringer 2013: 8-9). Lewin considered action research as well-characterized by the conversation of glitches trailed

by group deliberations on the path ahead. Action research had to involve the community affected by the problem to explore the causes, then map out a possible resolution to the issue, and finally, implement the suggested intervention. Moreover, the participants have a responsibility to monitor and evaluate the implemented intervention. Lewin's work brought a paradigm shift in that the researcher had an opportunity to adopt action research and be a mediator of societal change in affected communities. Adelman (1993: 13) explicates that Lewin and his colleagues categorized their investigation pursuits into four noticeable classifications of action research:

- “*Diagnostic action research*: this was designed to produce a needed plan of action. It involved an action team intervening in an already existing social problem, diagnosing the problem, and taking remedial action.”
- “*Participant action research*: this involves the participation of affected people from the initial inquiry to the intervention stage. Participation was valued because it enhanced local people's support of the agreed remedial measures.”
- “*Empirical action research*: this involved record-keeping and accumulating experiences in day-to-day work.”
- “*Experimental action research*: this type relied on a controlled study of the relative effectiveness of various techniques in nearly identical social situations. This type of action research had the most significant potential for the advancement of scientific knowledge.”

Despite the disparities in the categories of action research utilized by inventors, the core of action research was the stress on equal involvement of the study participants and their partnership. Importance was given to procedure more than consequences, with the apparent inference have been that reliable results are simply definite once value procedures are implemented. According to Adelman (1993: 15), “Lewin died in 1947 but his pioneering works in action research exposed that through dialogue, decision, action, evaluation, and revision in participatory democratic research, research became meaningful, and alienation was reduced.”

In 1946, Lewin was persuaded by action research's influence, stressing the natural link between action and research and vice versa. Lewin resolved: “No action without research; no research without action” (Adelman 1993: 8). Generations of the action research design are now taking up a hint from his trail-breaking findings to conceptualize and implement studies intended to

tackle real crises in communities. Consequently, “action research is being applied in various areas like community development, administration, organizational change, teaching, political change, empowerment, and national development” (Tripp 2005: 2-3).

5.4.2 Importance and Defence for Action Research

PAR is founded on the longing to challenge tangible-life difficulties with interferences that produce social change. Cahill (2007: 268) posits that “PAR does not only seek to explore and describe the existing problem but seeks to change it.” Succinctly, PAR “goes beyond the mere gathering of data from the participants to include social change, participant empowerment” (Moore 2004: 149), and “emancipation and participatory democracy” (Grant, Nelson and Mitchell 2008: 592). Action investigators find challenges and assume a path to resolve the identified issue (Kaye and Harris 2018). Knowledge production is tangled with effort.

Coglan and Brannick (2010: 4) accentuate that “action research is research in action rather than research about action.” In this course, the researcher moves away from the one-sided method that outlines conventional research effort by co-operating with participants in a sequence of crucial research pursuits as they jointly try to resolve a common issue. Rose, Spinks and Canhoto (2014: 1) explain that “action is taken to effect change and results produce knowledge about the process of change and why the change was essential.” Thus, action research is a methodical, collective, and independent way of producing and assuming action in which scholars and community shareholders merge their efforts to find a solution to prevailing multifaceted challenges (Greenwood and Levin 2006).

The feature of collaborative research distinguishes it “from the traditional designs that undertake that knowledge is only exposed using specific methodologies such as scientific method, which purposes to predict and control results” (Whitehead and McNiff 2006: 28). The intended outcome is “to endeavour towards shifting people’s practices and circumstances in which people practice as they pursue constructive change” (Kemmis 2010: 421).

The main difference of “PAR from other strategies is the underlying philosophy of ‘doing with’ instead of ‘doing for’ local stakeholders” (Greenwood and Levin 2006: 3), who collaboratively share encounters to achieve positive social change. The researcher undertakes the “responsibility of a facilitator at every phase of the research process intended to produce knowledge and obtain the contribution of local stakeholders rather than dictating to them,

which improves the capacity of the researcher to contribute to resolution and action in challenging problems consuming the participants” (Berg 2009: 251).

Significantly, participatory action research moves away from the idea that respondents are only suppliers of information to treating them as co-researchers. This entails that those affected by the problem under study become engaged as “decision-makers and co-researchers in some or all the stages of the research” (Cahill 2007: 268; Kaye 2017; Kaye and Harris 2018). This reveals that in PAR, “all the work revolves around the values of transparent and democratic participation inquiry that is collaboratively planned, designed, implemented, analysed and disseminated” (Guishard 2009: 87). The collective method comes from the established opinion that everyday difficulties require practical solutions. Briefly, the partnership also acknowledges the complexity or lack of sustainable resolutions that occur from not including the individuals affected by the problem under study. Involvement, itself a result of collaboration, then indorses shared possession and a feeling of accountability on the assumed resolution to the issue. Experiments that pursue peacebuilding in societies contaminated by conflict, action research suits the research design that encourages the anticipated action and change. Some versions seem deficient in cases wherever social shift is the stated conclusion.

The emphasis on partnership and contribution of participants creates the ontology and epistemic foundation of PAR self-apparent. Ontologically, the researcher assumes the dual responsibility of being an initiator and a driver of social transformation. Whitehead and McNiff (2006: 35) agree that “the methodological assumptions are that PAR is carried out by practitioners who see themselves as agents of improved social practice.” Epistemologically, Whitehead and McNiff (2006: 35) observe that “knowledge production in PAR is continuous and therefore not time-bound, meaning that the answers that are produced to respond to real problems are only tentative and not final.”

5.4.3 The Specifics of PAR/AR in this Study

Whitehead and McNiff (2006: 36) caution that “in social science inquiry, all answers should be viewed as both provisional and subject to critique and modification, and action researchers do not look for a fixed conclusion that can be applied everywhere.” This firm caution insinuates that this investigation's outcomes do not provide conclusiveness to reasons that lead youth to participate in xenophobic violence in Durban. However, the study tries to work with young

people from the INK area to design and implement strategies that promote nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts to enhance social cohesion.

The action group was composed of four females and six males drawn from respondents who participated in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) as explained in section 5.3.1. The small number was ideal for enhancing trust and better communication and accountability in the formulation and implementation of the intervention to address the problem. At the same time, these participants have indicated their availability in conducting dialogues and the skills transfer initiative. The responses given by the action group are explained fully in Chapter 8.

The importance of a small sample in PAR is that “acting on something that people have a control over is precisely the type of element that contributes to people’s beliefs that they are creative, knowledgeable and capable of making a difference in their own lives” (McIntyre 2008: 33). Grant reinforces this’s cautioning that “in social change work, it is crucial to achieving small wins rather than expecting large-scale change to occur dramatically.” The study’s discoveries can produce valuable experiences that can be employed as the foundation for PAR exploration elsewhere.

Enhancing relations is part of the intention of PAR. It can be observed that Kemmis (2010: 424) reflects a comparable supposition through demonstrating that “PAR aims to inspire democratic dialogue and practical deliberation, and hence offers a substitute for relationship building, as opposed to traditional designs that are inclined to be prescriptive rather than realistic” (Gustavasen, Hansson and Qvale 2008: 64). The PAR model’s adoption for this study was stirred by McNiff (1988)’s viewpoint where he states that “Built into action research is the provision that if I am discontented with what is already going on, I will have the confidence and resolution to attempt to change it; I will not be content with the status quo.” The style was inspired by the notion that the whole participants must be engaged in the problem’s examination course to enlighten insight and ensuing action.

Information construction continues as a shared method, involving young people who are the experts of their problems in this study to work together to resolve their community challenges collectively. Hence, Craig (2009: 7) recognizes crucial features of PAR: “the study is undertaken in a natural setting; the researcher as the facilitator must be unbiased and professional; various methods and sources of data are utilized; findings are reported in the form

of thick descriptions; process, not product, is stressed; meaning is derived from data analysis, and conclusions inform action.”

5.4.4 Steps in Participatory Action Research

When PAR is undertaken as the component of a scholarly evaluation, as is the situation with this study, it typically entails two concurrent inquiry cycles (Walker 1993; Zuber-Skerritt and Perry 2002). The primary series concentrates on the real-world challenge to be resolved, and the second series focuses on the stages that the researcher undergoes as part of the theory of their studies. According to Coghlan (2007: 300), “the thesis cycle is part of meta-learning for its value in producing theory from the core action research cycle.” Briefly, the first cycle of participatory action research is an ongoing process in seeking resolutions to the problem, while the second part of the action research cycle stops at the reflection phase, where the researcher compiles a report and then submits it for examination purposes. These stages are interrelated but precise as the steps in the action research cycle can be implemented backward and forward based on the insights attained. This is inevitable in achieving the intended aims. The process of action research involves five steps (Walker 1993; Zuber-Skerritt and Perry 2002; Zuber-Skerritt 2018), namely: (a) “identify a problem and determine the focus of the study, (b) determine the type of data to be collected and how the data is to be collected, (c) collect and analyse data, (d) develop a plan of action based on the findings and report or share findings, reflect, and plan for action with others.”

PAR reports the research findings and moves to craft an action plan to resolve the research problem and evaluate the intervention’s efficiency (Nyathi 2019). Hence, it improves “people’s problem-solving skills and strategies for the community’s best interests” (Kaye 2017: 4). This method transpires a reiterative recurring approach, differentiating it from the well-established direct procedures generally related to an empirical stage where the problem is acknowledged and conceptualized.

As a result, “the PAR routine provides a simple yet powerful cyclical framework – research, reflection, and action – which enables the researcher and the affected people to commence a shared and productive process of inquiry” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012: 35). In sequence, the exploratory stage is trailed by the designing and executing of the suggested resolutions, where opinions are produced to permit essential alterations in the phase to generate a constructive shift. The researcher’s strategy for this study was to devise an intermediation plan for youth

living in the INK area to equip them with conflict resolution skills and create platforms for young people from various backgrounds to meet and engage in dialogue. Afterward, the outcome of the intervention was assessed. The subsequent represented the phases assumed in the action research section of the analysis.

a. *Problem Detection*

In this investigation, PAR was intended to reduce youth participation in violence labelled xenophobic by training the participants in conflict resolution skills. Johnson (2008) highlights that social difficulties are rarely resolved except they are initially recognized and well-specified. The problem specified in this inquiry is related to the reasons leading youth to participate in xenophobic violence, making dialogue and training a large and notable task. An inclusive viewpoint in comprehending the problem implicated discovering the nature, triggers, magnitude, and xenophobic violence costs. The attacks on foreign nationals in Durban by various local people subscribing to different views of immigrants' presence in their communities were evidence to authenticate the recognized problem, xenophobic violence.

Discovering the exposed problem was stirred by a yearning to transform prevailing relationships to build a cohesive society. The detection of the crisis relieved the course of devising issues for the investigation. The crucial issues mentioned were:

- Why has xenophobic violence become a recurring phenomenon in Durban and South Africa at large?
- What are the factors triggering youth to participate in violence labelled as xenophobic?
- What are the factors hindering the tackling of xenophobic violence fully?
- What can youth do in their respective communities to transform the violent intolerance into embracing diversity to enhance social cohesion?

After the crisis was well-defined, the kind of information to be collected and the suitable approaches for gathering information that can address the issues mentioned were decided.

b. Information Gathering and Examination

Collecting data was imperative in guiding the devising an intervention that will reduce youth participation in Durban's foreign nationals' attacks. The researcher gathered information using interviews and focus group discussions in measuring the participants' insights and sentiments regarding interrogations elevated in the initial phase of the investigation. The researcher conducted twenty interviews and three focus group discussions to explore the xenophobic violence problem before forming the action group to help construct and execute a resolution to address the issue. The data collection was then trailed by examination and explanation of the pertinent information to find a decision that let of the action aspect of the study. The description and assessment of primary information helped the researcher obtain a more in-depth insight into the challenge of xenophobic violence in Durban. Therefore, it guided the researcher and the action group in formulating suitable interventions.

c. Framing and applying a Plan of Action

The action group and the researcher had to craft and implement an action plan to address xenophobic violence in Durban to identify the problem and collect needed information. Ten respondents, who volunteered from the three FGDs, founded the action group with the researcher. The action group and the researcher convened on 2 and 4 October 2018 to plan for the actions to address xenophobic violence to achieve the study's objectives, and preparation was conducted together with the action group.

The outcome of the planning was, to begin with, a dialogue which was held on 27 October 2018 at Ntuzuma township to foster peaceful relations amongst young people from different backgrounds. The discussion was followed by a skill-sharing initiative, which led to two conflict resolution skills training, as young people acknowledge the lack of conflict resolution amongst themselves and the communities.

d. Evaluation of the Intervention

Subsequently, the longing for positive change stimulating PAR, the skills sharing initiative, the dialogue, and the conflict resolution skills training were evaluated. Assessment assisted in shaping the outcome of the resolution carried out with the action group. An evaluation was conducted after the dialogues and the training. The researcher made notes throughout discussions and discussions on the WhatsApp group formed following the initial discussion

meeting. Nevertheless, a significant immediate result assessment was carried out in November 2019 for the skills transfer and subsequently for the training held in January 2020.

Generally, PAR features deliberated in the more significant portion of this section signify the PAR model's fundamental depths compared to some conventional strategies. However, this is not to propose that the plan supporting this study is perfect as Rose, Spinks and Canhoto (2014) illuminate that PAR has its weaknesses as it is "unscientific from a positivist approach to research." Their disagreement arises from the fact that "since PAR is pre-engaged with problem-solving in specified situations, interrogations arise on the relevance of the results beyond the immediate research setting" (Rose, Spinks and Canhoto 2014). Therefore, this also reveals the limitations of the investigation.

5.5 Research Methodology

Mouton (2001: 56) expounds that "research methodology focuses on how the investigation is conducted on the methods, tools, techniques, and procedures that are relevant to the attainment of the research objectives and achievement of the study aim." The study's drive was to understand the factors leading youth to participate in xenophobic violence and map ways to reduce their participation in violence in the INK area. At the core of this research was focusing on transforming negative attitudes, perceptions, and intolerance. To achieve this, the study embraced a qualitative research methodology because the study's nature sought to understand youth participation in violence labelled as xenophobic. Such methods enabled the researcher to explore the phenomena with a more in-depth understanding as having the accurate way was imperative.

According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2012: 36-37), the central underpinnings of the qualitative paradigm are as follows:

- "It encompasses the collection, analysis, and interpretation of narrative and visual data to gain insight into a phenomenon of interest."
- "The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis, such that deep understanding of the issue is gained."
- "The researcher strives to describe the meaning of findings from the perspective of the participants. Data is gathered directly from the participants".

- “Complex social phenomena are viewed holistically since research takes place in natural and non-manipulated settings.”
- “It assumes that the world is not uniform, and hence there are many truths.”
- “Data analysis occurs concurrently with data collection.”
- “Findings are accompanied by thick descriptions that clearly express the participants’ voices.”

Research is concerned with reliability, integrity, and transferability, that is, how and in which approaches the suppositions of an investigation may relate or be valuable in other comparable contexts. Though they are different critical methodologies like mixed methods and quantitative paradigms, this study is grounded on the approaches above. These stand “in stark opposition to the quantitative paradigm that is mostly concerned with reducing data to numerical values at the expense of extrapolating social meaning and experience” (Kumar 2019), “oblivious of the fact that not every experience can be expressed quantitatively” (Berg 2009: 3).

Qualitative research was used as it is grounded in a constructivist philosophical position. This relates to “the sense that it is concerned with how the world is experienced, interpreted and understood in a context ” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). By undertaking a qualitative study, the researcher obtained an in-depth insight into how the term ‘xenophobia’ is generally understood and further thoroughly revealed why South African youth participate in violence labelled ‘xenophobic.’ Table 5.1 presents a comparison between research design and research methodology.

Table 5.1: The comparison among research design and research methodology, adopted from Mouton (2001: 56)¹

Research Design	Research Methodology
Focuses on the end product: what kind of study is being planned and what kind of result is aimed at?	Focuses on the research process and the kind of tools and procedures to be used.
Point of departure = Research problem or question.	Point of departure = Specific tasks (data collection or sampling) at hand.

Focuses on the logic of research: What kind of evidence is required to address the research question adequately?	Focuses on the Individual (not linear) steps in the research process and the most “objective” procedures to be employed.
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The researcher adopted a qualitative study because it allowed for the analysis of a social condition, which allowed the researcher “to enter the world of others to attain a holistic, rather than a reductionist, experience” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). Qualitative research was “appropriate as the study pursued to uncover, illustrate, obtain and understand the people's experiences” (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). Using a quantitative approach, the researcher believes, was not going to fully understand some of the perceptions and experiences of young people and Durban communities that were needed to address the driving factors leading young people to take part in xenophobic violence.

This first research objective was to identify how xenophobia is generally understood in Durban communities. Hancock, Windridge and Ockleford (2009: 4) states that “qualitative research methods attempt to broaden and or deepen our understanding of how things come to the way they are in our social world.” Meaning, using qualitative research methodologies, the researcher seeks to discover responses to the how, why, what, and when questions of daily living. Succinctly, the researcher sought to find out factors why young people act in a certain way, how individuals of communities form their perception and attitudes towards or phenomenon or another. Moreover, qualitative research also enquires about individuals’ attitudes regarding the situation.

The questions raised above were imperative as they lead one to have a richer knowledge of the situation and interact with it. Moreover, one gets to have insights on the realities, at the very least according to one’s interpretation, but at most usually through a combination of the participant’s understanding and the researcher’s interpretation. With this, Denzin and Lincoln (2008: 3) offer the following definition:

“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study

things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.”

It is vital to have knowledge of and a deep understanding of the behaviours of youth in Durban. It is essential to know, for instance, why male youth are witnessed as one of the leading groups in the burning, looting, beating, and even killing of foreigners whenever xenophobic violence erupts in communities. Of course, there are some concealed behaviours that we cannot see, but that does not mean that they are not manifest and they are subject to investigation. MacDonald (2012: 34) postulates that “qualitative methods focus on the whole of human experience and the meanings ascribed by individuals living the experience; broader understanding and deeper insight into complex human behaviours thus occurs as a result.”

Qualitative research methods come with a range of data collection methods that one can choose from (Ritchie *et al.* 2013). The researcher believes that peace is a necessity and a culture that needs to be continuously cultivated in our communities; hence it can only make sense for peacebuilding practitioners or researchers who have a passion for promoting peace in various communities to adopt qualitative methods dissect through the community. Al-Busaid (2008: 12) contends in favour of qualitative research methods saying that “they are considered to be well suited for locating the meanings people place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives and their perceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions.” Qualitative research offers data collection methods that allow participants' natural participation and find the meaning and importance of research in communities affected by xenophobic violence.

Through qualitative research, the researcher has an opportunity to understand the practical issues encountered by the respondents. Thus, by using a qualitative research approach and related methodologies, the researcher was able to work with young people from Durban in understanding their environment, their challenges, and experiences, which further led to designing and implementing an intervention that sought to address some of their problems as well as to promote peace and social cohesion in their respective communities. With the xenophobic phenomenon complexity, the researcher adopted a qualitative method to understand and capture even smaller changes without manipulating participants and the different play variables. On the other hand, had the researcher used quantitative research, this would have “involved manipulation of some variables (independent variables) while other variables (which would be considered to be extraneous and confounding variables) are held

constant” (Hancock, Windridge and Ockleford 2009: 6). Succinctly, qualitative research helped compare the researcher’s understanding of Durban youth through its lenses as they are the experts of their problems.

5.6 Study Population and Sampling

Before research data was collected from the sample, it was necessary to stipulate a suitable population (Welman, Kruger and Mitchell 2005; Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 223). According to Babbie and Mouton (2005), “population denotes the total of all individuals who have specific characteristics and are of interest to the research.” On the other hand, Castillo (2009: 1) postulates that:

“A research population is generally a large collection of individuals or objects that is the focus of a scientific query. It is for the benefit of the population that research studies are done. However, due to the large sizes of populations, researchers often cannot test every individual in the population because it is too expensive and time-consuming.”

This study’s population accommodated for the gender divide, and for this study, gender is specified corresponding to the biology of being male or female. Hence, the population included male and female local South African and foreign nationals aged 18 to 35 years also had vital informants working with young people aged 36 years and above from Durban communities of Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (INK). The researcher targeted young South Africans who have witnessed or participated in xenophobic violence and foreign nationals who have seen or were victims of xenophobic violence.

The researcher entered the research area through youth-led Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) based and working in the INK area. These set up a meeting for the researcher to meet the Ward 38 Councillor, who permitted the researcher to operate within the area. The researcher focused on Wards 38, 40, 43, and 108, comprising people of varying distinguishing characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, and occupation, some of whom have been affected by xenophobic violence. The researcher chose the Wards mentioned above because the areas had experienced xenophobic violence before, and the youth-led NPOs operating in the space provided a convenient entrance into those Wards. Durban has numerous Wards, and as such, the chances of having all of them being involved in this research were improbable. Due to this, the non-probability method became more suitable.

5.6.1 Participatory Action Research Setting

The study took place in Durban under eThekweni Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal province. According to the 2011 population census of South Africa, “black Africans constitute 79.6% (41 000 938) of the total population of 50.8 million” (StatsSA 2012). KwaZulu-Natal “is the second greatest densely crowded province in South Africa, accounting for around one-fifth of the total population (10 267 300), of whom 86.8% are black African, 52.3% are female” (StatsSA 2012). Statistics reveal that almost half of the residents of Durban speak English as their first language. Other languages spoken in this city include Zulu, Afrikaans, and Xhosa. In terms of race, over 51% of residents are Black African. Nearly one-quarter of the population is Indian or Asian, while 15.3% are White, and 8.6% are designated as Coloured. The largest ethnic group is the Zulus. Sixty-eight percent of the city’s residents are under age 19, while 68% are working age.

Ward 38:

Ward 38 constitutes the settlement famously known as Lindelani. During the Census in 2011, this settlement was believed to have a total of 35,027 residents. This number was strongly believed to have grown over the years. This settlement has an area of about 5.3 square kilometres. The researcher’s estimated median age of the residents in Lindelani was approximately 23 years of age, based on her visits. Most of the residents there speak IsiZulu, but some speak English, IsiXhosa, IsiNdebele, sign language, and other languages. Many of the residents in this ward are South African citizens. Most of the people there stay in permanent homes, while a minority lives in informal settlements.

Ward 40:

Ward 40 constitutes the settlement famously known as KwaMashu, and it is believed to have a population of 35,512 people from the 2011 Census. This number has undoubtedly grown over the years. It has an area of 3.2 square kilometres. The researcher also estimated that the median age of the residents in the settlement was 24, and most of the residents speak IsiZulu. This also led to the general conclusion that many of the residents were South African citizens. The vast majority of residents in Ward 40 stay in permanent homes; however, there is also a minority of informal dwellings (shacks).

Ward 43:

Ntuzuma E was also another ward of interest in the research and is also known as Ward 43. It is believed to have 26,347 people and an area of 4.6 square kilometres (Census 2011). As with KwaMashu, the researcher estimated the respondents' median age to be 24 years of age and witnessed that most of the respondents were native IsiZulu-speaking residents. Most of the residents in Ward 43 stay in permanent households, but approximately a quarter remain in shacks or informal dwellings.

Ward 108:

According to the Census carried out in 2011, Inanda Ward 108 constitutes a population of 33,054 people. Most people in the area are Zulu-speaking people, including 93%, as per Census (2011). Most of the households are wholly-owned, with 65.4%, while informal dwellings constitute 21.3%. The female-headed families constitute 45.9% of the homes. In terms of employment, 27.4% of people residing in Ward 108 are employed, 83% are in the informal sector, and 41% are not economically active.

Etikan, Musa and Alkassim (2016: 3) posit that “a research population is also known as a well-defined collection of individuals or objects known to have similar characteristics and these usually have a common, binding characteristic or trait.” For instance, the researcher's population comprised local youth and foreign nationals who have witnessed or are victims of xenophobic violence, of which some of the foreign nationals were affected during the 2018 violence that erupted in the INK area targeting foreign nationals. Such diversity of the participants' experiences was important in understanding the realities and factors driving mainly male youth to participate in xenophobic violence. However, the researcher failed to get participants who had actively taken part in the looting or burning of foreign-owned shops and beating or killing foreign nationals as some young people approached to were unwilling to give out such information. However, many of the local participants acknowledged that they have once uttered xenophobic statements in their conversations.

To meet the objectives of the study, various sampling techniques were used in choosing the participants. Before going into detail on the methods, it was important for the researcher to define sampling. Sampling is “a process of selecting items from a population of interest such that results can be generalized from the study of the subset” (Kumar 2019). It should be specified in this study that the small sample used may not fully represent the entire population of Durban as one could not cover the whole area. This leaves a gap in future research to explore

the other areas not covered in this study. Briefly, sampling “involves selecting a few from a larger population to become the basis of predicting the prevalence of an unknown piece of information” (Kumar 2019). There are two types of sampling, namely, probability and non-probability sampling techniques, and in this study, the researcher adopted non-probability sampling. The differences between the two techniques are highlighted in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Distinction between probability and non-probability sampling techniques.

Probability sampling	Non-probability sampling
The sample probably represents the population.	Absence of probability.
It is used to generalize results.	Used in action research.
Reference is derived from samples.	There is no sample.
Every individual in an organization has an equal chance of being part of the sample.	There is no probability since there is no sample.
It may be representative of the population.	There is no limitation.
Observed data is used for inferential purposes.	Observations are not used.
Parametric and inferential statistics are used.	Non-statistic and non-inferential.
There is a risk in drawing conclusions.	No risk in drawing conclusions.

Source: Murwira (2019).

This investigation embraced the non-probability strategy as it includes. Non-likelihood testing includes the circumstance where the probability of choosing any component from the sampling outline is not known; the incorporation of the elements picked cannot be resolved. The technique is reasonable for qualitative investigations, which are not huge in scope (Babbie 2015). The non-probability method was proper for this investigation in that the researcher held authority over the choice of members who partook in the interviews and FGDs.

A sample is a “subset of the population, which is a group of subjects who represent the population under study” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). An example was used to make extrapolations about the whole population. Though “researchers recognize that research based on a sample is usually less precise or more subject to error than information collected from a population is, practical limitations such as time and cost justify the importance of sampling” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 224). The population for in-depth interviews was 15 youth and five members of various civil society organizations in Durban. The purpose of a sample

population was “to obtain a balanced picture of the situation under study” (Babbie 2015). Diverse sampling techniques are explained in the following sub-sections.

5.6.2 Purposive Sampling

The researcher used purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling techniques. Purposive sampling “involves the selection of a sample in which one has knowledge of the population, which will be in line with the purpose of the study” (Babbie 2015; Flick 2018). This enabled the researcher to freely choose any technique that she believed was relevant to the study” (Tongco 2007). The techniques utilized were also determined by the objectives of the study (Babbie 2015).

Twenty participants for the in-depth interviews were chosen, of which 15 were young people, and 5 were critical informants from various civil society organizations. These were selected based on their experiences and that they were residing and working in the INK area. The members were reached via telephone, and some of the researchers had to meet face to face where the purpose of the investigations was fully explained; after explaining the study’s intentions, those who were willing to participate signed consent forms. The INK area was chosen because the researcher believed that the areas provided rich experiences following various tensions between locals and non-locals.

In contrast to other examining procedures, which back general information, purposive sampling gave rich data for the investigation. Sampling was intended to create a full understanding, and in that capacity, members were purposively chosen. By profundity, one intends to pervade the field and its design by focusing on single examples (Flick 2018). Some of the key informants were chosen through purposive sampling as the researcher made sure that the people she was working with had knowledge of the phenomenon and contributed to finding a solution to curb the recurrence of xenophobic violence in Durban communities. Moreover, the researcher needed participants working with locals, refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants to understand the factors leading to xenophobic violence's recurrence and why male youth were seen at the forefront of these attacks. This meaning is substantiated by Ritchie, Lewis and Elam (2003: 79), who argue that in a purposive sampling

“The sample units are chosen because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and

puzzles which the researcher wishes to study. These may be socio-demographic characteristics or may relate to specific experiences, behaviours, role.”

This decision of using non-probability differs from probability, which tries to give everybody a reasonable possibility of taking part in the investigation. While that reasonableness is ideal, this study did not have the advantage of choosing individuals who may turn up not to like driving change and changing the narrative on foreign nationals in South Africa. Alternatively, then again to risk choosing individuals who speak to the equivalent or practically comparative perspectives. Just as is the case with most qualitative studies, the researcher had to opt for non-probability sampling, where the selected units were deliberately chosen to represent particular groups within the Durban community. This was because “the sample is not intended to be statistically representative: the chances of selection for each element are unknown but, instead, the characteristics of the population are used as the basis of selection” (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 2003: 79).

5.6.3 Snowballing Technique

The investigation also utilized the snowballing technique to collect data on young people and organizations operating in the INK area. Referral or snowballing happens “when a person selected for study assists the researcher by identifying other relevant people and sometimes establishing the initial meeting between the researcher and the referred person” (Naderifar, Goli and Ghaljaie 2017). It paves the way for finding the fitting people for the investigation and building up the researcher’s validity to the possible respondent. Snowballing sampling, therefore, is “the process of selecting a sample using networks” (Kumar 2019). A couple of people are picked to give the researcher the necessary data. At that point, the people allude the researcher to others or associations that may provide additional information. The cycle proceeds until the necessary number is acquired or a saturation point is reached (Naderifar, Goli and Ghaljaie 2017).

With the help of various youth-led NPOs representatives, for in-depth interviews, most of the young people were obtained through this technique as youth knew each other’s experiences and interests. The method was useful as the researcher had little knowledge about the Durban townships; hence she had to contact the NPOs to direct her to other youth who were members of the INK area who had information on the research topic. Snowballing was helpful, particularly in detecting and beginning field interviews with young people and organizations working on social cohesion programs. The researcher managed to recruit various respondents

through snowballing. The participants were more receptive and collaborative, given that the investigator had been suggested to them by somebody they already understood.

5.6.4 Convenience Sampling

Convenience sampling entails “drawing a sample that is both accessible and willing to participate in a study” (Etikan, Musa and Alkassim 2016). Convenience sampling was also utilized to select 24 participants for the FGDs, divided into three groups, and each group comprised 8 participants. The three FGDs consisting of 8 participants as smaller groups are easy to manage, and they give a platform for every participant to have an input, unlike the more prominent groups, which can silence the voices of other participants. The youth participants were obtained from the community dialogues conducted by youth organizations that the researcher had an opportunity to attend. In the process of selection, the researcher tried to select typical cases. It is also understood as “sampling where the advantage is taken of circumstances, events, situations and informants which are close at hand” (Etikan, Musa and Alkassim 2016: 6). These community dialogues were mostly attended by young people, making it convenient for the researcher to obtain participants. Moreover, the FGDs sought to examine the reasons driving the South African youth to participate in violence labelled xenophobic and design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce xenophobia and undertake a preliminary evaluation of its outcome.

5.7 Data Collection Methods

The approaches that scholars use to gather data are the recognizable and respectable processes that describe the primary variables being examined (Sullivan-Bolyai, Bova and Singh 2014). As a result, a study’s subsequent success depended on the quality of data collection methods employed. Davies and Hughes (2014) note that issues to be tackled and skills to be learned emerge with relevant and trustworthy data in each case of a study. As a result, this was the basis of the kinds of techniques employed to gather data, which are guided and directed by the study’s design.

5.7.1 In-depth Interviews

The investigator gathered information via in-depth interviews, which implies the researcher’s direct interaction with participants and informants partaking in this investigation. Interviews involve “a face-to-face verbal interchange of information where the interviewer attempts to

obtain information, opinions, or beliefs from other people” (Wilson and Sapsford 2006). Field minutes were also undertaken during the interviews to record relevant actions and facts from the participants. During interviews, the researcher invested adequate energy to ensure regular communications with the participants.

The data gathering approach was qualitative in-depth individual interviews, which were conducted in English and the isiZulu language. Interviews were utilized because the study aimed to explore the participants’ views, feelings, perceptions, and experiences. Also, interviews were adopted because of the setting and practice in which the research was performed, that is, the townships and informal settlements of Durban where the oral culture has been utilized as a means of interaction.

The interviews helped gather information through face-to-face communications on the factors driving youth participation in the attacks of non-nationals. It was a powerful instrument, as it offered the opportunity for respondents to open up and share their experiences. It also helped the researcher not exclusively be free to pose questions seeking additional explanations yet to decipher the conceivable validity of information exchanged by the respondents. In such a manner, qualitative interviews comprised of open-ended questions that served as the source of data. Accordingly, interviews were led in English and isiZulu language, recorded (with respondents’ authorization), and later translated and converted into English. An interview guide was created, which guided the flow of the meetings. The important topics that came of these are listed in section 5.8.

The researcher was invigorated by Hoyle, Harris and Judd (2002) on how to undertake interviews. The researcher guaranteed the questions were asked in an appropriate manner, which were fathomable by the respondents and which inspired them to put forth the essential attempt in responding to them. The researcher was continually mindful that inspiration powers that urge respondents to take an interest effectively should be prepared, and opposing forces countered. In this manner, the researcher set much emphasis on the first contact respondents with respondents. As a positive force, the researcher presented herself so that respondents trusted her.

In this way, in the presentation, the researcher explained herself as Zimbabwean by nationality, a student understudy, a peacebuilder, and a dependable person). She clarified the reason for the

investigation and its importance such that it incited interest for each member (i.e., the significance of the investigation to the respondents and the nation). She also guaranteed the confidentiality of respondents' data. The researcher knew that a few respondents, if not all, would be hesitant to the utilization of a recording device. In this way, the researcher clarified to participants that its only purpose was to help in the data's ensuing transcription while consoling them of confidentiality. All the interviews started after they had given their consent.

During the interview process, the researcher ensured that her behaviour was welcoming, considerate, conversational, and impartial. This was significant as it put participants at ease, so they talked openly. The researcher tried to show an intrigued way toward the participants' views instead of disclosing her own. The researcher was extremely mindful so as not to propose a potential answer and was reasonably just probing.

The investigator conducted in-depth interviews with key informants between July and August 2018 to acquire data. Babbie (2015) explains that informants are "individuals with experience or expertise in the social phenomenon." Five participants were derived from civil society organizations and community leaders from both locals and non-nationals. These were selected via a mixture of purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling techniques. The researcher targeted these stakeholders because they had direct contact with the community members, and they also worked with foreign nationals. The interviews took between 30 and 45 minutes, given that some of the participants had hectic work timetables. During the process, the researcher took notes and recorded the interviews in selected cases where respondents consented to be registered. Tables 5.3 and figure 5.1 present the composition of the respondents. Table 5.3 relates to in-depth interviews with leaders of organizations and local leadership operating in INK.

Table 5.3: Composition of respondents in in-depth interviews with leaders of organizations and local leadership operating in INK.2

Code	Education	Gender	Age	Nationality
IKOa*	Diploma	M**	37	South African
IKOOb	Degree	M	47	Congolese
IKOc	Diploma	M	40	Congolese

IKOd	Diploma	M	45	Ethiopian
IKOe	Degree	M	49	South African

Source: Designed by the author.

* IKOa: Interview with key informant from a particular organization (a)

** M: Male

Table 5.3 above shows the codes of the participants to protect their identities. Further, the participants requested that the researcher ought to exclude their work titles and associations. This would affect anonymity and confidentiality in the presentation of the findings in the study. In formulating the interview questions, the researcher was guided initially by the investigation's aims and objectives from which general and explicit inquiries were drawn. Concerns rising out of the interviews were likewise noted and sought after through probing during the interviews. This encouraged rich answers from the encounters of the participants. For instance, the specialist figured out how to distinguish the role played and actions taken by key informants in attempting to advance social cohesion between the locals and foreign nationals. These responses are further discussed in Chapter 6.

The researcher also learned about various challenges that organizations and community leaders encounter in promoting a culture of tolerance in townships. Punch (1998: 175) records that "interviews enable the researcher to access people's definitions of a situation, their perceptions, definitions, and meanings which lead to a construction of reality." The answers and interpretations of participants' opinions also helped plan intervention strategies intended to create constructive relationships amongst local South Africans and foreign nationals in Durban. Table 5.4 presents the respondents in in-depth interviews carried out with youth from the INK area. Figure 5.1 depicts the nationalities of critical informants and youth in the in-depth interviews.

Table 5.4: In-depth interviews with youth from the INK area.³

Age Range	Number of participants	Code
18-25	6	IYa*
26-30	4	
31-35	5	

Total	15
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Source: Own data.

* Interview with youth (a)




Figure 5.1: Nationalities for both key informants and youth in in-depth interviews1

For both the interviews with key informants and youth, 75% were South Africans, as they were the immigrants' host communities. More importantly, the study mainly targeted the locals to understand why some young people participate in xenophobic violence. On the other hand, 5% were Rwandese, 5% were Congolese, 10% were Zimbabwean, and 5% were Ethiopian. Zimbabweans formed the highest foreign national numbers as they showed keen interest in the study, and some were victims of xenophobic violence.

The data collected from the interviews guided the questions that were used in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Briefly, the findings from interviews enabled the researcher to get more clarity during the FGDs. During data presentation, the participants' responses were assessed across different interviews, and FGDs were conducted and then combined to describe the findings. Both interviews and FGDs were transcribed and then analysed, which enabled the researcher to identify the themes and bring out conclusions of the study linking with the study's objectives.

5.7.2 Focus Group Discussions

Consecutively, interviews were trailed by three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to investigate issues in the gatherings in more considerable detail. Quite possibly, the most widely recognized employments of FGDs happen in the study's exploratory period (Barbour 2007, 2018). The sample for the FGDs involved 24 participants who were selected using purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling. The researcher chose focus groups since they support more noteworthy openness and might be more worthy to members hesitant to participate in individual face-to-face interviews (Barbour 2007). Moreover, scapegoating theory formed the theoretical basis for this method as the main objective of these focus group discussions was to obtain detailed qualitative data that would be used to change the negative attitudes on foreign nationals and promote cohesive societies through dialogues, skills sharing, and training on conflict resolution skills.

The focus group is pertinent when the interest lies in finding various sentiments (Cyr 2019), and these take into account in-depth discussions of problems while considering explanation and questioning for additional data (Barbour 2018). The FGDs were held between September and October 2018, and the researcher facilitated the discussions to enable free consultation by all respondents. The objective was to make sure that no member dominated the discussions.

The researcher invited people to participate in the three focus group discussions, with the assistance of NPOs operating in the area, until a sample size of 24 was reached—each group comprised eight participants. The first included the South Africans only. This was done to create a platform where young people discuss issues they felt contributed to xenophobic violence without reserving their comments, primarily when directed to foreign nationals. The second group comprised foreign nationals only to create a safe environment to explore the contributing factors leading to violence without their voices being muted along the process. The third group was composed of four South Africans and four foreign nationals – the group's composition was chosen to acquire a balanced opinion on the matters and obtain clarities from both groups on the factors driving youth to participate in violence xenophobic.

In the FGDs, eight participants were females, and 16 were males; ten were in the age range of 18-25, ten were between the ages of 26 and 30, and four were between 31 and 35 years of age. The focus group participants, in turn, constituted the action group. The action group had ten members, while some of the remaining represented the control group, with whom the

researcher had meetings to assess the short-term outcome of the actions taken to address the problem. The biodata of participants in the action group was such that four were females and six were males. Table 5.5 displays participant information for the FGDs, and Figure 5.2 displays the nationalities present in the FGDs.

Table 5.5: Focus group discussions

Age range	Number of participants	Code
18-25	10	FGD1a*, FGD2a** and FGD3a***
26-30	10	
31-35	4	
Total	24	

Source: Own data.

* Focus Group Discussion 1 (first group) (a)

** Focus Group Discussion 2 (second group) (a)

*** Focus Group Discussion 3 (third group) (a)




Figure 5.2: Nationalities in the focus group discussions

South Africans formed the largest population (64%) in the study groups as they were the host country, and most people who execute violent acts against foreign nationals are South Africans. Hence, their presence as a large group was necessary to draw different perspectives on the driving factors. The Congolese and Zimbabweans both formed 14% of the FGDs, and the Kenyans and Eritreans comprised 4%. Also, “the participants had an opportunity to raise questions and seek explanations from their colleagues” (Neuman 2011: 459). The researcher’s involvement in utilizing this strategy was that members were conceded a voice and permitted to communicate their opinions during the discussions. Members had a space to portray their encounters and assessments on the factors leading young people to participate in xenophobic violence, which helped the researcher get closer to the data she anticipated gathering.

This study’s motivation was to capture, dissect, decipher, and comprehend young people’s encounters utilizing their assertions. The qualitative methodology was well-suited as it recognizes the utilization of techniques that enable articulating words and views through discussion. The participants in this study included locals and non-nationals to obtain diverse perspectives and experiences from the youth. It is important to note that the views represented here do not represent those of young people in the whole of Durban nor their respective communities. It is anticipated that their encounters can shed more light on and enlighten people of issues affecting young people leading them to take part in xenophobic violence and to bring solutions to the recurring problem.

The researcher formulated an FGD guide that she used to collect data. Patton (2002: 343) clarifies “how important an interview guide is and, in the process, notes that its purpose is to list the questions and issues to be explored during the interview.” It was set up to guarantee that the researcher does not wander from or leave out some inquiries. The meeting guide guaranteed that a comparative line of the request was sought after the various people met. This made it simple to deal with the discussion results efficiently. The guide filled a comparative need in FGDs and permitted singular encounters and points of view to rise out of the conversations. Open-ended questions were intended to support a full articulation of knowledge and data from the participants; consequently, they allowed the researcher to accumulate different viewpoints and examinations from various perspectives.

5.8 Data Analysis

The data were analysed qualitatively using thematic analysis where the researcher classified, compared, weighed, and combined empirical data collected from interviews and focus groups on obtaining meaning for an insight of the issue under review in a comprehensible clarification. Gray (2014: 602) outlines qualitative analysis as “a rigorous and logical process through which data are given meaning.” Examination of data comprises “data reduction, data display, and conclusion illustration or substantiation” (Miles and Hubberman 2004). Briefly, “data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes as transcripts” (Miles and Hubberman 2004). According to Corbin and Strauss (2008: 65), “data analysis involves collecting raw data and conceptualizing it.” The course continues via “writing summaries, coding, teasing out themes, making clusters, and making partitions” (Miles and Hubberman 2004).

Consequently, the method entails gathering qualitative data utilizing distinct techniques, handling the information, and scrutinizing it through a clear-cut, logical, and reliable assessment. Flick (2018) enunciates that “qualitative data analysis is the interpretation of data or text to develop a theory as well as the foundation of collecting additional data.” Data analysis succinctly follows a procedure that researchers follow to organize new data, describe the data, institute relations, and provide value to the information collected.

It can be stated that “there is no single way of analysing data” (Renner and Taylor-Powell 2003: 1). In this way, the examination of data obtained started ahead of schedule, during information collection, where the aftereffects of early information examination guided following information collection. After finishing each interview, data obtained were analysed to find what should have been discovered straightaway. It was a continuous analysis, and at the end of each interview, the researcher listened to the recorded. This enabled the researcher to know essential notions and themes that came out of the sessions. Nevertheless, the main component of information analysis was performed after data gathering, particularly after the transcription of interviews.

The data collected from the interviews guided the questions that were used in the focus group discussions. Briefly, the findings from interviews enabled the researcher to get more clarity during the FGDs. During data presentation, the participants’ responses were assessed across

different interviews, and FGDs were conducted and then combined to describe the findings. Both interviews and FGDs were transcribed and then analysed, which enabled the researcher to identify the themes and bring out conclusions of the study linking with the study's objectives.

Since data analysis was qualitative, the study was not intended to focus on counting or delivering numeric synopses. In the analysis, the findings from interviews and FGDs were broken down into information units analysed together. These were then grouped into themes to attain a comprehensible meaning. In analysing data, the researcher identified how the themes linked together and used exemplar quotes from both interviews and FGDs to present the findings.

The review of data depends on numerous changes, which are attached to the nature of the study. Thus, "the step that a researcher follows is guided by whether it is content, discourse, case or thematic analysis" (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 67). The researcher utilized thematic analysis, where the recurring themes developing from the data on the consultation texts were observed and inferred regarding the whole investigation problem. For instance, the evolving themes on the factors driving youth participation were discrimination, competition over scarce resources, and a culture of violence. The course of data analysis was conducted via thematic coding. The following themes were discovered from the data:

- Youth used as pawns
- Mob justice
- Lack of contact between locals and foreign nationals
- Discrimination
- Skills gap
- Service delivery failures
- Government and immigration policies
- The role of the media
- Woundedness
- Competition over scarce resources and opportunities
- Culture of violence

Coding encompasses “intermingling with data employing methods, for instance, inquiring, creating contrasts, obtaining ideas, and emerging the ideas in terms of their properties and dimensions” (Braun *et al.* 2019). Gibbs (2007: 38) declares “that coding enables the researcher to make logic out of the data being analysed.” Moreover, “it involves thematically sorting data and codes are the names or labels given to concepts derived through coding” (Corbin and Strauss 2008, Punch 1998). They “create a focus or direction for thoughts about the text and its meaning” (Gibbs 2007: 40). Therefore, coding concerns the creation of ideas, notions, and connections from the information collected.

5.9 Pilot Study

Pretesting was influential in the study as it enabled the researcher to identify potential problems with data collection protocols before fielding the survey. This was helpful as potentially costly mistakes were identified and remedied during this phase. One of the advantages of piloting the study was that it gave warnings regarding “where the primary research study may fail, where research protocols might not be followed, or whether proposed methods or instruments were unsuitable or overly complex” (In 2017). Two focus group discussions, with eight respondents each, and ten semi-structured interviews were held with young people from the INK area to discuss the present issues in some large-scale focus group discussions. However, the contributors who participated in pretesting were excluded in the final stage of data gathering. This stage helped identify real obstacles in following the inquiry process, and it uncovered the local politics and issues that could have affected the research process.

In the pilot studies, “investigators give their research technique a “test run” by piloting their means for collecting and analysing data on a small sample of participants with the same or similar inclusion criteria as would be the case in the main study” (In 2017). Herein “dress rehearsal,” scholars track through their research in a shortened structure and alter it centered upon the execution of the technique” (van Teijlingen and Hundley 2001). Accordingly, “data collected and analysed during pilot studies were typically not included in the body of data generated in the central part of the survey” (Chenail 2011: 257). Pilot studies also “have numerous restrictions. These comprise the likelihood of making imprecise notions founded on pilot data and obstacles occurring from pollution” (van Teijlingen and Hundley 2001). Moreover, the researcher understood that finishing a pilot study effectively did not necessarily ensure the entire investigation's achievement.

5.10 Validity and Reliability

Validity is the “degree to which data in a research study are accurate and credible” (Gray 2014: 692). It was imperative to check the accuracy of the findings of the investigation. Besides, validity “regulates whether the study truly measures that which it was intended to measure or how accurate the research results are” (Golafshani 2003: 599). Moreover, it ensured the reliability of the findings of the investigation. Silverman (2005) explains that validity and reliability concerns “persuading the researcher and the respondents that the results from the analysis are truly founded on important inquiry and are unbiased, or seeks to verify whether the results make sense or are trustworthy the people one studies.”

The outcomes from the interviews and FGDs were triangulated to confirm authenticity. Triangulation is vital in obtaining an in-depth understanding of the problem under study (Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Creswell and Creswell 2017). Triangulation by the technique was carried out to improve the inner authenticity of the conclusions. The objective was to minimize partiality aspects in the reactions that came either from the FGDs or the interviews. For example, throughout the focus group discussions, the participants did not bring up the citizens’ and immigrants’ lack of contact. This, nevertheless, came out in the in-depth interviews. In the words of Patton (2002: 343), “it becomes prudent for the researcher to use multiple methods of collecting data to obtain the best result.” Moreover, it can be acknowledged that “no single method can adequately provide solutions to the problem of rival explanation; thus, it is imperative to triangulate” (Patton 2002).

Reliability denotes “the degree of consistency” (Silverman 2005), and it concerns “utilizing a method that, if applied continually, will produce the consistent findings as was achieved using the first technique” (Babbie 2015). The objective of reliability is “to prevent random blunders whereas validity seeks at avoiding systematic error” (Babbie and Mouton 2005). The level of reliability of the researcher’s apparatuses was attained via pretesting. Throughout the pilot testing procedure, faults were removed, thus enhancing the extent of reliability or truthfulness. A reliability check was carried out before the investigator performed the real data compilation techniques. The reliability check aimed to assess the consistency of the data compilation tools in the interviews and FGDs. After findings were dissected, and before the last report, a short summation of the discoveries was taken back to a portion of the respondents for additional

conversations. These conversations added to the discoveries' legitimacy while extending the subject's comprehension under investigation, with resulting ends.

5.11 Ethical Considerations

The study trailed the Durban University of Technology's study ethics procedures. The researcher also sought a gatekeeper's letter from Africa Unite and Lindelani Youth Forum when the university issued ethical clearance for the study. In undertaking a research study, "ethical matters concerning the respondents' guarding are crucial" (Marshall and Rossman 2006). Hence, the researcher has the responsibility of notifying and safeguarding the participants.

The research procedure included volunteering, and respondents were notified about the purpose of the investigation. The "central issue was how the information for the participants was going to be stored" (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012: 36). With their willingness to participate in the study, the respondents signed consent forms. The participants were responsible for formulating the ground rules that governed the research process. Ritchie *et al.* (2013: 60-67) posit that "members' informed consent to participate must be sought, by providing them with information about the purpose of the study, the funder, the identity of the research team, the use of data, and what the participants will require of them." First, a written agreement was received from the respondents to proceed with the investigation voluntarily. Second, the researcher ensured that the names and other critical identification of the participants and organization where some came from were kept confidential. The researcher also took precautions with the recording and data collected to ensure no one other than the researcher had access.

Moreover, the researcher ensured anonymity and confidentiality throughout the research. Israel and Hay (2006) assert that anonymity enables the researcher "to guard the research contributors, cultivate a trusting connection with them, and encourage the integrity of the research." It also assists in safeguarding against misbehaviour and irregularity. Therefore, pseudonyms were used during data collection to protect the participants' identities. As Babbie (2015) states, protecting the subjects' personalities and well-being should be of primary consideration.

On the other hand, the researcher sought approval from the respondents to record the discussions. Hence, no recording took place without the participants' consent. The researcher emphasized confidentiality as Ritchie *et al.* (2013) define "privacy, that is, as preventing designation (if remarks refer to a person's name or a particular position) and implicit reference (by reference to a compilation of traits that might recognize an individual or small group)." Without ensuring confidentiality, the report may compromise the extent of contextual detail of specific comments.

5.12 Conclusion

The section illustrated the research design that led this study. The researcher used a participatory action research model to understand factors leading to youth participation in violence targeting immigrants in Durban. Briefly, the research design employed enabled the researcher to put the respondents at the centre of the study to devise, implement, and evaluate the intervention. The researcher made use of interviews and FGDs in gathering data. Moreover, in selecting the participants, the researcher used nonprobability techniques, including purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling. Lastly, the chapter presented the research ethics followed in the data collection processes.

CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

6.1 Introduction

As a qualitative study, this study combined Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), interviews, and meetings to gather information from the INK area, and the information was subsequently coded and examined. This section defines this qualitative analysis method and the rationale for the study design choices, and how these methods are proposed to answer the research objectives. The reason for multiple focus groups chosen was because “it allowed the researcher to evaluate the degree to which the data saturation had been achieved” (Onwuegbuzie *et al.* 2009: 3). Firstly, the data was divided into smaller parts, and a code was assigned to it. Secondly, “the codes were grouped into categories, and the last step involved developing themes that could articulate the subject of each of the groups” (Onwuegbuzie *et al.* 2009: 5-6). The use of themes was necessary because, without thematic categories, the researcher will have nothing to describe, compare and explain (Braun *et al.* 2019).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs) regards youth as critical agents of change and places them at the heart of sustainable and inclusive development policies. This was done because encouraged youth play a significant part in stopping tensions and safeguarding durable reconciliation. Also, despite increasing investment in the comprehensive set of government programs to promote social cohesion and the dynamic civil society organizations providing essential services to both locals and immigrants, the problem of xenophobic violence seems to be escalating.

6.2 Participants' Understanding of Xenophobia

The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 revealed that xenophobia signified negative attitudes towards foreign nationals, whereas xenophobic violence was just one of the forms of the manifestation of those attitudes (Misago 2016a, 2019). Participants were asked to reveal what they understood about xenophobia within the South African context from the focus group discussions and interviews. The question was asked to explore how the term ‘xenophobia’ was

generally understood. The section's themes that follow emanated from the FGDs and interviews as the same questions were used to gather the information.

6.2.1 Xenophobia is an Outcome of Socialisation

Respondents elucidated that xenophobia was the foundation and a breeding ground of xenophobic violence, as it covered various types of intolerant arrogances towards foreign nationals, regardless of their origin or nationality. Various scholars agree with this notion that in South Africa, xenophobic violence has affected both locals and non-nationals as locals, mostly from tribal minority groups, have been mistaken as foreigners and attacked (Mogekwu 2005; Masenya 2017; Sebola 2017; Dube 2019). This was deeply explained in Chapter 2.7. IKOb contended that:

Xenophobia is not a normal state of being for any humanity. Instead, it results from socialization, which cultivates extremist attitudes with violent mistreatments of the immigrants.

From the respondents, one can posit that xenophobia was not only motivation but was also an enormously complex issue, and the link between the existence of the immigrants' populace and nationalistic attitudes remains unsettled. Besides, a literature review by Misago (2016a) and Magwaza and Ntini (2020) correspond with IKOb that foreign nationals are continually seen as the outgroup or outsiders, making them continually rejected in some cases, attacked and killed. Such prejudice exhibited towards non-nationals leaves them vulnerable to attacks by some of the locals. Hence, the reason why in most cases, they are scapegoated by locals. Also, various scholars have explained that xenophobia was a practice that encompasses fairly several intolerant aspects (Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016: 33; Muchiri 2016)

The result of socialization is that there are societal attitudes that locals have adopted against foreign nationals. It can be stated that most of these negative attitudes are displayed towards black African nationals as various researchers have alluded in Chapter 2.7 that black nationals commit violence towards black African nationals living side-by-side with locals in townships and informal settlements (Mogekwu 2005; Dodson 2010; Siziba 2014; Gumede 2015; Masenya 2017; Sebola 2017; Dlamini 2018; Dube 2018, 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). Some locals view non-nationals as illegal and therefore deserve to be returned to their home countries. With this, Masenya (2017) outcries that perceiving black immigrants as illegal was of great concern as negativity has continued leading to the attacks on foreign nationals. Such perceptions have been a breeding ground of scapegoating of foreigners as causes of socio-economic problems.

6.2.2 Xenophobia as Self-Hate

Africans are observed as haters of themselves, as African nationals are attacked in various communities. The self-hate was traced to immigrants and local tensions that exist between different tribal groups in South Africa (Masenya 2017; Dlamini 2018; Dube 2018, 2019). However, in most cases, one can argue that these tensions have not been violent, unlike how non-nationals are attacked. IKOe gave an example that:

You see, there are prejudices and unfriendly attitudes that exist between and among several tribal groups; they despise each other based on which tribal group. Honestly, with such arrogance, what do you think will come of foreigners as they do not even come within South Africa? They will never accept them, and they will always see them as a threat.

The issue brought up by IKOe reveals the intersectionality of the history of the conflicts between the local tribal groups of South Africa and the current attacks on foreign nationals in Durban. Moreover, it leaves the gaps on why there was a high increase of Black on Black violence in South Africa, which has led Gordon (2020) to conclude that South Africa has an Afrophobic problem. The foreigners are an outgroup, as mentioned above, hence the arrogance against them. However, one can argue that there are various races and nationalities from other continents other than Africa that are not attacked. The question which remains is why the Black Africans have continuously been the targets of these attacks? The assumption was that this was due to self-hate.

To uncover why Black Africans continuously bear the brunt of these attacks, IKOb explained that:

Black people have self-hated due to the colonial and apartheid-era that they went through. We have been indoctrinated to be enemies of each other. I see that xenophobia has been mainly used to imply the terror and hatred of outsiders or foreigners or anything strange or foreign.

IKOb puts forth the notion of self-hate among Black people and has some roots in the colonial and apartheid era. A plethora of works has been authored on how xenophobic violence links with the colonial and apartheid-era legacy (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ayo 2015; Magidimisha *et al.* 2017; Mabena 2019; Mangu 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019; Magwaza and Ntini 2020), as noted in Chapter 2.5 and Chapter 3.2. As one investigates Black communities, Black people do not complement each other whenever someone achieves something; instead, they become jealous to the extent of killing that person. Therefore, this might explain why locals attack

Black Africans more, as they tend not to celebrate each other's successes as Black people. Therefore, IKOb views the attacks as not xenophobia but Afrophobia, as Black people are against each other, and in the process, the African immigrants are blamed for the injustices affecting the local Black people. Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 3) confirm that xenophobic violence is unique in South Africa as it was 'Black on Black.'

6.2.3 Xenophobia as Hate Crime

One of the responses that arose from the participants was that xenophobia was a hate crime. Such a hate crime carried a message to foreign nationals and those supporting them that they were unwelcome and must leave South Africa. This has been seen in how social media plays a role in circulating messages calling all foreign nationals to leave the country, as Oneko (2019) explained. IYc posited that:

We are not needed in this country, especially in these townships. These attacks on us by our brothers are just signalling that we are unwelcomed. I have tried to make friends with the locals and tried to integrate, but these people, some of them are animals, those I thought were okay with me, turned against me during the attacks. They even pointed to my house that it must be looted, and I should move out of the area.

IYc indicated that no matter the relationship that foreign nationals try to build with the locals, they will never be fully integrated or welcomed in the townships. This is because the same friends whom IYc had in the area were the ones who came and looted all his property and forced him to move out of where he was staying. This confirms some of the findings made by scholars that xenophobic violence unleashed on foreign nationals is a hate crime that carries a message intended to the foreign nationals (Misago 2019) that must leave. This has been witnessed in May 2018 violence against foreign-owned shops where a letter was issued that all foreign-owned shops in the INK area must be closed and owners to leave the area (Hans 2018).

IYg adds that:

We continuously attack each other as usual to unleash violence against each other as Black people. We have normalized these hate crimes, and sadly less was being done to address this hate crime as I have heard a few cases where people were prosecuted for these hate crimes against foreign nationals.

Like other hate crimes, xenophobia communicates to foreign nationals that they are not welcome in communities, schools, and workplaces, as Misago (2016a) explains. Succinctly, it aids as a warning beyond the unpleasant incident and those openly implicated. According to Misago (2016a), the violence carries a detailed memo that people related to those targeted will

be attacked, including their properties. Hence, this additional answers why even the locals have been targeted during the attacks on foreigners, as established in the reviewed literature (Okem and Asuelime 2015; Tshishonga 2015; Tshaka 2016; Masenya 2017; Ndlovu 2017; Dube 2018; Waiganjo 2018; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020) in Chapter 2.7. Moreover, in these xenophobic attacks, South African residents, partners, or foreign companies were likewise affected (McConnell 2009; Mkhize and Makau 2018). Therefore, one can agree with Misago (2016a) that simple rejection of xenophobic violence as acts of criminality hides the message carried by hatred offense. The message attempts to infuse panic and functions as a cautionary message which echoes away from the episode and points to the likelihood of upcoming violent behaviour.

IKOd gave an example about a particular group in Durban:

To fully understand the conflict between locally-owned shops and foreign-owned shops in the INK area, it was essential to understand who NORBA was. Therefore, it can be noted that most of the anti-immigrant violence taking place in the Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (INK) areas was centered on the role of NORBA. Therefore, it was significant to understand who they are. North Region Business Association (NORBA) is mainly composed of the local spaza shop owners in Durban Northern townships, including Phoenix, Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu (PINK). On the 3rd of May 2018, NORBA instructed the immigrant business owners to shut their businesses. The instruction was issued in the form of letters, and these were distributed to different shop owners by NORBA that claimed to represent local informal traders. The notice, dated 3rd of May 2018, stated: *“The North Region Business Association hereby instructs you to close down your shop and cease all operations within 14 days of this notice. You will receive the next instruction from your association representative.”* Do you notice the message was to shut down all the foreign-owned shops?

In May 2018, for example, the message was received in the INK area as foreign-owned businesspeople were told to close their shops and leave by the North Region Business Association (NORBA). Some shops were looted, destroyed, and burnt down following the NORBA's ultimatum calling the foreign shop owners to leave the area. Even after the Premier intervened, some foreign nationals could not reopen their shops and return to the area in fear of their lives.

It can be observed that the letter opened a way for the looting and burning of the immigrants' shops across the Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu area. It was noted that male youth were the ones who were at the forefront of these attacks, as local businesspeople mobilized them to execute their hidden agendas against foreign-owned shops. IKOc explained the reason that led to such a letter being issued:

Local shop owners accused foreigners of putting them out of business, resulting in tensions in INK. NORBA was against foreign-owned tuck shops in those traders from Somalia, and Ethiopia gets lower rates when purchasing stock, which allowed them to sell it at lower prices. Competition between the foreign merchants and locals had led to a souring of relationships, which ended in the locals issuing a petition to the foreign owners to close their shops. Locals, who mainly belong to the NORBA, had complained that their foreign competitors, predominantly Somalis, and Ethiopians, had introduced unfair commercial practices that had forced them to shut their shops. The chief complaint of residents was that there had been a massive influx of foreign nationals working in the area, with around 400 foreign-owned shops in the INK area.

Such accusation served as a spark of violence in May 2018, which led to attacks of foreign-owned shops in the INK area. IKOd explained that:

The foreign-owned shops believed that the letter was an indirect threat and could spark xenophobic violence, as the rampage erupted three years ago. Immigrants traders were not allowed to be part of business associations like NORBA, and they wanted to be part of that association.

In reaction to the memos sent out by NORBA, Hans (2018) explains that “the KwaZulu-Natal Somali Community Council called on KwaZulu-Natal Premier Willies Mchunu, eThekweni Mayor Zandile Gumede, and the justice system for intervention and preventative actions to be applied before the condition spiralled into mass violence and spread to unaffected areas.” As the deadline arrived, Hans (2018) reported that Premier Willies Mchunu convened an urgent discussion with small business owners, locals, and foreigners in KwaMashu township due to local calls spaza shops that foreign national business owners must evacuate the area by 17th May 2018. Hostilities were elevated at the local police station venue where the discussion was conducted, as locals demanded that the seven-day petition given to foreigners running spaza shops in the area was about to expire and foreigners has to close down their spazas.

It is imperative to note that the government persists in dismissing xenophobic violence similarly that it makes in many disorders distressing disadvantaged areas (Hanekom and Webster 2009; Maina *et al.* 2011; Sinwell 2011; Botha 2012; Managa 2012; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020a). It maintains established hostile-foreigner violent behaviour by attributing it diversely on lawbreaking or the inherent hatred that disadvantaged residents believe concerning individuals whom they see as taking opportunities from them (Musuva 2014; Mothibi, Roelofse and Tshivhase 2015). One of the local spaza shop owners' findings was that the government officials rarely visit the INK area when there are grievances. However, the foreign-owned spaza shops' attack was a call for the government officials to visit the area. One explained that these attacks were the only way to get government officials' attention. Therefore, the government's absence to resolve the community problems

can be noted as one of the contributing factors of xenophobic violence, and foreigners are just used as pawns in the process.

6.2.4 Afrophobia

The participants explained that *Afrophobia* is used to suggest a type of hate or mistrust of other Africans and mostly black people (Okem and Asuelime 2015; Tshaka 2016; Amusan and Mchunu 2017; Ndlovu 2017; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). The understanding of the participants corresponded with various scholars writing on Afrophobia confirming what they have witnessed in their communities as the most victims of the attacks were black Africans (Morris 1998; Olukaju 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Tevera 2013; Muchiri 2016; Amusan and Mchunu 2017; Mutanda 2017; Dube 2018, 2019; Dlamini *et al.* 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b). The outlining of the discussion alongside this position was of crucial significance as it stresses that not all foreigners, predominantly individuals who come from Europe, have not been at the receiving end of the attacks, unlike the black Africans. However, it was noted that the xenophobic attacks have uncovered that victims of xenophobic violence are not only Africans, as people from South Asia and China have also been affected (Olowu 2008; Olukaju 2008; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019).

Participants further defined xenophobia as a growing culture of hatred concentrated on immigrants irrespective of nationality. This confirms the studies undertaken by various scholars in South Africa in pursuit of explaining the harmful behaviours and attitudes directed against foreign nationals (Kersting 2009; Bekker 2010; Dodson 2010; Landau 2010; Breen and Nel 2011; Everatt 2011; Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013; Friebe, Gallego and Mendola 2013; HSRC 2013; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019; Cinini and Singh 2019; Mangu 2019; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Mlambo 2019; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020b). However, IYo argued that the trends of violence against immigrants in South Africa bring a unique picture as one specific group was frequently attacked:

Here in South Africa, the attacks have been directed predominantly, albeit not exclusively, at foreigners of African origin, Blacks. It is chiefly within this context that I call the violent attacks against foreign nationals Afrophobia and not xenophobia.

IYo labelled these attacks as Afrophobia, Africans hating Africans, and this led the participants to conclude that Africa is suffering from the fear of itself, and Dube (2018) also confirms that

South Africa has Afrophobia. Most of these attacks are directed against Black Africans, disturbing and betraying a rainbow nation's idea. Dlamini *et al.* (2020) also highlight that non-nationals from Africa have decades of entering South Africa and are welcomed to play a role in the republic's socio-economic development. However, the trends post-1994 have shown that South Africa has an Afrophobic problem. The post-apartheid era has not brought much peace, and the cycle of violence is now continuing. The cycle of violence has shifted the colour to Black on Black violence, which leads one to assume that people never moved away from the past violence but are now replicating it with Black people attacking each other.

Participants added that xenophobia interrogates immigrants' identity as they are categorized continuously as outsiders despite some having legal documentation. This argues that in South Africa, being a Black African immigrant seems to be a crime as race seems to be playing a role in xenophobic violence. Various scholars have brought this upon how Africans suffer in the hands of local Black people in townships and informal settlements (Olukoju 2008; Mapokgole 2014; Tshabalala 2015; Ndlovu 2017; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018; Dube 2019; Montle and Mogoboya 2020a).

IYi further added that:

I am concerned about us South Africans, saying, 'our brothers from Africa.' Where is South Africa located geographically? Isn't it also in Africa? Why do we speak as if we are not from Africa every time we talk about immigrants from other African countries? I honestly fail to understand us.

The issue raised by IYi speaks to some of the concerns raised by various scholars that South Africa seems to act as if it is not part of Africa. This has been observed from how natives undermine foreigners from African states and address foreign nationals using derogatory language (Nyamnjoh 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Moreover, locals seem to despise other African countries because South Africa is a developed country, and such attitudes have been grounded on the exceptionalism of the republic (Misago 2011; Gordon 2017, 2020).

Some defined South Africa's situation as Afrophobia, as violence targeted Black Africans, and at the same time, Black locals execute these violent acts on the minority outsiders. The profile of who executes these violent acts and those at the receiving is extensively explained by scholars (Dodson and Oelofse 2000; Dodson 2010; Langa and Kiguwa 2016; Masenya 2017; Dube 2019) in Chapter 2.6 and 2.7. Some participants saw the attacks as a reproduction of what Black people encountered under the apartheid rule and that this has turned to target the Black

non-nationals (Polzer and Takabvirwa 2010; Pollmann 2015; Pieterse, Stratford and Nel 2018). FGD2f explained that:

Naming the violence on foreign nationals as xenophobia without engaging in the Black experience pardons some actors from accountability. It disregards and weakens the vital role that apartheid played in forming the racial conflict, which culminates itself into violence.

Therefore, it can be argued that discourse on xenophobia cannot be explicated by looking at the current state of South Africa; instead, it must integrate the past, as present activities fail to integrate the local Black history in the examination of the xenophobic violence. This is confirmed by Dube (2018: 1019), who contends that local Black people seem to “dislike Black immigrants more than they dislike white or Asian ones.”

6.3 Causes of Violence labelled as Xenophobic

There are various factors raised by scholars that range from crime, poverty, unemployment, to mention a few, that trigger xenophobic violence in South African communities. Magwaza and Ntini (2020: 34) approve that competing for limited resources such as housing, jobs, poor public services amongst poor South Africans and poor African immigrants, the high prevalence of corruption from the Department of Home Affairs and SAPS officials and local Ward Councillors and lastly denialism from the government were some of the causes of xenophobic violence. These will be further discussed below as the attack of the non-nationals has been adopted by poor locals as a mobilization strategy to articulate their grievances to the government, in the process using non-nationals as scapegoats to vent out their frustrations. The following were findings obtained from both FGDs and interviews as the same questions were used to collect data.

6.3.1 Discrimination

Vulnerable and marginalized communities in society carry an excessive fraction of discriminatory problems. This was witnessed in how immigrants face daily discrimination in various communities in the INK area. FGD3d reported that:

Many inequalities are entrenched in fundamental societal structural inequalities, which are inextricably connected to racism and other forms of prejudice in society. Explicit discrimination violates one of the basic principles of human rights and often is at the root of intolerance.

Discrimination of immigrants amplifies xenophobic violence. Discrimination, inequality, and violence exacerbate their susceptibility. With this study, young people explained that underlying causes of xenophobic violence needed to be addressed as they left immigrants vulnerable and violated their rights. Scholars in Chapter 2.3 have explained that discrimination is linked to prejudice from which xenophobia stems, and findings show widespread of it leading to xenophobic attacks (Asia-Pacific 2001a; Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Furthermore, one can assert that discrimination has triggered the social exclusion and marginalization of non-nationals, especially Black people. One can assert that humanity has a responsibility to treat everyone, regardless of nationality or race, with dignity.

Furthermore, discrimination against foreign nationals was also ruining South Africa's regional status and diplomatic power. FGD2a reported that:

Observing the anger shown by some of the participants who are non-nationals, I have seen that some non-nationals now have little respect for the current government, the public administration, especially the Department of Home Affairs, and some of the South Africans generally. This was because of the continuous cultural discrimination that they face daily. Being in their shoes, sometimes it was never easy, especially when one is here legally.

The above report given by FGD2a was based on the backlogs which the Department of Home Affairs had on issuing proper documentation for immigrants. The literature has reported that some have been asylum seekers for over ten years without being given refugee status. Paradoxically, numerous immigrants impose similar allegations against locals regarding what locals do against them (for example, displaying ignorant, violent, and aggressive behaviour towards them, and usually being with no ethical qualities). This has painted a dire picture about South Africa as a xenophobic nation that has been graded as one of the world's highly unequal societies (StatsSA 2019a).

One of the participants, FGD1c, had to relate how he has continuously heard conversations of locals concerning foreigners as he elucidated that

I listen to these discriminatory comments that local people usually talk about, and they are never positive at all as they call us derogatory names like '*makwerekwere*' as if we were not humans. I remember one taxi driver saying, you see, our Durban was not dirty like this; these '*makwerekwere*' came with all this dirty pointing to the state of Durban's market. Sadly, these same labels are used by our youth to call our African brothers and sisters.

The issue raised by FGD1c was not new, and many studies have been conducted on discriminatory labels given to African nationals. Tafira (2011) explains how South Africans are labelled, and these labels are argued as carrying racial, xenophobic, and ethnocentric connotations. These labels are also traced from the languages used by different African nationals and the contact between these two groups (Oni and Okunade 2018: 46). Due to these labels given to African immigrants, studies have concluded that South Africans seem to favour immigrants from Europe and North America to those from Africa (Crush, Ramachandran and Pendleton 2013; Dube 2018: 1008). In a study of attitudes towards foreigners in KwaZulu-Natal, Gordon, Roberts and Struwig (2015) exposed that African immigrants were the highly detested in the province.

One of the reasons for negative attitudes towards African immigrants was that they were too many in South Africa. FGD3a explained that:

There are many stories told by the media and even by our politicians that we have many foreigners in South Africa. Such has created insecurity amongst the locals; hence, we see South Africans' constant lashing on foreigners. When such information is given, the public embraces it as accurate and maps mechanisms to deal with the situation, hence the xenophobic violence in communities.

What FGD3a highlights has been explained in the previous Chapters 2 and 3 that negative attitudes towards Black Africans are founded on the assumptions that they are many foreign nationals residing in South Africa (Dube 2018: 1009). It can be argued that although they are many foreign nationals, the number is disputed. The 2011 Census reported that the number of people living in the country who were not born there (that is, foreigners) was 2.2 million, making up 4.4 percent of 52 million. Therefore, the figure was significantly lower than the statistics usually flaunted by politicians, local and international media outlets. Therefore, the statistics given by the politicians and the media are misleading and always made without any evidence suggesting that they are exaggerations. In turn, these fuel xenophobic attitudes and pushes locals to blame and attack the African nationals.

Recently, in disputing media reports of South Africa being host to a third of Malawi's population, an official from South Africa's national statistical agency, Stats SA, argues that this was an exaggeration, as such a spike of foreign nationals would be reflected in other data, such as annual birth rates. Africa Check has also reported that there is no evidence to suggest that there are three million Zimbabweans in South Africa, suggesting that the number is much lower (Africa Check 2017). In its report, Africa Check quotes Loren Landau, a migration

specialist, who argues that both governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO) have a vested interest in overstating immigrant statistics. By doing so, governments can “justify more restriction, and NGOs can secure donor funding” (Dube 2018: 1009).

It is important to note that the hostility towards some makwerekwere (and the welcoming of white foreigners) is not unique to South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2006). What is different in South Africa is that these feelings of superiority are expressed even at the highest government levels, thus reinforcing these public views. This is somewhat unusual in Africa, where leaders’ public pronouncements are almost always characterized by platitudes of African solidarity, brotherly love, and equality (Dube 2018: 1011). Succinctly, African immigrants are accused of the social ills affecting the republic. This was further explained by Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 8) that because of the growing sense of entitlement from locals, they stereotype immigrants as a way of diverting their anger from government failure to address the structural problems they face.

6.3.2 Vigilantism/Mob Justice

Tracing the history of violence in South Africa, it was observed that it had been characterized by vigilantism. Young people indicated that they had adopted a tendency of taking part in mob justice instances even without knowing the root causes of why the person was being attacked. Vigilantism is mostly targeting those perceived or real criminals or outsiders within communities, and in South Africa, there is ‘necklacing’ of criminals in black townships (Kucera and Mares 2015). In South Africa, when violence against foreign nationals occurs, a group of locals mobilize themselves and attack non-nationals, including their shops. This mob violence, in many instances, results in the looting and destruction of property. FGD1b explained that:

The connection between high crime levels or perceptions thereof and attacks on foreign nationals is not particularly challenging to make as locals point much of this crime to foreign nationals and believe communities are justified to take action given the government's apparent incapability reluctance to deal with the situation.

Undeniably, the findings approve that, without practical indication, numerous residents uphold similar false relations concerning crime and immigration frequently indicated by the police and government officials (Shindondola 2002; Sisulu, Moyo and Tshuma 2007; Sharp 2008;

Quinlan 2013; Solomon and Kosaka 2013; Sebola 2017). The absence of evidence does not seem to bother those with such strong beliefs, and Misago (2016a) argues that it is somewhat regularly distorted to reinforce additional credibility that almost all non-nationals are unlawful with criminal intention henceforth cannot be tracked if they commit a crime. With such assumptions, xenophobic violence was bound to occur. IYm elucidated that:

Most of these people do not come through normal processes; some jump the borders and bribe them. So, does it mean all their credentials are recorded within the migration offices? That is why I believe that foreign nationals are just criminals!

The issue raised by IYm shows the perceptions that locals have on foreign nationals, which continue to fuel xenophobic violence despite there being a lack of indication to validate these allegations. Moreover, the locals seem to forget that in every community or nation, there are criminals. Hence, the researcher argues that all immigrants' blaming and bullying as criminals must stop as South Africans are not all innocent. Many locals are involved in criminal activities; however, non-nationals are blamed or scapegoated due to prejudice. FGDf explained that:

In most cases, the problem I picked was that crime was given a nationality, which was wrong as a crime was a crime despite being committed by a Zimbabwean or a South African.

Such instances of giving offenses citizenship were one of the issues fuelling xenophobic violence in local communities. This was done chiefly by the media in the way that they reported incidents. In most cases, when an offense was committed by a foreign national, they reported the person's nationality, forgetting the consequences that such reports spark violence against foreign nationals, including the innocent ones who suffer. Therefore, the researcher posits that the media houses need to move away from such stances as they fuel xenophobic tendencies within communities and breed violence, as communities tend to use mob justice to resolve the problems.

It can be argued that the supposed failure of the justice system to resolve offenses perpetrated by non-nationals triggers some individuals to support brutal methods of vengeance against foreigners. FGD3d stated that:

The sad part was that when it comes to crimes, locals see the faults of the foreigners but fail to see their shortfalls also, as stated in Matthew 7:3.

There has been a lack of substantiation to imply that foreigners in their communities have perpetrated nearly all crimes. This supports the point raised by FGD3d that there are various

crimes committed by locals, as no country is unaffected by crime. The shortfall to justify this reveals the power of adopted views as a mobilization strategy to attack foreigners, as widely explained by scholars in Chapter 2.3 (Misago 2016a; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Misago 2019; Mlambo 2019).

Respondents unanimously explained that the INK area had been affected by collective and vigilantism forms of violence for the past years. The areas have witnessed the recurrence of prearranged violence, including violent service delivery protests, taxi violence, gang and political violence, vigilantism, and mob justice.

Participants were mainly alarmed by how young people in communities were taking the law into their hands. Literature explained that mob justice typically included beating and burning up offenders or being accused to death (Steinberg 2008; Tewari 2015; Tsheola, Ramoroka and Muzondi 2015; Tshishonga 2015) what was taking place in the INK area. According to FGD3h, mob justice is mostly encouraged by the weak justice system. In his words:

Mob justice is caused by community frustration; there is a problem with the justice system; a killer, a rapist, would be back into the community tomorrow, out on bail. That individual is a threat to the community. How do you want the victims to feel if this consistently happens as if killing or raping was a good thing? I cannot say further than this because it pains me (pause).

When a community loses trust in the justice system and in the existing conflict resolution mechanisms that have been put in place, they tend to take matters into their own hands. From the participants' responses, young people explained that they had lost trust in their leaders because the local leadership was corrupt, which leads them to resort to mob justice and vigilantism as the crime was high within their areas.

Organized violence has been used and adopted to resolve assumed challenges in disadvantaged communities, as explained in Chapter 3.2. Participants acknowledged that with the way their communities tackled problems, community members, especially young people, mobilized against foreign nationals in the area. These attacks are “widely supported as a mechanism for community self-protection, and they institute instant justice, often through extortion and compensation to the aggrieved” (Misago 2019: 28-29). Also, Misago explains that this history of vigilantism, coupled with endemic prejudice, rampant impunity, and expedient political scapegoating against foreigners as criminals, present a cocktail of factors that ultimately result

in the targeting of and attacks against foreign nationals in various parts of the country (Misago 2019: 35).

The justice system has been failing the disadvantaged communities to the extent that local people organize themselves to achieve social justice. Participants explained that most of this was triggered by competition for political agendas, corruption, and poor service delivery in townships and informal settlements. Briefly, participants validated the claim made by (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 8) that “xenophobia was a consequence of the country's socio-economic environment.”

6.3.3 Lack of Contact between Locals and Foreign Nationals

The participants acknowledged that there was a lack of contact between locals and foreign nationals. They explained that most foreigners spend most of their time at work, which makes it challenging to become thoroughly acquainted with them within the communities, as reported by IYg:

On Sundays, they go to their churches led by the people from their origins, and most prefer to live in the CBD and in areas where White people live. How do I know someone given such barriers, and how do I protect someone who seems to be not caring to be integrated within my community?

Such a response reveals that people are not in contact and are still living in isolation. It can be noted that there is a lack of orientation programs for immigrants when they arrive, and this further distances them from knowing much about the communities in which they live. On the other hand, the immigrants have shown an unwillingness to integrate into the communities they live in, which makes them vulnerable whenever attacks occur. According to IKOb:

The attacks of foreign-owned shops depend on the relationship they have with the community. Foreigners need to be part of the community and come out of isolation.

That which IKOb raised was one of the critical concerns of local people that most immigrants did not show interest in integrating into their living areas. This made them vulnerable to the attacks; hence the need to open platforms for people from different backgrounds can interact and learn about different cultures to promote social cohesion. This was because young people made it clear that little is known about the origins of non-nationals, and they could not defend those they did not fully understand. Moreover, some scholars believe that contact was critical

in reducing prejudices and blaming the outer group (immigrants) as the source of societal injustices in South Africa (Allport 1954; Stowe 2012; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020).

The literature on xenophobia also proposes that Black South Africans' negative attitudes towards African immigrants are precipitated by substantial disparities amongst them (Dube 2018: 1010). Locals see it as a problem for foreigners when they are not fully integrated into the local communities and participating in local activities. Moreover, the literature reveals that Black foreigners experience difficulties integrating into South African society due to cultural differences and their inability to speak South African indigenous languages (Adam and Moodley 2013; Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Akinola 2014, 2017; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018). However, the integration of non-nationals in local communities does not guarantee their safety when xenophobic violence erupts. In a study of Congolese and Nigerian immigrants in South Africa, a recurring theme among immigrants was that being unable to speak a 'South African' language often set 'the stage for hostile reactions' (Morris 1998). Succinctly, the language provided a foundation for othering of immigrants in South Africa.

One of the concerns raised by IKOb was that:

Foreigners do not attend community meetings, which were wrong as the community will have little knowledge of them, and they will continue to be used as scapegoats. In Lindelani, a shop was guarded continuously by six local people, and it was never looted. The foreigners give credit compared to locals. Chinese shops were not ransacked; only Black-owned shops were. There was an intra-conflict between the Africans, which needs to be fixed. Black people hate each other, and nothing was being said about Asians occupying shops and jobs. Issue of jobs, drugs, and cheap labour provided by the foreigners were some of the causes of conflicts between foreigners and locals. However, we are dealing with symptoms instead of dealing with the root causes of the conflict.

Locals cannot buy from locals as foreigners sell at a lower price, as they have access to buying in bulk. However, competition has led the locals to close their shops. The loophole for locals and a cause for conflict was that the foreign nationals' business owners were divided, especially the Ethiopians. IKOb made it known that community members have grievances against foreign national shop owners and those grievances were that they did not have a relationship with the communities they served beyond the doors of their shops. As such, this continues to make foreign nationals, indeed foreigners, in the communities. This will consequently always make them victims of such criminal activities. He exemplified his statement by stating that "The safety of foreign nationals is dependent on the relationships they build with the communities

around them.” He gave a further example of a foreign national shop owner behind the constituency office of the African National Congress:

He is named by community B, and when the people wanted to loot the shop, the community members said, not this one, go to others. If the shopkeepers do not have a relationship with the community, they will not find protection. I have a relationship with the shop next to me, sometimes my neighbour’s daughter would want money like R100 quickly, and he would tell her daughter to go and ask the shop owners, and then he reimburses him when he comes back. In most areas, shop keepers confine themselves into a container and the shop they work in and never extend their relationship with the community beyond the exchange of money and goods.

The issues raised by IKOb were crucial as the immigrants were responsible for mixing within the local communities to build relationships. Furthermore, one of the issues that came out from the FGDs, interviews, and meetings was that people from different backgrounds (locals and foreign nationals) need to continue meeting and creating spaces to do activities together. Hence dialogues, which were included as one of the interventions, helped address such issues to enhance social cohesion among youth from diverse backgrounds and break the cycle of violence. The isolation of South Africa from other African countries was attributed to the apartheid era (Ukwandu 2017) and the lack of contact between the locals and the non-nationals during the discussions the research team had.

In most community meetings that the researcher attended in areas affected by xenophobic violence, the locals raised some concerns that they were not happy that the foreign nationals were not attending any community meetings, yet they were a part of the communities. IKOe reported that “It was not a good sign for foreign nationals to live in isolation and not attend community meetings for people to know them.” According to the report from IKOe, one can note that when foreigners show a lack of interest to integrate into communities, it triggers hostilities against them as they will be viewed as a threat to the entire community. Therefore, it was important for immigrants to assimilate to avoid instances where they are outsiders imposing a threat.

6.3.4 Youth used as Pawns by Local Business Owners

Sometimes youth are used as pawns to execute violent acts to thwart their participation in peacebuilding processes. IKOa explained that:

The conflict involving businesspeople was driven by local businesspeople who used youth to commit violence against foreign national shop owners. The local shop owners used “*pharas*” (drug addicts) to attack, loot, and burn the shops. The business

owners targeted drug addicts who needed money for their next shot as they were vulnerable and were willing to accept anything that will bring them money.

In exploring the tensions between locals and immigrants, the literature reveals that most of the hostilities emanate from a competition where foreigners are accused of weakening local spazas as they cannot keep up in the competition (Herrington, Kew and Kew 2010; Mamabolo 2015; Monkhe 2015; Mothibi, Roelofse and Tshivhase 2015; Hans 2018; Ntetha 2018; Hare and Walwyn 2019). The Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu communities' findings acknowledged this as a critical factor behind xenophobic violence eruptions. IKOe reported that:

In Ntuzuma, xenophobic violence in May 2018 was stirred by build-up tension over business competition between Somalians, Ethiopians, and locally-owned businesses. Respondents testified that the number of Somali- and Ethiopian-owned shops had significantly increased since 2017. This resulted in the collapse of companies owned by residents, who could not compete with the comparatively cheap prices offered by Somali and Ethiopian traders. Afterward, local business owners mobilized to attack Somali and Ethiopian shops.

IKOe further added that:

Groups of youths carried out the looting and demolition of Somali and Ethiopian shops. The local businesspeople hired these to cripple their businesses to close and move away from the area.

The xenophobic situation in the INK area was significantly polarised in 2017 and 2018, with violence in its high-density suburbs. Clashes were frequent among the businesspeople in the regions, and these were fuelled by the North Region Business Association (NORBA). The *pharas* were used as pawns to execute violent acts against foreign businesspeople. The violence resulted in the raiding, burning, and even murdering of the non-nationals in the INK area. These three townships became the hot spot of xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal during that time.

From the interviews and FGDs, the responses of the participants revealed the findings made by different scholars that the participation of youth in xenophobic violence was linked to local leaders pushing their hidden agenda in establishing their economic dominance in the informal sectors of the townships (Charman and Piper 2012; Misago 2016a, 2016b, 2017a; Hare and Walwyn 2019; Misago 2019). The INK area findings reveal that young people were used in organized violence against foreign nationals in INK by the resident business factions and people endeavouring to establish the authority necessary to advance their political and economic pursuits.

IKOc revealed that:

The conflicts within the INK area are centered around politics and who runs the spaza shops. Our youth just come in to benefit from these conflicts, and they are used unknowingly by these leaders and individuals who are protecting their businesses and political power, and interests.

Succinctly, the researcher maintains that violence against foreigners in INK was merely a product of another form of politics driven by locals' need to own and control the economic space in the INK area. Misago (2016a) also concurs that the business tensions in townships are mainly attributed to the economy's politics and micropolitics. Local business leaders and specific individuals plan these attacks well, and in INK, it has been NORBA. These leaders are seen using young people to execute their acts, and since 2017, the scenario has changed in the area as previously, most of the community members used to participate in the violent action. It is currently said to involve young people employed by local business people; however, some locals hold entrenched harmful views and hatred regarding Black foreigners, hence the recurrence of xenophobic attacks in the areas. The instigator's actions are motivated more by individual or faction's political and economic benefits instead of the community needs.

Xenophobic attitudes or views are not new-found in KwaZulu-Natal, nor are they expected to disappear soon. This can be observed from what occurred on 3 May 2018, where the immigrants and refugees' enterprises were given an ultimatum by NORBA to shut down their shops. Foreigners have continually been used as scapegoats for the social ills faced by the local citizens, and in an inexplicable turn of rationality, unemployment and poverty are now said to be the fault of foreigners. The xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal since May 2018 has resulted in death, injury and has displaced many from the communities. The violence is mostly directed towards migrant-owned businesses as they are consistently destroyed in the mayhem. Therefore, the chaos has led to plundering, torching, and demolition of business properties, and the immigrant business owners are amongst those harassed and chased out in local communities.

It is not only the immigrants who suffer when these atrocities are committed; the locals also suffer. Various scholars have explained this in Chapter 2.7 as these attacks, in some instances, do not look at the race, nationality, or ethnicity of an individual (Gumede 2015; Hans 2016; Goddey 2017; Gordon 2020). IYk explained that:

There is a certain woman who had rented the shop out to one of the immigrants as a way to sustain herself and her family. The sad part was that the whole shop was burnt

down, destroying their livelihood that has been passed from generation to generation. She indicated a point where the family failed to run the shop, which led them to rent it out, and the destruction of it during the anti-immigrant violence destroyed their livelihood as they depended on the store to fend for their families.

From the respondents, the researcher observed that xenophobic attacks from 2017 to 2020 have been along with economics as local business spaza shop owners perceive the Somalians, Ethiopians, to mention a few, running spaza shops in townships have taken up their space. For example, in section 5.2.3, it was explained how NORBA served a notice for foreign nationals to close their shops and leave the area. We continue to witness the displacement of informal foreign traders in Durban. The African National Congress' Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans Associations marched in Durban on the 3rd and 4th of November 2020 and removed all foreign nationals run businesses. Their issue was based on blaming elements of criminality and drug dealing brought by foreigners.

6.3.5 Government fuels Xenophobia

Prevalent anti-foreigner views between the local populace are reproduced in how the government officers handle immigration issues in South Africa. Dube (2019: 202) concurs that some government officials have, in various instances, accused immigrants of the socio-economic ills affecting the republic, and these have produced negative stereotypes of foreign nationals. Such contradicts the mandate of the government in respecting and safeguarding the lives of immigrants. For example, IYh enlightens that:

I have continually observed how the government is busy tightening immigration laws. Moreover, they are busy trying to boot out immigrants from jobs and owning specific spaces like spaza shops. All this to me indicates that foreign nationals are no longer needed. I wonder if every foreigner was to leave whether it would resolve all the socio-economic ills affecting South Africa.

The comment made by IYh shows that there are many means through which the government has tightened the laws against immigrants in South Africa. Such stances have led certain groups of people to use immigrants as scapegoats for the socio-economic injustices that they are facing. Moreover, local people tend to listen to most of the unverified anti-immigrant accusations given by government officials.

The recurrence of xenophobic violence is continuously seen in the relationship with the government as it continues not to admit xenophobia. With this, opportunists are continuing to exploit foreign nationals. Delving into most violent attacks on immigrants, the government maintained that it was not xenophobic violence but rather criminal activities. However, data

gathered from the INK area victims revealed that the incidents were xenophobic as only foreign nationals were targeted, and never the locals. FGD3a argued that:

It cannot be denied that they were incidents that began as a crime; however, these manifested themselves as xenophobia as, in the end, they only targeted one specific group that disapproves of the government's stance.

A study was undertaken by Magwaza and Ntini (2020) and Magwaza (2018: 41) shows that the government was accountable for the ongoing intolerance and xenophobia in South Africa. Looking at what FGD3a highlighted, it can be argued that the fact the result of these attacks mostly targets Black foreign nationals reveals that government continues to turn a blind eye on the trends of this violence that it was xenophobic. Such has led to the conclusion that the government was ignorant of the causes of attacks on non-citizens (Magwaza 2018: 42).

The government's stance on denying violence targeting non-nationals as xenophobic has made various factions and individuals capitalize on the situation. This was confirmed by HSRC (2008) that the denialism of the South Africa government tagging these outbreaks as criminal actions has prolonged the violence against locals and Black African immigrants (see Chapter 3.3). The findings by Magwaza (2018: 42) also support the report by HSRC that the fact that the government continues to "claim that South Africans are not xenophobic indicated high levels of denial that government still has." Therefore, the findings in this study reflect those of different scholars (e.g. Bekker *et al.* 2008; Burger 2009; Breen and Nel 2011; Charman and Piper 2012; Budlender 2014; Dzomonda, Tirivangasi and Masocha 2016; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Awosusi and Fatoyinbo 2019; Cilliers 2020; Erasmus 2020; Campbell 2016) argue that triggers of xenophobic violence are economical and the government indirectly coordinate these incidents by failing to address the relapse of xenophobic violence in disadvantaged communities.

Participants also noted that the government and leadership reactions to anti-immigrant violence played a role in triggering Black foreigners' attacks. Participants noted that government officials' denial revealed the disregarding of xenophobic violence; therefore, the public presumed that it was usual to loot, vandalize and even burn foreign-owned properties. The participants' responses mirror what Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 8) emphasized that such a level of denialism hinders the shared awareness of the roots and resolutions of xenophobic violence. Moreover, this had led the government to criminalize xenophobia to

defend the republic's image, and such reaction further fuelled more attacks of the foreign nationals.

The participants' responses also reveal that governance was a crucial determinant of xenophobic violence, which has led some young people to listen to what their leaders state, leading to the attacks on foreign nationals. FGD1b explained that:

These recent INK attacks are not a surprise because if you trace these xenophobic attacks' trends, they usually take place in elections here. Remember, we have elections taking place in May, and look how some political parties are campaigning using foreigners as scapegoats to gain votes.

The respondent expounded was not new as xenophobic attacks have become systematic toward the elections in South Africa. The participant was referring to March 2019 attacks, and in May 2019, there were general elections scheduled to occur. This follows accusations that non-nationals are the cause of poor service delivery in townships and informal settlements. FGD1d explained that:

I was not surprised that since the Mayor of Johannesburg, Mr. Herman Mashaba, took office, he officially declared that most social ills in Johannesburg are created by 'illegal migrants.' Early this year, Mr. Aaron Motsoaledi, the Minister of Health, contended that South Africa must re-assess its immigration policy to help stop illegal migrants from entering the country.

Despite these dangerous comments, the Minister of Health, however, did not provide proof to verify his accusations that non-nations were burdening the public healthcare system. This shows that government officials will continue to scapegoat immigrants to fail to deliver better services to the historically disadvantaged communities, which will continue to be one of the triggering factors of xenophobic violence. When the government leaders utter such statements, the local population quickly takes them seriously and believes that they are valid, especially young people, without validations.

IKOd further highlighted that:

During an interview last year, COPE Leader Mr. Mosiuoa Lekota, one of the opposition leaders, suggested that if his party formed a coalition government after this year's general elections, it would push for refugees and illegal immigrants to be placed in camps. Lekota said foreign nationals were being permitted to 'flood' the country, complementing that they now represented most people inhabited structures in cities like Johannesburg.

The participants' findings reveal that such embellishments from government officials are exceptionally risky because they validate or give credibility that the republic has many non-citizens burdening the locals' resources. IKOa added that:

How can a projected population of three to four million immigrants overrun a country with almost 60 million people? Some of the statements uttered are very destructive.

Furthermore, in 2018 the African Basic Movement (ABM) political party was formed in KwaZulu-Natal with an anti-immigrant manifesto of removing all foreigners by the end of 2018. This shows that Black immigrants will continue to be blamed for the current government's shortfalls in addressing the socio-economic needs of South Africans. It was alarming that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had allowed the registration of such a party that was founded on hate and discrimination of immigrants. IKOd indicated that:

Violence against immigrants goes hand in hand with election season. Take a look at the ANC manifesto unveiled in January 2019, the president of South Africa, Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, pledged to crack down on businesses operating illegally in townships and rural areas. Subsequently, after his speech, the police started to harass migrant and refugee traders in Mpumalanga Province.

The formation and the manifesto of the ABM triggered the 2018 xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal. As has been observed in the past, the ruling regime refused to admit that these outbreaks were xenophobic and maintained criminal actions. This reflects what Fabricius (2017) alleged that politicians play a role in "legitimizing xenophobic attacks when they are openly blaming for societal ills." Moreover, Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 9) reinforced the findings that the justice system and the Department of Home Affairs "aggravated the need for xenophobia by pinpointing the non-nationals as the problem inventors." With this, there was a need for effective leadership to profile communities on the root causes of violence to understand how the xenophobia phenomenon unfolds as Gordon, Roberts and Struwig (2015) assert that this will help establish collective understanding.

Without political will, xenophobic sentiments will continue in South Africa as participants elucidated that denialism of xenophobia by the state actors shows their unwillingness to uproot the problem entirely. Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 9) approved the reviewed literature that there persists the "lack of political will from the government agents to support local people to identify and halt xenophobia." This was because the rampant denial of xenophobia's existence influences the masses from the disadvantaged communities to continue to attack immigrants (Desai 2008; Landau 2010; Neocosmos 2010).

It has become established for youth to think that killing or looting foreign-owned shops is normal. The popular term used by most of these lawmakers was 'illegal migrants.' IKOc asserted that

I wonder how local people conclude spotting immigrants with valid documents and those who do not have them. The sad part is that the Department of Home Affairs gives immigrants to renew these documents. Some have been here for longer than 20 years, and still, they have not been granted refugee status. The levels of rejection of immigrants' applications are very high.

With what the respondent raises, immigrants are then hindered from having access to essential services like attaining education, having bank accounts, to mention a few. Many immigrants from African countries still struggle to get legal documentation from the Department of Home Affairs. Such reveals how xenophobia was entrenched against African immigrants at the expense of impoverished locals.

6.3.6 The Skills Gap

The inheritance of apartheid rules led to the backlog in necessary amenities, which persists as the current government falls short of providing a better education system and creating more job opportunities for young people. Thus, the inequalities in the in-service distribution in post-1994 South Africa are some of the topographies of denial that Africans continue to experience. IYb indicated that:

We have to fight for free education and attend under-sourced schools because of the designed demographics during apartheid. We still have no quality education contributing to a high level of unemployment rather than bringing change.

IYe added that:

When Black children started getting degrees and relevant qualifications, they are faced with a monster called in-service training than unemployment. The number of students that continue to be marginalized by institutions and policies like the N2+ rule is increasing daily. What are we free from? We still suffer as it cannot be right that we still have institutions such as CAO, which robs marginalized Black children to pay to be registered in a tertiary institution.

IKOa reported that:

As young South Africans, we lack relevant skills that will fulfil the developmental objectives of our country. Our curriculums are much focused on theory, and when you are released into the field of work, you cannot find a job.

The above reports have been one of the outcries of young people in the INK area who lack relevant skills as young people, making it hard for them to compete with skilled foreign

nationals. Some have highlighted that tackling the concerns of non-citizens has endangered the republic's economic rebuilding. However, skills are needed to ensure the nation's development, and these are usually tapped from the non-nationals, which precipitates clashes leading to perceptions that foreign nationals steal local people's jobs.

Participants highlighted how many young people lacked skills and some were illiterate, which also was one of the contributing factors that trigger violence in communities. Findings by Magwaza and Ntini (2020: 38) also reflect how illiteracy among residents sparked violence. Participants further explained that youth taking part in immigrants' attacks were mostly coming from poor communities affected by poverty and various disparities. Besides, several scholars have confirmed that xenophobic violence occurs among people at the inferior edges of the socio-economic and learning fields (Gelb 2008; Frye, Farred and Nojekwa 2011; Hickel 2014; Adeogun and Faluyi 2018; Oni and Okunade 2018; Von Holdt 2019). Illiteracies and poverty have played a part in sparking xenophobic violence as many townships and informal settlements face poverty and inequality. These factors have been detected as variables in committing violence, and hence, Magwaza and Ntini (2020: 38) argue that xenophobic violence in townships must be understood as an indicator of anger amongst the impoverished use of non-citizens as scapegoats. This casts illumination to the scapegoat theoretical framework (see Chapter 4.3.1), which explains immigrants' accusations by impoverished locals as reasons for xenophobic violence.

6.3.7 Service Delivery Failures

Participants highlighted that the outbreak of violence was linked to empty promises and poor service delivery. FGD1c stated that:

The government has failed to fulfil its obligations to create jobs for the citizens, build houses, and provide water. The government's failure to deliver on these promises post-apartheid has caused many frustrations and even precipitated violence against foreign nationals. You must not be surprised to see foreigners attacked because it is the same government with empty promises saying foreign nationals cause our socio-economic challenges.

When promises are not fulfilled, people get frustrated. This has been the situation in the INK area, leading to the scapegoating of foreign nationals. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, South Africa's transition into democracy signalled great promises to the Black majority, but the substantial constructive economic transformation has been accomplished only for a moderately

few groups. According to some scholars, such has led to enormous dissatisfaction among the inhabitants and a propensity to resentfully defend against every alleged intrusion (Misago 2016a, 2019; Mlambo 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019). Therefore, one can posit that xenophobic violence was triggered by these alleged intrusions, which drive citizens to scapegoat non-citizens due to the frustrations they are encountering.

Participants felt that inefficient service delivery in disadvantaged communities sparked xenophobic tensions between the Black locals and Black foreigners. Moreover, the hostilities have been surrounding RDP houses' occupation as Nyamnjoh (2006) explained that these houses were given to locals to live in. However, these have been sold and rented to non-nationals. Magwaza and Ntini (2020: 38) explained that this intensified xenophobic violence as foreign nationals are blamed for houses' scarcities. Dodson (2010) also highlighted the comparable discoveries that some locals sell or rent out these houses to immigrants. Therefore, the study's findings are also similar to those of Monson (2011), who discovered that the government's incompetence to serve up the communities devotedly had precipitated a social divide between South Africans and foreign nationals.

It was evident from the findings that scapegoating of foreigners arises from blaming the shortages of effective service delivery services to disadvantaged communities, which perpetuated xenophobic violence. Some participants felt that priority must be given to the locals' needs, and such argument was consistent with what other scholars (e.g. Mngxitama 2008; Everatt 2011; Matsinhe 2011) have mentioned that socio-economic prospects must be given to South Africans before immigrants. The study results reveal that natives are battling for their existence due to the scarcity of resources accessible for their survival. Therefore, there was a feeling of entitlement over resources that locals perceive they possess (Magwaza 2018; Magwaza and Ntini 2020); hence excluding immigrants grounded on that South Africans must be prioritized.

Findings from the literature have revealed the connection between ineffective service delivery and xenophobic violence in South Africa (e.g. Mkandawire 2015; Misago 2016a, 2016b, 2017a; Mkhize 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Mlambo 2019; Mlilo and Misago 2019). South Africa has witnessed violent protests, which are diverted to attack foreigners and their properties in many instances. Respondents in the study explained that one could not separate protests and violence in South Africa as many turn violent at the end. Sadly, Black African

immigrants were mostly attacked when these occur. For example, in November 2019, the Minister of Health, Aaron Motsoaledi, accused non-nationals of ineffective service delivery, citing that an increasing number of immigrants strained public services, making it hard to plan for local communities. FGD2b added that:

Whenever the government fails, it takes a shifting blame stance towards foreign nationals to shift the local people's focus on whom they should deal with. If people could stop being blinded by sudden shifts and begin to deal with the root causes of poor service delivery, xenophobic violence will be stopped.

Sadly, most protests that started by asking for water, electrical energy, or dwellings ended up with foreigners have been crushed and robbed. Hence, the leading cause of poor service delivery will remain unaddressed, leading to xenophobic violence's recurrence. It can be noted that most violence has broken out in relatively deprived and poorly serviced communities. The participants mentioned that most people who take part in these beatings and lootings of foreign-owned shops were opportunists who wanted to enrich their lives. In some instances, one can deduce that xenophobic violence has existed, driven by those who have wanted to improve their lives and who took advantage of the situation.

6.3.8 We are wounded

One of the participants, FGD2d, explained that:

As South Africans, trauma impacts everything else we do, and many young people have been nurtured up in a wounded context. There was a need to understand this wound to appreciate and acknowledge why we are struggling with xenophobia violence in South Africa. This will also help understand the investment needed to identify strategies for responding to this context.

The paradox is that despite increasing South Africa's investment in promoting social cohesion through government and civil society initiatives, xenophobic violence continues to escalate. One of the main supporting factors to this paradox has been the lack of appreciation of the nature, extent, and depth of people's woundedness within which xenophobic violence occurs.

Participants elucidated that they have a wounded context, hence understanding this wound to appreciate why people are struggling with Black immigrants' attacks in South Africa, appreciate the investment needed, and identify strategies for responding to this context. They explained that their wound's nature was personal, familial, institutional, historical, and generational.

Diverse research findings acknowledged the heritage of apartheid-era and history of isolation of Black South Africans that it established a rich base for xenophobic violence (e.g. Mnyaka 2003; Lemanski 2004; Zondi and Ukpere 2014; Gumede 2015; Minga 2015; Musewe 2015; Langa and Kiguwa 2016; Pineteh 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Mabena 2019; Montle and Mogoboya 2020a; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020). FGD1d explained that:

Apartheid created a radical notion of individuality and value, which inspired Black South Africans to perceive themselves as menial to Whites and distinct from the rest of the region. Also, it urged the split and separating of several peoples as a tool of administration and discouraged assimilation or the connection between the groups. As if it was not enough, it then instituted violence as a tool of delivering injustices and attaining political objectives.

FGD3f added that:

Violence against foreign nationals is a brainchild of South Africa's past of apartheid, which excluded and dehumanized certain racial, national, and ethnic groups and strengthened a belief that separation and segregation are both valid and crucial to running the state and the wellbeing of its people.

This study's findings confirm what other scholars have termed South Africa exceptionalism, where South Africans view themselves as distinct and superior overall African states as explained in Chapter 3.2 (Misago 2016a; Dube 2018, 2019; Misago 2019; Mlambo 2019; Mngomezulu and Dube 2019; Gordon 2020). Such has created negative perceptions towards Black African immigrants and triggered xenophobic violence where various individuals and factions make calls for foreign nationals to leave South Africa.

6.3.9 Culture of Violence

An additional illustrative aspect explained by the participants was the growing violence culture, as explicated in Chapter 3.3. According to Gordon (2020: 103), "South Africa is a violent society with alarmingly high levels of reported murders, assaults, and malicious property damage." Participants saw xenophobic violence as a manifestation of the growing violent culture that they traced back to the apartheid period. They explained that this history precipitated trauma that many have never dealt with even today, which manifests itself in xenophobic violence in Black communities. FGD1d reported that:

Xenophobic violence here in the INK area is a peculiar form of Black on Black violence, which shows the pill over repressed trauma. This repressed trauma then manifests itself as anger and hatred on the vulnerable foreign nationals.

The locals' socio-economic challenges lead to some of the frustrations, which are manifested in xenophobic violence. There are inadequate prospects and insufficient resources which serve as a breeding ground for the dislocation of shortfalls onto the foreigners (Tshabalala 2015; Tirivangasi and Mugambiwa 2016; Tshaka 2016; Sebola 2017; Tirivangasi and Nyahunda 2020), who is alleged as the deficient right to the privileges reserved for the South Africans (Olowu 2008; Olukoju 2008; Steinberg 2008; Mothibi, Roelofse and Tshivhase 2015; Ngcukana 2015; Tsheola, Ramoroka and Muzondi 2015; Mutanda 2017; Mkhize and Makau 2018; Misago 2019; Ngcamu and Mantzaris 2019).

The respondents were unanimous in acknowledging that South Africa was considered a very violent society. For example, the Global Competitive Index (GCI) report (2017) designated that personal security and violent crime are amongst the most problematic factors for doing business in South Africa (Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 3). The business environment, especially in the township, has shown to be volatile and unsafe for immigrants to run spaza shops. Another respondent reported that:

Our South African history plays a part in these violent acts against foreigners. Violence has been continually used as a mechanism to resolve conflicts. This has become a culture whenever we feel unheard as young people; we use violent means, and it is unfortunate that our Africa brothers are also scapegoated in all our unaddressed challenges.

Participants elucidated that xenophobic violence has created instability in communities as violence has been tapped as a strategy to resolve socio-economic challenges. Moreover, researchers explain that these attacks have caused the government to be accused of being ineffective in curbing the violence (Bekker 2010; Tshishonga 2015; Fabricius 2017; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020: 4). The findings, therefore, reveal that when the economic needs of the South Africans are threatened, they resort to violent means as a fast answer.

6.3.10 Competition over Scarce Resources and Opportunities

Various economic triggers of xenophobic violence have been raised, showing the link between economic competition, high levels of youth unemployment, and xenophobic violence (Tshishonga 2015; van Rensburg 2017). Due to high unemployment, youth remain idle in most INK areas, which leaves them vulnerable to organized violence and drug abuse. FGD3c reported that:

As young people, the government has failed us as it continues to deal with joblessness affecting most of us. When one has nothing to do, one will end up resorting to negative ways of survival.

Youth unemployment continues to skyrocket as in the first quarter of 2020; there were 20,4 million young people aged 15–34 years, and these young people, according to StatsSA (2020), accounted for 63,3% of the total number of unemployed persons. Such context has led many to participate in criminal acts such as high-jacking cars and looting foreign-owned shops to survive. The government's failure to resolve endemic poverty, high youth unemployment, and the shortage of housing and basic essential services (Dassah 2015; Magwaza and Ntini 2020) has precipitated the incriminating of foreign nationals by angry local young people. FGD2b explains that:

Inequality continues, and this is traced back to material deprivation caused by the apartheid regime's discriminatory policies and further exacerbated by the current government's inadequate delivery efforts.

Most of the youth in the INK area deliberated that the violent attacks on foreign nationals have been caused by the brutal competition for scarce resources and opportunities between locals and foreign nationals in a setting of high levels of poverty and unemployment, as informed by literature in Chapter 3.4 (Mnyaka 2003; Moge kwu 2005; Maina *et al.* 2011; Manik and Singh 2013; Mangu 2019; Marumo, Chakale and Mothelesi 2019; Misago 2019; Magwaza and Ntini 2020). FGD2g posited that "The game is more severely felt and resented around jobs, housing, and business opportunities."

FGD1h added that:

Most Africans' mistrust as purported illegal immigrants is disturbing because we have shown tolerance of white and Asian nationals. However, our fellow Africans have labelled them with many hurtful names, and with this, we are very far from achieving social cohesion. This was because there are continuous scapegoating and harmful depictions of Black foreigners, combined with existing intolerance, which continues to destabilize the attempts to curb the inheritance of prejudice within South Africa.

Most of the participants raised some concerns from that which they had witnessed, that xenophobia flourishes where economic deficit and hardships are acute. The participants explicated Afrophobia as strong hate or insecure feelings towards fellow Africans firmly embedded in the dissatisfactions over competition for the few available resources. The participants noted that the area of shared resentment and tensions amongst South Africans and foreign nationals has been in the business space. IYi argued that:

It is so funny that we Black people fight over breadcrumbs falling from the table of the oppressor. Look how we fight over spaza shops. Spaza shops? Who owns these big shops in town, and who has had the guts even to attack those bigger shops? There is something wrong with our minds that we need to fix as we are derailing our development.

Competition within the context of scarcity of resources becomes inevitable. Findings in the literature revealed that immigrants' scapegoating was embedded in the economic factor as both locals and immigrants engage in informal trading as a survival strategy (Du Toit 2003; Dodson 2010; Dzomonda, Tirivangasi and Masocha 2016; Dlamini 2018; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). Besides, immigrants are accused of taking up all the scarce unskilled work chances. Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 2) explain that migrants take up limited prospects as they are regarded as "enterprising, can settle for less pay, and cannot be members of any union; hence, employers can easily exploit them." Hence this has created tensions as the Global Competitive Report (2017) explicates that South Africa has a problem of the inexperienced youth labour force who are now contending for such openings with migrants.

One of the respondents, FGD2c, explained that:

South Africa is still trying to come out of the legacies of apartheid, and that must not be taken lightly. Black people are still deprived economically and trying to find their way out and even secure a job as a young person because of competition and higher preference.

Findings from literature also have made similar findings that the legacies of the apartheid regime, which include white sovereignty, and bias are still rampant, signifying economic scarcity and unfairness on the jobs (McConnell 2009; Mbazira 2013; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020; Montle and Mogoboya 2020a). With this competition for survival, Black immigrants have become the target of the local people's aggression continuously as their expectations remain unfulfilled. Masenya (2017) mentions that xenophobic violence stems from the South Africans claiming that non-citizens have taken their economic spaces of trading, employment, and social opportunities. This was not surprising as the republic has a long-standing structural challenge of youth unemployment, making locals see immigrants as competitors. FGD2h argued that:

That employers prefer to hire foreigners because they can settle for low wages. A high unemployment rate, especially among black South African youth, intensifies competition for jobs in both the economy's formal and informal sectors.

Black immigrants are generally prejudiced and attacked based on the perception that they are competing with citizens over scarce resources. FGD1c explicated that:

For youth, socioeconomic marginalization also affects the quality of primary education and the ability to acquire a tertiary education, limiting life opportunities and justifying violence to secure social standing and access material goods, often through gang-related activities. Violence, both interpersonal and collective, can seem like a practical tool for improving one's economic situation, considering others' extravagant flashes of wealth.

The South African unemployment rate continues to increase, as reiterated in Chapter 2.8, and youth are the most affected. Limited employment opportunities exacerbate youth idleness. With this, immigrants are always blamed and attacked when South Africa's lingering youth idleness, imbalance, and deprivation heats into xenophobic violence. Such a situation, coupled with the "increase in a contest of limited resources, xenophobic violence then become a tool for the youth of voicing frustrations concerning the government's incapability to deliver on its promises" (Dlamini *et al.* 2020: 19-20).

In Durban, participants expounded that much of the attacks have been triggered by competition to operate spaza shops in townships and informal settlements. Charman and Piper (2012) also had similar conclusions that Somali immigrants' attacks were driven by competition rather than xenophobia or Afrophobia. Evidence for this race is offered by "the warnings of violence produced by black undertakers against South Africa's Indian and white undertakers working in townships as they considered that they could not 'compete fairly' against non-black South Africans in these townships" (Spies). Such shows that not only Black immigrants are threatened but also local people.

5.3.11 The Role of the Media

Participants elucidated that the media has gone unchecked for too long in South Africa as it plays a critical role in fuelling xenophobic violence. In Chapter 3.9.9, various scholars have confirmed that media plays a role in inciting xenophobic sentiments as in most cases, it has acted as a catalyst for community mobilization against foreign nationals (Mogekwu 2004; Gomo 2010; Nyamnjoh 2010; Mkandawire 2015; Misago 2019; Somdyala 2019; Wasserman and Madrid-Morales 2019). IYa elucidated that:

We have a bigger problem with technology due to the spread of hatred messages in our communities. These messages incite violence, and in a way, I see them as a tool for mobilizing young people to attack foreigners. Sadly, some of this news is fake, photoshopped, and old. Our people do not check the validity of these and just start attacking.

Succinctly, what IYa explains has been opined by Chenzi (2020) that media has been blamed for shaping negative attitudes towards non-nationals. Also, in exploring the role of the media, IYc eluded that:

You see, when a local person commits a crime, there is no mention that the person was a South African. Nevertheless, when a foreign national does so, you will a headline saying a Congolese or Nigerian did this and that. They attach the nationality of the person. So, such incites hatred of foreigners because we do not hear any reports of the good initiatives they are doing in our communities.

The media has a culture of reporting crimes attached to nationality, and this has given the public the picture that immigrants from African states were to be blamed for the alarming rise of criminal activities (Nyamnjoh 2010). Such reporting fuels the hostilities between the locals and non-nationals, leading to scapegoating immigrants as the cause of criminal activities. Moreover, scholars have argued that xenophobia in South Africa has been encouraged by the white-owned media's epistemic racism. They argue that, in general, the epistemic racism of the South African media makes incidents of xenophobia-cum-Afrophobia possible in many ways. One of these ways involves disseminating information that misleads black South Africans about the source of their unbearable condition, and the other involves creating an undesirable image of an African immigrant. Thus, the standard image of a black African immigrant in the mainstream media of South Africa is that of a carrier of diseases, a robber, a murderer, or a rapist. Animal metaphors such as a "swam" or "hordes" of foreigners are often evoked to create both a siege mentality and to enable black South Africans to kill them with a clear conscience; since the killing of non-humans is neither a crime nor a sin (Okem and Asuelime 2015; Ndlovu 2017: 107).

In adding to formal plans and discussion, the media exacerbates and reinforces the negative attitudes by portraying non-citizens as illegal. IKOd explained that:

As many South Africans do not have extensive personal experience or encounter with foreigners, they rely heavily on third-party information, especially from the media. For instance, depictions of immigrants coming in waves and references to job stealers and aliens dehumanize immigrants and increase the likelihood of violence. This has made many young people participate in violence that has no evidence of its root cause.

At one level, one can argue that violence against immigrants was due to locals' frustrations as less has been done to transform their socio-economic needs. Such frustrations have pushed local Black communities to resort to violence accusing the minority foreign nations as the contributing group to their problems. Therefore, the findings reinforce that young people take

part in xenophobic violence driven by frustrations of their unaddressed challenges, which they perceive that immigrants are part of the cause.

6.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the reasons leading young people to participate in xenophobic violence have been outlined in this chapter. The findings of the study show that the first two objectives of the study were fulfilled. This was because participants were able to explain their understanding of xenophobia within their context fully. Moreover, they were also to elucidate the factors that trigger xenophobic violence, leading many young people to be found taking part. Briefly, one cannot describe the socio-economic grievances without addressing the Apartheid system, which has placed most Black people at a disadvantage as most of the inequalities in contemporary South Africa are due to the colonial and apartheid era. Besides, one cannot speak of the young people without mentioning the government's role and the political leaders who use young people to execute their agendas in fuelling xenophobic tendencies in the INK area. The findings reveal that the Black local business people play a role in mobilizing vulnerable young people to attack foreign nationals. Therefore, the INK area's xenophobic violence was fuelled by local business people who compete with the foreign-owned shops.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION OF THE INTERVENTION TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM

7.1 Introduction

This section's motivation designates and deliberates the strategies taken by the action group in addressing xenophobic violence. The information offered connects the data obtained from the participants with what literature has discovered on the phenomenon. The action group played a pivotal role in transforming the problem, and they took time to help change the behaviour, attitude, and perception of the young people to promote peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and socio-economic development. The group intended to capacitate participants to adopt nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts, to build sustainable relationships based on respect, trust, and confidence-building. The research team noted that dialogues, conflict resolution skills training, and skill transfer initiatives were influential in promoting social cohesion, peace, and community values amongst young people.

With the action group, a plan was developed from the shortfalls pointed out in the literature and from the respondents' findings on the factors leading male youth to participate in attacks of non-nationals. The researcher worked with young people to reduce youth participation in violence and utilize their capabilities in bringing about social change in tension-prone areas of Durban. As noted in the reviewed literature, many recommendations have been presented to deal with xenophobic violence. Still, lesser participatory action research has been carried out with young people to take ownership and design interventions to tackle their problems, as they are the experts of their problems.

7.2 The Role Played by the Action Group

Despite the birth of democracy in South Africa in 1994, many locals still face socio-economic challenges (Musuva 2014; Bhorat, Thornton and Van der Zee 2017; Mangu 2019; Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi 2020). Research also shows that racism and discrimination, perhaps now in subtler forms, continue to affect the lives of the poor and those who live outside the mainstream of society, especially refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and young people. The

dialogues and skills transfer initiatives were implemented within the context of disadvantaged communities of KwaZulu-Natal.

Owing to high levels of deprivation and joblessness among Black communities, locals continue to scapegoat Black African immigrants as the source of their problems as many immigrants continue to enter South Africa. Like all the provinces in the country, KwaZulu-Natal continues to endure the heritage of the divide between racial groups (Zulu, Indian, White, and immigrants) and the growing unawareness and intolerance between cultures and classes. As such, the action group sought to address the following challenges as described above:

- Lack of social cohesion among people from different backgrounds in Durban
- Discrimination (xenophobia) leads to stereotyping of others
- Gaps in the knowledge and skills levels of youth, especially among locals, refugees, and migrants
- Lack of skills to peacefully resolve common challenges faced by young people in their respective communities
- Lack of platforms to share experiences amongst citizens and foreign nationals

7.3 Preliminary Consultation: Developing the Intervention

The respondents and the researcher convened on 2 and 4 October 2018 to unpack a synopsis of the key results from the collected data and plan an intervention strategy. The preliminary consultation was joined by the ten respondents at the INK Creative Arts Centre in Ward 38, drawn from FGDs and interviews. This became the venue for most of the research team's meetings. The researcher worked with ten participants who formed the action group as working with a smaller group was convenient in developing trust. The consultation began with succinct introductions, where the researcher clarified her position as the facilitator. Moreover, the researcher explained the consultation's objectives in developing the intervention with the action group to reduce youth participation in related xenophobic violence.

The consultation planning was driven by the need to work with youth in mapping resolutions that will enable them to enthusiastically contribute to reducing xenophobic violence and building tolerance in Durban communities. The meeting opened a platform for the group to

think of resolutions critically, and several ideas were drafted on the flip chart. The action group explained that this was the best time to transform the INK area's volatile situation.

Of all the interventions proposed, dialogues, skills transfer, and conflict resolution skills training were adopted as the primary intervention. The participants stated that dialogues were imperative and the basis for comprehending other people's views in addressing xenophobic violence. The dialogue was significant in offering a platform for community members to exchange experiences to promote social cohesion. Dialogue, "distinct from other conflict resolution tools such as negotiation, does not depend on convincing another individual on the correctness of a viewpoint" (Brown 2008: 48). Instead, it enabled people to participate in productive discussions that help shift perceptions and attitudes towards one another. Such enables self-assessment in connection to other people's opinions. AG1 reported that:

As conflicting parties, we must start to talk to each other as this was important in addressing divisions that exist amongst us before doing any activity.

AG4 highlighted that:

Chatting and reflecting on problems between ourselves as young people will enable the group to consider what was needed to transform our problems. With this, the group can then start to think about working together.

AG10 added that:

Probabilities for thinking critically by listening and mirroring the ideas raised by other members will help us develop innovative propositions on this xenophobic sentiment problem that is affecting us. By talking to each other, I believe that mindsets will be transformed and that people can begin to understand other individuals' experiences and feelings.

AG10 highlighted above shows the crucial elements of dialogue as one of the methods adopted to rebuild broken relations within communities affected by xenophobic violence. The action group showed some willingness and the zeal to act on their concerns and challenges in the INK area than being bystanders. Moreover, they believed that taking the initiative to change misconceptions surrounding African nationals was pivotal in ensuring that youth play an active role in peacebuilding initiatives. By taking charge of bringing social change, the dialogue's outcomes will enable youth to take ownership of the implemented resolutions. Also, dialogues have the power to change negative perceptions as they open a platform for clarity on issues that people do not fully understand. Succinctly, dialogues enable people to change their mindsets from hurtful stereotyping to positive interactions.

The consultation was followed by a dialogue gathering centered on interconnected themes leading to the skills transfer initiative. This was then followed by conflict resolution skills training. The researcher continued to be a facilitator and served as a support structure to help the action group find ways to resolve their challenges as they were experts of their problem and solution bearers to those problems. The meeting enabled the researcher to work with the action group instead of imposing ideas on them as participatory action research adopted in the study promotes 'doing with' instead of 'doing for' action group to tackle the crisis (Greenwood and Levin 2006). Such a strategy promoted collaboration with the action group in utilizing combined energies to map resolution in reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence.

7.4 Youth Dialogue: Explaining Xenophobia and Afrophobia

Conflict is inevitable; however, it cannot be denied that battle is also a vehicle of change if tapped positively. Considering the violent history of South Africa, violence has been used to resolve conflicts, and youth have been witnessed as both perpetrators and victims of violence. Violence has become a way of solving other social problems. The dialogues sought to help build youth's motivation and capacity to use effective, nonviolent ways of dealing with the conflicts in communities to enhance social cohesion. With this, together with the action group, a platform was opened for young people to dialogue and reflect on the role that they have played in promoting nonviolent ways of resolving conflict and in enhancing social cohesion.

South Africa has been in the spotlight in upholding refugees' and migrants' rights since 1994 when South Africa opened its borders to immigrants. Scaling down to the provincial level, KwaZulu-Natal, especially the INK area, has been one of the hotspots where attacks on immigrants have been happening. Such incidences reveal that people are not in contact with each other and are still living in isolation, making it hard for foreign nationals to survive in such an environment, hence creating spaces where people can integrate, as the situation in KwaZulu-Natal is hostile to foreign nationals. The researcher sought to break the cycle of violence within communities affected by xenophobic violence by adopting a constructive route of resolving conflicts and reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence.

Furthermore, the recommendations made by various scholars have not been fully implemented, which is critical in understanding and measuring that which works and that which does not work in tackling the recurrence of xenophobic violence. Thus far, the reflection of the

interventions made is vital in informing or devising other methods of resolving youth participation in xenophobic violence. Limited efforts have been conducted to tackle the problem involving the affected communities in Durban.

The researcher and the action group undertook various interventions to address the xenophobic problem with the community members in the INK area. The dialogues and skill transfer were chosen as intervention strategies, as they sought to promote to change harmful attitudes towards immigrants. The sessions explicitly focused on youth to equip them with human rights information and conflict resolution abilities to be peacebuilders in communities and encourage them to participate in a democratic and pluralistic society. The sessions enabled the youth to reflect on their challenges and respond to their daily challenges. Simultaneously, the initiatives enabled youth to raise human rights awareness, share and learn new skills, and mediate conflict through dialogues.

On 21 September 2019, the research team conducted a youth dialogue at the Phansi Museum in Glenwood. The participants had to be transported to the venue as a central place could not be found at that time. Therefore, the Institute of Afrikology offered the site at the Museum. The dialogue's objectives were to uncover the concepts of xenophobia and Afrophobia and create a platform for young people from different nationalities to meet and continue to dialogue and bridge the gaps that divide Africans.

During the dialogue, AG4 first expressed the following concerns, as it was during the Heritage month commemorations:

I am concerned that our country only celebrates our heritage in just one day in September. The media showcases many different activities dedicated across Africa, yet 364 days one cannot see the African heritage content. Hmm, the media tends only to display the social ills that the country is going through.

This was one of the participants' concerns that the rainbow nation's call had lost its value within South Africa due to the continuous killings, hatred, and intolerance of Black immigrants. AG10 added that:

South Africa has a lot to deal with, looking at the identity issues as many have lost the core foundation of our humanity, Ubuntu. Where was Ubuntu in the past months that it is only mentioned during the Heritage month? We seem to be talking about Ubuntu, yet we do not practice that concept. It is time to express and share it amongst ourselves!

From his comments, one can deduce that Africans need to unite daily and not only when it is a commemoration of a particular national day, and this should be an excellent day-to-day relationship. The concept of Ubuntu has eroded in most African communities as human beings are treated and killed as if they are objects. Life no longer has value in African societies, and this must be revisited and revived, that is, that Black people's lives matter no matter the nationality, ethnicity, or gender.

AG2 shared that:

As human beings, we have developed this tendency to quickly dismiss other peers based on language, attire differences and then keep a distance from those we do not know. All must take time and learn all words as this is one of the issues leading to xenophobia, Afrophobia, discrimination, and intolerance in our communities. Take note that language was not only spoken, but it was body language also. Let us not quickly dismiss the elders' views; let us be open and have intergenerational dialogues within our communities.

Language has been one of the factors that have divided most African societies, as some groups are unwilling to learn other languages, and some dominant tribal groups tend to impose their languages on others and are unwilling to adjust. Moreover, some from other countries do not take the time to learn local languages, which continually frustrates the local people. Thus, language barriers serve as a breeding ground for intolerance and discrimination. AG6 added that:

We young people need to understand community dynamics and not cast others as the 'other' quickly but to communicate. We honestly have a history as South Africans that we have not dealt with due to colonization and apartheid.

In Durban, the INK area has witnessed xenophobic violence. AG8 asked

Where is the embracement of our fellow African brothers and sisters? The colonial era taught us the local people, the value of low-density suburbs, and the Central Business Centres (CBDs), which has led many to turn their backs on the townships. For your information, some of our townships to some immigrants look like their countries' capital cities. That is why you see immigrants coming to stay in these townships because they look like the Durban Central Business, which many are rushing into. Some of these townships look like Johannesburg, which many South Africans are rushing into.

It can be noted that most people are moving from township life to city life. However, some have difficulty in keeping up with city life due to its expenses and high rentals. Some immigrants, when they arrive, prefer to live in townships as the rent is lower. Their arrival in these townships has been one of the causes of xenophobic violence, as some do not understand

the circumstances leading them to settle in the local communities. The question that was posed by AG7 was

How do we unteach what the apartheid taught us to see our communities' value and then learn from other people what they see in our communities? As we do not learn from each other, and we do not ask other Africans the trade rules that make them successful. As locals, I am suggesting that we must ask foreign nationals that value that they see in our local communities, which we have not seen so that we work together.

Both locals and foreign nationals need to learn from each other to enhance social cohesion and build sustainable relationships. AG1 added that:

We need more community engagements on that, so we share experiences, and it is good that we have the Department of Arts and Culture as they must also assist communities in promoting social cohesion. It is about how intentional we are in recognizing who we are; the Western countries are intended to preserve their culture, yet we are not as South Africans.

For the dialogue, the research team had someone from the Department of Arts and Culture under the Social Cohesion division attend the session. It was indeed necessary for platforms to be opened for learning exchange amongst the locals and foreign nationals to curb xenophobic violence and shift the intolerance attitudes growing within the INK area.

The injustices of the past committed against the Black people in South Africa continually resurfaced during the dialogue. AG3 explained why xenophobia was present in the INK area and why it was recurring in most local communities:

The problem we have was that we have not dealt with our trauma as a nation. The problem continues, especially with things we can access and something we cannot access. Instead of dealing with those issues, we lash out at others. So how do we teach young boys to cry, to express themselves? If I do not cry, it means I beat when I am frustrated. If I am not given the platform to express my crying emotions, that means I must go to the opposite extreme, which is, lash out when I am frustrated.

One of the significant initiatives that the government may have carried out after the fall of the apartheid system was to make trauma healing services available to the broken Black communities. However, no investment was made in this regard; hence violence has been used to resolve problems. Sadly, most of these frustrations have been vented out on foreign nationals as they are continually blamed for social ills. AG5 added that:

But if I was in a cultural sense, it taught me how to deal with my emotions and never lash out at someone else. The challenge is that, as locals, we were not taught how to deal with our feelings to the extent that when we see immigrants doing better than us, we lashed out at them. We must find strategies for coping with challenges, stop blaming each other and find ways of collaborating to devise intervention strategies.

7.4.1 Afrophobia: What it entails

Participants in the meeting were then divided into three groups focusing on Afrophobia, xenophobia, and violence and discrimination. The following feedback was received from the participants. The group focusing on this topic defined Afrophobia as comprising an identity crisis, as they argued that many could not represent an African, and some described it based on colour or hair. AG10 mentioned that:

It is fear of Black foreign nationals, and in the South African context, it has turned to be Black on Black violence. Most of the attacks are targeting Black Africans, yet we have many Chinese and other races!

South Africa's situation is indeed different as most of the violence has been directed at Black foreign nationals, which has led many to state that it has been Afrophobia and not xenophobia. This confirms some of the scholars' observations in the literature review (Masenya 2017; Ndlovu 2017; Dube 2018; Waiganjo 2018; Dlamini *et al.* 2020). Some of the participants disputed that xenophobia did not exist, but Afrophobia as much violence was targeting Black foreign nationals from African countries. They even indicated that xenophobia was a foreign word that does not exist in the South African context as AG6 explained that:

Afrophobia is what is happening in South Africa as it is only a few cases where you find local people attacking Chinese or other races. They commonly use xenophobia, which is foreign and does not fully apply to our current issues. We are always running with words defined by external actors, and we are ignorant to sit down and define our own experiences.

From the above issue highlighted by AG6, it can be observed that in most cases, Africa has relied on letting outsiders define their situations hence the notion that xenophobia was a foreign concept being used to fit into the South African context. It was important for Africans to define their own experiences, which might help to trace the root causes of xenophobic violence in communities.

7.4.2 Why are we attacking each other as Black People?

AG4 gave the following response:

Many White people came and set up businesses and indoctrinated Black people to be laborers. The Black people have been the enemy in most cases during the colonial era, and this has been inherited as we lash out at each other as Black people. We were never taught to be confident in ourselves as Black people, and we have an identity crisis.

The divide and rule introduced by the colonial and apartheid eras have turned Black people against each other. The very same incidences have never been discontinued, they are ongoing, and Black people continue to fight each other. AG2 posited that:

There are too much anger and hatred amongst us as Black people. The young children have also adopted the lashing-out culture.

AG2 explained the challenges of being a foreigner in South Africa, and she stated:

I have challenges speaking my first language as my parents have restricted me due to the violence happening in South Africa.

As mentioned previously, language plays a role in these negative attitudes towards foreign nationals. AG6 added that:

The attacks are emanating from the Group Act that brought division amongst the Black people. The restriction of the South Africans' movement during the colonial era led many locals to have a knowledge gap of other African countries. Moreover, the state never went through the healing process, one of the contributing factors of violence within communities.

AG10 added that:

South African education was inferior as many do not even know African countries' names, and they focus more on European history.

AG4 added that:

There was no longer sharing amongst each other. It's now one for himself and God for us!

AG9 added that:

Tribal groups within South Africa are already divided, making it hard for locals to embrace the immigrants. There is a need for African education to close the gap and build relations amongst Africans.

From the above comments, the researcher observed that they were various issues that Black people were having looking at self-hate that exist and fuels Afrophobia. If Black people remain divided based on their nationalities, it will be challenging to address xenophobic violence fully. Communities still need to unlearn and relearn how to work together as a way of promoting social cohesion.

7.4.3 Xenophobia: What it entails

The participants reported that xenophobia was rooted in fear of immigrants, self-hatred, the apartheid era, ignorance, rejection, poverty, discrimination, and a lack of knowledge. AG2 highlighted that:

A lack of knowledge drove it as many need to be informed about themselves and others, laziness, dependency syndrome on the system.

Due to the lack of knowledge of various South African groups, perceptions have filled that knowledge gap. However, these perceptions tend to be negative and thus fuel Afrophobic violence in communities. It has been observed that most of the violence has targeted foreign nationals from other African countries. The reason for this has been that Black people have not come to accept each other in various communities, as they see each other as enemies.

7.4.4 Violence and Discrimination

The participants spoke of colonization of the mind, as this was passed from one generation to another. They added that there was a growing culture of violence and discrimination within their communities. The challenge has been that the community members seem to be lacking the will to transform the ways of dealing with violence. The perception was traced back to tribal groups within South Africa who despise one another, which has extended to how they treat foreign nationals.

The responses of the participants revealed a greater understanding of what xenophobia and xenophobic violence entails. This was important in that it fulfilled the first objective of the study. Understanding the phenomenon was influential in the dialogues. One of the dialogue's findings was that participants highlighted that xenophobia existed in Durban; however, they have witnessed more Afrophobia. Hence, their view confirms the findings in the previous literature that South Africa had an Afrophobic problem. Despite Afrophobia, participants raised that the concept of xenophobia must not be ignored as they are incidents where Asians have been targeted. Therefore, the responses given above by the participants reveal that dialogue was an essential tool in clarifying concepts like xenophobia in adding knowledge.

7.5 Skills Transfer Initiative as a Strategy to reduce Xenophobic Violence

Xenophobic attitudes or sentiments are not new, nor are they likely to vanish soon. In the framework of the republic, the phenomenon has been violent as, now and again, bursts of rage, dislike, and abhorrence manifest themselves, which makes one assert that the history of violence has also contributed to the utilization of force as a means of settling tensions. The attacks of immigrants from 2008, 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019 are ascribed primarily to dissatisfactions exhibited by locals in opposition to the current regime for the sluggish stride of change post-1994.

The violence poses a more significant threat towards the development of a state, and much of it is Black on Black violence. The remnants of apartheid continue to plague South African communities. Inequalities and a dearth of economic opportunities for young people have worsened over the years due to the stagnating economy. However, despite the declining economy, South Africa is currently home to more than 70,000 immigrants (UNHCR 2017). The socio-economic disparities that exist because of the inheritance of the apartheid regime that has led locals to scapegoat immigrants and perceive them as a threat, as they must compete with them for socio-economic opportunities. This mistrust has led to the attacks of non-nationals, resulting in fatalities and socio-economic losses on the side of foreign nationals.

These xenophobic incidents are not only symptoms of the hatred of foreign nationals; the violence, anger, and polarity synonymous with South Africa also stem from systemic, historical disparities and injustice, with origins bolstered in a racialized system (Mabena 2019). The persistence of adverse social and economic living conditions amongst the Black citizens decades into democracy has arguably created a state of alienation where the affected majority feels that they cannot positively impact their lives through real participation in relevant political and economic spheres. In Durban, the manifestations of alienation reach a climax in the form of violence towards perceived weaker individuals, who are mostly foreign nationals from other African countries, because locals feel powerless to affect institutions to address their concerns.

Young people are susceptible to be carriers of violence as findings in the previous chapter reveal that local business people tend to exploit idle young people to commit acts of violence against non-nationals. Hence, it was essential to undertake this research and work with youth

in addressing the matters that affect them and their communities. The researcher does think that investment in youth and in nurturing their ability, an enormous impact can be made in preventing them from becoming perpetrators of violent behaviour.

Historically, South Africa depended on migrant labour for mining, agriculture, and industries, with the initial determination to increase economic development, which required skilled labour and entrepreneurs. It can be noted that the republic suffers from a limited number of experienced individuals and industrialists because of numerous restraints. Consequently, there was still a high demand for skilled laborers, and this gap was because of historical causes. The apartheid era denied many Black people the opportunity to have skills, and it relied on migrants for skills.

The locals know little about how the foreign nationals are giving back to the host country, South Africa. With this, there has been a need to address this knowledge gap and hold foreign nationals accountable by giving back to the host country. Data collected from the participants revealed that some immigrants were skilled with entrepreneurial skills, and they had the potential to share those skills with locals, especially young people. It can be acknowledged that despite the adverse outcomes facing many immigrants in the country; they possess skills that contribute to the host communities.

In South Africa, migrant workers have been recognized as having additional services and ground-breaking philosophies, and these have contributed to enhanced commercial functioning and improved production. The country's failure to meet its international obligations and its inability to recognize the compassion for those who come from other parts of Africa was the betrayal of some of the Constitution's founding principles. Therefore, young people could not sit back and be bystanders; they researched where they could find foreign nationals who could transfer their skills to local young people.

The researcher believes that when youth are given appropriate training and opportunities, they can bring about social change. Therefore, young people must be put at the centre of intervention strategies, as they are an essential group in promoting societal transformation and have the ability to contribute to national development and peacebuilding. The action group was included in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the study. Besides, by continuously engaging youth in dialogue, training workshops, and consultation, the researcher believes

young people, when given appropriate programs, have the power to bring about social change by responding to the exact need of the communities in which they live.

Through the skills-sharing initiative, mechanisms and opportunities were created where refugees and migrants with unique skills and expertise have contributed positively to the host communities' benefit and advantage, reducing xenophobic tendencies. A Zimbabwean asylum seeker trained the group on how to make a toilet detergent. In a step-by-step manner, the trainer then displayed how to make the toilet detergent such that, in turn, they could make their own and start the income-generating project within their community. AG10 reported that:

The initiative has empowered me as I was stuck on what to do as a survival way, but now, I will collaborate with other members and make more detergents and sell. I am grateful that some foreign nationals are not selfish with their skills but are willing to work with everyone to benefit.

The training came because of the violent attacks that had been ongoing in the INK area, and the action group suggested conducting the practice to change the narrative that foreign nationals were not contributing to the host country. Moreover, this was to formulate lasting relationships that would give young people the ability to start their income-generating initiatives, as many were unemployed. Simultaneously, the training aimed to keep the conversation that human rights are not national rights alive.

Furthermore, the action group feared that the attacks would also spread in Lindelani, as young people attacked the Ethiopian shopkeeper and looted the shop. AG1, a member of the action group, witnessed the incident, and he narrates that:

I saw a group of five young men approaching this Ethiopian spaza shop at around 7 pm while I was just taking a walk. Then I saw these guys calling the shopkeeper to open the container or else they will kill him. He refused to open, and this provoked them, and they started breaking the door. What amazed me was that the neighbours were just watching and not rebuking these young people. I had to ask some of the guys to help protect the life of the shopkeeper. As they managed to break the door, we ran to the shop and begged them to take whatever they wanted but spare the shopkeeper's life. So, we had to drag the shopkeeper out to save him, and they continued to loot the shop. I am only happy that I acted and saved someone's life on that, although it was scary, and I feared for my life too, as it is hard to reason with these young people.

With this incident, the action group decided to take urgent action and work with young people and show them how the foreign nationals contributed to the host country. Hence, a skills-sharing initiative was initiated to learn from foreign nationals and create sustainable relationships. Those who were trained managed to sell the product after the training. Most

importantly, two months after the training, some had managed to open a co-operative where they make and sell the toilet detergents as part of the income-generating project.

With the concern that there was a lack of contact and platforms for South Africans and non-nationals to meet, contact was essential. This was because contact offered a space for hostile parties to meet to clear any assumptions. However, the task was to effectively bring these together, and therefore, a skill-sharing initiative was suggested. Since most of the attacks of non-nationals were triggered by negative attitudes, generalizations, and prejudice, youth participation in these attacks cannot be reduced if there was no contact between the two groups to understand each other.

The investigation has found the contact between the locals and non-nationals in the action group studied was deemed one of the significant factors explaining the impact of the research project on the two parties' relations. The action group perceived the skills-sharing initiative of making detergents an encounter that enabled different nationalities to contact. While the theory embraced in Chapter 4 on the scapegoating theoretical framework concerning contact demonstrates excellent contact conditions to yield positive social results. This investigation found that it is worth perceiving that contact can essentially be important in the general public.

The early assumptions on the contact hypothesis accordingly stay important—necessary contact between individuals from hostile groups will probably subvert negative attitudes while cultivating positive ones. Interestingly, the lack of such contact was assumed to encourage negative perspectives and practices. This additionally alludes to Allport's dispute that contact ought to be seen as significant and that the apparent significance of contact can differ from one set then onto the next. In any case, the disagreement that the social results of contact, in essence, are not always positive is a long way from addressing.

The skills sharing transfer did shift the participants' attitudes as they highlighted that it allowed them to change their attitudes towards non-nationals as they had an opportunity to understand what they have heard from other people, and the media was based on generalization. Such generalization was dangerous as it triggered hatred and, in some instances, led to violence. During the skill sharing, the contact they had made them appreciate the work done by foreign nationals in giving back their skills to the host country. The participants felt the contribution was vital as it helped to equip young people to understand the foreign nationals and their role,

and their initiatives assisted in addressing social issues like a high level of unemployment affecting young people.

The researcher felt that skill transfer by non-nationals to locals was significant in tackling stereotypes and prejudice between the two groups. The participants began to tolerate each other with interactions, which was a more astounding transformation needed in reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence. Hence, with such initiatives, the researcher acknowledges that they have a more significant potential to curb xenophobic violence and promote social cohesion in South Africa. This fulfilled the third objective in planning and implementing an intervention to tackle the problem.

7.6 Social Cohesion Youth Workshop on Conflict Resolution Skills

Xenophobic violence continues to recur, and youth are at the heart of these attacks as instigators. Hence, it was essential to ensure that young people are given a platform to participate in peacebuilding decision-making processes. Sometimes young people are used as pawns to execute violent acts to thwart their participation in peacebuilding processes. Thus, opening youth platforms to dialogue is vital as there are limited spaces for young people from different nationalities to meet and work together to design and implement intervention strategies to address KwaZulu-Natal's growing violent culture. There has been a greater need to create spaces where young people can integrate because KwaZulu-Natal's situation has been hostile to the immigrants.

The hostility that has been rampant within KwaZulu-Natal among citizens and non-citizens hinders having entirely cohesive communities. Moreover, there has been a large occurrence of prejudice linked to inequalities affecting disadvantaged communities. One of the significant incidences occurring in the past years has been xenophobic violence and attitudes that have given the country a negative reputation, and KwaZulu-Natal is one of the provinces well-known for such kinds of behaviours and issues.

The research team opened the space under the theme of 'Social cohesion youth training on conflict resolution skills.' This comes after the youth dialogue on xenophobia that the research team conducted. One of the concerns that emerged was that people from different backgrounds (locals and foreign nationals) need to continue meeting and creating spaces to do activities

together. Thus, the training helped address such issues to enhance social cohesion amongst youth from diverse backgrounds and break the cycle of violence.

The research commissioned by Freedom House focusing on xenophobic violence and social cohesion in Durban in 2017 had important results demonstrating that dialogue was effective in preventing violence. The findings revealed that both local and foreign respondents, foreign nationals in Isipingo regularly interact with local neighbours in different contexts and for different reasons, particularly through business transactions and intermarriages. They also indicated that interactions with the wider community are limited and even those with local neighbours are not necessarily satisfying because they are riddled with mutual suspicion and distrust (Misago 2017b). Collective or communal violence against ‘outsiders’ is probably the most visible and brutal symptom of the lack of social cohesion in Durban communities. This type of violence was not only an indicator of social fault lines but also an additional threat or obstacle to social cohesion as it causes permanent, or at least long-lasting, social damage in terms of undermining any chances of future peaceful cohabitation and interactions between locals and non-nationals.

The recurrence of xenophobic violence and the little done to curb the violence within South Africa is disappointing, as much scholarly work has been focused on recommendations and not on executing those recommendations. The proposal from academics rarely attempts to respond to the situation on the ground to transform the locals’ relationships and the foreign nationals. The lack of implementation of the recommendations also contributes to the violence’s recurrence, as this phenomenon needs to be dealt with at the grassroots level and not be left within the academic spaces.

Acknowledging that conflict is inevitable and a vehicle of change if tapped positively, on 5 and 6 December 2019, the research team conducted a two-day conflict resolution skills training facilitated by the researcher. The training came because of the growing culture of violence in communities as a way of resolving conflicts. The training focused on youth because they have been at the forefront to execute violence against foreign nationals. Moreover, they have been used as pawns by local business owners to loot shops foreign-owned spaza shops.

In Durban, violence has become a way of solving other social problems, for example, by using force when service delivery is poor. The workshop aimed to build youth’s motivation and

capacity to use effective, nonviolent ways of dealing with conflicts in communities to enhance social cohesion. With this, the research team opened a platform for young people to dialogue and reflected on the role that they have played in promoting nonviolent ways of resolving conflict.

Young people from different backgrounds were equipped with and allowed to strengthen their conflict resolution skills. Youth, children, and elders present were taught that conflict presents an opportunity when handled well and can be a costly disaster when handled poorly. Therefore, people must learn how to resolve conflict situations before they escalate into intractable disputes, using proven responses and techniques that work.

The training objectives were to identify conflict as an opportunity for clarity and learning, curtail the impact of perception on interpretations about motive, and define conflict to recognize it early and respond using an appropriate conflict-handling strategy. Most importantly, the training aimed to create an environment that promotes and nurtures a culture of conflict skill, where all who experience conflict feel comfortable raising it, knowing it will be dealt with courteously and sensibly.

The training sought a group of young African people who would help other Africans across KwaZulu-Natal to resolve conflicts constructively. The research team had a Social Cohesion, Nation Building, and Safe Communities representative under the Department of Arts and Culture. The representative was sent following the dialogues that the research team carried out in September 2019, leading to acknowledging the work that the researcher was doing with the action group in promoting social cohesion, as it was one of the department's mandates.

The representative elucidated the importance of having cohesive societies that promote sustainable peace and development. This came after the realization that violence derails development if it continues to be unchecked. Therefore, it will be necessary for the government departments to replicate this training in various South African communities to curb violence.

The following issues were covered during the training:

- Is conflict a necessary evil?
- Early warning signs of conflict
- What triggers conflict and violence in our communities?
- Shifting the perception of social groups and stereotypes

- How individuals usually resolve conflicts
- How communities resolve conflicts
- Steps in conflict resolution
- Conflict analysis
- Nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts

7.7 Is Conflict a necessary Evil?

Conflict is well-defined as an expressed struggle between two interdependent parties about how seemingly contradictory goals and needs for scarce resources will be met accompanied by a perception of interference and strong negative emotions. When participants were asked what came to their minds when they heard the word *conflict*, they stated blood, death, fighting, and stabbing each other. Table 7.1 presents the participants' responses who were focusing on whether the conflict was a necessary evil.

Table 7.1: Responses of the participants⁴

Good	Bad
It helps us to learn from each other	Creates anger, violence, and hurting each other
We can get different ideas and opinions from each other	Results in groups being separated and not seeing eye to eye
It helps create cooperation and dialogue	Results in relationships being strained and broken; people not getting along
We can learn to make peace with or among each other	Respect is lost
It helps us to reach a common ground	Creates hatred
We learn to compromise and not make everything about ourselves	Creates isolation
One can empathize and view things from other people's perspectives	Compromises a person's health due to anger and violent behaviours

Source: Own data.

Conflict offers prospects and challenges to reflect, be innovative, and pursue other ways of resolving our communities' differences. The participants given the task to look at conflict

acknowledged that conflict is a double-edged sword as it provided ways for people to realize problems and map ways to resolve them. On the other hand, poorly resolved conflicts led to violence, destroyed trust and respect, as highlighted in Table 7.1. Participants reported that in most cases, conflict was often motivated by a sense of grievance, be it shortage, disparity, cultural or moral differences, or the distribution of power. Hence when these are at play drives the parties in conflict to realize that action must be taken to address the grievances.

The training enabled the participants to understand that there were alternatives to violence as most instances have resorted to violence to resolve their problems. This was problematic; the violence was directed to non-nationals who were not even in conflict with the locals. Therefore, the training enabled the participants to explore nonviolent ways of resolving problems to curb xenophobic violence. Thus, this research acknowledges that when there was an absence of conflict resolution mechanisms in communities, it was important for the community to be equipped. Hence, to fulfil the study's third objective, the researcher believes that the training did equip the participants to opt for nonviolent ways of resolving problems.

7.8 Early Warning Signs of Conflict

The researcher unpacked that conflict was a vehicle for social change when handled constructively. However, there are early warning signs of conflict, according to Ford (2013: 9), and these include the following:

- "Psychological awareness, especially of 'negative' emotions such as anger, contempt, fear, tension, guilt, envy, jealousy, shame, and sadness, acts as an early warning sign that one has a conflict. The most toxic is disdain."
- "The view in which any of the following four behaviours are being exhibited also serves as a red flag: criticism, blame, defensiveness, and stonewalling."

The crucial insight into the exploration of relations was the importance of preventing a negative response, even when one perceives themselves as confronted with a conflict. If the volatile conflict sequence was not broken down, it will intensify to a deeper hostile and even violent. Therefore, the objective was not to eradicate conflict; relatively, it was to recognize their unavoidability and develop a reciprocally helpful speaking approach that was not damaging but somewhat promoted knowledge.

Participants were taught that not all conflicts could be problem-solved. Identity and relationships need naturally fashioned trials that battle modest tenacities and continue as distressing battles. The answer to tackling glitches, including rational and citizenship matters, using dialogues and constructive sentiments and behaviours, is one method that individuals can adopt.

7.9 What triggers Conflict and Violence in our Communities?

The participants listed various triggers of violence, which include substance abuse, migration issues that have manifested themselves as xenophobia, different religious beliefs, different cultural values and ideas, different opinions and ideas, politics of the stomach, racial discrimination, scarcity of resources, unemployment, the government leaders, corruption, crime, and poor service delivery.

7.10 Shifting Perceptions of Social Groups and Stereotypes: What are the negative and positive comments that Locals and Immigrants say about each other?

The research team explored the problem with perception, that one does not see things as they are, but one sees things as one is. The research team acknowledged that assumptions create a pattern through which one views the world. The team took time to define perception as a course through which one attains data about one's setting through one's five senses: smell, hearing, touch, sight, and taste. It was noted that when one observes behaviours, one makes assumptions and draws conclusions, especially about motive and intent. The assumptions and outcomes that one has about another person influence the action that one takes and the behaviour that one displays.

Participants were then asked what they hear and state about local people and the responses were that they are lazy, wait for the government to do things for them, and are violent. Regarding the immigrants, they said that they are criminals, human traffickers, educated, to mention a few. From their responses, they were asked whether everyone whom they come across was like that. The answer was an emphatic 'no.' With this, the participants were called to move away from assuming and boxing everyone because of one person who had done something wrong and moved away from individuals' generalization based on their

nationalities. An example was given of the displacement of Malawians in Burnwood community, Durban, in March 2019. The generalization precipitated the displacement following the assumption that all Malawians in the area were stealing from the locals. Hence, Malawians were forcefully removed from the area, including some Rwandanese and Zimbabweans.

In addition to assigning a harmful intent to behaviour that influences one negatively, the researcher explained that one often makes what is referred to as the ‘fundamental attribution error.’ This is the ascription of the causes of others’ behaviour to personal factors (while ascribing the origins of one’s response to environmental factors. Succinctly, it was posited that one makes negative personal assumptions about another person’s reasons for that which has happened while blaming the environment when it is one’s behaviour that is in question. One is giving oneself the benefit of the doubt.

7.11 How do Individuals usually resolve Conflicts?

The participants highlighted several ways in which they handle conflicts. These include bringing the matter to the elders to take action, calming down to understand the matter at hand, ignoring the conflict, investigating the cause of the conflict and finding ways to satisfy both sides, investigating the type of the conflict and the kind of person with whom they conflict to see how best they can resolve the dispute, confront the parties, some take the blame of everything even if not guilty, some apologize, some wait to calm down before addressing the issue. Some stated that they identify alternative people who can resolve the conflict.

7.12 How do Communities Resolve Conflicts?

When the participants were asked how the community resolves conflicts. They highlighted that in some cases, they use a mediator (for example, Thabo Mbeki mediated the Zimbabwean conflict), mob justice (for example, if there was a rapist or a thief that they had had enough of, the community members beat (sometimes to death) the criminal and, in some instances, burn the person), protests which are violent as libraries are burnt in schools, community dialogues, reporting to Ward Councillors, community meetings and anger was usually used in resolving the conflicts. Despite these methods, participants acknowledged that it was more comfortable in the past as there were structures in the community to help resolve the conflicts; however, we are too individualistic as Blacks. Moreover, the participants felt that we had lost humanity as

colonialism has taken away our community structure (e.g., chiefs, *amakhosi*) to help mediate conflicts.

The research undertaken by Freedom House in 2017 indicates that trusted community leadership and conflict resolution mechanisms are important assets for sustainable social cohesion and peaceful cohabitation. In Musina, for example, despite the occasional use of mob justice to punish suspected criminals when the police response is perceived slow or inadequate, residents generally regard local authorities and various community leadership structures as effective conflict resolution avenues (Misago 2017b). As evidence, they speak of instances when these mechanisms have been able to resolve conflicts before they escalated into violence. This is likely to be one of the primary reasons Musina has not experienced chronic group conflicts and anti-outsider violence seen elsewhere in the country.

7.13 Aspects they could change in the way they handle Conflicts

The following responses came from the participants regarding how they could change how they handle conflicts; changing the tone of their voices, humbling themselves, stopping emotional blackmail and making excuses, and finding other alternatives to resolving conflicts without lashing out stop making assumptions and generalizing.

7.14 Steps in Conflict Resolution

Participants were given steps that they could adopt in resolving conflicts in their respective spaces:

- Acknowledge the conflict
- Identify the real conflict
- Listen to all points of view
- Jointly look for ways to resolve the conflict
- Get agreement on a resolution
- The follow-up to review the resolution

7.15 Conflict Analysis

Participants were encouraged on the importance of conducting a conflict analysis to be aware of the actors involved and to bring context-based solutions. Conflict analysis is vital as it aids practitioners in various disciplines to understand the setting in which conflicts originate and

the part that they can play in addressing the problem. It was added that conflict analysis was a great necessity in dealing with xenophobia in various communities. This was because, according to Engel and Korf (2005), a conflict analysis assists to:

- simplify and prioritize the variety of issues that need to be addressed,
- identify the influences of conflict,
- classify the root causes and contributing factors of conflict to regulate valid responses,
- determine the involved parties' drives and through an understanding of their interests, needs, and views of the battle,
- evaluate the nature of relations between parties, comprising their readiness and aptitude to negotiate with each other,
- identify current information about the conflict and what additional information is required,
- evaluate the ability of prevailing conflict resolution institutions or practices to deal with the dispute,
- build rapport and understanding among parties, where possible,
- improve the problem-solving and analytical capabilities of local stakeholders in tackling current and future conflicts, and
- increase the understanding of the relations between the broader social, political, and economic settings and resources and their use in resolving conflicts.

7.16 Nonviolent ways that Individuals and Communities can adopt to Resolve Conflicts

The participants provided the following responses:

- Allow another party to finish speaking or to explain their side.
- Allow elders to be involved so that no one takes sides.
- Ignore negative things and consider or concentrate on the positive side of things.
- Speak in a low tone.
- Care for other people the way you want to be treated.
- Be patient and do not rush other parties involved.

7.17 Building Bridges: What can we do together as Young People to build Cohesive Communities

Young people felt it essential that they work together in building cohesive societies. Participants suggested sharing the skills gained with others in schools to curb bullying and school violence issues. Also, to open groups in schools to motivate each other and to share conflict resolution skills. They also explained that it was essential to have regular community forums involving councillors in the area, with young and older adults. This was because youth needed more platforms to build relationships and to promote unity. Due to the rise of violence, participants asserted that communities need conflict resolution training to promote nonviolent ways of resolving communities' conflicts.

Moreover, to conduct more social cohesion community conversations. They also added a need to increase support for the nation's healing through appropriate community conflict resolution skills. Arts and culture were noted as one method that can be used as a catalyst for social cohesion. It was also highlighted that there was a need to conduct more workshops on social cohesion and training to appreciate a united society's importance. Finally, the participants suggested that we hold cultural functions and provide youth with seminars to inculcate a sense of unity in them.

7.18 INK Area Xenophobic Attacks: Xenophobic Attacks in Phoenix, Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu Area

The researcher and the action group had an opportunity to visit areas affected by xenophobic violence in May 2018 following NORBA's ultimatum to migrants and refugees' enterprises to shut down and leave the area. In this case, the overall pretext in all the provinces that witnessed the lootings was of counterfeit goods or food offered for sale after the expiry date has passed, which jeopardizes health. However, there was no evidence, according to the authorities, that this was the case. One person asked why the food was looted if it had already expired. In other situations, there were allegations of the drug trade or other forms of criminality.

After investigation, most claims are untrue, though there are unquestionably some foreign citizens who, like other people, carry out criminal practice activities or evade regulations. In some cases, attacks are suspected to be driven by foreign nationals taking jobs that 'belong' to South Africans. Numerous studies demonstrate that most of these jobs are ones that South

Africans do not want. However, it may be realistic that some companies favour foreign nationals, especially those without documentation, because of their vulnerability. This anti-immigrant violence that has swept KwaZulu-Natal since May 2018 has led to death, harm, and several immigrants' displacement from these communities. The majority of the local youth led these lootings.

7.19 What the research team did with the Action Group

To solve this issue, the research team visited the areas affected by violence. One of the Refugee Social Services (RSS) assisted the team as he intended to visit the fields. During the site visits, the team met the Ward 108 Councillor of Inanda, a representative from Abahlali Basemjondolo, the Ethiopian Community Chairperson, and a police officer at Ntuzuma Police Station. The meeting sought to understand the attacks of foreign-owned spaza shops and map ways to resolve the problems. The research team also visited looted, burnt, and destroyed shops in Inanda and Ntuzuma to assess the damage. The team also visited Favours Wholesale to check where most businesspeople ordered their products.

Foreigners have continually been accused of socio-economic problems affecting the local communities as unemployment and poverty are now said to be the fault of foreigners. In all the research team's interventions, the team discovered that much needs to be done to change the attitudes and behaviours of host communities, authorities, and the media towards migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. As the election period in 2019 drew closer, it was felt that the killings would increase and that political leaders would become more hostile. There would also be an increase in xenophobic tendencies where the blame on poor service delivery would be shifted onto migrants and refugees.

7.19.1 Site Visits: Sunstar Supermarket – Inanda Matikwe Ward 56

The store owner thought that the store was looted by people who were not part of the community but joined by the community's youth. This happened following the ultimatum given by NORBA to foreign-owned shops to close and leave the area. He reported that he suspected NORBA people as no local shop close to him was looted. He added that people from NORBA were the ones who instructed some of the community members to come and plunder the shop. One of the store workers, a woman from Mozambique, indicated that they came and shouted at the community members to go inside the store and loot after opening it. Hence, she

suspected that one of the local business owners had had a hand in all the matters. From her report, the researcher noticed a group that first came and broke into the store and then opened it, and after opening, they then called all the community members close by to go and loot the shop.

The research team then moved across the road to another store owned by Africa, an Ethiopian. The shop was firstly burnt and then looted. However, it was rebuilt and repainted, and on the day that the research team arrived, they had just brought in new stock a day before. The shop owner had to ask for help from his landlord to assist him in securing the shop. IKOc (the landlord's son, not his actual name) was deployed to help the shop cashier retrieve the shop and observe the perpetrators. From the research team's conversation with IKOc, he noted that it was heart-breaking that community members loved and supported Africa as he also, in turn, participated in community needs. He further stated that what was alarming was that not even one locally-owned shop was looted but only the foreign-owned shop, which made him conclude that it was the work of the locally-owned businesspeople as there has been an ongoing conflict between them.

The building depicted in Figure 6.3 used to be a house and a shop in Ntuzuma E. It was demolished and burnt by the community, but where the lives were spared. It was one of the affected shops that the research team visited in the Ntuzuma area with the action group.



Figure 7.3:House burnt and destroyed in Ntuzuma E

7.19.2 Favours Wholesale in KwaMashu

With the accusation of the foreign nationals selling expired products, the research team made site visits in KwaMashu to observe where most of the traders bought their products. The team went to Favours Wholesale, where both local and foreign nationals buy goods. This caused the

team to wonder why the foreign nationals were blamed more than the locals, as they were all buying from the same wholesale store. The researcher understood that these were merely business politics between NORBA and the foreign-owned businesses, as NORBA wanted the foreigners to stop trading within the PINK area and leave.

7.19.3 Meeting with a Member from Abahlali Basemjondolo in Bhambayi

According to IYb, xenophobic violence is caused by the fact that the locals want to be heard; they need transparency in what foreign-owned shops sell as these are heavily protected that one can hardly see the person inside. Assumptions are rising because they do not know what is being sold behind the counters. Such raises suspicions and hence the need to have proper dialogues with foreign nationals. IYb elucidated that the dialogues need to have local leaders heading both domestic and foreign business to have a meeting with their people and dialogue to find amicable solutions. Despite the tensions, IYb highlighted that foreign shops could contribute to the community by donating batteries for loud hailing whenever there is a call for community meetings if they cannot physically participate. Moreover, IYb explained that violence to retaliate against foreigners is not a solution, as one person was shot at the Amaoti community. Regarding the last point, IYb emphasized that she was against the use of force, as there are different nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts. She also added that manufacturers are also significant players in the conflict, as she indicated that some products do not have an expiry date.

From the conversation with her, the research team noted that the Bhambayi community, where IYb was residing, was a unique case as she explained that when a few individuals were about to burn one of the foreign-owned shops in the area, the community members stopped them. People were encouraged to map ways of resolving the conflict rather than burning the shops. From this, the research team noted that the Bhambayi community, although volatile, is united.

The only challenge facing them was the Durban security company called Reaction Unit South Africa (RUSA), which uses force and violence to deal with community members. RUSA is a private security services company based in Verulam, known for crime prevention across the country. IYb explained that the police were tired of the Unit as they cannot control them. She added that:

Attacks need people to sit down and map a way forward. Foreigners are too many, and South Africans are still dealing with their challenges, and the presence of foreigners is a burden. Foreign nationals should not act as if it is their place.

IYb suggested that the research team could do the skills transfer together, and then the locals would find the resources for that activity. She further added that foreign-owned shop owners share where they buy in bulk, yet locals hide information regarding where they buy goods. From this, it can be noted that there are ways in which both locals and foreign nationals can work together to mend the broken relationships, and one way that was highlighted by IYb was by sharing skills. It can be noted that some groups do not share information on where they buy in bulk, which reveals that some Black Africans never support each other.

7.19.4 Meeting with Leader of Ethiopian Community

The researcher met with IKOd to comprehend the current situation with the attacks and lootings of non-national spaza shops in the INK area and map a way forward, as Ethiopians were among the most affected. IKOd shared that foreign nationals are the most targeted and vulnerable groups in the community. Since he was the Ethiopians Association leader, he referred to the Ethiopians and explained that they are exposed and marginalized and are connected to the current lootings that have been taking place in Soweto. He also shared that there were even lootings in Newlands West where shops were burnt, with the shops being Ethiopian-owned.

IKOd shared that when people are angry with the government and other socio-economic challenges, they tend to anger foreign nationals. He shared his own opinions on what causes xenophobia. He explained that xenophobia and the attacks surrounding it are caused by jealousy, which has developed over time. He explained that even conflicts of interest on the ground level were significant causes of xenophobia. IKOd shared that one of the matters that should be considered was that xenophobic attacks tend to occur when elections are approaching. IKOd highlighted that:

What was so confusing about the lootings was that if it was usual looting, then why do we only witness foreign-owned shops being looted, yet the locals' shops are left out.

The looting clearly illustrates that foreign-national-owned shops are the primary target. The unfortunate part about the lootings was that there was no valid evidence of the perpetrators' identity and actions, as most of the community was against the helpless people. It can be argued that xenophobic attacks and lootings create more room for criminal acts. Moreover, the attacks

have become systemic as they usually take place towards the time of elections, which poses why it has remained unanswered.

IKOd shared that it had been unfortunate to see that in South Africa, even the government was not taking the lives of the refugees seriously, as the government was not taking many initiatives. The human dignity of foreign nationals was not sincerely considered (IKOd mentioned that in South Africa, a dog's life is more important than that of a foreign national).

It can be argued that not all locals were treating non-nationals as being less than human beings. IKOd shared a story about a neighbour who assisted an Ethiopian national who was being attacked by the community members – the neighbour came to the rescue of the foreign national and even stated that the attackers should kill him instead of the foreign national.

IKOd shared that the police situation had changed over time, looking back to when xenophobia attacks had started. He stated that the police are now more willing to assist foreign nationals. There was also a positive element that he saw with the government; it seemed as if the government was slowly prioritizing foreign nationals' human dignity – this he saw through the intervention made with the NORBA representatives being arrested, and the case was still ongoing.

IKOd shared that the government and other stakeholders have tried to intervene by implementing social cohesion programs. However, he explained that when there are many conflicts of interest on the ground, it becomes a challenge for the government to intervene because in most cases, whenever the attacks take place in the community, the government is not present to see or even experience that which the foreign nationals endure. IKOd shared that sometimes even the spoken words by government officials usually play a significant part in triggering xenophobic attacks. He shared that he was sorrowful to hear the President of the Republic of South Africa stating that the taxi business and shop businesses belonged only to the locals. It was such instances that provoked the citizens to engage in criminal acts and xenophobic attacks.

7.19.5 Suggestions by Ethiopian Leader on the way forward

The Ethiopian leader made the following suggestions regarding the way forward:

- IKOd shared that a collective effort was needed to bring about social cohesion and peace in the communities. He explained that each individual's situation, whether on the ground level or the government level, to work together (this involves citizens, ward leadership, faith-based organizations, pastors, civil society groups, community leaders).
- Law enforcement of the country was feeble; therefore, something needs to change with the laws, the justice systems, and how law enforcement operates.
- There was a considerable gap when it came to knowledge about foreign nationals. Therefore, there should be campaigns where knowledge would be shared between the locals and foreign nationals. Locals need to endorse the alien national mentality of doing business and be willing to seek help when they require it.
- Foreign nationals should build relationships with the community they live in and be involved in community gatherings, even attending community meetings and soccer tournaments.
- Foreign nationals should socialize through any community gathering, such as religious gatherings, and involve themselves in social cohesion activities taking place in their communities.
- Locals need to be open-minded and be willing to allow foreign nationals to empower them by sharing business knowledge. People should be working together unitedly to bring about peace and social cohesion in their communities. IKOd shared that the police from Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu are currently very helpful, and they are always more than willing to help; they continuously patrol the areas and provide the workforce.

7.19.6 Meeting with Leaders in Ntuzuma Police Station

In Ntuzuma, IKOa indicated that xenophobic incidents are always once-off within the community, and the perpetrators usually use petrol bombs to destroy foreign-owned shops. The conflicts are extending to neighbouring townships such as Inanda, KwaMashu, and Lindelani. The dispute has been between NORBA and foreign business shop owners. IKOa reported that:

The NORBA wants to trade alone without any competitors in the area. There has been too much mushrooming of foreign-owned shops. The foreign-owned businesses seem to be sponsored to buy at a lower price, which has fuelled the conflict, and the issue was now uncontrollable. Firstly, NORBA demanded business licenses; however, when the Municipality came with them, they denied them as a local business, people did not want foreigners to receive the licenses.

Conflicts do not involve the community members, as they recommend that foreigners have good working relations and always have all stock products, unlike locally-owned shops. IKOa added that:

Foreigners are at risk as one was about to be burnt. However, he was saved by the police as they had already poured petrol on him by locals. Robberies of the foreign shops are going on as they want foreigners to leave.

He further reported that the issue did not involve expired goods as the police did not find any expired products when they inspected the shops within the area. The Chairperson and the Secretary of NORBA were arrested and released on bail, which has further fuelled the conflict. Shops are always looted or robbed. A car owned by one of the foreign business owners was burnt in Ntuzuma. IKOa further explained that:

Currently, anti-immigrant violence was staged in the form of robberies of the shops, and they have moved from looting products to taking money only in fear of being seen by the community. Locals do not know how to trade. They started lying about foreigners trafficking and hijacking, yet it was photoshopped. All they want to be foreigners gone, yet the community benefited from the services offered by foreigners. NORBA released another threatening ultimatum that on 8 September 2018 that all the locals renting out their houses for foreign businesses will be burnt down. The conflict will only end when the foreigners leave; however, the burning of shops would not resolve the dispute. At Ntuzuma L, a store was robbed, and they only took the money. NORBA uses the *pharas* to execute their schemes as they are always hungry.

IKOa indicated that in the previous year, mainly the community was looting the shops, but that this has since changed as NORBA now carried it out. He noted that at the political level, it was hard for the government to resolve the conflict. Indians support the foreigners as when the battle starts, their cars arrive and collect the products to save their business. Hence, locals cannot win the competition as he further added that:

The aim was to reduce and register the spaza shops. However, Ethiopians pose a more significant challenge as they do not comply and continue to open more shops even though they were instructed to stop. Somalians do not have a problem as they meet. NORBA has burnt one of the shops running from generation to generation, which greatly affected the affected family's livelihood. Ntuzuma and Inanda are the most affected areas; in Newlands, they burnt one shop.

It is now a syndicate crime, which makes the work of the police challenging to execute. Currently, NORBA has turned against the police stating that they are protecting foreigners. He indicated that they used to have a forum with business people, and local business people reported that they could not mix with foreigners. Therefore, these people met separately, and currently, they no longer respond as they see the police only protecting foreigners.

7.20 Formation of Anti-Xenophobic Forum in Durban

Following the recurrences of xenophobic attacks between August and September 2019, a call was made amongst various NGOs to form an anti-xenophobic forum that would help to design and implement intervention strategies to address the problem. Two of the members of the action group are part of the forum. The panel was pioneered in Pietermaritzburg, comprising leaders from different communities and organizations. AG3 explained that:

When we first started this forum, the challenge we had was that no one pitches up for a meeting when there is no attack, and this does down. However, when the attacks begin in taxis, truck attacks, the platform is revived. The first meeting was packed as people get interested when there have been attacks directly.

The above issue raised by AG3 can be noted as one of the problems hindering xenophobic violence in the Durban area. The researcher has observed the pattern that the foreign nationals only surface when directly affected; if not, they do not take any actions to attend meetings to build relations. This makes it challenging to work with foreign nationals in addressing their challenges. There are some external national groups that one will never come across, and these are the Nigerians. Ethiopians and Somalians only appear when their shops are affected; if not, they are nowhere to be found.

The researcher joined the forum with two of the action group members because those mentioned above found it essential to be part of the solution. The researcher and two members have met and continued the WhatsApp group to formulate ways of bringing various nationalities together to converse on the issues affecting them and work on a better advocacy strategy on tackling immigration issues in KwaZulu-Natal. Furthermore, the forum consisted of only older adults; thus, the researcher took the turn to represent young people from the three participants from this research project. The forum has also served as an early warning tool for any xenophobic attacks where members share and warn people whenever they are any upcoming attacks. This was important in saving lives and looting foreign-owned shops.

7.21 Conclusion

The relapse of attacks of immigrants in various communities in Durban reveals that the root causes remain unaddressed. The interconnectedness of the reasons leading youth to participate in xenophobic violence meant that it was essential to work with them to understand their experiences. One of the issues that young people have continuously raised is the lack of platforms for people from different backgrounds (locals, migrants, and refugees) to meet,

contributing to xenophobic violence regularly. Less recognition has been given to investing in youth. However, young people are essential in finding ways of reducing xenophobic violence. Despite various initiatives from civil society and the government, little concerted effort has been invested in harnessing the youth's potential in peacebuilding initiatives to enhance social cohesion. Therefore, this study sought to amplify young people's voices who are the answer to curbing xenophobic violence if given proper training and opportunities.

CHAPTER 8: SHORT-TERM OUTCOME EVALUATION OF THE INTERVENTION

8.1 Introduction

This section focuses on assessing the dialogue, skills transfer, and conflict resolution skills training conducted with members from the Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu areas. The chapter evaluated the Participatory Action Research (PAR) course and the researcher's observations to fulfil the study's third objective, which was to devise and execute an intervention plan to reduce xenophobic violence and embark on an initial assessment of its result. The section evaluates the degree to which the investigator and the respondents benefitted from the study.

8.2 Purpose of Evaluation in Peacebuilding Initiatives

The evaluation of the result of the resolution of the problem is a crucial component in PAR. Evaluation is "the systematic accomplishment and review of data collected on specific questions to deliver careful response for a program" (Church and Rodgers 2006: 93). In the words of Lederach, Culbertson and Neufeldt (2007: 1), "in peacebuilding efforts, it is crucial to have a reflective practice or culture which is an act of inferring lessons from the success or failure of an intervention and measuring the results of the response." According to Church (2008: 3), peacebuilders must assess their work to regulate whether it has brought change. Therefore, in PAR, evaluation is not merely an inquiry that abruptly ends. Instead, Muchemwa (2016: 219) explains that "it is a continuous valuation of ongoing research with the intent to learn from the research cycle." Therefore, evaluation in peacebuilding is "an evidence-based process intended to comprehend the intervention results, whether positive or negative" (Blum 2011: 2).

According to Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman (2004: 16), evaluation is "the use of social research methods to thoroughly examine the efficacy of social intervention programs in ways that are designed to inform social action and improve social conditions." The designation features three ideas that are crucial in evaluation. These include "the use of appropriate methods, the effectiveness of the intervention, and improving further action as driving the purpose of the evaluation" (OECD 2008: 2). The evaluation assumed in this study correlated to two facets of

the meaning: using social research techniques and ascertaining the efficiency of resolving the problem as exemplified in the results. For this study, the researcher focused on assessing the results of the study. Briefly, Sonpal-Valias (2009) designates result assessment as focused on transformations stemming from an intervention implemented and the investigation of the degree to which the resolution is liable for the conclusions.

The researcher was mainly concerned with the methodical gathering of information on the intervention to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence to produce findings on the resolution's outcome. The researcher's assessment's objective was thus dual: "judgment-oriented and knowledge-oriented" (Muchemwa 2016: 219). The prior was intended at determining the general value of the resolution and the effectiveness of the dialogue sessions, the conflict resolution skills training, and the skills-sharing initiative conducted by the action group to encourage connection construction between the respondents. Development in relations was to be established in enhanced capability amongst the members to resolve conflict non-violently. Finally, the researcher pursued data from the assessment results in the method of lessons learned to increase the understanding of both the intervention and participatory action research.

8.3 Pointers of Constructive Transformation

Participatory action research seeks to "bring positive change among participants" (Kaye 2017: 4). Indicators play a significant role in the evaluation procedure as it regulates whether the intended transformation is taking place or has transpired. Therefore, this segment underlines the result pointers that the researcher employed to regulate the resolution's worthiness implemented to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence. The study aimed to reduce youth participation in violence labelled as xenophobic, capacitating youth on conflict resolution, and cultivating the culture of tolerance among ten locals and foreign nationals in the action group. A signal of shifting relations included any constructive mindset and perception transformation amongst members that would encourage conduct. It was observed that "changing individuals involves strategies that shift attitudes, perceptions, feelings, behaviours, and motivations of participants in an intervention" (Shapiro 2006: 5).

The dialogue sessions, conflict resolution skills training, and the 'skill transfer initiative' executed by the experiment group sought to change negative attitudes and harmful perceptions

between members separated by xenophobic violence and capacitate them to be tolerant regardless of their nationalities. The transformation in mindsets and opinions would create behaviour alteration. Also, evaluating the actions undertaken to investigate the quality and value of interventions that address the core driving factors and actors of xenophobic violence or support the driving factors and actors of peace (Church 2008; Scharbatke-Church 2011).

Occurrences of xenophobic violence in South Africa are well-detailed (Karamoko and Jain 2011; Isike and Isike 2012; Koogotsitse 2012; Managa 2012; Konanani and Odeku 2013; Kosas and Solomon 2013; Fungurai 2015; Langa and Kiguwa 2016; Lanre-Abass and Oguh 2016; Magidimisha *et al.* 2017; Iwara, Obadire and Amaechi 2018; Mancini, Bottura and Caricati 2018). In recent years, xenophobic sentiments have deepened in townships and informal settlements. Durban townships and informal settlements are occasionally affected by violent attacks targeting the foreign nationals and their properties, especially the foreign-owned businesses (Everatt 2011; Dunderdale 2013; Dube 2019). Such occurrences are systematically high towards election periods. The violence occurs primarily because of the rivalry between the local and foreign business owners competing for economic space in townships.

The competition between local- and foreign-owned businesses has remained a fundamental basis of fierce hostilities that have left people devastated and need to rediscover the fragmented relations, hence the necessity for interferences that can shape tolerance amongst individuals from diverse national clusters was reflected a necessity in this situation. The behaviour alteration pointers included inter-personal interaction advancements, reducing suspicion, accommodation, conflict resolution abilities, partnership, mutual aid, and decreased violence and aggressive language amongst contributors.

8.4 The Evaluation Process and Apparatuses

The assessment procedure utilized the post-test model, which implicated detecting the performance pointers after implementing the resolutions. For evaluation purposes, the researcher involved the experimentation and control group. The ten respondents who composed the action group instituted the experiment group, and they took part in the execution of the resolutions to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence. The control group comprised ten participants, and these were interviewed for the evaluation. The group did not experience the intervention but was also in need of conflict resolution skills training and skills transfer

initiation, as demonstrated by baseline data. The researcher used Action Group 1 (AG1) to guard the identity of the contributors. The profiles of the participants in the control group are given in Tables 8.1 to 8.3. Table 8.1 presents the control group participants' profile in terms of age.

Table 8.1: Control group participants' profile (age).⁵

Age	Number of participants
18-25	3
26-30	4
31-35	3
Total	10

Source: Own data.

Table 8.1 shows that three participants were between the ages of 18 and 25 in the control group, four were between 26 and 30 years of age, and three were between 31 and 35. The focus was on youth driving peaceful relations that could promote social cohesion in Durban communities since young people are the largest population group in South Africa (StatsSA 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020). The domination of young people in the experiment group was strategic, as youth are more receptive to change. Young people are significant agents of change (Buire and Staeheli 2017), and transforming them can be likened to sowing the seeds of future peace (Steinberg 2013). Table 8.2 presents the control group participants' profiles in terms of gender.

Table 8.2: Control group participants' profile (gender).⁶

Gender	Number of participants
Female	4
Male	6
Total	10

Source: Own data.

The notion of volunteering to participate drove the employment of contributors, and Table 8.2 shows that the group had more male participants (six) than females (four). The action group comprised six males and four females because one of the findings was that young men are at the forefront of committing violent acts than young females (Ellickson and McGuigan 2000). The “violent nature among men is also linked to negative masculine socialization and norms which are connected to the pressure to engage in violence” (Diaz 2010: 10). Personalities

frequently discovered in the “cultural definitions of masculinity often include egotism, aggression, and dominance” (Pankhurst 2000: 11). This reveals how imperative men are needed in taking part in peacebuilding processes. While the aim was to have equivalent representation in the group, remarkably few female individuals showed a willingness to participate, proposing that efforts to concentrate females’ viewpoints in peacebuilding persist as a challenge. This obstacle is recognized in the literature as Agbajobi (2010), and Zubashvili (2013) pinpoint issues that destabilize females’ involvement in peacebuilding projects, a few of which consist of: “the prevalence of abuse against women, which generates fear and silence; women are mostly primary carers and providers in the home, making their participation difficult; and gender stereotypes and values.”

As the problem motivating this concerned study youth and xenophobic violence, the researcher also endeavoured to determine its nationalities. The data was significant because social cohesion plans must use data gathered from both South Africans and non-nationals for accurate collaboration amongst the two groups. The researcher emphasizes that though there was no nationality preference in collecting the contributors, the researcher's curiosity in knowing the members’ nationalities was also driven by the prevalent insight amongst contributors throughout baseline information collection that locals are violent. Table 8.3 summarises the control group participants' nationalities.

Table 8.3: Control group participants' nationalities 7

Nationality	Number of participants
Congolese	2
South African	5
Zimbabwean	2
Ethiopian	1
Total	10

Source: Own data.

Table 8.3 clearly shows that South Africans (five) outnumbered the other nationalities, with two Zimbabweans, two Congolese, and one Ethiopian participant. Research on xenophobic attacks in South Africa shows that most violent conflicts have grown to be centered on

immigrants and immigrants from Africa. The point is well-illustrated by Misago (2019), who sees Black locals targeting mostly Black Africans. The tensions between these two groups are heightened towards the periods of elections in South Africa. Therefore, it was imperative to have different nationalities characterized in the experimental group and the discussion and training to encourage progressive change.

The parting of the two groups permitted the seclusion of the intervention results in the experiment group. The researcher sought to ascertain the degree to which the interference accounted for the action group's result. This assisted in reducing other influences in elucidating transformations in the action group. The study was qualitative; hence, the method employed was not firmly an experiment or control technique implemented in quantitative research. Using the two distinct groups, the researcher sought to establish the intervention's efficiency to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence. To observe the intervention changes, the researcher relied on the changes reported by the participants. Thus, if the experiment group contributors testified positive changes, the result was that the intervention strategy implemented had a positive result. The transformations in the performance pointers recognized directly above turn out to be the foundation of suppositions on the conclusion.

For evaluation purposes, the researcher utilized interview guides to undertake post-intervention consultations. The guiding questions offered the researcher direction, and these were complemented by probing interrogations throughout the interviews. The interview questions could not be the same because the independent variable (the intervention) implied different experiences. Nonetheless, they were designed around common themes that allowed direct comparisons in attitudes, perceptions, and peacebuilding skills between the two groups. The direct comparisons were the basis for drawing valid conclusions of the effect of the actions taken relative to actions not taken.

The opening guide was intended for the experimentation group and requested contributors to mirror how the intervention impacted their association with other contributors. Themes were produced from the responses of the participants as part of the discoveries. The evaluation interviews were conducted after two months after the last initiative initiated by the action group. The two months enabled the researcher to observe the contributors and reflect on what was discussed during the dialogue. The experimentation group's findings were then used to

collect data from the control group, where the researcher compared their insights, opinions, and actions.

8.5 Outcomes of Assessment Results

Questions were presented to respondents in the experimental group to permit them to consider how the actions implemented influenced their insights, opinions, and behaviours to determine the degree to which they were developing the essential capability in advancing relations with non-nationals. In light of the experimental group's reactions, questions were intended to assess the ten respondents' insights, opinions, and behaviours in the control group. This was intended to observe the distinctions that could be credited to the control group's action. The action group's adverse reactions were not contrasted with the control group, even though they were accounted for since this inferred no change. The researcher was keen on noticing positive changes in the experimental group since the intervention prompted such change.

8.5.1 Reasons for joining the group

Regardless of disclosing the motivation behind the formation of the action group, the researcher needed to ask for the personal reasons for what good reason they had joined. Two revealed that they wanted to bring change to the recurring problem. The most important number of members (six) decided to join the group to look for a learning experience. Only two joined out of curiosity. The respondents who needed a learning experience expressed that they were trying to understand and share data about local communities' issues and curbing xenophobic violence by joining the group. For example,

AG1 stated:

As a youth, we have so many issues affecting us, and we are the only people who can bring a transformation to those challenges. Hence this group challenged me to try and map solutions to this recurring violence against foreign nationals in our communities.

AG5 stated:

I realized this as a great prospect to move away from being a bystander and become part of the solution seekers to bring social change in our community.

Table 8.4 presents the participants' reasons for joining the action group.

Table 8.4: Participants' reasons for joining the action group.

Reasons for joining	Number of participants
To learn	6
Curiosity	2
Not sure	0
To bring change	2
Total	10

Source: Own data.

Having individuals interested in promoting peace and social cohesion was significant for accomplishing the research targets, as the researcher would then be working mostly with individuals who were aware of the reason for which the group was formulated. As shown in Table 8.4, most of the participants joined the group to learn, while others were curious, and some joined to bring about social change. The participants' level of consciousness was additionally supported by how the researcher clarified the basis for building up the group toward the group discussions during information collection when the researcher settled on volunteers' decision to join the group. Those who joined to transform the problem made the researcher realize that it was essential to transform the xenophobic situation into a peaceful outcome by finding ways to work jointly with locals and non-nationals. Moreover, the participants explained that they sought to change the relationships that have led to the attacks of non-nationals through changing perceptions and improving communication skills addressing the root causes of the hostilities.

In communities, the government is often seen trying to find solutions to community problems. When young people join initiatives that endeavour to discover transformation, it proposes an affirmation that xenophobic violence is unacceptable and must be ended. In such a circumstance, working with individuals passionate about bringing societal change was significant as they were experts of their problems and solution bearers. Moreover, one can argue that peacebuilding and social cohesion initiatives without youth participation may contribute to the problem's recurrence. Therefore, following the discovery that most of the xenophobic violence was instigated by youth, it was fundamental to involve them and not sideline them in mapping solutions to the problem.

8.5.2 Were the objectives of the intervention met?

The researcher pursued to understand from the participants whether the objectives of the interventions were met. All the participants expressed that the interventions' objectives were met as they could have a platform to work together as locals and non-locals in exploring the xenophobic problem affecting their communities. The responses given by the participants generated several themes, which are reported and discussed in the sections that follow.

a. Enhanced Understanding of the problem

The participants mentioned that the group allowed them to speak about contemporary issues affecting young people, mostly xenophobic violence, which has led many youths to be used as pawns in executing violent acts against non-nationals. Through dialogue that was conducted, AG4 indicated that:

Sharing and talking about xenophobia, Afrophobia, and how to deal with these made me realize that we are just fighting amongst ourselves as Black people. Such needs to stop as we are only divided by misconceptions and ethnic backgrounds, but we share common values that promote peace and treat each other with dignity.

AG6 related that:

Being part of the group enlightened me that most of the violence occurring is based on perceptions and prejudice we have against each other. This has hurt the Black communities so much. I feel obligated to improve my understanding of foreign nationals and interact with them more to understand them. It is a challenge that I am giving myself because we are all Africans, and we all deserve to be respected no matter which nationality we are from.

The dialogue facilitated change amongst the participants as it offered a platform to exchange their encounters. The dialogue was imperative as Delgado (2019: 219) explains that “in post-conflict society dialogues coming from the top-down will take longer in accomplishing positive peace, rather than the dialogues that have emerged from the bottom up which may be the engine to social mobilizations and the way to capitalize on social skills in achieving justice, truth, and reconciliation.” This shows that the bottom-up approach was relevant to this study as tensions occurred in communities; therefore, the community members were given a platform to unpack their challenges and find common grounds. Before the intervention, the respondents had negative perceptions of each other, which precipitated hostile relations. Those most affected were the foreign nationals, as they experience various stereotypes from some of the locals. On the other hand, some of the locals were alarmed by the commonly-held viewpoint that foreign

nationals were criminals and that they were the causes of socio-economic ills affecting the locals. Below are some of the examples of the responses regarding individuals' feelings about the group. AG3 relates:

For me, it was my first time to be in contact and have a conversation with foreign nationals. At first, I was sceptical of the group that it was just for fun, but later I realized that there are deep-rooted issues that we sometimes push under the carpet, and they keep resurfacing. Despite our differences, I realized the issues discussed exposed the interests of our communities. With continuous interactions with foreign nationals, I felt a little sense of connecting to their stories and had similar problems. My assumptions about some of them began to disappear, and then I felt moved by the group. With every meeting and activities, we did together, I felt that something positive was happening. The group became a safe space for me to open up, and that led me to even share with my family members that as South Africans, we need a mindset shift on how we view our fellow brothers who are not citizens. Indeed change, peace, and better relations are possible if the group continues that way.

AG10 reported that:

The process that I went through allowed me to rethink why locals sometimes dislike us. The country is diverse, and most Black people bear the brunt of all these socio-economic ills. This sometimes frustrates, leading others to vent out their frustrations on foreign nationals. Despite all of this, I have developed a habit of active listening from these conversations I lacked before. I felt a growing cohesion and relationship building in the group.

AG5 explained that:

The discussions opened my eyes to how I view other people around me. The process helped me understand and see deep inside people's feelings. I now understand that it starts with me building better relations with our fellow brothers.

AG6 illustrated that:

As a group, we did a drop in the ocean, but it is significant as I was touched about how people I never talked to before I came close and initiated conversations. When the group began, I avoided talking to some South Africans, but this later changed because I realized that we are one and after one shared a goal to build broken relationships amongst each other. I feel safe amongst the group and doing these skills-sharing programs together; I feel we are on the same page.

AG9 added that:

The dialogue and the training helped me understand that even if there are general views that foreign nationals are criminals and that they are the causes of socio-economic ills facing South Africa, some were against such views that were causing divisions. Most importantly, some were ready to work with others to build peaceful communities.

The participants' responses above acknowledged the negative perceptions between South Africans and non-nationals and that these perceptions were triggers of attacks of non-nationals. The participants highlighted that the dialogue session helped them listen to each other's

opinions, and this opened a space for a shift in the perceptions and mindsets that the participants had. By asking young people whether the interventions' objectives were met helped them present their world based on their experiences and find common ground to address the presented challenge of xenophobia. The spirit of tolerance was achieved amongst the participants as they explained that they began to understand and empathize with what locals and non-nationals go through because of the existing socio-economic inequalities in South Africa. This revealed that the participants began to tolerate each other regardless of their nationalities.

The experiment group's findings were contrasted with the ones for the control group to monitor the differences. The action group participants were asked whether they have attempted to understand the locals and non-nationals they find themselves in tension with. This question was important as peacebuilding is a "proactive resolution that seeks an encounter after conflict or violence" (Mtukwa 2015: 87), "where people can focus on their relationships and share their feelings and experiences to create new perceptions and a new shared experience" (Lederach 1997: 30). Understanding each party was necessary to find a collaborative group and map out resolutions. Moreover, one can argue that approaches to avert, manage or resolve xenophobic violence in South Africa can succeed if built in the precise examination of the root causes and possible course of the attacks.

The participants' responses from the control group revealed that eight participants have not attempted to understand the people they conflict with, while one revealed that sometimes he tries to understand and the other indicated that he almost tries to understand. Overall, none of the participants indicated that they always try to understand the other parties they are in tension with. This showed that the mindset of not engaging with others was still rampant. The explanations given revealed the constant use of the hostile language of othering each other, making it hard for both locals and non-nationals to understand each other.

Also, some participants revealed a high tendency of scapegoating the non-nationals for the challenges affecting their lives and communities. By not engaging, this revealed a barrier for formulating a roadmap of resolving their interest. Moreover, such a barrier was a breeding ground of negative perceptions, othering, and misconceptions of each other. Hence, both locals and non-nationals have a responsibility to understand each other to improve their relations and

curb xenophobic violence. This was important because both groups need an opportunity to express their different interests and challenges.

Succinctly, when those with clashing opinions are given a platform and opportunities to engage, resolutions to their challenges become possible. Lederach (1997) explains that “any peacebuilding initiative must begin with narrating the past events and what happened during the conflict.” This was fundamental, as Mtukwa (2015: 89) asserts that “acknowledgment through hearing one another’s stories validates their experiences of each and is a way of moving forward.” Besides, sharing experiences helps to unearth “not only that which is already known but that which is there but not yet understood” (Booth 1994).

b. Improved Communication

The researcher had an assumption that the effective reduction of xenophobic violence in Durban cannot take place without a sufficient level of honest dialogue and communication of a reciprocal and communicating nature. This was because the terms and results of improved communication and dialogue lay the foundation for the passing of the essential aspects of problem-solving. The respondents expressed that their experience of being part of the group was beneficial as the dialogue paved the way for them to communicate. The WhatsApp group made communication easier amongst the group members. AG8 reported that:

I had some fears that communication will disappear after the dialogue, but WhatsApp made life more comfortable, and that did not happen.

In link with the above report, this study’s discoveries have revealed the significance of effective or constructive communication (sincere dialogue) and the outcomes thence, as both locals and non-nationals strived collectively to accomplish a shared objective in tackling xenophobic violence. The contact between the action group was positive as the local and non-local youth were brought together around a shared need to be met jointly. This, in turn, enabled the improvement of constructive communication for common insight, which transformed to be a productive development, whereby mutual truthfulness, recognition, and expressions of apology and friendships were cultivated between the participants.

The researcher believes that constructive communication and dialogue positively redefine relations between the conflicting parties. Through dialogue, the participants were able to have face-to-face interactions, which improved their communication. The action group studied

referred to this type of communication as comforting discussions, which enabled them to listen and learn for common understanding (rather than blaming each other). Moreover, these discussions disclosed the truth and acknowledgments of shortfalls, where most of the tensions were founded on assumptions. Through dialogue, both locals and non-locals in the action group were able to engage in restoring broken trust that did not exist before, but they managed to engage in constructive communication towards new encouraging relationships. Moreover, the evaluation process revealed that reducing xenophobic violence becomes much more promising when there is the possibility of mutual willingness from both sides to explore and unpack the root causes of the tensions using their lens.

The control group was asked whether they communicate with individuals who have wronged them in the past. Of the ten participants, one indicated that he sometimes communicates with people who have wronged him. However, the other nine participants revealed that they do not communicate with people they are in conflict with or view as a threat. Most of the responses revealed that the participants saw no need to engage with people who have wronged them as they felt that it revived the wounds they have.

The findings suggest that the tensions continue as the underlying causes remain unaddressed without communication between the conflicting parties. Moreover, some expressed anger and frustrations, which makes it hard for them to communicate with others. The researcher can argue that the lack of proper communication tends to lead to an escalation of the tensions. Hence, having proper channels of communication can help unpack any misunderstandings that exist, leading to resolution.

8.5.3 Working together to enhance tolerance

The skill transfer initiative which was conducted brought the locals and non-nationals in contact through working together. The participants emphasized that bringing the individuals from both sides of the tensions was one of the significant and leading factors contributing to the reduction of hostilities and promoted tolerance. AG7 stated:

The skills sharing done by foreign nationals helps me feel safe in the group knowing that we are working as a team and having each other's back.

AG4 advanced the opinion:

I realize that small things are critical in promoting unity. The skill transfer initiative has transformed how I view immigrants. It has created a space to learn more about each other and survive without depending on one income source.

The participants' above report reveals a shift in the mindset where the respondent highlighted that it shifted perspective on viewing the immigrants. The researcher believes that the skills sharing initiative had a positive effect as through contact, it transformed the negative perceptions that the participants had. Such a shift of attitudes amongst participants reveals that initiatives like these can break the intolerances and hostilities between the locals and non-nationals in South Africa. AG5 explained that:

Initially, I was concerned that people would start arguing and pointing at each other. However, the group turned out to be one of the best initiatives as I began to tolerate the fact that we are the same and, above all, sought to find solutions to our problems.

This was a significant positive change in the small group with whom the researcher was working, as it demonstrated the potential of skill transfer initiatives in promoting tolerance. Through contact, the participants revealed that working in unison enabled them to understand each other and not discriminate based on backgrounds and nationalities. The finding of this possibility can accelerate the development of shared respect.

The researcher also took the time to understand the control group's attitudes by asking them whether they will work collectively with their rivals in promoting peace in their communities. The findings were that three indicated that it would be a little possible while seven reported that it would be impossible. The respondents indicated that it was unfeasible to work with individuals who do not fully know their intentions and whom they did not know. Such responses showed that collective action was unrealistic where parties were not willing to work together. Such a situation hinders progress towards peacebuilding and relationship-building. The implication was that violence against foreign nationals was likely to persist.

8.5.4 In which ways will include your tactics towards conflict change because of your involvement with the action group?

The participants were asked how they would incorporate the nonviolent skills gained due to their involvement with the action group. The question sought to assess whether the participants will resort to violence or find other nonviolent alternatives to resolve their problems following the conflict resolution skills training. The outcomes displayed that of the ten members, six uncovered that the involvement was 'very significant,' and four felt that the group experience was 'significant.' The following themes were reported from the participants' responses.

a. *Pursuing Nonviolent Resolutions*

The respondents highlighted that though the conflict was inevitable and part of human life, they have purposed not to resort to any violence in tackling their challenges. Members sincerely believed that they were prepared to adopt nonviolent resolutions. This devotion acknowledged the previous events of observing the devastation caused by xenophobic violence. AG7 captured this devotion:

The past has been violent, and it seems we have not broken that cycle of violence. This is seen when we are raising our grievances, and we tend to resort to using violence as a way of settling our problems. It is so sad that we diverted them to target foreign nationals along with most of the protests we stage. With these interventions, I have learned diverse nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts I will use.

Such a response was inspiring since the frequent cause of division stemmed from violent protests, which targeted foreign nationals, especially those with spaza shops in townships. The destructive nature of such violence called for nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts, as peaceful ways can promote development, protect human rights, and promote social cohesion. AG9 cemented this point:

The meetings with the action group have enlightened me that violence is a threat to peace and that violence was incompatible with development in any given state. The skills transfer spearheaded by foreign nationals helped me understand the South African challenges that we need to consider nonviolent ways of resolving conflicts.

Such responses demonstrated the participants' willingness to see a change in communities as violence was a threat to human life and peace. The platform gave the participants a way to explore nonviolent methods of resolving conflicts, and this showed a more remarkable shift in the attitudes observed before the intervention was initiated. This can serve as an observation that violence has failed to resolve conflicts.

b. *Regarding Rivals as Allies*

The members also stated that the group involvement had trained them to deal with conflict with an optimistic view. The participants acknowledged that working collectively in addressing conflicts was essential. Most importantly, they reported that they would approach their rivals as allies in the event of any interpersonal conflicts. This portrayed a more significant shift in attitude from seeing rivals as enemies to seeing them as allies. AG1 stated:

We must move away from the 'us and them' mentality because such views divide us as Africans as we base our humanity and nationalities. Such will continue to kill us,

and we will continue to turn against each other instead of uniting and addressing our problems.

The point inferred from the reply was significant in shifting mindset as South Africa still has a considerable responsibility to unlearn using violence to address its problems. Participants also noted that violence hinders development and social cohesion in their communities. Moreover, violence begets violence, which makes it hard to break the cycle of violence. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ beliefs that exist tend to trigger separation amongst groups. Hence, the researcher believes that the action taken aided in reducing tensions amongst the members.

c. Reflecting on the Desires and Feelings of others

The respondents conveyed opinions that they would endeavour to build empathy and sincerity to comprehend their desires and feelings. For example, AG8 reflected this point when he stated:

I had no empathy for others. This intervention has taught me to unlearn and relearn to reflect on others’ needs and feelings.

Such responses were motivating in that the group members had managed to assess themselves on how they treat other people around them. An appreciation of others’ desires and feelings can lessen any existing hostilities when the other group is aware that their concerns are recognized. The answers given by the members were heartening, seeing that before the resolution, tensions amongst members were also ascribed to the collapse of acknowledging others, as individuals defended their stances without listening to the needs of others. The significance of this attitude to the tension was that it was collective.

8.6 Lessons learned from the Assessment

During the evaluation course, the members’ responses unearthed several lessons that were consistent with the study’s objectives. The researcher summarised the lessons as follows:

- Youth participating in violence have the longing to shift by taking part in focused discussions in promoting peace. This was because young people can be a cause of turmoil when they are not involved in constructive pursuits.
- Peacebuilding groups fashioned with the individuals affected by societal difficulties, for instance, xenophobic violence, are recognized by their members as drivers of change.

- Encounters through dialogue can accelerate improved awareness amongst confirmed opponents. The group created a platform for individuals to speak, listen, and exchange views, producing dedication to building interactions that collectively helped them resolve their challenges. This represents dialogue as a safe space that can transform harmful conduct into constructive personalities that drive harmony.
- Skills sharing initiatives and dialogue inculcates a sense of collective fit, allowing members to extricate from violent acts and reduce intolerance and stereotypes, improving persons' ability to lessen bias and hostility. These are the elements necessary to construct durable and nonviolent contacts.
- Dialogue and skills-sharing initiatives can open a way for conflicting parties to create a project that generates gains for members and the community in the long term. In the pursuit to promote social cohesion via dialogue, the initiative developed into the skills transfer that equipped youth to start self-sufficient projects of making toilet detergents. The initiative promoted unity and mutual co-existence outside the dialogue sessions.

The experiences learned propose that the intervention taken integrated the bond aspect to tackle harmful perceptions and attitudes that encouraged behaviours to destabilize peacebuilding. The intervention's transformative outcome also brought some crucial thoughts regarding the design used to accomplish the study's objective. Participatory action research can be useful where there is a need for resolutions to critical difficulties. The dialogue, conflict resolution skills, and skill transfer by foreign nationals uncovered that participatory action research:

- PAR has the potential to tackle precise challenges that affect members who offer voluntarily to act,
- PAR supports contributors to build structural and conflict resolution skills,
- PAR promotes communication among the researcher and the contributors confronted by the socio-economic problems and
- PAR makes information construction precisely pertinent to the demands of contributors.

8.7 Conclusion

The chapter was concerned with the short-term evaluation of data collected after the dialogue sessions, skill sharing initiatives, and conflict resolution skills training. For both initiatives, it was generally found that the initiatives opened a platform for different nationalities to meet and find ways to tackle their community challenges. Moreover, the findings pointed to the importance of contact, working together for a shared goal, and communication leading to change of harmful perceptions and, above all, the pursuit for adopting nonviolent means to resolve conflicts.

CHAPTER 9: SELF REFLECTION

9.1 Introduction

The researcher also observed how the intervention process was progressing since some scholars highlight the need for self-reflexivity as one of the crucial elements that a researcher should carry out. The research project contributed to the topic under study (Babbie 2015). A reflection of the study enabled the researcher to understand the factors driving the recurrence and hindering the curbing of xenophobic violence in South Africa.

9.2 Factors driving the recurrence of Xenophobic Violence

Using the participatory action research design, the researcher understood how the term *xenophobia* is generally understood but further examined why South African youth participate in violence labelled as xenophobic. According to Jupp (2006), an experimental method is beneficial when aspiring to obtain accurate and in-depth data on a topic, which proved to be correct, subsequently reflecting on the first two purposes of the study. PAR helped in amplifying the voices of youth within their communities. This led to identifying intervention strategies conducted by the government, civil society organizations, and relevant stakeholders to reduce xenophobic violence.

MacDonald (2012: 36) states that “action research involves an action researcher and community or organization members who are seeking to improve their situation.” This method focuses on information construction as it pursues to resolve communal difficulties unearthed by the investigation to bring social change. An intervention strategy aims to reduce xenophobia as well as to undertake a preliminary evaluation of its outcome. In this study, PAR aimed to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence by training the participants in conflict resolution skills, which proved useful to a certain extent.

9.2.1 Lack of effective Conflict Resolution Apparatuses

The researcher observed that the Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu community members lacked conflict resolution skills to constructively channel and resolve their conflicts and diffuse the pressures fundamental in any different and dynamic community. Violence has been used

continuously to resolve conflicts, as expounded in Chapters 2 and 3. This was because the justice system has shown ineffectiveness in tackling some of the problems affecting the community. Hence, groups or individuals then turn to mob justice and violence.

Looking at the xenophobic violence that broke out in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in the INK area, the lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms can be seen to be a missing link, as in most cases, government responses are reactive. In addition, when the xenophobic attacks broke out, the local authorities failed to involve the communities in the actions that heralded violence against foreign nationals. In the INK area, xenophobic violence has been fuelled by business people's frustrations over the local authorities' alleged incapability (police, Ward Councillors) to address community grievances. Some of the South African businesspeople have had to state it aloud that they have had to push the foreign-owned business shops out as a technique to bring in the interest of the Office of the Premier and the Mayor, as they rarely visit the areas to address community needs.

The above reason for drawing attention reveals that local businesspeople were not satisfied with the numerous meetings held previously, where they complained about the mushrooming of more non-national spaza shops that had been asked to stop until they were regulated. The local business people's dissatisfaction proved the local authorities' weakness or ineffectiveness in addressing their needs. There was no deeper engagement between the locals and non-national businesspeople to comprehend the source of the problems raised and deliver the type of response that could have altered the perilous misunderstandings that precipitated the foreign-owned attack shops.

Despite the government agents' incapability or reluctance to tackle their business fears, local business people, under the NORBA banner, began setting up public gatherings where violence against immigrant-owned shops was premeditated. The unfortunate part was that although the local authorities were aware of what was developing in the community against non-nationals, they never took action to prevent the effects. Such a situation showed the justice system's incompetence and the deficiency of efficient methods to resolve tensions constructively in the INK area. The researcher views it as a breeding ground for the recurrence of xenophobic violence in townships and informal settlements.

The researcher can assert that as long as problems of disadvantaged communities in Durban remain unaddressed, collective violence is based on frustrations and violence will be adopted to vent those frustrations as a means to resolve community problems. Moreover, Black Africans will continue to be blamed for these unaddressed problems. Therefore, one can conclude that the deficiency of operative conflict resolution apparatuses in all likelihood will end in xenophobic violence in Durban.

9.2.2 Growing Culture of Impunity

In the study, the researcher identified a prevalent impunity culture concerning the instigators of violence against immigrants. In many instances, non-nationals are attacked across South African communities, but not many have been sentenced. Those who have been arrested in the INK area are reported to have been released without charges. The participants did not remember any completed xenophobia-associated law court incidents, nor did they know whether the “special” courts projected by the government were initiated or not in dealing with intolerance-related crimes. The researcher observed this as a lack of interest by the justice system to take the initiators of xenophobic violence liable, perpetuating the growing culture of impunity, which motivates the continuation of xenophobic violence.

Findings in other studies likewise verify the prevalence of impunity in the Republic (Bergmann 2011). With “violence welcomed by impunity, and impunity greeted by indifference” (Monson 2011: 46), the dearth of responsibility, as per the conditions of the trial, has offered a definite possibility for continuous assaults of non-nationals in communities. Therefore, one can conclude that impunity has proven to be a supreme act of facilitation by the locals in the assaults against non-nationals.

9.2.3 Institutional Authority not having power

In the INK areas affected by intolerant brutality, the established authorities appeared to have no standardizing authority due to a lack of public trust because of poor service delivery. NORBA appeared to be having the economic potential of the spaza shops, and it governed that commercial space as its base of power. Hence, xenophobic violence was executed swiftly in the area as it provided power for the local business people to remove the non-nationals operating in the area. Sadly, this continues to occur as we have recently witnessed foreign informal traders’ removal by the uMkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans Association

(MKMVA) in Durban CBD. One can argue that most of these conflicts in Durban are driven by economics, and local informal traders continue to clamour to control informal trading space even in Durban's townships and informal settlements.

9.2.4 Woundedness

Many young people have been nurtured in a wounded context. It is necessary to understand this wound to appreciate why people are struggling with xenophobia violence in Durban. This will likewise assist with comprehension and the investment needed to identify strategies for responding to this context. To understand the participants' reports in the wounded context, the researcher devised a graph to explain better the process of the unhealed trauma that they were carrying. Figure 8.1 depicts the stages of woundedness.

Figure 9.1: Stages of Woundedness



Source: Own data

It is difficult for wounded leaders to lead social cohesion initiatives. The absence of comprehending the nature, extent, and depth of the woundedness within which xenophobic violence occurs. Wounded individuals and families breed wounded institutions, which

additionally breeds wounded communities and societies, and lastly produce wounded leaders who cannot address the violent nature of the nation. It was challenging to have an effective xenophobic violence intervention when those who should do the work are broken and depleted. Moreover, when those who should lead and guide others are broken and drained, when the institutions that are vehicles for carrying out the work are breaking and draining their resources when those who should respond are too broken and asleep to hear, how can one afford to continue neglecting woundedness in policies, programming, and practices? People need to start investing in themselves, their awakening and healing, and mend the brokenness and repair the ruptures. Investing in people is a crucial component of effective xenophobic violence interventions. If the trauma is untreated, if the wound is untransformed, then history will continue repeating itself, and every time it does, the cost rises as society is breeding another generation of angry and broken young people.

9.2.5 Governance Role in fuelling Xenophobic Violence

Governance, which refers to all formal and informal systems of control, leadership, and authority (Misago (2019), assumes a vital part in triggering xenophobic violence. Briefly, one contends that governance plays a role in creating a breeding ground for violence due to its incapability to address common service delivery issues. Such inabilities have led government officials and political leaders to scapegoat non-nationals to cause their socio-economic challenges. Masikane, Hewitt and Toendepi (2020: 9-10) adds that “xenophobia in South Africa is a result of stereotyping and scapegoating where there is a shift of aggression from the government’s failures to deliver what they promised to the people, like the equitable distribution of wealth and reduced poverty.” Furthermore, Nyamnjoh (2010: 60) expounds that xenophobia emanates from “lack of accountability whereby the politicians and policymakers fail to problematize social problems and quickly search for viable solutions.” When no accountability is in place, it becomes difficult to fully address the xenophobic problem in South Africa. Moreover, it is contended that governance assumes a primary function in the formation of xenophobic opinions. Neocosmos (2008: 2) concluded that “it is a result of past and current social and political scapegoating and the result of political ideologies and awareness, in brief, political biases” that drive the xenophobic relapses.

With shared discontent and intense disdain towards non-nationals, Misago (2019) explicates that individuals and groups tend to mobilize each other, especially in areas where there was a lack of effective governance and institutions on resolving conflicts constructively. Poor or

ineffective governance is the source of negative attitudes and intolerances of non-nationals, especially Black immigrants. Moreover, when communities lack effective conflict resolution institutions, xenophobic violence becomes inevitable in polarized communities infested by poor governance, which promotes negative attitudes.

In the INK area, xenophobic violence was driven by economic strains, and these have led various local groups, including political and spaza owners, to mobilize and attack foreign business owners in townships and informal settlements. Misago (2019) also argues that “local economic politics have given both the chances and motivators for violence against foreigners which has been prearranged and driven by local factions (formal and informal) as an endeavour to reinforce the power needed to push their political and commercial interests.” Governance assumed a function in xenophobic violence formation by being both an instrument and a motivator or an ideal result. Succinctly, local business groups like NORBA have mobilized and planned violence for commercial benefits.

9.2.6 Issues hindering tackling Xenophobic Violence

The recurrence of xenophobic violence in various communities in South Africa reveals that the root causes remain unaddressed. Furthermore, an analysis of the literature exposes that most comprehensive research has deserted the recommendations’ application. However, in working with youth from the INK area, the researcher observed the following issues leading to the recurrence of xenophobic violence in Durban and South Africa at large:

- The absence of political will: as much as one can have sound advocacy policies on immigration, without political will, xenophobic violence will continue to recur.
- There is no civic will: community members are divided over foreign nationals into various communities.
- Civil society works in silos: civil society organizations are more focused on reporting, bringing more funding to their organizations instead of tackling xenophobic violence's root causes.
- The problem of silo-thinking: this problem overlooks the interconnectedness of occurrences of xenophobia. A comprehension of the factors precipitating violence and the intersectionality of these are fundamental and pertinent as a roadmap to designing effective intervention strategies.

- The relapse of xenophobic violence in South Africa will be solved at the grassroots level and not in boardrooms. Therefore, interventions must ensure that young people's voices form the part as they have been the influential group in executing violent acts against non-citizens.
- Unaddressed collective discontentedness emanating from poor service delivery and poor governance, if this persists, non-nationals will continue to be blamed for locals' socio-economic ills and this discontentedness.
- The role of the government: as the government officials and political leaders persist in blaming foreign nationals for poor service delivery, xenophobic violence will recur.
- Tackling xenophobic violence with a human-rights-based approach is an issue.
- There is a lack of platforms or spaces for locals and immigrants to meet: there is a need to create spaces where people can integrate. Few attempts have been crafted to tackle xenophobic violence's underlying causes, and most of these attempts have been reactive and excluded young people.
- Youth exclusion: in contemporary South Africa, youth (especially male youth) have been part of the instigators of xenophobic attacks against immigrants. Therefore, young people must not be left behind any planned intervention as they become a breeding ground for violence's recurrence.
- The growing culture of impunity makes it normal for any individuals or groups to attack and prejudice non-nationals. Such violates the immigrants' rights, the constitutional and international obligations signed by the South African government to adhere to and to pursue in protecting non-nationals.
- There is a lack of policies or programs to counter xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The lack of policies enables the attacks to continue and leaves immigrants vulnerable.

9.3 Conclusion

The section reflected on the study's findings focusing on the factors driving the occurrences of attacks of mostly Black Africans in Durban and South Africa. Moreover, the chapter focused on the elements that have hindered the curbing of xenophobic violence. Without addressing the communities' inequalities, locals will continue to blame the foreign nationals for their sufferings. Also, young male people must be allowed to participate in social cohesion and peacebuilding decision-making processes. In some instances, youth are used as pawns to execute violent acts to thwart their participation in peacebuilding processes.

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Introduction

This research project aimed to address the knowledge gap on youth participation in xenophobia and initiatives that can be adopted to reduce their participation. Therefore, this chapter provides the conclusion of the findings and the recommendations. The section is prearranged as follows: a restatement of the research aims and objectives, a summary of the methodology, theoretical framework, findings, research methodology, limitations of the study, implications of the findings, contribution to knowledge, and areas of further research. The study responds to the knowledge gap on why Black young men take part in mostly Black African nationals' attacks.

10.2 Research Aims

As stated in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1, the research aims to engage youth in exploring and understanding why they participate in xenophobia-related violence and design and implement strategies to reduce xenophobic violence.

10.3 Research Objectives

As specified in Section 1.7 of Chapter 1, the research objectives were:

4. To identify how the term *xenophobia* is generally understood.
5. To examine the reasons motivating the South African youth to participate in violence labelled as *xenophobic*.
6. To design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce xenophobia and embark on a preliminary evaluation of its outcome.

This investigation planned to add to scholarly discourse and new information on the issue. Specifically, the study aimed to discover that xenophobia, which has been generally understood by xenophobia, examines the factors driving the recurrence of xenophobic sentiments within South Africa and explores the factors driving youth to participate in this form of and design and implement an intervention strategy to reduce xenophobic violence.

Prior studies contend that in South Africa, xenophobia has been challenging to attest to because what media term xenophobic violence has only affected a particular group of individuals (Nyamnjoh 2006; Matsinhe 2011; Zvomuya 2013; Mamabolo 2015; Sebola 2017). As such, the study's findings helped the researcher and the affected communities devise and execute an intervention plan to reduce youth participation in violence, as they were the experts of their problems.

The impetus to conduct this investigation was grounded on the gaps unearthed in reducing xenophobia in South Africa. While various recommendations have been made, and numerous initiatives have been executed, there has been a continued recurrence of xenophobic violence in South Africa. There are broken ties amongst people and a lack of tolerance, respect, unity, and love. All stems from perceptions, the othering of each other, and the high rate of violence in communities as a way of resolving conflicts. The researcher argued in Chapter 1 that there was a gap in having research that specifically explores the role of youth in the attacks of foreign nationals in South Africa. This study, therefore, sought to cover that gap and contribute to knowledge.

With this in mind, the research set out to provide comprehensive empirically-based and theoretically informed factors leading to youth participation in xenophobic violence. Using a qualitative, exploratory, case study, participatory action research design, and scapegoating theoretical framework, the study identified and analysed the key factors leading young people to partake in xenophobic violence. The study situates its conclusions within and speaks to broader contemporary debates in xenophobic violence, collective violence, and peacebuilding research. The study reveals that current empirical and theoretical explanatory models on xenophobia and xenophobic violence are inadequate without entirely focusing on the major groups like youth, who are at the forefront of executing these violent acts.

To meet the study's first objective, the researcher explored how xenophobia and xenophobic violence are understood to have a full understanding of the concepts. The study then moved to explore the underlying factors and triggers of xenophobic violence. With underlying causes established, the study paid particular attention to youth's often-missed role and their position within these attacks. The study adopted a participatory action research design to work with

young people in devising intervention initiatives to reduce youth participation in the attacks through these findings.

The solution to reducing youth participation in foreign national attacks in South Africa lies with the local young people. Hence, government and civil society programs must continuously work with young people through dialogue, training, and skills sharing initiatives as some of the avenues to curb xenophobic violence. It was vital to effectively devise and execute peacebuilding programs with young people, as any social cohesion initiative without young people at the forefront would be futile, as young people are both perpetrators and victims of xenophobic violence. Moreover, peacebuilding strategies must include conflict and stakeholder mapping, building trust, and collaborations with several key stakeholders in the community.

The study worked with young people who took a leading role in exploring why young people participate in violence labelled as xenophobic. Most of the ideas raised stemmed from structural conflicts that have been manifested through political-related violence and other socio-economic tensions in communities. To address this, the researcher engaged members of various government departments and civil society organizations, and young people living in the INK area, for discussions of baseline data (detailed in Chapters 5 and 6). The research team discussed a possible intervention plan to be used to strengthen community peacebuilding approaches.

One of the weaknesses was that communities lacked practical conflict resolution skills. It was noticed that they raised their grievances, and in most cases, these turned out to be violent. On the other hand, government and civil society organizations' initiatives have been reactive when addressing xenophobic issues. Also, initiatives to address xenophobic violence have not been inclusive enough of the local needs and priorities. To this end, their intervention strategies have been faulty, as xenophobic violence continues to recur. The repetition of xenophobic violence presents a threat to social cohesion and peacebuilding in South Africa.

Coupled with the intolerance of foreign nationals are negative perceptions that foreign nationals have been the leading cause of socio-economic ills affecting South Africa. From the participants' inputs, the researcher trained young people in developing conflict resolution skills and had a dialogue on how young people understood the xenophobia phenomenon and invited a skilled migrant to educate young people on making toilet detergents. This initiative aimed to

increase trust and build broken relations between locals and foreign nationals. Most importantly, it was indirectly encouraging foreign nationals to give back to the host country to break the misconceptions that they are not contributing to national development.

10.4 Theoretical Framework

The thesis adopted scapegoating as a theoretical framework. The researcher discovered some theories' shortfalls in understanding the factors precipitating the recurrence of xenophobic violence and youth's role in this type of violence. The theory mentioned above was adopted because of the complexity and interconnectedness of the factors leading to xenophobic violence in South Africa. The primary basis of the cause was based on blaming mostly Black African nationals for the social ills affecting the local Black communities. The theory helped the researcher to understand the causes in a broader perspective and that there was no one size fits all intervention in understanding and addressing xenophobic violence.

10.5 Summary of Research Methods

The study was exploratory, a case study, and participatory action research. The researcher adopted a qualitative approach and the design mentioned above to ensure that the researcher explores the problem and collaborates with local youth in targeted areas to devise strategies that addressed the problem. This was important as participatory action research allowed the researcher to collaborate with the participants as co-researchers. The design enabled the participants to play an active role in finding resolutions to their challenges as they were the experts of their problems. The researcher used participatory action research to have the young people's full involvement in mapping their solutions to their community challenges. This enabled the researcher to ensure that young people take ownership of the project as they were the experts of their problems.

The study was qualitative, and it utilized in-depth interviews and focus group discussions on gathering the experiences of young people and understanding why youth were seen taking part in violence labelled as xenophobic. Moreover, it helped the researcher to obtain think descriptions of their views on the problem addressed in this study. Also, the researcher utilized nonprobability techniques, which included purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling. The researcher also explained how research ethics were followed in collecting data.

10.6 Summary of the Findings

The factors driving the recurrence of xenophobic violence are complex and interconnected. Due to the intersectionality of the factors leading young Black men to participate in violence considered as xenophobic, it was an excellent initiative to work with them in this project to understand their experiences. One of the significant issues identified was that local business people used idle and vulnerable young people to execute violence against foreign-owned businesses in the INK area. The researcher found that in Chapter 6.3.4 that there are localized economic politics taking place in Durban. The researcher provided ample evidence that the attacks were organized and led by local business people attempting to consolidate their power to run spaza shops in the townships and informal settlements. These local business people use young people as pawns to execute the attacks against foreign-owned spaza shops to consolidate their power. The local businesspeople are instead the ones mobilizing vulnerable young people to attack foreign nationals. Therefore, the INK area's xenophobic violence was fuelled by local business people who compete with the foreign-owned shops.

One of the crucial conclusions was a lack of contact between locals and non-nationals, which paves the way for continuous assumptions and harmful attitudes. This was a significant concern as young people raised several concerns about the lack of platforms for both citizens and foreign nationals to meet to share experiences and learn from each other. The contact of groups hostile to each other was observed as one of the interventions that must be promoted by doing activities and having dialogues to understand each other as Africans. With this, the study sought to open such platforms through participatory action research and amplify young people's voices in addressing xenophobic violence in Durban.

The researcher discovered that the position of Black young men also triggered their participation in xenophobic violence. Hence, understanding young people's role in related xenophobic violence needed to be explored with the struggles they go through for them to secure a living. The findings revealed an ongoing struggle over scarce resources and opportunities due to the high unemployment rate, inequalities, and other socio-economic factors. These inequalities have led the South Africans to blame non-nationals as the cause. Moreover, politicians have also played a crucial role in reinforcing these unfounded allegations against Black Africans and sowing the seed of hate, intolerance, and prejudice.

Respondents elucidated that xenophobia was the foundation and a breeding ground of xenophobic violence, as it covered all forms of intolerant arrogances towards foreign nationals regardless of their origin or nationality. From the respondents, one can posit that xenophobia has been a motive and a profoundly multifaceted issue, and the connection between the presence of immigrants' populations and xenophobic sentiments remains unresolved. Moreover, xenophobic violence's recurrence is continuously seen in relationships with the government, which continues not to admit xenophobia. With this, opportunists are continuing to exploit foreign nationals. On the other hand, xenophobia was also highlighted as thriving within an ingroup versus outgroup dichotomy.

The reasons leading young people to participate in xenophobic violence were outlined. It was observed that the causes leading young people to participate in xenophobic violence were deeply entrenched in the growing culture of violence in communities. Moreover, the community's socio-economic grievances cannot be described in isolation when speaking of youth and violence without addressing the impact of the apartheid system on most Black people. Most of the responses of young people were interconnected to the past violence that was adopted to resolve conflicts. Moreover, young people highlighted that one could not talk of xenophobic violence without mentioning the role of governance and political leaders fuelling xenophobic tendencies and using young people as pawns to execute their political agendas. Such has led foreign nationals to be scapegoated for the socio-economic ills affecting South Africa.

10.7 Limitations of the Study

Several challenges arose; firstly, it was a challenge for the researcher to attend some of the meetings with the participants as the environment was volatile, and most of the researcher's data collection took place during the outbreaks of xenophobic violence in various areas in Durban. Hence, the researcher had to shift some meetings and FGDs to protect the participants. The researcher misguidedly thought it would be relatively easy to coordinate sessions with key informants from various NGOs working with young people in the INK area. Unfortunately, it proved to be challenging to set up meetings with them as they continued postponing, and the researcher had to wait for months to finally meet up with them. Another challenge involved finding foreign nationals to participate as some were reluctant to disclose their identities as non-South Africans to a broader audience. The researcher believes that this revealed the more

comprehensive background experience of daily fears in KwaZulu-Natal's very conservative province.

It is significant to note that this research focused only on the INK area and the specific wards 38, 40, 43, and 108. Therefore, the researcher excluded specific neighbourhoods within the INK area because of the vast communities. Besides predisposition and reactivity issues, another significant impediment of this investigation was that the exploration test was confined. Accordingly, a review of this exploration is the restricted chance of generalizing the investigation to different groups and programs. The study relied on connections of trust and support to alleviate fault and ensure validity in the investigation. Nonetheless, this methodology might be inclined to embellish and distort and depend vigorously on the researcher's understanding. With such little numbers, this study's discoveries do not represent the INK area's ordinary members.

One of the investigation's critical limitations was bias regarding the researcher's contribution to Africa Unite as a Human Rights Peer Educator in 2017. As such, some participants had a challenge adapting to the researcher taking on an interviewer's role, a phenomenon described by Maxwell (2008) as 'participant reactivity.' As some of the respondents knew the researcher, their reactions could have been affected by this. In some instances, the participants tried excessively to collaborate with the researcher by presenting the answers that they supposed that the investigator was pursuing. However, the researcher managed to convince the participants that without honesty, the problem at hand recurs. The researcher continually reminded the participants that their responses should not be made to please the researcher and help tackle their challenges as a community.

As far as participatory action research is concerned, the researcher recognizes that only one cycle development of ten months informed this research's outcomes. It would have been advantageous to embark on more than one cycle to prove the participatory action research's recurring nature in improving practices. However, the motives for selecting this design have been expounded in detail in Chapter 5.

10.8 Implications of the Findings

Key results arose from the research that can influence and devise local-centered actions to foster social cohesion and peacebuilding. This investigation strengthens the extensively admitted fact that the effect of xenophobic violence is still flourishing in South Africa. The adoption of dialogue, conflict resolution skills training, and the action group's subsequent action to recognize immigrants with entrepreneurial skills to share their skills with young people to promote relationships, possibly the exact initiative that can promote tolerance and social cohesion for both locals and foreign nationals.

Skill sharing initiatives promote contact between locals and non-locals as this has been recognized as one of the actions that must be promoted. Contact enables clear misunderstandings or negative perceptions that individuals or groups or individuals have against each other. Hence, the findings reveal that when young local and non-local people are given spaces to meet, there was a possibility of reducing their participation in xenophobic-related violence.

10.9 Contribution to Knowledge

The contribution of this study to knowledge emanates from the scapegoating theory of prejudice to demonstrate the nature and extent to which foreigners experience xenophobic violence. Understanding the attacks of non-nationals seen from the scapegoat lens, which is a triggering factor leading to youth participation in xenophobic violence. Outcomes of the research contribute to academic knowledge through their theoretical implication to peacebuilding. The finding shows the relationship between skill transfer initiatives, dialogue, and conflict resolution skills training. Most youths are unemployed, which makes them vulnerable to being used as pawns in executing the interests of local business owners against foreign-owned businesses. Therefore, the skill transfer initiative equipped youth to start income-generating activities in making toilet detergents. Through this initiative, local youth were able to engage with foreign nationals who were offering these skills and, in turn, acquired not only skills but also developed relationships with them.

The findings revealed that most of the tensions between South African and Black Africans in Durban are driven by economic politics. Local business owners' desire to control and own spaza shops fuels xenophobic violence. Hence, entrepreneurial initiatives like the skill transfer

undertaken in this study are some of the initiatives that can be explored and adopted by the South African government to promote business skills that will help to address unemployment challenges faced by many youths. Through these initiatives, the findings show positive outcomes of contact among the participants to promote tolerance and cohesion. Furthermore, the contribution to this study is by its participatory action research involving youth to solve their problem of xenophobic violence and promoting social cohesion; hence using the local ownership approach.

10.10 Areas of Further Research

The investigation's qualitative idea implied that the outcomes could not be summed up to different young people in South Africa. As it may, the contentions progressed in this investigation can be advanced in future undertakings at peacebuilding concerning two areas, as detailed below.

- Outcomes of the study show that dialogues have a powerful force in promoting peace. The intervention can be implemented with other groups of young people to capture their experiences using dialogues and then evaluate their situations.
- Skills transfer initiatives are essential for equipping young people with skills such that they can, in turn, use these to start income-generating activities. Therefore, if foreign nationals continuously offer such initiatives, they can promote tolerance among the citizens and foreign nationals. Moreover, they enable foreign nationals to give back to the host communities, thereby curbing the perceptions that foreign nationals do not contribute to the locals and the local economy. These initiatives change immigrants' negative attitudes and perceptions and offer young people skills to start income-generating activities. This is essential to look at the high unemployment rate amongst young people in South Africa.

Further exploration ought to be led to see how Black African nationals survive after being victims of violent attacks. This will help the public authority and various partners to meet up and devise policies that ought to stop expected aggressors from carrying out similar attacks against Black African nationals living in South Africa. More research was also needed in exploring indigenous ways of resolving hostilities that lead to xenophobic violence in South Africa. This was important as South Africa was a unique case with different experiences on the

phenomenon. Hence, it was a time that she starts tapping into locally brewed solutions to curb xenophobic violence.

10.11 Recommendations

South African leadership can learn various lessons from the xenophobic attacks, which may address the complex and underlying challenges. The researcher has suggested the following measures which can assist in curbing xenophobic violence and other related challenges:

- Socio-economic challenges like poverty, poor service delivery, the high unemployment rate amongst youth need to be addressed urgently holistically.
- Government and civil society organizations need to invest and continue implementing awareness programs through community dialogues, human rights education, campaigns on the xenophobic phenomenon, social cohesion, and other social problem.
- There is a need to invest in entrepreneurial initiatives that will also bring non-nationals to equip the locals to not depend more on the government but can be self-sufficient through income-generating projects. Through this, the locals can then actively participate and contribute economically.
- The researcher suggests that there is a need to educate local people about Africa through cultural diversity programs. There is ample evidence that South Africans have little knowledge of other African countries. Hence, Africa's education and history must be prioritized to foster understanding and tackle harmful perceptions and change the migration narrative.
- South African leadership and civil society must move away from implementing reactive responses to xenophobic violence but must find long-lasting ongoing responses. It is vital to have ongoing projects that will continue to build up and not once-off initiatives as the problem cannot be resolved by one initiative.
- The study also recommends that people be educated on the intersection between youth, race, urban informality, and xenophobic violence as these are deeply entrenched in South African society. This was because most of these attacks were conducted mainly by Black young men towards Black Africans.
- There was also a need for political will amongst South African leaders and recommended that political leaders stop uttering xenophobic and discriminatory

remarks about immigrants, which triggers xenophobic violence. Relevant authorities must counter intolerance, stereotypes, prejudice and cultivate tolerance and social cohesion in South Africa.

- It is proposed that the South African administration fulfil its obligation to protect refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants. The government must hold accountable the instigators of xenophobic attacks and tackle the growing culture of impunity.
- Youth must be at the centre of intervention strategies to curb xenophobic violence, as they are both victims and perpetrators of violence in South Africa. This was because young people are an essential human reserve in leading societal change and contribute substantially to national development and peacebuilding. Continuous dialogues and platforms must be put in place to build community relationships, trust, and reciprocity. The programs will help in amplifying the voices of the youth and communities at large, as this came because of realizing that the role of youth in driving social change, cohesion and peacebuilding initiatives has not been fully upscaled, and the young people have remained mostly at the margin of socio-economic processes and development structures, with little acknowledgment as social stakeholders. The study aimed to ensure that both locals and foreign nationals continue to meet and have spaces to do activities together to enhance social cohesion. Youth are innovative, having and employing diverse methods of power and articulating themselves through various peacebuilding initiatives. The exclusion of young people in most social cohesion initiatives has triggered many to question the authenticity of government efforts towards mainstreaming youth both as targets and associates to achieve national developmental goals and social cohesion. If South Africa must harness its youth's potential, it must take a second look at its inclusion of youth in development, with the opinion of repositioning young people at the centre of the more extensive development and social cohesion agenda.

10.12 Conclusion

In concluding the study, it is imperative to mention that the action group members supported the action as a constructive mechanism for fostering non-violent interactions. Participants' reactions present how equipping young people with conflict resolution skills and skill initiatives to promote social cohesion needs to be conceptualized through participatory,

collaborative, and acceptable interventions to the exact local contexts. In such actions, relationship-building dialogues, followed by symbolic gestures of building tolerance and equipping young people, are valuable in transforming contacts. This is discovered to be a feasible substitute for fostering peace in the dearth of efficient government-centered reactions to xenophobic violence. The study's findings reveal that the study's objectives were fulfilled as the researcher and the co-researchers were able to unpack how xenophobia was understood as this was addressed during the dialogues and the interventions of skills transfer and conflict resolution skills training helped in reducing youth participation in attacks. The interventions shifted the perceptions about migrations and immigrants in general, revealing that the study achieved its objectives. However, much needs to continue to involve youth in peacebuilding decision-making processes and to tackle the xenophobic phenomenon.

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Appendix 1: Letter of Information

Faculty of Management Sciences
Department of Public Management & Economics

Date:

Dear participant

Thank you for taking an interest in my research. My name is Cresencia Nyathi. I am currently registered for Doctoral Studies in Peacebuilding at the Durban University of Technology. I wish to provide information on my research study to have a clear understanding of what it is all about. The title of my research is **“Reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence: a case study of Durban.”** There has been a recurrence of xenophobic sentiments within various communities in Durban, which have threatened many lives. With this recurrence, youth have played a role, and this research project seeks to unpack what is hidden behind youth participation in xenophobic violence. With the finding, the research project aims to work with youth in designing and implementing intervention strategies that will help reduce youth resorting to violence and adopt constructive ways of resolving problems. With the implementation of the intervention strategy, the participants with the researcher will work together in evaluating the outcome of the intervention to promote social cohesion.

If you choose to be part of the study, you will:

1. Be required to be personally interviewed
2. You may be part of the focus group discussions, with each group comprising 6 to 8 participants to further discuss the issues raised in the interviews.
3. You may be part of the action group comprising 8 volunteer participants who will design, implement and evaluate the conflict resolution skills and human rights training.

Each meeting will be held for only an hour. You will not provide your name during the interviews, and I will not use your name when reporting on the focus group discussions. I will only see your answers. However, if you participate in the action team to develop and implement the intervention, you will be known to everyone. The researcher will publish the findings for academic purposes, and the participants will be equipped with conflict resolution skills and on human rights issues to promote social cohesion.

The participant may be withdrawn for non-compliance, and if the participant is sick, he or she may choose to withdraw from the study. Your participation is voluntary, and one can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative outcomes should you choose to pull out from the study. You will not be paid for taking part in the study, and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study.

You will not provide your name during the interviews, and I will not use your name when reporting on the focus group discussions. I will only see your answers. However, if you participate in the action team to develop and implement the conflict resolution skills program, then you will be known to everyone.

Should you have any problems or queries, please contact me, my supervisor, or the Institutional Research Ethics administrator. Complaints can be reported to the DVC: TIP, Prof F. Otieno on 031 373 2382 or dvctip@dut.ac.za.

Yours faithfully

Cresencia Nyathi

Email: cresencia.nyathi@gmail.com

Contact number: +27 74 408 1621

Dr. Sylvia Kaye

Supervisor

Email: sylviaK@dut.ac.za

Contact number: 031 373 6860

Appendix 2: Consent to Participate in the Study



Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, _____ (name of researcher), about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: _____,
- I have also received, read, and understood the above-written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the study results, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials, and diagnosis, will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- Given the research requirements, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a researcher's computerized system.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during this research that may relate to my participation will be made available.

Full Name of Participant

Date

Time

Signature / Right

Thumbprint

I, _____ (name of the researcher) herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct, and risks of the above study.

Full Name of Researcher

Date

Signature

Full Name of Witness (If applicable) Date

Signature

Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable) Date

Signature

Appendix 3: Consent for Audio Recording



I _____ (full names of participant), in addition to the above, I hereby agree to the audio recording of the focus group discussion for the purposes of data capture. I understand that no personally identifying information or recording concerning me will be released in any form. I understand that these recordings will be kept securely in a locked environment and destroyed after five years or erased once data capture and analysis are complete.

Signature of participant

Date

Appendix 4: Letter to Gatekeepers



Re: Permission to Undertake Research

Faculty of Management Sciences
Department of Public Management & Economics

Date:

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Cresencia Nyathi, and I am currently registered for Doctoral Studies in Peacebuilding at the Durban University of Technology. I wish to provide information on my research study to have a clear understanding of what it is all about. The title of my research is *“Reducing youth participation in xenophobic violence: a case study of Durban.”* There has been a recurrence of xenophobic sentiments within various communities in Durban, which have threatened many lives. With this recurrence, youth have played a role, and this research project seeks to unpack what is hidden behind youth participation in xenophobic violence. With the finding, the research project aims to work with youth in designing and implementing intervention strategies that will help reduce youth resorting to violence and adopt constructive ways of resolving problems. With the implementation of the intervention strategy, the participants with the researcher will work together in evaluating the outcome of the intervention to promote social cohesion.

The participants will be given a letter of information regarding the study and will be made to sign consent forms. The participants will be informed that participation is voluntary, and they can withdraw from the study at any time. Also, confidentiality will be maintained as their names will not be used in the study.

Your permission to undertake the research would be greatly appreciated. Should you wish to discuss the study further, please feel free to contact my supervisor or me.

Yours faithfully

Cresencia Nyathi

Email: cresencia.nyathi@gmail.com

Contact: +27 74 408 1621

Dr. Sylvia Kaye

Supervisor

Email: sylviaK@dut.ac.za

Contact number: 031 373 6860

Appendix 5: Gatekeeper's Response Letter from Africa Unite

Africa Unite KwaZulu Natal
3rd Floor Dennis Hurley
2 Cathedral Road
Durban
4001
Email: info@africaunite.co.za
Call: 081 430 6067



To whom it may concern.

With this letter we hereby acknowledge receipt of the letter concerning Cresencia Nyathi's interest to conduct research with Africa Unite Peer Educators.

We highly appreciate her interest in working with Youth on the subject of Xenophobia as this has proved a tough issue and the research thereof will prove valuable to Africa Unite's work

I as the Youth Co-ordinator in KwaZulu Natal has assessed Cresencia's educational background as well as her involvement in youth work and is confident of about having Cresencia conduct with research with our Peer Educators.

The Africa Unite KZN Office is ready to receive her to begin the work.

Kind regards,

Kanyisa Boozi

YOUTH CO-ORDINATOR (KZN)

Appendix 6: Gatekeeper's Response Letter from Lindelani Ward

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LINDELANI YF
177-507 NPO

Fax :0866065341

Contact :0620068767

Email :lindelaniyf@gmail.com

Contact :0721814009

Enquires :MB.Mahlaba

Website :www.lindelaniyf.wix.com

Address: A 1 Mdubu road
Ntuzuma 4359
Durban

Nature of letter: **Confirmation**
Attention to: To whom it may concern
Organization Name: **Lindelani Youth Forum**

Lindelani Youth Forum LYF (177-507 NPO) is an organization recognized as a youth organization, it is a team of young, enthusiastic, creative and dynamic professionals with a stream of innovative ideas based in Lindelani.

this letter serve to inform you that the LYF has allow Ms Cresencia Nyathi to do her researching on youth and xenophobia within Lindelani in Ward 38 and Lindelani Youth Forum, to unpack the causes of youth participation in xenophobic violence and what measures have been conducted or implemented to reduce such.

The organisation hope that the research project will go on to focus on the potential of youth in peace building, promoting social cohesion through designing, implementing and evaluating an intervention strategy that will reduce xenophobic violence

THANK YOU

Endorsement signatures:

LYF Chairperson
M.B Mahlaba

LYF Secretary
H.L Vilakazi

Appendix 7: Interview and Focus Group Discussion Guide



DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
INYUVESI YASETHEKWINI YEZOBUCHWEPHESHE

Opening question

- a) What comes to your mind whenever you hear the word “xenophobia?”

Xenophobia

- a) In your understanding or experience, what do you think are the causes of xenophobia in Durban? Let us break them into socio-economic and political.
- b) Looking at what you have seen, heard, or witnessed, the violence unleashed on immigrants can be called xenophobia?

Target groups

- a) Who are the most affected by xenophobia in Durban, and why?

Xenophobic violence

- b) Why has the phenomenon of xenophobia turned to be violent? Explain further
- c) Which group usually carries these violent acts?
- d) Are xenophobic outbreaks attributed to South African citizens' frustrations against the democratic government for the slow pace of transformation since 1994? Explain your response
- e) xenophobic outbreaks are mainly attributed to South African citizens' frustrations against the democratic government for the slow pace of transformation since 1994.
- f) What is your take on this; is the outbreak of xenophobic violence and attacks in South Africa strongly connected to its history, which is characterized by violence and many societal ills?

Appetizer

- a) Do you think people know what xenophobia is? Explain your response
- b) What is feeding xenophobia in your own opinion looking at what is happening within Durban?
- c) Why are other areas affected by xenophobic violence and others not?

Interventions

- a) What intervention strategies have you seen, heard implemented by different community stakeholders to stop the recurrence of xenophobic violence?
- b) Where are these interventions bringing any change? explain further

Youth intervention

- a) What can we do as a youth to reduce youth participation in xenophobic violence?

Closing question

Do you think xenophobic attitudes or sentiments are likely to disappear soon? Give reasons for your answer.