



**REINTEGRATING EX-COMBATANTS: AN ACTION
RESEARCH PROJECT IN A
RWANDAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE**

**A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management Sciences: Public Management, specialising in
Peacebuilding**

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Declaration

I, Jean Bosco Nsengiyumva Binenwa declare that:

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- ii) This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
- iii) This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
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Abstract

Post-conflict countries have a range of needs of interventions in the reconstruction efforts. These efforts require immediate, medium and long term interventions. DDR process require the immediate restoration of security which requires demobilization in the both the regular army and armed groups. Demobilized combatants need to be economically and socially re-integrated in their local communities. Therefore governments through demobilization commissions or programmes ensure that ex-combatant is re-integrated as matter of governments' responsibility. In the specific case of this research, former members of armed groups from DRC and former RDF soldiers all members of an Agricultural cooperative based in Jabana (Kigali City) have been participants to this research which is by nature an action research project aiming most importantly on participation outputs oriented to learning.

Before this project, economic, political, social and psychological dimensions among the ex-combatants were frustrating. However, after this project, the following were discovered: Economically, the approaches that have been used allowed ex-combatants to learn basic and necessary skills of creative entrepreneurship while working in corporate setting. Socially, this research discovered that the nature of research requires working in group settings in addition to personal and collective participation toward the attainment of the project's objectives. Working in group settings is the social cohesion that originates from sharing common goals, interests, successes and failures if any. In addition, group members became best friends among themselves and relied on each other in time of need. At psychological level, ex-combatants have gained self-confidence, self-trust, and removal of past negative clichés that they used to hold against each other. Finally, in the implementation of this research, aspects of peace-building, together with unity and reconciliation and peace-building in its broad term has been witnessed from its outset to the concluding phase of the research. Recommendations were devised; some are formulated towards ex-combatants at individual level and others for RDRP.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank and appreciate the different people and institutions that, in one way or another, motivated and assisted me in the completion of this dissertation. I am primarily very grateful to God the Almighty who created me and provided me with the strength and the occasion to engage in doctoral education. I am convinced that without this support my studies could not have been completed.

My simple expression cannot fully explain the gratitude that I would like to express to my supervisor, Professor Geoff Harris of the aforementioned university. His constant intellectual co-operation and friendship throughout this research needs more than many thanks. I thank him from the bottom of my heart for so many helpful corrections and pieces of advice that I acquired from him. In fact, if he were not supportive, it would not be possible for me to write and complete it. Dear Professor Geoff Harris, thank you for your understanding and kindness.

I am thankful to the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) that allowed me to conduct this research in the sector of Jabana in a safe way. I am also very indebted to the Jabana ex-combatants who accepted to participate to this research. Their willingness to spend their time, despite their many occupations, during the different lengthy workshops and interviews and to share their personal opinions and experience about how to improve their social and economic integration via Jabana cooperative were very important. Without their input, this thesis would not have been completed.

Last but not least, I am thankful to my dear wife Susurutsa Anne, our daughters Bana Sun Sarah, Ineza Nice and the recent splendid God's gift Beza Santa, our sons Tunga Eddy and Shima Yvan, my friend Niyongira Eustache for his valuable support in the achievement of this thesis, my brothers and sisters for their loving and encouraging ways through which they have supported me when I used to be far away from them in South Africa attending seminars and courses.

You are all greatly thanked here.

Binenwa N. Jean-Bosco

Dedication

I humbly dedicate this research to my Beloved Family; that is my dear wife Susurutsa Anne, our tender daughters and our lovely sons, specifically Beza Santa, Bana Sarah Sun, Ineza Nice, Tunga Eddy Yadoux and Shima Yvan.

Equally, I devote this effort to my late father Binenwa Donath and my mother Mukandutiye Alver who gave me the very first courage and chance to attend school and so discover the scientific world.

Finally, this research is dedicated to all the Rwandan ex-combatants who have been demobilised, particularly those of Jabana. Their social and economic integration is a key to national development.

With gratitude, respect and love

Jean Bosco N. Binenwa

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List of Acronyms

ADB	African Development Bank
AGLR	African Great Lakes Region
ALIR	Armée de Libération du Rwanda/Army for Libération of Rwanda
APPMs	Armed Political Parties and Movements
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
BNDFs	Burundian National Defence Forces
CACD	Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs/Economic Community of the African Great Lakes Region
CNDP	Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple/National Congress for the Defence of the People
CROS	Centres for References and Opportunities
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration
DDRRRR	Disarmament Demobilization Repatriation Resettlement Re-insertion Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSAC	District Social Affairs Coordinators
EWSA	Electricity, Water and Sanitation Authority
FAB	Forces Armees Burundaises
FAR	Forces Armees Rwandaises / Rwanda Armed Forces
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo / DRC Armed Forces
FDLR	Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda/Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FOCA	Force combattant Abachunguzi/ Abachunguzi Combatant Force
GGLR	Greater Great Lakes Region

Ibid	Ibidem
ICA	International Cooperative Agency
Id	Idem
ILO	International Labour Organisation
MDR	Movement Démocratique Républicain / Democratic Republican Movement
MDRTSP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Transitional Support Program
MIDIMAR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Repatriation of Refugees
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo/United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for the Development
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PARECO	Patriotic Alliance for the Reconstruction of Congo
PDC	Centrist Democratic Party
PDI	Islamic Democratic Party
PDR	Party for Democratic Renewal
PL	Liberal Party
PPC	Party for Progress and Concord
PSD	Social Democratic Party
PSI	Socialist Party-Imberakuri
PSP	Solidarity and Prosperity Party
PSR	Rwandan Socialist Party
R	(grand) R
R	(small) r
RADER	Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais
RCA	Rwanda Cooperative Agency
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
RDF	Rwanda Defence Force
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army

RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RUD-URUNANA	Urunana rw'Abaharanira Ubumwe na Demokarasi/Alliance of Activists for Democracy
UDPR	Democratic Popular Union of Rwanda
UNAR	Union Nationale Rwandaise / Rwandese National Union
UN-DPKO	United Nations-Department of Peacekeeping Operations
VCT	Voluntary Counselling and Testing
WB	World Bank

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the following; historical background, background to the genocide, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) presence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), research problem, study rationale, research objectives, research scope and thesis structure.

1.2 Historical background

Rwanda is located in the African Great Lakes Region (AGLR) which is constituted by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda. All the three countries share common borders and were colonized by Belgium. These countries are re-grouped in a regional economic bloc called the African Great Lakes Region Economic Community (CEPGL) (Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs) formed on 18th October, 1983. The 1994 genocide has, in fact catalysed the extension of the initial GLR map to the Greater Great Lakes Region (GGLR) as a result of the conflict's chain of consequences that have spilled over to other countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia not to mention the direct neighbouring countries and even the farthest located countries such as Malawi.

1.3 Background to the genocide

The shared colonial legacy of Rwanda, Burundi and DRC has played an important role in the regional conflict dynamics since early 1960s. Rwanda's own historical background is marked by four key eras notably pre-colonial Rwanda, colonial Rwanda, post-independence Rwanda and post-genocide Rwanda.

Pre-colonial Rwanda was monarchical and was led by the Nyiginya Clan for centuries. In that era, Rwanda was characterized by clans rather than ethnic groups (Shyaka, 2005). Historical Rwanda was characterized by social class stratifications based on wealth or political influence. Thus, in pre-colonial Rwanda, one would be labelled as "Mututsi", "Muhutu", and "Mutwa" based on the number of cows one held (considered as wealth indicator) (Bendix and Stanley, 2010; Amnesty International, 2010; Mohamed, 2003). Social 'promotion' or 'demotion' on the traditional Rwandan social ladder was both objective and subjective. However, subjectivity tended to override objective factors of socio-economic promotion such as personal merit resulting from hard-work (Boshoff, 2014; Shyaka, 2005; Mohamed, 2003). Social stratification

did not depend solely on ‘the cow factor’, although this was the symbol of the ubuhake (client ship or serfdom) practice that was the emblem of subjectivity practiced by the monarchy dominated by the Nyiginya clan (Carney, 2011; Shyaka, 2005). Currently, the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) has established socio-economic strata in its community development strategy. These classes range from destitution to rich (Umutindi nyakujya, Umutindi, Umukene, Umukene wifashije, and Umukungu) (Amnesty International, 2010; MINALOC, 2008; Ansoms, 2005).

The most decried practice of the monarchical rule was kunyagwa. This was an act of dispossession of herds of cows or agrarian property as a result of a failed ubuhake. The kunyagwa and kugabana acts (dispossession and imputation of wealth) amounted to ‘*debiting*’ and ‘*crediting*’ wealth to and from any Munyarwanda whether a Mutwa, a Mututsi or a Muhutu on grounds of rewarding loyalty (kugabana) or punish disloyalty (kunyagwa) (Boshoff, 2014; Carney, 2011; Shyaka, 2005; Mohamed, 2003). The practice had permeated the Rwandan collective consciousness to the point that even family patriarchs could dispossess their own sons for reasons of misconduct and mismanagement of family wealth such as cows. However, the household of the punished man never ran short of dairy or farm products. In other words, this was a symbolic punishment of disloyalty and rebellion.

The arrival of European explorers such as Morton Stanley who visited Rwanda in 1876, followed by three German explorers Oscar Baumann, Von Götzen and Richard Kandt in 1892, 1894, 1894 (Viret, 2010; Mohamed, 2003) augured the start of the colonial era for Rwanda. One year after Von Gozten’s visit in 1894, Rwanda became part of the Deutsch Ostafrika colonies in 1895 (Perras, 2004). However, due to shortage of German human resources needed to administer the vast newly acquired colony, the metropolitan power decided to administer Rwanda through the monarchy particularly using customary chiefs and sub-chiefs. In his exploration ‘diary’, Von Gotzen displayed attributes or peculiarities of each of the three ethnic groups he found in Rwanda. He described the physical and intellectual characteristics of Tutsis as ‘too elevated to be Negroes’ whereas Hutus were described as ‘Negroes’ and Twas as ‘Pygmies’ (Carney, 2011; Shyaka, 2005; Mohamed, 2003). The characterization of Rwandan population by German researchers fitted the mainstream race theory that was the vogue in the European research and political institutions in 1900s (Kane, 2007; Perras, 2004). Race theory was used for issuing identity cards to Rwandans and identity cards included the ethnic group of

the bearer. The card was used to decide who to kill or spare years later (Carney, 2011; Querido, 2009; Krain, 2005; Shyaka, 2005).

Belgium became Rwanda's new metropolitan master in 1919 after Versailles Treaty that stripped Germany her colonies (Gillhespy and Hayman, 2011). However, the Belgians followed the Germans administrative style that consisted of using local customary leaders. More importantly, they continued to stress the supposed superiority of the Tutsis. Belgian interests in Rwanda were mainly cash-crop agriculture, mining activities and the important human capital of assiduous Rwandan labourers who were readily available to be taken to Katanga in the mining enterprises known as Gécamines (La Generale des Carrières et des Mines) in the Belgian-Congo.

Belgian colonial politicians would have had difficulties to weaken the monarchy's influence on its people had there not been the Catholic Church to win the hearts and minds of Rwandans using religion's soft power (Bouta, 2015; Bendix and Stanley, 2010). Belgian politicians and the Catholic Church courted the Tutsi elite and paid little attention to the exploitation of the rest of the population. Of course, not all Tutsi benefited from Belgian rule and not all Hutu suffered under it. Nonetheless "we" and "them" characterisation had been firmly established (Bendix and Stanley, 2010: 23).

The first years of both Belgian politicians and the catholic clergy were characterized by rosy relations backed by the race theory and the German legacy. The short-lived cordial ambiance was marked by the king's baptism (King Rudahigwa became Pierre Charles in 1943) which also symbolized the Christianization of the whole of Rwanda and the crucial royal decree that abolished ubuhake (client ship or serfdom) in 1954. The two dates were key milestones in Rwanda's breaking away from monarchical rule and ushering in new republican regime.

As the winds of African decolonization began to blow, the Tutsi elite claimed independence from Belgium. In reaction to the monarchy's unfriendly attitudes to its masters, the Belgian politicians and the catholic clergy shifted their support to the Hutu elite who were largely the products of catholic seminaries. The formation of Hutu-based political parties was a feature of this period: Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation des Bahutu (Parmehutu) headed by Grégoire Kayibanda, Aprosoma (Association pour la Promotion Sociale des Masses) that in theory was headed by Joseph Gitara (but the real leader and founder was the catholic Archbishop André Péraudin), and Movement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) which

associated with Dominique Mbonyumutwa (but Parmehutu and MDR merged to form what became MDR-Parmehutu). In reaction, the monarchy and the Tutsi elite founded their own parties notably UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise, headed by Prosper Bwanakweli) and RADER (Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais), headed by Lazare Ndazaro (Carney, 2011; Mohamed, 2003).

Both UNAR and RADER were pro-monarchy and nationalist while the rival political parties supported continued Belgian rule on the grounds for ensuring preparedness of the Hutu masses to be adequately prepared to govern themselves (Carney, 2011; Mohamed, 2003). The sprouting of political parties divided along 'ethnic' lines resulted in the November political chaos that was triggered by a false rumour of the death of Parmehutu leader Dominique Mbonyumutwa at the hands of UNAR activists in Ndiza (Central Rwanda) (Carney, 2011; Chambers, 2009; Mohamed, 2003). The already volatile political landscape between Hutus and Tutsis degenerated into a countrywide killings of Tutsis in last two months of 1959, forcing thousands of Tutsis to seek refuge in neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and DRC.

The Tutsis who remained in Rwanda have always been made scapegoats of all the fears and failures of successive post-independence governments from first provisional government led by Dominique Mbonyumutwa in 1961, followed by Grégoire Kayibanda's regime (1962 to 1973), and Habyarimana's regime (1973 – 1994) (Carney, 2011; Shyaka, 2005). A routine had developed of killing and jailing Tutsis whenever Rwanda experienced or sensed an external security threat. For instance the November, 1963 raid by Tutsi guerrillas in South Eastern part of Rwanda resulted in a mass killings of Tutsis across Rwanda and claimed an estimated ten thousand Tutsis countrywide (Carney, 2011; Shyaka, 2005). The threat was permanent due to the stance the successive Hutu-led governments had 'sworn' not to have the exiled Tutsis back in Rwanda. This stance resulted in the 1994 genocide by its regular armed force, Forces Armées Rwandais (FARs) and supported by government militias that included the notorious Interahamwes. The fall of the MRND-led government led to a spill-over of violence into the neighbouring DRC where the government, army and militias and over two million people had found refuge.

The 1959 killings of Tutsi in what was called the Hutu-revolution resulted in the exile in masses of Tutsis to the DRC, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya (Viret, 2010). On 1st October, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)/Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a military

attack against the FARs. On 29th March, 1991 a ceasefire was signed between RPF and the then government of Rwanda. In other rounds of peace talks, the Arusha Peace Agreement was negotiated and signed on 04th August, 1993. The Agreement was founded on the establishment of the rule of law, power-sharing, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people, the integration of armed forces, and other miscellaneous provisions (Nyambura, 2011; Chesterman, 2010; Shayka, 2005).

On 6th April, 1994 the plane that carried President Habyarimana from Arusha, Tanzania was shot down as it approached the Kigali International Airport. The president's assassination sparked a swift and systematic countrywide genocide of Tutsis and anyone who spoke against the mass murders. Killings were perpetrated by ex-FARs, the National Gendermerie and trained Interahamwe across the country. The genocide lasted 100 days and was stopped by RPA/RPF who invaded from its Uganda bases. The Sindikubwabo interim government that implemented the genocide was deposed by RPF on 04th July, 1994.

1.4 The FDLR presence in eastern DRC

The countries of the Greater Great Lakes Region (GGLR) have borne the burden of the Rwandan conflict by not only receiving an influx of Rwandan refugees but also by being drawn into the conflict, dubbed as 'the African World War I'. The underlying instigators of this war was the presence of an ex-FARs army and Interahamwe who were hosted by neighbouring countries, in particular the DRC, where fugitive politicians and militaries had settled in Goma close to the Rwanda-DRC border. Mobutu's unreserved welcome of the genocidal politicians and military forces was dictated by his wish to curry favour with the West. During the cold war rivalry between capitalism and communism, Mobutu's Zaire was 'the vanguard' of capitalist politics at the doorsteps of the then communist Angola. Angola later converted to capitalism

Therefore, as a move meant to charm western countries, Mobutu allowed retreating Rwandan political and military structures into the eastern DRC in July 1994. In 1996, ex-FARs and Interahamwe planned a massive military attack on Rwanda but this was foiled by a pre-emptive RPA attack which resulted in the disbandment of refugee camps along the DRC-Rwanda border (Boshoff, 2014; De Coning, 2010). A further consequence of the Rwandan war against genocidal forces in the eastern DRC was the end of the Mobutu regime by Joseph Désiré Kabila's AFDL which was supported by both Rwandan and Ugandan Forces. Many Rwandan refugees, including ex-FARs and Interahamwe, chose to seek sanctuary in the eastern DRC's

forests. President Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila Kabange, the current DRC President.

An unsuccessful attempt to invade Rwanda in 1996 by ex-FARs and Interahamwe led to the creation of ALIR/PALIR (Armée de Libération du Rwanda) a military wing, and PALIR (Peuple Armé pour la Libération du Rwanda as a Political wing) formed between 1997 and 1998. ALIR changed its name to the FDLR after it was internationally condemned for killing western tourists in Buindi Park in 1999 (De Coning, 2010; CIDDR, 2009; Chambers, 2009). The FDLR has continued its insurgency course which it began in 2000, though other armed groups such as FDLR/RUD and FDLR/FOCA (Abachunguzi Combatants Force) were formed from the mainstream FDLR (Bendix and Stanley, 2010; Omaar, 2008). Since 2001, FDLR insurgents have been predominantly involved in economic activities in North and South Kivu provinces (Omaar, 2008) and have delayed fighters returning to their home country (Zandevlier and Narayan, 2010). The presence of ex-FARs and Interahamwe in the DRC has created a breeding ground for local outlaw groups that have added themselves to the list of multiple factions of Rwandan insurgents in the eastern DRC. The Congolese rebel groups like the Mai Mai made up of Nandé, Hundé, and Banyanga ethnic discontents have always harboured anti-Rwandan sentiment.

However, there have been alliances of local outlaw groups with Interahamwe and ex-FARs estimated to number 8,000 in both North and South Kivus (Thakur, 2008). There is a case of a notorious criminal group called the Rastas formed and commanded by an FDLR deserter called Koffi who has managed to Rally local elements from Mayi Mayi and the FARDC. The group was estimated to number 300 and 500 combatants (Omaar, 2008: 58). Other groups consist of Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese which include the PARECO and the CNDP whose forces had previously been integrated into the DRC's regular armed forces. They protested the central government's failure to meet terms of a peace agreement which was signed in March, 2009 and resumed fighting the government of DRC in June, 2012. The PARECO group looted Tutsis' properties in the North and South Kivus and acted as a surrogate of the Kinshasa government, the Interahamwe and ex-FARs who were against the Tutsi-dominated CNDP who fought to protect the rights of Congolese nationals.

In the aftermath of the 2002 Sun City Peace Agreement between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC government (Zandevlier and Narayan, 2010; International Crisis Group, 2009), three military operations have jointly been undertaken by both Rwanda and the DRC with the aim of

eradicating the FDLR's threat to peace of both countries. This situation led to the operations called Umoja Wetu¹, Kimia² and Amani Leo³ (Dagne, 2011). MONUC played an important role in the disarmament and repatriation of Rwandan ex-combatants from North and South Kivu provinces. DDR was delayed until 1997 while Rwanda was engaged in fighting ex-FARs and Interahamwe insurgents from the Eastern DRC (RDRC, 2010). As part of the recovery process, the government set up a commission (RDRC) mandated to implement the DDR process using UN-DDR standards (Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards) (IDDRS, 2006) in addition to home-grown approaches tailored to ex-combatants' needs (ILO, 2009; Caramés, 2006; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004), a major one being '*the cooperative*' paradigm (RDRC, 2010). In conclusion, effort to eradicating the FDLR as threat to peace resulted in both humanitarian and economic destructions that deeply affected DR Congo.

1.5 Research problem

Reintegration is one of the activities which are carried out in the post-conflict peace building process. Security-sector reform calls for downsizing the army size and demobilising combatants from armed groups (Wulf, 2004; Nathan, 2004; Caparini, 2004; Ball, 2005). Demobilising ex-combatants and regular soldiers require an appropriate plan for effective economic and social re-integration. Failure to effectively implement ex-combatants reintegration process poses a serious threat to peace post-conflict. As long as factors that led to groups taking up arms remain unresolved, reintegration will fail (Duma, Van Laar and Klem, 2012; Patel *et al.*, 2009; Hill, Taylor and Temin, 2008; Pugel, 2007). In most cases, ex-combatants join insurgency groups due to their economic and social plight.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are decisive steps towards stability and development for country recovering from armed conflict. In this regard, several factors explain the need for effective DDR programmes to focus on former combatants. These factors include the alienation and depersonalization of combatants during the period of military service which are considered major causes of the difficulty of adjusting to civilian life. In this regard, Ducci (2012), Kilroy (2005) and highlight the fact that military culture permeates all spheres of life. Combatants receive a new identity as a soldier while simultaneously depersonalising them. Military values, different from civilian values, include obedience, loyalty and discipline which reinforces military (Snider *et al.*, 2009; Chelini *et al.*,

¹ Our unity

² Calm

³ Peace today

2008). Military units are generally characterized by cohesion within the group reinforced by specific rituals, a common identity and perception of the enemy (Rousseau and Van de Veen, 2009).

Communities are supposed to facilitate the reintegration of those they may consider responsible for their suffering. For that reason, once demobilized, ex-combatants face rejection as they are regarded as having blood on their hands. The experience from various post conflict societies illustrate that if ex-combatants are marginalized within their own communities and remain unemployed for long periods of time once they are demobilised, they use weapons in order to survive. They may join new armed groups which pose new security threats at local, national and regional levels.

In addition, vulnerable categories of ex-combatants which include women, children and disabled soldiers could be marginalized and confined to poverty if no effective rehabilitation program is planned before the demobilization process begins. Similarly, the end of hostilities and the beginning of the re-insertion package typically provided to each discharged ex-combatant are not enough to ensure reintegration. In order to stabilise war affected societies long term actions are required.

1.6 Study Rationale

Underpinning this research is the belief that effective reintegration is achieved through the development of income-generation projects at the local community level (Martin and Mathema, 2010; Caramés, 2006).

The primary survey I conducted in 2009, in the Jabana DDR project showed that the Jabana ex-combatants' cooperative, on which income-generation hopes had been pinned, was dysfunctional. Furthermore, the findings in the RDRC's (2010) report on cooperatives confirms that ex-combatants' typically cooperatives failed shortly after they started, largely due to the non-participation of its members.

As will be explained in chapter six, I utilized an action research design in which Jabana project participants played a key role. The motive for using this method in implementing the ex-combatants' reintegration project was that the findings of the preliminary survey outlined the lack of participation by members as the primary reason for the cooperatives failure. This action research project aimed at reviving this participation.

The RDRC caters for ex-combatants' issues related to socio-economic reintegration through entrepreneurship training. Nevertheless, findings of the preliminary survey showed that many ex-combatants were not able to translate training knowledge into practical income-generating projects. An additional impediment to successful reintegration of ex-combatants is the lack of effective participation. The reintegration pattern favours the top-down instead of a bottom-up approach to reintegration.

The empowerment and transformation of ex-combatants was, I believed, the key to research amongst Jabana ex-combatants. Empowerment entails knowledge and know-how transfers whereas transformation changes mind sets, structures, functions, and power relations within a cooperative setting (Groovaerts, Gasser and Inbal, 2009). Additionally, effective participation activates both ex-combatants and the wider local community, whilst socio-economic factors influence the empowerment and sustainability of the individual and the local community. In this respect, participation is seen as the best asset to ensure ex-combatants' competitiveness in their local neighbourhood.

Most DDR initiatives focus on ex-combatants' leaders, neglecting members at the grass-roots level. Such approaches only perpetuate dependence and apathy among ex-combatants and their communities. One of the major challenges to community development lies in under-estimation or inability to capitalise on available resources at the grassroots level (Bouta, 2015; Nikkhah and Redzuan, 2010; Donais, 2009). It is on these grounds that this study's objectives look into gaps amongst the ex-combatants of the Jabana cooperative while bridging those gaps with personal knowledge and know-how in research. So far, ex-combatant-focused reintegration (Holguin, 2010; Caramés, 2006) remains an unexplored dimension in the DDR process implemented in Rwanda.

In an effort to address economic and social challenges faced by the Jabana ex-combatants' cooperative, a research method was deemed appropriate in order not only to understand reintegration efforts but, where necessary, to also transform them. Using action research design, involvement of working together with ex-combatants in the upliftment of their dysfunctional organization by setting grounds for corporate cooperative amongst members (Zandvliet, 2009):

- Mind-set change meant to help transcend the old-fashioned thinking that one needs to have large sums of money in order to start and run a profitable business (Duma, van Laar and Klem, 2012; Gianforte and Gibson, 2005)

- Empowering the cooperative in terms of organization and structural makeup for competitive advantages (Duma, van Laar and Klem, 2012; Ehmke, 2008).

1.7 Research objectives

The study's overall aim is to contribute to knowledge in relation to the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Its specific objectives are:

1. To critically review the relevant literature, including the importance of successfully reintegrating ex-combatants in order to provide a foundation for sustainable peace.
2. To assess the levels of reintegration achieved by one reintegration project (an agricultural cooperative) in Rwanda, including the social and economic situations of households and the performance of the cooperative.
3. Using an action research approach, to plan, implement and evaluate an intervention designed to enhance the project's contribution to social and economic reintegration.

1.8 Research scope

After the 1994 genocide, a wide array of research has been conducted. A great proportion of the researcher has covered subjects related to post-conflict restorative justice traditionally known as Gacaca courts⁴ (Bowd, 2008), institution and economic building (Ansoms, 2005) and rebuilding Rwandan society (Nicholaides, 2009; Cohen *et al.*, 2009; Schaal and Elbert, 2006). In the DDR process in Rwanda, there has been limited research on the topic for instance Edmonds et al, 2009 and Mukeshimana, 2006, which respectively tried to highlight local ownership and the role that the RDRC has played in ex-combatants reintegration process. Besides the role played by the RDRC at any reintegration level and involvement of local authorities and communities, aspects of individual reintegration of ex-combatants have to be also assessed basing on their way of life, individual differences, capabilities, opportunities and limitations. Reintegration as a project set at individual level may lead to sustainability and positive change economically, socially, politically, psychologically. In the present study, I, focused on ex-combatants' participation which takes place at the grassroots level. Unlike the liberal standpoint of peace building discourse (Campbell, 2011; Paris, 2010; Chandler, 2004) that promotes the top-down

⁴ Is a type of Rwandan traditional popular jurisdiction which gives power to the respected elders of the communities. Generally alleged culprits rarely contest the court ruling due to the respect and trust they have in the 'judges' known as *inyangamugayo* (trustworthy persons). The latter type of jurisdiction has been adapted to the genocide context while aiming at fast-tracking the hundreds of thousands of genocide related-court cases that could in estimation last for hundreds of years. Another reason for that restorative justice using Gacaca courts is primarily building trust and premising forgiveness and healing on both sides of victims and victimizers.

approach of peace building, this research focuses on both individual and group participation and the locally-built peace using a bottom-up approach (Justino. 2010; Mehler, 2009; Lambourne, 2004).

The present study's particular focus is on ex-FDLR combatants whose socio-economic reintegration took place in 2009. The empirical research was conducted amongst a group that is heterogeneously constituted by FDLR ex-insurgents and ex-RDF soldiers. The heterogeneity of this cooperative is regarded as one of the indicators of reintegration effectiveness. Cooperative members working together, is itself a sign of reconciliation. I used an action research design so that ex-combatants could own and use the knowledge they contributed to creating. More widely, the RDRC had not fully understood the underlying causes of the failure of many ex-combatants' cooperatives throughout the country despite the resources invested in them and this research should help in increasing their understanding.

1.9 Thesis structure

This research thesis is made of eleven chapters clustered into five sections or parts. The first section is made of research background and objectives chapters. The second section consists of a literature review which comprises chapters on peace building theory, reintegration process, and an overview of DDR processes looking at six case studies, five from sub-Saharan African countries and one from Latin America. Analysis of these different cases is done in a comparative perspective, paying particular attention to what has been considered as best-practice. The last chapter in this section focuses on Rwanda's DDR process, under which a cooperative approach has been taken as the best way of fast-tracking ex-combatants' reintegration. Section three includes chapters which consist of context and justification of the choice of Jabana as a research case-study, action research design, data collection methods and analysis, and the research plan and the reality. The fourth section focuses on data and analyses it so as to meet the specific objectives listed in section 1.7. The fifth section summarises the research and reflects on its implication for reintegration practice in Rwanda.

CHAPTER TWO: PEACE BUILDING THEORY AND THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines two important theories relevant to reintegration, peace building and conflict transformation. The chapter responds to the second research specific aim of examining peace theories relevant to participation. Before examining the concepts of peace building and conflict transformation, it is important to briefly deal with the basic concepts of conflict, peace and violence. Much of this material derives from the work of Johann Galtung (Webel and Galtung, 2007). Other key references include Heathershaw (2009); Newman *et al.*, (2009), Paris (2010), Alcorta and Nixon (2011). Recent documents by researchers (Bouta, 2015; Boshoff, 2014; Humphreys and Weinstein 2013; Andrews, 2012; Ducci, 2012; Hansen, 2012; Harun and Mahmood, 2012; Alusala, 2011; Campbell, 2011; Dagne, 2011; Bendix and Stanley, 2010) about reintegrating ex-combatants using an action research project in a Rwandan agricultural cooperative, among others have provided a foundation for this project.

2.2 Key concepts in peace building theory

2.2.1 Conflict

Conflict essentially involves a difference in needs, wants of interests of two or more parties, and is pervasive, multi-faceted and multileveled (Gillhespy and Hayman, 2011). Its pervasiveness implies that conflict exists everywhere and has existed since the beginning of mankind. It can occur between individuals, groups or nations. If not dealt with, conflict can have negative effects for the parties concerned and may escalate into violence. Three ways of dealing with conflict are management, resolution and transformation. The first typically involves separation and control of parties. Fighting children may be sent to different parts of the house, a violent husband may be legally barred from being in the proximity of his wife, and peacekeepers may prevent warring groups from fighting (Duma, van Laar and Klem, 2012; Alcorta and Nixon, 2011). Conflict resolution tries to solve the dispute by attempting to find a solution which satisfies each of the parties involved. This often depends on parties discovering different needs that they have which may not have been obvious earlier on. A resolution may still leave the parties disliking each other intensely. Conflict transformation tries to deal with this by attempting to rebuild the relationship between the parties. Forgiveness and reconciliation are key concepts in conflict transformation.

2.2.2 Violence

If a conflict is not at least managed, let alone resolved and transformed, violence may occur. Violence, according to Galtung (2009), can be of three types - direct (including physical and emotional), structural and cultural. Direct violence involves actions designed to intimidate, harm or kill other individuals and is the most commonly understood use of the word violence. Another particular contribution of peace studies in which Galtung played an important part, is the recognition of structural violence. Structural violence refers to programmes and policies which gives advantage to one group over another and cause harm, even death, to the latter without necessarily intending to do so. The apartheid system in South Africa is a classic example and so are deaths which could have been prevented, for example by an immunization programme, but were not prevented (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2013; Ducci, 2012). Often, such neglect has ethnic underpinnings, as with apartheid. Structural violence may be enforced and resisted by direct violence. Cultural violence refers to the justification or excuses for direct and structural violence (Hansen, 2012; Harun and Mahmood, 2012). In the case of apartheid, biblical arguments were used to justify the separation of races and a racial hierarchy which gave precedence to the interests of whites. As we have seen, the colonial rulers of Rwanda decided on particular roles for the ethnic groups they identified.

2.2.3 Peace

The concept of peace can be understood according to mechanisms used to reduce violence that can rise due to competing interests. These can be informal and tacit, social mores and customs.

Negative peace means the absence of direct violence which may occur as a result of threat by the more powerful party to a conflict but does little to deal with its underlying causes, such as ethnically-based inequalities. Heatherslow (2009) describes it as an unwarranted peace because there are still impending threats.

Positive peace, on the other hand, can be said to occur when the underlying causes of war have been dealt with as far as possible, although this may not mean much in terms of the relationship between the parties (Kriesberg, 2010; Edmonds, Mills and McNamee, 2009). Transformal peace takes peace in the direction of building or re-building relations, with reconciliation being a central aspect of this type of peace (Kriesberg, 2010; Lambourne, 2004; Miall, 2004).

2.3 Peace building

The term peace building can refer to a preventive role so as to deal with the causes of conflict so that violence does not break out. Of more relevance to this research is its role in recovery after violence has ended, perhaps as a result of a peace agreement between warring parties. Part of peace building – a particularly important part – is DDR whilst economic, political, institutional, social and psychological recovery tasks which occur at national, regional, community household and individual levels (Ong, 2012; Onuoha, 2011; Paris, 2010; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004; Carames, 2006). Ideally, peace building will not be about returning the society to its status quo before the violence but will attempt the transformation of issues, actors, structures and rules.

In Miall's words (2004: 5), it will be 'a roots -and- branches change, without which the prospects of returning to violence are high. This is all the more true for deep-rooted conflicts (Meek and Malan, 2014; Alusala, 2011; Lambourne, 2004). For sustained peace to come about, it is necessary to work on relationships between the conflicting parties. Often, as with Rwanda, these will be of different ethnicities. It is not enough to simply resolve the conflict but also the relationships between the parties need to be changed. Fisher and Zimina (2010) have termed this transformative peace building, as opposed to technical peace building which focuses on repairing the damage and destruction but doing little to deal with the damaged relationships which may well fuel new violence. Transformation involves a focus on the cornerstones of the conflict triangle discussed in chapter one – attitudes, situations and behaviours.

Rwanda is attempting this first kind of peace building. With particular reference to DDR, there are Rwandan combatants operating in the eastern DRC, including FDLR and other dissident factions, which still pose a direct threat to Rwanda's peace building process. Though some of these insurgent groups contain alleged genocide perpetrators, the constructive transformational approach of the country's peace building process in Rwanda brings together both former RPF soldiers and ex-FARs and other combatant forces from the DRC who are allowed to enlist in the regular RDF army provided they have no record of genocide. Alternatively, they can be demobilized depending on established criteria and personal request. Rwanda's post-conflict peace building can thus be described as both integrative and constructive (Kriesberg, 2010; Paris, 2010). The main actors in peace building in general and DDR in particular, are various levels of government, foreign donors (bilateral and multilateral), ex-combatants, and local communities.

Transformative peace building can be top down or the bottom up, depending on the level of participation of various actors. In reality, the dominant ideology is liberal peace building, whereby post-conflict recovery is handled by the UN and other prominent institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, with the clear aim of establishing western-style democracy and a free market economy.

Liberal peace building is implemented from the top-down and jointly led by international peace builders and local political structures. Hansen (2012) argues that liberal peace building is a “mission civilisatrice” that is being challenged by the view that emphasises bottom-up solutions over the top-down approaches (Dagne, 2011; Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009; Chandler, 2004). Sanyal (2010) argues that the grassroots levels must always be led by government agencies for the bottom-up to be efficiently operational. Cooksey and Kikula (2005) talk about striking a balanced approach when they suggest that the top-down and bottom-up approaches have to be concurrently implemented in post-conflict times.

The present research focuses on the bottom-up approach of participation through cooperatives established in local communities. Key references to this approach include Kruzan (2012), Majee and Hoyt (2011), Birchall and Ketilson (2009), MDRP (2008), Cooksey and Kikula (2005) and Slocum (2003). The underlying assumption is that reintegration requires that ex-combatants have livelihoods which meet the basic needs of themselves and their families.

In addition to urging ex-combatants to work in cooperatives, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) has also “mainstreamed” former fighters economic and social empowerment in a bid to avoid them standing as ‘islands’ in the wider community. The RDRP policy of mainstreaming and cooperative support has therefore been an opportunity for ex-combatants to gain the same benefits as the wider Rwandan community beneficiaries from government’s socio-economic development programmes (AfDB, 2011; MINALOC, 2008). Working in cooperative settings contributes to a democratised participation of ex-combatants since decisions are made jointly while collectively assuming risks and successes. Cooperatives have the potential to change mindsets away from counterproductive individualism to a collective way of thinking and doing things (Ong, 2012; Onuoha, 2011; Zandvliet, 2009).

The extent to which cooperatives in fact result in such changes depends in part on the laws and procedures which, in theory at least, guide the practice of cooperatives. The way of removing power imbalances or power asymmetries in the process of decision-making and ultimately in

reaping yields of collective effort (Nathan, 2013; O'Neill, 2012; Nyambura, 2011; Mehlum and Moene, 2010; Francis, 2004). Prior to elaborating on peace building and transformation theories, concepts such as conflict, peace and violence are defined as antecedents to the said theories.

2.4 Issues in transformation

The previous section has discussed the key role of transformation in peace building. The issues in conflict transformation are both objective and subjective (Scharbatke-Church, 2011; Kriesberg, 2010: 52). The objective issues relate to material interests, which include access to land, employment, education, health care, political power and influence, which go to improve one's standard of living. The subjective issues of transformation include psychological, emotional and social aspects which require personal transformation. The difference between objective and subjective concerns is that the former are negotiable while the latter are difficult to negotiate because the contending parties to conflicts tend adhere to their values and beliefs (Schroeder, 2015; Serneels and Verpoorten, 2010; Muggah and Steenken, 2010).

Material problems are better addressed by redistributing the available resources using the national legal frameworks as a guiding standard which help justice and fairness in the redistribution of resources to the rightful claimants. It is during the transformation process that unjust laws and other systemic flaws can be corrected. The sheer breadth of transformation is illustrated in table 2.1, derived from Miall (2004).

Table 2. 1. Summary of major aspects of conflict transformation

Key aspects of conflict transformation	
Aspect	Component (s)
Context Transformations	Change in the international or regional environment
Structure transformation	Change from asymmetric to symmetric relations Change in power structures Changes of markets of violence
Actor transformations	Changes of leadership Changes of goals intra-party change Change in party's constituencies Changing actors

Issues transformations	Transcendence of contested issues Constructive compromise Changing issues De-linking or re-linking issues
Personal/elite transformations	Changes of perspective Changes of heart Changes of will Gestures of conciliation

Source: Miall (2004: 10)

Table 2.1 above shows summary of major aspects of conflict transformation, and they include context transformations, structure transformation, actor transformations, issues transformations and personal elite transformation.

One of the most critical issues is the rapport de force between parties that hold the reins of power and vulnerable parties. The power imbalance which exists (Meek and Malan, 2014; Korppen *et al.*, 2008; Ropers, 2008) between the elite and the grassroots and the elites themselves is referred to as power asymmetry (Kriesberg, 2010). Post-conflict transformation processes require a change of power relation between stakeholders as part of the peace building processes. Subjective issues (Kriesberg, 2010: 52) concern immaterial objects such as psychological and emotional concerns. Cases which include subjective issues include systematic marginalization. The ‘we and them’, the “etherisation” of some social groups leads to systematic and systemic exclusion from national resources and other prerogatives (Sanyal, 2010; Dudouet, 2006).

Subjective aspects of conflicts which emphasise local ownership are addressed by conflict management mechanism, peace education, reconciliation and forgiveness implemented at the grassroots level while emphasizing ownership by locals (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009; Utterwulghe, 2003). If objective issues are cloaked in subjectivity by opportunist politicians, they can result into mass-scale violence such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Zeebroek, *et al.*, 2010; Shyaka, 2005; Mohamed, 2003).

The earlier discussion of transformation tended to focus on the relationships between individuals and between groups. Structures also need to be transformed. Transformation entails a revision of structural relationships and power distribution (Zandevlier and Narayan, 2010; Narten, 2009; Miall, 2004; Francis, 2004). In fact, structural transformation envisages change of

structures that hinder better delivery of state/government service to its citizens. Transformation in this respect may be helped by decentralizing government services and developing power away from the centre (Sujatmiko, 2012; Kroppen *et al.*, 2008). Then there is more potential for a wider distribution of government services.

Structural transformation promotes the delivery of social justice (Bloomfield *et al.*, 2006; Clements, 2004; Lambourne, 2004) because it changes unjust structures systems that make injustice prevail in pre-war times. In order to pave a way for positive peace leading, political parties in post-conflict periods are expected to integrate even the weakest and least represented political actors in the framework of power-sharing. “Those who have the power of decision-making in post-conflict states are expected to treat their adversaries humanely” (Kriesberg, 2010: 52). Lambourne (2004) sees conflict transformation in post-conflict period from the perspective of the fair distribution and access to available national resources and/or opportunities. In the process of trust and confidence-building; “transformations often advance and then fall back before advancing again” (Kriesberg, 2010: 60).

2.5 Transformation is critical for successful reintegration and sustained peace

This section presents the fact that transformation is centrally about the relationships between individuals and groups. Through such transformation, ex-combatants are assisted to become civilians again, rejoin families and communities, to find livelihoods and helping host communities to recover in the aftermath of armed conflicts. Transformation involves the social and cultural component which is based on interactions between refugees and local communities which enable refugees to live amongst the host population, without discrimination and as contributors to the development of their host communities .

Transformation is also critical or successful reintegration and sustained peace. With the coming of the ex-combatants in the community, there may be full utilization of resources leading to economic development and growth of a country. With transformation, there is legal component which focuses on a wide range of rights enjoyed by local citizens. These include freedom of movement, access to education and the labour market, access to public services and assistance, including health facilities, the possibility of acquiring and disposing of property, and the capacity travel with valid travel and identity documents 7). Over time, the entire process should lead to permanent residence rights and perhaps, ultimately, the acquisition of citizenship in the county of asylum.

However, transformation is always easier if the economic context is positive; if not, the community may take out their frustration on the newcomers. Whenever new comers join a given community, the local people become insecure and observes them as intruders who may cause commotion, take the available few jobs, struggle and fight for the scarce resources in the community.

2.6 Summary

In attempting to meet the second research aim, this chapter has examined some key concepts, particularly in so doing; it has provided a context for the DDR efforts of the Rwandan government which have emphasised transformed relationships on the one hand and provision of adequate livelihoods on the other. The next chapter examines DDR in more detail.

CHAPTER THREE: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter continues to deal with the first research aim and undertakes a critical review of the literature on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter contains the literature reviewed that was published up to the end of 2009, on which the empirical study was based.

3.2 Brief description of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a process implemented in post-conflict countries with two main components, security and stabilization, which is also referred to as security-sector reform (Wulf, 2004; Nathan, 2004; Caparini, 2004; Ball, 2005) and peace building, which consists of transformation activities aimed at sustainable peace (Hopp and Unger, 2009; Ropers, 2008; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004). The term reintegration is understood as a generic term because it encompasses both reintegration and re-insertion which are the second and lengthy process following the security –oriented disarmament and demobilization. All these components are essential to recovery; and it is also vital to ensure that the root-causes of the conflict are dealt with in a systematic way in order to avoid conflict- trap (Collier *et al.*, 2003). Whether “disarmament and demobilization take place as a result of consensus, coercion or compulsion” (Özerdem, 2004: 30); ex-combatants find themselves in the civilian sector and must adapt to new realities in a new socio-economic setting irrespective of their discharge circumstances or their physical status, they will need assistance to become self-reliant and productive.

3.3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) objectives

The objectives of the DDR process are to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. DDR is a complex process with “political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions” (UN-Secretary General Note, 2005: 25).

Based on the UN-DDR approach, the primary responsibility for DDR programmes rests in the hands of national actors. The UN’s role is to support the process as a neutral actor. National ownership is broader than central government and ideally involves the participation of a wide range of state and non-state actors at the national, regional and local levels, including Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (MDRP, 2008). The importance of good planning, co-ordination and integration of these efforts is obvious.

3.4 Key concepts in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

3.4.1 Who is a Combatant?

The term 'combatant' should not be understood only as denoting an individual carrying a gun. "All members of an armed group can be part of a target group for demobilization," including "persons working in logistics and administration," as well as individuals which include "women and children who have been abducted and abused" (Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004: 15).

Based on an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a combatant is a person who is a member of a national army or an irregular military participating in military activities and hostilities, recruiting or training military personnel, holding a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization. They may carry arms and wear a military uniform or unarmed and in civilian clothing (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2013; UN-General Assembly, 2005: 24).

3.4.2 Disarmament

Disarmament forms an integral part of disbanding military units. The weapons used by the personnel must be handed over to the authorities who are responsible for the safe storage, redistribution or destruction of those arms (IDDRS, 2006; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004; Özerdem, 2004). Disarmament consists of the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and the civilian population. Disarmament is essential aspect of confidence-building which is aimed at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment. All measures must be aimed at the mind set of participants, irrespective of whether these are standing armed forces, guerrilla groups, paramilitary or militia forces or civilians. Therefore, disarmament process must involve the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Table 3.1 lists five steps which need to be completed during disarmament. Each of these steps to the disarmament process involves political, legal, administrative, organisation, financial, logistical and security aspects (Knight, 2010; Willems *et al.*, 2009).

Table 3. 1. Disarmament steps

1	A weapons survey
2	Weapons collection
3	Weapons storage
4	Weapons destruction
5	Weapons reutilization

Source: Gleichmann *et al.* (2004: 17)

Table 3.1 above shows summary of disarmament steps which include a weapons survey, weapons collection, weapons storage, weapons destruction and weapons reutilisation. This means that for one to disarm there must be weapons survey, weapons collection, weapons storage, weapons destruction and finally, weapons reutilisation whilst political, legal, administrative, organisation, financial, logistical and security aspects.

3.4.3 Demobilisation

Demobilisation is defined as a formal and controlled process through which active fighters are discharged from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of combatants in camps designated for this purpose. The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called re-insertion (UN-Secretary General, 2009).

Demobilization would include the following activities:

Assembly in discharge centres, verification of ex-combatant status and provision of non-transferable ID cards, recording of ex-combatant's socio-economic data, pre-discharge orientation for transition to civilian life, health screening and voluntary HIV/AIDS counselling and testing (VCT), addressing the special needs of female and child ex-combatants and facilitation of transport to areas of return (MDRP, 2006)

3.4.4 Integrated, disarmament and demobilisation processes

Disarmament and demobilisation should take place in the earliest stages of the peace process. The purpose of disarmament and demobilisation is to help prevent a relapse into war-like acts and so contribute to a secure environment for recovery and reconstruction. Rufer's (2005: 15)

summary of the steps to follow for an integrated demobilization process is presented in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3. 2. Steps in integrated demobilisation process

An effective preparation and planning, in particular surveys of the number of combatants and weapons, the determination of a timeframe that is sufficiently flexible but also as precise as possible, the formulation of conditions for the admission of combatants to a DDR programme and informing in advance of affected combatants and civil society.
The construction of secure and functional assembly areas and/or quasi-military cantonment sites in which the actual disarmament and demobilisation process is carried out.
The establishment of structures for an effective control of the disarmament and demobilisation process with an equal participation of the parties to the conflict (national DDR and monitoring commissions with the participation of international and national actors as well as representatives of the parties to the conflict).
If necessary, the implementation of weapons buy-back programmes (sometimes also called weapons-for-development programmes) with which, if necessary, weapons can be obtained from both the civilian population and ex-combatants.
Additional measures connected with weapons management such as laws, weapons embargoes and the control of trans boundary weapons trade.

Source: Rufer (2005: 16)

Table 3.2 above indicates the steps in integrated demobilisation process, including; an effective preparation and planning, the construction of secure and functional assembly areas, the establishment of structures for an effective control of the disarmament and demobilisation process with an equal participation of the parties to the conflict, the implementation of weapons buy-back programmes, and additional measures connected with weapons management.

Reintegration Circles are designed to assist people in Monterey County recently released from prison, addiction treatment programs or similar backgrounds in successfully reintegrating into their communities and society. The Reintegration Circles program was initiated in 2012 in response to the AB109 Realignment legislation and a need for increased reintegration services in Monterey County. A Reintegration Circle process focus on three key themes: building a positive self-image and identifying an individual's strengths and achievements, healing and reconciliation with loved ones, and developing clear steps to achieving long-term goals.

First, in the Reintegration Circle process, clients build a foundation for a successful transition into their community and society by identifying their personal strengths and achievements. This process emphasizes a future-success perspective, rather than dwelling on the past-failure perspective. Clients are recognized, respected and supported as being the best experts in guiding their own lives. Other circle participants such as close family and friends, whom the client has requested to attend, identify and reinforce positive qualities of clients, helping the client to improve their outlook toward society, self-esteem and self-empowerment, and awareness of available resources.

Second, facilitators guide a process of healing and reconciliation between the client and those closest to them who have been hurt by their absence due to incarceration or previous lifestyle. Reconciliation is based on discussing how people were affected by the clients' absence and how harm can be repaired and a positive, supportive relationship restored/established. Steps necessary to restore relationships are also included in the clients plan for a successful future life.

Third, based on a foundation of positive self image and reconciled relationships, clients identify long-term goals and short term steps to achieve those goals. Other circle participants share insight about ways they can support the client and how the client can make progress fully utilizing their own strengths, talents, skills, community resources, and the support of members of the community into which they are transitioning.

3.4.5 Reintegration

Reintegration is a two phase process, re-insertion and the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants. Re-insertion refers to the arrangement made to relocate an ex-combatant into his/her former home or a new community among others. Reintegration is defined as the long-term process of re-entry into the community, the building livelihoods and returning to a peacetime lifestyle (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004).

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Meek and Malan (2014) argue that it is both a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility which is often necessitates long-term external assistance.

In the re-insertion phase, ex-combatants are frequently provided with basic household goods, land, food supplements and housing materials. Reintegration is a much longer process and its objective is to incorporate the ex-combatant and their family into civilian society, with the hope of them achieving economic independence through involvement in productive activities (O'Neill, 2012; Onuoha, 2011). Table 3.3 lists the main reintegration tasks while table 3.4 provides the performance indicators by which progress can be measured.

Table 3. 3. Reintegration requirements

1	The formulation of a national policy
2	Support for regional implementation agencies and local level emergency aid
3	Transport to selected settlement regions
4	Discharge payments
5	Re-insertion packages
6	(Re)construction projects
7	Vocational training

Source: Body (2005: 3)

Table 3.3 above indicates the reintegration requirements and they include: the formulation of national policy, support for regional implementation agencies and local level emergency aid, transport to selected settlement regions, discharge payments, re-insertion packages, (re)construction projects and vocational training. Reintegration is a complicated concept that can be interpreted based on different perspectives. For example, from a layman point of view, reintegration will be considered as one returning back to their normal livelihood after an interruption by crisis like war and disaster. From DDR perspectives, reintegration is about transforming fighters into law abiding people who will once again live normal lives just like the ordinary people in their communities (Muggah, 2010). DDR's reintegration goes beyond just the return of ex-fighters to their past normal lives; it mainly focuses on the stability of state security by providing the means through which basic needs and services can be easily accessed by ex-fighters, which as the result will discourage ex-fighters from going back to unlawful and subversive.

Table 3. 4. Reintegration performance indicators

Type of reintegration	Performance Indicators	
Social Reintegration	i	Acceptance of the ex-combatants and their families into the receiving communities
	ii	The degree of the ex-combatants' participation in community social life, frequency of interaction
Economic Reintegration	i	The incidence of crime/illegal activities attributable to ex-combatants
	ii	The level of poverty/financial autonomy among ex-combatant households as compare to the community average.
Political Reintegration	i	The degree of engagement in political affairs
	ii	The degree of engagement in community leadership

Source: Body (2005: 3)

Table 3.4 above indicates the socio-economic reintegration performance indicators which include; social reintegration, economic reintegration and political reintegration. Social reintegration include; performance indicators such as acceptance of the ex-combatants and their families into the receiving communities, and the degree of the ex-combatants' participation in community social life, frequency of interaction. And economic reintegration includes; the incidence of crime/illegal activities attributes to ex-combatants; the level of poverty/financial autonomy among ex-combatant households as compared to the community average (Body, 2005). DDR programmes have become an integral part of peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. There is hardly any UN peacekeeping mission that is not confronted with the aspects of DDR programmes (Meek and Malan, 2014; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004: 19).

3. 5 Four key challenges and an overview of DDR

Although DDR process is basically the responsibility of affected countries, the process becomes the United Nations' responsibility under its charter. Article one stipulates that the purpose of the UN is:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful

means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (United Nations' Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1).

DDR processes are part of a wider integrated recovery strategy encompassing economic development, security sector reform, integration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and justice and reconciliation. While DDR has mainly been undertaken by UN peacekeeping missions, many development agencies have also become involved in this sector.

3.5.1 Ownership of DDR processes


In the MDRP (2006) guiding principles, national ownership is given precedence (Nathan, 2013; Donais, 2009; Reich, 2006). However; it has to have the backing of international actors and links to finance for the recovery and reconstruction efforts (Paris, 2010). In the MDRP process, the demobilisation process is typically undertaken over a period of 36 months (MDRP, 2006). Full national ownership of DDR ideally requires the participation of national governments, the former armed opposition and members of local civil society (O'Neill, 2012; Justino, 2010; Fischer, 2006; Pouligny, 2005). Ownership also implies that local actors are involved in decisions about objectives, strategies, programme design and implementation. All in all, they should drive the programme (Kilroy, 2005: 6). Simply creating a “national commission,” however, is insufficient in ensuring ensure local ownership and facilitating social reintegration.

In practice, DDR has often been top down and has failed to maximise local ownership of the process. ‘Ordinary people’ feel excluded from the planning and implementation of certain key programmes, which in turn impacts on the sustainability of the programme (Solomon, 2009: 18). There is often a difference of opinion between local actors, with local knowledge and aspirations, and foreign actors, with the financial resources. The United Nations and other international institutions are external enabling co-actors to governments owning and implementing the DDR process. Stakeholders to the peace agreement nevertheless remain the most indispensable actors in the implementation of the process notwithstanding their lack of financial resources (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004: 4).

3.5.2 Balancing security and development

We have discussed the security emphasis of disarmament and demobilization and the importance of a level of security for the success of the socioeconomic processes of re-insertion and reintegration. The figure 3.1 illustrates how crucial DDR steps are linked and call for care in generating real security, justice and then reconciliation in an entirely compact process.

Figure3. 1.A Framework for DDR



Source: Adapted from Michael (2006: 2)

Building peace in post-conflict country involves security and stability which are in other words termed as the state building phase (Fischer and Schmelzle, 2009; Marko, 2005). On the other hand, the post-conflict peace building phase is focused on transformative and sustainable peace building interventions is also needed (Justino, 2010; Reich, 2006; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004; Lambourne, 2004). The whole process, for example, involves context, issues, actors, structures and levels (Kriesberg, 2010; Ropers, 2008; Miall, 2004; Grewal, 2003). As the process of peace building takes its course, its performance indicators and expected outcome should be borne in mind from the outset by both national and international actors in order to reduce the likelihood of violence re-occurring (Risch and Hoebeke, 2010; Justino, 2009; Collier *et al.*, 2003).

3.5.3 Planning for an integrated DDR process

Disarmament and demobilization are often demanding in terms of time, resources and qualified staff. Proper early planning in the process therefore seems essential to close the current gap between the DD-phases and the R-phase in order to keep the link between the immediate intervention and the long-term recovery programmes (Specker, 2008: 11-12).

An important differing characteristic between the R-phases and the DD-phases is that the former deal with longer term peace building interventions while the latter are designed to address more immediate interventions (Uvin, 2014; O'Neill, 2012; Viret, 2010). For instance, international peace-builders in Iraq found themselves facing conflict between Sunnis and Shias and the US-led coalition was obligated to be a guarantor of a marriage against nature between Shias and Sunnis (Paris, 2010; Newman *et al.*, 2009).

The DDs receive massive resource investment and as a result, they are attained faster than the Rs phases. DD programmes usually show quick results, whereas the reintegration phase often depends on voluntary contributions and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a timely manner in post-conflict environments.

Donors all too often arrive with predetermined plans that limit the involvement of local actors in strategy development and decision-making. As a result, outside interests and plans take precedence, and local civilian populations are marginalized as one of many 'stakeholders,' despite rhetoric adopted by the international community that emphasizes local ownership and the importance of 'indigenous mechanisms' (Ross, 2008: 15).

The gap in this process can be minimized if the transition between the R-phase and long term reintegration programmes are properly planned, in close co-ordination with donors, and adequately resourced from the outset. The immediate post-conflict DDR interventions are resource-consuming thus, creating a gap between DDs (or the small “r”) and the Rs (or the capital “R”). Due to the general context of quick fixes, there is tendency of directing funding to beneficiaries other than ex-combatants and war-affected communities. Another explanation to the gap between the two “r” and “R” is “the unsystematic” financial “r” management which leaves grey areas in its budget reporting. According to Specker (2008), it is reported that there is a general lack of good data from donors on how much money is spent, through which channels

and what the requirements are for their decisions. The long-term reintegration which in fact is the transformational phase therefore suffers from the above-hinted gaps found in the “r” phase.

3.5.4 Connecting the top and the bottom

Reintegration takes place at three levels – the national, community and individual levels, also referred to as the “macro, meso, and micro levels” (Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004: 75). Reintegration phase rests much in the hands of national governments, international organizations and international NGOs, but centrally with local communities. That is, it is a bottom up rather than a top down process (Kilroy 2005: 6) which takes place within communities rather than in offices in capital cities. In short, the challenge is for those at the top to communicate with those at the bottom with a view to enhancing the reintegration process on the ground. Then there can be some expectation of positive news as regards the performance indicators of Tables 3.4. The following case studies will illustrate the importance of these challenges in practice.

3.6 Six DDR case-studies

In this section, case studies of six DDR processes are presented in tabular form – under the headings of objectives, security sector reform, re-insertion, reintegration, challenges and solutions. The data come largely from MDRP (2008). Cases are assessed taking UN-DDR guidelines as the universal standards (IDDRS, 2006) and the broad UN-peace agenda as the guidelines for post-conflict peace building activities (Tholens and Strazzari, 2010). Lessons from the case studies are discussed in section 3.5.

Table 3. 5Six DDR case-studies

Case-study 1 Angola

DDR Objectives	<p>To support the country’s political transition and re-integrate half a million citizens,</p> <p>To create a sustainable institutional structure for DDR,</p> <p>To commit the government to supporting demobilization policies, and</p> <p>To implement effective security measures.</p>
Security Sector-	<p>In total, there are 138,000 persons in need of demobilization, 105,000 UNITA combatants and 33,000 soldiers of the Armed Forces.</p>

Reform	<p>A total 373,000 persons, 86,000 combatants and their families were recorded by February 2003. Initially planned for 80 days but lasting for more than four months, the prolonged demobilization caused delays to the entire DDR process. Demobilization concluded in the first quarter of 2007 with a total demobilization count of 97,390, some 70 percent of the expected figure.</p> <p>35 cantonments have established in all Angola's 18 provinces. The government and Armed Forces were put in charge of the camps and given the responsibility of identifying and registering combatants, collecting and destroying weapons.</p>
Re-insertion	<p>A five-month salary between \$300 and \$900 (settlement package) was paid to ex-combatants. In addition to the settlement package, IRSEM disbursed \$100 for ex-combatants' transportation.</p> <p>2007, 52,612 persons were reinserted (84 percent of expected) and 84,409 were re-integrated (66 percent), in a total 250 approved sub-projects.</p>
Reintegration	<p>An institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for ex-combatants (known by its Portuguese acronym IRSEM) was created to assist with ex-combatant re-integration.</p> <p>IRSEM was divided into three departments: Projects, Human Resources and General Service, and Administration. IRSEM has an office in each of Angola's 19 provinces. Offices are allotted more staff in provinces with high numbers of individuals to re-integrate, in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, and Kwanza Sul. Provincial offices post-employment opportunities, organize project inventories, assist development initiatives, and coordinate and supervise reintegration activities.</p> <p>Reintegration process was underrepresented in provinces and suffered gaps in its planning and co-ordination by both national and international actors.</p> <p>In the context of gaps between planning and implementation in the DDR process, Reintegration of ex-combatants has suffered the most in line with this shortcoming in the Angolan DDR process. Nevertheless, in order to</p>

	<p>address unsolved challenges in the DDR process, the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA's representative have set in place an ad-hoc committee to solve hindrances to the smooth the implementation of reintegration process. The commissioned committee came out with recommendations which included a plan to create income-generating activities relying on cattle rearing, fishing and engineering projects. Two years before 2007 Care International Director, Daniel Júlio, confirmed that around \$1.3 million had been spent on reintegrating some 3,600 ex-combatants of UNITA in Bié Province (Caramés and Sanz, 2009).</p> <p>According to surveys on re-integration, 60% of ex-combatants possessed employment created on their own, 5% worked in the formal sector, and 35% remained unemployed. 96% were employed worked in agriculture.</p> <p>In late June 2008, a survey was conducted on 10,500 ex-combatants within three to six months of receiving reintegration support. By late 2008, 97,390 (92.7% of expected), 52,612 (83.3%), and 84,409 (65.9%) ex-combatants had demobilized, reinserted, and re-integrated respectively.</p> <p>The MDRP said some 81,700 direct recipients of assistance completed reintegration activities, while 250 subcontractors were hired to give reintegration support to 128,000 ex-combatants and community members.</p>
Challenges	<p>There has been disparity between planning and implantation, noticeable, for example, in the number of cantonments, which has increased from the original 27 to 35. The cantonments were divided into three types: areas for ex-combatants, areas for female relatives, and areas for disabled and elderly persons. Most demobilized combatants did not return to their home communities but remained in urban areas where they were less likely to be socially stigmatized.</p> <p>Reintegration was set to conclude in December 2006, but was extended in order continue work with combatants already demobilized, who represented a security threat to the country in the existing climate of violence and insecurity.</p>

Solutions	<p>In 2007 an ad-hoc committee was appointed to review all the hindrances thwarting the smooth implementation of the DDR process.</p> <p>At the end of the commissioned ad-hoc study, legislation to enable disabled ex-combatants to gain access to public and private business opportunities was set up and enacted;</p> <p>In October 2007, the Angolan government approved recommendations by a technical team specialized in Armed Forces and UNITA re-integration. The recommendations included a plan to create self-employment in cattle rearing, fishing, and civil engineering.</p>
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Source: Verkoren, *et al.*, (2010), Caramés and Sanz (2009); MDRP (2008)

Case-study 2 Burundi

DDR Objectives	<p>Burundi DDR programme had the following Objectives:</p> <p>To demobilize an estimated 55,000 combatants of the Burundian Armed Forces, Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs), and the National Defence Force, and support their reintegration into civilian life.</p> <p>To support the re-insertion of an estimated 20,000 Gardiens de la Paix and 10,000 combatants militants of APPMs.</p> <p>To facilitate the reallocation of government budget resources from the defence to social and economic sectors over five years.</p>
Security Sector Reform	<p>The security sector reform set the aim of downsizing the Burundian, National Defence Forces (BNDF) to 30,000 soldiers' maximum, and demobilization of 5,000 police officers in order to streamline expenses and divert military spending to social and economic areas. 78,000 ex-combatants from party affiliation notably CNND, CNDD-FDD, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Amongst the overall figure of ex-combatants, there is an estimated 3500 child combatants.</p> <p>For the regular Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB), the verification</p>

	<p>mechanism had made it a precondition to present an Identification card whereas for rebels, presentation of an arm was their only identification.</p>
Re-insertion	<p>Re-insertion allowance was distributed with no regard to levels of ranks or affiliation of combatants (whether ex-rebel or ex-government army soldier).</p> <p>The minimum allowance was \$515 and the average \$600 which meant that the total re-insertion package was understandably over six hundred dollars. The allowance was paid out in 10 cash instalments. The first payment was made upon decamping, the second after three months in a host community of choice, and the rest in quarterly payments.</p> <p>Initially the payment was made via the commercial banking system and not by hand, but later it was announced all payments would be made in goods and not cash.</p> <p>In special demobilization of children, the World Bank availed 3.5 million USD which settled every child to \$20 for each month for 18 months.</p>
Reintegration	<p>Reintegration into the various sectors of the economy included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) activities for employment creation, ii) training for self-employment, iii) formal education, iv) business promotion, and v) employment promotion <p>The national demobilization commission gave precedence to business promotional activities in the process of ex-combatants re-integration. Ex-combatants therefore had to be directed to taking professional trainings in farming and fishing, food production, small retail, and trades and crafts.</p> <p>Communitisation of reintegration has been central to the Burundian reintegration process.</p> <p>The approach consisted of:</p>

	<p>i) reconciling ex-combatants with host communities,</p> <p>ii) help in mitigating perceptions that can cause damage,</p> <p>iii) support for rehabilitation, and</p> <p>iv) specialized information sharing and sensitization around family, HIV/AIDS, and women's issues.</p>
Challenges	<p>Reintegration experienced the following technical problems: a lack of national scope and financial infrastructure; low numbers of NGOs supporting reintegration in communities; deficiencies in the primary school system; and depleted funds for planning, management, and logistics.</p> <p>Lack of transparency by ex-rebel factions in the provision of combatant's figures hoping to have bigger amounts of re-insertion allowances (factions such as the CNDD-FDD, for instance, alleged to have an overstated 80,000 combatants in order to profit from DDR).</p> <p>There have been disparities in the distribution of re-insertion allowance between ex-rebels (now leading the country) and ex-government forces (while CNDD combatants received \$ 600, the Gardiens de la Paix received just \$100, and youth an average \$330).</p> <p>There were also difficulties in the transition from demobilization to reintegration due to a variety of political and technical strains.</p>
Solutions	<p>Solutions to delayed re-insertion are:</p> <p>After the evaluation of the on-going DDR process the World Bank programme funding recommended a funding extension of the programme funding in order to cover accumulated delays in the process due to political misunderstandings.</p> <p>In order to speed up the DDR programme's activities NPDRR decision-making has been decentralized by establishing a vocational training project, raising awareness of the psychological problems faced by ex-combatants and improving efforts to accommodate physically disabled individuals in society.</p>

Source: Duma, Van Laar and Klem (2012), Caramés and Sanz (2009) and MDRP (2008)

Case-study 3 Liberia

Objectives	<p>In a context where state apparatus seemed to be non-existent, the prime objectives of the DDR process were :</p> <p>i) To put in place a functioning government under the state of rule of law;</p> <p>ii) Undertake disarmament and demobilization in preparation of the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants.</p>
Security Sector Reform	<p>By February 2005, 101,495 combatants had been demobilized.</p> <p>612 foreign combatants, predominantly from Sierra Leone and Guinea, 127 of them child soldiers, and 379 other combatants have been demobilized after 2005.</p>
Re-insertion	<p>An important intervention in re-insertion is the provision of \$30 per individual ex-combatant for a period of 6 to 8 months. The latter re-insertion money was given in an aim to cover the entire training period.</p> <p>Ex-combatants claimed that the re-insertion allowance package was low and that more could be made working in rubber plantations. Ill-prepared re-insertion programmes created a loss of interest in the process. Re-insertion kits given to ex-combatants were sold by their intended beneficiaries shortly after having received them. 39, 000 ex-fighters who were lured into demobilization and disarmament without adequate compensation and/or training to prepare them for civilian life.</p>
Reintegration	<p>Reintegration was done through both formal and professional education.</p> <p>40% of ex-combatants returned to school (formal education). the remaining 60% who did not qualify for the formal education have been oriented to professional training to acquire life-skills such as agriculture, automobile mechanics and driving, tailoring and bricklaying.</p> <p>In addition to the empowerment aspect through formal education and professional training, there has been other reintegration components such</p>

	as psychological reintegration and assistance provided to combatants infected and affected by HIV/AIDS.
Challenges	<p>Lack of coherence of actions and actors.</p> <p>Uncoordinated actions between policy-making and implementation.</p> <p>Disproportion between the number of combatants and surrendered arms.</p> <p>Manipulated lists provided by Units Commanders of combatants had women and children excluded from benefiting from the re-insertion and reintegration process;</p> <p>The lack of local ownership is the biggest failure of the DDR process and</p> <p>There has been a missing link between the DDs and the R by not preparing combatants to re-integrate within civilian livelihood by being equipped with marketable professional skills.</p>
Ways out	The final re-insertion and reintegration phase incorporated women associated with armed groups who were excluded from earlier programming (approximately a third of the total).

Source: Caramés and Sanz (2009)

Case-study 4 Sierra Leone

Objectives	<p>To strengthen security and to facilitate return of government authority and combatants' return to civilian life;</p> <p>Recognition of former combatants as civilian individuals and the provision of initial assistance for a return to civilian life (re-insertion facilitation);</p> <p>Provision of aid to former combatants to cover their basic needs (re-insertion facilitation);</p> <p>To help combatant re-integrate into the civilian through professional education.</p>
Security sector reform	42,330 weapons and more than 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were collected, all of which were subsequently destroyed. It is estimated that at least one combatant possessed one arm;

	<p>Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program (CACD) scheme has been put in place to rid of arms and ammunitions that have been surrendered. As a result, 9,000 weapons have been collected and destroyed. Incentive initiative for arms surrender has been put in place. 20,000 US-Dollars have been promised to counties declared arms-free.</p> <p>To make it sustained and legally-bound, a legislation regulating arms collection has been put in place.</p>
Re-insertion	<p>Provision of re-insertion basics such as basic household commodities and around \$150 re-insertion allowance.</p> <p>The period between re-insertion and reintegration was set for 3 months</p>
Reintegration	<p>Reintegration aid package include formal education and vocational training. Education empowerment prepares ex-combatants to be competitive for employment opportunities in both in the public and private sectors.</p> <p>Around 55,000 former combatants have received aid for re-integration, which includes vocational training programmes and formal education grants that allow them to subsist for between one and three years, along with support for fishing, agriculture and business projects;</p> <p>Despite the above achievement there is an uneven balance between DD and R.</p>
Challenges	<p>Long-term reintegration (which comprises Economic and Social Re-integration) has received little of financial investment and technical resources instead reintegration efforts have rather been invested in Disarmament and Demobilization phases.</p> <p>Conflict backgrounds and DDR processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia are intertwined; they too have similarities in their respective DDR processes;</p> <p>In Sierra Leone like in Liberia there has been common and fundamental problem of ‘ownership’ Solomon (2009: 18) “Full national ownership also implies that local actors are involved in decisions about objectives,</p>

	strategies, programme design and implementation.” In sum, both countries’ governments should drive the programme. Simply creating a “national commission” however, is insufficient to ensure local ownership.
Solutions	In IDDRS’s perspective, reintegration processes should be designed to stabilise both the socio-economic environment of ex-combatants, as well as benefit the community into which ex-combatants re-integrate (Lamb, 2004: 24).

Source: Caramés and Sanz (2009); Anderlini and Conaway (2004)

Case-study 5 Mozambique

Objectives	<p>Mozambique’s DDR short and medium-term objectives were to set ground for peace, security and political stabilization;</p> <p>The long-term DDR objectives are aimed at long-term reintegration through individual and group development programme.</p>
Security Sector Reform	Out of an estimated total number of 64,000 troops comprising of government and rebels, a quota of 15,000 combatants of each side was agreed upon and the remaining 34,000 combatants had to re-integrate in the civilian life.
Re-insertion	<p>Each combatant who was sent back to his local community was given an identification card, food, clothing, transportation money;</p> <p>Ex-combatants received a two year salary payment as a transition from re-insertion to re-integration. The monthly re-insertion allowance was harmonised with salaries paid regularly to Mozambique personnel.</p>
Reintegration	<p>Due to a low-rate of educated combatants coupled with the political option (of scattering combatants throughout the country). Agriculture has turned out to be the biggest sector that has absorbed many of the ex-combatants.</p> <p>Training and kits have been designed to provide technical and business training to ex-combatants and to supply vocational kits to a selected demobilized population.</p>

	An employment policy was designed and implemented to ensure that reintegration of ex-combatant is carried out by both the public administration and the private sector.
Challenges	<p>The Mozambican DDR faces threefold challenge. The first challenge is logistical, the second technical and the last is political.</p> <p>The agricultural sector that the government capitalised on assisting in the reintegration process faced multiple challenges. These difficulties included a shortage in ex-combatants and poor supporting infrastructure. Small scale businesses have therefore been more attractive than the less promising agricultural sector. The absence of a well-function private sector made it difficult for ex-combatants to find reintegration opportunities out of government capacities.</p> <p>Time lag in the processes of collection and destruction of illicit arms posed a security concern though the process was said to have been smoothly implemented particularly in its Disarmament and Demobilisation phase.</p> <p>In general terms challenges facing reintegration in Mozambique lies much in policy-making and implementation.</p>
Outcome	Given the challenges are linked more on reintegration than on the DDs, overcoming challenges depends much on appropriate policy-making and implementation with appropriate and timely support of both national and international actors.

Source: Solomon and Ginifer (2009), Coelho and Vines (1994)

Case-study 6 Colombia

Objective	To permanently end the threat of violence from armed factions-the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC)
Security Sector Reform	With the registration of more than forty thousand demobilized combatants-thirty one thousand demobilized from the AUC paramilitaries and nine thousand voluntarily demobilized from the FARC and ELN guerrillas.

	<p>In April 2006, more than thirty-one thousand men and women of the AUC participated in the DDR program. The Colombian government and other actors having a stake in the DDR process realized that members of AUC opted to renounce violence as contrary to the initial scepticism and distrust in combatants' good faith in renouncing violence and embarking on the path of peace. Initially it was expected only twenty thousand men and women could disarm, demobilize and re-integrate the civilian livelihood. But ten thousand additional combatants lined up for the DDR programme.</p> <p>In the early stages of the disarmament and demobilisation there was a great deal of scepticism shown. The process however, bore immediate results. The Colombian National Police reported a seventy three percent drop in kidnapping and thirty seven percent drop in homicides between 2002 and 2005.</p>
Re-insertion	<p>Support Centres known as Centres for References and Opportunities (Centro de Referencia y Oportunidades, or CROs). Numbers of these centres have increased from eleven in the summer of 2006 to more than twice that by autumn of 2007.</p> <p>Centres for references and opportunities have played the role of "a clearing house" for all reintegration efforts. This was an innovative and potentially very constructive component of the whole DDR system.</p> <p>CROs contributed in providing information regarding benefits, legal, psychosocial, and educational support, and all other issues relating to the DDR process.</p> <p>Centres for Reintegration Opportunities throughout the country included three centres exclusively designed for minors.</p> <p>One of the CROs' tasks has been to assist demobilized combatants enter The National Learning Service (El Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, or SENA)</p> <p>The SENA program was one of the few widely praised aspects of the re-insertion process.</p> <p>Centres for Reintegration Opportunities have been a strategic asset for</p>

	<p>Colombia's DDR process.</p> <p>In accordance with the agreement between the government and the AUC, the government of Colombia provided demobilized individuals a modest stipend of 358,000 Colombian pesos (US \$160 at the time) each month. The re-insertion allowance was meant to last eighteen months from the date at which the ex-combatants demobilized. They were then individually eligible to apply for a one-time six-month extension of the stipend. Ex-combatants justified their irregular attendance or absence from attending training courses as a result of the inadequate financial support packages. As a consequence, ex-combatants' motivation in attending professional trainings was negatively impacted.</p> <p>One important flagship re-insertion and reintegration practice has been encouraging ex-combatants to deposit their re-insertion stipend of 358,000 Colombian pesos (US \$160) in bank accounts or microfinance accounts. This innovative practice, introduced demobilized individuals to the formal financial system (with which many were previously unfamiliar).</p>
Reintegration	<p>The ultimate goal of ex-combatants' reintegration is renouncing violence and undertaking a normal civilian livelihood with the backing of marketable skills.</p> <p>Colombia's Law 782 provides for a set of social, economic, and judicial benefits to be offered to the demobilized. These benefits include access to health care, education, employment-generating "productive projects," and psychosocial support for reintegration into Colombian society.</p>
Challenges	<p>There has been a security and safety breaches by Colombian national police that accessed ex-combatants personal information from the Centres for Reintegration Opportunities (CROs) and subsequently there have been reported disappearing of ex-combatants;</p> <p>Limited choices by ex-combatants in their orientation in professional education;</p> <p>There is no indication of an existing extensive instruction given to the demobilized on how to take advantage of and benefit from banking services (such as savings accounts and/or loans).</p>

	Many El Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA) sites have been characterized by some technical and organizational flaws. These flaws range from limited numbers of professional discipline in the interest of ex-combatants.
Solutions	<p>Government-sponsored employment programs are clearly necessary for reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life but the programs will only be successful if developed properly.</p> <p>Microcredit models with sufficient educational and vocational training support have proven effective around the world. Microcredit and vocational training programmes should be easy to use and apply. The two reintegration schemes should be backbone of any DDR process. While these two reintegration schemes are outstandingly indispensable, they have however been easy to use and readily available and accessible to ex-combatants across the country (in the rural and urban areas). The most important underpinning in the success of microcredit and professional training is the mechanism of Monitoring and Evaluation for reasons of preventing corruption, manipulation and abuse by opportunist actors or beneficiaries.</p>

Source: Solomon and Ginifer (2009), Coelho and Vines (1994)

3.7 Three main challenges

From this review of DDR case studies, three main challenges to their effectiveness were identified.

3.7.1 Gaps between policy making and implementation

The cross-cutting weakness in the six re-insertion and reintegration processes is the gap between policy-making and implementation. These gaps are organizational, structural and technical (IDDRS, 2006; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004). Reintegration was best carried out by the Angolan government. When problems were encountered they took place at the implementation level. An ad-hoc joint committee was commissioned to identify causes that had prevented the smooth implementation of the process. The independent committee was made of Angolan government officials and national army personnel and ex-combatants. At the end of the inquiry

into flaws in the DDR process, the committee recommended that ex-combatant's reintegration be enshrined in the Angolan national law (Duma, Van Laar and Klem, 2012; IAWG-DDR, 2010; Caramés and Sanz, 2009).

Unlike other post-conflict countries where reintegration processes are exclusive government business, the Colombian government conferred the reintegration process to the private sector. Previous researches (Rouw and Willems, 2010; Specht, 2010) assert that the private sector which was in the early stages becoming essential to the implementation the re-insertion and reintegration process. It was headed by the influential businessman Frank Pearl, appointed by former President Alvaro Uribe and contributed in galvanizing the business community behind the reintegration process.

Generally the private sector showed little faith in ex-combatants' trustworthiness and professional skills. However, when ex-combatants are equipped with appropriate and competitive professional skills, they become a necessary and needed workforce in the private sector. Ex-combatants became beneficial to the wider community in that they promote local economy while concurrently building grounds for community reconciliation (Specht, 2010).

The most important benefit that the private sector was expected to bring to the reintegration process was the absorption of ex-combatants in the job-market across Colombia. Openness of business community did not mean giving-combatants negligible jobs as was the experience of many ex-combatants in other countries where DDR processes has taken place.

The absorption scheme was aimed at quantitative and qualitative placements of ex-combatants whether in the blue-collar or white-collar employments (Tholens and Strazzari, 2010). Ex-combatants are supposedly predisposed to hear the private sector's word than the national commissions because the former is regarded to be as a hands-on actor in the world of entrepreneurship than the techniques government commissions. Ex-combatants' exposure to business in provided them with an opportunity to change their mind sets, which is the ultimate prerequisite for the grand R to be successfully attained (Specht, 2010; ILO, 2009; IDDRS, 2006; Michael, 2006; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004).

But even if the government entrusted the re-insertion and reintegration process of ex-combatants to the private sector, the government's authority and oversight over the reintegration process remains irreversible under any country's DDR context (Specht, 2010; IDDRS, 2006;

Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004). The government's role of policy-making and decision-making in the process of DDR remains without alternative even if reintegration can take the bottom-up approach (Justino, 2010; Verkoren *et al.*, 2010).

3.7.2 Non - Effective participation

Various scholars (Majee and Hoyt, 2011; Zeebroek *et al.*, 2010) question the cause of participation, which stakeholders are involved, how power relations play out, the crucial aspect of power in the success or failure of the entire process. When the principle of one person and one voice is not used, there is ground for power asymmetry, thus making the whole process undemocratic and creating counterproductive participation.

Public participation means the public's involvement in decision-making processes over topics that have direct or distant impact on their lives. The public is made up of a broad spectrum made of ordinary citizens, government, civil society and the private sector. Participation is important in design and implantation of policies regulating every aspect of public life (Uvin, 2014; Slocum, 2003).


An action approach depicted in Figure 3.2 presents participation as a cyclic process whose phases are not compartmentalized according to participants various statutes. The three phases which make up the participation cycle are a succession of dependent activities. It may happen that actors who translate the phases into action may not be the same people who implement the action.

For example, an individual or a team which has designed a socio-economic development policy is not the same team that implements, those who implements, may evaluate the as they may need external experts to ensure neutrality in the ascertainment of the project success or failure (Uvin, 2014; Solomon and Ginifer, 2009; Babbie and Mouton, 2002).

For a top-down DDR approach, there is little degree of participation by ex-combatants and their local communities. DDR policies and related actions carried out by co-actors (nationals and internationals) are delivered to people at the grassroots level but the latter have power to influence neither the policies nor the implementation course. A top-down approach presents itself as necessary when post-conflict contexts are characterized by emergencies (Schroeder, 2015; Cahill, 2007). Top-down reintegration further calls for policies that address the underlying causes that made ex-combatants to join rebellions (Specht, 2010; Schmelzle and

Bloomfield, 2006; Miall, 2004). Forms of injustice benefit those who have power and takes place at the expense of the oppressed sections of the population.

Figure3. 2. The levels of participation



Source: Asiedu (2010: 71)

A bottom-up DDR approach enables communities in the design and execution of reintegration projects. The design entails the coming together of communities and policy-makers in the determination of what is in the best interests of locals while at the same time being guided by the national goals of DDR process. At the implementation level, communities need NGOs in the implementation of designed projects. Sprecht (2010: 10) refers to this process as the community being in the driver’s seat. The bottom-up approach matters as sustainable peace, stability, and development are measured at the grassroots level under “a wider recovery strategy based on the community” (Sprecht, 2010: 10.). Failure or success of re-insertion and reintegration of ex-combatants is measured at the grassroots level. Caramés (2006) confirms the role of the grassroots communities in DDR as beneficiaries of re-insertion and reintegration interventions on behalf of government and other nongovernment actors.

Community-based reintegration recommends the use of locally-made and driven solutions to economic recovery. This must be done with an aim of creating jobs for specific groups of local

communities while creating employment opportunities for instance in industries of agriculture, handicrafts, timber industry and fishery depending on available opportunity and the ability of creating job opportunities (Justino, 2010; ILO, 2009; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004).

3.7.3 Poor preparedness to participate in the economy

Most ex-combatants decide to go farming once they recognise the limited wage job opportunities, but the skills needed for agricultural enterprises are not part of the courses typically availed to ex-combatants. Yet agribusiness should take centre-stage in their economic reintegration because the majority have access to land, which is an important asset in terms of productivity and access to loans from banks and micro-finances (Justino, 2010; ILO, 2009). If ex-combatants lack opportunities on the job-market, then the agriculture option is not taken seriously. This should be their new big and promising economic reintegration opportunity as well as the community at large. In post-conflict wider recovery plan, agribusiness should be prioritized as a reintegration opportunity. Agribusiness should therefore be an emphasis in the training.

Despite receiving the re-insertion allowance, reintegration goals are not attained because ex-combatants complain that the re-insertion package ‘is not enough’. In Colombia, ex-combatants gave as an excuse for not attending scheduled reintegration trainings that the re-insertion allowance was too little to cover their households’ monthly needs. The ex-combatants opted to go for immediate money-making by taking small jobs instead of attending reintegration training courses (Risch and Hoebeke, 2010; Morgenstein, 2009). Another example is the Mozambican DDR process where reintegration opportunities were missed because ex-combatants chose to live in towns instead of rural areas where they could practice skills acquired during the reintegration training sessions (Coelho and Vines, 1994).

The literacy level amongst ex-combatants is low because most of them come from poor backgrounds with little opportunity (ILO, 2009; Watson, 2009; Ozerdem and Podder, 2008). In the demobilization process, better educated ex-combatants do better, particularly in the context where peace agreements specify representation quotas in newly formed armies of national unity. When ex-combatants are mentally unprepared to demobilize from the army and join new and different environment of civilian livelihood, this negatively impacts the subsequent phases of re-integration. Lack of mental preparation for the DDR process results in depression feelings of

hopelessness expressed by ex-combatants. Soldiers who have been forced to demobilise struggle the most with the reintegration process (MDRP, 2008).

Little attention is given to developing skills and the mapping out of business opportunities before ex-combatants start their own businesses. There is a tendency of ‘prescribing the same activities’ to ex-combatants, typically a focus on agriculture and mechanics. Pre-investment assessment of the value-chain is a means of ensuring success and avoiding bankruptcy (Michel, 2012). Ex-combatants are generally not mentored on financial management or on creative business making skills. The lack of knowledge in these areas has led to their financial resources being depleted. Many ex-combatants subsequently moved to urban areas to find alternative employment such as working as security guards which are poorly paid.

The above case-studies look at countries which have emerged from armed conflicts. However, each country has its conflict context, issues, actors, structures; national legal frameworks (O’Neill, 2012; Miall, 2004). Although the implementation of DDR process should not be taken as a ‘one size fits all’ the best practices found in the cases should be carried forward, emulated and learned by other countries in post-conflict context. The most important point is indeed learning from action approaches to implementing DDR process (Justino, 2010), which fits with this research’s prime purpose of “bottom-up participation” in ex-combatants’ socio-economic re-integration.

3.8 Solution to these challenges

3.8.1 Reconciliation

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the right of all Rwandan ex-combatants to seek alternative legal status in the country of asylum as one of the options provided within Cessation Clause implementation framework. Therefore Rwanda will continue to closely work with governments of the countries of asylum to address issues regarding acquisition of the Rwandan passports and other travel documents for those who may be accorded local integration opportunities and legally allowed to stay in the host countries under alternative status. An application form for Rwandan passports has been availed in the Rwandan embassies in different countries and has been uploaded on the website of the Rwanda Directorate of Emigration and Immigration for easy access for any Rwandan refugees who need it.

Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Reintegration in Rwanda project, which started in 2010 brought together International Alert, Umuseke, Duterimbere Association sans but lucrative (Duterimbere not-for-profit organisation, or Duterimbere Asbl), Duterimbere Institution de microfinance (Duterimbere micro-finance institution, or Duterimbere IMF), Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe and ARCT Ruhuka in a partnership, which aims to strengthen reintegration efforts to benefit four target groups: genocide survivors, former combatants, ex-prisoners and youth. Tobie and Masabo (2012) assert,

The project is original in the Rwandan context for three principal, interconnected reasons: it brings together four groups in joint activities, while caring for the specific needs of each constituency; it uses a comprehensive approach, working on the psychological health, dialogue needs and economic wellbeing of the target groups; it selected its target groups at the individual and family level, but also includes a strand targeting the population as a whole, articulating connections between the community and national level.

Operating in eight sectors of Rwanda, 5 group therapy sessions for trauma sufferers, conducted by counsellors from ARCT Ruhuka, are provided. These sessions are conducted jointly for members of different groups; former combatants, survivors and ex-prisoners have access to a space where they can share their experiences of the genocide and the psychological consequences they have inherited from it. Individual counseling is provided if requested by beneficiaries. ARCT Ruhuka also provides awareness-raising sessions for communities, in which the project is active, helping neighbours or family members to identify signs of trauma and informing them of referral possibilities. As of March 2012, ARCT Ruhuka had trained 42 facilitators, held 52 meetings on trauma, and broadcast 4 programmes on radio and television. The various clubs were providing psychological help to 358 people. Their activities revolve around active listening techniques and taking responsibility for individual and group traumas. The beneficiaries have been able to detect signs of trauma early on in individuals and to attempt to help them, and they have adopted an understanding attitude towards those affected psychologically.

A strong learning point from this strand of the project was the similarity of individuals' symptoms from all sides of the conflict. While the causes of trauma were different, behavioural and clinical symptoms were often the same for survivors and ex-prisoners. Trauma counselling offered considerable benefit to former combatants. While this last group had benefited from a

reintegration programme implemented by the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), a number of former combatants felt that they had not received adequate screening for trauma, and had found themselves suffering from alcohol or drug abuse. This may be due to the fact that the trauma only revealed itself after they had undergone demobilisation, or that the large number of former combatants did not allow RDRC to provide adequate or sufficient screening for trauma. Meanwhile, youth are often a victim of “secondary trauma”, or “transferred trauma” phenomena. In Rwanda, while youths did not all personally suffer as a result of the genocide, the environment in which they were brought up has been strongly marked by the violence their families have endured. This has, in turn, impacted on their ability to interact in a peaceful social environment and they have started to develop symptoms of trauma.

3.8.2 Rebuilding local infrastructure and governance systems

Rwanda has been hosting ex-combatants, mainly from the DRC, but also from other African countries, for decades. The majority of the refugees are hosted in five camps - Gihembe, Kigeme, Kiziba, Mugombwa and Nyabiheke. In 2015, UNHCR will continue providing protection and assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers. Over the past few years, thousands of refugees have returned to Rwanda and another 10,000 are expected to do so in 2015. UNHCR is active in a joint Government and One UN return and reintegration programme for Rwandan returnees, which provides a platform for all stakeholders to coordinate their activities.

With a country target of 10,000 resettled refugees, Rwanda is part of UNHCR's regional comprehensive solutions strategy for Congolese refugees in the Great Lakes region. The Rwandan Government makes land available for refugee camps and facilitates access for refugees to public services, particularly the educational system. To ensure that refugee students are enrolled in upper secondary education, UNHCR will support the construction of additional schools for some 4,800 students.

3.8.3 Education and skills training

Recently, a reintegration project that will help at least 5,000 vulnerable returnees was launched and it is funded by governments of Rwanda, Japan and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The project dubbed “Enhancing socio-economic reintegration of Rwandan returnees and other vulnerable groups” were implemented in phases and saw the returnees obtained vocational

and technical skills and micro-business start-up kits, livestock assistance as well as construction materials to build their own houses .

This was the fourth phase of the general projects to reintegration Rwandans returning from different countries. The project also intends to rehabilitate some infrastructure such as primary schools and health posts in communities where the returnees are being resettled. Over 9,300 returnees and other vulnerable Rwandans have been provided with direct reintegration assistance to secure sustainable livelihood since 2010. More than 2,600 beneficiaries were trained in vocational skills in carpentry, masonry, tailoring, mechanics, hairdressing and other market-driven skills.

Northing (2014) argues that the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has stepped up efforts to support the sustainable reintegration of Rwandan refugees returning from neighbouring countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. The organization is training some 184 trainers, who will in turn impart their acquired skills to 1,500 selected returnees and vulnerable members of host communities in Rwanda.

The training of trainers, which is the fourth in a series of similar interventions for returnees, is funded by Japan and focuses on improving teaching skills, providing advanced training for effective adult learning and promoting best practices to help returnee beneficiaries to become self-employed. Returnees are trained in skills including carpentry, welding, knitting, tailoring, mechanics, masonry and hairdressing.

The trainers are drawn from the districts of Gisagara, Huye, Nyaruguru and Nyamagabe (Southern Province), Karongi, Nyabihu, Rubavu and Rutsiro (Western Province), and Musanze (Northern Province). Given the success of phases I, II and III of the project, IOM and the Ministry for Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs are now targeting 5,000 direct beneficiaries, of whom 1,500 will receive vocational skills training and 1,500 will receive livestock assistance. Another 2,000 beneficiaries will be provided with construction materials to improve their housing.

Since its inception in 2010, the programme has benefited more than 8,000 direct beneficiaries and their families, representing a total of over 40,000 indirect beneficiaries. The impact of the programme can already be seen in a 78% average increase in income for direct beneficiaries and

an improvement in living conditions for 63% of beneficiaries who received housing assistance under the previous three phases (Northing, 2014).

3.8.4 Medical and psychological assistance

Support Project Promoting Entrepreneurship in partnership with the Embassy of Belgium in Rwanda (Action Zone)'s main project activities were also focused on the different courses which included: Foundation of the company, Management Company, Pre and Post Credit Behavior, Conflict Management, Cooperative Management, HIV / AIDS, Gender, Culture and Mushrooms Study Tours. Another important activity was the awareness Sector Kirehe on various topics received by the different training of trainers (themes mentioned above). Kirehe sector has a total of five administrative units. For this phase of the project focused on raising awareness of these five cells in the first place. Kirehe District with a total of 12 administrative areas, but given the planned activities and the duration of the pilot project is one year, implementation of the various activities were focused in the Kirehe is precisely within five cells that sector are: Gahama, Kirehe Nyabikokora, and Rwesero Nyabigega.

The project objective is to contribute to the reduction of the prevalence of HIV and AIDS through the involvement of people with disabilities. There is also support for the reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Rwanda. Target groups estimated to be at least 10,000 combatants out of 70,000 combatants (96 % men, 3.9 % children, 0.1 % women) who are demobilized in the framework of the MDRP and are reintegrated in Rwanda from three military factions.

In addition, in Kundermann and Dukundane's (2010) study, it was discovered that the program objective was that "Ex-Combatants are successfully reintegrated in the Rwandan society in selected areas". Its overarching objective was "to contribute to the stabilization of peace in the program regions". It was embedded in the Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which operated in seven countries of the Great Lakes Region between 2002 and 2009. The program's components referred to capacity building for RDRC (GTZ), vocational training and business skills training for individual ex-combatants as well as cooperatives (GTZ), community based reintegration (CBR) works including employment as well as training for improved livelihoods (KfW), and finally, a medical rehabilitation component for ex-combatants living with disabilities and chronically ill ex-combatants (KfW). The program contribution referred to the last (reintegration) stage of the overall Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process which was already defined before the start of the program.

The rapid peace and stability the country gained convinced over three million Rwandan refugees, who had fled to different countries, to voluntarily repatriate only four years after the genocide.

3.8.5 Income generating activities

Support Project Promoting Entrepreneurship in partnership with the Embassy of Belgium in Rwanda (Action Zone) also targeted the income generation in all districts of the country. In one area of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Target group, the project targets 150 trainers Duterimbere and 90 community facilitators (counselors or coaches of low-income women entrepreneurs and potential business and youth); Duterimbere 1500 members, 60 000 beneficiaries Duterimbere Asbl interventions (80% of beneficiaries are of low-income women economically active). That is to say 2000 people per district.

An example is of a women's economic empowerment project, with development of business models for mushroom and pineapple value chain. The overall objective of the project is to develop models and expand them elsewhere in the sector of mushroom and pineapple. The project will target in particular, women with low income grouped in cooperatives and beneficiaries Duterimbere Asbl. The intervention area is constituted by the District Kirehe (Mushroom business models) of the Eastern Province and the District Rulindo (pineapple value chain) in the Northern Province.

Given this mission, the project focuses its activities on economic development from different entrepreneurial training to educate low-income women settlers to the creation of income-generating activities for the cultivation of mushrooms.

3.8.6 Evaluating the reintegration projects/programmes

Previous scholars (Tobie and Masabo, 2012) argue that evaluating the reintegration projects/programmes involves constructing a framework which aims to establish a coherent tool to understand why different organizations might have different aims when implementing their programmes, and to explain why it might be useful to target different groups. Organisations like FARG, IBUKA and AVEGA clearly target the rehabilitation of genocide survivors. When

targeting former combatants or refugees returning to Rwanda, an additional step of reinsertion is necessary.

For example, the Alert-led consortium would fall under the reintegration category, accompanying individuals and communities and ensuring that they develop ways of building a positive, cohesive future for themselves.

This model also implies a greater degree of coordination and consultation between agencies operating in Rwanda. The activities building up to a reintegrated Rwandan society should build on each other and avoid sending out contradictory messages. Linkages should be built between organisations, which might, for instance, initiate a system of referral, by which they could decide to redirect individuals to those organisations which implement activities most suiting individuals' needs. Mutual help and discussions could also take place to tackle the most contentious topics, such as the link between reintegration and justice.

Finally, the model provides a roadmap for reintegration. It explains how activities should be made sustainable by initially providing direct assistance to affected populations, then gradually building their capacity to look after themselves through dialogue and economic recovery, before finally being fully reintegrated into Rwandan society. In this sense, the step beyond reintegration would be the integration of beneficiaries into normal services provided by the state.

It must be noted that, while the programmes analysed during this study did not present their activities in this way, organisations to which this model was presented strongly saw their activities fitting into one category or the other. FARG, for instance, clearly agreed that its activities were of a rehabilitative nature. Its plans for an exit strategy already include a referral system for the beneficiaries, who will be redirected to specific state social services after having benefited from the programmes offered by FARG, therefore avoiding dependency on direct support activities and pointing towards greater autonomy and reintegration.

3.8.7 Outcomes of the reintegration projects

Various outcomes have been observed by researchers. For example, the Fostering Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Reintegration in Rwanda project, the benefits of the integrated approach were very much felt by the beneficiaries. When asked why and how the activities helped them specifically, most answers referred to the impact they had on other aspects of their lives; for example, an economic activity helped them feel better about their

trauma, or the dialogue sessions allowed them to set up a successful business venture. Yakana (2010), one of the beneficiaries says,

The Alert project helped me accept myself, and grieve. The training given by Pro-Femmes has helped me reintegrate into the community in all aspects, and to meet people again. I realised I had a lot of prejudices against ex-prisoners, and Hutus generally. I did not know that they, too, had suffered, in some respects, from the genocide.

According to MIDIMAR (2014), some of the returnees who completed vocational skills trainings through the above project have registered success stories in different parts of the country after setting up income-generating activities. In addition to specific projects targeting returnees, the latter are also integrated in all existing poverty alleviation government programmes like other citizens.

Returnees recover their properties without any complications. For returnees whose properties have been illegally taken over by other people, local authorities and the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs intervene to ensure that the properties are returned to the right owner. The most complicated cases are dealt with by the justice system. In addition, returnees are visited on a regular basis by MIDIMAR reintegration staff to ensure that they are smoothly reintegrated in the community, and also try to help those who are still facing challenges (MIDIMAR, 2014).

Mr. Theophile Rwanga, 28-years-old, lives in Kiramuruzi sector in Gatsibo District in the Eastern Province. The courageous and humble man, with well-trimmed beard, had thought he would never cope with the level of development he found when he returned his home in 2012 after 18 years living in forests in South Kivu in the DRC. Met with a huge dilemma, wondering how he would make it after he returned, local authorities selected him as one of beneficiaries of the “Enhancing Socio-economic Reintegration of Returnees and other Vulnerable Group” project.

The brilliant Rwanga surprised everyone when he chose to study three courses; wielding, carpentry and bricklaying in one session. After graduating six months later, he used the skills he acquired to start a private business. Rwanga’s testimony is a success story of a young person projecting a bright future for many returnees. “I can make luxury timber and metal products, including sofa chairs, doors, windows, beds, roofing materials, among others,” (MIDIMA,

2014: 11) testified Rwanga when visited by MIDIMAR staff in January 2013. Bavugameshi returned from Minova, DRC in 2005. He currently owns a garment-making workshop in Kiramuruzi trading centre, where they design and make all kind of modern-fashion styles. Bavugamenshi told his story when MIDIMAR reintegration staff visited him in January 2013.

“I had a secondary school diploma in agriculture when I returned, but I could not get a good job. So I sought assistance from local leaders. I was later selected as a beneficiary of Rural Small and Micro-enterprise Promotion project, which promotes micro-projects in rural areas. The project facilitated me to join the tailoring skills training centre and gave me start-up kit on completion,” narrates Bavugamenshi (MIDIMAR, 2014: 15).

“After completing the training, I started operating from home using the sewing machines I got as start-up kit, but I realised that this was not going to help me become a big business man. So I changed strategy and resolved to set up a workshop in town. I secured a loan from URWEGO Opportunity Bank to set up this workshop,” Bavugamenshi said (MIDIMAR, 2014: 15).

3.9 Measuring the performance of reintegration efforts

This section relates to the third research specific objective to devise performance indicators to be used in an ex-combatants' reintegration project. It is important at the outset to note that in line with the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR) guidelines, a number of experts assert that the DDR is not a mechanism for achieving long-term objectives, but is most appropriately seen as a means of helping to create a stable and secure post-conflict environment that is conducive to political and economic development (Verkoren *et al.*, 2010). The central objective of reintegration programmes is to support ex-combatants in their efforts for social and economic integration into civilian society. The national reintegration programmes provide assistance to help ex-combatants establish sustainable livelihoods. Several guiding principles would apply for reintegration assistance: (i) minimize market distortions and maximize beneficiary choice, (ii) provide assistance that leads to sustainable livelihoods, (iii) involve communities of settlement and foster reconciliation, and (iv) provide benefit to the wider community (MDRP, 2008).

Three major aspects of reintegration have been identified earlier – social re-integration, political reintegration and economic re-integration. The emphasis in this section is to explain the performance indicators which can be used to assess a community-based reintegration project with respect to the social and economic aspects.

3.9.1 Economic dimensions of reintegration

It must be said that ex-combatants face the very similar challenges to the rest of the community during the period of recovery after armed conflict. That is, do they have, or can they develop, skills which will lead them into employment or self-employment?

If, as is commonly the case, the answer is no, then agricultural activity to provide the household's subsistence needs, with a surplus to be sold for cash, is the most common alternative. As has been noted, ex-combatants can be trained in skill such as mechanics, but the competition they will face in the market place is likely to be fierce. It is almost impossible to think of training which will give ex-combatants an "edge" in the labour market, and there is in any case the valid question why they should receive preferential treatment. That is why many countries recovery from civil war absorb many ex-combatants in to an army of national unity, which is often far bigger than is justified by the security situation.

The following table lists the components of a micro-enterprise program model for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants (Body, 2005: 12).

Table 3. 6. Socio-economic reintegration assessment of conditions in country and selected area, needs profile of target group

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Survey of potential business opportunities and referral alternatives in the area.▪ Selection of local NGO or government partners (to provide local knowledge, background check on applicants for loan/grant approval, and monitoring assistance).▪ Program design and approval, public announcement of program.▪ Initial screening of applications, background checks with partner NGOs and cross checking with the military, to identify fraudulent applicants (care should be taken to eliminate personal bias in this screening process).▪ Interview of screened candidates, preliminary evaluation together with local community advisors, to check for reliability and to produce a first applicant profile.▪ Conduct of aptitude tests, assessment of results re: business skills, attitude to risk, and business experience. If insufficient score refer applicant to skills training, temporary public works projects, local employment offices or local NGOs, using the inventory of referral alternatives developed above.▪ Development of small business training curriculum (such as entrepreneurship, functions of management, types of businesses, accounting and taxation, marketing and business |
|--|

planning); training of a pool of small business advisors/trainers.

- Business Planning for screened applicants:

- Information sessions on local business opportunities
- Business idea generation workshops, market research by applicants
- Business training sessions
- Preparation of business plans by applicants, assisted by business advisors

- Assessment and Approval of Business Plan by a Selection Committee comprised of the Executing Agency, a Microfinance Institution or bank (if involved), a local NGO partner, and a representative of the community business advisory panel. Selection criteria will include business viability, number of jobs created, guarantees available (if loan) and applicant's reliability.

- Business start-up and operation

- Monitoring and on-going business counselling/technical assistance
- Loan repayment (if applicable)

Source: Body (2005: 12)

This chapter relates to the third research specific objective to devise performance indicators to be used in an ex-combatants' reintegration project. It is important at the outset to note that in line with the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR) guidelines, a number of experts assert that the DDR is not a mechanism for achieving long-term objectives, but is most appropriately seen as a means of helping to create a stable and secure post-conflict environment that is conducive to political and economic development (Verkoren *et al.*, 2010). The central objective of reintegration programmes is to support ex-combatants in their efforts for social and economic integration into civilian society. The national reintegration programmes provide assistance to help ex-combatants establish sustainable livelihoods.

Three major aspects of reintegration have been identified earlier – social re-integration, political reintegration and economic re-integration; such performance indicators are the benchmarks that can be used to assess a community-based reintegration project.

Economic reintegration provides a contribution to self-reliance and financial independence which is viewed as essential for achieving objectives of demobilisation at the political and social levels. This may be supported by Nubler (2013), Porto, Parsons and Alden (2011) who argued that the last step of DDR is a long – term process which starts together with reinsertion

and focuses on the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families. A victorious reintegration is completed especially when ex-combatants and their families are able to generate enough income to ensure their financial independence and when the community has accepted them (Watteville, 2012).

Economic reintegration should help ex-combatants to play a constructive economic role in the communities to which they return or settle, their presence tends to be seen in a more positive light by these communities. In this context, economic reintegration can also contribute to the complex, long-term process of social reintegration. Prior to economic reintegration, sustained conflict tends to destroy pre-war economies, infrastructure and markets, break down the public sector, leave land uncultivable due to unexploded ordinance and landmines, and undermine the social relations often at the heart of trading, meaning that livelihood opportunities are scarce. In addition, ex-combatants may have limited levels of education, skills and work experience, further hampering their ability to gain employment (Ink and Watson, 2010).

3.9.1.1 Household economic and income security

Economic reintegration involves improvement on the household economic and income security of the ex-combatants. A reintegration project must consider number of issues when assessing the ex-combatants' socio – economic situation; and also to get a better picture of the level of economic security of ex-combatants' household. Some of the issues that must be considered include number of people that contribute to the household's income, the ex-combatant's main and secondary economic activities, house ownership and access to land, among others.

Economic aspect of community-based reintegration programmes, must take into account both adequate livelihoods for ex-combatants and the building of harmonious relations between ex-combatants and community members. Care needs to be taken not to advantage ex-combatants to the detriment of community members, as this will surely hinder social re-integration.

Given this background, the certain points should be considered as obvious performance indicators for economic reintegration such as the number and proportion of ex-combatants engaging in productive economic activities.

Average earnings from these activities, by comparison will need such as the number and proportion of households above the poverty line and the extent to which they are above it.

Ex-combatants of households should have stable sources of income as they held low level and unstable jobs. The figures of the National Institute of Statistics on Rwanda show how the informal sector moves in parallel with the informal economy, with 91% of jobs. Indeed, the Rwandan economy is characterized by a labour market duality of formal and informal markets. This is advantageous since the informal sector is the lifeline for different persons like individuals who are less educated, jobless and people with falling income. Since the youth are the majority of the population of Rwanda, they become the most victims of unemployment. Consequently, they are obliged to turn to the informal sector. This situation values more the informal sector as it offers work alternatives for the jobless. In fact, this requires deep analysis and subsequent initiatives by the government to fully associate all stakeholders in order to take advantage of the informal sector. This entails the setting up of an adequate structure of vocational training and social security that help ex-combatants and other people to work safely and move from their informal to formal market.

In Jabana's households, unemployed members depend on those who are employed which is not enough to ensure the survival of the family. Economic reintegration should help households to use the small piece of land to provide sufficient food or income for their survival. In addition, economic reintegration cooperatives should provide formal employment to supplement the household income that is many members must be employed at all levels of the organisation with gender balance with limited fear losing their jobs without reason. A cooperative composition should also help household heads earning and the entire households' wellbeing.

Income is the most important indicator of reintegration. It reflects the individual and household members' ability to meet their basic needs. For one to survive in Rwanda such as Jabana, one must earn an income of at least USD\$ 120 equivalent to about 80,000FRW. Such income level can make it possible for an ex-combatant to pay for accommodation lease, buy stock for food, pay school fees or contributions, and pay for health care and transport fares for each household member (Isaksson, 2011).

Economic reintegration should help to reduce food shortages among ex-combatants that is capability afford meals three times a day. In this case good number of ex-combatants can stock food for about a week; stocked food may include basic food that often used such as flour, potatoes and beans, and for some cases have meat and fruits in their meals.

Economic reintegration should help ex-combatants have access to safe drinking water. In Jabana, economic reintegration project must help both urban and rural inhabitants to access infrastructures such as tap water, electric power and telephone networks. The project should not only involve people living in the capital city where infrastructures such as water and electricity are well developed compared as well as other parts of the country. The number of people for instance who benefit from safe drinking water must be high both urban and rural areas.

Economic reintegration project is helpful enhancing living conditions coupled with the ability to have access to regular medical care, which is usually a major concern for people living in the Jabana. In this case ex-combatants can be able to pay for medical consultation, treatment and hospitalization, pay for some drugs (generic drugs) and have means to take a patient to a health centre in case of serious sickness.

With economic reintegration, ex-combatants must be able to have medical insurance and every household member must at least sleep under insecticide treated bed nets. This can be observed by the rate of members accessing health insurance, as well as accessing anti-malaria mosquito nets. The government of Rwanda has been engaged in a campaign that promotes access to health insurance, known as "Mutuelle de Santé", through all health centres. This campaign calls the biggest population to be covered by that health insurance and the expansion of health insurance makes its programme affordable as it helps everyone without discrimination. However, this health insurance must cover both urban and rural populations at relatively low cost on the side of the subscriber.

Economic reintegration should make education possible for ex-combatants and their siblings. Education is important for people as a good school education is a necessary requirement for subsequent income-earning. With favourable economic earning, households are able to send their school-age children to school, given government policy which forbids teachers and principals from excluding a child whose parents have failed to pay school fees from school. This is the minimum ability that is required to fulfil the educational responsibilities as parents or heads of household such as afford to pay for their children's uniforms, provide them with pin money every day for food every day pay school fees that is required for every child. Other educational responsibilities include purchase properly school materials such as notebooks, books and pens and pay a tutor to help his children at home.

Economic reintegration could help ex-combatants to have clothes that are in good conditions or afford to buy a good pair of shoes, sweaters to wear during rainy and cold periods. In addition, economic reintegration project must help ex-combatants to pay for new clothes on special occasions of the year. With such projects, ex-combatants have the ability to purchase hygienic soaps, clothes and other materials which may not endanger the health of family members.

3.9.1.2 Primary economic activity

As regards primary economic activity, there is a need to check the principal sources of ex-combatants' livelihoods in a selected area. In this case, agriculture has been viewed as the primary economic activity because it contributes the biggest source of income in rural areas compared to urban areas (Porto, Parsons and Alden, 2011). The next economic activity that provides source of livelihoods is the wage labour, informal trade and commerce, so on. However, such economic activities vary from place to place that is rural and urban areas.

According to Ball and Hendrickson (2005), agricultural activity being the most common alternative to solve the economic problems among the ex-combatants should provide the households with subsistence needs, with a surplus to be sold for cash. As has been noted, ex-combatants can be trained in agricultural mechanisation such that they are not affected by seasonal changes.

3.9.1.3 Providing occupational skills

An economic reintegration project must play a fundamental role in designing of reintegration programmes that involve determining the set of professional skills among ex-combatants. Among the areas of concentration include the occupation and professional training before joining the project. The professional occupation may include employment in public or private sectors, working in manual trades (tradesmen), teachers, nurses among others. Professional trainings may include public sector (nurse or teacher), skilled manual labour, administration/finance, agriculture, political/social mobilisation among others.

3.9.1.4 Cooperative as means of economic reintegration

Cooperatives should be ideal instruments; such a strategy that allows the country to support dynamic cooperatives where cooperatives have an important form of organization to fight against social exclusion and poverty, for example, through local initiatives development and savings mobilization.

Cooperative structures have traditionally been associated with people who struggle to make a living. Cooperatives as aiming at mutually beneficial collective action should help people who have combined their resources of capital and labour to capture greater or different benefits from an enterprise than if the business were undertaken individually (Majee and Hoyt, 2011). The very nature of cooperatives must encourage joint, collaborative effort between ex-combatants and community members. Ideally, cooperatives are characterized by openness, liberality and free adhesion are cooperatives led by corporate principles (Zeebroek *et al.*, 2010; Zeuli, 2002) are bound by internal rules and regulations, but also abide by principles and values such as those established by the International Cooperative Association which are: Voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training, and information; co-operation among cooperatives; and concern for community...Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, cooperative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others (Majee and Hoyt, 2011).

Within the cooperatives, influential personalities should not be more powerful than the group structure and the cooperative's structures are superseded by these personalities. This can be guided by the existence of rules, roles, procedures, precedent and relationships among others, aimed at binding group members to the organization's objectives. However, hierarchy only serves the few whose influence dictates the course of action within the organization and other members are not free-willed participants but mere adherents.

Any successive program or project must be funded by international donors. However, such over dependence on external agencies to support these programs raises multiple problems. Still, such funding should be normally available for reintegration training of ex-combatants. Donors should center on disarmament phase of DDR programs aimed at removing weapons from the hands of ex-combatants. Donors should be willing to fund programs that are perceived of by the community as rewarding violence. This reduces the extensive delays between demolition and entrance into reintegration programs and to the shortening of the actual reintegration training program. Such training should last for more than eight months to properly train ex-combatants in any vocational skill. This additional training helps ex-combatants to find jobs in their chosen vocation and often sell their tool kits and look for employment in other areas. Such dependency on donors also means that reintegration programs tend to end when donors leave or donor funds

dry up, leaving reintegration only halfway finished. Economic reintegration program should aim at sustainability that is a key concern and one that should be addressed in the design and implementation of reintegration efforts.

In addition, economic reintegration of ex-combatants should be aim to solving financial problems which may lead to domestic abuse. The accumulating frustrations on the daily basis are normally due to unstable jobs and difficult working conditions, one becomes nervous and this culminates into violence in the home. Man is the sole financial provider of every domestic need while his income cannot cover all the needs of the family. Therefore economic reintegration should solve such situation since the majority of ex-combatants are married to women with lower education levels. Similar conclusions were made by Mugisho (2011) greater economic dependence results in more severe abuse because women who economically dependent on their abusers cannot leave them and when they try to do so due to financial constraints are more likely to return to their husbands. In addition, economic abuse is in itself domestic abuse given that abusive partners act in ways that undermine the women's ability to reach financial independence. In addition to common problems related to means, female participants reported that they often face psychological problems such as anxiety, headaches, insomnia, fatigue, loss of appetite, feelings of powerlessness, loss of hope for life and feeling guilty. A mother's poor psychological state does not allow for an environment where they are able to discipline the children.

Cooperatives should be well designed and managed to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in running and better performance. Cooperatives need to be run by members who have managerial knowledge. All stakeholders especially internal stakeholders at all levels should get trainings. The training should be participative that is allowing individual contributions together with opinions such that members feel fully part and partial of the organisation. Sometimes cooperatives founded by leaders, others by ex-combatants who do not have prior business experience. If such cooperatives are to succeed, then there should be training in order to avoid conflict of interest among members. An effective economic reintegration cooperative should be managed in order to avoid consequence of mismanagement which may be as a result of lack of trust among cooperative members and lack of transparency amongst management.

Cooperatives as a means of economic re-integration have traditionally been associated with people who struggle to make a living. Uphoff (2000) observes cooperatives as aiming at

mutually beneficial collective action. Majee and Hoyt (2011: 49) define cooperative as “associations of people who have combined their resources of capital and labour to capture greater or different benefits from an enterprise than if the business were undertaken individually”. It is not difficult to see the attraction of this form of economic organisation – where workers are owners and owners are workers – to those overseeing re-integration. The very nature of cooperatives encourages joint, collaborative effort between ex-combatants and community members. Ideally, cooperatives are characterized by openness, liberality and free adhesion are cooperatives led by corporate principles (Zeebroek *et al.*, 2010; Zeuli, 2002) are bound by internal rules and regulations, but also abide by principles and values such as those established by the International Cooperative Association which are:

Voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training, and information; co-operation among cooperatives; and concern for community...Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, cooperative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others (Majee and Hoyt, 2011: 50).

The success of a cooperative is determined by instrumental and structural reasons existing within the group (Majee and Hoyt, 2011 and Narayan, 2000). A cooperative may be either bondage or bridging-driven (Uvin, 2014; Majee and Hoyt, 2011 and Narayan, 2000). In the first case, influential personalities are more powerful than the group structure and the cooperative’s structures are superseded by these personalities despite the existence of rules, roles, procedures, precedent, and relationships, whatsoever, aimed at binding group members to the organization’s objectives. Hierarchy only serves the few whose influence dictates the course of action within the organization and other members are not free-willed participants but mere adherents. Bondage-based cooperatives are prone to stagnating and disintegrating in the long-run because they rely on personal relationships (Majee and Hoyt, 2011). The consequence of this is that no new financial or material resources are invested in the cooperative from outside. Perhaps more importantly, there is a disconnection between ordinary cooperative members and those in leadership. Since personal engagement is critical to the success of cooperatives, this disconnection can be fatal (Majee and Hoyt, 2011 and Narayan, 2000; Sarker, 2001).

A bridging cooperative maintains the connectedness between members and encourages strong work inputs will both economic and social benefits. In Rwanda, the cooperative sector is large and diverse. It consists of cooperative savings and credit cooperatives, banks cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, fishing cooperatives, consumers, workers, craft and artisan cooperatives. Traditionally, Rwanda has its own forms of self-help mechanisms that comply with the principles of self-help. Some of these forms, as Ubudehe (working together), umubyizi (mutual assistance) and Umuganda (community work) have survived until today. What is true to this date, no efforts have been made to consolidate the traditional philosophy of mutual assistance to economic development initiatives.

The organization and operation of cooperatives in Rwanda are based on the following values and principles:

- Cooperatives encourage a sustained increase in incomes of their members,
- They facilitate the creation of a network of autonomous and independent cooperative organizations that are able to negotiate with partners at all levels of links.
- They promote entrepreneurship and innovative spirit and effective ownership of cooperative enterprises.
- They establish an institutional framework adapted to the needs of cooperatives.
- They strengthen co-operation and training education of resource development for the professional management of cooperatives’.
- They promote mobilization of savings for investment and develop good corporate governance in cooperative movement.

3.9.2 Social dimensions of reintegration

This section presents various social dimensions of socio-economic reintegration project among the ex-combatants.

Social reintegration implies community acceptance of an ex-combatant and their family, and their ability to participate in local events and decision-making to the same extent as other community members. Social reintegration assistance would seek to build trust and foster reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in their communities of settlement. Specific activities to be carried out in this regard include:

- Information and sensitization of ex-combatants, communities and society-at-large through outreach services, including training of counsellors, specialized counselling, strengthening of community services; and
- Public awareness and sensitization campaigns.

Successful social reintegration has to prepare both ex-combatants who have to re-integrate the community while the latter has to be prepared to absorb ex-combatants. Social reintegration implies reconciliation with the purpose of restoring normal relations or a state of social equilibrium between individuals, social groups or political entities which were formerly in conflict offences which have been committed. Reconciliation may require “restitution, penance and forgiveness” (Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004: 86).

Social reintegration is successful when it is premised by programmes aimed at promoting justice, truth, reconciliation, forgiveness, justice between ex-combatants and the civilian populations (Patel *et al.*, 2009). In order to build bridges for rapprochement between the offended and the offenders, social reintegration programmes have to communicate these programmes (Uvin, 2014; Caramés, 2006). Among the indicators which would measure performance concerning social re-integration, Leff (2008: 16) suggests the following:

- The level of participation – both the extent and degree of participation of ex-combatants in community groups and associations.
- Levels of violence and crime by ex-combatants.
- Levels (both frequency and intensity) of social conflict between ex-combatants and other community members.

To this could be added the extent of co-operation between ex-combatants and community members in joint communal activities. Indeed, participation is the key characteristic of the bottom-up reintegration approach (Cahill *et al.*, 2007; Specht, 2010, ILO, 2009). It calls for both local community and ex-combatants to work on ‘joint-venture’ projects that contribute in eradicating psychological and emotional hindrances to successful social re-integration. Caramés (2006) proposes that there should be ex-combatant’s projects where ex-combatants take the lead in decision-making. When it is the community-led project that integrates ex-combatants, this is called the community-focused social reintegration model. The third proposed social reintegration model is the ‘individual and community based model’ according to which

community members re-integrate targeted ex-combatants. This model involves ex-combatants but also brings in other members of the community who have been affected by conflict and war. True participation is a guarantor of success of any type or model of re-integration.

In time, as the distinction between ex-combatants and community members fades, the differentiation implied by assigning people to one or other group will cease. This may well take a generation, or more.

Social dimensions of reintegration project include own perceptions on reintegration, social networks and community participation, interpersonal links and support networks, perception of authority, community response to ex-combatants, so on.

3.9.2.1 Own perspectives on reintegration

The main of social reintegration project should be to deepen understanding of relationship between identity and reintegration among ex-combatants. The project should plan a participatory or action assessment of ex-combatants' own perceptions of whether they would still see themselves that is, after war, as soldiers, demobilised soldiers or as civilians. Such assessment must focus on ex-combatants' own perceptions of whether they considered themselves to be reintegrated into civilian life and otherwise, what would make this possible.

3.9.2.2 Social networks and community participation

Social reintegration should aim at gauging ex-combatants' participation in the structure of community social and organisational life. Such common form of social reintegration includes social activity and network that may appear to be linked to the community gatherings, churches gatherings or services. In such cases, with DDR, the ex-combatants may be assisted in becoming self-professed religion corresponding with the church or religious denomination of which they may prefer to be members. Examples of religious denominations may include Catholics, Protestants, and Islam among others. Thus, belonging to any of the religious group would mean successful social reintegration and social acceptance within the community, access to social networks and make some kind of progress up the organisational hierarchy.

Social reintegration implies community acceptance of an ex-combatant and their family, and their ability to participate in local events and decision-making to the same extent as other community members. Social reintegration assistance would seek to build trust and foster

reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in their communities of settlement. Specific activities to be carried out in this regard include:

Information and sensitization of ex-combatants, communities and society-at-large through outreach services, including training of counsellors, specialized counselling, strengthening of community services; and public awareness and sensitization campaigns.

Successful social reintegration has to prepare both ex-combatants who have to reintegrate the community while the latter has to be prepared to absorb ex-combatants. Social reintegration implies reconciliation with the purpose of restoring normal relations or a state of social equilibrium between individuals, social groups or political entities which were formerly in conflict offences which have been committed. Reconciliation may require restitution, penance and forgiveness (Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004).

Previous scholars (Ink and Watson, 2010) discovered that reintegrating ex-combatants is a main challenge to improve human security and establish sustainable peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. This is due to the fact many of whom were used to make a living through violence but when they are back into society things have to change. Such social reintegration entails helping ex-combatants changing from the roles and positions that defined them during the conflict towards identifying themselves as citizens and members of local communities. In such situations, employment and income generation are often the principal concerns of both local people and ex-combatants alike, and are among the key determining factors as to whether those who have been living by the gun are willing to disarm and reintegrate into society (Ink and Watson, 2010). Thus DDR should be a key area in peace building and offers opportunity to bridge the divide between ex-combatants and the local community whilst social reintegration.

Social reintegration is successful when it is premised by programmes aimed at promoting justice, truth, reconciliation and forgiveness between ex-combatants and the civilian populations (Patel *et al.*, 2009). In order to build bridges for rapprochement between the offended and the offenders, social reintegration programmes have to communicate these programmes (Uvin, 2014; Caramés, 2006).

3.9.2.3 Interpersonal links and support networks

Social reintegration involves not only being formal member of organisation but also informal social interactions and networks. The DDR project must aim at helping ex-combatants to gain

insight into the informal social networks to which they have access. Such consideration may include, who the ex-combatants spend time with, who do ex-combatants turn to in times of need, and the most important person in their communities. Among the most important source of social interaction for ex-combatants may include family, fellow colleagues, church leaders or any another leader or prominent person in the community.

Flourishing social reintegration has to equip ex-combatants households with equipment particularly for the kitchen that could be shared with neighbours. This lending and borrowing would indicate good relationships. This creates good neighbourhood and provides a basis for lending and borrowing from neighbours in times of trouble. Belonging to social groups such as choirs, cultural and sports groups is also an important indicator of social community integration. The importance of social reintegration is that it engages people in community activities, such as in churches, libraries and sport centres. This fosters openness and reintegration of newcomers. In addition, community involvement contributes in changing assumptions and stereotypes in all aspects from both newcomers and the hosting community, which could strongly prevent the reintegration of anyone into the community.

The DDR project must also check the nature and extent of the support networks to which ex-combatants have access, specifically, the people they would or could turn to in case of need or problems. This may include the most prominent person to whom the communities turn when problems arise, the one who can resolve conflicts, allocate land/shelter when needed, arrange support for the sick, the old, the disabled or any other needy person.

3.9.2.4 Perceptions of Authority

The project must also gauge ex-combatants' relations with communities, and their perception of authority and hierarchy outside of the military structures. This involves the most important person in the community and the levels of authority who handle various issues within the community, such as cultural leaders, government officials, and church leaders among others.

3.9.2.5 Community response to ex-combatants (traditional ceremonies and reintegration)

Immediately after the war, the most critical concern of humanitarian agencies, communities and the government departments would be the simultaneous movement of return and resettlement of the different affected groups which could increase the conflict level at local level. This is in line

with Porto, Parsons and Alden (2011) who argued that a number of thousand ex-combatants as well as several displaced people descend with little or no support at the village level. The issue here is how such groups can relate to each other, specifically the residents that stayed behind, in context of severe scarcity of resources. Still, since ex-combatants are to a certain extent being targeted differently to other vulnerable groups, the prospect of rising friction at community level between civilians and recently demobilised soldiers is a working hypothesis for many involved in the resettlement and return process.

The DDR project should aim to understand whether and to what extent programmes that target ex-combatants differently from other vulnerable groups actually inhibit social reintegration. The programmes might be reinforcing the sense of difference experienced by ex-combatants together with cleavages that might separate them from the communities that now received them. A successful social reintegration is assumed to provide positive transformation of modalities of behaviour and most importantly, identities formed under conditions of conflict. This involves focusing on whether special treatment aimed at ex-combatants actually inhibit or delay reintegration. Other areas of concentration can involve whether ex-combatants were received in the community and what the community does to receive or welcome him/her.

In addition, there is a need to check the type of relationship that exists between ex-combatants and the communities living in Jabana regarding traditional ceremonies and social reintegration. Such traditional ceremonies and social reintegration involves happiness, satisfaction, lift morale of those that return, push away malign spirits and help everyone to forget sad events witnessed in the past. All this helps reintegration. However, it may be hard for some ex-combatants to join traditional ceremonies and reintegration due to various hindrances. These obstacles may include the lack of financial resources needed to conduct the ceremonies amongst families and communities welcoming ex-combatants, the death or displacement of the elders who know the traditions and the fact some ex-combatants have settled in areas that are not their places of origin.

Social reintegration also implies community acceptance of an ex-combatant and their family, and their ability to participate in local events and decision-making to the same extent as other community members. Social reintegration assistance would seek to build trust and foster reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in their communities of settlement. Whenever new members come to the society, there is fear that such people will cause congestion

in the society, lead to scarcity of resources, interference of peace and increased crime rate among others. Sometimes, those who are accepted may be subjected to conditions such as bribery, or having a family member already living in the receiving community. Social reintegration therefore should help ex-combatants and their families to be given a place in the society. Similar conclusions were made by Barakat and Özerdem (2005) and Chandler (2004).

Social reintegration should target the level of participation that is, the extent and degree of participation of ex-combatants in community groups and associations. The degree of the ex-combatants' participation in community social life and frequency of interaction, with friends, other parties, and participation in the community social life is important. If the degree of the ex-combatants' participation in community social life and frequency of interaction is low then is not socially reintegrated. Similar findings were discovered by Cohen and Fabri (2009) who asserted that lack of reintegration projects can lead to self denial by the ex-combatants in the community.

Levels (both frequency and intensity) of social conflict between ex-combatants and other community members can serve as a reintegration measurement. Ex-combatants may not be accepted in the community if there is a social conflict between ex-combatants and other community members. If they come to the society, there may be fear that such people will cause congestion in the society, lead to scarcity of resources, interference of peace and increased crime rate among others. As a result, ex-combatants and their families are denied a place in the society. Those who are accepted may be with conditions such as bribery, or having a family member already living in the receiving community. Similar conclusions were made by Barakat and Özerdem (2005) and Chandler (2004). If the levels (both frequency and intensity) of social conflict between ex-combatants and other community members are minimal, then there is social reintegration.

To this could be added the extent of co-operation between ex-combatants and community members in joint communal activities. Indeed, participation is the key characteristic of the bottom-up reintegration approach (Specht, 2010; ILO, 2009; Cahill *et al.*, 2007). It calls for both local community and ex-combatants to work on 'joint-venture' projects that contribute in eradicating psychological and emotional hindrances to successful social re-integration. Caramés (2006) proposes that there should be ex-combatant's projects where ex-combatants take the lead in decision-making. When it is the community-led project that integrates ex-combatants, this is called the community-focused social reintegration model. The third proposed social reintegration model is the 'individual and community based model' according to which community members

re-integrate targeted ex-combatants. This model involves ex-combatants but also brings in other members of the community who have been affected by conflict and war. True participation is a guarantor of success of any type or model of re-integration.

In time, as the distinction between ex-combatants and community members fades, the differentiation implied by assigning people to one or other group will cease. This may well take a generation, or more.

It is easy to measure community reintegration for a person because of community practices that are the way of life in each village in Rwanda. The absence or the frequency of participation in these activities can be a speaking indicator regarding the integration level for people. Community suggests a sense of connection between people and their community through shared interests regardless of the cultural and geographical characteristics of members. In Rwanda Umuganda is what connects people to their communities, that is, individual contribution rendered to community but in the context of this research it refers to a day that is devoted monthly to community work and meetings. The last Saturday of each month, residents of villages get together for manual work, mostly destined to cleaning their residences, streets; repairing broken small bridges, building houses and huts for the poor. At the end of these manual activities, the social reintegration should liaise ex-combatants and residents to discuss and share information regarding different aspects of life in their village. Issues of common interest such as security, domestic violence, gender, education, hygiene and HIV must be discussed in order to find solutions. In this case, ex-combatants should even be allowed to express personal problems for advice and if necessary to get help from community members. The work of Umuganda which is carried out by ex-combatants of Jabana should be positive interaction as many heads of households are connected with the community thereby, connecting people to the group's activities.

3.9.3 Political dimensions of reintegration

The dimensions of political reintegration are often forgotten or deliberately left aside in the implementation of reintegration programmes. Beyond a commitment to demobilisation and an end to the use of violent means in the resolution of disputes, a deeper commitment by all at a social-political level is needed if post-war societies are to sustain the peace. This assumes that the peaceful and active participation of ex-combatants in the political process of their societies should be regarded as a crucial component of peace-building, and that successful reintegration

depends on both social acceptance, economic self-reliance and political participation. Similar conclusions were made by Kingma (2013) Porto, Parsons and Alden (2011) that in the longer term the reintegration depends on the process of democratisation, containing the recovery of a weak or collapsed state and maturing of an independent civil society. Some of the issues to be considered in the DDR may include ex-combatants information about elections, via which information source , information about political parties, whether elections are important for peace building, whether an ex-combatant participated in the previous elections or will vote in the next elections and whether they participated in any election campaign.

3.9.3.1 Elections and voting

Political reintegration should ensure that ex-combatants are aware and engage themselves in elections. In addition, ex-combatants are expected to show how elections are important to the consolidation of peace in Rwanda specifically Jabana. In this case, ex-combatants may indicate the need to engage in political affairs either before or in the next elections.

3.9.3.2 Knowledge of political parties

Political reintegration must consider the ex-combatants' knowledge of the political parties in Rwanda.

3.9.3.3 Political participation and party activism

Political participation and party activism may create a split among ex-combatants. This means that some ex-combatants may be interested in taking part in election campaigns yet others may not. This may help in observing the level of ex-combatants' interest in active participation in politics in a country and help to clarify the political mobilisation which ex-combatants experienced while still soldiers. Under this section, ex-combatants may show interest in politics through participating as candidates in future elections, organising events or participating in events.

3.9.4 Psychological dimension of reintegration

Psychological reintegration is important to ex-combatants because it reduces psychological disorders that are experienced by parents, predominantly women. This may result in the vulnerability of children, causing the child discomfort behaviours and ildiscipline or **even** delinquency. A poor family environment negatively affects the long-term basis. Similarly, Linda *et al.* (2010) discovered that parents give their children three kinds of inheritance namely

biological, economic and cultural. Indeed, apart from the biological heritage, the two others require more effort and investment on the part of parents and are the most important determinants of children's future. The children's future depends on parents' income availability, their level of education and other resources such as availability of infrastructures and government programmes. The greater the inheritance, the better the chance their children will be able to live a decent life and to expect bright futures (Blank, 2003).

Ex-combatants children are regular victims of violence in addition to witnessing violent incidents between parents. This is in line with Linda *et al.* (2010) who argued that, the children who are abused physically and psychologically experience behaviour problems during their childhood and develop symptoms of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, poor physical health, poor school or work performance and likelihood of drugs and alcohol abuser. In addition, children who are exposed to psychological violence are more likely to become either victims or perpetrators of violence once they become mature.

Psychological reintegration should solve poor living conditions among families of ex-combatants who are consequently driven to stress causing inadequate and dangerous parenting behaviour to the development of their children. Therefore psychological reintegration among ex-combatants should aim at fighting stress and irritability that sometimes impose children to do what is beyond their capacity; which results in high level of criticism and severe punishment. This is in line with Bradshaw (2007) who highlights the cyclical nature of poverty which results in poor maternal health, the generating of sub-standard social and environmental conditions in addition to immune compromised children predisposing them to failure and long term unemployment. Many participants in unstructured interviews and workshops admitted that their children started working from a young age. Children of both sexes are given jobs because employers ignore their rights paid less than to adults.

There should be vocational training centres for children as they are supposed to be at school. These vocational trainings should apply to school children to prevent children engaging in work activities without skills. This situation exposes them to unimaginable risks. However children may learn at the workplace through mentorship by a more experienced person or a parent. This may be supported by Mamun *et al.* (2008) who indicate that the lack of parental supervision affects a child's behaviour at work. Not having parental supervision in the work place leads the

child to discredit his boss's discourse and moral authority. In these situations young boys and girls see themselves as adults.

Psychological reintegration should help ex-combatants out of poverty and not be isolated from other community members. Citizens who do not become involved in community activities reduce their chance of total integration in society and so, they cannot promote interactions with others. They cannot participate in decision-making at the community level either, regardless of their level of education, social status or age. The community is the place where various interactions in mediating structures between the larger social, political and economic environment and where the everyday life of individuals is depicted in a friendly way. Actively participating in community life empowers the individual by creating relationships and strong social cohesion. In other words, the situation promotes complementarity and information sharing among the members of the community.

3.10 Summary

Re-insertion and reintegration of ex combatants are processes that can be studied at both national and international levels. Some countries as discussed in the above case studies have applied this process and satisfactorily reinserted and re-integrated former combatants. In order to achieve a better understanding of each step of the DDR processes, the experience of different cases need to be looked at in order to learn about challenges and best practices. The chapter has discussed the DDR process in terms of its objectives and its varied concepts. Various DDR perspectives were discussed and emphasis is placed on the process as a nationally owned undertaking. The benefits of strong elements of bottom-up, locally owned DDR were evident.

CHAPTER FOUR: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESSES IN RWANDA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an over view of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes (DDR) in Rwanda, Disarmament and demobilisation plans and structures, Disarmament and demobilization, Statistics, Re-insertion, Reintegration, and Cooperatives as means of economic re-integration and summary.

4.1.1 DDRC Rwanda

The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), were formed in January 1997 as an autonomous Government Commission, and were formally established in the year 2002 by a Presidential decree No 37/01 of 09/04/2002. It is charged with planning and implementing the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the ex-combatants.

Between September 1997 and April 2011, the RDRC demobilized 18,692 people including 2,364 ex-child soldiers (former RPA) and 26,585 ex-Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF), 9,215 adult and child members of ex-Armed Groups from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and registered 12,969 members of ex-Forces Armes Rwandaises (ex-FAR settled in the country). As we shall see, Rwanda's DDR aims at having ex-combatants re-integrate within communities. Not only are ex-combatants located in communities which are new to them; they are also expected to re-integrate with ex-combatants from different groups.

Economic reintegration is about turning ex-combatants into economic agents through income-generation activities. Income-generation is often thought to depend on the acquisition of marketable skills needed on the job-market and that employment is essential to successful economic re-integration. However, the reality is that few ex-combatants possess skills which would lead them into a wage job and in any case, they will be competing with people who have remained in the civilian sector. Wage jobs, it has become increasingly recognised, will not absorb many ex-combatants and alternative forms of livelihood must be emphasised (Specht, 2010; Watson, 2009; ILO, 2009; IDDRS, 2006; Michael, 2006; SIDDR, 2005; Gleichmann *et al.*, 2004).

In Rwanda, an emphasis on cooperatives in ex-combatants' reintegration started in 2006 when a few associations were aggregated into cooperative (Sentama, 2009; Morgenstein, 2009 and

RDRC, 2006). Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission reports that between 2008 and 2011, 82 cooperatives have been evaluated and many more others have been formed (RDRC, 2012).

The national policy on promotion of cooperatives states in its third clause that “cooperative societies are one of the best ways for communities to organize themselves, in a business manner, to achieve common objectives and help share the realizable benefits of economic development. In addition the cooperative is also guided by democratic values such as that of self-rule, freedom of entrance and exit, which have values in other areas of social and economic life.

Prior to the establishment of the Rwanda Cooperative Agency (RCA) under Law N° 50/2007 of September 2007 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2007), the cooperative sector operated within the Ministry of Commerce which is also referred to as PPMR (Projet pour la Promotion des Petites et Micro-Entreprises Rurales), Rwanda Private Sector Federation. The cooperative policy document describes the cooperative sector as diverse, consisting of savings and credit, banking, agricultural, small processing and marketing and fishery, handicraft and artisanal cooperatives.

The cooperative approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants operated by RDRC is a top-down approach when it comes to planning, implementation, evaluation and programme leadership in order to accomplish stated and implied goals of a planned action to be undertaken (OECD, 2009; Larrison, 1999).

4.2 Disarmament and demobilisation plans and structures

MONUSCO is a tri-lateral effort led by Rwanda, MONUSCO and DRC in FDLR’s repatriation and reintegration programme. Its DDR programme aims to repatriate foreign combatants operating on the Congolese soil, of which the FDLR combatants are of greatest concern. MONUSCO’s statistics on Foreign Armed Groups (FAGs) indicate that between 2002 and 2012 that around 22,000 FDLR combatants have been active in the eastern DRC. It is estimated that as at mid- 2013, there were some 11,000 active combatants in this part of the DRC, some of which originating from Burundi and Uganda. Under the programme, MONUSCO takes its sensitizers’ team to FDLR and other combatant strongholds and urges them to return to their countries of origin. MONUSCO’s sensitization activities complement the RDRC’s own

sensitization programme that include radio programme called ‘Iwacu Heza⁵’ and ‘Isange mu banyu⁶’. Combatants who leave rebel groups and surrender their weapons are airlifted by MONUSCO to Goma where they have three mandatory days in preparation to return to Rwanda. MONUSCO clusters ex-combatants according to need and status, which include sick and the disabled, women and children and those who are physically fit before handing them to RDRC. The RDRC takes ex-combatants to Mutobo demobilization centre while their civilian dependents are taken to Nkamira transit camp. Both sites are located in Rwanda’s western province. Former child soldiers are directed to a specialized demobilization centre in Muhazi (in Eastern Province) (RDRC, 2010).

The following outlines the process FDLR combatants go through once they leave the bush and are placed in local communities of re-integration. The reintegration process is a partnership between the Rwandan and DRC governments with the co-ordination provided by MONUSCO. The Rwandan DRP takes charge of DDR process from the demobilization centre to ex-combatants’ communities of origin.

Community reintegration takes place at the grassroots level, so ex-combatant reintegration is managed at this level. The RDRC provides ex-combatants with a reintegration package which is referred to as Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA) once they have been recorded in the sector database. Ex-combatants are then able to access finance to facilitate their re-integration. They are provided with information on capacity building opportunities at a district and provincial level, in addition to other information from the national level, including training opportunities (Schroeder, 2015). While the above DDR administrative structure presents itself as bottom-up approach in managing the process, orders are given from the top hierarchies in order to reach the lower levels. This one way pipelined DDR management thwarts the participation and democracy expected of community-based participation (Martin and Mathema, 2010). Solomon and Ginifer (2009) and Larrison (1999) suggest that the top-down approach is inescapable in the process of building up systems and institutions. The DDR process is implemented for and by people with a militaristic mind-set that upholds the chain of command,

⁵ Best is home

⁶ Feel at home

rigor and discipline. Therefore in the context of RDRC and ex-combatants, beneficiaries would automatically respond to militaristic approaches.

At the sector level, ex-combatants form associations and cooperatives. Community-focused reintegration supports a cooperative leadership which rotates between civilians and ex-combatants. Cooperatives having a civilian at the helm perform better than those led by ex-combatants. Civilians have richer experiences and connections than ex-combatants who are only familiar with military life where the government was in charge of their needs (Caramés, 2006; IDDRS, 2006). Cooperatives which consist of both civilians and ex-combatants promote personal growth for each type of cooperative member (MDRP, 2008).

4.3 Disarmament and demobilization: Statistics

Tables 4.7-4.12 inclusive present data on the numbers of ex-combatants demobilised in the period 1997-2009. These tables indicate that during these eleven years, some 112,000 ex-combatants were demobilised in Rwanda. Some 57 per cent of these were demobilised in the Western Province, closest to the border with the DRC. The year 2002 was the peak year, with some 19,000 demobilisations. In the final year (2009), there were only some 2,500 demobilisations.

Table 4. 1. Statistical data of RDRP from 1997-2009

PROV INCE		AG s		AGs Total	EX - FA R		EX- FAR Total	EX- RD F		EX- RD F Total	Gran d Total
Eastern Provin ce	Year	Female	Male		Fem ale	Male		Femal e	Mal e		
	1997							23	210 2	212 5	2125
	1998							1	873	874	874
	2001		138	138				1	166 1	166 2	1800
	2002		61	61	16	165 4	1670	2	168 8	169 0	3421
	2003	1	83	84	10	257	267		831	831	1182
	2004	1	106	107		6	6		709	709	822

	2005		61	61					466	466	527
	2006		65	65		284	284		257	257	606
	2007		30	30					382	382	412
	2008		49	49				1	216	217	266
	2009		54	54					477	477	531
EASTE RN Total						220			966	969	1256
		2	647	649	26	1	2227	28	2	0	6

Table 4. 2. DDR data, Northern Province, 1997-2009

	Year	AGs		AGs Total	EX-FAR		EX- FAR Total	EX-RDF		EX- RDF Total	
		Female	Male		Female	Male		Female	Male		
NORTHERN PROVINCE	1997							11	597	608	
	1998							2	288	290	
	2001	1	636	637				2	1133	1135	
	2002	2	174	176	23	1456	1479	1	1533	1534	
	2003		130	130	9	448	457		888	888	
	2004	3	157	160		7	7		691	691	
	2005		94	94					417	417	
	2006	4	153	157		53	53		274	274	
	2007	2	59	61				1	247	248	
	2008	1	65	66					174	174	
	2009	2	90	92					319	319	
NORTHERN Total		15	1558	1573	32	1964	1996	17	6561	6578	

Table 4. 3. DDR data, Southern Province, 1997-2009

	Year	AGs		AGs Total	EX-FAR		EX- FAR Total	EX-RDF		EX- RDF Total	Grand Total
		Female	Male		Female	Male		Female	Male		
SOUTHERN	1997							8	1553	1561	1561
	1998							1	736	737	737
	2001		294	294				1	1519	1520	1814
	2002		222	222	28	2339	2367		1498	1498	4087
	2003	3	210	213	3	262	265		604	604	1082
	2004		327	327	1	6	7		564	564	898
	2005		117	117					300	300	417
	2006		123	123	1	133	134		174	174	431
	2007		67	67				1	242	243	310
	2008		91	91					123	123	214
	2009		151	151					324	324	475
SOUTHERN Total		3	1602	1605	33	2740	2773	11	7637	7648	12026

Table 4. 4. DDR data, Western Province, 1997-2009

	Year	AGs		AGs Total	EX-FAR		EX- FAR Total	EX-RDF		EX- RDF Total	Grand Total
		Female	Male		Female	Male		Female	Male		
WESTERN	1997							5	745	750	750
	1998							1	386	387	387
	2001	5	916	921				2	1668	1670	2591
	2002	3	261	264	37	2789	2826	1	2032	2033	5123
	2003	1	407	408	10	625	635	1	1057	1058	2101
	2004	5	552	557		7	7		885	885	1449
	2005	1	342	343					546	546	889
	2006	3	360	363		42	42		301	301	706
	2007	2	107	109					342	342	451
	2008		159	159					206	206	365
	2009	2	290	292					383	383	675
WESTERN Total		22	3394	3416	47	3463	3510	10	8551	8561	15487
Grand Total		44	7676	7720	205	12764	12969	146	43131	43277	63966

Table 4. 5. DDR data, Kigali City, 1997-2009

KIGALI CITY	YEAR	AGs		AGs Total	EX-FAR		EX-FAR Total	EX-RDF		EX-RDF Total	Grand Total
		Female	Male		Female	Male		Female	Male		
	1997							35	2340	2375	2375
	1998							20	1331	1351	1351
	2001	1	164	165				6	1641	1647	1812
	2002		47	47	27	1472	1499	7	1886	1893	3439
	2003		55	55	40	753	793	4	978	982	1830
	2004	1	56	57		5	5		731	731	793
	2005		22	22				2	483	485	507
	2006		49	49		166	166	1	227	228	443
	2007		14	14					452	452	466
	2008		37	37				3	246	249	286
	2009		31	31				2	405	407	438
KIGALI CITY Total		2	475	477	67	2396	2463	80	10720	10800	13740

Source: RDRC, 2009

The Western Province has the biggest number of demobilized ex-AGs, ex-FARs and ex-RDF soldiers which comprises 63,996 soldiers. The Northern Province has the lowest number of demobilised soldiers with figures of 10,147. The difference in the number of ex-combatants is due to the fact that most FDLR soldiers who are involved in the conflict in the Eastern DRC are predominantly from the Northern and Western Rwandan provinces.

4.4 Re-insertion

Upon the arrival of ex-combatants in the demobilization centre, RDRC undertakes a needs-assessment of each ex-combatant, the plan being to base reintegration on ex-combatants' needs. The assessment includes providing assistance in finding accommodation and medical care if needed. The preliminary phase of re-insertion is sensitive to special groups of people such as women, children and disabled combatants. Ex-combatants are required to take part in the pre-demobilisation orientation programme (PDOP), and are provided with demobilisation ID cards and certificates. They go through a discharge ceremony and are then able to travel to the community in which they intend to settle. With regard to the re-insertion package, the RDRC

provides ex-combatants with US\$100 for the lowest-ranked ex-combatants while the highest-ranked ex-combatants receive up to US\$ 1000.

4.5 Reintegration

The reintegration phase is the long-term process for RDRC and ex-combatants. In addition to the classic income-generation approach to re-integration, the RDRC mainstreams ex-combatants' reintegration through community-based programmes. Ex-combatants benefit socially for the community but also become beneficiaries of the government's backing to community development projects (AfDB, 2011; RDRC, 2010; Birchall and Ketilson, 2009; MINALOC, 2008).

A distinctive feature of Rwanda's social reintegration efforts has been the use of modified traditional courts, Gacaca, to deal with the huge backlog of alleged genocide perpetrators. This "home grown solution" has been developed to help repair the deeply torn social fabric using cultural approaches to cement unity and reconciliation (such as *kuva ku rugerero*⁷, *Kunga*⁸, *Gacaca*⁹). This approach has been conducive to social reintegration of the Rwandan social fabric, but particularly in the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

The RDRC has mainstreamed ex-combatants' reintegration within the broader national economic development agenda. However, fewer Ex-combatants are able to benefit from access to the Rwanda Cooperative Agency, Rwanda's Private Sector Federation and being linked to banks and micro-finances.

4.6 Reintegration since 2009 to 2015

Between 1994 and October, 2013, more than 30,000 Rwandan ex-combatants returned back home and were successfully being reintegrated together with other communities. Despite the successful repatriation that followed the victory of RPF in July 1994, over 10,000 Rwandan ex-combatants are still residing in various parts of the DR Congo. Rwandan government aims at ensuring that all repatriated ex-combatants are reintegrated into the communities. In this regards, the RDRC specifically initiated mechanisms and co-ordinated all programs meant for repatriation and reintegration of Rwandan ex-combatants from DRC.

⁷ Demobilization term used in pre-colonial Rwanda's military (Ingabo)

⁸ To mediate

⁹ Traditional Rwandan popular jurisdiction (the grassroots' people's court)

In 2013, the Rwandan government, MONUSCO and host country were called upon to begin the implementation of all aspects of disarmament including the use of force and the promotion of voluntary repatriation and reintegration of FDLR combatants. In this regards, a special brigade composed of Tanzanians and South Africans was created and started operating under MONUSCO mainly targeting M 23 rebels and FDLR. The Rwandan government established sustainable programmes and mechanisms for effectively and efficiently repatriating and reintegrating of FDLR ex-combatants.

Following the new development, a considerable number of ex-combatants from FDLR strongholds in East of DRC returned.

However, most of the former combatants returned in vulnerable conditions with limited livelihood skills and resources. Such conditions pressurized the government of Rwanda to create social and economic opportunities for the reintegration of ex-combatants as one of the major priorities. With various support including that of the Japan' government which involved the Rwandan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Disaster Management and Repatriation of Refugees (MIDIMAR), between 2010 and 2013, the programme provided direct assistance to approximately 4,000 beneficiaries, indirectly affecting the lives of 8,000 ex-combatants grouped in Cooperatives and members of various vulnerable communities (IOM, 2013). Assistance has been given in various forms specifically small business start-up kits, provision of livestock and housing materials and vocational skills training. Such activities have been contributing to beneficiaries' income-generating opportunities and enhancing their living conditions.

These activities were implemented from March 2013 to March 2014 in 10 districts identified as priority by the MIDIMAR. Selected districts are Rutsiro, Musanze, Rubavu, Huye, Karongi, Nyaruguru, Nyamasheke, Gisagara, Nyabihu and Nyamagabe. Based on vulnerability assessment benchmarks, in collaboration with the District Social Affairs Coordinators (DSAC), IOM completed the Rapid Capacity and Needs Assessment designed to collect correct data on labour market opportunities, available marketable skills training and the capacity of local skills training institutions. In addition, project beneficiaries were identified and the priority needs of the community with assistance from the IOM field assistants (MIDIMAR, 2014).

Many beneficiaries specifically 3,000 ex-combatants were assisted by the project in 2012. Among them, some were given construction materials, others received livestock, while the rest were trained in diverse areas such as vocational skills in various fields, including carpentry,

masonry, mechanics, welding, tailoring and hairdressing. Over the 2013-2014 periods, the project has been operating in 10 districts countrywide (MIDIMAR, 2014).

In 2015, DDR will benefit from close collaboration with the Rwandan government and UN agencies, under the framework of the Delivering as one initiative. For instance RDRC will rely on UNHCR partnerships and other partners (table 5.6) in delivering adequate services to ex-combatants to ensure the protection of people of concern in Rwanda.

Table 4. 6. DDR 2015 partners in Rwanda

2015 DDR partners in Rwanda	
Implementing Partners	
Government Agencies	RDRC, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Disaster Management and Reintegration of Refugees
NGOS	Africa Humanitarian Action, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, American Ex-combatants Committee, Parlement des Rwandais, International Organisation for Migration, Plan International and World Vision.
Operational partners	IFAD, ILO, FAO, UNAIDS, UNECA, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNICEF, UNV, WFP and WHO, so on.

Source: Schroeder, 2015

Table 4.6 shows the institutional participatory arrangement for DDR in Rwanda which involve the participation of all stakeholders including the civil society organizations (NGOs), local governments and the international agencies, as implementing partners.

As a result the financial capacity for DDR operations in Rwanda has steadily increased from USD 4.6 million in 2010 to USD 5.2 million in 2014 (Schroeder, 2015). This took into consideration the initial costs for developing the newly-created camp of Mugombwa. Fewer former combatant arrivals in 2014 have led to setting the 2015 budget at USD 5.3 million (Idem).

4.7 Summary

This chapter has examined the purposes and processes of reintegration in Rwanda, with particular reference to community-based reintegration projects and to social and economic reintegration. It identified the role of institutional participatory arrangement which could be used to determine the success or otherwise of social and economic reintegration in community-based projects. The following part will examine the research design, research methodology, and data collection methods and data analysis.

PART THREE

CHAPTER FIVE: ACTION RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to explain the conceptual and epistemological logic that underpins the use of an action research design. I begin with the explanation of the action research design and at the same time compare the positivist and constructivist paradigms in an attempt to justify the relevance and their choice as the epistemological foundation of the research design used in this study. According to Okaja (2003), research design means the “structuring of investigation aimed at identifying variables and their relationship, it is used for the purpose of obtaining data to enable the investigator test hypothesis or answer research question by providing procedural outline for conducting research” (p.2). Reflexive action models are explored and I examine a number of participative case-studies in order to highlight various characteristics action research design. I used the term research design as it is used by Mouton (2001), the standard South African research text. Others use “research approach” or “research methodology”. Mouton uses the latter term to describe whether the data collected are quantitative, qualitative or mixed.

A research design means that research is conducted through the act of sharing (Reason and Bradbury, 2008). In this research, we consider participation as commitment to the achievement of common goals, which result in activities that include research and actions intended to bring about social change. Social participation involves a reciprocal exchange between the individual and the community. It involves both collective responsibility to enable everyone to participate actively in social life and individual responsibility to act as a responsible person.

Cornwall (2008) presents a variety of participation types, with four ordinate layers from a total absence of participant’s participation, the highest level of participation where the power of decision-making resting in the hands of participants. These are summarised in Table 5.1.

Regardless of the precise form, participation requires a personal commitment and openness to activity where dialogue, co-operation and collaboration prevail. It excludes a relationship of subordination. It involves a pro-active participation and membership with other actors with the aim of attaining common goals which cannot be attained when acting in isolation.

Table 5. 1Modes of participation in action research

Mode of participation	Roles of participants and researchers
Contractual	People are contracted into the projects of researchers to take part in their enquiries or Experiments
Consultative	People are asked for their opinions and consulted by researchers before interventions are made
Collaborative	Researchers and local people work together on projects designed, initiated and managed by researchers
Collegiate	Researchers and local people work together as colleagues with different skills to offer, in a process of mutual learning where local people have control over the process.

Source: Adapted from Cornwall and Jewkes (1995)

Table 5.1 above provides an insight on the modes of participation in action research. The modes of participation include contractual, consultative, collaborative and collegiate. The table also demonstrates the roles of participants and researchers as indicated above.

Participation contributes to self-actualization, which results in the interaction between personal factors which includes one's capabilities and other personal characteristics and environmental factors which are enabling factors. Participation allows access to knowledge and facilitates the feelings of new status, attitude and behaviour.

Authors argue that participants must feel recognized by valuing their competencies and their cultural framework. That framework facilitates development and helps to build trust on behalf of participants. Klein (2007) states that trust-based relations have to be built right from the early stages of the research to ensure maximum participation and involvement of each member of the group. Coghlan and Brannick (2001) stress that the trust-based relation in a sense that this must remain strictly conditioned by both the researcher's and participants' capacity to safeguard the quality of relations stemming from their respective needs and their decision to work together.

In line with Maddux (2002), participation builds self-efficacy that is a subjective dimension related to the ability to mobilize resources and appropriately accomplish a task or action. A person with a sense of high self-efficacy, for example, believes in his capacity to act in order to achieve their objectives while a person with a low sense of self-efficacy feels unable to attain their goals. The feeling of self-efficacy is central to every human being. In practice, a person

behaves depending on how he feels or appreciates his ability to succeed within a given situation. It implies a self-regulating mechanism that influences the person in decisions, choices, aspirations and expectations. Two dimensions of self-efficacy exist - internal and external dimensions. The first dimension of self-efficiency is the belief that a person can succeed in a particular way while the second dimension is more collective and confirms that a social group is able to successfully perform any project (Mertens, 2009).

So participation must offer space for reflection and confrontation of constructive viewpoints which includes challenging opinions. Participation must therefore create space for dialogue and reflection, allowing participants to constantly review their viewpoints, convictions and lay a foundation for merging knowledge. Creswell (2003) warns that divergent viewpoints and confrontation can result in the polarization of views instead of consensus building.

In some instances the more eloquent participants impose their points of view on others (Creswell, 2003) which require the researcher to meet the challenging task of promoting participants' dialogue as a strategy to patch up their diverse opinions while promoting practical thinking and knowledge. Good dialogue during action research yields consensus amongst participants around the subjects of dialogue, with opportunities for all participants to help "produce" knowledge.

At a higher level, co-operation is termed as collaboration, where all participants own their role in the action and thinks towards the common task to fulfil it. Each action participates in identifying the problem and searching for alternate solutions. Co-management is the most efficient and complete form of participation and co-ownership implies that equality is based on mutual respect among the partners in determining the processes and the product of the co-management agreement. In a group such as a cooperative, there is already a structure which promotes a shared vision and a commitment to shared responsibility and participation, although these may need to be regularly reaffirmed. In short, then, action research fits the action ethos of the economic structure under scrutiny - the cooperative.

5.2 Action research case-studies

This section outlines six case-studies which used action research as their research design, in order to gain insights into how this research design might play out in the present research. Each case study, it will be noted that starts with an identified problem.

Table 5. 2. Summary of recent six case studies using action research design

CASE STUDY 1: Long-term sustainability and success of communication and information technology (C and IT) initiatives	
LOCATION	Queensland, Australia
YEAR	2005
PURPOSE	<p>The study aim used action research in the Tara Shire community for sustainability of C and IT initiatives, and specifically:</p> <p>To provide critical insights into the complexity of building community capacities, to evaluate communication and information technology (C and IT) initiatives in rural communities, and to suggest success strategies for future capacity building and C and IT projects.</p> <p>To build community capacity in planning and evaluation through workshops, teleconferences and other activities. These activities sought to facilitate broad community participation in planning and conducting evaluations of local C and IT initiatives such as community websites and information literacy Programmes</p>
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	<p>Eight people who include seven women and one man from various townships participated in the first community leaders' meeting. Twenty-three people (fifteen women and eight men) with a diversity of ages and occupations participated in the first community workshop, which included presentations about local C and IT projects and small group discussions.</p> <p>The process involved participants to work in the areas of education and training, community and youth development, retail, accounting, and agriculture.</p> <p>One priest, three retirees and one unemployed person took part in the research.</p>
RESULTS	<p>A key rationale for using action research design and action evaluation is that they can produce empowerment. This can result in an increased sense of power, confidence and control, which is often</p>

	<p>the consequence of successful action.</p> <p>Using action research design and action evaluation methodologies and methods, the project aimed to increase collaboration and co-operation between community groups, to be empowering for participants, and to increase informal leadership skills, particularly for rural women.</p> <p>The use of multiple participation, research and evaluation methods provided a range of rich research data and on-going feedback, which enabled rigorous validation of the findings and the data analysis. Most of the qualitative data was entered into the Vivo programme where it was coded and analysed.</p>
REFERENCE	Lennie <i>et al.</i> (2005)
CASE STUDY 2: Use action research in primary health care	
LOCATION	Limpopo Province, South Africa
YEAR	2003
PURPOSE	Due to persistent gaps in primary care the study aimed to demonstrate the usefulness of action research in primary care. The author used action research design firstly to develop a deeper understanding of mutual participation in the doctor–patient encounter and secondly to apply this learning in a rural cross-cultural practice setting.
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	Four patients who were terminally ill formed groups with their family members, friends and neighbours, the groups ranged from four to eight participants in each group. In three of the groups, a home-based care volunteer was included.
RESULTS	The action research process had a positive effect on the doctor–patient encounter. The research facilitator had certain basic tenets in order to facilitate participation. The patients who participated

	<p>actively benefited most. Basic interviewing techniques were used to facilitate the mutual participation in action research design;</p> <p>The principles of action research design such as mutual collaboration, reciprocal respect, co-learning and acting on results from the enquiry are essential in the doctor–patient relationship.</p> <p>Self-awareness, the ability to self-critique and reflect in a deep manner using such tools as a reflective diary are essential for nurturing the development of effective primary health care workers and consequently care structures for the patients and their families.</p>
REFERENCE	Marincowitz (2003)
CASE STUDY 3: Action planning for remote area health planning	
LOCATION	Australia
YEAR	2005
PURPOSE	To examine the process of planning within the dynamic political, economic and social forces which impact on the development of regional, rural and remote area health services
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	<p>30 rural community members, and individuals representing their own interests or those of community interest groups and local government; 84 rural and remote health professionals; 44 public servants; and 18 metropolitan health professionals.</p> <p>Data from a tertiary teaching hospital which looked at telehealth technology trials was included</p>
RESULTS	<p>In general, findings show a number of barriers to the planning process including:</p> <p>A lack of local community inclusion in planning committees and local information being overlooked in the final implementation plan,</p> <p>Poor communication within central government,</p> <p>A bias toward the medical view of health services</p>
Reference	Martini (2005)

CASE STUDY 4: Development of an information source for patients and the public about general practice services: An action research study.	
LOCATION	Two primary care trusts in the North of England and two local health boards in South Wales
YEAR	2006
PURPOSE	<p>The study aim used action research was to develop an information source for patients and the public about general practice services, and specifically;</p> <p>To explore the information needs of patients in the context of UK Primary Care,</p> <p>To develop an information source about general practice services that was designed to be usable and useful to patients.</p>
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	<p>103 members of the public, general practice staff from 19 practices, National Health Service (NHS) managers from four Primary Care organisations and the research team participated in the study.</p> <p>The research team worked with a senior member of the management team who championed the project and recruited up to six volunteer practices.</p> <p>Each of the practices agreed to work with their patients, PCO managers and research team to develop and publish information about the services and performance.</p>
RESULTS	<p>The research team found that the public wanted to know more about the quality and range of general practice services, but the sources of information then current did not meet their needs.</p> <p>The public did not like league tables that compared the performance of various practices and only a small number of people wanted to use comparative information to choose between practices.</p> <p>The authors chose action research as an approach because it was felt to be compatible with the participation and</p>

	<p>developmental nature of the project and with their desire to empower service users and generate a tangible product.</p> <p>The nature of the complex processes and the role of the researchers as facilitators of change were felt to be compatible with an action research approach.</p> <p>The action research approach also enabled the research team to act as partners in the process, with all of the participants sharing views and contributing to the change processes, according to their knowledge and expertise</p> <p>Data were collected using a multi-method process, which emphasized the iterations between defining the issues, developing solutions, and evaluating. In-depth interviews were carried out with PCO members, managers, and practice staff.</p> <p>Data (field notes, interview transcripts, reflective diaries, and documents) were analysed using a <i>constant comparative</i> approach. The research team identified emerging themes from participants' discussions that described the factors influencing the public's use of information and their information needs. Themes were explored and interpreted in an interactive way with the project participants and were then triangulated between the different stakeholder groups and sites. The findings were used in turn to guide the development of an information source for patients and the public about general practice services.</p>
REFERENCE	Marshall <i>et al.</i> (2006)
<p>CASE STUDY 5: Valuing autonomy, struggling for an identity and a collective voice and seeking role recognition: community mental health nurses' perception of their roles.</p>	
LOCATION	South East, United States
YEAR	2008

PURPOSE	<p>The study was carried out in a large, community-based, behaviour health system to provide a full continuum of care, including mental health, substance abuse and mental retardation services.</p> <p>Action research which built on Habermas's philosophy was used to approach the problems and concerns of the Community Mental Health Nurses (CMHN).</p>
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	<p>The study used six focus groups because researchers felt that interviewing individuals would be more time-consuming and that a diversity of opinion was important in addressing the problem.</p> <p>Group sizes ranged from five to ten people and the duration of the meetings ranged from an hour and a half to two hours.</p>
RESULTS	<p>Using action research, three conceptual outcomes emerged as key concerns for the nurses and formed an umbrella for their recommendations for change. These were: 'Struggling for an Identity and a Collective Voice', 'Valuing Autonomy' and 'Seeking Role Recognition'. The study resulted in a plan of action being developed by the participants to address their concerns.</p> <p>The researchers reported that this study, because of its focus group and action research methods, empowered the nurses through its processes and that the nurse participants were 'invested in the action plan's outcomes'. Using the action research framework made the implementation of the interventions and actions more effective. From the researchers' perspective, it was important to have CMHNs participate in a process that would elicit their concerns, a process that was specifically aimed at developing a consensus regarding the expressed concerns.</p>
REFERENCE	White and Kudless (2008)

CASE STUDY 6: Hospital mealtimes, an action research for change	
LOCATION	Australia
YEAR	2005
PURPOSE	<p>The study was designed to address the problem of poor nutritional care within a hospital setting, and specifically;</p> <p>To improve the patients' experience of mealtimes,</p> <p>To implement patient-centred mealtimes for older patients by changing the focus from institutional convenience to one that focused on their requirements, an action research approach was used that focused on action and change.</p>
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY THE RESEARCHER	<p>Three focus groups involving 19 staff were undertaken. The project was carried out within a 26-bed unit providing care for older patients with complete discharge needs. Older patients were referred to the unit from throughout the acute NHS Trust.</p> <p>A sample of six patients was interviewed. Observations included the location for eating, the involvement and activity of nursing staff, and the timing and duration of the events; all of these were recorded onto an observational schedule. Data were analysed using interpretive, inductive approaches such as categories, themes and patterns.</p>
RESULTS	<p>The data identified three main themes which impacted on patients' experiences of mealtimes: institutional and organizational constraints, mealtime care and nursing priorities, and the eating environment.</p> <p>When this paper was published, only two of the three phases of the project had been completed. The changes that had been made thus far included alterations to practice at mealtimes that prioritised mealtime care for all staff on the unit, such as making sure that nursing staff were actively involved and had rescheduled other work, such as giving out medication, in order</p>

	<p>to avoid mealtimes. The ‘Malnutrition Universal Screening Tool’ was also introduced in order to identify those patients at risk of malnutrition, and changes had been made to the physical environment to ensure it was more conducive to mealtimes, including improving the ambience of the dining room by purchasing new crockery and tablecloths.</p> <p>The researchers maintained that by using action research, they were able to improve the mealtime care of patients. They also suggested that the action research approach worked as a vehicle to enable practitioners and researchers to collaborate in their efforts to improve the real world of practice, including the clinical situation and the outcome for patients.</p>
REFERENCE	Dickinson <i>et al.</i> , (2005)

Table 5.3 above tries to give the reader an overview of what is entailed in carrying out action research design and the purposes of carrying out participatory research projects. Three examples of previously published action research projects were provided to enable the reader to become acquainted with the various processes and stages prior to experiencing them personally.

Reason and Bradbury (2008) describe action research as an approach which is used in designing studies which seek both to inform and influence practice. Creswell and Clark (2011) and Mertens (2009) state that action research is a particular orientation and purpose of enquiry rather than a research methodology. They also propose that action research consists of a ‘family of approaches’ that have different orientations, yet reflect the characteristics which seek to ‘involve, empower and improve’ aspects of participants’ social world. A further list of features of action research, put forward by the same authors (2009: 3), states that it, is a set of practices that respond to people’s desire to act creatively in the face of practical and often pressing issues in their lives in organizations and communities; Calls for an engagement with people in collaborative relationships, opening new ‘communicative spaces’ in which dialogue and development can flourish.

We define action research as an approach employed by practitioners for improving practice as part of the process of change. The research is context-bound and participative. It is a

continuous learning process in which the researcher learns and also shares the newly generated knowledge with those who may benefit from it.

5.3 Insights from the case studies

It is clear from these case studies that action research differs from other research design in several ways, the most obvious being that it involves community members as co-learners and co-researchers. In this regards, Defoer *et al.* (2009) state that people learn better and become more motivated to apply their knowledge when it comes from action research. They say that learning is achieved through a cyclical process which comprises three stages that are action, observation and reflection. Through this process, participants explore and “acquire progressively a solid practical knowledge that they use for guiding the actions that transform their lives” (Doefer *et al.*, 2009: 2). The cases show that, unlike other research design, action research insists on taking into accounts the traditions, context, culture and economy of a local community.

It turns the field into a place of learning and research is developed around the needs and interests of participants and local people. Action research does not seek scientific solutions, but places more value on local experiences that are practical, applicable and suitable for specific situations. The participants from the local community are considered as the first experts and practitioners within their communities.

In action research, participants should not be perceived as receivers or adopters of new potential knowledge brought in from outside. The idea is to create a process that encourages participants to explore, to experiment and to innovate from the existing body of knowledge. The underlying purpose is to create sustainable learning and innovation development. Indeed, participants experience new ideas and systematically make observations, followed by analysis of the results which allows innovative action; lasting improvements are the results of the appropriation of participation innovations.

Social learning means that learning takes place within social settings of the participants. The facilitator leads the sessions by stimulating exchanges, discussions and constructive criticism. Social learning involves participants in all aspects that are best equipped to develop their own understanding of the situation. It allows them to decide what the appropriate criteria are for ranking aspects of their lives better than outsiders. In short, social learning stimulates and

provides a more complete view of facts, causes and effects and the ability to influence values, beliefs and socio-cultural constraints much more than an isolated individual.

5.4 Data collection in action research

For many traditional data collection methods, respondents answer prepared questions. Participants are therefore often reluctant to answer questions; and when they accept, they are subject to various interferences and significant distractions from their main task. There is no way to strictly verify how the information provided matches the investigated facts. Based on these gaps, the diary was preferred and used in many case studies summarised in Table 5.3 as a retrospective and reflective material which provides quite rich information about events and author's feelings; thus recording ideas for the purpose of later reflections.

In the case study on knowledge construction and professional development, Marincowitz (2003) argues that the research diary was used to deeply capture and reflect on the impact of negotiation, reflection and collaborative efforts on co-constructing knowledge in improving the working practices through action research process. According to the author, the research diary yielded reflection and critique to learning; shared colleagues' work experiences based on negotiation and reflection within an action research paradigm were significant in the construction of knowledge.

The experience of the case study on psychological change processes in women's intimacy to contend that the diary offers a unique window on human phenomenology because it helps to capture untold aspects of social interactions which are important determinants of how people change, and because of the importance of close relationships to such interactions. The diary was the central part of the methods used by Dymond *et al.* (op cit) in their case studies on the process of redesigning one high school science course of Illinois to incorporate the principles of Universal Design for Learning (UDL) and to promote access to the general Curriculum. The diary was chosen because of the overarching purpose of the full study (of which this case study was a part). According to authors, the diary helped to record rich data and information that favoured the design of high school science courses and the evaluation of the effectiveness of that process in assisting students to gain access to the general curriculum.

5.5 Triangulation in action research studies

The studies presented above have used the diary method; none of them has based its methodology on a single data collection tool. The most commonly applied methods used in the case studies are outlined in the following chapter. They include observation, focus groups (FGDs) and structured and unstructured interviews. In the context of this study, there is the need to rely on several methods in order to minimize biases and the validity and reliability of the results.

All case studies in table 5.3 illustrate the above statements. The case study of primary health care in Limpopo Province (Marincowitz, 2003) involved observation; interviews and FGDs. Seven meetings with each group were audio-taped over the research period of six months. Each group consisted of the primary patient, their doctor who was also their researcher family members, friends and neighbours. In three of the groups, a home-based care volunteer formed part of the group.

5.6 Summary

This chapter examined the research design. Action research is a collective approach which integrates research and action by involving both researchers and participants in consultation and collaborative relationship. PR is centered on a specific and problematic situation which when inserted in real social setting prompts noticeable changes. PR avoids the common mistake of traditional research methods, which considers people or groups as reservoirs of information that are passive. Furthermore, this chapter has focused on action research design. It outlined the epistemological and conceptual foundation of this study and showed how an action research design can empower individuals - like ex-combatants who are members of cooperative – to make their own decisions as a group but based on the specific participation of its members. Data collection and triangulation issues were discussed and how these worked out in practice is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Under geographical context, the researcher provided background information on the community and the reasons for choosing it as the location for the research. Its unique location was noted.

CHAPTER SIX: DATA COLLECTION METHODS

6.1. Introduction

The study employed several research methodologies to collect data that the researcher needed and these include mixed research methods. These methods provided a basis for both primary and secondary sources.

Mixed research is a general type of research (it is one of the three paradigms) in which quantitative and qualitative methods, techniques, or other paradigm characteristics are mixed in one overall study. This involves integrating qualitative and quantitative research techniques for data collection and analysis. If the researcher uses numbers, they are using a quantitative measure; if they use a descriptive style it is qualitative measure; and if they are somewhere in between it is a mixed method (Mertens, 2009; Nutting, Miller and Crabtree, 2009; Creswell, 2003). The researcher preferred to use mixed methods (1) because of the need for in-depth insights from individuals and (2) also the need for quantitative aspect which are a feature of performance indicators. These include a questionnaire, participant observation, Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs), interviews and workshops. The researcher used secondary data from various books, journals, company reports and research papers.

The diary and note books were used as major means of recording the data collected from participants.

6.2. Documents

Documents of various kinds provided secondary data needed in this research. Fine *et al.* (2003: 80) contend that documentary methods help the researcher to read and discover the contents of many written documents like institutions' magazines, newspaper articles, letters, official reports, administrative records, web pages and diaries about a given topic. I therefore consulted documents from the RDRC, MDRP, and UNDP. The contents of these documents allowed me to draw particular conclusions related to the ex-combatants' concerns their re-integration. In the same respect, Polit and Hungler (1999) state that documents are vital resources to any researcher who wants to investigate social aspects.

Mouton (2001) states that documents are social products that must be shared among the individuals who live in a given society. Since they are based on some particular conventions and mirror some detailed discourses, written documents therefore provided data to this research. Collected data from different written documents are useful since they contribute to the

understanding of reintegration subject and its' various perspectives. In addition, the documentary approach contributes to the ample justification and understanding of the subject at hand.

From the documentary review, the researcher accessed a secondary source of data collection and it involved him going to library, consulting the internet, reports and journals among other sources, whereby obtaining written information and to know what other authors have discussed about the same topic. The secondary data also originated from reports which comprised the reintegrating ex-combatants as well as action research projects that were carried out prior to this study.

6.3. Questionnaire

Among the research instruments used in this study was the questionnaire, preceded by a covering letter, introducing the researcher, explaining the purpose of the research and soliciting assistance in providing the required information. Items in this questionnaire were drawn and administered to the ex-combatants specifically those who could write. Those who could not write were assisted to fill in the questionnaires. All 34 members of Jabana agricultural cooperative received and answered the questionnaire. Formulation of the questionnaire was based on the respondent's background, economic, social, political and psychological conditions. However, to get enough data to supplement this study, interviews were used. Items which were used in this study are presented (Appendix 1).

6.4. Interviews

An interview involves the investigator gathering data through direct verb interaction with participants. This was via a face to face interview with the respondent.

An unstructured interview guide was developed for this research (Appendix 1) and focused on individual opinions regarding the socio-economic integration of ex-combatants. Furthermore, the researcher did not frame questions; instead he listed themes related to the specific aims of the research.

An unstructured interview is a qualitative method of inquiry that combines a pre-determined set of open questions with the opportunity for the interviewer to explore further on particular themes or responses.

Unstructured interviews contribute to capturing points of view, reflections and observations of people from different categories (Babbie and Mouton, 2002). Opinions or points of views are important in unstructured interviews for the following reasons:

- Have a particular specialised knowledge;
- Have a particular status or position;
- Bear information that the researcher cannot obtain elsewhere.

The main difference between structured and unstructured interviews is that the latter relies more on probing questions in order to ensure the qualitative aspect of expected data. The researchers who use unstructured interviews are supposed to adjust themselves to time constraints. For instance, in the middle of an interview, the interviewee may have a reason to cut short the interview and move to other urgencies. In such a case the interviewer should have the maturity to ask the most pertinent or summative questions because that moment is the only opportunity in tight schedules, for example, busy officials (Kajornboon, 2004). Not only the interviewer should be skilled in managing tight schedules but should also be able to ask thought-provoking questions, and even questions that are not particularly pleasant. Therefore when the respondent proves to be uneasy with a given question, the researcher should be able to debrief or to cool them the tense mood.

Unstructured interviews have both advantages and disadvantages in the course of data collection process. The advantages are that themes of questions prepared beforehand help to avoid the infringement on interviewees' time and it is easier to build on leads/hints in order to deepen the interview;

Building positive rapport contributes in quickening access to sought data. The method contributes to yielding high validity data because respondents are able to elaborate on expected (themed) information in the expert-like perspective. The method helps to tackle complex and sensitive issues that could not be tackled in classic structured interviews. The method helps the researcher to predetermine which theme to discuss or not to discuss and the method makes it easier data recording. The disadvantages include the following:

- Interviewer may give out unconscious signals/clues that guide respondent to give answers expected by interviewer
- It is time-consuming and expensive

- It is difficult to exactly repeat the same interview themes discussed in previous interview sessions
- Depth of qualitative information may be difficult to analyse (for example, deciding what is and is not relevant)
- The personal nature of interview may make findings difficult to generalise (respondents may effectively be answering different questions)
- Regarding validity, the researcher has no real way of knowing if the respondent is lying in their answers (Hannan, 2007).

Unstructured interviews were used in this research to obtain feedback and offered the interviewer the opportunity to explore issues or services. Interviewees were allowed to express their opinions, concerns and feelings on the reintegration of ex-combatants of Jabana. The unstructured nature of this method allowed for conversations to flow as opposed to cutting someone off because they strayed from the topic. There was a limit imposed by pre-determined answers, additionally unstructured interviews provided the advantage of posing several probing questions.

All 34 ex-combatants, 28 male and 6 female members of the Jabana agricultural cooperative were interviewed. I investigated the existence strengths of the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants through members of the Jabana agricultural cooperative. Therefore, I conducted three categories of interviews, one for male members of the Jabana cooperative, one for female members of the Jabana cooperative, and finally in order to get the insight from community members using purposive sampling, five local leaders from Jabana Sector, five representatives from neighbouring cooperatives in Jabana Sector, five close ex-combatants' relatives and five close neighbours were selected. In addition, 3 respondents from RDRC staff members, the programme monitoring officer, the training desk officer and guidance and counselling officer. The researcher made an appointment with respondents before each meeting.

Two interview rounds took place, one between 10th November and 20th December, 2009 in order to assess reintegration challenges. The last round of interviews took place between 04th November and 15th December 2014 to assess the impact of Jabana agricultural cooperative. The data recording process included taking notes using note books and pens. The interview guide is included as Appendix 2.

6.5. Workshops

The success of the workshops relied on learning new knowledge and particularly in bringing about transformation within individuals' and communities' ways of thinking (mindset change) and doing things in terms of improving their livelihood economically and socially. An effective workshop can provide more hands-on, participatory, transformative, mutually beneficial and life-enduring transformation exchange in know-how and knowledge. Workshops are small in size, more intimate, result-oriented, and costly in terms of time and financial resources. Workshops do not require great expertise from participants.

For a workshop to be successful, it must have objectives and be participant driven. Its' aims reflect an existing challenge faced by the participants. Workshop is a 'rear window' because both the facilitator and the participants' work proceeds with workshop activities (Tiberius and Silver, 2001). The workshop is one of the realms of informal adult action learning method in which objectives are set by participants rather than the lecturer in the classic education system. Participants own the outcome of the learning activities which makes the workshop an objectively verifiable process (McIntyre, 2008). The central feature of workshops is participation of attendants. Participation matters in workshop because it contributes to the exchange of know-how and knowledge. Workshops contribute to problem-solving after challenges and appropriate solutions. At the end of workshops, participants are expected to serve as multiplying effects within their local communities by sharing learned knowledge, skills and the use of tools while exploring issues and taking action in order to address local challenges.

Participation in workshops must be democratic. The environment should be characterized by trust, respect, warmth in the dynamics of participants' rapport and most importantly valuing participation in the process of finding solutions to local challenges (Babbie and Mouton, 2002). It is through democratized participation that brainstorming exercises become important in workshops as participants bring in their opinions. All participants' ideas count, and the best ones are retained as solutions.

In this research workshops involved an examination of participants' challenges which would range from economic to socio-political issues in the reintegration of ex-combatants. Participants are stakeholders who participated under the principle of equal footing where everyone's idea

weighed the same. In workshops participants were engaged in an exchange of knowledge and skills in the pursuit of solutions to challenges faced.

I conducted 25 workshops involving the 34 members of the agricultural cooperative and other interested ex-combatants in groups averaging 28. The method of recruiting the participants was based on democratic aspects and experience in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants. Workshops took place every last Saturday of the month from June 2012 to July 2014.

Data were recorded for each workshop that is, there was a written record under headings which the whole group agreed to.

6.6. Focus-Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus group is used to gather data, usually in the forms of opinions, from a selected group of people on a particular and pre-determined topic (Sedgley, 2009). Focus group discussions in this study were an interaction between researcher and her assistant and more than one participant for the purpose of collecting data. Focus-Group Discussions (FGDs) occur in groups of about eight people brought together under the guidance of a researcher or a skilled interviewer in order to focus on a specific subject (Punch, 2005: 46). The method promotes conversation as it allows every person to participate in discussing topics or questions provided by the researcher, who otherwise plays a very small role in the discussion. Groups are normally homogenous such as with respect to gender, age or background.

This method remains a forum of small groups of respondents brought together for up to two hours to solicit their views and beliefs on a given topic (Punch, 2005: 14). This approach produces more data that is often more original, rich and valid compared to other methods of research. When conducting FGDs, the researcher remains alert to new aspects of discussion by following up on new and unexpected opinions that participants may bring in. The process remains conversational and this distinguishes it from unstructured interviews which are guided by a limited number of preset questions. FGDs allowed the researcher to conduct groups until saturation is reached, that is the researcher feels there are no more new ideas flowing among the participants.

In this vein, Mouton (2001) emphasises that the approach promotes the understanding of respondents' attitudes and perceptions from their group discussions. Focus group talks are a "microcosm of the society" (Babbie and Mouton, 2002: 33) and the opinions of Jabana

cooperative members were used to help build a collective approach to facilitate socio-economic re-integration. Correspondingly, Mouton (2001: 41) found that such innovation depicts how the contributions of participants in their unit discussions interconnect and that sometimes conflict and argument become apparent between the participants of the same team. Furthermore, Mouton argues that the participants in each team react as team-friends by questioning one another without fear, exchanging stories and observations built on the experience and opinions of other members of their group.

Table 6. 1. Summary of three studies which used FGDs in the DDR context.

Place	Year	Reason	No's of FGDs	No's of people	Results	Reference
DRC	2008	To assess the needs for reintegrating former combatants	3	632	The study found that the country engorges means to re-integrate them but there is lack of political willing	Matundu, 2009
Liberia	2009	To see how to re-integrate ex female combatants in society	3	596	The study underscored some difficulties that interfered with women's engagement in DDR programmeme	Smith, 2010
Angola	2009	To study the effectiveness of reinserting children ex-soldiers	2	483	The study revealed that 70 % of respondents confirmed that children re-insertion is necessary to build a strong nation as the youth are the future of every nation; they are the half of the nation.	Doreen <i>et al.</i> , 2009

Source: Othman (2004: 11)

Table 6.1 above summarises of three studies which used FGDs in the DDR context. The advantages of the FGDs method have been presented above but it has several potential disadvantages. For instance, the participants who participated to one group discussion may be absent in the following. In fact, it is not easy to have the same people as originally planned. Some of them may feel disinterested, nervous or shy to speak in front of other people and so they will not contribute at all. Conversely, there may be some participants who can influence the attitudes and beliefs of their counterparts. A researcher's presence may negatively affect participant's involvement in the group's discussion. Moderation may also be challenging as some researchers may not moderate the group as effectively as others (De Vaus, 2002: 74). Mouton (2001) stated that if one or more participants monopolise the group discussion, one opinion will prevail in the group. Finally during data analysis, the researcher may find it difficult to analyse the data he has collected from the field when there is a large amount of information which requires additional time to be spent on it.

As mentioned, FGDs in this research were usually composed of individuals with similar characteristics (ex-combatants, local leaders, relatives of ex-combatants, etc.) These homogenous groups felt free to openly discuss topics and members were relaxed with each other. Data quality would decrease if, for instance ex-combatants of Jabana were reluctant to share their opinions or if they otherwise felt restrained in the presence of people who differ significantly from them.

The table presents the Focus Group Discussions that were carried out in Jabana.

Table 6. 2The FGDs for the study

Place	Year	Reason	No's of FGDs	Type of participants
Jabana	2010 (At the beginning of the project)	To assess the needs for reintegrating former combatants	2	Ex-combatants in Jabana
Jabana	2014 (At the end of the project)	To evaluate the impact of socio-economic reintegration project on the ex-combatants' social and economic needs	2	Ex- combatants in Jabana

Jabana	2010 (At beginning)	To assess issues to reintegration of ex-combatants at the local administration level	1	Local leaders
Jabana	2014 (At the end of the project)	To examine the impact of socio-economic reintegration project on the ex-combatants' social and political dimensions	1	Local leaders
Jabana	2010 (At the beginning)	To assess the ex-combatants' economic, social and political concerns at community level	1	Community members
Jabana	2014 (At the end of the study)	To evaluate the impact of socio-economic reintegration project on the social and political dimensions of ex-combatants	1	Community members
Jabana	2010 (At the beginning of the project)	To assess the ex-combatants' economic, social and psychological reintegration at household level	1	Wives and relatives of ex-combatants
Jabana	2014 (At the end of the project)	To examine the impact of socio-economic reintegration project on the economic, social, political and psychological dimensions.	1	Wives and relatives of ex-combatants.

Source: Author's survey

As indicated in table 6.2 above, the focus group discussions in practice were made of four homogeneous groups of at least eight participants. Participants were allocated to 4 FGDs, each of

which met on two occasions, one at the start of the research and another one at the end of the research. Four FGDs were made up of ex-combatants, two with wives and relatives of ex-combatants, two of local leaders and two of local community members that is, at the beginning and end of the project. The following are the themes that guided FGCs in Jabana:

- Socio-economic situation of ex-combatants of Jabana before the implementation of the income generating project;
- Stresses of reintegration as experienced by ex-combatants;
- The effect of ineffective reintegration on children;
- Long term reintegration through Jabana cooperative;
- The economic impact of reintegration, the impact of reintegration on Jabana group cohesiveness the impact on social interaction and community integration impact on stress levels and the impact of the project on the political dimensions.

Data were recorded for each FGD in a similar way as workshop data (see 6.5). That is, there was a written record under headings which the whole group agreed to.

6.7. Participant observation

Observation is a common technique used for both anthropological and sociological studies. Its relevance to action research studies is clear. The aspects of observation that are discussed here include definitions of participant-observation, its purpose, the roles of the observer, and additional information about when, what, and how to observe.

Observation allows the researcher to systematically describe existing situations using his five senses and providing a written picture of the situation under study. It involves active looking, inquisitions, informal interviewing, improving memory and writing detailed field-notes. The process of participant-observation guides the researcher to active learning through exposure and involvement in the everyday activities of participants in the research settings (Kombo, 2006)

DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) state that the advantage for a researcher to use participant-observation is to develop an accurate and holistic understanding of the phenomenon that is under study. In this vein, this method contributes to increasing the validity of the study, as observations help the researcher to develop a better knowledge of the milieu and phenomenon that are being studied. The validity of the research is stronger when participant-observation is

combined with other methods. Participant-observation is critical to this study as it lays the foundation of the methodology. As a tool of data collection, participant-observation has provided materials recorded in the diary and contributed in the same orientation (Othman, 2004).

Before starting the data collection process in the field, the researcher had to know exactly what kind of observation to use. Angrosino and dePerez (2000) describe three common practices in the process of conducting observations. The first is the descriptive observation. This is a practice where the researcher observes everything. The disadvantage of this practice is that it collects data which may not be relevant to the study. The second category is focused observation which emphasises interviews in order to support the data collection process. In this approach the decisions regarding what to observe is guided by participants' insights. The third mode of observation is the most systematic; that is selective observation where the researcher concentrates on various activities in order to delineate the differences in their activities (Angrosino and dePerez 2000).

Participant-observation encounters a range of challenges one of which is balancing the need for sufficient closeness and connection to the community in order to understand events in the community and write about it. This requires the use of inconspicuous methods such as natural conversations, observation, and various kinds of unstructured interviews, checklists and the development of an open, non-judgmental attitude, being a careful observer and a good listener, and being open to the unexpected in what is learned. Fine (2003) emphasizes that participant-observation is the most effective when one belongs to the group involved in the study and explores routine of behaviour and its organized setting. Participant-observation is more different and difficult than only undertaking observation of the research participants. For situations in which participation is required for understanding, observing without participating may not lead to fully understanding of each activity. Indeed, observation methods provide researchers with ways to check nonverbal expressions, feelings and help to determine the terms that participants use. They also delve in people's communication with each other, observing events that participants may be unable or unwilling to share.

In order to collect desired data as described above, it was imperative to prepare an appropriate operational plan, that is knowing what, whom, where, and when to observe. When looking at whom to research and target research population as subjects, qualitative researches consider

research population as participants. Thus, ‘who’ has to be understood in the context of research participants and not subject as it would lend to sound as subjects under study. Observation started from the very first day of the research and is summarised in Table 6.2.

Table 6. 3. Field observation activities and timeframe in Jabana

Step of field research	Observation activity	Timeframe
1 st Step	Community entry: introduction and exploration by the researcher in the research field (Jabana)	September - October 2009
2 nd Step	Understand community problems	November - December 2009
3 rd Step	Assessing the effects of reintegration problems Identification of income generating project Project implementation and monitoring	January 2010 – July 2014
4 th Step	Outputs and outcomes assessment	August–December 2014

Table 6.3 shows the four steps, observation activities and timeframe of the DDR project of ex-combatants in Jabana. The observation and trust building phase allowed the researcher to visit the group and talk with its leaders. It is in this context that the researcher started his observation. Each discussion, workshop and visit was subject to observation in order to record feelings, attitudes, reactions and actions. After each observation session, an evaluation was conducted in order to retain meaningful information and data captured. Data were recorded for each observation in a written record through note taking.

6.8. The research plan and field reality

Field research is almost certain to find a difference between plans and realities. McIntyre (2008: 1) explains that there exist key principles for AR which include (i) a collective commitment to investigate a problem in a given area, (ii) a desire to involve in self-and collective reflection to gain clarity about the issue under investigation, (iii) a joint decision to engage in individual and collective action that leads to a useful solution that benefits the people involved, and (iv) the building of alliances between researchers and participants in the planning, implementation, and

dissemination of the research process. These objectives are achieved through a cyclical process of participation that favours collective knowledge construction, and action at different moments throughout the research process. The ex-combatants' group of Jabana provided the researcher with the opportunity of learning as a participant. I realized that ex-combatants in Jabana were in the best position to provide suggestions on how to proceed with improving the economic status of their cooperative.

6.8.1 The research plan

Plans are a guide to action and involve three main stages that clarify the questions to ask, the actions to try out, and development of an action plan. Moreover, Secret *et al.* (2011) state that before undertaking the AR cycle, the researcher and participants should have enough information before taking part in planning or intervention to prevent disjointed actions. In this research context, sufficient data was assembled before planning activities. The plan that is outlined here was not the act of the researcher alone but the outcome of joint efforts by the researcher and participants. The table below shows the major phases of the project.

Table 6. 4. Plan for action research in Jabana

STEP	DESCRIPTION	TIMING	RESPONSIBILITY
Step 1: Community entry	Introduction of the researcher, clarification of research Objectives and validation of ethical norms	September-October 2009	Researcher and participants
Step 2: Understand community problems, priorities and areas needing project impact	Research questions and diagnosis of socio-economic problems	November 2009	Researcher and participants
Step 3: Understand the effects of problems	Social and psychological effects; identifying gaps and then make an assessment of what actions need to be taken	December 2009	Researcher and participants

Step 4: Identification and assessment of internal problems, group and cooperative challenges	Organizational challenges (group and cooperative)	January-February 2010	Researcher and participants
Step 5: Internal re-organization, assessment of economic opportunities	Rebuilding leadership and conception of income generating project	March 2010	Researcher and participants
Step 6: Gathering means for the project	Financial and human resources	April -May 2010	Researcher and participants
Step 7: Project implementation	Launching of project	June 2010	Researcher and participants
Step 8: Project consolidation	Increasing financial and human resources to strengthen the project	July 2010	Researcher and participants
Step 9: Project monitoring	Management project monitoring mechanisms	August 2010- July 2014	Researcher and participants
Step 10: Outcome assessment	Economic, social and psychological outputs and outcomes	August – December 2014	Researcher and participants
Step 11: Submission of the thesis	Final touches of the thesis	2015	Researcher and Supervisor

The above plan in table 6.4 was designed as a response to issues faced by the group at the time the researcher arrived in Jabana. The researcher faced a daunting task to facilitate the process of learning and building the skills needed in implementing the research plan. Ex-combatants initially brought few skills to the process.

6.8.2 Selection of research participants

Participants' categories: in order to ensure that reintegration is understood under different aspects, the researcher planned to involve the following types of participants in the study.

The ex-combatants' group of Jabana and non-combatants were contacted prior to the start of this research project in order to gain their participation. Non-combatants mostly local leaders, local communities' members and ex-combatants' relatives participated in the research within certain time limits, whereas ex-combatants participated in the research from its outset to its end. More importantly, not only were ex-combatants participants, but they were also the owners of the research process and its outcomes. Contacts with participants were predominantly by cell phone communication and those who did not have cell phones were informed of the research by word of mouth. Ex-combatants expressed enthusiasm in the research to which they were going to be partakers in the subsequent days. Their enthusiasm can be explained by the fact that the research had come in a time they had a critical need to extricate themselves from socio-economic stresses.

Prior to mobilizing people to take part in the research I informed local leaders about my research aims and related activities which included involving the local population comprising both ex-combatants and non combatants. 34 Ex-combatants were purposively selected and participated as members from armed groups in the DRC, the RDF and members of the Jabana cooperative. I also looked at participants according to age, gender, location and relationship to ex-combatants.

My field research plan initially targeted FDLR ex-combatants living in the Western Province of Rwanda close to DRC border. The reasons that motivated the shift of focus to Jabana, an administrative Sector of Nyarugenge District in Kigali city include:

- Ex-combatants in the Jabana are a representative group in terms of background, some being from the RDF while the remaining category of participants are made of former insurgents from the eastern DRC.
- The group is predominantly composed of ex-combatants who have been demobilized during the thirty first phases of the DDR process. The latter being the phase that was targeted in this study because it coincided with the period of my research proposal validation in May 2009.
- The Jabana cooperative of ex-combatants was facing serious problems and was assuredly heading towards a halt for reasons related to administrative and technical pitfalls.
- The majority of group members were jobless and those who had occupations were facing unstable working environment (lack of contracts and poor salary).

6.8.3 Researcher's role

The researcher's role was to listen, ask questions, heed and consider participants' views differing from mine. Constructive, complementary and contending ideas were looked at while searching for best solutions to issues which had been discussed. The researcher was not a trainer but a facilitator during the research process, much of which took place in workshops. The process created a spontaneous and continuous collaboration between me and the participants. In the discussion, the researcher contributed with his own opinions and provided explanations on issues that participants knew less about in AR.

Although the AR process is broadly unpredictable, the experience of Jabana showed the necessity of careful preparation of meetings, including tentative lists of topics for discussion. To make participants feel comfortable, the researcher always suggested start-up techniques which included arranging chairs and desks so that the participants could see each other during discussions.

During meetings/sessions, the researcher explained the subject of the meeting and requested participants' viewpoints on the subject under discussion. Participants' reactions helped him to better understand the subject and related issues. Participants had the freedom to propose or object to aspects of discussions during meetings. The researcher ensured that group discussions were productive and included decisions for action. The workshop always ended with an evaluation designed to determine what participants thought about what had happened and if the session had reached its objectives. In this regard, the experience of Jabana suggests that several factors can lead to success or failure of a workshop, particularly when the purpose of a workshop is not clearly understood and members thus do not actively participate.

6.8.4 Introduction of the researcher

The first informal visits the researcher organised to Jabana focused in developing relationships with cooperative members, which enabled a formal presentation of the study. This was done during a meeting that gathered the majority of the group members. The researcher exchanged information about identity details and discussed the most important points regarding the research purpose, its importance for both sides, the action approach that would be used, its goals and requirements, and what the group could expect from the study.

At the beginning, the group did not appear to be receptive to the idea of using AR within their cooperative mostly because their cooperative had not functioned for several years due to mismanagement and mistrust. Financial assistance was considered to be the necessary condition for the cooperative to restart.

In the researcher's opinion, the participants were right to express their doubt at the beginning and did it in an honest way. Indeed, it is always better to have enough discussion prior to any decision instead of engagement without conviction. I helped participants to overcome their doubts including showing them a documentary film that emphasizes the impact of approaches in decision making. After the debate, the participants expressed their interest in the research. They did so by confirming and signing the participant's consent form.

6.8.5 Trust building

Participation requires trust between the target community and the researcher and first contact is not immediately followed by data collection. There is need, for example, to find out who are the key informants holding certain information. More importantly, it was important to build trust with all potential participants.

Building trust with Jabana cooperative members was a process which began with preliminary contacts between respondents and researchers. They were initially reluctant to release information about themselves and their cooperative. The researcher organized additional short visits to the group for simple conversations in order to familiarize himself with cooperative members and for them to familiarise themselves with him. This involved four monthly visits, during which the researcher talked with local leaders, cooperative group leaders and other influential members on issues related to ex-combatants, the group of Jabana and the social environment in the area. The researcher obtained interesting information which included the past and present situation of the cooperative and its members and the economic resources available in the Jabana.

Ex-combatants did not cooperate easily with the researcher during initial contact. They felt that researchers often came to collect information and left without providing any feedback. The researcher was aware of potential problems he might face. Consequently, he introduced himself to the leaders of the group without being escorted by any RDRC staff which enabled his first visits to be informal. He met the participants in afternoons and on the weekends when everyone

was available. The researcher held unstructured conversations which avoided any formal research discourse. He did not carry a notebook or recording device with him. Creating a relationship with people was a necessary step prior to collecting information.

During preliminary visits, the researcher had to avoid asking specific questions and thus allowed participants to express their opinions openly. In this regard, throughout ordinary conversations, topics emerged. This gave the researcher the opportunity to connect with cooperative members through short queries. One initial problem was the absence of women because of household responsibilities. The significance of economic and social problems can make a person reject researchers but the experience of Jabana was largely to the contrary. The aim of meeting the members of Jabana group was not merely to collect but to pave the way for the next interactions with the group.

Research and experience assume that each person is endowed with special knowledge. Access to such information is possible through relations of mutual recognition. Knowledge results from a co-production based on the intersection among these multiple facts. The AR process in Jabana invited each participant to recognize the knowledge and skills of others. This implied that every participant should be recognized as a co-researcher or co-investigator and co-trainer. This enhanced and valued participant' sources of knowledge, experience, and balanced the power of participation. Both the researcher and the participants expressed their willingness to listen to each other and to respect the freedom of speech.

6.8.6 Equal participation

Participation has its true meaning when there is a horizontal relation between the researcher and participants. At the beginning of this study in Jabana, people did not participate equally in the research activities, due to their position or role in group, their level of instruction, and their personal character. In brief, there existed three categories of participants those who were shy, those who were monopolizing the meeting, those who accepted participants point of view. The researcher used several ways to build a more equal level of participation.

First, topics focused on the group needs and problems. This contributed to active participation for the group of Jabana as proved by strict respect of meeting attendance. Cases of absence or leaving before the end of meeting were very few and those which occurred had relevant reasons. In fact, participants who were excused to leave and those who were absent were the ones who

had no motivation in the activities. Second, there was respectful use of language and expressions. For better exchange of opinions, the researcher asked participants to use the language and expressions that were familiar to everyone. Communication was therefore restricted to the use of the local language “Kinyarwanda”. The researcher’s contribution was to guide the discussions in order to discourage the interference of technical terms from the participants who were either French and/or English speaking, although some participants could not comply since both English and French are used as official languages in Rwanda and some people use them more fluently than the local language. Third, different means of communication were used during workshop sessions. Presentations were verbal, written and/or visual. Verbal presentations were useful but the support of visual presentations provided to be most effective. This offered opportunities for debates, insights for interpretations and further discussions and analysis as various perspectives were heard.

We adhered to a research timeline with each presentation. A sheet with the diagram drawn indicated the issue that was discussed, the date, the place and the group used, the person who drew and the one who facilitated it and, finally, the key findings. This ensured that the information and demographics were genuinely recorded and properly reported at the feedback sessions. The sheet highlighted the value of feedback. In particular, this step concerned the presentation and the analysis of the information which provided a record of the proposals by the community. The participants were continually thanked for every task they had accomplished which motivated them and built their confidence.

Every participant was considered as a learner and a researcher at the same time. Interactions during meetings were structured horizontally. The seats or chairs were arranged in a circle allowing each participant to be visible and equally participate in discussions. In addition, some subjects were examined in sub groups composed of five participants but these sub groups were not fixed in terms of composition. A participant could move from the sub group to another and interactions with new people. This method contributed in the success of learning processes between participants while at the same time improving social relationship within the group. The processes increased their experience in problem-solving and decision-making. It also gave participants a better understanding of personal problems, increased awareness of personal abilities and self-confidence in sharing opinions in public.

World-wide, women participate widely in social movements in times of crisis but they are relegated to the domestic arena once the crisis is over. Women's participation is necessary but representation does not flow automatically from participation. This is what happened initially; although women were regular in all activities of Jabana, they were not active during meetings. Researchers have always found that lack of economic resources and income in households affects women more than other social categories. It would have been a great mistake to leave the women of Jabana out when seeking ways to reduce poverty. Women were actively encouraged to express themselves by sharing their attitudes, asking questions or commenting on various points that were raised in the meetings. As strategies, women were given the floor in turns, were appointed to supervise reflection in groups, and were designated to give their opinions during debates. One FGD was composed only of women.

6.8.7 Field reality during data collection in Jabana

This section presents what actually took place when the researcher was collecting data using these instruments of study in Jabana.

Interviews: I conducted qualitative interviews which were used to gather detailed in-depth information. The focus was on each individual's experiences and the interviewee was at the centre of this element of the enquiry. Interviews were used to assist with seeing reintegration of ex-combatants from an ex-combatant perspective and to explore ex-combatants' experiences and views on reintegration. Among the difficulties I encountered were time constraints and repetition of the same themes previously discussed. In depth qualitative data was also difficult to analyse and some respondents were not cooperative. I assured the respondents of confidentiality of their information, and that it would be used solely for academic purposes. Some of respondents thought there was no direct benefit from the research results. Other limitations were the time and financial constraints.

Thiollent (2011) argues that participation in a research cannot be imposed on a population, it is important to discuss with those concerned. In this way, they can say how they see their own participation in the research process and its eventual consequences in their lives. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, I went to Jabana with recommendation letters. There, I established opening contact with the group and started negotiating entry to the community.

Coming back to the choice of participants for the interviews, I also looked at participants according to age, gender, location and relation to ex-combatants. The participants were selected on the basis of their geographical proximity to the research bases, their willingness to participate in the projects, and their contrasting demographic and organizational characteristics.

Factors which hindered the use of unstructured interviews included missing interviews with participants, and interviewees who deviated from the subject of the interview.

Workshops: The method of recruiting the participants was based on democratic aspects and experience in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants. Some of the limitations encountered were lack of time management by the participants. At the beginning of this study in Jabana, people did not participate equally in the research activities, due to their position or role in group, their level of instruction, and their personal character. In brief, there existed three categories of participants those who were shy, those who were monopolizing the meeting, those who accepted participants point of view. The researcher used several ways to build a more equal level of participation.

Initially, the focus was on the group needs and problems. This contributed to active participation for the group of Jabana as proved by strict respect of meeting attendance. Cases of absence or leaving before the end of meeting were very few and those which occurred had relevant reasons. In fact, participants who were excused to leave and those who were absent were the ones who had no motivation in the activities. Second, there was respectful use of language and expressions. For better exchange of opinions, the researcher asked participants to use the language and expressions that were familiar to everyone. Communication was therefore restricted to the use of the local language *Kinyarwanda*. The researcher's contribution was to guide the discussions in order to discourage the interference of technical terms from the participants who were either French and/or English speaking, although some participants could not comply since both English and French are used as official languages in Rwanda and some people use them more fluently than the local language. Third, different means of communication were used during workshop sessions. Presentations were verbal, written and/or visual. Verbal presentations were useful but the support of visual presentations provided to be most effective. This offered opportunities for debates, insights for interpretations and further discussions and analysis as various perspectives were heard.

Participation-observation: I conducted a participation-observation which was used to gather detailed in-depth information. The focus was on each individual's experiences and the interviewee was at the centre of this element of the enquiry. Participant observation via Practice meetings (including ex-combatants participation/support groups meetings), backed up by field notes, research dairies, and a review of relevant documentation – such as annual reports and minutes of meetings – also provided datasets.

Upon clearing the potential equivoqual aspect of 'on whom' the research has been carried, the question rather is restructured as 'with whom' the research was conducted? Therefore, in his research planning, the researcher involved ex-combatants as participants in the research and not as research subjects. The three levels of data collections were designed to cover field data at the ex-combatant level, their family settings, and the local community. Moreover, the research area was initially to be Rwanda's Western province but the Jabana ex-combatants was chosen because it fulfilled the desired heterogeneity of ex-combatants from the DRC and former RDF soldiers and involved a cooperative project. In terms of where to observe, I intended to observe them individually, in their family settings and at community participation activities known as umuganda, civilian nightly patrols known as ironondo (to ensure local security) and at various community schemes aimed at economic and social promotion.

Focus Group Discussions: During focus group discussions, I moderated the conversations between group respondents. This was encouraged because discussions were a consistent means of scrutinising views on social re-integration. The focus group method was used to discover and underscore social opinions. Some perceptions of interviewees were a cause of concern that individual interviews might not be possible. Jabana participants for example did not want to converse about problems that they found personal in a one on one interview. However, via a group contact, some participants felt able to use 'they' rather than 'I' in order to hide their personal attitudes. In this research, focus group methodology reflected what the people thought about ex-combatants' socio-economic reintegration through a selected number of respondents taken from the local community.

6.9. Analysis of qualitative data

Qualitative research refers to a systematic subjective approach used to describe life experiences and situations to give them meaning (Cruz, 2011). In the same case analysing quantitative data, such as that from large scale surveys, is relatively straight forward, although there is the

necessity of good judgement in interpreting the numerical results. The analysis of qualitative data however, inevitably involves subjectivity and the consequent danger that a researcher will emphasise their own opinions and beliefs, irrespective of what the data might be saying. In this research, participants were involved in the analysis stage because their discussions, points of views and suggestions served as benchmarks in the analysis process.

Interpretations stem from discussions that arose during workshop sessions. Discussion subjects were written on flip-charts and were deliberated in sub-groups (caucuses) and subsequently discussed in plenaries. It was during the plenary sessions that different themes emerged. A research report was drawn up by themes discussed and adopted during workshop sessions.

As this was an analysis of qualitative data, the process required mixed methods such as thematic and content analyses. Such methods are suitable for depicting a series of intellectual processes by which raw data is examined and reformulated in order to become a research product. From the researcher's field experience, the diversity of participants' discussions open up a range of points of views, suggestions and diverse perspectives under which analysis was carried out.

Content analysis and thematic analysis are very close relatives and the terms are often used interchangeably in content analysis the researcher collates and classifies the different patterns found in the data. The process concerns taking one portion of the data - one discussion, one account, one subject - and comparing it to other data that seemed similar or different. This contributed much to the conceptualisation of the relations between various pieces of data. For instance, by comparing two ex-combatants who have the same background, diagnostic questions were asked such as: why is 'A different from B' and how are these two related? This way of questioning was efficient since the purpose of qualitative studies is to yield knowledge, 'chart' patterns and themes within human experience (Hammouda and Rudzki, 2004).

Quantitative method involves quantifying data and generalizing results from a sample to the population of interest and measuring the incidence of various views and opinions in a chosen sample (Cruz, 2011). Hammouda and Rudzki (2004: 32) states that in a quantitative research methodology, "a researcher can use thematic breakdown as a means to find themes and check on reliability and uniformity of judgement". In this study, the researcher wanted to determine various themes through analysis, which was an appropriate way for scrutinising data stemming from observation, unstructured interviews, FGDs and workshop sessions. This procedure required the researcher to understand and follow the different themes that were deducted from

the data he had collected in the field. It is in this way that the collected information was analysed and interpreted in order to get patterns of meanings regarding the reintegration of ex combatants in community.

Savoie-Zajc (2007: 58) found that thematic analysis is a common approach that is used for scrutinizing social reality. The researcher therefore checked what themes could be deduced from the responses of the respondents to the different interviews questions. If we consider the different views of people regarding the reintegration of former combatants, the 'researcher's opinions must be as close as to the majority of the informants' (Savoie-Zajc, 2007: 62). This implies that the respondents may have individual and inconsistent internal opinions that are centred on how their cooperative can become functional again. Because the researcher cannot grasp the whole genuineness of his respondent's internal opinions, then he has to quote excerpts from their ideas to the various discussions that occurred in different units. Since various participants may give different ideas in quantity as well as in quality during FGDs, Thiollent (2011: 42) asserts that during data scrutiny, the researcher must not neglect some of the respondents' opinions. Thus, data analysis requires a sound and logical evaluation of participants' overall discussion and equally the variation of the atmosphere that may influence the level of their contribution during discussions.

During data analysis, the opinions of the participants may conflict and there may be a change of views and beliefs within the same group. The researcher should respect to take note of such changed views e.g. regarding why their cooperative failed and processes to follow to renew it. The researcher verified arguments of participants to determine if they had not been influenced by people of particular social status or whether they represent the majority views. It is also necessary to note the divergence between the majority and the minority's points of view in different groups during FGDs and how alike the opinions of most respondents are (Mouton, 2001:68).

Data were also analysed using interpretive, inductive approaches such as categories, themes, and patterns.

6.10 Validity and reliability

Previous researchers (Mugenda and Muganda, 1999) describe validity as the accuracy and meaningfulness of inferences, which are based on the research results. The research ensured content validity of the research instrument by ensuring that questions or items are in conformity

to the study's objectives. Reliability of the questionnaire refers to the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study (Pak, 2008). The instruments were piloted to the selected people so as to establish internal reliability of the instrument.

In addition, these concepts deal with concerns and questions such as:

- i) How do we know the participants are telling the truth or the whole story?
- ii) How can we know whether researcher bias is distorting the way the data is analysed and the conclusions reached?
- iii) Would another researcher, faced with the same research objectives, arrive at the same results?

Measures taken to lessen bias in this study included researcher's readiness for critical assessment, systematic self-reflection and democratic, personal, equal and active participation:

i) Recruiting the participants: In order to ensure freedom of participation recruitment was based on independent and personal choice.

ii) Self- assessment: I kept rigorously a personal diary to record what I have done at the end of each stage of the research in order to carry out self-reflection and self-assessment.

iii) Informal meetings with fellow researchers (colleagues and friends): Informally but regularly I met friends (researchers) for critical reactions.

iv) Openness to participants' critical opinions for critical assessment: It's evident that sometimes I had quite different views of events. Feed-back from ex-combatants was revealing, not only of their own feeling, but of how the researcher was getting on, in particular the interpretations of the researcher's ideas, attitudes and behaviour; this was very stimulating in terms of objectivity.

v) Within the workshops: Topics focused on the group needs and problems

In order to allow open discussion from all participants the researcher was a participant like each ex-combatant of Jabana.

vi) The use of language and expressions that were familiar to everyone was recommended for full participation. Therefore exchange of opinions was restricted to the use of the local language "Kinyarwanda". The interference of technical terms from the participants who were either French and/or English speaking was discouraged.

vii) **Finally, different means of communication were used** during workshop sessions, for example visual presentations offered opportunities for debates, insights for interpretations and further discussions and analysis at various perspectives were heard.

6.11 Research ethics

Ethics requires a particular attention in AR studies because of the nature of its methods, specifically that it is generally unstructured and involves long interactions with participants. Research ethics guide both the researcher and the participants with the aim to obtain consent of respondents to a voluntary participation and establish equal relations during the research process. Indeed any research involving human beings must define the ethical values that must guide the researcher in order to approach respondents without doing harm and gain reliable information as each respondent reveals freely information appropriate to the issue under study. In this case, there was the potential economic benefit for participants if the cooperative was re-invigorated. The following ethical principles guided this research:

- i) Before engaging in any form of talk or discussion, the researcher explained the purpose of the inquiry in order to allay any fear that would arise in a respondent's mind.
- ii) The respondents were told about the benefits of getting involved in the research.
- iii) The inquirer ensures full confidentiality regarding any consequence that the respondents would face in case of expressing their opinions in relation to the research aims. For instance, providing opinions about project's failure that was caused by some specific stakeholders who would not wish to be associated with project's failure, explaining likelihood of ostracism or political repercussion, whatsoever.
- iv) Respect of the principle of anonymity. This principle serves as a 'shield' to the respondent irrespective of the sensitivity of information he/she may provide.
- v) Before collecting information, explicitly each respondent was allowed to express their consent by signing the informed consent form.

Thiollent (2011) argues that participation in a research cannot be imposed on a population, it is important to discuss with those concerned. In this way, they can say how they see their own participation in the research process and its eventual consequences in their lives. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, I went to Jabana with recommendation letters. There, I established opening contact with the group and started negotiating entry to the community.

6.14 Summary

This chapter focused on the various methods the researcher used to apply to collect information and analyse data for information collection and data analysis. For data collection, documentary methods were used to collect information from different written documents. The researcher had to meet the participants in order to get primary data and to observe FGDs, interviews and workshops. The chapter also looked at the nature of the action research that was used as an action approach or active learning. The diary was chosen as the means of recording interviews. Writers prefer it owing to its retrospective and reflective material that provides rich information about the events and provides the research with an opportunity for further reflections. The researcher applied both content and thematic analyses to identify key themes from the data that were collected using a range of methods.

This chapter has focused on research plan and research reality. It dealt with the selection of the group that included the FDLR combatants who came from the DRC and those who were demobilized from the regular army. For his introduction to the group at Jabana, the researcher sought effective ways to set up ethics and build trust between him and the team in order to ensure better collaboration.

The observation and trust building phase allowed the researcher to visit the group and talk with its leaders. The aim of visiting the group was to prepare for the next interactions. During these contact sessions, he discussed ethical principles relating to the research with cooperative members. In the same vein, the PR plan was discussed as to how participants would respond to different questions. It was in this context that the roles of both the researcher and the participants were described. Although the researcher prepared activities for respondents during meetings, both sides worked jointly for achievement. After the sessions, an evaluation was conducted which sought conclusions and recommendations, the desired objectives process involved both participants and researcher who were at the same time learners.

PART FOUR

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONTEXT AND PRE- INTERVENTION SITUATION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter starts by showing the context of the study and various socio-economic characteristics of the Jabana households. The chapter also shows how other issues have hindered the process of reintegration which in turn affected relationships within households.

7.2 Geographical context

7.2.1 Introduction

The third research objective (see section 1.7) is to use action research design to assist in the reorganisation and revitalisation of the cooperative at Jabana. Subsequent to the approval of my research proposal in 2009, I started my research at the same time as the third stage of demobilization in Rwanda which had started in January 2009. According to the RDRC, the said stage was started after successful completion of stages I and II which covered the years 1997-2000 and 2001-2008 respectively (RDRC, 2010).

In Rwanda the reintegration process of ex-combatants principally concerns former soldiers of the national army RDF and armed group members made of former FARs and the nebula of FDLR-Interahamwe operating in eastern DRC particularly in the North and South Kivu Provinces (Amnesty International, 2010; Omaar, 2008). In chapter four, we noted that the reintegration of ex-combatants started in 1997 but involved solely RDF soldiers, given that ex-FARs and Interahamwe were still involved in their insurgency campaign against Rwanda. In 2001 when the first group of armed groups from the DRC completed their demobilization course from various centres such as Mutobo, Rusizi and Muhazi (Zeebroek *et al.*, 2010; World Bank, 2002)

Before beginning my work with the cooperative, my objective was to immerse myself within the group, understand their challenges and share concerns and hopes of ex-combatants. My intention was to engage with the participants as something of a peer rather than as an external expert. We saw in chapter four that cooperatives were closer as the main vehicle to promote social and economic re-integration.

The RDRC conducted a survey in 2009 on 127 ex-combatants' cooperatives, it was found out that only 71 were still existing while 56 had collapsed (RDRC, 2010). Out of the 71 cooperatives which are still in operation as at 2009, the RDRC chose 42 to receive needed funding and training as a test-case. Of the 42 cooperatives, it was found out that 21 had performed well and half poorly, after the RDRC had invested the funds in training and evaluation rounds. The organisation found still in a position of uncertainty as to how best help cooperatives perform well.

7.2.2 The choice of Jabana

My decision to study Jabana cooperative was motivated by rounds of meetings I had with the RDRC staff, reviews of RDRC reports and field visits I conducted alongside with RDRC's staff in charge of monitoring and evaluation. My choice was also influenced by the existence of heterogeneity among the ex-combatants living in the sector ex-RDF soldiers and ex-combatants from armed groups and the fact that its cooperative had collapsed by 2009.

I had originally planned to study reintegration in the western province, but I changed for several reasons:

- Unlike ex-combatants in the Western Province, those of Jabana are diverse backgrounds, with some coming from RDF but the majority being former insurgents from eastern DRC.
- The Jabana cooperative of ex-combatants had collapsed due to administrative and technical pitfalls.
- The majority of group members were jobless and those who were employed were working in an uncertain environment due to lack of contract and poor salary.
- Jabana is the outskirts of Kigali city thus linking it to urban Kigali and typical rural and remote locations of Northern Province.

7.3 Location of Jabana

Map 7.1. Administrative Map of Rwanda – Provinces and Districts



Map 7.2. Kigali City and its Districts



Map 7.3. Sectors making Gasabo District



Source: MINALOC (2012)

The administrative office of Jabana is located 20 kilometres inland from the main road.

7.3.1 Brief presentation of statistics and socio-professional activities of Jabana community

7.3.1.1 Statistics

Jabana is one of 15 sectors of Gasabo district in Kigali City. The population of Jabana is 25151 divided into 5469 households. The size of household average is 4.6. Jabana is administratively divided into 5 cells and 42 villages as shown in Table below.

Table 7. 1A summary of Jabana statistics

Cells	Number of villages	Population	Number of household
Akamatamu	6	3761	817
Bweramvura	10	5320	1157
Kabuye	11	7862	1710
Kidashya	5	2769	602
Ngiriyi	10	5439	1183
Total	42	25151	5469

Source: INSS, 2009

Table 7.1 above demonstrates a summary of Jabana statistics regarding cells, number of villages, population and number of households. Among the cells, there are Akamatamu, Bweramvura, Kabuye, Kidashya and Ngiriyi; with 42 number of villages that is, 6 (Akamatamu), 10 (Bweramvura and Ngiriyi), 11 (Kabuye) and 5 (Kidashya). The table also indicates a population of 25151 and 5469 number of households.

7.3.1.2 Socio-professional activities in Jabana

In general, socio-professional activities in Jabana consists of farmers, ranchers and traders, hairdressers, tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, drivers and engine builders.

Identified crops in Jabana include banana, bean, maize, cassava, rice, eggplant, pineapple, fruits, leaves and industrial crops namely rice and sugarcane. Breeding includes cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, rabbits, poultry and beekeeping Small livestock have an important place in society. Trade sector has shops, restaurants, liquorstore, micro finances, seed mills and markets. Jabana has 5 small shopping centers and good infrastructure such as water, roads and electricity.

Jabana has cooperative arts and crafts that hold small-scale production units, repairs, quarry operators, pottery, shoe makers and hair shavers. The industrial sector is not well developed in JabanaIt comprises of Kabuye sugar factory as the biggest, along with some small sawmills, joinery units and a brickyard.

The ex-combatants of Jabana have another advantage in terms of their location as it is on the outskirts of the capital city Kigali. This location offers opportunities in income-generation

particularly in the sector of raw material extraction such as stones, gravel and sand used in the construction of private and public infrastructure such as housing and road construction.

Jabana's location also allows its ex-combatants to have access to jobs, which for instance includes working in security companies operating in Kigali city.

Jabana is characterised by several waves of inward migrants. The first wave, many of whom were RDF soldiers and their families, returned in 1994, after 30 years in exile in Uganda and other neighbouring countries of Rwanda. Another segment, which had gone into exile after the genocide opted to return between 1996 and 2000 and to these were, added the ex-combatants for reintegration starting in 2009.

7.4 The pre-intervention situation

7.4.1 Showing characteristics of household structure

The study targeted the only ex-combatants' cooperative located in Jabana. Actually, 34 members represent the total cooperative composition. They registered as ex-combatants and represent 34 households or families and the household head was typically responsible for 4 to 6 dependents. All participants are exclusively Rwandese.

Marital status of household heads

This section presents the marital status of ex-combatants who were surveyed in this project. The results were analysed in the table below:

Table 7. 2: Marital status of household heads

	Single	Married	Widow	Total
Male	6	22	-	28
Female	-	2	4	6
Total	6	24	4	34

Source: Author's data

From table 7.2 above, the vast majority 22 of households of ex-combatants are headed by married male; they did not make it clear whether they have a second or a third wife. Only 2 are headed by married female. Out of the 28 male, 6 are single also considered as not yet legally married. On the other hand, out of the 6 of female households, 4 are widows.

Still, the majority of respondents were male 28, reflecting the overall dominance of men in the target group. Very few women participated in this study as ex-combatants, and the majority registered as family members. Nevertheless, it is most likely that women face in any case the

same level of difficulty in reintegration as officially registered ex-combatants, which makes it unfortunate that they could not be given much attention in the current this study.

Age of ex-combatants

This section presents the age of ex-combatants who were surveyed in this project. Basing on; from 21 to 30 years, 31 to 40 years and over 40 years and the results were analysed in the table below:

Table 7. 3. Age of ex-combatants participated in the study

	From 21 to 30 years	31 to 40 years	Over 40 years	Total
Male	13	3	12	28
Female	3	3	-	6
Total	16	6	12	34

Source: Author's data


As indicated by table 7.3 above, 13 of ex-combatants are aged between 21 and 30, followed by 12 ex-combatants who are above 40 years, and lastly 3 ex-combatants who are between 31 and 40 years. This means that over 40 years ex-combatants indicated that their age worked against them looking for employment as the job market preferred hiring younger people. These challenges meant that older cooperative participants were anxious for their future and their families. A similar useful comment was made by those with limited education.

Education level/literacy of respondents

It was previously discussed in chapter four that an economic reintegration project must play a fundamental role in the designing of reintegration programmes that involve determining the set of professional skills among ex-combatants. Such areas of concentration include occupations and professional training such as employment in public or private sectors. Professional training would include the public sector (e.g. nurse or teacher), skilled manual labour (tradesmen), administration/finance, agriculture, and political/social mobilisation.

This section shows the education level or literacy of ex-combatants who were surveyed in this cooperative. The results were analysed and presented in the figure below:

Figure 7. 1.Education levels of ex-combatants surveyed



Source: Author's survey


As indicated in the figure 7.1 above, half of the respondents surveyed did not progress beyond primary level, 10 had attained vocational training, and very few had completed secondary (3 respondents) and 6 had completed primary level. All women did not go beyond primary level. A proportion of 10 ex-combatants were illiterate (7 male, 3 female). This means that lack of formal qualifications constitutes a single most important obstacle to get formal employment, in an environment with very high rates of unemployment. Thus, the assessment of functional literacy for those who claim to have formal education, though outside of the scope of this project, is also a priority.

In addition, results show that the members who have had opportunities to attend vocational trainings are very few. However, those who had been given vocational trainings and hold vocational training certificates did not appear to have adopted radical views regarding their situation. The consequence of such attitudes leads to more isolation and marginalization.

Background before joining the cooperative

This section presents the background of ex-combatants before joining the cooperative. The results were analysed and presented in the figure below:

Figure 7.2 Background of ex-combatants before joining the cooperative



Source: Author's survey

From figure 7.2 above, 28 of respondents were ex-combatants while 6 were civilians before joining the cooperative. All men (28) were ex-combatants whereas the women (6) were civilians. However, women were used as cooks, porters and so on.

7.5 Summary

This chapter presented various socio-economic characteristics of the Jabana households. The chapter also showed how other issues have hindered the process of reintegration which in turn affected relationships within households. This chapter dealt with specific aim number to collect and analyse data on ex-combatants' households in Jabana in order to grasp their socio-economic challenges and stresses they face in the process of re-insertion and re-integration.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE FINDINGS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND REINTEGRATION IN JABANA

8.1 Introduction

This chapter connects with section 3.9, where performance indicators in an ex-combatants' reintegration project were to be used. As earlier stated, this is in line with the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR) guidelines. A number of experts assert that the DDR is not only a mechanism for achieving long-term objectives, but is most appropriately seen as a means of helping to create a stable and secure post-conflict environment that is conducive to political and economic development (Verkoren *et al.*, 2010). The study was carried out before the implementation of the socio-economic reintegration project among the ex-combatants in Jabana. This was done to check the ex-combatants' situation based on their level of economic, social, political and psychological aspects. Thus, this chapter presents status of performance indicators before ex-combatants' DDR project in Jabana. The major aspects of reintegration to be analysed include economic, social, political and psychological reintegration.

8.2 Economic dimensions of reintegration

Economic reintegration is known for providing a contribution to self-reliance and financial independence which is viewed as essential for achieving objectives of demobilisation at the political and social levels. It was earlier observed and supported by Nubler (2013), Watteville (2012), Porto, Parsons and Alden (2011), that DDR deals with reinsertion and focuses on the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families and empowers them to generate enough income to ensure their financial independence and community acceptance. This study aimed to discover whether the present socio-economic reintegration projects have helped ex-combatants play a constructive economic role in the communities to which they returned or settled and if their presence tends to be seen in a more positive light by these communities. This is to fulfill the idea that economic reintegration should contribute to the complex, long-term process of socio-economic reintegration.

Household economic and income security

It was earlier stated in chapter four that economic reintegration should involve improvement on the household economic and income security of the ex-combatants. Still, the socio-economic reintegration project should put into consideration number of issues when assessing the ex-combatants' economic situation in order to get a better picture of the level of economic security

of ex-combatants' household. This study therefore, considered various issues such as number of people that contribute to the household's income, the ex-combatant's main and secondary economic activities, house ownership and access to land.

Table 8.1 The number of income earners in the ex-combatants households in Jabana

How many income earners are in your household?	Frequency
Two income earners	22
One income earner	8
Some other response	4
None	0
Total	34

Source: Author's survey data

Table 8.1 above indicates that 22 of ex-combatants' households has two income earners, that is, the ex-combatant and his spouse whereas eight have one. However, all the ex-combatants surveyed indicated that they are basically responsible for the income of the household. This is achieved through their main income earning activity; the most common wage earning activity is cleaning but one-third are jobless and therefore dependent on their smallholding. In addition, the household head was typically responsible for 4 to 6 dependents as indicated by table 8.2 below.

Table 8.2. The main the income activity of the respondents

Income activity	Male	Female	Total
Civil servant	2	-	2
Cleaner	8	3	11
Vigil	2	-	2
Welders	3	-	3
Carpenter	1	-	1
Jobless	11	1	12
Undisclosed	1	2	3
Total	28	6	34

Source: Author's survey data

As indicated by table 8.2 above, most of the respondents were jobless (12), welders (8), carpenter (1), vigil (2), cleaners (11), civil servants (2) and others (3) did not declare the main income activity. This means that most of ex-combatants surveyed in Jabana were jobless. For women, the common wage job was cleaning.

Table 8. 3: The number of dependents per respondents' household

Number of dependents per household		
1 to 3	4 to 6	7 and over
4	22	8

Source: Author's survey data

From Table 8.3 above, most (22) of the surveyed ex-combatants in Jabana, have 4 to 6 number of dependents, followed by 8 (7 and over dependants) and 4 (1 to 3 dependents) respondents. Dependants increase the level of expenditure needs of the household but formal sector earning opportunities are limited, especially for ex-combatants who are likely to have limited education and relevant experience. Ink and Watson (2010) who argued that ex-combatants may have limited levels of education, skills and work experience which further hampering their ability to gain employment and earn income to cater for their dependants. The significance of the cooperative in such a context is obvious.

Previous studies (Isaksson, 2011; Porto, Parsons and Alden, 2011; Paris, 2010) support the findings of this study, that income is the most important indicator of economic reintegration and thus reflects the individual and household members' ability to meet their basic needs. This implies that high income level makes it possible for an ex-combatant to carry out various transactions such as paying for accommodation, buy stock for food, pay school fees or contributions, and pay for health care and transport fares for each household member. Ex-combatants argued that their living conditions at a personal and household level were not desirable and thus cannot meet the basic needs of the household.

Table 8. 4. The characteristics and needs of integrated households

Indicator	Sub-Indicator	Frequency (34)	
Monthly Income	1. Have income from U\$ 50 and above	1	
	2. Have income from U\$ 40 to U\$ 49	1	
	3. Have income from US\$ 30 to U\$ 39	6	
	4. Have income from U\$25 to U\$ 29	11	
	5. Have income less than U\$25	10	
	7. Don't have income , assisted by relatives / friends	5	
Food	1. Have three meals a day throughout the year	Yes	No
		3	31
	2. Have, throughout the year, a sufficient stock of maize and rice	Yes	No
		4	30
	3. Have a variety of food throughout the year	Yes	No
		3	31
	4. Have the means to buy the condiments to prepare sauce	Yes	No
		6	28
	5. Access to improved water source (drinking water) close to home	Yes	No
		32	2
Health	1. Afford to pay for doctor's consultations, treatment and hospitalization if required	Yes	No
		8	26
	2. Afford to pay for medication	Yes	No
		14	19
	3. Have the means with which to take a patient to a health care centre	Yes	No
		3	31
	4. Do you have medical insurance	Yes	No
		31	3
	5. Each household member sleeps under insecticide treated bed net	Yes	No
		29	5
Education	1. All children in the household are enrolled in school	Yes	No
		18	16
	2. Afford to pay for uniforms for each child	Yes	No
		15	19
	3. Have at least from U\$ 0.42 to US 0.71/day per day per child to purchase food for them	Yes	No
		2	32
	4. Have financial means to pay school fees for all children	Yes	No
		14	2
	5. Afford to pay other contributions required by the school	Yes	No
		7	27
	6. Afford to purchase school materials such as	Yes	No

	notebooks, books, so on.	9	25
	7. Afford to pay a tutor to help children in the household	Yes	No
		1	33
Clothing	1. Each member of household has a pair of clothes in good condition	Yes	No
		7	27
	3. Each member of household affords to buy new clothes on special occasions like Christmas	Yes	No
		2	32
	4. Each member of household affords to buy clothes for cold periods	Yes	No
		7	27
	5. Can afford to buy sufficient toilet soaps and laundry soaps for each week	Yes	No
		9	25
Relationships	1. Neighbours can feel to visit the household	Yes	No
		13	21
	2. Neighbours can feel free to lend and borrow household stuff	Yes	No
		16	18
	3. Have real friends to rely on in both good and difficult times	Yes	No
		9	25
	4. Belong to an association or any organized group, other than the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana	Yes	No
		5	29
	5. Participate in community work (Umuganda) which brings together all members of the village / town (Umudugudu) every last Saturday of the month	Yes	No
		8	26
	6. Pay monthly contributions for community policing at the level of village (Umudugudu) / town	Yes	No
		9	25
Accommodation	1. Have somewhere to stay (house) with enough space for all household members	Yes	No
		6	28
	2. The house has at least one toilet and one bathroom	Yes	No
		5	29
	3. Live in a house with a kitchen and appliances	Yes	No
		13	21
	4. Can you afford to live in a house that has enough functional electric light or oil lamp?	Yes	No
		19	15
	5. Have enough beds with mattresses and sheets for each household member	Yes	No
		8	26
	6. The house has a dining room with a table and enough chairs	Yes	No
		11	23
	7. The house location provides access to clean water	Yes	No
		19	15

Source: Author's survey

Table 8.4 above shows characteristics and needs of integrated households among the ex-combatants surveyed. Income figures for surveyed ex-combatants in Jabana indicated in table 8.4 above are clear: the average income of the household head is 30, 0000FRW. This is almost the equivalent of U\$ 40 that an individual earns per month. The low income level makes it challenging to fulfil obligations as the household heads such as paying for basic needs right from personal, spouse, and children to other luxurious needs.

Twenty-three participants earned an average income of RWF 35, 000 (U\$ 50) per month. Similarly, eight participants have an average income of RWF 25, 000 (less than U\$ 35). The group includes five ex-combatants who are unemployed. The income situation in the Jabana cooperative is alarming because there is no household in Jabana contains less than one dependent.

As displayed in the table 8.4 above, monthly income of US\$ 36 for a household of four dependents in group of Jabana is roughly equivalent to US\$ 9 per person per month, which is 0.3 US\$ per day. This means that more than 30 ex-combatants of Jabana lived below the poverty threshold. Income data provides the idea of the level of reintegration in Jabana. We find that almost all the members of the group lack the minimum financial means that are required to meeting basic needs such as food, medical expenses, clothes, and a decent home to live in, among others. This explains that poor people use less money to buy food and other needed things on daily basis. The prevalence of poverty in Rwanda is higher in those households whose agricultural activities are their main source of income which is the reality in most rural areas.

Food shortages signify of participants' vulnerability. Table 8.4 above demonstrates that only three people surveyed out of thirty four can afford to eat three times a day. There is a small increase in the rate of participants as only six can stock food for one week; stocked food includes basic food that Rwandans often use such as flour, potatoes and beans. The rate drops sharply because three participants confirmed rate of what they get variation and quality of food, which means that 31 participants eat the same type of food throughout the year. In the FGDs, many participants stated that they could go as long as two months without including meat and fruits in their meals.

Even so, we did not consider the most reliable measure which considers that food security is assured when a household can make a stock of one year. This situation affects most rural women and children, and it was discovered that most of them have anaemia. During the interview process, thirty ex-combatants over thirty four stated they had dependents who only ate one meal a day. They indicated that they leave the home in the morning without having eaten breakfast. Only the children eat at midday and that is when they are back from school. Most of time, they take a meagre meal made of 'cassava bread' and a little bean sauce without vegetables or meat. Children do not drink milk at home, occasionally they have it served at school.

Almost all confirmed that they have access to safe drinking water, as indicated in table 8.4 above. Jabana includes both urban and rural areas with its inhabitants being able to access infrastructures such as tap water, electric power and telephone networks. For two years now, EWSA (Electricity, Water and Sanitation Authority) has been running a countrywide project that supplies electricity and water to poor households. This study does not reflect the national reality since it involves people living in the capital city where infrastructures such as water and electricity are well developed compared to other parts of the country. Although the number of people who benefit from safe drinking water has increased, some rural areas still suffer because people cover long distances travelling to fetch water.

Many ex-combatants live a fragile situation as regards health. Living conditions can be made more difficult if it is coupled with the inability to access to regular medical care, which is usually a major concern for people living in the Jabana. During FGDs and interviews, the views of the participants revealed that, Jabana inhabitants suffer. Table 8.4 above indicates that only eight participants can afford to pay for medical consultation, treatment and hospitalization; fourteen of them can afford to pay for some drugs (generic drugs) and only three have means to evacuate a patient to a health centre in case of sickness. Still, the same table 8.4 above shows that thirty one participants have medical insurance and every household member of the thirty four participants sleeps under insecticide treated bed nets. Contrary to other health variables, the rate of access to health insurance, as well as access to anti-malaria mosquito nets, increases greatly. Since, the government of Rwanda has been engaged in a campaign that promotes access to health insurance, known as "Mutuelle de Santé", through all health centres. This campaign led to most of the population because the majority is covered by this health insurance. The expansion of health insurance has made its programme affordable as it helps everyone without

discrimination. This health insurance covers both urban and rural populations and eighty five percent of expenses while the rest is paid by the subscriber.

An unstructured interview highlighted how disease had impacted their children's development which subsequently limited their school attendance. Malaria, diarrhoea, chest pain and respiratory complications were the most common diseases. Mortality rates are higher amongst the disadvantaged. Mothers from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to give birth to babies with low birth weight than mothers from advantaged settings. Participants revealed that the proportion of children with asthma tends to decrease as household income increases.

Education is important for people as a good school education is a necessary (but certainly not sufficient) requirement for subsequent income-earning. Only half of the households are able to send their school-age children to school, given government policy which forbids teachers and principals from excluding a child whose parents have failed to pay school fees from school. All other sub-indicators show that in the sector of education, all participants are below the minimum ability that is required to fulfil the educational responsibilities as parents or heads of household (table 8.4 above). Fifteen participants could afford to pay for their children's uniforms but only two could provide them with some money for food every day. Furthermore, only fourteen participants could afford to pay school fees that are required for every child, nine said that they could purchase properly school materials such as notebooks, books and pens. One could afford to pay a tutor to help his children at home. When this research started, all participants had their children in primary schools, while we know that it is at the secondary level that the majority of parents in Rwanda experience difficulties of ensuring proper education of their children. Parents often find the difference when enrolling their children in schools as well as the conditions in which they study. Good schools have competent teachers who are well paid. Transport and libraries are also provided. Schools with little income did not have any of the above mentioned.

This situation remains a handicap for poor children, which impacts negatively on their school performance. Only two participants claimed they could send their children to private schools where educational is better. The remaining participants confirmed that they send their children to schools in the periphery of Jabana where children from poor backgrounds study in poor learning conditions.

As regards accommodation, table 8.4 above demonstrates that the majority live in houses without a kitchen, internal water closet and related equipment. Their accommodations did not have enough space for dependents and could not afford to purchase more beds, mattress and sheets for each household member. Accordingly, one participant said,

“We have four children who sleep in the same bed, girls and boys together. We have no cash to build a big house that can accommodate everyone in good conditions. You can understand why we have no chairs, no table, etc. You see that the house in which we live is too small but we thank God to have given us this small house, we are poor.”

This participant describes what most of Jabana residents always experience. They cannot afford to have accommodation with enough space and only five live in houses that have modest bathrooms including toilets. There were only a small number of participants who had a dining room as we could see at least a simple table and few chairs in their house.


The lack of resources affects food security, housing and other living conditions for members of Jabana. Twenty seven participants indicated that they could not afford to have clothes that are in good conditions, not even buy a good pair of shoes nor sweaters to wear during rainy and cold periods. In a FGDs and a workshop, the majority of participants (32 out of 34) admitted they could not afford to pay for new clothes on special occasions like Christmas and the New Year. One female participant expressed that the neighbours often bought for their children but for her, it would not be possible due to financial crises. Finally, 25 participants could not afford to buy enough laundry and toilet soaps to make at least a small weekly stock. It should be noted that the inability to regularly purchase hygienic soaps, clothes and other materials may endanger the health of family members. Another participant expressed his frustration of always borrowing iron box from neighbours as he could not afford to buy one.

Primary economic activity

There was a need to check the principal sources of ex-combatants' livelihoods in Jabana. As discussed in chapter four and supported by previous scholars (Porto, Parsons and Alden, 2011), agriculture has been viewed as the primary economic activity because of its biggest contribution to the source of income in rural areas compared to urban areas. It was also earlier stated that the next supporting economic activity that provides source of livelihoods would be the wage labour,

informal trade and commerce, among others. Nevertheless, such economic activities are relative that is, vary from place to place (rural and urban areas).

Figure 8. 1.The primary activity of ex-combatants in Jabana



Source: Author's survey

From figure 8.1 above, 19 respondents cited agriculture as the primary source of income whereas 15 cited other sources. This means that agricultural activity being the most common alternative has been viewed by participants to provide the ex-combatants households with subsistence needs, even though the surplus are sold for cash. To some extent, the project found that the principal sources of income for ex-combatants' livelihoods varied dramatically between rural and urban areas, although the urban/rural distinction is not always clear cut out.

I discovered that, though Rwanda has made a remarkable economic progress, the level of unemployment and poverty among ex-combatants in Jabana was still high before the project. As the EICV2 (2010: 8) reports, for the period 2008-2009 in Rwanda professional employees represented only 2.0 %, senior officials and managers 0.1%, office clerks 0.1%, commercial and sales 5.9%, skilled services 5.5%, and the agriculture/Fisheries 79.6%, unskilled elementary 6.8%. To confirm this, a respondent in the FGDs stated that

“Like other Rwandan citizens, we are bound to follow the national policy regarding poverty alleviation through kwihangira imirimo.¹⁰ The government cannot find jobs for everyone in the country. We know that there are high rates of unemployment in cities and every year there are more and more new job seekers on the labour market as thousands of young people are graduating from colleges and universities. We need to reorganize ourselves for a new departure towards a sustainable social and economic life”

The above situation illustrates how ex-combatants want to achieve long-term reintegration. Sustainable and full reintegration becomes complete once most participants have jobs and feel satisfied with what they earn. They must continue to access opportunities of income or employment offered by the local market. Economic reintegration is fundamental in this process as it promotes not only economic, but also social, political and psychological reintegration. Rwanda is encouraging her citizens to tirelessly combat poverty and joblessness by backing the national goal. This justifies why the cooperatives remain a formal business organization and a potential means of economic reintegration on which Jabana members must focus. In nutshell, many employed ex-combatants stated that their low salaries do not meet their family’s needs which negatively affect their psychological states. In this way, the cooperative must strengthen their reintegration efforts by opening a multidimensional and continuous process of learning. This helps them cope with the situation and progressively leads to full participation in the economic and social life of the broader society.

The cooperative promotes economic integration, which in turn provides the ability for people to access services they need. This also favours people to have a good quality of life, participate in social and political life and develop a sense of belonging to their community. The aim of a cooperative differs from other businesses because cooperatives help their members and communities to meet their needs. By focusing more on group rather than individuals, cooperatives become “democratic” organizations that value the community. Unlike other forms of employment, the cooperative is guided by values and principles that build on democracy. Such a post demobilization situation presents attitudes (section 9.4) that focus more on members’ needs than on profits.

¹⁰ Entrepreneurship

Cooperatives as a means of economic re-integration

As discussed earlier in chapter four, Cooperatives are ideal instruments in the country and can be an important form of organization to fight against social exclusion and poverty, for example, through local initiative, developments and savings mobilization.

The cooperative promotes economic integration, which in turn provides the ability for people to access services they need. This also favours people to have a good quality of life, participation in social and political life and to develop a sense of belonging in their society. The aim of a cooperative differs from other businesses because cooperatives help their members and communities to meet their needs. By focusing more on group rather than individuals, cooperatives become “democratic” organizations that value the community. Unlike other forms of employment, the cooperative is guided by values and principles that build on democracy. Such a post demobilization situation presents attitudes that focus more on members’ needs than on profits.

During workshop sessions, participants identified key points that can help the cooperative to move ahead. Such points include voluntary and open membership, democratic control of members, economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and information, co-operation among cooperatives and concern for community.

The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Programme, encourages and continues to sensitize ex-combatants to form cooperatives as means of socio-economic reintegration and reconciliation. Since the creation of Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission/Programmes (RDRC) in 2001, it has been a tool for ex-combatants reintegration. This is based on various reasons such as the economic context of Rwanda is characterized by a labour market that is always saturated. Thousands of young people graduate each year but remain unemployed. In addition, the majority of ex-combatants have a very limited education, which does not allow them to actively compete for jobs. Finally, initiating or joining a cooperative does not necessitate having education or prior experience.

Ten years ago when the demobilisation process was in its early stages cooperatives rarely functioned as they were intended to. A survey (RDRC, 2009) on cooperatives indicated that there were 124 cooperatives early in 2008. Among forty two cooperatives that participated in a performance competition at the end of 2009, twenty one had improved and the other twenty one declined in their performance despite additional support, including funds and trainings provided

by the RDRC. This competition indicated that only fifty percent of the cooperatives improved and this was supported by some participants who were in both unstructured interviews and FGDs

“...cooperatives may fail to reach their objectives if the members are not strongly committed to work hard, if there is poor management of the cooperative’s resources, if financial interest is their main target, or if the cooperative is not open to existing partners who can provide support to them in the area.”

These participants emphasize that cooperatives often collapse when they start earning profit as greedy leaders embezzle the cooperative’s resources. The very few females who are in the cooperative’s leadership are never involved in fund misappropriation.

The Jabana cooperative is one of the cooperatives which has performed badly. The cooperative was founded by twelve ex-combatants with the goal of finding a solution to their reintegration problem as discussed in previous sections. The cooperative membership increased to 34 members in 2009, the year when this research began. The members’ main income generating activity was farming and selling agricultural products. The cooperative has always experienced internal conflicts that oppose top managers and other members causing mismanagement due to lack of transparency. Founded in 2006, the cooperative had not yet carried out any tangible benefit for its members. The continued inability of the Jabana cooperative to generate income for members, the research project identified poor functionality as the reason for its failure. For that reason, before the improvement factors, the research first identified and analysed the causes of its poor functionality. As outlined by section 11.3, the participants in both focus groups and workshop sessions stated that the group of Jabana suffered from various difficulties related to financial problems, poor management and lack of democratic governance, and challenges linked to the external environment.

The results show that the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana increasingly faced internal and external problems that ultimately had the same impact of marginalizing ex-combatants. The participants were eager to reorganize their group once they had discovered what the problems were.

Poor financial management led to poor performance and to a greater extent bankruptcy. The cooperative has suffered losses during the period of first six months since the initial project was poorly designed and poorly managed. The cooperative was running regular sales at constant

prices without profit. Based on the participants' statements, most of the cooperatives' leaders were its founding members. This position gives those leaders a good chance to manage the cooperative for their personal benefit. As stressed above, this cooperative was initiated by ex-combatants who were living in unemployment and poverty and had low skill levels, and were without prior business experience. In fact, there had been less effort to fully integrate and give any say to members who later joined.

A consequence of mismanagement is that lack of trust between cooperative members caused in part by the absence of transparency amongst managers. This was supported by ex-combatants who attended FGDs as they agreed that:

“There is a big problem in this cooperative; we think it is not well managed. We cannot know exactly what is happening in here and we are not involved in decision making. The vision is not shared as we can't know how cash is managed. Everything is done by the leaders themselves. We are excluded somehow.”

The lack of a common vision and financial management remained a big issue for members. These factors have greatly contributed to the deterioration of trust and social ties among members. It's difficult for members to participate in meetings and other activities initiated by their leaders while at the same time these top managers usually hide opportunities such as training, meetings and learning visits organized by the RDRC.

The Jabana cooperative is undemocratic which negatively affects the decision-making processes and this was confirmed by participants during unstructured interview sessions. When cooperative leaders disregard their mandate and fail to consult and inform other members about how the cooperative functions it leads to distrust. Similarly, a participant stated that very few members continued to attend meetings of the cooperative. Members who participated in these meetings were complaining that the meetings take much time and each participant is not given an opportunity to speak properly. Cooperatives which are closed to the outside world close an important means of access to information and opportunities. The obvious consequence is isolation which keeps the cooperative from benefiting from the experience of others.

Lack of a vision for self reliance and sufficiency

Self-sufficiency as a vision within Jabana cooperative remains a challenge. When I interacted with the members of Jabana cooperative, they openly told me they needed external support. The

experience of Jabana shows clearly that by expecting too much external support, members fail to rely on their own capabilities while they could seek ways and opportunities available locally for their development.

Poor co-ordination and lack of task allocation mechanisms

Co-ordination in Jabana cooperative should be a process of gathering and sharing information and planning within the framework of shared goals. These aspects may make the situation worse in terms of cooperative functionality. Attitudes are complex and difficult to overcome in a situation fuelled by a conflict of interest. Such an atmosphere prevails in a group due to lack of proactive attitude and inclusive co-ordination, lack of mutual listening and contested leadership. The absence of overall co-ordination of the cooperative's activities reveals the lack of common objectives, and without common objectives, there will not be contributions of individual talents. Every member needs to work together to contribute to division of roles and tasks, which ultimately results in the cooperative performance and cohesion.

Lack of legal status

The use of illegitimate business activities is the basis for creating several problems. The Rwandan Ministry of Local Government requires each cooperative and association to register as early as possible before starting their activities. The leaders hope that former combatants will quickly proceed and acquire the legal status but unfortunately, many cooperatives fail to do so. The registration and formalization of cooperatives in Rwanda require the preparation of a file that meets the requirements of the law (Law No 50/2007: 2-3). Those requirements include the collection of three copies of the minutes of the General Assembly that created the cooperative. This document must be co-signed by the founding members. Three copies of the statutes must also be included, followed by the management and board stating what their names and addresses are, and finally there must be the bank statements of payments of subscriptions showing that at least half of amount of shares has been released.

Inability to access funding

Many risks that are associated with entrepreneurship must be faced positively by members. It is in this context that banks base their decision of granting funds based on their risks assessment. Risks affect the repayment capacity of the client or the partners which is why many cooperatives that are managed by ex-combatants fail to attract and retain adequate partnership with finance institutions.

As the Jabana cooperative is not well managed, banks are reluctant to lend them money which means that the cooperative loses many partners who could be supportive in its activities. In additionn, the cooperative was very limited in terms of information outputs. This, in fact, leads to poor information sharing among all the members and even with other cooperatives. Examples include few letters that are kept in the archive of the cooperative, and the researcher noticed that all the correspondence, including the RDRC documents were scattered and disorganised. This is another aspect that would dissuade partners about the seriousness of Jabana cooperative.

8.3 Social dimensions of reintegration

This section presents social dimensions of reintegration among the surveyed ex-combatants in Jabana. Social dimensions will be handled through sections regarding relationships, own perspectives on reintegration, freedom within the community, social network and community participation, interpersonal links and support networks, community response to ex-combatants and social Relationships with other community members.

Table 8. 5The various aspects of social dimensions of ex-combatants

Relationships	1. Neighbours can feel free to visit the ex-combatants' household	Yes	No
		13	21
	2. Neighbours can feel free to lend and borrow household stuff	Yes	No
		16	18
	3. Have real friends to rely on in both good and difficult times	Yes	No
		9	25
	4. Belong to an association or any organized group, other than the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana	Yes	No
		5	29
	5. Participate in community work (Umuganda) which brings together all members of the village / town (Umudugudu) every last Saturday of each month	Yes	No
		8	26
	6. Pay monthly contributions for community policing at the level of village (Umudugudu) / town	Yes	No
		9	25

Source: Author's survey data

Table 8.5 above indicates responses from surveyed participants on grounds of ex-combatants' relationships with their neighbours. Further discussions will be presented in the following sections as we move on.

Own perspectives on reintegration

It was earlier mentioned in chapter three how social reintegration mainly aims at deepening understanding of the relationship between identity and reintegration among ex-combatants. It was also previously discussed that the project must plan a participatory or action assessment of

ex-combatants' own perceptions of whether they would still see themselves as soldiers, demobilised soldiers or as civilians. This study assessed ex-combatants' own perceptions of whether they considered themselves to be reintegrated into civilian life and otherwise, what would make this possible.

Table 8. 6: The ex-combatants' own perceptions of reintegration

Whether reintegrated into civilian life	Frequency
Yes	26
No	8
Total	34

Source: Author's survey

From table 8.6 above, the ex-combatants' own perceptions of whether they still saw themselves as soldiers, as demobilised, or as civilians and they were asked to elaborate more whether they considered themselves to be reintegrated by the DDR into civilians' life and if not, what would make it possible. Most of the respondents considered themselves ready to be reintegrated into civilian life, while eight of them had little belief as shown in the table 8.6 above. A minor proportion of the respondents saw themselves as civilians, however, not sure of being reintegrated.

Table 8. 7. The ex-combatants view regarding freedom within the community

Neighbours can feel free to visit the ex-combatants household	Yes	No	Total
	13	21	34

Source: Author's survey

From table 8.7 above, 13 of the respondents agreed that neighbours are free to visit their households while 21 were not free to visit their households. This means that more than a half of surveyed participants indicated the neighbours were fearful of the ex-combatants, which was observed in the lack of freedom to pay a visit to an ex-combatants' household. Prior to reintegration projects, ex-combatants always worked as a team under the slogans of unity and solidarity. This would help them to stick together and become victorious in various battles thus achieving group goals. However, this study discovered that such togetherness in the community is still lacking due to the fact that residents in Jabana fear to associate with them. Ex-combatants

claimed that they aim at having good life, and thus called upon total and good social integration in the Rwandan society.

Each ex-combatant has problems and needs that require particular solutions which cannot be achieved if there is division in the cooperative and if the members do not provide each other mutual support. This develops and strengthens the values of the internal cohesion of the group. When every member observes these values, the group becomes unified and things move better.


The research results showed that despite challenges ex-combatants face they have values and qualities to share for personal and group benefit. Each ex-combatant has a background which differentiates him from others, age, education, gender, family, social relations, and so on. In fact, military life and tasks are achieved in a very orderly organizational framework which is based on two major values that are the strict adherence to hierarchy and the close collaboration on the horizontal level that promotes teamwork. In addition, the researcher has noted that from their military experience, ex-combatants of Jabana have more developed analytical skills than civilians of the same level of education.

On the social level, solidarity and brotherhood in the military is well developed. One of the participants in a workshop said that comrade 'refers to many things because it means brother, friend, colleague and partner'. When the demobilisation process begins ex-combatants begin to re-enter civilian life. They begin to seek ways to meet all their basic needs having left the army without sufficient preparation and qualification. Gaps cause ex-combatants to fail to be competitive in seeking employment. Few manage to reintegrate into society successfully. Accordingly, one of the major outcomes of this research was identifying cohesion within the Jabana cooperative as the first and most important step towards the cooperative recovery, a major factor of the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Social networks and community participation

Similar discussions were carried out in chapter three (section 3.9) that social reintegration must gauge ex-combatants' participation in the structure of the community's social and organisational life, such as, activity and networking within community gatherings and churches services.

Table 8. 8.The ex-combatants’ social networks and community participation



Source: Author’s survey

From figure 8.3 above, 27 out of 34 respondents did not belong to any association on any organisation, other than the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana. The study discovered that most common form of social activity and network appears to be linked to the churches (choirs), cultural and sport groups. Only 7 respondents belonged to such groups. Belonging to social groups such as choirs, cultural and sport groups is also an important indicator of community integration. . The importance of social reintegration is that it engages people in community activities, churches, libraries and sport centres which in turn foster the openness and the reintegration of newcomers. In addition, community involvement contributes to change assumptions and stereotypes in all aspects from both newcomers and the hosting community, which can strongly prevents the reintegration of anyone in the community.

In such cases, with DDR, the ex-combatants may be assisted in becoming religious, joining a church or religious denomination of which they may prefer to be members. Examples of religious denominations may include Catholics, Protestants, and Islam among others. Thus, belonging to any of the religious groups would mean successful social reintegration and social acceptance within the community, access to social networks and they would make some kind of progress up the organisational hierarchy.

Interpersonal links and support networks

It was prior discussed in chapter three (section 3.9) that social reintegration involves both being a formal member of an organisation and having informal social interactions and networks. For any reintegration project to be successful, and to help ex-combatants gain insight into the informal social networks to which they have access it must be considered who the ex-combatants spend time with, to whom ex-combatants turn to in times of need, and who is the most important person in their communities.

Table 8. 9.The interpersonal links and support networks among ex-combatants

Neighbours can feel free to lend and borrow household stuff	Frequency
Yes	16
No	18
Total	34
Have real friends to rely on in both good and difficult times	Frequency
Yes	9
No	25
Total	34
The most important source of social interaction for excombatants	
Family member	8
Colleague	6
Church leader	3
Any other or prominent person	7
None	10
Total	34

Source: Author's survey

Although the family is the most important basis for social interaction for ex-combatants, table 8.8 above indicates that 16 out of 34 respondents also interact with each other through borrowing and lending household goods among themselves and neighbours. However, 18 respondents argued that neighbours cannot feel free to lend and borrow household items. Still, table 8.8 above shows that only 9 ex-combatants have real friends to rely on in both good and difficult times, while majority (25) of respondents do not. The table indicates that, among the

most important source of social interaction for ex-combatants may include family member (8), fellow colleagues (6), church leaders (3), any another leader or prominent person (7) and none (10) in the community. This means that ex-combatants interpersonal links and support networks were poor.

Figure 8. 2. Ex-combatants’ household equipment




Figure 8.2 above shows that the majority (19) of the respondents did not have enough equipment to share with their neighbours, 12 did not have whereas only 3 of the ex-combatants had enough equipment. Poor households lack equipment particularly for the kitchen such as knives, saucepans, buckets, and plates among others. However, neighbours often share the limited stuff they have, and type of lending and borrowing indicate good relationships among community members.

Table 8. 10.Belong to social groups and the state of lending or borrowing from neighbours

	Yes	No	Total
Can you lend and borrow from neighbours?	9	25	34
Do you belong to any of the social groups in the community?	4	29	34

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 8.9 above describes that participants who cannot afford to lend and borrow from neighbours were 25 out of 34 ex-combatants in Jabana. Only nine had friends they could rely on

in times of trouble. This means that ex-combatants are not equipped with enough household goods that can be shared with neighbours. This has created poor relationships within the neighbourhood and has hindered them from lending or borrowing from neighbours in times of trouble.

Still, table 8.9 above shows that, most of the surveyed participants (29 out of 34) do not belong to any of the social groups in the community whereas only 5 belong to such groups in Jabana. Belonging to social groups such as choirs, cultural and sports groups is also an important indicator of social community integration. The importance of social reintegration is that it engages people in community activities, churches, libraries and sport centres which in turn foster the openness and the reintegration of newcomers. In addition, community involvement contributes to change assumptions and stereotypes in all aspects from both newcomers and the hosting community.

Perceptions of Authority

This section presents ex-combatants' perception of authority in Jabana. This involves the person they consider as their ultimate leader in Jabana.

Table 8. 11. The ex-combatants perception of authority in Jabana

Whom do you consider as the ultimate leader that y respect?	Frequency
Cultural leader	5
Government official	3
Church leader	6
None	20
Total	34

Source: Author's survey

Table 8.10 above indicates that most (20 out of 34 ex-combatants) of the respondents did not show respect to none of the mentioned leaders in Jabana, whereas the rest, indicated cultural leaders (5), government officials (3) and church leaders (6). I discovered that most of the ex-combatants' relations with communities, and their perception of authority and hierarchy outside of the military structures was poor. This involves the most important person in the community

and the levels of authority who handle various issues within the community, such as cultural leaders, government officials, and church leaders among others.

Community response to ex-combatants (traditional ceremonies and reintegration)

This section presents community response to the ex-combatants in Jabana and this is presented in form of ex-combatants contribution for community policing at village levels.

Table 8. 12. Whether ex-combatants contribute for community policing

Pay monthly contributions for community policing at the village level (Umudugudu)/town	Frequency
Yes	9
No	25
Total	34
Do you always attend traditional ceremonies	
Yes	4
No	30
Total	34

Source: Author's survey

As indicated by table 8.11 above, only 9 out of 34 surveyed participants pay monthly contributions for community policing at the village/town level (Umudugudu)/. This means that several thousand ex-combatants contribute little or no support at the village level. This is due to the fact that most ex-combatants are not given enough support from the citizens. How these different groups would relate to one another and specifically to residents, in a context of severe scarcity of resources was an issue at hand, to which few had convincing answers. Still, because ex-combatants were to a certain extent being targeted differently to other vulnerable groups, the prospect of rising friction at community level between civilians and recently reintegrated ex-combatants was a working hypothesis for many involved in the resettlement and return process. Therefore, this project aimed to understand whether and to what extent DDR programmes that targeted ex-combatants differently from other vulnerable groups actually hinders reintegration.

Still, table 8.11 above indicates that only 4 surveyed participants can regularly attend traditional ceremonies in Jabana, whereas the majority (30) do not. This implies that the relationship that exists between ex-combatants and the communities living in Jabana such as engaging in traditional ceremonies and social reintegration was poor. Missing out on such traditional ceremonies and social reintegration has hindered them from sharing community happiness and satisfaction. This leads to low morale of those that return and regrets why they exist and

always remembering sad events witnessed in the past. In addition, it was hard for some ex-combatants to join traditional ceremonies and reintegration due to various hindrances. These obstacles may include the lack of financial resources needed to conduct the ceremonies amongst families and communities welcoming ex-combatants, the death or displacement of the elders who know the traditions, and the fact some ex-combatants have settled in areas are not their places of origin.


This study aimed at examining the aspect of the reintegration process to assess to what extent this dimension featured in the expectations and experience of ex-soldiers. However, none of the respondents brought up traditional ceremonies in the context of the project's general surveying on attitudes, either individually or within focus groups. Nevertheless, when specifically probed following on focus group work, all respondents acknowledged that not only had traditional ceremonies been important in the past as markers of change and social acceptance, but that ceremonies were, in many cases, expected by ex-soldiers and their families upon their return to civilian life. One spouse of an ex-combatant asserted that traditional ceremonies are synonymous with happiness, satisfaction, they lift morale of those that return, push away malign spirits and help everyone to forget sad events witnessed in the past. All this helps with reintegration.

However, only a few of the respondents indicated that they had experienced traditional welcoming and healing ceremonies. They ascribed this to a number of factors such as the lack of financial resources needed to conduct the ceremonies amongst families and communities welcoming ex-combatants, the death or displacement of the elders and going to places where they were not originally from.

Social Relationships with other community members

This part presents ex-combatants' social relationships with other community members such as their participation in community (Umuganda) work. Participants were asked to indicate their level of participation by answering yes or no.

Figure 8. 3.The ex-combatants' participation in community work



Source: Author's survey


As indicated in the figure 8.3 above, 8 out of 34 of the respondents had been participating in community activities (Umuganda) whereas 26 had no interest in participating in such activities. In Rwanda, it is easy to measure community integration for a person because of community practices that are the way of life in each village. The absence or the frequency of participation in these activities can be a clear indicator regarding the integration level of people. Community suggests a sense of connection between people and their surroundings through shared interests regardless of the cultural and geographical characteristics of its members.

In Rwanda, Umuganda is what connects people to their communities. The concept implies individual contribution rendered to community but in the context of this research it refers to a day that is devoted monthly to community work and meetings. The last Saturday of each month, residents of villages get together for manual work, mostly destined to cleaning their residences, streets, repairing small bridges, building houses and huts for the poor. At the end of these manual activities, the residents discuss and share information regarding different aspects of life in their village. Issues of common interest such as security, domestic violence, gender, education, hygiene and HIV are discussed in order to find solutions. It is even allowed to express personal problems for advice and if necessary to get help from community members. The fact that 26 heads of households are not connected with the community in this way is disheartening because these people are socially isolated as a result.

8.4 Psychological dimensions of reintegration

This section presents the psychological dimensions of reintegration of surveyed ex-combatants in Jabana. Areas of concentration were isolation from other community members.

Figure 8. 4.Isolation feelings from other community members.



Source: Author's survey

From figure 8.6 above, 24 out of 34 respondents felt isolated from other community members. Such kind of isolation creates psychological effects among the ex-combatants. Results indicate that the psychological effects of poverty isolate a significant number of ex-combatants from other community members. Citizens who do not become involved in community activities reduce their chance of total integration in society and so, they cannot promote interactions with others. They cannot participate in decision-making at the community level either, regardless of their level of education, social status or age. The community is the place which intervene many mediating structures between the larger social, political and economic environment and where the everyday life of individuals is depicted in a friendly way. Actively participating in community life empowers the individual by creating relationships and strong social cohesion. In other words, the situation promotes complementarily and information sharing among the members of the community. Finally many ex-combatants in Jabana expressed less interest in community work.

8.5 Political dimensions of reintegration

It was earlier discussed in chapter three (section 3.9) that political reintegration and demobilisation is ending the use of violent means in the resolution of disputes, and creating a deeper commitment by all at a social-political level to ensure sustainable the peace in the community. Political reintegration provides basis for the peaceful and active participation of ex-combatants in the political process of their societies, it is a crucial component of peace-building, and that successful reintegration depends on social acceptance, economic self-reliance and political participation.

Elections and voting

Previous discussions in the chapter put it forward that political reintegration must ensure that ex-combatants are aware and engage themselves in elections. In this study, ex-combatants were expected to show how elections are important to the consolidation of peace in Jabana. This section presents the ex-combatants' engagement in political affairs (elections and voting) either before or in the next elections.

Table 8. 13. Whether ex-combatants were aware of the next elections

Are you aware of the next elections?	Frequency
Yes	31
No	3
Total	34


Source: Author's survey

As indicated by table 8.12 above, the majority of the respondents 31 responded positively whereas 3 responded negatively. Among those who had a positive response, considered elections important to the consolidation of peace and a source of good government policies in the country. This was mainly asserted by focus group discussions, as well as by the more qualitative responses in the survey. Some ex-combatants speak of elections as a period of choosing a government that can attend to its people's needs. A small group of individuals in this study mentioned the need for a change in regime and the need for a new leader and there were various suggestions to the fact that leaders should be given at most two terms (of about 4 to 5 years) to allow innovations to develop the country.

Knowledge of political parties

Political reintegration must put into consideration the ex-combatants' knowledge of the political parties in Rwanda. This section presents ex-combatants knowledge of political parties not only in Jabana but also in the entire country.

Figure 8. 5. The ex-combatants' knowledge of political parties in Rwanda



Source: Author's survey

Figure 8.5 above displays ex-combatants' knowledge of political parties in Rwanda. The figure indicates that 32 of the respondents knew about Rwandan political parties and had ability to mention some of the parties such as Centrist Democratic Party or PDC, Democratic Popular Union of Rwanda or UDPR, Liberal Party or PL, Party for Democratic Renewal, Party for Progress and Concord or PPC, Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF, Rwandan Socialist Party or PSR, Social Democratic Party or PSD, Socialist Party-Imberakuri or PS-Imberakuri and Solidarity and Prosperity Party or PSP. Ex-combatants in Jabana did not only have knowledge about the political parties in Rwanda but also emphasized an issue of belonging to these parties.

Political participation and party activism

This section presents findings on the political participation and party activism among the ex-combatants in Jabana.

Table 8. 14.The ex-combatants’ political participation and party activism

Do you belong to any of the political party?	Frequency
Yes	10
No	24
Total	34
Whether ex-combatants would be interested in taking part during election campaign	
They would be interested to take part in during election campaign	26
They would not be interested	8
Total	34
How would ex-combatants prefer to participate in electoral events	Frequency
As Candidates	13
Through Organising political events	6
Through participating in electoral events	7
Any other	8
Total	34

Source: Author’s survey

From table 8.13 above, it is clearly indicated that 10 out of 34 respondents belong to different political parties whereas 24 responded negatively. This was as a result of poverty affecting most of the ex-combatants hindering the interest in belonging to political parties. In the same table, 26 out of 34 ex-combatants would be interested to take part during election campaign on condition that their financial situation improves whereas 8 of out 34 ex-combatants declared that they would not. This is quite amazing to see that more than half of the ex-combatants would be interested in taking part during election campaigns. In addition, it shows how these ex-combatants experienced political mobilisation during their stay in armed forces. The same table indicates that 13 out of 34 respondents would be interested in participating as candidates in the future electoral events. Similarly, 7 declared that they would just participate, 7 would organise a political events and 8 would take some other part in the next electoral events. This indicates a notable split among the ex-combatants with respect to political participation and party activism

in Jabana. Such political participation and party activism increases political determination, performance and patriotism. This is in line with Duma, van Laar and Klem (2012) and Porto, Parsons and Alden (2011) whose findings indicated that political party membership is positively related with individual's availability to work as a political activist, specifically, those who are members of a political party and are available for any type of political work. Although political participation and party activism may bring about an outstanding split among ex-combatants, ex-combatants may be interested in taking part in election campaigns in order to bring about change within Jabana. This may help in observing the level of ex-combatants' interest in active participation in politics in a country and help to clarify the political mobilisation which ex-combatants experienced while still soldiers.

8.6 The stresses of reintegration

This section centres on ex-combatants' satisfaction with demobilization experience, post demobilization attitudes and coping with lack of livelihood. Furthermore, it discusses the effects on marital relationships, the effects on children and finally, and it explores the issue of child work.

8.6.1 The demobilization experience

The results show that satisfaction after demobilization depends on the reason for demobilization. Indeed the time spent in service is not very influential, just as the motive of army affiliation has no significant impact.

Table 8. 15. The participants' perceptions and satisfaction on demobilization

Army affiliation (n=28)	Time spent in Service			Motivation to join the army affiliation		Demobilization Motive			Satisfaction after demobilization	
	1 to 5 years	6 to 10 years	11 years and above	Personal	Circumstantial option	Order	Personal request/wish	Sickness/disabled	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
FDLR	5	8	3	3	13	12	3	1	7	9
RDF	1	9	2	8	4	7	2	2	3	9

Source: Author's survey data (2009-2011)

Table 8.14 above indicates that ex-combatants from armed groups outnumber those from Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) because initially the research target was the thirty-second phase of demobilisation (February, 2009) that encompassed many ex-combatants from the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) based in the eastern DRC.

The majority of ex-combatants have spent six years or so in the service before demobilization. Participants from RDF indicated that they joined the army on a voluntary basis but those who joined the FDLR it followed after circumstantial decision-making. They avowed to have spent several years in Eastern DRC as refugees where they attended various campaigns launched by the FDLR. The ideological factor coupled with the fragile social and economic situation of refugees forced them to join the FDLR. For that reason, Hazen (2001: 3) finds two ways of joining armed groups. The first is on a voluntary as the concerned person chooses voluntarily and individually to join the faction. Obviously the deliberate nature of such a choice can be discussed as it generally hides a perceived lack of options. The second way is through coercion. This specifically concerns both children and women who are forced to join armed groups through violence and abduction. Few participants have been demobilized for reasons of disability; most of them were former soldiers of RDF and none of them suffers from chronic disability. All of them said that when demobilization started, they were suffering from chronic stomach pain.

Only one-third of cooperative members revealed they had felt satisfied upon demobilization, members from FDLR being more satisfied than those from the RDF. Former FDLR combatants stated that they were tired of the life in the jungles of the eastern DRC and this may explain their satisfaction as they longed for returning to their family in Rwanda. This enthusiasm can promptly change into dissatisfaction in case of prolonged unemployment. Hazen (2001: 6) stresses that the majority of ex-combatants who leave the military family become uncertain about access to income and the satisfaction of their basic needs. Although some armed groups have no means to pay the salaries of combatants, these fighters are often able to meet their needs by looting and other similar activities

It is clear that in wartime, combatants create ways to access necessary and desirable goods. In peace-time, these ways are forbidden and punishable. Therefore, Hazen (2001: 7) highlights that leaving armed groups and returning to civilian life means that fighters have left means of access to goods, and in many cases they do not have necessary skills for starting living with socially

acceptable means. Indeed, the skills that they learned during the war are no longer viable in the new civilian context. Resettlement and rehabilitation programs can limit the shock of demobilization but can only offer short-term solutions. The researcher concludes, a sustainable economic development, skills development, creation of employment opportunities are necessary for effective ex-combatants' reintegration (Hazen, 2001: 7).

Participants formerly affiliated to the RDF wanted to continue in the service. The major reason might be that for more than a decade Rwanda is not at war. The last attack against Rwanda by the FDLR took place in 2001. FDLR activities revolved around extracting minerals in the North Kivu and South Kivu, DRC provinces (Pole Institute, 2008:10).

Demobilization was seen as a loss of source of income for ex-former RDF soldiers, as well as loss of military health insurance benefits and access to Zigama Credit and Savings Services. Participants in the demobilisation feel dissatisfied as they do not have the sufficient education that ensures successful socio-economic reintegration after demobilization. The negative perception over the demobilization for a category of participants may negatively impact on personal efforts towards reintegration. If a new significant income generating activity is assured for each veteran, it could generate more favourable perception and motivation towards the reintegration process.

8.6.2 Livelihoods

This subsection discusses ex-combatants' attitudes after demobilization. It describes the participants' feelings and attitudes following unemployment. After demobilization, some ex-combatants found themselves unemployed while the majority of ex-combatants faced economic stress from the outset of the demobilization process and they lost their livelihood. Chapter three shows a clear link between economic stress, health and the prevalence of psychopathological problems. This situation is more prevalent among unemployed and poor people compared to the wealthy or the rich. Ex-combatants face greater pressure than other categories of unemployed people. For instance, while young people who have completed their studies may feel stress due to job scarceness, their feelings are mixed with hope. If unemployment extends for a relatively long period, the impact is still bearable because of little responsibilities and support from parents and relatives. The reality for ex-combatants is that they have lost their livelihood and are demobilized when they already have considerable responsibilities. They are deeply affected by

the new experience of being demobilized combined with the challenge of providing for their families without income.

Despite living in a difficult social and economic context, many ex-combatants tend to see their poor living conditions as a personal failure. Half of the ex-combatants admitted that they experience feelings of guilt for living in such a situation and being under pressure from the family to provide for them.

Some ex-combatants seek work outside the blocks. For instance, they could do menial jobs in Nyabugogo main bus station or to shops in Gatsata. However, as participants stated, former combatants remained depressed due to repeated failures in finding more lucrative or permanent employment. According to Nurun and Ranjan (2006: 28), there can be many types of psychological reactions to unemployment but two of them are more common. One is unemployment as a sickness, when a person is obsessed with finding employment. The second is unemployment as lifeless that is when people give less consideration to the question of livelihood. For the former, the experience of unemployment leads to disgust or repulsion. The person who has a livelihood is valued, and job loss might cause heartbreak.

Although we are not well equipped for deep psychological analysis of unemployment, the obvious deduction from participants' reaction toward unemployment may lead to the acceptance of marginality in response to multiple attempts and repeated rejections by the labour market. Accordingly, Galic and Sverko (2008: 7) state that the consequence of strong and desperate reactions may remove chances of obtaining new employment since motivation is totally lost.

Some participants felt abandoned by their former colleagues, relatives and friends which makes relationships increasingly more difficult. However, though the tendency from the majority of participants is to blame others for their financial disadvantage, we have found that a plausible explanation is that the course of life of the unemployed and employed persons is different. Leaving a job means leaving working relationships. Finally, the probability of tension within family relationships was high due to the anxiety that was regularly raised by insufficient resources and subsequently the probable feeling of loss of value and consideration by other family members.

The above opinions clearly explain the reason why being unemployed keeps an individual in a situation of dependency which does not contribute to sustaining a sense of personal value within

the family and the society. Access and right to work are the basis of financial independence, and when they are absent, social integration becomes almost impossible. Actually, this shows how former combatants were eager to see their project revived as they expected the reintegration project to help them.

On the other hand, this would be more serious for participants who had not obtained a job since demobilization began. They were reliant to the family's assistance. All the members of Jabana group had experienced problems with the reintegration process but the situation faced by the unemployed was more uncertain. In a workshop, some of them confirmed that being assisted is difficult.

“If you have no job, you will always blame yourself for being a burden to the relative who assists you. You feel accountable for something. But since you do not have means to support yourself or to terminate the assistance, you learn how to live with resignation”

Since a relative is providing financial and moral support, to restore the balance in relationships, one ex-combatant felt obliged to participate in household duties like maintaining the garden, cleaning or washing the car and escorting children to and from the school. Another aspect that was emphasized is that joblessness makes an individual to always be close to their relatives who assist them and this usually leads the concerned person to fall under excessive control and lose freedom at some extent. It further reduces their chances of looking for job opportunities because the time they can devote to that task is remarkably reduced. Although the aspect related to family assistance and support by friends is not documented in the context of the reintegration of ex-combatants, in an unstructured interview, participants revealed that

“Even if we are neglected, we assume and feel this project of reintegration is a good way to help us in different ways. Our thoughts are that not only this aspect plays an important role but also it will lead us to other positive achievements, which can help us overcome economic, social and psychological problems we are meeting in our daily life.”

People feel frustrated, discouraged and even abandoned in case their expectations are not met. These ex-combatants were expecting their cooperative to be renewed and better implemented as it was a good way to help them integrate community economically, socially and psychologically.

8.6.3 The effect on marital relationships

It is better to understand the context in which ex-combatants, employed or unemployed, spend their time and what their hobbies are. The points were highlighted by the participants. Leisure, traditionally seen as the reward of labour, disappears as ex-combatants are unemployed. Those who were members of RDF dedicated their free time in sports with friends, watching news, watching football matches and movies on TV screens that are dedicated to recreations in barracks or garrisons. In addition, they used to go to stadiums to attend important sport events; they could go to cultural centres as they benefited of sensible reduction of participation fees just by exhibiting their cards, which is a common advantage granted to students and soldiers in Rwanda. As stated by participants, now things have changed they face boredom, isolation and feel diminished since they are no longer have access to sport and leisure facilities of barracks while they are totally limited by financial means for entertaining cultural events and other similar assemblies.

Unemployment deprives many Jabana ex-combatants of useful recreational spaces. A job opens chances to access recreational areas whereas those who lack financial resources see their social interactions reduced, pushing them to stay at home. In workshops and unstructured interviews, some participants stated that free time is a vacuum time that increases stress as it makes them thinking too much of problems they are facing. This is emphasized by one participant in the following testimony:

“Since I have nothing to do, my occupation is reduced to chatting with friends I meet occasionally. In fact the solution available to me is to walk in the neighbourhood....very often I have had the chance to meet with someone I know in the centre of Jabana... then we talk only for killing time. This is useful because it allows me to forget my problems for a while.”

Lack of regular employment, low level of self-esteem, progressive extinction of professional expectations and social rejection force ex-combatants to try forgetting their problems and their environment. Disproportionate amounts are sometimes spent on alcohol abuse.

Another issue highlighted by the results of this study is that of ineffective reintegration of former combatants. Ex-combatants who participated to this study fall into two groups: those who work but remain unstable as they do not have really rewarding jobs and those who are unemployed. It is clear that ex-combatants feel frustrated and laid blame against the government

and the RDRC. Those who had been given vocational trainings and hold vocational training certificates but did not have appear to adopt radical views regarding their situation. The consequence of such attitudes leads to more isolation and marginalization.

In the light of the results discussed in previous sections ex-combatants face numerous challenges and poverty is the main consequence. Nevertheless, several aspects indicate that marital relationships are affected by weak economic situation. The results of this research show that the majority of ex-combatants of the Jabana are married, and that regular violent marital conflict occurs. Participants indicated that men are often the perpetrators of this violence. The causes of domestic abuse are often linked to financial problems. They stated that by accumulating frustrations on the daily basis due to unstable jobs and difficult working conditions, one becomes nervous and this culminates into violence in the home. Man is the sole financial provider of every domestic need while his income cannot cover all the needs of the family. In FGDs, some respondents gave the following testimony:

“I’m always surrounded by two realities I cannot escape: needs and powerlessness. Conditions are difficult; my income is not enough for everyone in the home. In reality, the situation is always beyond my control. At home I have no power; power is cash because “if you have it you become a true husband, a true father and a true man”. You see that lack of it puts you in a quagmire and finally you give up and lose control over what you say and do.”

The situation becomes more difficult since the majority of ex-combatants are married to women who received a primary school education. This makes them unable to find a job in order to provide a supplementary resource to their families. Most of them stay at home being only busy with household duties.

This again indicates that women who lack income live in difficult conditions. Some participants emphasized in unstructured interviews, with that their wives’ position of inferiority makes them to unconditionally submit to the authority and the will of their husbands. According to Mugisho (2011: 58), greater economic dependence results in more severe abuse because women who economically dependent on their abusers cannot leave them and when they try so due to financial constraints are more likely to return to their husbands. In addition, economic abuse is

in itself domestic abuse given that abusive partners act in ways that undermine the women's ability to reach financial independence.

The marital violence that characterizes couples of the group of Jabana, as highlighted by the results, can be classified into three categories: physical, psychological and economic. In relation to physical abuse, results show physical abuse in Jabana results in beating. Other forms of physical abuse cited include pushing. As for economic violence, the results show a link between economic dependence and violence. Women of Jabana stressed that since their husbands have poor income, this has increased men's aggressiveness and wives have no say about the household income management although it is the wife's responsibility to ensure the survival of the family. Wife's responsibility in the household includes every day preparation of meals for everyone, taking care of children and monitoring everything for the school, receiving visitors, etc. Therefore when a problem affects one of these areas of life, women are the first to experience frustration and this could explain the stress and depression stated which some women married to ex-combatants of Jabana have confirmed. The psychological aspect of violence in Jabana includes regular criticism, intimidation, verbal threats, and isolation as the husband can decide without clear reason to stop communicating with his wife for many days. There are other mistreatments that were mentioned by participants such as husband preventing his wife from sleeping, eating, or not at all leaving the place of residence without permission.

8.6.4 The effect on children

Results from Jabana highlight that poverty is associated with several other issues. In this way, there is persistent hostility between parents and children, which participants interpreted as a simple matter of indiscipline. In different interviews that were organised, several participants revealed that the households that are headed by women were facing serious problems as women were lenient towards their children.

"Families under women leadership are in danger as they (women) are not tough with their children. In most cases, if a woman is a single parent, she is careless and has no authority vis-à-vis her children."

As it has been proven in the previous sections, women are the most affected and vulnerable economically and psychologically within the group of the Jabana cooperative. They hardly meet the needs of their children, a situation which may favour tension since children's needs are

frequently food, clothes, recreation. Contrary to participants' beliefs in different discussion groups, indiscipline is not merely a consequence of natural insufficient authority by women. It has primarily to do with resources and the quality of life in the family that basically implies the quality of relation among family members. Such relation should exist particularly between children and parents and it is expressed by love, affection and dialogue.

All participants in the FGDs complained about their inability to adequately to meet properly their needs and stated in various ways women have been the most affected. In addition to common problems related to means, female participants reported that they often face psychological problems such as anxiety, headaches, insomnia, fatigue, loss of appetite, feelings of powerlessness, loss of hope for life and feeling guilty. A mother's poor psychological state does not allow for an environment where they are able to discipline the children.

The above described situation reduces parenting ability, which increases the likelihood of the same symptoms among children. Undoubtedly the psychological disorders that are experienced by parents, predominantly women of the group of Jabana put children in vulnerability by causing discomfort behaviours and not indiscipline or delinquency.

A poor family environment negatively affects the long-term basis. Similarly, Linda *et al.* (2010: 7) assume that parents give their children three kinds of inheritance that are biological, economic and cultural. Indeed, apart from the biological heritage, the two others require more effort and investment on the part of parents as the most important determinants of children's future. Participants are aware of the problem as a hopelessly one of them stated, "We do not have means in order to prepare the future of our children". The children's future depends on their income availability, their level of education and other resources such as availability of infrastructures and government programs. The greater the inheritance is the better the chance is that their children will be able to live a decent life and to expect bright futures (Blank, 2003).

Ex-combatants children are regular victims of violence in addition to witnessing violent incidents between parents. As Linda *et al.* (2010: 6) stress, the children who are abused physically and psychologically experience behaviour problems during their childhood and develop symptoms of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, poor physical health, poor school or work performance, likelihood of drug and alcohol abuse, etc. In addition, children who are exposed to psychological violence are more likely to become either victims or perpetrators of violence once they become mature (Lind, 2010: 6).

Indeed, poor living conditions among families of ex-combatants of Jabana puts daily pressure onto parents who are consequently under stress, causing inadequate and dangerous parenting behaviour in the development of their children. In this regard, participants revealed that stress and irritability sometimes impose children to do what is beyond their capacity, which results in high level of criticism and severe punishment.

The results collected from the different FGDs, workshops and unstructured interviews that were organised with Jabana former combatants highlight that children suffer from the social exclusion of their parents. The problems that limit the integration of their parents are the same as those that prevent children from enjoying a normal development from infancy. When there is no appropriate action, poverty can become a quasi-hereditary or cyclic phenomenon.

In his research on theories of poverty, Bradshaw (2007: 22) highlights the cyclical nature of poverty which results in poor maternal health, the generating of sub-standard social and environmental conditions in addition to immuned and compromised children predisposing them to failure and long term unemployment. Many participants in unstructured interviews and workshops admitted that their children started working from a young age. Children of both sexes are given jobs because employers ignore their rights and pay less than to them than adults.

In some cases, children combine work and school. Concerning the type of work children do by gender, participants in FGDs reported that boys work in small woodwork shops that are located in Gatsata and Gacinjira, in Gisozi Sector. Boys also work in auto repair garages, leather processing or garment workshops,, in construction or quarries for example. Girls sell a variety of small items in Jabana town, such as selling vegetables and fruit. It was also noticed that some of them are involved in domestic work after school. In FGDs, many participants stated that

“You can see children working in different areas here and there. Most of them are orphans or come from poor families or from families headed by mothers. Most of these children, boys and girls, never go to school. The money they are paid is very derisory and they cannot claim for a bigger amount since they come from poor families. Others work but they are never paid. Girls who work as house girls are sometimes abused sexually by their bosses as they promise them (the girls) to increase their pay. It is not

the child who decides how much to be paid but the employer himself. These children often work without a contract.”

In this particular case of Jabana, some participants in workshops admitted that children are obliged to work because of their parents’ extreme poverty

“As a father of three children, I am paid as a casual labourer and when I fall sick they lack food, thus I ask my son to go and work after school at a brickyard in Jabana in order to get little money so that they can buy food.”

In Rwanda, there are no vocational training centres for children as they are supposed to be at school. If vocational training does not apply to school children, it means that children engage in work activities without skills and this situation exposes them to unimaginable risks. As participants highlighted in an unstructured interview, children learn at the workplace through mentorship by a more experienced person. This trainer is not a real instructor or educator but someone who gives orders, sometimes violently. Accordingly, Mamun *et al.* (2008: 262) indicates that the lack of parental supervision affects a child’s behaviour at work. Not having parental supervision in the work place leads the child to discredit his boss’s discourse and moral authority. In these situations young boys and girls see themselves as adults.

Participants in both unstructured interviews and workshops indicated that in Rwanda, the common term used to refer to this situation is “Gukamilika”. The word refers to a child who becomes an adult due to the circumstances. The passage from dependence to responsibility causes him to behave as an adult. According to participants this problem is especially frequent in households headed by women, working children being predominantly male. In addition, this situation often leads to serious consequences as most of the children in these situations begin to smoke, drink and engage in promiscuous activity.

8.7 Summary

The chapter has highlighted the characteristics of heads of households, the marital status and household structure, gender, sources of household income, the situation at the pre-project phase and the socio economic situation of ex-combatants. At the household level real reintegration is linked to factors which affect an adult at an individual level. The marital status and household structure implies that there is a high prevalence of reintegration due to a lack in basic needs such as food, accommodation and health care. Poverty is widespread among women headed

households Most of households of cooperative members are managed by men and very few are managed by widows.

Ex-combatants fall into two groups they are either employed or unemployed. The unemployed are not able to satisfy their needs. The socio-economic situation of ex-combatants before the implementation of the project required the analysis of their living conditions and the ability to meet their basic needs. Ex-combatants income, food self-sufficiency, access to health care, education, accommodation conditions, clothing and relations with other community members had to be looked at separately.

The different stresses of ex-combatants' reintegration were also looked at which included looking at their occupation. Ex-combatants who are unemployed are plunged into economic and psychopathological troubles. They feel that they are abandoned and avoided by their former colleagues, relatives and friends. This disturbs marital relationships due to the poor economic situation. Most male ex-combatants are married, they become embroiled in mental conflicts and repeatedly in marital contentions.

As participants to different groups of discussions have indicated, men are the main perpetrators of this violence. Male ex-combatants conflict is being the sole financial provider of all financial means in the home and if once he fails to provide he becomes stressed and sometimes resort to abuse.

Children are not safe in situations where the above mentioned stresses take place. The lack of adequate financial means generates conflict between children and parents. In households managed by women children become independent. Without doubt, they are employed at low cost because they can be easily exploited since they ignore the laws that regulate labour in Rwanda.

CHAPTER NINE: THE SITUATION OF JABANA COOPERATIVE

9.1 Introduction

The cooperative is a means to an end and it provides the economic base which is necessary for people to reintegrate successfully. Cooperatives by their nature encourage human interaction – they are distinctly different from other forms of individualistic business organization.

9.1.1 Identification, social share and SWOT analysis of the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana.

Table 9. 1Identification of the cooperative

Date of birth of the cooperative	Current Number of members (2009)		
	Male	Female	Total
2006	28	06	34

SourceSource : Author's data 2013

Table 9.1 above shows identification of the cooperative incorporated in 2006, having number of members totaling to 34 (28 male and 06 female) in 2009.

9.1.2 Social capital of the cooperative

Table 9. 2.Social capital of the cooperative

Its current state				
Share (in currency)	Social Share	Capital Value	Contractual employee	Other employees non contractual
8.4 USD	288.6 USD	351.4 USD	01	12

Source: Primary data

Table 9.2 above shows social capital of the cooperative in the current state. The table shows share of USD\$ 8.4, social share of USD\$ 288.6, capital value of USD\$ 351.4, 1 contractual employee and 12 other employees non-contractual.

9.1.3 Strengths, Weaknesses, Threats and Opportunities of Jabana Cooperative

This section presents the strengths, weakness, threats and opportunities of Jabana

Table 9. 3.Strengths, Weaknesses, Threats and Opportunities of Jabana Cooperative

Strengths	Weaknesses
1.The cooperative has a structure 2.Cooperative has a share capital including lands owned by members that can be exploited. 3.Cooperative has an office and office equipment	1.The absence and/or non-compliance of procedures for administrative and financial management. 2.Lack of effective participation in the affairs of the cooperative for all members. 3.Absence of reports on the financial statements and internal controls. 4.No action plan (planning of activities). 5.Lack of management and organization of the cooperative. 6.Lack of competence in economic marketing. 7.Lack of keeping books (accounting, financial and bank books). 8.Lack of classification of documents Lack of entrepreneurial spirit within the cooperative. 9.Internal conflicts
Opportunities	Threats
1.The cooperative is known and supported by local authorities. 2.Availability of market for income generating activities in Jabana 3.Availability of manpower in Jabana 4.Availability of training opportunities 5.Availability of Microfinance Institutions and banks in Jabana suburb	1.Loans from banks and microfinance institutions require a prior organization. 2.Unstable rainy seasons that affect crop as noticed recently in Jabana. 3.Negative perception by banks and community members about ex-combatants and their initiatives

Source: Author's survey data

Table 9.3 above shows 3 strengths, 10 weaknesses, 3 threats and 5 opportunities of Jabana Cooperative, members can build on strengths and opportunities to overcome weaknesses and threats in Jabana Cooperative.

The reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda depends largely on the ability of ex-combatants to engage in economic activities. However, most important is the ability of the Rwandan economy to create jobs that would create substantial reintegration opportunities.

Rwanda has made remarkable economic progress, but the level of unemployment and poverty is still high. As the EICV2 (2010:8) reports, for the period 2008-2009 in Rwanda professional employees represented only 2.0 %, senior officials and managers 0.1%, office clerks 0.1%, commercial and sales 5.9%, skilled services 5.5%, the agriculture/fisheries 79.6%, and unskilled elementary 6.8%. To confirm this, a respondent in the FGDs stated that

“Like other Rwandan citizens, we are bound to follow the national policy regarding poverty alleviation through kwihangira imirimo.”¹¹ The government cannot find jobs for everyone in the country. We know that there are high rates of unemployment in cities and every year there are more and more new job seekers on the labour market as thousands of young people are graduating from colleges and universities. We need to reorganize ourselves for a new departure towards a sustainable social and economic life”

The above situation illustrates how ex-combatants want to achieve long-term re-integration. Sustainable and full reintegration becomes complete once most participants have jobs and feel satisfied with what they earn. They must continue to access opportunities of income or employment offered by the local market. Economic reintegration is fundamental in this process as it promotes both social and psychological re-integration. Rwanda is encouraging her citizens to tirelessly combat poverty and joblessness by backing the national goal. This justifies why the cooperatives remain a formal business organization and a potential means of economic reintegration on which Jabana members must focus. Many employed ex-combatants stated that their low salaries do not meet their family’s needs which negatively affect their psychological states. In this way, the cooperative must strengthen their reintegration efforts by opening a multidimensional and continuous process of learning. This helps them cope with the situation and progressively leads to full participation in the economic and social life of the broad society.

The cooperative promotes economic integration, which in turn provides the ability for people to access services they need. This also favours people to have a good quality of life, participate in social and political life and develop a sense of belonging to their society. The aim of a cooperative differs from other businesses because cooperatives help their members and communities to meet their needs. By focusing more on group rather than individuals, cooperatives become “democratic” organizations that value the community. Unlike other forms

¹¹ Entrepreneurship

of employment, the cooperative is guided by values and principles that build on democracy. Such a post demobilization situation presents attitudes (section 8.4) that focus more on members' needs than on profits.

Combined with values such as cohesion, mutual aid, solidarity, equality, fairness and openness, cooperatives become the reference for the people who lack means and potentialities to undertake their own businesses.

Therefore, the purpose of cooperatives is to have people who are well integrated in society and who can work together to meet their needs and aspirations. Joint work helps a cooperative's members to access jobs and services by allowing each of them to have a say, which triggers a democratic management of the cooperative. This makes the cooperative become a buffer between the society and former combatants. It becomes a solid foundation for them to live, survive and meet all the social and economic need of everyday life. This was also stated by most of participants during an unstructured interview

“For us, the cooperative is a real social and economic heart. It allows us to gain knowledge, status and recognition to practice the skills and participate in the exercise of power shared with other members within the cooperative. This means that we need cash, not as a priority but as a means to have modest savings, rather than over-enrichment. We need to belong to a cooperative that provides us opportunities to bolster our community ties through mutual assistance. In this way, we will define our own needs rather than waiting for other people to do it for us.”

According to these participants, when the cooperative opens a solid foundation for its members, it promotes the development of services by members and for members, which allows everyone to control their own future. This gives greater autonomy to the community and raises efficient business practices. It guarantees the homogenization of goods and services which are focused on mass market. The cooperative becomes an essential tool to develop a fair, equitable and consistent society that ultimately encourages active citizenship and involvement in the community since the latter is characterized by many community values, including democratic participation. For achieving this, the cooperative of Jabana needed to work tirelessly to overcome its limits that delayed too much its progress.

9.2 Jabana cooperative

9.2.1 Establishment

Rebuilding a cooperative requires the contribution of every member. In this regard, some participants who were present in a workshop argued that

“We, as members of Jabana cooperative, have to strongly commit to the reconstruction of our cooperative. We are ready and willing to do so. This cooperative is for us; we must manage it as well because we all work for raising its economy. This will be achieved if we have an open mind, are trained in acquiring new competences and if we consult with other cooperatives around us. Our development will automatically enhance the social conditions of the people who live around us.”

Change can never come from outside. These participants ascertain that change comes when each member contributes to it. This change begins in the members ‘minds. This will change their attitudes following the principles of renovation for a profitable group.

9.2.2 Performance

During workshop sessions, participants identified key points that can help the cooperative to move ahead.

Voluntary and open membership

Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to anyone who can use their services and are willing to accept the responsibilities of the members.

Democratic control of members

Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members who actively participate in developing their policies and making decisions. Regarding members' participation in an economic way, they will contribute equitably to the capital of their cooperative and control it democratically. At least, part of that capital is usually the common property of the cooperative.

Economic participation

Members contribute equitably to the capital of their cooperative and have the right to control it. Part of that capital is usually the common property of the cooperative. Members usually receive limited compensation on capital subscribed as a condition of membership, in proportion to their

transactions within the cooperative and the remaining part is used to support the other activities that are approved by the members

Autonomy and independence

Cooperatives are autonomous organizations controlled by their members. If they enter into agreements with other organizations, including with governments, or raise capital from external sources, their autonomy and democratic control must be preserved.

Education, training and information

Cooperatives provide education and training to their members, elected representatives, managers and employees so that they can participate effectively develop their cooperative.

Co-operation among cooperatives

Cooperatives make more efficient services to their members and strengthen the cooperative movement by working with other cooperative structures at local, national, regional and international levels.

Concern for community

Cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies approved by their members.

9.2.3 The situation at September 2009

The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Programme, encourages and continues to sensitize ex-combatants to form cooperatives as means of socio-economic reintegration and reconciliation. Since its creation in 2001, the RDRC has been a tool for ex-combatants' re-integration. This is based on various reasons such as the economic context of Rwanda is characterized by a labour market that is always saturated. Thousands of young people graduate each year but remain unemployed. In addition, the majority of ex-combatants have a very limited education, which does not allow them to actively compete for jobs. Finally, initiating or joining a cooperative does not necessitate having education or prior experience.

Ten years ago when the demobilisation process was in its early stages cooperative rarely functioned as it was intended too. A survey (RDRC, 2009) on ex-cooperatives indicated that there were 124 cooperatives early in 2008. Among the forty two cooperatives that participated

in a performance competition at the end of 2009 twenty one had improved and the other twenty one declined in their performance despite additional support, including funding and training provided by the RDRC. This competition indicated that only fifty percent of the firms improved. The idea was supported by some participants who were in both unstructured interviews and FGDs,

“...cooperatives may fail to reach their objectives if the members are not strongly committed to work hard, if there is poor management of the cooperative’s resources, if financial interest is their main target, or if the cooperative is not open to existing partners who can provide support to them in the area.”

These participants emphasize that cooperatives often collapse when they start earning profit as greedy leaders embezzle the cooperative’s resources. The very few females who are in the cooperative’s leadership are never involved in fund misappropriation.

The Jabana cooperative is one of those which has performed badly. The cooperative was founded by twelve ex-combatants with the goal of finding a solution to their reintegration problem (section 8.8). The development of knowledge can open their minds regarding generating income so they can have better living conditions. The cooperative membership increased to 34 members in 2009, the year when this research began. The members’ main income generating activity was to extract stones which they could sell as construction materials. The cooperative has always experienced internal conflicts that oppose top managers and other members causing mismanagement due to lack of transparency. Founded in 2006, the cooperative had not carried out any tangible benefit yet for its members. The continued inability of the Jabana cooperative to generate income for members, the research project identified poor functionality as the reason for its failure. For that reason and before the improvement factors, the research first identifies and analyses the causes of its poor functionality. As outlined by section 10.3, the participants in both focus groups and workshop sessions stated that the group of Jabana suffered from various difficulties related to financial problems, poor management and lack of democratic governance, and challenges linked to the external environment.

9.3 The reasons for poor performance

The results show that the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana increasingly faced internal and external problems that ultimately had the same impact of marginalizing ex-combatants. The

participants were eager to reorganize their group once they had discovered what the problems were.

9.3.1 Poor financial management

Poor financial management – as outlined in Tables 9.4 to 9.7 – meant that the cooperative involvement in the sorghum trade resulted in it being effectively bankrupt in September, 2009.

Table 9. 4: Value of goods and materials of the initial capital invested

Designation	USD
Sorghum	101.8
Bags	1.2
Balance	13.5
Bucket	1.6
Total	118.4

Source: Primary data

From table 9.4 above, value of goods and materials of the initial capital invested include sorghum (USD\$ 101.8), bags (USD\$ 1.2), balance (USD\$ 13.5) and bucket (USD\$ 1.6). This means that sorghum had the biggest contribution, followed by balance, bucket and finally by bags.

Reimbursement Plan of the initial loan

Loan: 97, 000 USD. Interest: 16% pa. Duration: 6 months.

Table 9. 5.The reimbursement plan of the initial loan (USD '000)

Duration (months)	Remaining capital	Capital repayment	Interest paid	Total
1	97.0	16.1	1.2	17.4
2	80.8	16.1	1.0	17.2
3	64.7	16.1	0.8	17
4	48.5	16.1	0.6	16.8
5	32.0	16.1	0.4	16.6
6	16.0	16.1	0.2	13.3
Total	339	97	4.5	101.5

Source: Primary data

Table 9.5 shows the reimbursement plan of the initial loan in Jabana. The table shows duration of 6 months, capital repayment of USD\$ '000 of 16.1 per period, total interest paid of 4.5 and total payment of USD\$ 101.5.

Table 9. 6. Depreciation (\$'000)

Designation	Quantity	Acquisition value (USD)	Lifetime (year)	Annual amortization (USD)	Monthly amortization (USD)
Sacs	5	1.2	1	1.2	0.10
Balance	1	13.5	10	1.35	0.11
Bucket	1	1.6	2	0.8	0.07
TOTAL		16.5		3.4	0.28

Source: Primary data

Table 9. 7.The analysis of operations in the first six months of the initial project (\$'000)

Products/months	1	2	3	4	5	6
Sales (USD)	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3	624.3
Charges (USD):						
Buy sorghum	645.1	590.8	640	605.4	605.4	605.4
Transport	20.3	21.5	21.5	21.5	21.5	21.5
Employees	16.3	17.2	17.2	17.2	17.2	17.2
Interests	762	508	635	381	254	127
Amortization	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28
Taxes	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Total	684.8	632.1	681.5	646.5	646.3	646
Difference	-60.5	-7.8	-57.2	-22.2	-21.9	-21.7

Table 9.7 reports performance over the first six months of the project. It indicates charges in USD dollars on buying sorghum, transport, employees, interests, amortization, giving totals of 684.8 (period 1), 632.1 (period 2), 691.5 (period 3), 646.5 (period 4), 646.3 (period 5) and 646.0 (period 6). However, despite the positive totals, there are negative outcomes throughout all the

six periods. Total losses incurred during the first six months were -191.5 USD'000 and averaged -31.9 USD'000 per month.

As outlined in the table above, the cooperative has suffered losses during the period of first six months since the initial project was poorly designed and poorly managed. The cooperative was running regular sales at constant prices without profit. Cooperatives need to be run by members who have managerial knowledge. The Jabana cooperative does not have members with managerial training. Few opportunities are provided to ex-combatants by the RDRC.

“We belong to this association but we never get training, only the big persons here go to training. We are never asked to contribute with our opinions but the managers only come and just tell us what to do and we do.”

Based on the participants' statements, most of the cooperatives' leaders are its founding members. This position gives those leaders a good chance to manage the cooperative for their personal benefit. As stressed above, this cooperative was initiated by ex-combatants who were living in unemployment and poverty and had low skill levels, and were without prior business experience. In fact, there has been less effort to fully integrate and give a say to members who joined later.

9.3.2 Lack of trust among cooperative members

A consequence of mismanagement is that a lack of trust develops between cooperative members caused in part by the lack of transparency from management. This was supported by ex-combatants who attended FGDs as they agreed that:

“There is a big problem in this cooperative, we think it is not well managed. We cannot know exactly what is happening in here and we are not involved in decision making. The vision is not shared as we can't know how cash is managed. Everything is done by the leaders themselves. We are excluded somehow.”

The lack of a common vision and financial management remain a big issue for members. These factors have greatly contributed to the deterioration of trust and social ties among members. It's difficult for members to participate in meetings and other activities initiated by their leaders while at the same time these top managers usually hide opportunities such as training, meetings organized by the RDRC and learning visits.

9.3.3 Undemocratic participation

The Jabana cooperative is undemocratic which negatively affects the decision-making processes. In an unstructured interview, participants confirmed that.

“In this cooperative, there is absence of compromise on important issues. This creates contentions among us, many people are unhappy, there are contestations and tensions within our cooperative.”

When cooperative leaders disregard their mandate and fail to consult and inform other members about how the cooperative functions, it leads to distrust. By the same token, a participant stated that very few members continued to attend meetings of the cooperative. Members who participated in these meetings were complaining that the meetings take a long time and each participant is not given an opportunity to speak properly.

Most former combatants' cooperatives experience similar problems,; that some members put themselves first, ahead of the collective. Participants in workshops said that

“At the start, we thought we would be sharing interests but we now see that some members here are selfish and they disregard the interest of the whole group. People outside see us as one strong team but if you look closely, there is hatred among us and people are discouraged.”

A situation of this kind continues to fuel jealousy, constant criticism, dissension and deep frustration. Training content given to ex-combatants does not place a great deal of emphasis on internal cohesion. On several occasions, I took part in their training sessions and I noticed that the content focuses on entrepreneurial knowledge but does not insist on the importance of internal cohesion for the cooperative success. In addition, the majority of members in all group discussions we had stated that their cooperative does not cooperate with other similar organizations.

“All the members here are like isolated; they are not opened to the outside world. For the prosperity of the association, all members should have similar aims, have access to information and different opportunities to be strongly united.”

Cooperatives which are closed to the outside world close an important means of access to information and opportunities. The obvious consequence is isolation which keeps the cooperative from benefiting from the experience of others.

9.3.4 Lack of a vision for self reliance and sufficiency

Self-sufficiency as a vision within Jabana cooperative remains a challenge. When I interacted with the members of Jabana cooperative, they openly told me they needed external support.

“We need strong help, from outside to encourage our activities. We need any external support, this is a good initiative. It is not bad because at the beginning it is necessary to work hard for self sufficiency.”

In fact, as stated by this member, external assistance is of paramount importance at the beginning. This helps the members of the cooperative to work hard for self-sufficiency. The experience of Jabana shows clearly that by expecting too much external support, members fail to rely on their own capabilities while they could seek ways and opportunities available locally for their development. In FGDs, some participants revealed

“We have to work hard and not wait for others to help us. If we have already started to do something, we don’t miss help. We don’t have to sit and cross our arms waiting for someone to help. We are many heads here. If we are asked to contribute with ideas, I am sure this can work perfectly. But we do not dream the same, we need to work for the welfare of each member. There are other cooperatives around us, they work with their own means and no one has ever given them support, why not us?”

If we consider the above participant’s argument, he makes it clear that the cooperative must suffice itself through hard work. This can only be achieved if all the members work as one united team for the members’ welfare and for the whole team’s self-sufficiency. This cooperative can develop positively provided that all the members commit to openness and hard work. Many of the cooperatives held by civilians near Jabana such as the cooperative of welders of Nyabugogo and the cooperative of carpenters of Karuruma work very well though they have waited for external support.

9.3.5 Poor co-ordination and lack of task allocation mechanisms

Co-ordination in Jabana cooperative should be a process of gathering and sharing information and planning within the framework of shared goals. This was confirmed by most of respondents who attended a workshop these words:

“We are one team, we need our activities to be well planned and coordinated for the association’s positive outcomes. This cooperative is ours. It is not achieving because we

do not unite our efforts as one team. There is inadequate management of activities but we have no mechanisms of distributing tasks among us.”

The above participant highlights how Jabana cooperative is not working cohesively. For him, people are not deploying efforts to develop and maintain transparent and effective collaboration at all levels of the organizational structure. In fact, any team in which each member ignores their respective tasks cannot reach its objectives. Without members' motivation to make individual sacrifices for the team, with lack of interaction and unshared goals between the group, these are enough elements to lead to a group's malfunction and collapse.

These aspects may make the situation worse in terms of cooperative functionality. Attitudes are complex and difficult elements to overcome in a situation fuelled by a conflict of interest. Such atmosphere prevails in a group due to lack of proactive attitude and inclusive co-ordination, lack of mutual listening and contested leadership.

The absence of overall co-ordination of the cooperative's activities reveals the lack of common objectives. Without common objectives, there will not be contributions of individual talents. Every member needs to work together to contribute to division of roles and tasks, which ultimately results in the cooperative performance and cohesion.

9.3.6 Lack of legal status

The use of illegitimate business activities is the basis for creating several problems. The Rwandan Ministry of Local Government requires each cooperative and association to register as early as possible before starting their activities. The leaders hope that former combatants will quickly proceed and acquire the legal status but unfortunately, many cooperatives fail to do so. The registration and formalization of cooperatives in Rwanda require the preparation of a file that meets the requirements of the law (Law No 50/2007: 2-3). Those requirements include the collection of three copies of the minutes of the General Assembly that created the cooperative. This document must be co-signed by the founding members. Three copies of the statutes must also be included, followed by management stating their names and addresses, and finally, there must be the bank statement showing payment of subscriptions of at least half of the amount of shares released.

Considering the above aspects, in an unstructured interview, one participant who is Jabana cooperative's manager said:

“Our cooperative of Jabana has no legal status because it didn’t try to meet the government’s conditions. This causes us some difficulties. We are aware of this but since we were allowed to start our activities, we have to go on. This causes us a big loss as we cannot legally exchange with others.”

Even the managers of the Javana cooperative know that they work illegally and only with their own interests at heart. This leads to ignorance and disengagement by the rest of the members of the cooperative as they fail to see any benefit in their continued participation in the cooperative activities.

The consequences of the cooperatives operating without official recognition mean the cooperative cannot apply for loans from banks and microfinance institutions. This failure has generated internal tensions in the cooperative as members accuse the leaders of selfishness and negligence and leaders subsequently blame the members for showing less interest and commitment for the cooperative development as most of them are often absent from meetings.

9.3.7 Inability to access funding

Many risks are associated with entrepreneurship and must be positively managed by the cooperative. . It is in this context that banks base their decision of granting funds based on their risks assessment. Risks affect the repayment capacity of the client or the partners which is why many cooperatives that are managed by ex-combatants fail to attract and retain adequate partnership with finance institutions. On this point of view, participants in FGDs stressed that;

“There is no democratic operation in Jabana cooperative. Our leaders seem to be very passive, so we cannot attract banks and microfinance institutions to give us loans. I think financial institutions do not consider us former combatants of Jabana as a credible cooperative, which hinders us from getting funds.”

In the same context, another participant in the same group as stated that

“Banks and microfinance institutions have a negative image of cooperatives that are initiated by ex-combatants. These institutions believe that these cooperatives are mismanaged and that information is not well shared among the members. So, banks think that we have no viable business from which we can be trusted and taken as serious partners. Another problem we have is that we have not our own office where people can come and contact us for different issues. ”

As the Jabana cooperative is not well managed, banks are reluctant to lend them money which results in the cooperative losing prospective partners who could be supportive in its activities. On the other hand, the cooperative was very limited in terms of information outputs. This, in fact, leads to poor information sharing among all the members and even with other cooperatives. Examples noted by the researcher include letters and correspondence in the cooperative archives were scattered and in disarray. This is another aspect that would dissuade partners about the seriousness of Jabana cooperative.

Table 9. 8. The benchmarks in a performing cooperative compared to the situation of Jabana

Benchmarks of performing management	The situation of Jabana cooperative
Representation of all categories of members in management structure and the leaders consult the Statutes and internal regulations of the cooperative	Women are absent in management structures, only the president with some members take decisions without involving others. When leaders make decisions, they do not refer to the internal regulations and statute
Leaders know they are accountable for their positions and roles and organize regular meetings with active participation of all members	Leaders are less conscious and not accountable for their positions or roles. There are less than two general meetings a year and only half of the members get involved.
Financial records and economic management documents exist. Leaders of the cooperative can analyse them. The cooperative can mobilize financial resources.	Financial records and management documents are absent. The leaders and cooperative members cannot analyse the financial situation of the cooperative. The only source of revenue was selling of construction materials and it has stopped in unclear circumstances.
Leaders and members of technical teams of the cooperative are trained in the management of the cooperative and the cooperative covers credit to its members.	Only few leaders are trained but other members of the management team are not trained in cooperative management. There is no credit granted to cooperative members or any financial advantage provided as the cooperative doesn't have money

Self-reliance as a principle within the cooperatives and the cooperative adheres to a union or networks of similar organizations.	Self-reliance does not exist as there is no money in the cooperative. There are no activities with which to generate income. No adherence to a cooperative union or similar organizations and the cooperative cannot negotiate support from public and private services
The cooperative has networks to find out what is going on outside and it can influence partners.	The cooperative does not have networks to find out what is going on outside. The cooperative lacks information and it cannot influence the partners.
The cooperative seeks to consolidate relations with finance institutions and its trading partners for the benefit of its members.	The cooperative does not have the resources and means with which to have the same impact of consolidated relations members with benefits.

Source: Author's survey data

9.4 A new plan for JabanaFirst, participants compared the principles that can promote the group to the ideas they discovered for better management, then they balanced and found what could be prioritised in the future in order to reunite the group and so reach their objective of full re-integration.

9.4.1 Rebuilding cohesion among members

The cooperative needs cohesion in order to attain a peaceful life and investment in its activities in order to help them satisfy their needs and desires. This was confirmed by majority of participants in an unstructured interview as they affirmed that

“As a team, we need unity and solidarity. This is something like glue that sticks us together towards the same goal. We aim at having good life, we want total and good social integration in the Rwandan society. This is possible if we are helping one another with transparency inside our team.”

In fact, building a unified and organized community is an essential step towards re-integration. This is another way of enabling the members of the group to accomplish their potentiality and improve their lives. Each ex-combatant has problems and needs that require particular solutions which cannot be achieved if there is division in the cooperative and if the members do not

provide each other mutual support. This develops and strengthens the values of the internal cohesion of the group. When every member observes these values, the group becomes unified and things move better.

The research results showed that despite the challenges ex-combatants face they have values and qualities to share for personal and group benefit. Each ex-combatant has a background which differentiates them from each other such as age, education, gender, family, social relations, etc. In fact, teamwork in military life and its' tasks are promoted and achieved in a very orderly organizational framework. This is based on two major values, the strict adherence to hierarchy and close collaboration on the horizontal level. In addition, the researcher has noted that from their military experience, ex-combatants of Jabana have more developed analytical skills compared with civilians of the same level of education.

On the social level, solidarity and brotherhood in the military is well developed. One of the participants in a workshop said that comrade 'refers to many things because it means brother, friend, colleague and partner'.

When the demobilisation process begins ex-combatants are able to re-enter civilian life. They begin to seek ways to meet all their basic needs having left the army without little by way of relevant work experience or qualifications. As a result, few have managed to re-integrate into society successfully in economic terms. Accordingly, one of the major outcomes of this research was identifying cohesion within the Jabana cooperative as the first and most important step towards the cooperative recovery and then a major factor of the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

More than a half of the participants in FGDs revealed that without cohesion, Jabana cooperative cannot provide a stable place to encourage collaborative work. This implies that there must be equality and solidarity in the team. Furthermore, participants considered cohesion as one of the most favourable and important element that can promote progressive learning of organizational and management practices. The ideas above are supported by a participant's view in an unstructured interview:

"A group in which there is lack of solidarity and equality can never move toward good management and positive organisation. We must therefore work as one team whose target is one and whose relations among team members are solid. This will make us be

strongly united and equal. If some of us are more valuable and that we think individually, we will never reach anywhere, division is failure and not an achievement.”

At the time this research began the Jabana cooperative had not begun operating although it had its statutes and regulations. This was due to lack of cohesion among its members. The situation resulted in the inability to run any income generating activity for more than a year. Mistrust and the exclusion of other members in decision-making by leaders was the biggest handicap the cooperatives faced.

Prior to any economic initiative or activity, participants thought it necessary to start working on mechanisms that could restore trust, unity and cohesion among themselves. This obviously implied the revision of the cooperative structure as well as its management mechanisms. Indeed, cooperatives differ from other companies in that their growth relies much more on the interaction between the different members and associate values than financial resources. In a workshop, most of participants admitted that the cooperative's reform was necessary.

“No change will be expected in case we, the Jabana cooperative members, do not seek, recognize and welcome the views of all members of this cooperative. If there is change and all members are not consulted about it, this will never be achieved. Valuing attitudes and opinions of the members is of paramount importance for better achievement, making everyone will feel at home.”

Ex-combatants attempted to explain how change for a better and sustainable future cannot achieve if it is initiated by external decision makers or a small group dominating internally. In order to be positively introduced and to reach the desired results, change must come from inside, from the ideas of the team's members. Accordingly, it is essential to care for the quality of daily interactions among stakeholders who are at the same time members of the group. Both technical and managerial tools are good. They will only be successful if the action and behaviour of the group members are appreciated for their interests.

9.4.2 Building a culture of management for positive results

The level of cohesion for a group depends on the degree of its attractiveness. People feel enticed when they feel they will benefit in the group's activities and its mode of organization. In order to attract more people and increase more interests, groups and organizations have to clearly define

their objectives and clarify modalities of participation. The tasks of each member must be well defined. This must also apply for role distribution, which remains a good way to induce an excellent and blameless leadership style. Regarding Jabana group and given the weight of the problems experienced by ex-combatants from inside their cooperative and how this affected the individual and the group levels, a good number of participants in unstructured and workshops expressed the need to turn the page and for change. For them, this is a way to reconcile and urgently focus on results. As a result, the findings showed the necessity of integrative approaches in order to rebuild a cooperative that focuses on monitoring the achievement of expected results. Besides, 15 out of 34 participants insisted that

“Any management based on the results is very much advantageous for us. It will promote our group’s values of cohesion. In other words, this requires each of us to manage the group for better production. We have to willingly participate, to be transparent, to be accountable and to share any information that is beneficial to the whole team. If we make this a way of life, certainly we will be highly motivated and so we can deeply engage in all aspects of our cooperative existence.”

In fact for Jabana cooperative, managing for better results encompasses an integrative aspect. Participation infers that all cooperative partners are involved in defining the results to be obtained in a fixed time period. Participation helps to harmonize the expectations of each and every member of the group. This cannot be achieved if there is no clearness and precision in reporting the results. This is easily facilitated by all the proper classification of probable outcomes and statistics as well as the creation of a framework for supervising the outcomes of the cooperative members as they all share responsibility for achieving results. By enhancing organizational capability and effectiveness, the team’s accountability strengthens and managers become charged at all levels with wider tasks.

Jabana group is intended to create jobs and revenue to its members in order to prompt their reintegration and development. Indeed, cooperatives can be either a profit or non-profit organisation, but in both cases the objective remains the same, that is to make profit. However, the difference lies in the way this surplus is handled. Based on the aim of the group, 20 out of 34 participants in FGDs confirmed that

“After disbursement of dividends on shares and interest on loans, the remaining amount of money is shared among members at the discretion of the directors. This is often done in proportion to the business operations that they have made with the cooperative along the year.”

In the case of non-profit cooperatives, the excess is not distributed to members and it must be returned to the general reserve of the cooperative. McLeod (2006:1) states that the cooperative may utilize these funds to develop services to its members. Furthermore, it can distribute them to other cooperatives, non-profit or give them to charity. One experimented RDRC official in cooperatives stated that

“This is a cooperative that needs to reshuffle, it needs total re-organization. No one knows where its funds have gone and how they have been used. Jabana is not the only cooperative with such problems, here there are many others kinds that belonging to other ex-combatants of this country.”

The Jabana cooperatives aim to provide work and help its members to reach a point at which ex-combatants can sustain themselves. This can only be achieved if the cooperative engages in profound change. The Jabana cooperatives constitution outlines the statutes and the structure of the cooperative (the general assembly, the board of directors and the supervisory committee). The latter are defined so that the cooperative can obtain an official recognition and then carry out its activities in a legal way (Introduction, Law N° 50/2007 OF 18/09/2007).

The starting point for cohesion within the Jabana cooperative was ensuring that participants identify and understand the main components of cohesion and the association between cohesion and the group efficiency. Cohesion must be rooted in the values and principles that promote proper functioning of the group. On this issue, participants in workshops and FGDs argued that

“Our team is easily comparable to a shell that holds its associates. Its meaning is deep and we must comprehend this as a real conveyer of reciprocal wants among all of us as team members. We want cohesion between both the individual and the group. This is simply to say the team needs complementarily between the two social entities.”

The individual has needs and aspirations they express through interactions within the group and must be incorporated. For them, becoming an active member of a group gives them strength.

This increases members' motivation and their performance solidarity toward other group members. This in turn cements cohesion and improves the functioning of cooperatives.

9.5 Expectations on performance indicators

For a group to be successful, it requires its members to be dynamic and participate in every activity that is organised. For instance the group of Jabana has statutes that are well defined with clear objectives but in an unstructured interview, participants declared that

“We are of course members of this cooperative but we do not know even one objective or a single article that guides our organization.”

The statutes provide a clear orientation of the group existence and organization. They also determine group's objectives and responsibilities of each member. This proves that members are not aware of the statute which has contributed to the demobilization of almost the entire group.

Insufficient meeting attendance and lack of communication were also raised by participants as another important challenge. Each team member should overcome this to show their strong loyalty to contributing to change and success for the cooperative's welfare. As it is outlined above, the meeting attendance not only reflects commitment but it also helps all members keep regularly updated about their group progress.

Communication comprises two major components both external and internal communications. The latter refers to constructive exchange of information between group leaders or members. Good communication prevents conflicts, encourages participation and motivation. The group realized the necessity of being more proactive in terms of communication in order to share information internally and externally with similar groups and organizations as information is an inevitable factor of success in business practices. External communication deals with how the organization keeps contact with other associations that work in the same area or even those from abroad. Participants in FGDs and in workshops emphasized that

“Lack of communication also contributes a lot in hindering our association's growth. If each of us is concerned with communication, the leaders should also be concerned. They have to be always connected to other communities, stakeholders, banks, local authorities and NGOs. Leaders are supposed to be the eyes and ears of the group.”

Participants deplored that their opportunities for training are very limited whereas members of similar cooperatives held by civilians attend training regularly. In fact many NGOs and even the FPSR organize or sponsor regular training. The latter's aim is to target small organizations that operate at the grassroots level. These comprise cooperatives and associations of women, cooperatives of farmers, youth associations, etc. Obviously the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana was limiting itself to training organized by the RDRC.

This study allowed participants to notice that when need for change is expressed and unanimously decided by all members of the group, the outcome is absolutely positive. In fact, failure to conduct desired change occurs when the members of a group do not participate in the process. Undoubtedly, success of the process of change undertaken by the group of Jabana was the consequence of ownership of the process. Essentially, before any action is taken the entire group must identify and discuss the need, explore ways and directions, and the role of each member in that process.

Participation is seen as the core value for the group's existence as it promotes democracy. The absence of democratic leadership has hindered their cooperative to internal division and finally to disintegrate. Based on these research outcomes, without transparent democracy, members cannot have right to equal say and consideration in the team. Lack of communication, transparency and democracy inside an organization will foster suspicion and distrust, which bears awful consequences.

9.6 A project

Leadership is a process by which a person influences skilfully the activities of an individual or a whole group with the aim of achieving a shared goal or purpose. This is one of the mechanisms that helped the Jabana group revitalize their cooperative. According to participants in different FGDs, interviews and workshops, in the few past years, the cooperative leaders were behaving as people with particular status. Leaders were distant from members avoiding take care of participants.

This study assisted the Jabana group in making the necessary positive changes with their activities within the group and members are now happier with the cooperative. We had to meet members who had been discouraged by the different problems within the group and we led a process of discussing what was going wrong in the team. Recognising and diagnosing

challenges within the group encouraged members to return to the group. The suggestions we gave are largely developed in the suggestion part of the conclusion (section 12.4). Members have learnt and implemented a leadership that focuses on the work which needed to be done. It included a leadership concerned with the democratic organization of the group which pays attention to all members. There are many testimonies given by participants what their cooperative is undergoing as a result of the intervention and the different opinions that were developed during the different workshops organized. Below is the testimony of some participants who participated in a workshop

“...With your presence here, things are changing. For the moment, we feel and understand the meaning of being a member of Jabana cooperative. We are members with full rights and we are listened to, we are considered and now we can participate effectively to the life of the cooperative.”

Changes began with a change in mind-set, in behaviour and in cooperative actions. Unless enforced, few people will accept to commit themselves to businesses for which they do not clearly understand. It is through the mind-set change that individuals accept and support change initiatives. In the light of this assumption, participants assessed deeply the role of the leadership in teambuilding and cooperative development. After this crucial exercise, participants felt and expressed the need to review their team by electing new leadership.

I observed during the research that good leadership contributes to team building which in turn assists in helping everyone to feel integrated and encouraging them to take part in the group development. This is a leadership focused on fostering cooperative's cohesion and its organization. In this way it focuses on all members so that each one feels heard and motivated. Another particular aspect that is linked to leadership in Jabana is the distribution of tasks for the work to be done. Job distribution remains a good way to achieve the objectives of the cooperative but this is also a technique to ensure that team members are acquiring the culture of teamwork. This practice promotes the culture of unity, helps members to focus on their shared vision for meeting their goals by supporting each other for their better future.

It is important that both leaders and the Jabana cooperative must continuously focus on group cohesion and working together to achieve common objectives. Such connectivity of objectives aims at reaching the desired change and results. Participants in this research identified and started working under guidance on some fundamental principles which include leading by

example, knowing and using the resources of the group and communicating effectively by receiving and providing information. Leaders began to plan, monitor, coordinate and represent the group in full and in a democratic way. The leadership also began delegating and giving responsibility to members of the cooperative in order to share the leadership of the cooperative. After the above principles applied, it proved necessary to evaluate the project's performance and results that had been achieved enabling the Jabana cooperative to help its members to learn from past experiences. Finally, they should seek, and accept recommendations from its members as a way of creating a stronger united cooperative.

Experience showed that good administrative practices led to good governance and strengthened cohesion among members. The ex-combatants committed to meet frequently in order to reach the desired changes within their cooperative agreeing to hold a general meeting once a month. This was an important step for improving the cooperative's management given that in the past, everybody showed less interest in these meetings. Prior to this discussion meetings had always began when urgent issues needed to be discussed and not as a matter of course. There was never a fixed meeting time or an agenda with only a few members being informed. General meetings were almost ignored with sometimes, a year going by without having held a single meeting. This prompted absenteeism, criticism and increased lack of commitment to the cooperative's existence.

Some participants in the FGDs revealed that they had become more interested in the frequent meetings that were organized, despite their experience of meetings being boring. Once general meetings started they became progressively stimulated and involved, fully participating.. This was confirmed by participants in workshops.

“Most of us are very motivated to come to meetings because we are granted now equal consideration. We also find that we are given equal opportunity to share ideas. We lost a lot of things in the past and that now, we are gaining via attendance. This is very beneficial to the progress of our cooperative. We have even noticed individual benefits as we learn a lot through such meetings.”

Regular meetings in Jabana cooperative were significant as they allowed the group members to rebuild positive interactions within the group. The people in charge of the cooperative's administration could report the progress and challenges while other members could contribute with ideas. They provided other forms of practical support such as voluntary participation in

various activities for the cooperative development. The research highlights how important work is for group efficiency since individuals tend to specialize in tasks and roles according to their abilities or motivations. The role is an organized pattern of conduct an individual holds in an interactional group. Different roles exist within the group, some focus on carrying out tasks, maintaining cohesion and others with satisfying individual needs. The group's force is not valued in terms of individual capabilities but their merit is rather the combination of personal means and abilities in a complementary way.

As the cooperative moved away from inactivity, progress slowed. Participants were impatient with the pace of justice and equality which succeeded through respect and equal consideration. This depicts how collaboration strengthens the feeling of consideration and mutual trust among the group members.

The research also found that Jabana group shifted people from the positions they held to help the cooperative function properly. This allowed the members to strengthen their commitment toward group activities. Besides, it promoted participation and discouraged the grip of the cooperative by a group of individuals who had mismanaged the cooperative, which culminated into its near destruction. In a FGDs, more than half of participants were convinced that

“If people change posts in turn, this can help the group to progress. This gives chance to everyone to show what they can and it also shows that people are considered equally. In this way, the cooperative can build and not stagnate.”

In addition, participating in agenda setting and meetings schedule of the General Assembly and other important meetings are not only the right but also the responsibility of all members. The decision was specific about participation mechanisms and it was integrated in the text of internal regulations. Before this research project was initiated, all important meetings of the cooperative were convened by the executive committee. The other members were passive. This generated consequences such as endless disputes and monopoly in decision-making. Given the background of members and the problems the cooperative has faced, participants retained three elements which should start guiding the group organization on daily basis. These 3 guiding principles for the organization of the group are leadership, contributions, and activity recording.

Concerning the new organization, participants opted for three positions in the executive management team comprising the president, the secretary and the treasurer. Prior to this

decision, the group organization had six positions that were occupied respectively by the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and two advisers. The management team was redefined as the vital component for the group development and performance, having the responsibility of conception, implementation, supervision and evaluation of all projects. This helped to simplify the structure, which is a way to increase participation and collective responsibility in the cooperative relying on the commitment and contribution of all its members. There was no tangible reason to overload a small group with a top heavy structure that generates weakness and lack of transparency.

The group agreed to designate by consensus three people who would assist the management team with the particular task of controlling and auditing the cooperative activities on a monthly basis. The team should also advise the management and prepare the audit report for the general assembly. It was decided that the audit committee should complete its duties two days before the general assembly meeting held on the last Saturday of every month. The audit committee's mandate would then end after the submission of the report with the general assembly then electing three new members to replace the outgoing team. The renewal of members provided to each group member the opportunity to participate to the cooperative management through the monthly audits. It replaced the previous committee of advisors which had existed since the creation of the group. This research highlighted two important problems that undermine this cooperative of Rwandan ex-combatants. Those problems lacked clear definition of responsibilities and absence of control or audit mechanisms. The negative side of this is that two or three single individuals are allowed to use the cooperative for their personal interests, which is not the case for the other members who are the majority. Before the election, the responsibilities of each function within the group was discussed and outlined as exposed in the table below.

Table 9. 9.The various responsibilities in the cooperative

ORGAN	RESPONSIBILITIES
1.General assembly	i) Holding monthly meetings. Performing decision-making and recommendations that guide projects and activities of the group. ii) Apointing members in the management committee and the audit committee. iii) Receive, examine and approve reports and making recommendations
2.Executive Committee	i) EEestablish the agenda and meeting schedule and report on the actions of the committee. ii)

	<p>suggests and gives advice to the group</p> <p>iii) carrying out the actions decided by the General Assembly and ensure that the status is respected and enforce discipline among the members of the group.</p> <p>i) Tdelegate tasks in order to encourage participation and to establish contacts with individuals, groups and institutions providing resources.</p> <p>ii) reporting on the evolution of the group, help solve the problems that members cannot resolve individually, to represent the group and to provide training for members.</p>
	<p>i) Oorganizing and debriefings and chairing meetings, summarize the discussion at the end of session.</p> <p>ii) encouraging participation of all members in discussions decisions and works and ensures the status of the group is respected.</p> <p>iii) ensuring that the secretary and treasurer do their job</p> <p>iv) ensuring that members pay their contributions as agreed, organize the work and distribute tasks.</p> <p>v) ensuring that the work plan is respect, maintain harmony in the group and Represent the group in meetings with other organizations.</p>
3.Secretary	<p>i) Preparing the agenda and minutes and to keep attendance lists at meetings;</p> <p>ii) keeping all record books of the group and read and to keep minutes of meetings;</p> <p>iii) managing correspondence (letters received and sent by the group); and</p> <p>iv) assisting the President of co-operative</p>
4.Treasurer	<p>i) T keep the financial accounts of the group and to keep record books;</p> <p>ii) reporting to members on expenditures and revenues and the available balance in the cash box or the bank;</p> <p>iii) establishing receipts for money deposited by members and to make available the money and other elements for the audit committee and group members who wish to witness the way audit is performed;</p> <p>iv) keeping the cash book and registers of purchases, sales and contributions and manage the use of savings fund of the group</p>
5.Audit committee	<p>i) To perform monthly controls and audits of the management committee and to give reports and recommendations to the general assembly</p>

Source: Author's survey data

The table 9.9 shows the redefining and enhancing functions in the Jabana group. The table presents different organs and their responsibilities. Among the departments include general assembly, executive committee, treasurer and audit committee.

The identification and the outline of the functions were considered by the group as central to attaining the cooperative goals. For that reason, each participant was requested to be committed to fulfilling the mission of the group which would help members to accomplish their tasks, especially urgent duties and require assistance and participation from other members. In addition to a collective commitment from all members, it was imperative to find members with skills. These members had to sacrifice themselves for the cooperative's development, particularly with focus on its main activities.

The cooperative would rely on volunteering and personal commitment since there was no money to pay salaries. On this issue, participants emphasized that persons to be elected for each of the above functions should behave in accordance with values such as commitment, honesty, patience, communication, the ability of keeping confidentiality of the group, be respectful, active and energetic, the ability of motivating other members and avoiding addiction to alcoholic drinks. Stewart (2004) believes as individual and group reputation that moves a group towards positive change and what participants in different groups expressed their support and positive expectations to the new team after new leaders had been elected and appointed in all above positions. This was a very important step towards rebuilding the group as this was the first free and fair election of leaders since the inception of the cooperative.

Before the initiation of this study, the members of Jabana were predominantly male. However the research contributed to highlight that the lack of women in the cooperative indicating that they were not represented in the different organs of the group. A woman was for example allowed to sit on the executive committee. The importance of their participation in decision-making had to be expressed by women's regular attendance to meetings so they could have access and participate in all responsibilities of the group.

On this point, more than a half of participants to workshops stated that

"We know women face many challenges to participate to the different activities in the group. They are always busy with household duties, take care of children and follow up

their education process. However, their participation to every group's activity is needed. They have constructive ideas and they can help in other activities to show their support and commitment. They do not come because men do not allow them to do so."

The majority of women in Jabana cooperative were often absent or passive, this made them lag behind when there were interests to share. In view of that, it was decided that they had to participate in different meetings and activities the cooperative organized. Women could work during weekends because that was when they have fewer duties. Another important resolution the group decided about women was for them to always be in attendance. This was to make sure that women were represented in the cooperative's governing organs. It is important to recall that the women who are components of the group of Jabana are not ex-combatants. They are rather mere civilian women who are either spouses or widows of ex-combatants.

9.6.1 Enhancing the cooperative identity

Group cohesion is the result of many factors that influence individuals to remain members of a group. In addition, cohesive groups are the ones that satisfy the needs of their members. Once their necessities wants are met, these members felt necessary to remain bound to those groups. One important social need a person can seek to satisfy as a group member is identity. During workshop sessions, some former combatants stressed that

"...and when we were still in service, we had personality and we were easily identifiable in different ways. Uniform, patrols, parades, etc. helped us to get social identity. Without even saying your name, people could recognise and respect you. But after demobilization, we felt abandoned as our identity was lost. The reason is that in our interactions with others, we had nothing to refer to for our personal presentation and value."

After being demobilised ex-combatants lost their jobs and important reference of social distinctiveness. So, by becoming members of cooperatives, they hoped to find a new source of satisfaction for their social needs and identity. It is a part of the self-concept that results from the awareness of belonging to a group, the value and the emotional significance attached to that membership. In one way or another, the cooperative must ensure that its members do not feel abandoned in order not to lose their self-confidence.

More than a half of the participants in FGDs stated that group or social categories can determine one's self esteem by providing a negative or positive self-concept to group members. In the case

of Jabana cooperative, image and self-esteem of the team must be enhanced. Those participants stated that

“...the sorts of group members should bear a positive connotation and if there are assessments, these must be shared by both team members (in-group) and activists of various teams (out-group). Indeed, the significance of social identity must depend on the evaluation of the groups that are implicated in the equivalent social distinctiveness.”

The above opinion implies a positive social identity as the result of favourable comparison between the in-group and out-group. If evaluation shows a gap in favouring the in-group, this gives a strong esteem and prestige to the group and its members. The opposite will be the case if judgment is negative for the in-group, this will lower the team's prestige. People like to acquire and maintain a positive social identity. However, if they discover that their social identity has become unsatisfactory, they leave the group and try to find a more valued team where they will hold their identity. At the beginning of this research I found that most members had left the Jabana cooperative. Once it began to improve members began to return to the cooperative but they doubted their ability to restart and run it successfully. For these reasons, Jabana group should always seek ways to enhance their image and positive self-esteem for their members.

The redefining of the cooperative contributed to focusing on a common vision while concentrating on achieving group tasks which led to positive notes were observed under these values. For example, when there was error, the liability was not for a person but the whole group that had assumed the responsibility. In addition, group members were more willing to listen to each other, with more free expression of ideas and opinions. They seemed to understand the different issues with a satisfactory level of analysis, many of them asked to be evaluated by other members in order to improve.

Such improvement is a way of moving toward the group mission which fights poverty. The members believe that team work can help them overcome economic problems. Financial problems within the cooperative have led to the group recruiting new members who are financially stable. This allows the cooperative to benefit from both their experience and financial contribution. Conversely this can result in power imbalance in terms of decision-making. People do not have the same background and the same problems, their objectives will diverge. The consequence is that the powerful member may use the cooperative for personal interests. In the same vein, other members may feel isolated and discontent, which causes group

internal dissensions. In view of that, participants in unstructured interviews and workshop sessions noted that

“Any group needs members of different categories. If there is a uniform composition of revenue generating, the cooperative will not advance financially. The rich and the poor must unite though in most cases there will be misbalance in contribution. But this can only be achieved if all the members without exception are committed to the cooperative’s common interest.”

Individuals’ contribution to the cooperative was an important issue when the group was not running an income generating activity. The group had to start anew which explains why participants were encouraged to contribute. Each member was requested to contribute Rwf 2000 a month (approximately US\$ 3). The amount had to be received by the cooperative’s treasurer or paid into the cooperative bank account. The contributor was issued a receipt once he/she had contributed. People can contribute when they know their contributions will be easily identifiable and formally reported. Members could pay their dues uninterruptedly to the group until they saved 64, 000 Rwf, equivalent of US \$ 112. In addition to members’ contributions, some fundraising activities were organized although the amount fundraised was not enough.

Participants stressed the importance of regular and individual contribution. This was the unique financial means on which the group relied. In the same way, it increases participation, motivation, solidarity and accountability among the group members. The group referred to the past when contributions were not obligatory and this led to the disengagement of many members and the control of the cooperative falling into the hands of some individuals.

It was not easy for unemployed members as they were jobless and they were unable to pay their contributions. However this did not threaten the determination of the group as they proposed to work for the cooperative as a compensation of the required contribution. Group members appreciated this decision. Without financial resources, volunteers were needed for the cooperative to resume its activities. Initially there were a limited number of people who willingly expressed their availability to perform tasks that could cover the value of their contributions.

When cooperatives and associations started people hoped to reach new initiatives. The cooperatives would seek volunteers who could perform urgent tasks as their organizational resources were still limited. Of course, it is important to note that not only such arrangement depends largely on the availability of activities within the group but also on the capability of the individuals who must carry those activities out. A cooperative cannot rely on such an arrangement for a long period. The arrangement should be planned on a short period so that unpredictable problems are avoided.

Recording information in registries regularly and correctly is an important indicator of good organization and management. A group which fails to record its activities expresses its incapacity to function efficiently and is unable to move towards its goals. Data recording helps managers to remember what they have done and what they have planned in the future. Members are therefore able to take note of their activities. Each member of the management committee is required to have a recording book that he/she updates daily, weekly, monthly or annually whichever the case. The secretary of the group holds a notebook in which different meetings' minutes are recorded and another file containing all the correspondences of the group. The correspondences include the letters sent out and those received, both being arranged chronologically.

9.6.2 Expectations of participants vis-a-vis income generating project in Jabana

In deciding to recognise their cooperative, expectations of ex-combatants were to live good life ("*Kubaho neza*"), but this requires indicators ("*Ibipimo*"). In fact, well-being is living a happy life built on various factors whose aim it is to satisfy human basic needs. Indeed, this was an important step toward the outline of their expectations before reorganising the cooperative and starting an income generating project. The majority of participants acknowledged that satisfaction of basic needs goes beyond food, water and clothes for example. Participants were precise on the issue and they categorised both physical and non-physical needs. They include food, drink, shelter, warmth and sleep, protection, security and stability, family, affection, relationships, achievement, status, responsibility, reputation (esteem needs), personal growth and fulfilment also contributed to living a happy life.

In order to satisfy human needs and the capacity of each person to stay alive participants insisted that those indicators should include food security, health, education, clothing, housing,

household equipment, and community integration. Each indicator was specified as outlined below.

Income

To reach income of Frw 120,000 (approximately US \$ 200), considered enough for the satisfaction of basic needs and to increase it progressively in order to be able to save something every month.

Food self-sufficiency

To have three meals a day throughout the year for all household dependents, to have throughout the year a sufficient stock (beans, potatoes, maize, rice, whatsoever) so not every day to run out of food, to have food varied so as not to be forced to eat the same thing (including meat, vegetables, and fruits), at all times have the means to buy the condiments to prepare sauces and access at any time to an improved water source (drinking water) close to home.

Health

Afford to pay for medical consultation, treatment and hospitalization, drugs, have means to evacuate a patient to a health centre, have medical insurance and at least each household member to sleep in a bed with impregnated mosquito net.

Education

Having all children of school age enrolled in school, afford to pay for uniforms for each child, have financial means to pay school fees, pay all contributions required by the school, purchase school materials such as notebooks, books, slates, pens, pencils, erasers and pay a tutor for the children.

Clothing

Have a pair of clothes in good conditions for oneself and each dependent, have (and each dependent) two pairs of shoes in good conditions, possesses an iron and be able to buy sufficient toilet soaps and laundry soap for each week.

Relationships with other community members

Neighbours and members of their households to come to a home without problems, lend and borrow household goods to neighbours without problems, have real friends to rely on in good and difficult times, belong to an association or any organized group other than the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana, participate in community work (Umuganda) which brings together all members of the village / town (Umudugudu) every last Saturday of the month and provide a monthly contribution for community policing at the level of village (Umudugudu)/town.

Housing and Equipment

Afford to have accommodation with enough space (rooms) for all dependents, live in a house equipped with toilets and bathrooms, have a kitchen in the house with enough equipment, a house with enough functional light bulb or an oil lamp, have enough beds with enough mattress and sheets for each household member, a house with a dining room with at least a medium table and 4 chairs and live in house with easy access to drinking water, primary school and health centre.

Depth assessment suggests that some expectations are less important than others though they can also be used to measure the reintegration for instance the areas of residence, tap water, light bulb, type of clothes, type of bed and mattress, among others. It is important to point out that taking into consideration every detailed aspect is not easy. The experience of Jabana shows that the choice and agreement on reintegration indicators in each aspect of existence was difficult.

9.6.3 An income generating project in Jabana

A project is a set of activities limited to time and space. These activities help to achieve a development goal although they require human and financial resources. Micro-projects are also named "self-help" initiatives, something that people can organise in order to improve their own lives. In the context of Jabana cooperative, this is a group of former combatants who were either demobilized from RDF or FDLR combatants who came from the DRC. The group also comprises widows of former combatants. These cooperative members are working together in order to improve their own living conditions and those of their dependents.

In the above mentioned group, the new initiative consists of a micro project that is merely limited to the needs in human resources and equipment. As highlighted by this study, ex-combatants face various factors that limit them in conducting a pre-project assessment. The

cooperative is predominantly formed by people with lower education level. In addition, results show that the members who have had opportunities to attend vocational trainings are very few.

Interviews in unstructured interviews accepted that

“Many of us have been trained on entrepreneurship but we found it difficult to materialize the learned knowledge and skills. So we end up quitting our initial reintegration purpose and step in other unintended income-generating activities such as being hired as security guards, for instance...”

The statement of the above respondents indicates that the RDRC approach is simply to provide training. The consequence is that the majority of ex-combatants are left behind. The approach of training trainers is not followed by mechanisms that can help to ensure the transmission of competence to the rest of the cooperative members. Another respondent stated that even those who get the training are never told about how cohesion influences the success of projects initiated by former soldiers.

In the light of the above arguments the lack of training infers that any project initiated without serious preparation cannot meet envisaged goals and may not have a long-term impact. In fact, without project preparation, there is precipitation in the formation of cooperative and this is what happened to ex-combatants. They launched their cooperative without prior analysis of feasibility and other factors that can help to assess anticipatively the project success.

Almost all participants to FGDs, unstructured interviews and workshops sessions said that

“Just after demobilization, we went to cantonment and when we left there, the RDRC told us to start cooperatives. We set up hurriedly and blindly cooperatives thinking that we would get financial assistance or find donors, which was not true. This is the reason why we can't trust the RDRC, it does not help us enough.”

In order to avoid the same mistake before launching a project, a meticulous assessment of requirements which can help members to have clear indication in advance that their time and money will be spent on a profitable generating activity. The first step was to identify the advantages and challenges of undertaking any cooperative project. The group's deliberations are summarized in the following table.

Table 9. 10The identified advantages and challenges of the project

Advantages	Challenges
As a group, work will continue even when circumstances will prevent a member from participating.	Due to differences in character, skills and experience making decisions in groups will require more time.
In case of urgent work, tasks will be divided among members because many hands make work easier and help to save money and time	It can be more difficult to define and to distribute roles and responsibilities among group members
Members will bring together their knowledge and skills and will learn from each other	People do not feel equally responsible that is to say collective responsibility may result in absence of individual responsibility.
The group makes easier access to loans, labour, land, etc.	While each member would like to get a maximum profit from a common project, some members will find excuses to contribute little time and the money
As an organized group it will be easy to meet development agents in order to get advices and share experience.	
The group will benefit from the participation of women and women will thereby be rewarded by the respect and esteem.	The distribution of profits in proportion to the work and contributions can be problematic and lead to serious internal problems

Source: Author's survey data

Self-reliance is an outcome of a well-constructed process of human capital empowerment. Economic empowerment, that premises social re-integration, is a process that evolves from the individuals' drive to make them count economically. Upon exhausting all alternatives of income-generation, a quarrying business was adopted as the most valuable economic activity that suited better their economic goals in the cooperative framework.

Post-conflict countries have a range of needs of interventions in the reconstruction efforts. These efforts require immediate, medium and long term interventions. The DDR process require the immediate restoration of security which requires demobilization in the both the regular army and armed groups. Demobilized combatants need to be economically and socially re-integrated

in their local communities. Therefore governments through demobilization commissions or programmes ensure that ex-combatants are re-integrated as matter of governments' responsibility or as a mandate to implement peace agreements concluded between governments and rebel forces.

In the specific case of this research, former RDF soldiers and former members of armed groups from DRC all based in Jabana (Kigali City) have been participants to this research which is by nature an action research aiming most importantly on participation outputs oriented to learning.

9.6.4 Project identification

Before embarking on project implementation, the members of Jabana cooperative were determined to succeed in their income-generation business. Therefore, ex-combatants have managed to research factors of success that are available in and around their neighbourhood. The latter step averted potential threats that would have thwarted the materialization of surveyed opportunities in Jabana.

In the light of researching (mapping out) income-generation opportunities for the Jabana ex-combatants group, an outstanding business opportunity was identified after considering the following parameters:

9.6.5 Consideration of the basic economic theory of supply and demand (consumer-market and product to be supplied)

In recent years, the construction industry in Rwanda has been steadily booming in economic terms. It is offering a viable opportunity for related industries such as quarrying. By the same token, 'market assessment' by the cooperative is underpinned by the following aspects: What products or services do people need in the sector of Jabana? Who sells these products or services in the sector? What is the selling price?

9.6.7 Mapping out project opportunities and feasibility

Before starting income-generating activities, the members of the Jabana Cooperative have taken time to survey different business opportunities in different sectors of development in Jabana as outlined below by table 9.11.

Table 9. 11.Mapping out income generating activities in Jabana

Type	Potential Sub-Project	Examples
Agricultural Activities		
Traditional Crops	Production of basic traditional crops (domestic consumption)	Subsistence agriculture- Maize, beans, sorghum, bananas, cassava, Irish potatoes, among others. (With surplus for sale to market).
	Improved production in higher lands or in swampy areas with market surplus.	Fertilizers (Organic/and/or inorganic) and other agricultural chemical products used in agricultural production (such as Irish potatoes, fruit, market gardening crops whatsoever).
	Production of non-traditional crops.	Production of fruit – For example passion fruit, oranges, mushrooms and other initiatives in the diversification of agriculture.
	Production of young tree seedlings or any other materials- For example, cuttings , orchard, or ornamental plants etc	Establishment of seed beds, for trees and flowers, woodlots, forest or agro-forestry and other tree-based specialty initiatives.
Livestock Keeping	Increase the production of local livestock.	Traditional livestock keeping – for instance cows, goats, pigs, chicken etc (kept on the basis of community grazing).
	Improvement of the production of livestock.	Installation of farm ranches relatively larger for instance cows, goats, etc. Installation of fences, improvement of traditional stock, for example dairy cows, poultry or the production of pork and other stock improvements as well as other diversification initiatives.
Fisheries	Capture fishing (Rivers, lakes, or fish pond/farming).	Rehabilitation or construction of fish pond for fish farming, fishing projects in rivers or lakes, for instance, installation of village fisheries, fish processing, fish drying among others.
Processing of Agricultural and Animal Products	Primary processing of agricultural and animal products as well as farm produce.	Maize or millet milling, oil production, processing of fruit, processing of hides and skins. Operation of slaughter houses, butcheries, processing of milk products, packaging of food products among others.

Processing of Wood Products	Processing of trees and timber	Production of wood/tree based such as construction wood, charcoal, firewood whatsoever.
Marketing of Agricultural Products	Marketing of food products	Initiatives in marketing agricultural products, construction of market stalls, storage facilities for products whatsoever.
Non Agricultural (Off Farm) Income Generating Activities.		
Brick Making	Production of materials for the construction industry such as bricks and tiles.	Installation of individual or collective equipment for the making of burnt or un-burnt bricks and/or tiles. Construction storage facilities for storing and marketing of these materials.
Furniture Making	Production of furniture for example, wooden or metallic.	Installation of carpentry workshops operated by individuals or in groups to make wooden or metallic furniture. Establish welding shops for the making of metallic equipment- such as doors and windows.
Car Repair and Washing	Automobile vehicle repair services.	Establish workshops/garages for vehicle repair services by individuals or in cooperative associations.
	Car washing services.	Establish car washing bays for automatic car washing centers or the use of other water sources.
Extraction	Extraction or the construction industry.	Carry out operations for the extraction of minerals or construction materials, for example gold, stones, gravel, sand, and lime among others.
Collection and Treatment of Solid Waste	Operations for the removal of waste (household or industrial)	Establishment of association for the collection and disposal of urban and semi-urban waste. Creation of small units for the recycling of waste.
Trade and Commerce	General trade in assorted merchandise on markets or in other services elsewhere.	Involvement of ex-combatants in a wide range of trading and marketing as well as distribution enterprises and services, vending and exchange.
Transport Services.	Supply of transport services.	Creation of transport services; for example, bicycle transport, motor cycle transport and automobile


		transport.
Security Services.	Supply of security services.	Setting up associations for supplying security services (guarding among others).
Land/Plot.	To acquire plots of land for the family or for associations.	Provide security for acquired premises- for example, those allocated by purchase, rent, or squatters whatsoever. Securing land as cooperatives/associations for income –generating activities.
Habitat	Shelter/secure house for the family.	Construct houses for families. Construct shelter in grouped settlement agglomerations.

Source: Author's survey data

Table 9.11 above demonstrates the mapping out income generating activities in Jabana. Income generating activities include traditional crops, car repair and washing, fisheries, collection and treatment of solid waste and habitat among others.

Farming, quarrying, and service-based businesses such as public transportation, motorcycle taxi were identified by the majority of participants as profitable activities in Jabana. In the end, quarrying was unanimously selected by all participants as a feasible for the group as outlined by Fig 9.1

Figure 9. 1: The most profitable income generating projects across Jabana



Source: Author's survey data

Figure 9.1: shows the most profitable income generating projects across Jabana including dairy cows, bar-restaurant, fishing dam, motorbike taxi, quarry project and public transportation mini-bus. Once all business opportunities had been assessed cooperative members selected the quarrying sector which seems to be cost-effective in terms of investment and exploitation but most importantly, the sector is prompted by the fast-growing construction sector in Kigali city and its suburbs.

Quarrying is profitable for ex-combatants and the wider local community as the project employs both ex-combatants and other civilians from the local community. This project is a self-help initiative because it is not a typical corporate organization. The cooperative has been created in order to improve the economic and social standards of its members. The cooperative members are from the RDF and former FDLR insurgents.

It has been discussed respectively in the fourth and fifth chapters that the Jabana group is predominantly formed by people with lower education level. Therefore, life-skills or professional training was necessary for them to successfully re-integrate their local community.

Respondents in unstructured interviews said that

“Yes, we have had professional training in the area of entrepreneurship. This is a general training program that is designed by RDRC. Nevertheless, most of us still need empowerment in turning learned entrepreneurial knowledge into practice.”

In addition, other participants to FGDs and members of the cooperative asserted that:

“RDRC has done a great job in providing us ex-combatants with reintegration package, training in entrepreneurship, income-generation opportunities, linking and mainstreaming our reintegration within the broader national community development policies. We appreciate the commission for that! However, there is still a need for individualized follow-up.”

The RDRC approach to ex-combatants reintegration is collectivized. To that challenge, RDRC needs to take the approach of keeping individualized ex-combatant's track from the exit of the demobilization camp up to the stage of income-generation in their communities. Monitoring and

Evaluation mechanisms would involve individualized personal data record that include performance indicators, site visits by RDRC's technical teams to areas where ex-combatants are running their business from.

9.6.8 Cooperative partners

In addition to investment opportunity as assessed above, members also surveyed potential partners in their business. Survey partners based on the role they may play in the implementation of the cooperative's goal in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary level partners.

Primary level partners are those whose support is irreplaceable. Their indispensability lies in the cooperative insistence that business cannot materialize without local population's consumption, taking part in the cooperative's activities and their general support. In case the cooperative is unaccommodated by the local population, the cooperative cannot exist. The second in line among primary partners is RDRC which is expected closely to follow up how ex-combatants perform in their income-generation project after they have received training in entrepreneurship. The RDRC has the *droit de regard* on the cooperative albeit the latter organization has its independence in their action. However at any time, RDRC may come to the end of its mandate but the cooperative ought to carry forward its activities in the years to come. The third entity in the primary level of partners is the Jabana Local Public Administration Institutions (The Office of Jabana). Its primacy status in the partnership with the cooperative is due to the aspect of legality and right to operate within the sector that falls into the sector's authority.

Secondary level partners are those institutions the cooperative may rely on in reaching out to external resources such as credits from banks and micro-finance, learning best-practices from peer cooperatives either formed by civilians or ex-combatants.

Tertiary level partners are those national and international institutions that may be willing to contribute to the empowerment of the cooperative in terms of finances, material resources and training opportunities.

9.6.9 Cost of investment and profitability

The quarrying business the cooperative was the cost-effective because they have invested a modest capital from which they expected high financial returns.

Leasing quarrying field is estimated to be last for one to two years but with an array of opportunities of accessing other fields that can be leased for the same business for longer. Besides the quarrying income-generation, ex-combatants considered to own delivery resources such as tracks and modernizing the business. Nevertheless, possibilities remain open towards other types of business depending on anticipated gains and sustainability that the new sector would offer to members of the Jabana ex-combatants.

The table below provides an outlook of a project planning that creates room for profitability, growth, reflection of each member's wishes and expectations (in a realistic perspective) and measures of mitigating any possibility of cooperative bankruptcy.

Table 9. 12. The operationalization of the quarry project

Project Activity	Indicator of achievement	Activity Output
Exploration phase of the quarrying site	Quality and quantity of stones, sand and gravel is ascertained by hired experts. Safety and health measures are ensured before extraction phase	Report of site assessment by cooperative members is available.
Site leasing for 3 years	3 year-leasing permit secured by the cooperative	Site exploitation permit is secured
Mobilization of needed resources in quarrying activities	Human resources and material resources	Quarrying resources readily available at the site
Production phase	daily sells of quarry products (stones, gravel and sand)	Stones, gravel and sand are loaded from the site and delivered to customers
Equitable sharing of cooperative shares (following the principle of 1 person 1 share); Increment of cooperative investment capital (contribution stems from individuals' interests)	Clauses of the cooperative statutes clearing stipulating the principle of capital increment and interest sharing at the end of every month	Equitable sharing of project returns and equal amount subscribed for capital increment at the end of the year are ensured.

Source: Author's survey data

From table 9.12 above, it is indicated that operationalization of the quarry project involves project activity, indicator of achievement and activity output. This means for any activity output to be effective and efficient, the prior operations must be considered.

The profitability of Jabana project is determined by the quantity of resources (stones, gravel and sand) collected on a daily basis. The trend of profitability can grow for example if the project can get three trucks of stones, sand and gravel per day making a total average revenue of Frws 103,320 Frws (US-\$164) per day for all the items available on the site (stones, gravel, and sand).

9.6.10 Financial records

In order to achieve their profitability goals, cooperative members are expected to be acquainted with some basic skills in financial analysis, at least at the rudimentary level of accounting (debit and credit, buying, selling and interest/profit). For that reason the group has evaluated their project's profitability. Ex-combatants have therefore been able to make good use of transactions on papers but also they could assess the patterns of the industry they are working in, for instance, knowing the fluctuation of prices in the construction domain in order to avoid lagging behind and more importantly, avoiding business bankruptcy. Analysing their threats and opportunities has helped them to stay in the course of business, either taking comparative or competitive advantages amongst other operators in quarry business. Furthermore, the fact of knowing or simply being kept abreast of market situation helps ex-combatants in setting realistic prices for their products.

It is important to emphasise on the significance of financial statements, based on historical accounting information, which reflects the transactions and other events that have affected the cooperative. Managers and other users of the firm's financial statements are interested in the future and use historical accounting data to help in predicting how the cooperative will fare in the future.

Jabana cooperative raised money by issuing debt, so the increases in borrowing represent cash inflows. The final line of the statement of cash flows combines the cash flows from these three activities to calculate the overall change in the cooperative's cash balance over the period of the statement.

9.6.11 Project monitoring and implementation

All the activities that the Jabana association has carried out must be monitored and implemented. One of the key resolutions taken for the project's effectiveness is to handle carefully the cooperative's budget. This was an obvious and big challenge for cooperatives like Jabana as it had little or no budget experience. Consequently, it was important for the cooperative's members to know how to run and supervise their financial resources suitably in order to reach their goals.

9.6.12 Mobilization of starting capital

Jabana cooperative has no big budget. Therefore, the members are expected to meticulously manage and plan for their limited resources. This idea is also confirmed by some participants' views:

"...it is fundamental that our budget reflects our wishes as cooperative members. This furthers the spirit of working together and strengthens ties between us members. And thanks to such practice, we can ascertain that our cooperative can last for long."

The cooperative has worked to promote its internal policies premising a transparent management, profitability and equitable sharing of cooperative dividends. Internal best-practices for instance include a six month appointment of three members of the association whose term is six months. Furthermore, each member of the cooperative is expected to be part of the internal auditing team. Such practice provides the cooperative with added value because, among other things, audit reports are scrutinized by banks or micro-finances' credit boards. Being able to reach out to external resources is the utmost opportunity for the cooperative growth.

Ex-combatants have managed to mobilize their starting capital of which 50 US\$ was contributed by each of the 34 members. The cooperative's capital was 1700 US\$ in addition to a loan amount of 2037. 3 US\$ granted by Amasezerano Micricrofinace as loan. According to the cooperative's statutes, its members have equitable shares, meaning 1 person 1 share.

Table 9. 13. (A, B, C) The operational plan of the new project

A. Overview of capital cost of the new project

Designation	Quantity	U.P (USD)	T.P (USD)
1. Fixed assets			
- Land to operate (career area 2.4 Ha)	1	848.8	848.8
- Toilet	1	127.3	127.3
Total			976.1
2. Equipment and furniture.			
- Office table	1	16.9	16.9
- Office chairs	4	11.8	47.5
- Seat	3	25.4	76.4
- Bicycle	2	67	134
- Wheelbarrow	5	25.4	127
- Spade	10	16.9	169.7
- Hoe	10	8.1	81
- Pick	10	5.09	50.9
- Machetes	5	2.5	12.5
- Hammers	4	12.4	49.6
- Crowbar	10	13.5	135
- Small pieces of crowbars	10	6.7	67.9
Total			976
3. Materials			
- Sand (m ³)	6 m ³	50.9	305.6
- Gravel (m ³)	2 m ³	84.8	169.7
- Stone (m ³)	7 m ³	67.9	475.3
Total			950.6
4. Other expenses			
- Stock rent	12	5.09	61.1
- Office rent	12	6.7	81.4
- Salaries of workers	12	50.9	610.8
- Guards salaries	2	16.9	33.9

- Communication fees	3	8.1	2403
- Transport fees	3	2.5	7.5
- Care costs.	15	4.2	63.6
- Other office equipment	-	-	37.3
Total			915.9
TOTAL GENERAL			3567.7
UNEXPECTED 5%			178.3
Total cost of the project			3746.1

Source: Author's survey data

The above table 9.13 shows the overall capital of the new project including assets, equipment and furniture and other unforeseen expenses. Such expenses on resources like fixed asset, equipment and furniture, materials and others like office rent, salaries of workers and transport costs whatsoever.

B. Depreciation table

Table 9. 14.The operationalization of the quarry project

Designation	Quantit y	Price USD	Life time (year)	Annual depreciation cost (USD)
Office table	1	16.9	5	33.8
Office chairs	4	47.5	5	95
Bench	3	76.4	5	152.8
Bicycle	2	135.8	4	33.8
Wheelbarrow	5	63.6	3	21.2
Spade	10	105.9	3	35.3
Hoe	10	84.6	3	28.2
Pick	10	50.9	3	16.9
Machetes	5	12.7	3	4.2
Hammers	4	49.9	5	9.9
Crowbar	8	108.6	5	21.7
Small pieces of crowbars	8	54.3	5	10.8
Total		807.1		466.6

Source: Author's survey data

Table 9.14 above, demonstrates a depreciation table with designation, quantity, price (USD), lifetime (annually) and annual depreciation cost (USD). The annual depreciation rate of materials is fixed at 20% while for furniture supported by metal parts it varies from 20% to 33%.

9.6.12 Environment protection measures of the quarry site

Mitigation measures identified and implemented by participants in order to avoid negative environment impacts on the quarry site correspond to the activities below:

- Restricting the area access to workers and trucks only;
- Restoration of the quarry site at the end of the project;
- Protection of the area against erosion by draining canals;
- Avoiding soil excavation during the rainy season;
- Obligatory wearing of helmets, boots and closed shoes by workers;
- Frequently powering water in the area in order to contain both sand and dust;
- Plant trees around the area in order to compensate fallen trees.

9.7 Summary

The chapter presents the actions undertaken upon entering the ex-combatants' organization. When I entered the Jabana cooperative ex-combatants were disorganized, scattered and did not have a common interest and vision for their economic and social reintegration through the cooperative. The cooperative (as it is RDRC's expectation) is the way they believe their reintegration will take place. Important actions I have taken to redress (in a fashion) was to reconnect the members, ensured that members have a common purpose and interest in the cooperative as their opportunity to be re-integrated economically and socially in their local community and the wider Rwandan society.

After research participants had oriented their interest to a collective project that could help them to generate financial income; a quarry project was selected after sessions of identifying locally available opportunities for income-generation. My contribution in the cooperative has generally been of two ways, establishing a structural organization that includes the setting of legal statutes that made members of the cooperative bound by the terms of the statute and more importantly setting the financial income they expected from the common good of working together in the

cooperative. Another important input from the research was to contribute in bringing about a horizontal relation between members as opposed to their former power imbalance that could be taken as the main cause of their organization falling into shambles.

What I learned from research participants is that having common interests in a cooperative setting like theirs, concurs to a quick transcendence of old differences. It is worth noting that the Jabana ex-combatants group cooperative is made of former belligerent forces. Additionally, having interacted frequently with research participants, I came to terms that every cooperative member (in different characters, backgrounds, knowledge and skills) is an asset

CHAPTER TEN: THE OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION

10.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines outputs and outcomes resulting from chapter ten on the reintegration project. Outputs are the immediate results of the project whereas outcomes are results yielded by the project in both the medium and long term time frame. The chapter's specific objective aims at assessing outputs and outcomes of the reintegration project amongst the ex-combatants of Jabana. The study's overall aim was to contribute to knowledge in relation to the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Its specific objectives are;

- 1.To critically review the relevant literature, including the importance of successfully reintegrating ex-combatants in order to provide a foundation for sustainable peace.
- 2.To assess the levels of reintegration achieved by one reintegration project (an agricultural cooperative) in Rwanda, including the social and economic situations of households and the performance of the cooperative.
- 3.Using an action research approach, to plan, implement and evaluate an intervention designed to enhance the project's contribution to social and economic reintegration.

10.2 Economic output

A. Reimbursement of initial loan

- Amount received: 2037.3 USD
- Loan interest rate : 16%
- Reimbursement Period: 12 months

Table 10. 1The reimbursement of initial loan

Period	Loan amount (USD)	Reimbursement USD	Interests USD	Total USD
1	2037.3	169.7	12.2	185
2	1867.5	169.7	14	183.7
3	1697.7	169.7	12.7	182.5
4	1228	169.7	11.4	181.2
5	1358.2	169.7	10.1	179.9
6	1188.4	169.7	8.9	178.6
7	1018.6	169.7	7.6	177.4
8	848.8	169.7	6.3	176.1
9	679.1	169.7	4.2	174
10	509.3	169.7	2.9	172.7
11	339.5	169.7	1.6	171.4
12	169.7	169.7	0.4	170.2
No. of months 12	12942.1	2036.4	92.3	2132.7

Source: Author's survey data

From table 10.1 it is indicated that reimbursement of initial loan includes the reimbursement period (12 months), total loan amount (12942.1), reimbursement (2036.4), loan interests (92.3) and total amount accrued (2132.7). Since the first project failed, the cooperative initiated a new project which required a new loan to strengthen and revitalize the cooperative. As outlined in the above table, a loan of 2037.3USD was regularly and completely reimbursed at an interest rate of 16%.

C. Account operations

Table 10. 2The quantity and value of products sold per year from 2010 to 2014

Designation	Quantity /year	Unit purchase cost (USD)	Unit Sale Price (USD)	Gross profit per unit (USD)	Annual total profits (USD)	Total profits of 5 years (USD)
Sand truck (m ³)	620 m ³	10.1	15.7	5.0	3473.6	
Gravel truck (m ³)	504 m ³	10.1	16.9	6.7	3422.7	
Stone truck (m ³)	940 m ³	10.1	15.2	5.0	4787.7	
Total					11684.2	
Year 2010						11684.2
Year 2011 (+10% of last year).	-	-	-	-	-	12852.6
Year 2012 (+14% of last year).	-	-	-	-	-	14652.0
Year 2013 (+18% of last year).	-	-	-	-	-	17289.3
Year 2014 (+23% of last year)						21265.8
Total profits of 5 years (RwF)	-	-	-	-	-	77743.9

Source: Author's survey data

From table 10.2 it is indicated quantity and value of products sold per year from 2010 to 2014. Since the first project failed, the cooperative initiated a new project which required a new loan to strengthen and revitalize the cooperative. As outlined in the above table, a loan of 2037.3USD was regularly and completely reimbursed at an interest rate of 16%. As outlined in the above table, operations were programmed for a period of 4 years (2010-2014). Therefore, the annual net profit varies from 11 684.2 USD to 21265.8 USD.

D. Annual expenses

Table 10. 3.The annual expenses of the project from 2010 to 2014

Designation	Amount(USD)
- Sock rent	61.1
- Office rent	81.4
- Salaries for workers	611.2
- Salaries for guards	203.7
- Communication fees	101.8
- Transport fees	5.0
- Care fees	63.6
- Credit reimbursement	2133.2
- Office supplies	3.1
- Annual depreciation cost	464.3
- Taxes	84.8
- Annual shares for members of the cooperative	865.8
Total 2010 exercise	4679.6
Year 2010	4679.6
Year 2011(+4% of last year).	4866.8
Year 2012(+4% of last year).	5061.5
Year 2013(+4% of last year).	5264.0
Year 2014 (+4% of last year)	5474.6
Total expenses for 4 successive years (2010 to 2014)	25346.7

Source: Author's survey data

Table 10.3 above shows the annual expenses of the project from 2010 to 2014. Total expenses for the new project are calculated on the basis of expenses of the year 2010 valued at 4 679.6 USD. It shows how the project increased annually at a rate of 4% until the year 2014.

E. Analysis of annual income for a period of 5 years.

Table 10. 4. Analysis of annual income for a period of 5 years

No	Designation	Gross annual income (USD)	Annual expenses (USD)	Annual net profits (USD)
1	Year 2010	11684.2	4679.6	7004.5
2	Year 2011	12852.6	4866.8	7985.7
3	Year 2012	14652.0	5061.5	9590.4
4	Year 2013	17289.3	5264.0	12025.3
5	Year 2014	18690.6	5458.9	13698.9
	Total 5years	75168.8	25331.0	50305.2

Source: Author's survey data 9

Table 10.4 above illustrates the analysis of annual income for a period of 5 years. The annual net profits within 5 years of the new project increased from one year to another ranging from 10% to 23% as result of compliance to good management principles of the new project of Jabana.

10.2.1 Saving

In focus group discussion all participants unanimously declared saving as the most valuable project outcome. Saving is organized in group and each member can save weekly. The minimum amount saved by each group member is 8 dollars (US\$) per week. Members can also apply and receive loans from the cooperative savings. This is very important because the culture of saving prepares ex-combatants of Jabana to manage their small incomes and even to manage bigger loans from banks.

10.2.2 Loan

Members of Jabana cooperative are allowed to borrow money and then pay back in the agreed period of time starting from one month to 6 months thereby allowing all members to access loans. The interest rate of 10% per month was agreed by all members of Jabana cooperative. The amount the cooperative gives out in loans is between US\$ 10 and US\$1000 depending on the personal performance record of the applicant. Asked to explain why the interest rate is so high, participants in focus group discussions responded that this helps the cooperative and group

to grow. One example is that the cooperative is now able to buy a number of pigs for each member.

As stated in focus group discussions some members of Jabana cooperative managed to obtain loans from outside such as Amasezerano Community Banking, which offered loans to 8 members. The biggest loans amount was US\$ 1800 while the smallest one was US\$ 300.

10.2.3. Individual income generating activities as result of the project

Agriculture: Most of the members are successfully involved in agricultural activities (29/34). Some of them have their own land and others have to rent it. They select profitable crops such as Irish potatoes, cabbage and maize which grow well in all areas and tolerate climatic change conditions in Jabana.

Animal husbandry

After saving for a period of 4 weeks, members seat together and choose one profitable activity the group can run collectively. Two different situations were found during the impact assessment of the project. First, there is animal rearing which mainly targets pigs, sheep and cows as one of collective activities and second to help individual group member buy animals and then rear them.s.

In the first case it was found out that the animals belong to the cooperative as a group not to individuals. Then, they use the cooperative savings to buy animals and once they multiply equitable distribution is done for the benefit of each member.

10.2.4 Attendance

The very first positive effect of the Jabana cooperative revitalization is holding weekly meetings. In every meeting, there is a different moderator elected in the previous meeting. The first item on the agenda is always a prayer. The attendance book is the second item on the agenda, followed by the savings collection. Then people with loans are requested to present short reports on how efficiently loans are utilized and how they help beneficiaries to make interests with more attention given to figures. New initiatives by the cooperative and individual initiatives are exposed and discussed and reports by the cooperative staff are presented and commented. Savings, giving out loans and recovery of loans need a recording system, thus book keeping control is also done in weekly meetings.

Particular attention is given to financial reports by internal audit committee. Meetings are concluded with a prayer after electing the moderator for the following meeting as this is done on rotational basis.

10.3 Impact of reintegration on Jabana group cohesiveness

Participation is an important factor for group performance. Therefore, it becomes important to assess how the project has helped to increase the level of participation within the group of Jabana. Regarding Jabana's members, their ideas were considered, which made them feel they were equally treated. In this regard, participants stated that,

“We realized that the social nature of humans complies with group obligations easily but we, as a group, like to be recognized as different individuals within a group”

Another participant emphasised the point in the following words:


“We are a team made of different people but our ideas have the same target. We need profit from what we are doing. Accordingly, the prime profit we have obtained from the project was equal participation and free expression as well as individual recognition member of the group”

By comparing the performance indicators after the project with those before, one can see the effect of the intervention on economic, social and political life.

10.3.1 Economic re-integration and community integration

Respondents observed that there was a sizeable increase in average wealth, especially in household durable assets, saving or spending and change in current income (6) (previous week and month) for the average project participant. Participants suggested that cash cropping provides periodic windfalls from sales, and that these are mainly invested in durable assets (and not necessarily in agricultural inputs or equipment).

Figure 10. 1The ex-combatants engagement in business sectors



Source: Author's survey

Figure 10.1 illustrates that after the project, the biggest number of ex-combatants were engaged in agriculture while others expanded their agribusinesses. More than a year after completion of the project, project participants were at least a quarter more likely than other members in Jabana to be engaged in agriculture, and 13 more likely to have sold crops. Interest in as well as positive attitudes toward farming were also significantly higher among project participants. Similar conclusion was made by Ball and Hendrickson (2005) who argued that agricultural activity to provide the household's subsistence needs, with a surplus to be sold for cash, is the most common alternative to solve the economic problems among the ex-combatants.

In addition, ex-combatants can be trained in skills such as mechanics, but the expected competition they would face in the market place is likely to be fierce. It is almost impossible to think of training which will give ex-combatants any edge in the labour market, and there is, in any case the valid question, why they should receive any preferential treatment (Body, 2005). That is why many countries recovering from civil war absorb many ex-combatants in an army of national unity, which is often far bigger than is justified by the security situation.

Besides, the project had an important impact on rates of participation in illicit activities such as selling prohibited local beers (Muritye, Kanyanga, etc.). Those who still participate in illicit

activities spend fewer hours in the illicit activity, as agricultural activities seem to fully absorb their time.

All the above achievements in economic activities are due to group work initiated among the members. The group functions well when members work together to achieve a common objective. Team work functions optimally when each member is recognised for their hard work. That is why groups should set up mechanisms in order to allow each member to feel appreciated as an individual and not as a mere group member.

This may be further explained by Di Micco and Bender (2004) who affirmed that attention to individuals in group dynamics is very necessary as this leads members to remain close while focusing on the same objectives. This equally builds good relationships and strengthens feelings of individual membership, empowerment and recognition. It is in this context that a participant said,

“Before the project, I was feeling as if the cooperative was for other people. I was simply there without any consideration, which influenced me to severely condemn others, including innocent people although there was no clear reason. I was always trying to make myself being right though I was not.”

In a study on the effects of team building activities on group climate and cohesion, Malynda (2006) highlights that team building activities are effective in building a positive group climate, leading to development and cohesion of newly formed groups. In particular, the results showed a significant reduction of conflicts in the group, a significant increase of commitment of group members and a significant increase of cohesion when team building activities were used.

More than a half of all participants stated that,

“...we were isolated before but since the group has been organized, all of us now focus on common goals. We work under a clear organization that is well structured. This makes each member know clearly the role assigned to him/her. This has led each of us to experience the value of organic solidarity.”

In fact, such team spirit leads the group towards two types of group unity. Salo (2006: 1) points at socio-affective and functional cohesions which results in new and positive relationships among group members who rely on values like interdependency, co-responsibility, reciprocal

control, mutual support and gratification. Technical cohesion (or functional cohesion) is like the motor that leads the group. It helps the association to operate in order to meet organizational goals around which tasks are explicitly defined, organized and individuals are designated to accomplish them in a team.

In the Jabana cooperative, the general assembly, secretary, accountants, and the executive committee make the organizational structure whose success relies now on the functional cohesion of the group. Interpersonal relationships in Jabana group reflect human cohesion since team members decided to visit two members of their team every two weeks. All participants indicated that there are tangible advantages in visiting one another. For them, visiting increases the group magnetism and charisma (attractiveness of members towards the group). During focus group discussions some respondents admitted that,

“Visits often trigger and stimulate communication among team members, which generates good affinities among us. When we visit our group members, we become one, we stand together in order to move towards prosperity as we are working hand in hand for common interests and goals.”


Another element that was highlighted through the project was the consideration of personal goals while pursuing group goals. Accordingly during focus group discussions participants stated that the group existed because of a set of needs that should be satisfied through common goals whilst satisfying their own individual needs. Some respondents argued that,

“At the start of this project, we decided to work for it as volunteers with the final aim of getting personal benefits. We as individuals expected the project to favour us in this way. If I am satisfied with the project, my team member will also benefit of it to develop. We as individuals or team need this project and the project needs us; this is reciprocal help that builds around the satisfaction of our needs by achieving the prescribed goals.”

10.3.2 Impact on social interaction and community integration

The results of this research show how work and revenue are both important factors of social integration. Access to work influences the true way for people to afford their new social identity.

Figure 10. 2..The social engagement and community integration



Source: Author's survey

Figure 10.2 above shows social engagement (15) and community integration (19) in Jabana. This means that since social engagement involves giving in money or contributing towards the community need, the number was a little bit small compared to community integration (19). With Community itegration, ex-combatants were free to coordinate with their neighbours. Some participants asserted that after the project, they were even free to enter their neighbours' houses without fear. Thus, there were positive improvements across most measures of social engagement and community interaction. This suggest a broad-based reduction in isolation and some gains in stability.

This means that one key impact of the project of Jabana is its effects on social relations of ex-combatants with other community members. In fact, the vulnerability deriving from lack of income forced ex-combatants to marginalize themselves. Nevertheless, as soon as the project started generating income, things began to change. Some participants felt empowered and could now meet others. For instance, cooperative members who were unemployed before the project got employed and stated looking different as well as attending ceremonies organized by their relatives and friends. In fact appearing in particular occasions such as weddings, birthdays among others, is very important because of their capacity to increase visibility and consideration by other community members. As this is not mere physical presence, it requires contribution in

case the ceremony is organized by close relatives. One participant stated that his contribution is meaningful though it is moderate:

“In the past, I used to find excuses but now I respond to all invitations and my small contribution is valued. My relatives and my friends know that I was jobless for a long period but for the moment, I get some cash. What they appreciate the most is the good will I show and not the amount of money I bring them.”

Another participant said,

“Recently, one of my neighbours had a sick child. He wanted assistance to transfer his child to King Faisal hospital. I was among the spearheads to solicit funds to such noble cause.”

In addition to the above, another participant stated that during the time he was jobless, he befriended alcoholics who sometimes mistreated him:

“Sometimes, I could realize that alcohol was compromising my future life but I was powerless and unable to give it up. I could not leave those friends because I depended much on them, which pleased them as they could humiliate me. They used to insult me telling me I was good for nothing. This could happen because I was unable to pay even a bottle of beer for myself. But since I have an occupation, I plan my daily activities. From Jabana cooperative, I have got real friends, the ones we share the same goals, visit and advise me.”

This time, a female participant gave a similar testimony revealing that she could not allow her children to attend church gatherings even if they always requested her to do so as the only clothes they had were the school uniforms. This woman's statement depicts how poverty generates stigma. Sometimes neighbours blame poor people for being irresponsible and dirty. This is supported by one of the participants:

“People do not understand how poor folk suffer. When one is poorly dressed because they cannot afford to buy soap, others think that they just like being dirty.”

However, when a person finds resources to take care of themselves as well as their family, the situation changes, consideration and relationships with neighbours also improve. As for

relationship within the family, the impact is visible as one participant argued that there is less tension in the family:

“Since I have started leaving money to my wife for household needs, our interactions are now good, we have ceased quarrels”.

Insufficient resources increase domestic violence for instance poor couples will experience destructive communication and which are psychologically harmful. During the project, evaluation was underway and participants indicated that there were fewer people absent from cooperative meetings because children could now go to school and had food to eat. The children were no longer hungry and had access to regular meals. Meals provide them with enough energy to concentrate on lessons in classroom. In addition, participants confirmed that their ability for providing children with school materials has increased and that kids had stopped combining school and work. It had been difficult and had negatively impacted their school performance.

The project has also made a significant impact in the integration of ex-combatants in the community. Community integration represents multiple benefits for the ex-combatants. In the same vein, attending regular community works and other gatherings helped them to break out their self-imposed isolation. On this issue, more than half of participants revealed that they are connected to a wider community as they regularly participate to the collective works of Umuganda. It is during this gathering that all national policies that are related to development are often communicated by the president of the community or village. Besides, new policies and issues related to education, health, family, gender, and domestic violence, and child protection are debated by village residents during the activities of Umuganda. It should also be mentioned that Umuganda is used as a platform for security debate by community members. For that reason, four participants testified that they have been elected as members of cell committees, with particular responsibilities of community policing. This is a clear indicator that ex-combatants are fully integrated in the community. They are elected by local people to carry out security, an activity which means that they are trusted and not reviled by their community.

Many participants believed there is progress in ex-combatants' accommodation. They said that three jobless ex-combatants, who were assisted before the implementation of income generating project, are now paying monthly accommodation fees. Many more other participants stated that they have moved from very poor accommodation conditions to more comfortable ones,

which increased the monthly rent costs up to 25%. Besides, during the evaluation session, seven participants who could not pay their lease regularly stated that they are now able to pay it.

10.3.3 Impact on political interaction and community integration

Table 10. 5Political interaction and community integration

Do you belong to any of the political party?	Frequency
Yes	30
No	4
Total	34
Whether ex-combatants would be interested in taking part during election campaign	
They would be interested to take part in during election campaign	32
They would not be interested	2
Total	34
How would ex-combatants prefer to participate in electoral events	Frequency
As Candidates	15
Through Organising political events	10
Through participating in electoral events	7
Any other	2
Total	34

Source: Author's survey


Table 10.5 above shows political interaction and community integration of the ex-combatants in Jabana. The table indicates that after the project 30 out of 34 ex-combatants had already registered with various political parties; 32 out of 34 would be interested to take part in during the following election campaign, 15 participate as candidates, 10 organising political events and 7 through participating in various ways. This shows how the socio-economic reintegration project has had a tremendous impact on the political aspects among the ex-combatants in Jabana. Self reported rates of negative participation in political affairs were fairly low among the sample population, but they were especially low among project participants – they tended to report a

third less interest in or links to recruiters and recruitment activities. Given the difficulty of shifting such behaviors, these impacts of the project are regarded as extremely promising.

Still, in Jabana where the bulk of the population is poor and underemployed, many ex-combatants had continued to make their living through unlawful activities, including robbery and unlicensed mobile selling (moving from street to street). While the security situation in Rwanda has steadily improved since 2003, the government, the UN, and NGOs fear that ex-combatants are permanently a possible source of instability, particularly in poor suburbs. They could also be recruited into regional conflicts as mercenaries. Agriculture as one of the activities in the reintegration project will continue to be a major source of employment and income for rural ex-combatants. As a result, ex-combatants would become more supportive to the security-political affairs than becoming threats to leaders.

10.3.4 Impact of reintegration on stress levels

Figure 10. 3.Psychological interaction and community integration



Source: Author’s survey

From figure 10.3 above, 20 out of 34 respondents said that the reintegration project increased the contribution to households’ needs, income motivation (8 out of 34) and commitment towards cooperative activities, feelings/hope (6 out of 34) of better future and self confidence among the project participants. The evaluation of the project indicated the majority of participants have made a significant psychological progress which was noticed at the individual

level. This situation depicts how ex-combatants faced a long period of stress, loss of confidence and stigma due to the mutual misconception that existed between ex-combatants and community members. Today, all of them are involved in different cooperative activities and personal activities which have generated income motivation and commitment towards the cooperative. In consequence, hope in a better future and feelings of self-confidence have increased.

Some of the participants have indicated that the psychological effect of the project on family relationships has been considerable. In fact, the project has contributed to increase participants' economic contribution to the satisfaction of households' needs. In this regards, it has increased respect and collaboration in problem solving. In the same context, one participant stated that his wife used to consult her own brother for different issues without informing him. Such practice had frustrated the husband and so culminated in marital tensions. He said that he could not change anything as he was always angry and powerless:

"I was just considered a husband by name. But now, since I am behaving responsibly and using dialogue, our relationship has much improved."

The majority of the participants in this reintegration project shared this point of view. Family relationships, as stated in the section about the evaluation of the cooperative of ex-combatants before the project indicated that, their mismanagement was increasing poverty among members of the group, lack of trust and poor collaboration. But for the moment, trust has been restored since collaboration is complete and unconditional. Each member of the group is currently considered by others as an important partner in the group. In addition, the mechanism that is intended to strengthen social relations among the members of the group such as regular mutual visits, solidarity in case of illness, family celebrations like wedding, children baptism, whatsoever, are now done with full commitment.

We have also to point that the psychological change that was generated by the project has resulted in a new perception towards RDRC, the ministry of defence and the government. Almost all participants stated that before the project implementation, they used to develop fierce criticism and blamed institutions for abandoning them and withholding money. Today, Jabana ex-combatants' perceptions and feelings towards these bodies have changed. The project has helped them to understand that the first person responsible for their reintegration is themselves

and that successful collaboration with any partner, including the above mentioned institutions, depends on their personal effort, respect, trust and positive communication.

If we consider the relations with other community members, participants stated that nowadays they feel more considered, recognised and respected by members of the community, compared to the past. Some ex-combatants say,

“...in the past, neighbours and other community members used to blame us for indifference. This was due to the fact that we were not respected. People were insensitive towards us and discriminated us in every aspect of life. Now, everyone is very open with us and respects us just like any other civilian.”

Indeed, change of perception towards members of the community is crucial. Without sensitive modification, their business cannot continue. In this respect, the civilians of Jabana are partners at the first degree and they deserve respect, consideration, good communication and careful treatment by all ex-combatants of Jabana.

Before the research project, participants stated that they could only afford to eat one meal a day. Once implementation took place ex-combatants could afford two to three meals a day in addition to providing food for their children after school. Project participants indicated that they could now afford to buy fruit and vegetables. Most participants could afford a weekly food provision and great deal of participants stated that they are able to stock bathing soaps, washing powder or renew dishes and kitchen equipment. Other participants indicated that they could now access primary medicine. They also confirmed that all ex-combatants had subscribed for the “Mutuel de santé” (medical insurance) of 2011 and they confirmed they will maintain it for 2012. They will no longer be short of clothes for special events for themselves and their family members.

10.4 Summary

Outputs here are understood in the context of immediate or short-term results yielded by the projects. Outputs are predominantly of an economic nature than a social one and they are counted for in terms of access to financial means. Another important aspect of project outputs is that ex-combatants have been able to cover expenses related to their daily needs which include daily meals, children’s school fees, clothing and medication. Project outputs are both medium and long term returns yielded by the project. These are social transformation such as

reconciliation, group re-integration, recovering self-esteem and esteem of others within their inner circle and the wider community. An indicator of social reintegration is the removal of stereotypes, prejudices and resentment (due to non-participation and past context of belligerence in war and the genocide).

PART FIVE: GENERAL CONCLUSION

CHAPTER ELEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

11.1 Introduction

This research was conducted with the aim of providing answers to challenges faced by post-conflict Rwanda, remedial action that has been undertaken by the Rwandan government and its development partners. The study's overall aim was to contribute to the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The project made a comprehensive evaluation of the possible sources of influence and experiences among the former combatants in Jabana, Rwanda. To achieve this, the researcher carried out an action research on economic, social, political and psychological dimensions that would elucidate the main areas of the reintegration procedures. Its specific objectives are:

1. To critically review the relevant literature, including the importance of successfully reintegrating ex-combatants in order to provide a foundation for sustainable peace.
2. To assess the levels of reintegration achieved by one reintegration project (an agricultural cooperative) in Rwanda, including the social and economic situations of households and the performance of the cooperative.
3. Using an action research approach, to plan, implement and evaluate an intervention designed to enhance the project's contribution to social and economic reintegration.

11.2 Key issues in the reintegration process

Post-conflict Rwanda has been facing a range of socio-economic and political challenges as war and genocide affected key sectors of socio-economic development such as agriculture, health and education.

DDR process in Rwanda has a hallmark of unity and reconciliation. It is through such a programme that RDF soldiers and ex-combatants from the DRC returned back to their communities. It is through the demobilization programme that some ex-combatants returned to Rwanda and were reintegrated within RDF.

Economic, social, political and psychological reintegration of ex-combatants is the ultimate goal of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP), which is in fact the essence of this research.

The process of reintegration began in 1997 and currently the third demobilization stage is underway. A common challenge to most ex-combatants is the diligent and creative use of the money they are given for reintegrating into their communities. Some of the data that were captured in the survey prove that some ex-combatants have received between US\$ 100 and US\$1000. The amount could serve as a stepping stone for starting an income-generating activity. An action method was implemented as a remedy to bridge the gap between demobilization and effective economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Conflict and genocide in Rwanda had destroyed the economy, infrastructure and markets, it has broken down the public sector and undermined the social relations often at the heart of trading, meaning that livelihood opportunities became scarce. In addition, ex-combatants had limited levels of education, skills and work experience, further hampering their ability to gain employment.

The central objective of reintegration programmes is to support ex-combatants in their efforts for social and economic integration into civilian society. The national reintegration programmes provide assistance to help ex-combatants establish sustainable livelihoods. This study had earlier discovered that the Rwandan government through public awareness campaigns via radio and TV productions at both national and local levels sensitized the population about the rights and challenges of ex-combatants. It was also discovered that, the majority of ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups live in deplorable socio-economic conditions. Households of ex-combatants did not have stable sources of income as they held low level and unstable jobs. This mirrors the whole sector in which Jabana cooperative is located. Other ex-combatants had been socially isolated not only in the community but also within the family because of their inability to support their families financially. From the political point of view, some ex-combatants were dormant as regards civic activities such as participating in politics and party activism

Capacity building

The study discovered that the reintegration capacity of districts and sectors is still limited due to scarce resources and insufficient employment opportunities.

Skills training, livestock or housing assistance

Despite the continued progress and achievements over the past few years, the RDRC was still facing financial challenges aggravated by lack of skills that could affect the capacity for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Community infrastructure

In order to facilitate the smooth reintegration process of ex-combatants, it is essential to increase the absorption capacity of communities. In this regard only IOM supports small-scale community development projects such as the rehabilitation of schools and health facilities. Obviously these interventions do not specifically target ex-combatants.

11.3 Summary of findings for social-economic reintegration of ex-combatants

Economic dimensions of reintegration

The researcher found out that ex-combatants' households had two income earners, that is, the ex-combatant and his spouse who were solely responsible for the income of the household. It was discovered that most of them could not provide all the necessary needs to their households such as food stuffs, providing education to their children, and buying clothes for their family members.

Ex-combatants who were unemployed were plunged into economic and psychopathological troubles. They felt that were abandoned and avoided by their former colleagues, relatives and friends. As a result, it affected marital relationships due to poor economic situation and those who were married became embroiled in mental disorders repeatedly leading to marital contentions. Conflict and domestic violence cases were always the order of the day in ex-combatant' home once he failed to provide financial support and thus became stressed and sometimes resorted to various abuses. Children of ex-combatants were not safe in situations where the above mentioned stresses took place. Financial crises generated domestic conflict between children and parents.

After this project, it was discovered that economic reintegration helped to improve the income security of ex-combatants' households. Areas of development included number of people that contributed to the household's income, the ex-combatant's main and secondary economic activities, house ownership and access to land. Income-generation opportunities for the Jabana ex-combatants with outstanding business opportunities were identified. This included agriculture, livestock keeping, fisheries, brick laying, furniture making among others. The study also identified the most profitable income generating projects across Jabana including dairy cows, bar-restaurant, fishing dam, motorbike taxi, quarry project and public transportation mini-bus. Once all business opportunities had been assessed cooperative members selected the

quarrying sector which seemed to be cost-effective in terms of investment and exploitation but most importantly, the sector was encouraged by growing constructions sector in Kigali city.

Social dimensions of reintegration

This study discovered that social dimensions of reintegration are various and can include all forms of social activity, for example churches (choirs), cultural and sport groups. Belonging to social groups such as choirs, cultural and sport groups was also an important indicator of community integration. Most of the ex-combatants had neither participated in community activities nor belonged to such mentioned groups. However, most of the respondents considered themselves ready to be reintegrated into civilian life. Other considerations included with whom the ex-combatants spend time with, to whom the ex-combatants turn to in times of need, and the most important person in their communities. Among the most important source of social interaction for ex-combatants included family, fellow colleagues, church leaders or any another leader or prominent person in the community. Nevertheless, lack of household equipment limited ex-combatants to share with neighbours thus hindering good relationships within the community. Those who could not afford to lend and borrow from neighbours were eighteen over thirty four.

After this project, it was discovered that social reintegration was promising among the participants. This project created good neighbourhoods and provided a basis for lending and borrowing among ex-combatants and their neighbours. In addition, ex-combatants declared their interest in belonging to various social groups and social networks in Jabana which is an indication for social community integration. Such community engagement included participating in activities like church choirs and services, libraries and sport centres which in turn foster the openness and the reintegration of ex-combatants. The level of participation in Umuganda emerged as successful as the ex-combatants started participating together with other residents of villages in manual work, such as cleaning their residences, streets, repairing broken small bridges, building houses and huts for the poor.

Psychological dimensions of reintegration

Being isolated from other community members affected ex-combatants psychologically. They could not participate in decision-making at the household level, community level regardless of their level of education, social status or age. After the project, through active participation in community life the ex-combatants were empowered thus creating relationships and strong social

cohesion. This had promoted equipment and information sharing among the members of the Jabana community with ex-combatants.

Political dimensions of reintegration

Interestingly, almost all respondents considered elections important to the consolidation of peace in the country. Some ex-combatants asserted that election period was time for choosing a government that could attend to endless needs of the people. Others mentioned the need for a change in regime and the need for a new leader and they suggested that leaders should be given at most two terms to allow innovations and creativity in the country. The researcher found out that ex-combatants were interested in taking part during election campaigns through either participating, organising political events or any other form in the next electoral events, not only in Jabana but countrywide. Such political participation and party activism increases political determination, performance and activism whilst patriotism (Duma, van Laar and Klem, 2012; Porto, Parsons and Alden, 2011) and will bring about change within Jabana community.

11.4 Reflecting on my own learning

Lesson One

I have learnt that the reintegration of ex-combatants is especially challenging and is considered to be one of the more difficult phases of DDR. Thus, reintegration needs to be clearly linked to disarmament and demobilisation from the outset. Reintegration into civilian life is integrally connected to the wider socio-economic development of the country, which will determine to what extent it can offer jobs to the demobilised persons, a job that will give them sufficient resources to take care of their families and dependants. In many cases, unemployment can be quite endemic and lack of livelihood might have been one of the sources of the conflict. A great deal depends on sustained external support that can be brought by the International Community to complement and reinforce national efforts. It is especially important to focus on the local communities and their ability to provide jobs and alternative livelihoods through specific projects and programmes. In addition, budget and sector support should take into account the needs of former combatants. At the same time, consideration must be given to ensure balance support between demobilised ex-combatants and other citizens.

Lesson Two

Reintegration is a difficult and drawn-out process that is influenced by many factors, not least the reason why those involved chose to fight, or ended up fighting, in the first place. However,

one of the key factors in determining whether ex-combatants are willing to put down their guns and return to a civilian way of life is if there are appropriate economic and livelihood alternatives open to them.

When employment opportunities do not materialise, experience has shown that ex-combatants rapidly become frustrated and can engage in protests, disruptive or destructive actions. In the absence of potential employment opportunities, ex-combatants are likely to resort to illegal activities such as smuggling, illegal mining and weapons trafficking, which can potentially destabilise communities locally, regionally and nationally.

In some cases ex-combatants have crossed borders and become insurgents in neighbouring countries, as has been the case in the Mano River countries in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In other cases ex-combatants are hired as private security guards or employed by private military companies (PMCs). This risks placing individuals, who are often traumatised and accustomed to using violence to protect themselves and resolve conflict, in positions of power, where they are charged with maintaining security. .

Lesson Three

It is important that ex-combatants find a post-conflict-time equivalent of the role they played during the conflict. If they have a position that gives them a stake in the post-conflict social order, they will help to support this order instead of acting against it. Viewing the ex-combatant as an individual, with ambitions, frustrations and potential thus enhances the chances of devising more suitable reintegration programmes.

- i) The consequences of inadequate reintegration rebound at the community, national, regional and even international levels, impacting on the sustainability of peace agreements, stability of states and regions, as well as on crime, security and human security in all contexts.
- ii) Ultimately, the long-term potential for peace, human security and sustainable economic development in a country emerging from conflict is compromised by the inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants

Lesson Four

Rwandan reintegration programme drew up plans for socio-economic reintegration. This committee identified a number of sectors and activities in which the ex-combatants could be reintegrated, such as crafts sector, income-generating activities, specific trades, agriculture and

cattle breeding. However, neither the RDRC nor the international experts involved considered carrying out a thorough economic context analysis in order to assess the absorption capacity of the Rwandan economy, or tried to determine the specific qualifications for which there would be sufficient demand in the post-conflict setting of the country.

First, a thorough analysis of the socio-economic context of Rwanda is required to determine what economic possibilities there are for ex-combatants. Second, it is necessary to engage in the profiling of specific target groups within the expected caseload of ex-combatants to be reintegrated. The expected outcome of this exercise is a map of economic opportunities for specific target groups in geographical areas, which allows interested parties to actively intervene to help enhance stability in Rwandan.

Lesson Five

Reintegration of ex-combatants aims to contribute to Rwanda's reconciliation process. Outcomes of Jabana project strongly indicate that an individual's ability to engage with a reconciliation process is significantly influenced by their economic condition. Improving the economic potential of vulnerable people bolster social cooperation and limit the risk of conflict at a family and community level.

Lesson Six

I have learnt that the necessity of starting early, (and as quickly as possible,) is frequently mentioned for both reintegration and reentry efforts. The first months after demobilization are the most critical in the entire reintegration process. This suggests that processes are complex and need sufficient planning, but also that early intervention is a vital preventive element for transitioning persons into a new way of life.

Lesson Seven

I have also been able to describe reintegration as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility.

Lesson Eight

I have learnt that reintegration programming is best accomplished when ex-combatants and their respective communities participate in the design of the programme rather than relying on

outside professionals. Participation in rehabilitation is vital for attaining high quality and ownership of the process.

Lesson Nine

I have learnt that, learning from past negative experiences, a good reorganization and additional financing credit in cooperatives owned by ex-combatants provide the best benefits compared to the original project, with two positive outcomes: (i) social reintegration for dependents of ex-combatants and (ii) mental or psychological rehabilitation for adults and children within ex-combatants' families.

11.5 Implications for policymakers

11.5.1 Ex-Combatants' Economic Reintegration

The approaches that have been used allowed ex-combatants to learn basic and necessary skills of creative entrepreneurship while working in corporate setting. They have realized that working in corporates and running parallel personal business are not mutually exclusive. This rather creates the ground for a “symbiotic” relationship between single-handed and corporate businesses. In fact, entrepreneurship has been staged while taking the existing advantage in the neighbourhood it is located in.

Based on this research's data, quarry business is profitable and requires little investment. Nevertheless, other activities to supplement ex-combatants households are desirable, even selling manure which would result in the improvement of farm production and the harnessing of social ties.

The most important implication of using action research approach for addressing the hindrance in economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants is the restoration of cohesion and to change the mind of the people. Without mindset change it is impractical to expect any lasting solution for the poverty trap which ex-combatants fall into shortly after their exit from active as ex-members of the RDF and ex-combatants from the DRC.

Knowledge, know-how and working in corporate settings have enormously contributed in promoting unity, reconciliation and peace-building agenda in Rwanda. The acquired skills and knowledge are mainly expected to yield multiplying effects as they (the skills and knowledge) are passed on to other people in Rwanda, which effectively changes the wider society.

11.5.2. Ex-combatants' social reintegration

The nature of research requires working in group settings in addition to personal and collective participation toward the attainment of the project's objectives. Such a way of working helps the members to generate income for their interest, which results in the economic reintegration. Besides, the most important return in working in group settings is the social cohesion that originates from sharing common goals, interests, successes and failures if any. Group dynamics contributed much to the demystification of individual and group levels such as RDF ex-combatants -Versus- FAR-Interahamwe, ex-combatants from the DRC. Participation in the same project helped individuals appreciate each other at their face value.

Group members became best friends among themselves and relied on each other in time of need. In other words, in the current utilitarian world, a business friend may become closer than a brother. One important aspect is that the members of Jabana project used to hold negative clichés by the time the RPA was fighting the genocidal government. This government totally demonized and dehumanized the RPA. This was played as a psychological warfare that was mongering fear amongst Rwandans. But in the course of the project, the same group members could look back and forgive the past wrongs (with indignation and contempt against dirty politics).

11.5.3 Ex-combatants' psychological reintegration

At the psychological level, ex-combatants have gained self-confidence, self-trust, and removal of past negative clichés that they used to hold against each other. They understood that dirty politics was to blame for mutual dehumanization, as it mirrored image and cognitive dissonances, and it has lost its place in the minds of individual ex-combatants who participated to this action-research.

11.5.4 Ex-combatants' political reintegration

It was discovered that after this project almost all respondents considered elections important to the consolidation of peace in the country. For example, ex-combatants stressed that election period is time for choosing a government that could attend to endless needs of the people. It was also discovered that the need for a change in regime and the need for a new leader and they suggested that leaders should be given at most two terms to allow innovations and creativity in the country. This research also found out that ex-combatants were interested in taking part during election campaign through either participating, organising political events or any other

form in the next electoral events, not only in Jabana but countrywide. Such political participation and party activism increases political determination

11.6 Peace-building implication

As conspicuously elaborated in the evaluation section, the implications of this research are mainly of the nature of “confidencebuilding” (section 7.1.4.1). However, these consequences are entwined with other contingency inferences of the nature of building trust among the members as they have been discouraged by the cooperative’s mismanagement. As it is stated (section 8.2.2, the main implication of building such trust among the members is to set up solid grounds for economic capacities through income-generation in the context of this research. Indeed, its contingent inference “trust-building” is designed to underpin the rebuilding and strengthening the torn Rwandan social fabric as a consequence of genocide and war.

In the implementation of this research, aspects of peace-building, together with unity and reconciliation and peace-building in its broad term has been witnessed from its outset to the concluding phase of the research. In the absence of team spirit, this project would have lacked an irreplaceable springboard for success.

11.7 Specific Recommendations

The recommendations that are devised in this point are twofold, some are formulated towards ex-combatants at individual level and others for RDRP.

11.7.1 At the individual level (Ex-combatants)

The ex-combatants who are partakers to this action research are highly recommended to keep the newly acquired knowledge and know-how. These innovative skills will help them, today and in the future, to have an edge in the dynamics of the entrepreneurship world in Rwanda and elsewhere.

The ex-combatants participants to this research are expected to use the newly learned approaches as their springboard in a successful manner. Accordingly, this can help them to conduct their current and future income-generating activities. For instance, they can use these aptitudes to contribute to the dissemination of the approach among other ex-combatants and vulnerable groups in the Rwandan wider society.

The approach used in this research is the result of creativity. Thus ex-combatants are recommended and expected to create and/or stage their own fashion of creativities according to personal ambitions and environmental realities. Ex-combatants are suggested to own and sustain the culture of creativity in order to make money instead of working for it. This will be their ultimate solution to the poverty-trap in which most of them have succumbed.

11.7.2 The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP)

Most ex-combatants experience deficiency of creative entrepreneurial skills. Thus they should learn about the know-how in order to become competitive upon their demobilization.

Moreover, they should do their best for changing their mind sets. Such transformation can push them into creating wealth instead of seeking it. With such mind predispositions, ex-combatants would be in a position of starting income-generating activities. Ultimately these activities can turn into highly profitable businesses and income-generating projects. That would contribute in fast-tracking the national agenda of sustainable development based on wealth-creation.

To a country emerging from war like Rwanda, it is suggested that they try to find solutions to their own problems while taking an inward instead of an outwardlook. This assumes that people should not simply cut and paste what has actually worked out in other countries. Since post-conflict situations differ from an area to another, though they might look similar people should adapt to their own contexts. It should be understood that there is no one size fits all solution to all the post-conflict situations due to the different contexts and backgrounds in which they happened. That is why the best-practices that are achieved by a given country out of conflict situation should be learned and even streamlined by the United Nations organization in as much as it is the same universal organization that provides a universal DDR platform and/or format to be followed and implemented. In spite of this home-grown solutions have been highlighted in the course of this research, it is worth reminding that the basic UN-World Bank DDR framework have been followed by the RDRP in the spirit of applying international practices while selecting what suits best the real needs of Rwandans.

The AR experience in Jabana should be mainstreamed amongst wider Rwandan society in order to fast-track Rwanda's Vision 2020 and most importantly the United Nations' MDG n°1 goal which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.

The RDRP should harness and mainstream creative entrepreneurship amongst all the ex-combatants under different cooperatives countrywide. In reality, this would allow them to have a chance of creating wealth and escape the poverty trap while equipping them with different useful skills to start with little capital.

Much effort should be invested in monitoring individual progress towards re-integration. In particular, this should go with the economic reintegration because the latter results in social re-integration. Let alone RDRP needs include additional approaches (having an added value to its way of implementing the process), but also it reassesses the way it implements the DDR process while taking cooperative as the nucleus reference upon which every decision and change should be thought over and implemented. RDRP intervention should go beyond the currently referred unit of measurement. In other words, ex-combatants' cooperatives should take "the individual" as the ultimate unit of measurement and assessment in terms of implementation of its (RDRP) programme envisaging an ex-combatants' effective socio-economic re-integration. Should that be taken into account, interventions centering on individuals will address real issues faced by people. There is a gap of reporting between heads of associations and individual ex-combatants' concerns as far as the success of economic reintegration is concerned.

An action approach that was used by the Jabana project should be replicated by RDRP amongst other ex-combatants countrywide because the approaches yielded quicker, bigger and long-lasting economic and social returns at both individual and group levels.

On the whole, ex-combatants' income-generating activities should be mainstreamed via the national organ of Private Sector Federation (PSF) for a couple of reasons. The first one is to mainstream ex-combatants' income-generating activities in the wider national PSF. The second is to ensure multiplication of effects/replication of best-practices out of the approaches that resulted in ex-combatants' successful economic and social re-integration.

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire

- 1.What is the monthly income of your household?
- 2.Can all household members afford to have three meals everyday throughout the year?
- 3.Can your household afford to make a stock of food every month?
- 4.Do you have enough means to versify your meals throughout the year?
- 5.Do you have enough means to buy regularly condiments for sauce preparation?
- 6.Can you afford to pay regularly your subscription of medical insurance?
- 7.Does each person in your household sleep under insecticide treated bed net?
- 8.Do all children of school age enrolled in school?
- 9.Can you afford to pay for uniforms for each child?
- 10.Can you afford to pay other contributions required by the school?
- 11.Can you avail at least 350 Frw (0, 5 US \$) / day per child for school food?
- 12.Can you afford to pay school fees for all your children?
- 13.Can you afford to purchase school materials such as notebooks, books, etc.?
- 14.Can you afford to pay a tutor to help your children?
- 15.Does each member of household have a pair of clothes and shoes?
- 16.Can you afford to buy toilet and laundry soaps for each week?
- 17.Can your neighbours feel free to come to your home to borrow household stuff?
- 18.Do you have friends to rely on in good and difficult times?
- 19.Do you belong to an association or any organized group, other than the cooperative of ex-combatants of Jabana?
- 20.Do you participate in community work (Umuganda) every last Saturday of the month?
- 21.Do you pay your monthly contribution community policing in your village?
- 22.Does the household have its own house with enough space (rooms) to fit all dependents?
- 23.Does the household have a toilet, bathroom, kitchen and electric light or oil lamps?
- 24.Does the household have a dining room with enough chairs for all members?
- 25.Does the household have enough beds, mattress and sheets for each household member?
- 26.Is there any political party (parties) you know in Rwanda? If yes, mention some of them.
- 27.Do you belong to any of the political party?
- 28.Are you interested in taking part during election campaign?
- 29.How would you prefer to participate in electoral events?

Appendix 2: Themes that guided interviews and focus group discussions

- 1.Socio-economic situation of ex-combatants of Jabana before the implementation of the income generating project.
- 2.Stresses of reintegration as experienced by ex-combatants.
- 3.The effect of ineffective reintegration on children.
- 4.Long term reintegration through Jabana cooperative.
- 5.The economic impact of reintegration.
- 6.The impact of reintegration on Jabana group cohesiveness.
- 7.The impact on social interaction and community integration impact on stress levels.