



# **Nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe, 1999 to 2013: strategies, methods and effectiveness**

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## Declaration

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**Abstract**

This study investigates the effectiveness of the strategies and methods that were employed by non-state actors as they engaged the state in nonviolent campaigns in order to address the socio-economic and political challenges experienced in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013. Using a combination of exploratory, descriptive and evaluative methods, the study argues that the nonviolent campaigns used in Zimbabwe were in the short term successful despite the state's violent responses, which were at their peak during the run up to elections. The findings reveal that Women of Zimbabwe Arise, the Zimbabwe National Students' Union and the National Constitutional Assembly among other non-state actors were effective in the short term. As a result Zimbabwe stands out as a plausible example where nonviolence as a strategy failed to end a brutal regime but enabled the non-state actor (the Movement for Democratic Change) to gain popular civilian support through its effective engagement of nonviolent strategies and methods. It was just its failure to estrange some of the pillars of violence (some members of the military, the police and the intelligence system) which curtailed the democratically elected opposition to get in into power. However, the brutal state responses directly and indirectly triggered a severe socio-economic and political down turn. This became apparent in the health, education, and water and sanitation services that were on the verge of collapse; increased corruption, growing displacement and emigration of Zimbabweans, and withdrawal of external support. The study concludes that the failure of nonviolent campaigns was partly a result of limited knowledge among Zimbabweans about what nonviolence involves, state brutality, poor planning and lack of patience by non-state actors and their resort to violence instead of sticking to nonviolence. It is nonetheless imperative to encourage civic society to cultivate a culture of nonviolence through the use of various agents of socialization which include the: home, school and the media.

**Dedication**

I dedicate this study to the surviving and departed nonviolence advocates in Zimbabwe for their tireless efforts in disseminating knowledge on how opponents can be engaged through the use of nonviolent strategies and methods.

## **Acknowledgements**

My contact with the Durban University of Technology (DUT) transformed my thinking and my academic aspirations. I thank the Durban University of Technology for enrolling me, financing my studies (The DUT covered tuition fees on my behalf by means of a fee waiver) and making available several lectures on research methods and techniques including creating a conducive research environment with supportive and caring staff. In addition, allow me to acknowledge the support that was also rendered to me to attend an international conference in Cape Town 4-8 July 2014, convened under the heading: Small Actions, Big Movements: The Continuum of Nonviolence. I learnt a lot about nonviolence and peaceful resolution of conflicts from this conference.

I left Zimbabwe with the aim of doing research on the violent epochs that were experienced by the inhabitants of South Eastern Zimbabwe during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. However, the lectures by staff in peacebuilding, and by professionals or invited experts on the subject of nonviolence transformed my thinking and motivated me to direct my attention to the field of nonviolence. After reading more on proponents of nonviolence such as Mohandas K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Gene Sharp, my area of focus became: *Nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe, 1999 to 2013: strategies, methods and effectiveness*. I convey my sincere gratitude to all the teachers, organisers, trainers and facilitators on the subject of nonviolence to whom I was exposed at the University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN) in 2013. Geoff T. Harris has always reminded us that violence is a choice one makes, and that where violence is perpetrated, there is always a nonviolent alternative that can be used to address any challenge.

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<b>Contents</b>	<b>Page Number</b>
Declaration.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Dedication.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
List of Tables .....	10
Acronyms.....	11
<b>PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>1. 0 CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING .....</b>	<b>14</b>
1.1 Introduction.....	14
1.2 Background.....	14
1.3 Research Problem .....	18
1.4 Research Context .....	18
1.5 Research aims and objectives .....	22
1.6 Significance of the Study .....	23

1.7 Research design, research methodology and data collection methods.....	24
1.8 Overview .....	25
<b>Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>2.0 CHAPTER 2: THE THEORIES OF NONVIOLENCE.....</b>	<b>26</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	26
2.2 Definitions of nonviolence.....	27
2.3 Why nonviolent resistance? .....	29
2.4 Misconceptions about nonviolence .....	39
2.5 Types of Nonviolence .....	41
2.5.1 Pragmatic nonviolence .....	41
2.5.2 Principled nonviolence.....	43
2.6 Planning nonviolent campaigns .....	47
2.7 Four levels of planning and action. ....	51
2.8 Communication in nonviolent campaigns.....	53
2.9 Methods of nonviolence.....	55
2.9.1 Methods of protest and persuasion.....	56
2.9.2 Methods of noncooperation .....	57
2.9.3 Methods of Nonviolent Intervention.....	58
2.10 Summary .....	59
2.11 Conclusion .....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
<b>Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>3.0 CHAPTER 3: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NONVIOLENCE .....</b>	<b>61</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	61
3.2 A case of nonviolence in the Middle East.....	62
3.2.1 Nonviolence up to the Second World War .....	62
3.2.2 Nonviolence after the Second World War .....	63



3.2.3 Impact .....	65
3.3 Europe and New Zealand cases of nonviolence.....	66
3.3.1 Nonviolence before the Second World War .....	66
3.3.2 Nonviolence after the Second World War .....	70
3.3.3 Impact .....	71
3.4 The Americas .....	71
3.4.1 Development of nonviolence until the Second World War .....	71
3.4.2 Nonviolence after 1945 .....	72
3.4.3 Impact .....	74
3.5 Asian experiences of nonviolence.....	75
3.5.1 Nonviolence up to the Second World War .....	75
3.5.2 Nonviolence in the post Second World War Era .....	75
3.5.3 Impact .....	76
3.6 Nonviolence in African.....	76
3.6.1 Nonviolence before colonisation .....	76
3.6.2 Nonviolence during colonisation .....	77
3.6.3 Nonviolence after independence .....	80
3.6.4 Impact .....	81
3.7 Zimbabwean nonviolent campaigns, 1890 to 1998.....	82
3.7.1 Nonviolence and the pre-colonial state.....	82
3.7.2 Nonviolence and the colonial state .....	82
3.7.3 Nonviolence and the post-colonial state up to 1998 .....	83
3.7.4 Impact .....	84
3.8 Summary .....	84
3.9 Conclusion .....	84

<b>Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>4.0 CHAPTER 4: AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE SINCE 1890 .....</b>	<b>86</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	86
4.2 Terrorism.....	87
4.3 Colonisation 1872-1890.....	93
4.4 Anglo-Ndebele War 1893-4.....	95
4.5 First Chimurenga 1896-7 .....	97
4.6 Settler Government: Responsible Government 1922-1952 .....	98
4.7 Federation 1953-1963 .....	101
4.8 Second Chimurenga 1964-1980.....	102
4.9 Lancaster House Conference 1979 .....	105
4.10 Gukurahundi in Matabeleland 1982-87 .....	107
4.11 RENAMO Incursions 1981-1992 .....	108
4.12 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 1991-98.....	110
4.13 Summary .....	111
4.14 Conclusion .....	112
<b>PART III: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>5.0 CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS .....</b>	<b>113</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	113
5.2 The research phases .....	113
5.3 The Research Design .....	114
5.3.1 The Type of study .....	114
5.3.2 Descriptive .....	115
5.3.3 Exploratory or historical-descriptive .....	115
5.3.4 Action Research .....	115
5.3.5 Evaluation .....	116

5.4 Why use a questionnaire? .....	116
5.5 Research methodology .....	117
5.5.1 Qualitative Research .....	118
5.5.2 Relevance to the study .....	119
5.6 Sampling .....	120
5.6.1 The study population and its sampling frame .....	120
5.6.2 The sampling method and the sample size.....	120
5.7 Data collection methods.....	121
5.7.1 Interviews.....	121
5.7.2 Open unstructured interviews .....	122
5.7.3 Considerations for unstructured Interviews .....	122
5.7.4 Advantages and disadvantages of Interviews .....	123
5.7.5 Inclusion criteria .....	124
5.7.6 Exclusion criteria .....	124
5.7.7 Recruitment process.....	124
5.8 Delimitations.....	125
5.9 Limitations .....	125
5.10 Ethical considerations in data collection.....	126
5.11 Validity and Reliability of data collection methods.....	127
5.12 Individual Interview Guide Questions .....	128
5.13 Methods of data presentation and analysis.....	128
5.14 Summary .....	129
5.15 Conclusion .....	129
<b>PART IV:DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .....</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>6.0 CHAPTER 6: NONVIOLENT METHODS USED IN ZIMBABWE 1999-2013 .....</b>	<b>131</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	131

6.2 Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion .....	131
6.2.1 Demonstrations .....	132
6.2.2 Music and song .....	139
6.2.3 Protest theatre.....	144
6.2.4 MDC red card, slogan caricatures and symbol .....	144
6.3 Methods of noncooperation .....	146
6.3.1 Social noncooperation.....	146
6.3.2 Economic noncooperation.....	147
6.3.3 Political noncooperation .....	150
6.4 Methods of nonviolent intervention.....	152
6.4.1 Sit-ins and occupations .....	152
6.4.2 Alternative communication systems and media.....	153
6.4.3 Alternative economic institutions .....	155
6.4.4 Disclosing identities of secret agents .....	158
6.5 Regular Institutionalised techniques of political action .....	159
6.5.1 Referendum.....	159
6.5.2 Elections.....	161
6.5.3 Negotiation.....	169
6.5.4 Litigation.....	170
6.6 Summary .....	173
6.7 Conclusion .....	173
<b>PART IV:DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .....</b>	<b>175</b>
<b>7.0 CHAPTER 7: GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS .....</b>	<b>175</b>
7.1 Introduction.....	175
7.2 Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) .....	176
7.3 Arrests and imprisonments.....	178

7.4 Internal displacements .....	182
7.5 Introduction of rigid legislation .....	185
7.6 State engineered violence against non-state actors .....	190
7.7 Rigging of elections, intimidation and political violence .....	197
7.8 Militarisation and Politicisation of state institutions.....	203
7.9 Use of food as a political weapon .....	210
7.10 Manipulating church leaders.....	212
7.11 Suppression of activities of NGOs and teachers’ organisations .....	215
7.12 Awarding ‘key’ allies hefty salaries and other packages .....	216
7.13 Violence against dissenting voices and fanning divisions .....	216
7.14 Summary .....	221
7.15 Conclusion .....	222
<b>PART IV:DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .....</b>	<b>223</b>
<b>8.0 CHAPTER 8: EFFECTS OF THE STATE ACTOR AND NON-STATE ACTORS’ CONFLICT .....</b>	<b>223</b>
8.1 Introduction.....	223
8.2 Economic meltdown and the shortage of basic commodities .....	223
8.3 Collapse of service delivery .....	225
8.4 Corruption .....	229
8.5 Displacement and emigration.....	233
8.6 Sanctions .....	235
8.7 Entrenchment of Violence .....	237
8.8 Summary .....	243
8.9 Conclusion .....	244

<b>PART IV:DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .....</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>9.0 CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS OF THE NONVIOLENCE TRAINING PROGRAMME .....</b>	<b>245</b>
9.1 Introduction.....	245
9.2 Importance of the training programme and composition of participants .....	245
9.3 Pre-training programme implementation evaluation .....	246
9.4 The Questionnaire .....	247
9.5 Pre-training questionnaire Findings .....	247
9.6 Content of the training programme .....	249
9.7 Training methods and Participants’ activities .....	251
9.8 The Training, 5-9 January 2015 .....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
9.9 Post-training programme evaluation .....	252
9.10 Prospects for nonviolence in Zimbabwe .....	253
9.11 Summary .....	255
9.12 Conclusion .....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
<b>PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>257</b>
<b>10.0 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>257</b>
10.1 Introduction.....	257
10.2 Main Findings .....	258
10.3: Recommendations.....	261
<b>APPENDICES .....</b>	<b>265</b>
Appendix A: showing budget for the training programme .....	267
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>272</b>



## **List of Tables**

Table 2.1: Examples of successful nonviolent campaigns-----	37
Table 2.2: An operational plan format-----	52
Table 2.3: A summary of the methods of nonviolent action-----	62
Table 4.1: Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia in 1930-----	104
Table 9.1: Pre-training understanding of nonviolence-----	258
Table 9.2: Pre-training understanding of violence-----	258
Table 9.3: Post-training understanding of nonviolence -----	260



**Acronyms**

ACCZ:	Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe
AIPPA:	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ANC:	African National Congress
AU:	African Union
BSAC:	British South Africa Company
CIO:	Central Intelligence Organisation
ESAP:	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FRELIMO:	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FTLRP:	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GMB:	Grain Marketing Board
GNU:	Government of National Unity
GPA:	Global Political Agreement
JOC:	Joint Operations Command
LOMA:	Law and Order Maintenance Act
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-M:	Movement for Democratic Change led by Aurther Mutambara
MDC-N:	Movement for Democratic Change led by Welshman Ncube
MDC-T:	Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai
MIC:	Media and Information Commission
MP:	Member of Parliament
NUNW:	National Union of Namibian Workers

NCA:	National Constitutional Assembly
NDP:	National Democratic Party
NGOs:	Non Governmental Organisations
NSC:	National Security Council
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union
POSA:	Public Order and Security Act
PRV:	Pfumo reVanhu
PTUZ:	Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
RENAMO:	<i>Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana</i> (Mozambique National Resistance)
RSF:	Rhodesian Security Forces
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
SNCC:	Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
SWAPO:	South West Africa People's Organisation
UN:	United Nations
WOZA:	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
ZANLA:	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU:	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF:	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU:	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC-TV:	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television
ZCTU:	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDF:	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIDERA:	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZEC:	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

ZIMTA:	Zimbabwe Teachers' Association
ZINASU:	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZNA:	Zimbabwe National Army
ZPRA:	Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army
ZRP:	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZTV:	Zimbabwe Television
ZUM:	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

*Peace is not the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice*<sup>1</sup>

## **PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

### **1. 0 CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

This chapter gives an outline of the major issues which are contained in the study. It includes a background and rationale of the study, the research context and the research problem. In addition, it outlines the aims and objectives of the study. In addition, a justification of the study is articulated including a summary of the research design and methods used in the study.

Evidence from various works on Zimbabwean history reveals that Zimbabwe experienced the scourge of violence for a long period of time. This influenced scholars to write largely about the brutal epochs at the expense of nonviolent efforts made in the country especially by non-state actors, to compel the state to bring about socio-economic and political changes in the country from 1999 up to 2013. This study focuses on the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns used by non-state actors, to try and influence the state to attend to the serious socio-economic and political problems that affect Zimbabwe.

#### **1.2 Background**

For the past 128 years the history of Zimbabwe has witnessed successive challenges that have resulted in violent conflicts. Since 1890 there has been six major violent conflicts, notably the Anglo Ndebele War of 1893-94, the First *Chimurenga* (Liberation War) of 1896-97, the Second *Chimurenga* of 1964-1980, the Matabeleland Disturbances (*Gukurahundi*) of 1981-87, Mozambique's war with RENAMO from 1982 to 1992 (which affected almost the whole of Zimbabwe's eastern border areas) and the ongoing conflict between the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) from 2000 to the present. The periods of violence attracted attention at the expense of the history of nonviolent campaigns. These dark epochs demonstrate an almost

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Luther King

unbroken sequence of violence in Zimbabwe which deserves practical and urgent attention for sustainable peace and development to prevail in the country.

The Zimbabwean history of violence and conflict dates back to the country's colonisation by Britain in 1890. The white liberal historian, Palmer (1977; 1986) argues that consecutive colonial laws were responsible for violently dispossessing the indigenous Africans of their land. Linked to this, Gundani (2001: 48) noted later that the history of the land question in this country is fundamentally a history of its alienation. By 1899, nearly 16 million acres of arable land had been taken by White settlers from the Blacks (Auret 1990:5). The disillusionment and frustration over the land alienation by the settlers led to the First *Chimurenga* or *Umvukela* (*Umfazwe*) 1896-97 in Zimbabwe in which the Ndebele and Shona were defeated. According to Moyo (1987), the result of the defeat was the establishment of the poorly watered, hot, stony or sandy, tsetse and mosquito infested Native Reserves for Africans. The most noticeable reserves were Gwaai, Nkai and Shangani in Matabeleland; in Masvingo; Zaka, Bikita, Chivi and Matibi 1; and in Manicaland province the rocky and mountainous Chikwaka reserve was established (Moyana 2002:31).

Further land seizures culminated in the passing of the Land Apportionment Act in 1930 which divided the country into Black and White areas. The land available to Blacks was 28 591 606 acres or 29.8 percent for a population estimated at 1 081 000 in 1930 (Palmer 1977: 38-43) whereas 51 percent of the best land was assigned to about 50 000 White settlers. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 which was purported to have reduced the imbalances in land ownership by claiming that 44.9 million acres was allocated to each race (Moyo 1987: 33-49) did very little to redress the problem. Practically, this 'equal allocation' of land gave infertile and/or poorly watered areas to Blacks while Whites occupied 80 percent of the prime agricultural land.

After a significant number of nonviolent approaches pursued by Blacks were given a cold shoulder by the Whites the main Black nationalist parties in the 1960s the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), mobilised millions of land hungry and poor peasants to wage a bloody liberation war against the racist Rhodesian government (Mamdani 20082) by appealing to the idea of *Mwana wevhu/Umntwana womuhlabathi* (child of the soil). It was believed that to deny this 'son of the soil' land ownership was a violation of basic human rights (Zvarevashe 1982:14). Throughout the Second

*Chimurenga* land remained the rallying point in a violent conflict which led to the death of about 30 000 people (CCJP and Legal Resources Foundation 1999:7).

The Second *Chimurenga* ended with the Lancaster House Conference agreement of 1979 whose contentious clauses became the seedbed of the conflict over land 20 years later because of its rigid willing-seller willing-buyer principle.

Following the attainment of independence in 1980 conflict erupted between the ruling ZANU PF party and the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU), the two political parties that had united into the Zimbabwe People's Army to jointly fight against the Rhodesia Security Forces (CCJP and Legal Resources Foundation 1999). This regional conflict affected the two Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces leading to the death of over 20 000 people. The bloody conflict was ended by the signing of the Unity Accord of 1987, but did not remove the shock, grief, anger, bitterness, revengeful thoughts and need for retaliation of the Ndebele people because no efforts were made to reconcile and heal the parties to the violent conflict.

During almost the same period with that of the *Gukurahundi* the eastern border areas of Zimbabwe were susceptible to attacks by the *Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana* (Mozambique National Resistance) (RENAMO) which had been fighting against the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique (Tavuyanago 2002). It was alleged that RENAMO was taking revenge on the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) due to their support of FRELIMO in Mozambique before and after independence; an accusation which the Zimbabwean government refuted under the guise of protecting the Beira and the Maputo corridors for its economic interests. The war led to the deaths, loss of property, and displacement of people also in Zimbabwe's Eastern Districts until it was ended in 1992 by the Rome Accord. It also left a lot of anger and bitterness due to the failure to provide post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation support to the affected people. Sustainable economic development was blocked due to the persistence of uncertainties, fear and insecurity.

It became apparent that the 1987 Unity Accord signed between ZANU and ZAPU was a strategy to usher in one party rule in the country. It was claimed that Zimbabweans were united forever by the 'revolutionary spirit' that had inspired the *Chimurenga*. The emergence of Edgar Tekere's

Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1990s provided a new challenge for ZANU PF. This invigorated ZANU PF to re-examine its political doctrine so that a patriot or loyalist was defined as an individual who backs ZANU PF while supporters of opposition parties were viewed as ‘sellouts’. Consequently, the Zimbabwean situation was marked with political violence, intimidation, violation and disregard of human rights.

The formation of the MDC in September 1999 and its fearsome challenge to the previously uncontested ZANU PF supremacy produced a feeling of alarm inside the ruling party which embarked on merciless attempts to demolish the opposition by extensive use of brutality. Certain that the MDC was a front for white driven interests, ZANU PF responded with the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) dubbed the Third Chimurenga. During the FTLRP land was seized from the White owners without compensation for the land or developments which were carried out on the farms and Blacks were settled without proper planning. The FTLRP was viewed as a feasible strategy for resolving the land issue ‘once and for all’ since it had never been adequately tackled since the attainment of independence in 1980 (Mlambo 2005). Moore and Raftopoulos (2012: 241) note that the Zimbabwean crisis was, ‘rooted in the long-term structural political-economic legacies of colonial rule combined with the legacies of African nationalist politics’ and that it must be understood in the context of a ‘major threat to the political future of the ruling party ZANU PF.’

Even with the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) which followed after the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008, violence and division went on. Consequently, the country remained characterised by bad governance, human insecurity and human rights violations. Even the eagerly awaited election of 31 July 2013 which was hoped would bring sustainable peace and development were rushed and marked by several irregularities that led to another disputed election.

The brutal conflicts outlined above demonstrate that Zimbabweans have been subjected to successive epochs of violence and bloodshed, whereas non-violent campaigns have been ignored. The only viable and lasting strategy to the Zimbabwean conflict is peacebuilding in which dialogue, forgiveness, love, participation (of both victims and perpetrators) and reconciliation are prioritized in the establishment of relationships. This study hence deviates from that of other scholars who focused mainly on the violent experiences in Zimbabwe.

### **1.3 Research Problem**

Violence led to socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe, the region and the wider international community while scholars contest each other about what is more effective between violent and nonviolent campaigns against opponents. In Zimbabwe violent approaches overshadowed nonviolent tactics, but a peace builder and strategist has to establish what the real position is through research. In addition, very little attention has been given by academics to the nonviolent campaigns used by non-state actors such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Zimbabwe National Students' Union (ZINASU), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), the MDC, or to the state's responses and overall outcome during the Zimbabwean conflict between 1999 and 2013. Furthermore, scholarly works have documented success stories in different parts of the world about the success of nonviolent campaigns against ruthless opponents (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; 2011). A cursory examination of the Zimbabwean conflict challenges this conclusion because hatred and dissonance still prevails despite the formation of the GNU which was meant to help in defusing and transforming the conflict and this was not achieved because all efforts culminated in yet another contested election after 31 July 2013. Consequently, the conflict is on-going with no immediate chances of being resolved in sight amid a deteriorating socio-economic and political environment even in the post GNU era. Hence, challenges surrounding the conflict have generated a lot of interest for research and intervention.

Therefore, the issues which need to be researched are the nonviolent campaigns that were undertaken by non-state actors (focusing on strategies and methods' effectiveness in the short and long term) against the state and the responses of the state to these campaigns including the overall impact of the contending parties to the conflict.

The fact that nonviolent campaigns received little attention as compared to violence in the media and academic circles motivated me to provide a comprehensive history of nonviolent campaigns which were used by non-state actors as they engaged the state between 1999 and 2013. After realising the lack of interest in nonviolence, the researcher designed, implemented and evaluated a nonviolence training programme in a drive to highlight the use of nonviolent campaigns in resolving socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe. This was done as a precursor for promoting a culture of nonviolence in the resolution of conflicts.

### **1.4 Research Context**

This study is guided by the conceptual framework of nonviolence which is discussed in chapter 2. Zimbabwe has been rocked by socio-economic and political insecurity and violence since 1890. More recently post election violence, collapse of service delivery (for example in water and sanitation, health, energy and education), widespread unemployment, displacements and



deaths became the order of the day as the government abdicated its responsibility to secure its citizens beyond political affiliations.

Zimbabwe has been affected by serious conflict between non-state actors (including the NCA, the ZCTU, ZINASU, and MDC supporters) and the followers of the state, namely ZANU PF from 1999 to the present. WOZA was also added to the list of non-state actors in 2003. Several scholars such as Hammer, McGregor and Landau (2010), Jones (2010), Musoni (2010) and Raftopoulos have referred to the acute conflict in Zimbabwe as the Zimbabwean crisis. The crisis was manifest 'through loss of land and property rights, disagreements between the government and the civil society groupings, the human rights and constitutional violations, state authoritarianism, the wider pan-African and anti-imperialist significance of the struggles in Zimbabwe and the fundamental role of Robert Mugabe' (Raftopoulos 2009: 202).

In fact, Zimbabweans have lived and are still living in an exceedingly vulnerable economic milieu that requires support from all the conflicting parties for redress. Since 2000 an overwhelming number of Zimbabweans including workers and peasants have been victims of dreadful economic problems. In the process about 100, 000 workers were laid off between 2000 and 2001, one thousand one hundred companies shut down, 1.7 million people survived through the informal sector which became the biggest employer in the country (Kumbawa 2002). The unemployment rate was estimated to be above 90 percent in 2009 (Source?). Zimbabwe has experienced severe poverty challenges and food insecurity which can only be alleviated through multi-stakeholder teamwork. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's public infrastructure facilities which include roads, railways and bridges have deteriorated severely (Kamidza 2009: 3). The crisis has had negative effects on the provision of water and sanitation, health, banking, education, fuel, electricity, waste management and food. Machakanja (2010: 7-8), asserts that the ten years of political violence is seldom described as an 'armed conflict' due to the latent nature of the issues that fed and sustained the crisis.' Added to this, she notes that its comprehension:

is further complicated by the fact that people's narratives, recollections or memories of the political crisis and violence are highly fractured and politicised, to such an extent that there is little consensus on what happened, how it happened and why it happened (Machakanja 2010: 7-8).

The socio-economic and political dislocation has brought inconceivable hardship on Zimbabweans.

During this Zimbabwean crisis violence became the state's survival strategy in word and deed. In fact, ZANU PF methodically and energetically instilled fear by mobilising youths to terrify the population (Chakaodza 2011: 14). It used hateful attacks to humiliate the MDC leadership and endanger the security of the electorate. Linked to this, Samuel Mumbengegwi, former Finance Minister said, 'This is up to you; if you want peace, you should vote for us. If you vote for the MDC, we will go to war' (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe 2009: 2). In addition, President Mugabe threatened that,

ZANU PF fought for our rights, land and a bright future. This legacy should not simply be vanquished by the stroke of a pen at the ballot just because I am not getting basic goods.... Otherwise a simple X would have taken the country back to 1890. The Third Chimurenga can't just die because of an X. All those who died in the struggle will turn in their graves (Sunday Mail reporter 2008: 3).

Moreover, it is clear that Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked as a result of President Mugabe who was quoted saying 'of course, he was bashed. He deserved it. I told the police to beat him a lot' (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008: 14). In another statement, the late Vice-President Joseph Msika said 'If you vote for Tsvangirai on June 27, you are voting for the former Rhodesians and thus you are voting for war' (Post reporter 2008: 1). In 2010, Didymus Mutasa referring to the then Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai said he will never rule Zimbabwe even if he won the elections (Sibanda 2010). Moreover, the state driven violence was revealed by Jonathan Moyo, former Member of Parliament for Tsholotsho who emotively deplored the insecurity which dogged Zimbabwe for over 33 years and put the entire blame on the country's security sector and President Mugabe. He declared:

One does not need to be a malcontent to see that, after 25 years of controversial rule and with the economy melting down as a direct result of that rule, Mugabe's continued stay in office has become such an excessive burden to the welfare of the state and such a fatal danger to the public interest of Zimbabweans at home and in the diaspora that each day that goes by with him in office leaves the nation's survival at great risk while seriously compromising national sovereignty. ... First, Mugabe is now leader of a shelf political party that exists only in name... The rot in Zanu PF smells in government where the Cabinet has become no better than a status club in which ministerial positions have no strategic policy value as they have become instruments of patronage to gain personal access to national resources and the illusion of power and influence. This explains why government has now resorted to ruling through "GBO" (Government By Operations) led by jittery security arms, implemented an undeclared state of emergency and roped in the Reserve Bank to pursue an unprecedented law and order approach to monetary policy in order to criminalise Zimbabweans, whether as individuals, families or businesses, to

make them insecure and vulnerable to inhuman and barbaric attacks in the name of restoring order reminiscent of the Gukurahundi days. ... Mugabe now lacks the vision, stature and energy to effectively run the country, let alone his party (Moyo 2006).

The aforementioned position by those in authority is evidence of the insecurity which prevails in Zimbabwe and the existing situation cannot be allowed to continue if sustainable peace and development are to be attained in the country.

The violence led to displacements, forced migration, loss of life and property, and widespread unemployment. Faced by lack of socio-economic and political security, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans fled the country into neighbouring countries and beyond. A significant number went into South Africa and as a result these immigrants had a huge impact on 'South Africa's social landscape, as well as demand for jobs, housing and other services' (Aggad and Sidiropoulos 2008: 2). Furthermore, Zimbabwe is currently the largest contributor of immigrants to South Africa, yet these immigrants are among the most insecure in South Africa as they become victims of xenophobic attacks (Hopstock and de Jager 2011: 132-133).

Since 2000, state security forces in Zimbabwe committed acts of violence against thousands of civilians, targeting primarily political opponents and aid workers. Human rights violations included imprisonment, disappearance, murder, torture, and rape (Amnesty International 2003; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2002; Human Rights Watch 2007). Related to this, on 30 April 2008, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in its press statement reported that there are 'country-wide reports of systematic violence in the form of assaults, murders, abductions, intimidation and wanton destruction of property against innocent civilians whose alleged crime is to have voted 'wrongly'' (CCJP 2008). More recently, a Face Book network established in March 2013 code named *Baba Jukwa* (a concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking community with their leaders, Government, MPs and Ministers) alleged that several assassinations by ZANU PF including the death of ZANU PF members such as General Solomon Mujuru, Edward Chindori Chininga and MDC activists as well as orchestrating attempts to assassinate Morgan Tsvangirai in an accident that killed his wife, Susan.

The FTLRP led to lack of security because it was violent, racist, partisan, violated the rule of law, led to displacements, loss of employment and life. This revealed traits of greediness as some persons had multiple ownership of fully utilised farms instead of having farm obtained from the

underutilised ones as agreed and directed by the government. Linked to this, Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that:

At the centre of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme there was a ‘relentless pursuit of justice’ that degenerated into ‘a vendetta and ended up in revenge.’ Race came into the picture and a few whites were left dead by the so-called “jambanja” (invasions)/“Hondo Yeminda”/Third Chimurenga (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 207).

The security sector undermined peace from 2000 to the present thereby bringing about increased human insecurity. Therefore, any run up to elections from 2000 to the present was riddled with violence and increased violation of human rights. The country was rocked by corruption and inequitable distribution of resources including the much publicised diamonds at Chiadzwa-Marange in Manicaland province of Zimbabwe (Hove, Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2014). Zimbabweans, however, do not have enough space to advance their grievances as a result of repressive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) which has brought untold suffering both physical and psychological to the ordinary, innocent and vulnerable civilians in the country. With the inauguration of the inclusive government, changes were proposed and partially implemented in some of the contested areas, such as the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, AIPPA, the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) and POSA, although some human rights groups have questioned the significance of these measures (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2010: 3).

### **1.5 Research aims and objectives**

The major aims of this research were to: a) Document the nonviolent campaigns used by the non-state actors (including the MDC) and assess their effectiveness from 1999 to 2013. b) Design, implement and evaluate the effectiveness of imparting knowledge on nonviolence through a training programme.

Its specific objectives were to:

1. Explain the evolution and development of nonviolent campaigns in different parts of the world.
2. Describe the history of violence in Zimbabwe from 1890 to 2013.

3. Examine the nonviolent strategies and methods used by non-state actors to deal with the socio-economic and political challenges, the state's response, and the impact of the nonviolent campaigns used between 1999 and 2013.
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies and methods used by non-state actors between 1999 and 2013.
5. Drawing on insights from the exploratory research, to design and implement a training programme to impart knowledge about nonviolence and how this can be used to resolve conflicts.

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The traditional (?) writers focus on violent strategies in dealing with conflicts but recent studies have shown that major nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006 have scored 53 percent success in achieving their objectives whereas violent resistance achieved a 26 percent success rate (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 8). Again, nonviolent resistance provides limited impediments to ethical and physical participation, information and education, and challenges (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). With these divergent views emerging among scholars it is important to establish an approach which can be used to test and explain the Zimbabwean conflict which began in 1999.

There is limited documentary evidence compiled in academic literature about the role that nonviolence played as a strategy used by non-state actors to persuade and at times compel the state (ZANU PF) to resolve socio-economic and political challenges experienced in the country since 1999. My research contributes by filling this gap by studying the nonviolent campaigns which were used by non-state actors such as the MDC, NCA, ZCTU, ZINASU and WOZA.

Zimbabwe has known violence ever since 1890. This led to the violation of human rights, deaths and displacement of people (Sachikonye 2011). Given this challenge it is imperative to promote the use of nonviolent campaigns in the resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe. Elsewhere nonviolent campaigns became a reference point in addressing challenges, and the culture of violence was replaced by peaceful resolution of socio-economic and political challenges at national level (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 25-37). Accordingly, such a development may contribute in transforming the Zimbabwean conflict and prevent the further emigration of Zimbabweans into

other countries due to socio-economic and political insecurity, end the demonisation of the country, encourage investment, and foster sustainable peace and development.

Albert Bandura, a behaviourist and advocate of social learning theory assert that one acquires destructive or constructive attributes by learning them at home, at school and by communication with the milieu in general (Bandura and Walters 1963: 1-43, 82-84, 177-79). This means that being socialised in a brutal environment, has damaging effects on youth development and is a foundation for violent and harmful behaviour in adult years. In fact, if destructive behaviour directed at environmental stimuli is met with approval by peers and elders, then violence is reinforced. On the other hand, if aggression is met with condemnation and reprimand, rather than approval, then violence will be reduced (Bandura and Walters 1963). What emerges from these scholars is that violence and nonviolence can be taught and hence can be viewed as choices that people make. Given the long exposure of Zimbabweans to violence, this study examines the role nonviolence played between 1999 and 2013 as a way of emphasising the importance of nonviolent campaigns. This is followed by the designing and implementation of a nonviolence training programme, in an effort to build positive peace and replace the culture of violence in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

The Zimbabwean conflict affected the region and the international community and its effects will continue to dog the world unless it is addressed. A peaceful environment is essential for attracting investors and reducing the emigration of large numbers of Zimbabweans into other countries including the Republic of South Africa. My study endeavours to advocate for the use of nonviolent campaigns in addressing socio-economic and political challenges in a drive to establish a favourable investment environment in Zimbabwe and even beyond.

### **1.7 Research design, research methodology and data collection methods**

I employed an exploratory research design to provide the background history of the conflict, understand the nonviolent strategies and methods used, and the responses it elicited from the opponent. In addition, an evaluation design was used to assess the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies and methods used by the non-state actors, and of the responses of the state actor. In addition, I designed and implemented a training programme directed at the conduct of effective nonviolent campaigns.

A qualitative investigative research methodology was applied in this study. I used the following data collection methods:

## **Methods**

## **Techniques**

- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| (i) Analysis of historical material   | I examined records, analysed content, viewed video tapes and films and YouTube writing up my notes, and examined research records.  |
| (ii) Analysis of documents            | I analysed available primary and secondary documentary sources.   |
| (iii) Interviews (twenty respondents) | I recorded informal interviews and used a detailed schedule with open-ended and closed questions to interview 20 respondents who had been involved in nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013.   |
| (iv) Nonviolence training programme:  | I designed and implemented a training programme based on insights from the interviews. I trained forty volunteers to help them gain more knowledge about nonviolence that would compel the state actor to address pressing socio-economic and political challenges. |

For selecting the 20 respondents I used convenience sampling, choosing students from tertiary educational institution because it was convenient for me as a lecturer and colleagues who are also researchers were cognisant of the value of my research. Snowballing was used to identify students with knowledge of nonviolent campaigns. Data was organised according to themes and tables were used to present data. Details regarding the research design, methodology and data collection methods are discussed in chapter five.

## **1.8 Overview**

Chapter two covers the conceptual framework which is the core of this study. Various aspects of the nonviolence concept such as strategic planning, types, strategies, methods and their merit

over violence are discussed. The third chapter examines the evolution and historical development of the concept of nonviolence in Asia, the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and Africa before focusing on Zimbabwe the location of this study. Chapter four provides an overview of the general causes of violence and/or terrorism and a history of violence in Zimbabwe. This is undertaken as a precursor of justifying the importance of continuous training of non-state actors in the use of nonviolent campaigns to persuade and at times compel the state to address the socio-economic and political challenges facing the country. In the fifth chapter, the research design, methodology, data collection methods, sampling techniques and ways of analysing data are provided. Chapter six presents and analyses the findings of the first part of objective 3 about the nonviolent campaigns used in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 and the findings of the second part of objective 3 are discussed in chapter seven which presents the responses of the state as it confronted the non-state actors. The eighth chapter presents findings of the third part of objective 3 on the impact of nonviolent strategies and methods which were used in Zimbabwe during the period covered by this study. The ninth chapter (which deals with objective 5) evaluates the effectiveness of the nonviolence training programme which was initiated due to the limited knowledge about nonviolence that was revealed during the course of the interviews. Chapter ten provides conclusions drawn from the study and also gives recommendations to various stakeholders who are critical for the continued use and propagation of nonviolent approaches in the resolution of socio-economic and political challenges faced by Zimbabweans.

## **Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW**

*'Brute force can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom' –Dalai Lama*

### **2.0 CHAPTER 2: THE THEORIES OF NONVIOLENCE**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

In the past, subjugated people, time and again engaged violence in their struggle for liberation. However, in the present world with the teachings drawn from nonviolent visionaries, Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., and nonviolence theorists such as Gene Sharp and Richard B. Gregg, it has been demonstrated to us how significant changes can be brought about nonviolently so that violence can be avoided. The wish of the majority of humanity to be peaceful, constructive and develop provides a fertile ground to cultivate a culture of nonviolence in the resolution of socio-economic and political conflicts in Zimbabwe.



This chapter provides the conceptual framework guiding this thesis. It provides various definitions of the term nonviolence in order to come up with a definition which embraces the kinds of nonviolence which have been used in Zimbabwe. It provides the reasons why people advocate and adopt nonviolence so that one can compare it with the considerations that made Zimbabweans follow the nonviolent path. It discusses various misconceptions about nonviolence so as to see whether they are also held in Zimbabwe. Finally, it compares the different approaches to nonviolence focusing on methods of nonviolence such as pragmatic and principled nonviolence, and the planning and propagation of nonviolent campaigns, so as to find out whether or not these were taken into consideration during the Zimbabwean nonviolent campaigns.

## **2.2 Definitions of nonviolence**

Nonviolence as a belief and strategy goes beyond the denial of violence to accomplish political transformation by vigorously opposing violence. It should therefore not be confused with *non-violence*, which refers to a simple action that does not involve any violence. According to the United States Institute of Peace (2009: 4), there is no consensus about the meanings of terms such as nonviolent and nonviolence because many languages have no words for these concepts. Plausible arguments have been made against the use of the word nonviolence because it fails to differentiate between popular mass action and normative, ethical, or religious beliefs regarding nonviolence. Some of the terms used to define nonviolent action, are useful whilst others are not. Terms that may be misconstrued are ‘nonviolent resistance’, ‘civil resistance’, ‘passive resistance’, ‘nonviolence’, ‘people power’, ‘political defiance’, and ‘positive action’ (Sharp 2005: 20). Finnegan and Hackley (2008) note that instead ‘in the literature and in practice, the strategy has been referred to as ‘nonviolent struggle’, ‘people power’, ‘civilian-based defence’, ‘nonviolent conflict’, and ‘strategic nonviolent conflict’, among other terms’. Nonviolence has been defined as a philosophy that discounts the use of brutal exploit in a divergence over power to achieve social and political intentions but nonviolence is also multifaceted and has diverse denotations (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 2006). The term has commonly been understood in the pessimistic sense as the nonexistence of violence. However, nonviolence can also be seen as an assumption and practice that uses a constructive, dynamic and powerful system for achieving definite aims. Pragmatic and principled nonviolence are two different kinds of nonviolence that can be identified.

Mohandas K. Gandhi, the Indian independence leader emphasised the fact that nonviolence is active. Sharp (2005: 37) notes that, Gandhi recognised that nonviolence required an active or positive shift when he indicated that changing of patterns of obedience and cooperation should be preceded by a transformation of will and attitudes on the part of the advocates of the strategy. From this viewpoint, activity is part and parcel of the whole process bringing about change where conscious influence leads to a psychological shift or movement to self-respect and courage, away from passive submission. Subjects have to realise that the regime can only continue to exist due to their assistance, and that they therefore have to withdraw their cooperation and obedience in a determined way.

War Resisters' International defines nonviolence as 'either (1) the behaviour of people who in a conflict refrain from violent acts; or (2) any of several belief systems that reject violence (both physical and structural) on principle, not just as impractical'. These comprise a wish to transform authority relations and public configurations, an approach of respect for everyone or human life, or even an idea of life or premise of social exploit (War Resisters' International 2009: 9, 144).

On the basis of the above insights, I define nonviolence as the peaceful resolution of conflict through protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and intervention, without resorting to physical and structural violence.

Meanings of terms that relate to specific actions need further elucidation. These terms are nonviolent action, nonviolent resistance, and nonviolent struggle. According to Sharp (2003: 34) nonviolent action is a way of accomplishing objection, opposition, and interference without resorting to physical violence. These actions may be carried out through deeds of either omission or commission or a blend of the two. It includes several specific methods that are grouped into three broad classes which are respectively nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention. According to Schock (2003: 705), nonviolent action encompasses action in a joint quest for societal and political justice, but excludes violence or the threat of it.

Another critical term is that of nonviolent resistance. It is defined as 'nonviolent struggle, conducted largely by noncooperation, in reaction to an act, policy, or a government that a person or group disapproves of' (War Resisters' International 2009: 145).

According to Sharp (1990: 1), nonviolent struggle is a political modus operandi or strategy

which engages political, socio-economic and psychological approaches and sanctions which inflict force or punishment in contrast to being violent. It is therefore similar to nonviolent action. It signifies that resorting to nonviolent action in a conflict is in fact decisive and forceful. Nonviolent struggle is particularly appropriate with regard to nonviolent action against resolute and equipped opponents who use oppressive counter methods (War Resisters' International 2009: 145). Sharp (1990: 2) notes that the state adversary generally has considerable 'administrative, economic, political, police and military capacity'. The State machinery is headed by the privileged who are viewed as antagonistic and harmful to the wellbeing and security of the majority. The opponent group may also be a non-state faction backed by the State equipment. Nonviolence is hence perceived as a technique for dealing with conflict and bringing about socio-economic and political change.

### **2.3 Why nonviolent resistance?**

This section reviews the reasons why individuals and movements are convinced of the strength of nonviolence as opposed to the short-lived nature of violence.

The extent of world problems and the inability of the responsible governments, governmental, regional, continental and international bodies such as the United Nations to deal with the problems in the world is a clear demonstration that nonviolent resistance is an alternative that can prove to be worthwhile. According to Martin and Varney (2003b: 9-10), 'the problems are enormous, but governments and international bodies, which are supposed to be responsible for fixing them, are either ineffectual or actually the cause of the problems'. Despite peacekeeping forces many wars are going on across the world, and despite the end of the cold war, military spending continues at a high level, the possibility of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare remains, and so-called 'conventional weapons' are being made more deadly, and there is massive research into ever more effective ways to kill, maim, control and manipulate people. It is in this light that my study examines the strategies which were used by the government in Zimbabwe to quell nonviolent campaigns.

There are different views as to whether violent or nonviolent ways more effective in confronting ruthless opponents. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008; 2011) are renowned for advocating nonviolent strategies and differ radically from other writers such as Pape (2005; 1996), Byman and Waxman (2000), Horowitz and Reiter (2001) and Abrahms (2006) who consider the use of

violence as being more effective. While the traditional belief supports violent strategies in dealing with conflicts, recent studies have shown that major nonviolent campaigns have scored 53 percent success whereas violent resistance achieved a 26 percent success rate (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 8). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 8) arrived at this conclusion after thorough empirical research. They examined the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent campaigns in conflicts between non-state and state actors using aggregated data on prominent nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 by means of a statistical comparison of historical cases that were characterised by periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance in different historical epochs and geographical milieus, convincingly demonstrating that violence does not take place because of structural and environmental reasons, or is necessary to achieve political ends. We have to ask whether this also is true for Zimbabwe.

Mattaini (2003: 151-152) claims that nonviolence can be used both for defensive and offensive purposes, with many examples of effective strategies for protecting populations, cultures and institutions available, compared to defensive military operations for protecting national borders from outside attacks. This distinction is important as it clearly shows that nonviolence can be used as both a tool of resistance and a tool for bringing about change, including regime change.

For over a Century, from 1900 to 2006, nonviolent campaigns were more than twice as efficient compared to the violent campaigns in accomplishing their given aims because they were able to attract wide participation from the population. Most academics using strong prominence on statistical analysis during their assessment of the effectiveness of nonviolent approaches against repressive regimes as compared to violent strategies concluded that nonviolent resistance must win the backing of the military to topple tyrannical regimes (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Nonviolent campaigns win support of the military because ‘One common scenario leading to loyalty shifts is when the regime violently cracks down on a popular nonviolent’ movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 50). Accordingly, ‘successful violent campaigns saw defections occur approximately 32 percent of the time, while successful nonviolent campaigns experienced defections about 52 percent of the time’ (King 2012). Therefore, the ability by nonviolent advocates to alienate the military from the regime influence the military to betray the regime thereby enabling democratic revolutionaries to succeed before the regime use the military to rout the democratic opposition (Katz 2003). Again, nonviolent

resistance succeeds since it ushers in limited barriers to ethical and physical participation and loyalty, and that the higher levels of involvement lead to improved resilience, increased chances for strategic innovation and civic interruption and transfer in support amongst the opponents' former allies plus members of the military organisation (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Miller and King (2006: 18-19) argue that nonviolent resistance has over time been used by diverse peoples in many different circumstances. It has been used throughout the world by people of all sexes and age groups, occupations, and classes seeking social and political security. It has occurred under both autocratic and democratic regimes. McCarthy and Kruegler (1993: 1) observe that no government is immune to nonviolent challenge whether despotic or democratic. Watner (2006: 33-34) further note that advocates of nonviolence argue that nonviolent struggle has not failed due to brutal suppression but rather as a result of weaknesses in the way it was conducted or applied. Ackerman and Rodal (2008: 115) therefore claim that civil resistance can be used today in any part of the world where the welfare of people and tyrannical authority cannot be reconciled. However, authoritarian rulers such as can be found in countries like Zimbabwe, China, Russia, and Burma also recognise how powerful civilian based nonviolent action can be and are hence determined to constrain its development by presenting it as an externally driven evil meant to bring about regime change (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 120-121). My own research reveals the reasons which compelled Zimbabweans to resort to nonviolence as they confronted the government of Zimbabwe.

Such reasons include those whose nonviolence as a valuable tool for bringing about social change while others practice it as a way of life (War Resisters' International 2009: 9). According to Weber and Burrowes (1991), nonviolence can be used mainly because it is accessible to everyone and does not alienate antagonists or third parties, and because it fractures the sequence of brutality and counter-hostility. It makes room for change, draws attention to the challenge as opposed to violence, and is much more likely to attract public sympathy and support. In short, it has greater opportunities for generating beneficial rather than ruinous results, works toward conflict resolution, develops self-awareness, and is the only form of struggle that is in line with the tradition of the main religions. By remaining dialogic and participatory, it is also highly transformative (Martin and Varney (2003a: 219).

Gelderloos (2007), an anarchist and critic of nonviolence, claims that nonviolence is ineffective, racist, statist, patriarchal, inferior tactically and strategically, and deluded. These claims, according to Martin (2008) are a sign of misunderstanding nonviolence and are made without evidence. He argues that Gelderloos demonstrates lack of awareness of the pragmatic approach in nonviolent action, misrepresenting it as comprising only of protest and persuasion, and omitting the more forceful methods of noncooperation and intervention. He in addition attacks principled nonviolence from a standpoint in which the end validates the means. He castigates nonviolent action campaigns on the basis of a number of premises that logically exhibit double standards. One can therefore ask what reasons have been advanced by Zimbabweans who do not believe in the use of nonviolent campaigns in dealing with entrenched governments.

King and Miller (2006: 23) note that Gene Sharp demonstrated that violence decreases chances for negotiation and reconciliation, while nonviolent action advanced the probability of conflict resolution, peaceful settlement and reconciliation. The quest for justice using nonviolent action can resolve grievances reducing the possibility of revenge, which is which is a characteristic of violent struggles. They quote Martin who asserts that hostility clashes with the aims of nonviolent culture. Violence breeds brutality and inflicts sudden agony on its victims. Where there is reliance on violence campaigns easily degenerate into cycle of violence and oppression. Weber and Burrowes (1991) affirm that as a strategy of activism, nonviolence guarantees no automatic and dependable victory like other methods of conflict handling. Closely linked to this, Popovic, Milivojevic and DjinoVIC (2006: 22) citing a 2005 Freedom House Study by Karatnycky and Ackerman, point out that in 50 of 67 democratic transitions during the previous 33 years, nonviolent resistance was a key factor. They further claim that when the opposition movements employed nonviolent resistance, change would lead to a freer and fairer community, while those who use violence reduce the chances of attaining sustainable democracy. Using empirical evidence, Celstino and Gleditsch (2013: 385) are in agreement that nonviolent protests greatly improve the chance of transitioning to democracy, particularly when the international environment is favourable. Direct violent action on the other hand, is less effective in undermining dictatorships and is more likely to lead to new dictatorships. Chabot and Sharifi (2013) citing both past and recent examples of Iran and Egypt reiterate that only principled nonviolence of the Gandhian model can promote better and fairer societies, whereas pragmatic nonviolence that succeeds in overthrowing dictators also promotes the overt and covert violence

that is associated with neoliberalism and democracy.

Gregg (1960: 100) further argues that nonviolent resistance is more cost-effective than war because it costs far less in money as well as in lives and suffering as it usually permits a large part of the agricultural and industrial work of the people to carry on, and hence normal can be maintained during the struggle. He cites the example of the Indian struggle for independence during which probably not more than five hundred Indians received permanent injuries and not more than eight thousand were killed or died later from wounds. On the British side not a soul was either killed or wounded. He further declares that given the long time the conflict lasted, the casualties much lower than they would have been if the Indians had used violence against the British. In support of this, Mattaini (2003: 152) remarks that during Gandhi's Salt *Satyagraha* campaign only two protesters died and 320 were hospitalized. In the deadly massacre at Jalianwala Bagh, nearly 400 were killed and over 1100 wounded, according to the most common estimates. Sharp (1990: 9) also points out that casualty numbers are generally a lot lower in nonviolent campaigns than in conventional or guerrilla wars.

Helvey (2004: xi) also affirms that a smaller number of lives are lost and concludes that there is less destruction of assets. Furthermore, the socio-economic costs of violence are extensive since those who do not participate in the conflict also suffer, as was the case with the collateral damage experienced in the bombing of Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan (Popovic, Milivojevic and DjinoVIC 2006: 22). Zunes (2005: 2) comments that even when an equipped rebellion is triumphant, huge sections of the population are forced to leave their home areas, farms and villages are laid waste, cities and the nation's infrastructure are ruthlessly destroyed and the economy is ruined, leading to serious ecological damage. The overall outcome is a growing recognition that the payback of war may not merit the costs. Mattaini (2003: 153) adds that even though both violence and nonviolent action produce reverberating effects, the former has damaging emotional effects on many people who are not directly involved such as the economic and intercultural shifts that resulted from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US. Compare this with the positive effects of nonviolent action as exemplified by the US civil rights movement which spurred several social reforms focused on expanding rights and opportunities to the African Americans suffering from discrimination. Nonviolent campaigns have advantages over violent campaigns because there can be a backlash against the originators of violence by, for example,

causing division among regime supporters, such as the judiciary, members of the security sector, and civil servants (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 11). Sharp (1990: 9) observes that while it is commonly alleged that nonviolent action takes longer to have an impact than violent resistance it is not always the case because nonviolence has at times been victorious in a few weeks or days. The protest by non-Jewish (Aryan) wives against the arrest of their Jewish husbands in the heart of Berlin in 1943 which culminated in the Nazi government releasing the Jewish prisoners after several days of protest (Martin 2005) and the Egyptian revolution of 2011 which removed Hosni Mubarak are good examples. In fact, Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013: 271) note that the Arab Spring events of 2011 make clear the importance and rapid impact of nonviolent resistance.

Nonviolent resistance creates more effective peace as it does not leave a sense of frustration, whereas violence inevitably breeds hatred, revenge and bitterness. Nonviolent resistance acts more quickly than war. Thus nonviolent resistance certainly produces less ill-effects, if there are any, than war does, and this reduction of ill-effects benefits both the users of nonviolence, as well as the opposing side, and the world at large' (Gregg 1960: 101).

Nonviolent campaigns may be viewed as operating more directly than political violence. It challenges economic issues through economic resistance and political grievances are addressed by means of noncooperation or collaboration regulated by the need of the situation. The nonviolent sanctions strike directly at the opponent's sources of power, namely the cooperation and obedience on which they depend, instead of targeting the opponent's military might which are the apparent expression of the opponent's power. For instance, widespread strikes can cripple the economy while large scale rebellion can paralyse the army (Sharp 1990: 11). Basing their arguments on a combination of statistical and qualitative research, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 42) make several assertions. Nonviolent campaigns that force loyalty transfer amongst members of the security forces and civilian bureaucratic system have higher chances of success. Repression in some instances, including the Philippines and East Timor, attracted 'well-timed international sanctions' which led to the success of nonviolent resistances. Violent and nonviolent campaigns with wide and cross-cutting participation stand the best opportunity of attracting defectors and winning international support.

Sharp (1990: 6) stresses that the premise that supremacy gains from violence and that triumph essentially accrues with the superior capability for violence is mistaken. This can be supported



by ample evidence from historical and recent examples showing successful nonviolent campaigns. Examples of such successful nonviolent campaigns are many and some are shown in table 2.1 below. Roberts (1991: 1) also states that the defeat of communist rule in European countries was not caused by nuclear weapons or the use of military might, but by civil struggle. Sharp (2005: 444) observes that ‘however, the formulation and the application of strategy in large-scale nonviolent struggles are more complex than in military conflicts. This is because the factors contributing to success and failure in nonviolent struggles are more numerous than in military struggles’ since the former involves many institutions of the society and a greater number of people as opposed to only having the military forces as combatants as is the case with the latter. Supporting this, Chenoweth and Stephan note that nonviolent campaigns have a higher success chance as compared to violent campaigns. The strength of the regime makes very little difference to the success of the campaign. The key to victory are the methods and strategies used by the advocates and a wider participation which cuts across all age groups. In fact, proper organisation, relevant methods and large numbers of participants are vital to the success of a nonviolent campaign. Accordingly, these renowned scholars who did research on the strength of violent and nonviolent campaigns concluded that:

Violent resistance against conventionally superior adversaries is the most effective way for resistance groups to achieve policy goals. Instead, ...nonviolent resistance is a forceful alternative to political violence that can pose effective challenges to democratic and non democratic opponents, and at times can do so more effectively than violent resistance (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 9).

**Table 2.1 Examples of successful nonviolent campaigns**

Country	Year	Commentary
Nazi Germany	1943	The Rosenstrasse protest by Aryan wives in the heart of Berlin for the release of their Jewish husbands is one among other examples of successful nonviolent resistance in Germany and shows that nonviolence can be successful even against ruthless opponents (Celeste 2012).
El Salvador	1944	Popular nonviolent campaign toppled the dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez despite being a US client state (Martin 2008).
India	1947	Strategic nonviolent struggle led by Mahatma K. Gandhi since 1916 led to Indian independence from the British Empire. The British government was pressured by Gandhi mobilising people and restoring their self-respect encouragement, culminating in them leading mass non-cooperation and establishing institutions outside British control, consequently undermining its dominance, both in India and abroad (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 18).
Philippines	1986	Philippines despot Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown through ‘people power’ (Martin 2005) when during the struggle among their numerous actions the nonviolent resisters safeguarded soldiers who withdrew their loyalty from the regime (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 19).

Eastern Europe	1989	Following the collapse of communism in Poland, the legitimacy of one-party systems disappeared in eastern Europe as people in country after country took to the streets demanding regime change and these led to free multi-party elections being held throughout the region by 1990. Nonviolent movements successfully undermined the one-party systems putting pressure on the political leadership and the Soviet Union was hesitant to aid the Communist regimes in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in 1990 (Peaceful Revolutions n. d.).
Poland	1989	Fall of socialist systems in Eastern Europe in countries like Poland was made successful by a decade-long nonviolent struggle waged by the Solidarity organization. This organization started by using strikes to establish a free trade union, and went on to use underground activities that challenged and made illegitimate the government during martial law. Consequently, Solidarity was invited for negotiations by Poland's communist president paving way for free and fair elections (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinojovic 2006: 19).
South Africa	1990	The termination of apartheid in South Africa was largely due to effective mass nonviolent action that characterised its decisive phase in the 1980s. Despite having Nelson Mandela imprisoned for most of this period, the apartheid regime was pressured to negotiate a new political arrangement which guaranteed equal rights by boycotts, strikes and protests led by his followers (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinojovic 2006: 18).
Soviet Union	1991	A coup in the Soviet Union was prevented by strategic nonviolent action where people resisted it by strikes, stay-aways among other means and even saw soldiers ordered to shoot demonstrators sympathising with protesters (Martin and Varney 2003b: 31-33).
Tajikistan	1991	Among other things the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to the strong support and nonviolent civic influence the independent countries enjoyed. Protests led by the newly formed Rastokhez, that were violently suppressed, gave greater momentum for political change and this led to other opposition parties joining in peaceful demonstrations lobbying for change thereby forcing the government to make some concessions that eventually led to its independence. Nonviolent action in different forms also saw the gaining of independence of other countries from the Soviet Union in 1990 like Mongolia, Lithuania and Moldova and in 1991 in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia (Peaceful Revolutions n. d.).
Indonesia	1998	The stepping down of President Suharto owed much to popular force (Martin 2005). Protests encouraged many people to join and participate whilst the regime's open repression against the protesters backfired against it (Martin and Varney 2003b: 28-29).
Serbia	2000	The fall of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic was triggered by mass movement led by Otpor (Martin 2005; 2008).
Madagascar	2002	Nonviolent action through massive protests, strikes and demonstrations was initiated following a disputed 2001 election outcome where both President Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana were claiming victory, that lead to a High Constitutional Court ruling after a recount that neither candidate had won an overall majority. Ravalomanana had won 46% and Ratsiraka 40% of the vote further strengthening the opposition when a runoff election was called within 30 days. The runoff election outcome saw Ravalomanana declared winner of the election in May 2002 becoming new president of Madagascar despite violence mainly came from supporters of Ratsiraka in the run up to the election (Peaceful Revolutions n. d.).
Georgia	2003	A corrupt and unrepresentative regime led by Eduard Shervadnadze was dethroned through nonviolence in the Rose Revolution where the clenched fist symbol was replaced by a hand holding a rose (Deats 2009: 9).
Ukraine	2004-05	Pro-democracy nonviolent campaigns resulted in defections by the military and police leading to the fall of the dictator (Merryman and DuVall 2006: 3) bringing about the success of the Orange Revolution where orange flags, shirts and tents were the symbols for the protestors that were spread throughout the streets where masses of citizens were encamped (Deats 2009: 9).
Kyrgyzstan	2005	A corrupt and authoritarian regime led by President Askar Akayev was dethroned in the Tulip Revolution which was led by Kelkel, a student movement, following the parliamentary elections in February and March 2005 through mainly nonviolent action although there were some violent incidents during its initial days (Peaceful Revolutions n. d.).
Lebanon	2005	Nonviolent action following the death of former prime minister Rafik Hariri saw the occupation of Martyr's Square by hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people in anti-Syrian protests leading to the resignation of the pro-Syria Prime Minister Omar Karami and his cabinet although they temporarily remained in office in a caretaker role waiting for replacements (Peaceful Revolutions

		n. d.).
Thailand	1992& 2006	A military dictatorship was removed from power in May 1992 by people through nonviolent struggle of widespread strikes and protests. The Thai Prime Minister was again forced to resign in early 2006 by a nonviolent movement as there was a wide belief that he was corrupt (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 19).

In fact, nonviolent struggle because of its nature has to depend on popular support coming from the complaint cluster, third parties and even from the opponent's cadres and supporters (Sharp 1990: 14). Violent struggles rarely involve the participation of many ordinary members of society as is the case with nonviolent campaigns, due to the central role that military forces play (Martin 2008). In other words, violence limits involvement. Able bodied men dominate in conventional and guerrilla forces. The concealment associated with guerrilla forces restricts participation. Nonviolence's ability to accommodate gender-inclusiveness inclines it to avoid a mixed strategy and violence, but to rather stick to nonviolent methods (Asal et al. 2013). However, Carrington (n. d.: 12) is of the view that the fact that fewer participants are required for violent campaigns to successfully prosecute their objectives does give them a certain advantage over nonviolent campaigns.

Helvey (2004: 118) confirms that one critical merit 'of a nonviolent strategy that is not always enjoyed where violence is employed, is that its ranks and leadership benefit immeasurably from the complete absence of age or gender restrictions.' On the other hand, violence inevitably excludes the less physically active but nevertheless valuable supporters to a movement. Nonviolent resistance's mobilization of support cuts across all spheres, geographic locations, gender, classes, status, age groups and ethnicity (Gregg 1960: 102). Martin and Varney (2003b: 87) state that almost all sections of the population can take part in methods which include boycotts, strikes, and rallies that are highly empowering. Martin (2008) is of the view that 'violence can be giving power to those concerned, but partial contribution means the empowerment is limited'. It can in fact be argued that nonviolent resistance is much more appropriate to the struggle for global emancipation, quest to end hostility and domestic usurpation of resources from the weak which is prevalent in the entire world (Sharp 1990: 18). Carrington (n. d.: 8-9) observes that nonviolent movements achieve much more when they draw in support widely, and will not accomplish their goals when they fail to mobilize a forceful and varied group of participants that can wear down the command base of the opponent and sustain

toughness in the midst of subjugation.

Carrington (n. d.: 10-11) further notes that violent campaigns are more likely than nonviolent campaigns to secure direct foreign aid in the form of arms and funding. They are more than fifteen times more likely to secure direct material support from foreign states, which is believed to be much more effective than the social and moral aid available to nonviolent campaigns. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 8-9; 2011) however challenge these assumptions and insist that a campaign's devotion to nonviolent techniques enhances its local and global profile and recognition, thereby attracting wider support for the struggle, which can bring much more pressure to bear on the opponent. They further argue that potentially compassionate civics recognizes aggressive combatants as encompassing maximalist or radical aims further than accommodation. They also perceive nonviolent fighting groups as less excessive and in that way they augment their demand and aid the drawing out of concessions through negotiation. Zunes (2005: 2) agrees that a different drawback of armed uprising is that maintaining a strong military presence usually requires ongoing external sponsorship to obtain weaponry. However, this reliance will have strings attached and this at times compel the old oppressive rulers to partner with major powers in an effort to overthrow the new government. Citing the Libyan rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi (where international support changed the outcome of the conflict) and superpower experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan during the Cold War, Carrington (n. d.: 11-12) points out that economic sanctions rarely prove to be a deciding factor in nonviolent campaigns, whereas direct military aid has propelled many locally weak insurgencies to ultimate victory. He notes that, 'arms cannot help nonviolent movements and funding, though helpful in any situation cannot produce tangible, quantifiable tools on which violent campaigns rely.' His main argument is that nonviolent movements' strength is their ability to draw in a large number of people, and thereby having a much greater impact than violent movements. It nonetheless remains true that people can only afford to protest and strike for a certain period of time before they will be forced to return to work in order to fend for their families.

Critics say that nonviolence does not work against ruthless and repressive opponents. They cite the example of the British in India. Martin (2005) like Celste (2012), Caplan (1994) and Stratford (1987) dispute this, drawing attention to the way that nonviolence succeeded against the Nazi occupation of Norway during World War II, when the Norwegian government led by

Quisling ordered the teaching of Nazi dogma in schools. The teachers refused and many were imprisoned. In the end, fearing a backlash the Quisling government withdrew its directive and Nazi indoctrination was stopped. Schock (2003: 708) points out that ‘nonviolent resistance to Nazis in Norway, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Romania saved the lives of countless Jews.’

The debates about the strengths and weaknesses of violence and nonviolence motivated me to examine more closely the reasons why some Zimbabweans resorted to nonviolence against the establishment of the day between 1999 and 2013.

## **2.4 Misconceptions about nonviolence**

It is necessary first to review how the concept of nonviolence was misconstrued elsewhere, in order to discuss misconceptions that exist about the nonviolent campaigns that took place in Zimbabwe during the period covered by this research.

Nonviolent action has been viewed as ineffective, ignoring the truth of power in politics, and having naïve advocates who do not accept that violence is the real source of power in politics (Sharp 1990: 1). These misconceptions arise as a result of disregarding the key role of power in politics as well as in the dynamics of nonviolent struggle.

Funk (2002) notes that one of the most frequent misconceptions about nonviolence as an approach to peace is that it is a paradigm that enjoins passivity, which is a supposition that reflects the dominance of power politics assumptions. It equates power with the ability to hurt and regard it as the exclusive possession of governments and armed militant groups. Nonviolence activists do not subscribe to this view and propose that the power of any government derives primarily from the consent of the people and only secondarily from coercion. By consenting to a given status quo and operating within the framework of a given regime, people empower it. Alternatively, when people reduce or withdraw their approval they can weaken, dent and challenge the status quo thereby creating new possibilities for other constituencies (Sharp 1990: 4).

Nonviolence should not be confused with religious and ethical beliefs that do not support using violence. King and Miller (2006: 64, 66) argue that faith may be involved in some struggles, but religious motivation is not a prerequisite to practice nonviolent methods since it is possible in

any culture or religious setting. They further assert that the spiritual strength and religious confidence of Gandhi and King at times exceed the calculated thinking that underlies the utilization of nonviolent struggle. They moreover conclude that bystanders commit the mistake of believing that one must be compelling, noble, or imbued with outstanding qualities to use such strategies. Mattaini (2003: 158) is also of the opinion that it is not clear whether nonviolent campaigns require charismatic leadership, because most well known examples have had such figures but relying on them has both advantages and disadvantages. Finnegan and Hackley (2008) confirm that courageous and innovative leaders led in many, but not all cases of nonviolent action.

Schock (2003: 705-706) declares that nonviolent action is not inaction, submissiveness, avoidance of conflict, passive resistance, limited to state sanctioned political activities, composed of regular institutionalized techniques of political action (such as litigation, letter writing, lobbying, voting, or the passage of laws), a form of negotiation or compromise, assuming that the state will not react with violence and structurally determined. In fact, nonviolent action is an unswerving determination to confront adversaries, and an open rebuff of inaction, compliance and passivity. It does not depend on moral authority, coercion, or require that activists hold particular ideological, religious, or metaphysical beliefs, and it may be legal or illegal (such as with civil disobedience). Sharp (2005: 21-22) supports Schock when he identifies some of them as understandings that are still widespread concerning nonviolent struggle, when he says that nonviolent action has nothing to do with passivity and submissiveness. It is a way of handling conflict and can be very powerful. It does not depend on the assumption that people are inherently 'good', but recognizes the potentialities of people for both 'good' and 'evil', can be practised by 'ordinary' people and is well aware that opponents may use violence against nonviolent resisters. Nonviolent resistance has been widely employed against powerful governments, foreign colonisers, dictatorial regimes, despotic rule, empires, brutal dictatorships and totalitarian systems. He adds that one of the many common myths about conflict is that violence works speedily, whilst nonviolent resistance delays to bring results. This is not true. Some violent struggles and wars have lasted many years, even decades, while there are nonviolent campaigns that have brought about changes speedily, even within days or weeks. The time that it takes to attain victory depends on various factors, including the strength of nonviolent resisters' resolve, and the wisdom of their actions.

My research therefore examines the misconceptions that were prevalent among Zimbabweans regarding nonviolence and violence as means to bring about change, and how such misconceptions can be addressed through a training programme designed to cultivate the culture of resolving socio-economic and political challenges through nonviolent methods.

## **2.5 Types of Nonviolence**

There are two main approaches to nonviolence that have been advanced by scholars, activists and organisations. These are firstly; the strategic considerations of resorting to nonviolence referred to as pragmatic nonviolence, and secondly, ethically based nonviolence generally known as principled nonviolence. This section presents some of the important ideas about nonviolence as advanced by the major proponents. In this study I identify the type(s) of nonviolence used and the orientation of the contestants during the campaigns that took place in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2013.

### **2.5.1 Pragmatic nonviolence**

Pragmatic nonviolence can be 'understood as the decision to use nonviolence based upon strategic considerations and does not rely on a fundamental commitment to nonviolence which extends to all situations; it may be limited only to the situation at hand' (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2006). Martin and Varney (2003b: 82) note that the pragmatic approach to nonviolent action is the one most commonly advanced appropriate than always resorting to violence for a given intention. John (n. d.) conceptualises pragmatic nonviolence as a system of action, instrumentally envisioned and premised on logical alternative assumptions as opposed to normative ones, with victory in the conflict as its main goal. In other words, Weber and Burrowes (1991) assert that *pragmatic* adversaries employ nonviolent action as a method due to its effectiveness in given conditions and define conflict as a relationship involving opponents with irreconcilable interests so that their aim is to defeat the antagonist.

Martin and Varney (2003a: 214-215) say that pragmatic nonviolence is hinged on the assumption that nonviolent action is more effective than other means of action against opposing hostility and oppression, and in particular that it is more effective than violence. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006) state that pragmatic nonviolence is rooted in the use of practical, constructive nonviolent strategies and actions. Its aim is to

transform the status quo (including that of individuals), from adverse conditions that affect a particular group to the broader politics of supremacy in the public sphere.

Pragmatic nonviolence theory is hence founded on the idea that the power of a ruler emanates from the consent of the people being ruled (society) so that the sources of power are based on the acceptance of the ruler's right to rule ('authority') over economic resources, manpower, military capacity, knowledge, skills, administration, police, prisons, and courts etc that are the instruments of power. The effectiveness of these sources of power depends on the extent of collaboration, compliance, obedience and support that the ruler is able to get from his subordinates. That reliance makes it feasible, under certain conditions, for the ruled to reduce access to these bases of power or to subvert them completely, thereby weakening or leading to a total collapse of the ruler's power (Sharp 1980a: 23).

All bureaucratic structures need the collaboration of people at every level, from the bottom workers to the top hierarchy and if a significant number remove their backing for a length of time, the authority of the power structure collapses (Power and struggle 1997). Withdrawal of consent from the government through disobedience and noncooperation help people wrest power from the government (ruler), and appropriate it for themselves in the quest for equality and righting of whatever injustice the people may be seeking to correct.

The pragmatic approach to nonviolence does not rely only on conversion, but proposes a range of methods of persuasion and nonviolent coercion to which shared meaning is not central (Martin and Varney 2003a: 221). The merit of pragmatic nonviolence is that it ensures the use of any one of the four apparatus of alteration which embodies conversion, accommodation, coercion, and disintegration, and that these methods can bring about the kind of transformation desired by the aspirants through taking power from the rulers to the governed (A comparison of practical and principled nonviolent action theories 2013). It means that pragmatic nonviolence does not limit any tactics from being used, and that the means and ends are separate.

In practice however, pragmatic and principled nonviolence are not rigidly separated. According to Martin and Varney (2003a: 215), Gandhi advocated an ethical stance, but he also had a shrewd sense of what could actually be effective in practice. In this regard, many Western activists who espouse a realistic position in organizing protest campaigns personally hold a moral position,



although they may not publicize it. Also, pragmatic clients of nonviolent action often get power from a cultural denial of violence, thereby tacitly revealing a connection involving the principled and pragmatic points of reference. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006), assert that in pragmatic nonviolence, participants or a pressure group can decide not to engage in violence despite the absence of established beliefs or a spiritual basis for that alternative in their society. Although principled nonviolence as an approach and strategy may persist in different conditions, it is perhaps the secularised type that is most extensively used. This nonetheless does not mean that principled and pragmatic nonviolence always exist separately, or that a precise distinction can always be made (John n. d.).

### **2.5.2 Principled nonviolence**

The idea of principled nonviolence derives from Mohandas K. Gandhi, the leading proponent of nonviolent action in the twentieth century and the inspiration for many who came after him. Many movements were motivated to engage in nonviolence as a result of his campaigns in South Africa and India (War Resisters' International 2009: 18). This was due to his persuasive and emphatic commitment to nonviolence as a principled method of struggle, even though he was neither a systematic theorist nor a scholar who tapped into any research findings (Martin 2005). According to Albert (1978: 3), Gandhi's nonviolence revolves around three major fundamentals:

- 1) Self-improvement (the effort to make oneself a better person), 2) "constructive program" (concrete work to create a new social order), and 3) campaigns of resistance against evils that blocked the way forward, such as the Indian caste system and British colonial exploitation.

He made it clear that, 'the first principle of nonviolence is noncooperation with everything humiliating' (War Resisters' International 2009: 18). It is evident that he viewed noncooperation of the ruled with the rulers as essential to his strategy of nonviolence.

Gandhi observed that nonviolence is an issue of principle and a moral requirement because hostility, subjugation, and exploitation are evils that must be opposed (Martin and Varney 2003b: 80). Nonviolence was preferred because it brought about an authentic transformation of attitude and contradicts violence which avoids dialogue and causes injury. [Fired by this conviction, Gandhi halted the Indian campaigns of 1922 after the Chauri Chaura riots because they had failed to commit themselves to moral purity and the use of nonviolence (Greg 1960: 68-69).

In fact, ‘for Gandhi, nonviolent action was a search for truth’. He introduced the term ‘*satyagraha*,’ literally ‘truth force’, ‘which is often translated as nonviolent action’ (Martin and Varney 2003b: 81). Gandhi noted that, *satyagraha* means moving progressively on the road to discover the truth and change the antagonist into a companion in the process. Put differently, it is not used *against* anyone, but is carried out *with* someone. It is hinged on the philosophy that the ethical appeal to the heart or conscience is more useful than an appeal based on threat, inflicting physical pain, or on brutality. Gandhi said it had to be a doctrine, a way of life, to be absolutely effective (Weber and Burrowes 1991). Post-modern critics would on the other hand maintain that passes as truth would necessarily vary from individual to individual. Gandhi viewed nonviolent action as a way of promoting dialogue with those in authority in an effort to encourage them to voluntarily change their policies or behaviour (Martin and Varney 2003b: 81). The failure of dialogue is often the reason that triggers nonviolent campaigns expressing activists’ strong resentment about the issue in question.

In Gregg’s view, showing hostility in response to aggression does not challenge ethical ideals, but provides an alternative which brings encouragement and moral sustenance. The application of nonviolence in reaction to brutality makes the assailant lose ethical balance, while the advocate maintains moral balance. The loss of moral balance on the side of the aggressor is caused by the ‘kindness, generosity and voluntary suffering’ of the victim (Gregg 1960: 44, 47). Victims do not resort to the use of hostility due to their respect for the qualities and ethical integrity of the attacker and this builds support for the nonviolent resister from bystanders to the detriment of his violent attacker.

In Gandhi’s analysis, nonviolent social change is about establishing ‘a new society in the shell of the old, which he termed constructive programme’. It is closely linked to the broader resistance manifested in social impartiality, economic self-sufficiency and environmental harmony (War Resisters’ International 2009: 40). The constructive programme for Gandhi assisted in the training for civil noncompliance, incorporating disobedience and giving it a chance to instil the skills required to establish a new society (War Resisters’ International 2009: 41).

Principled nonviolence refers to religious or ethically based nonviolence where nonviolence is viewed as a moral necessity based on the sacredness of human life. Put differently, it is:

a form of nonviolence in which practitioners (a) explicitly state their intention to conduct and resolve conflict without violence, (b) adopt many precautions to demonstrate and carry out that intention, and (c) are prepared to suffer, even sacrifice their lives, if need be, rather than inflicting suffering on others while holding fast to the truths they believe (The Lokashakti Encyclopedia of Nonviolence, Peace, & Social Justice, 2013).

It was epitomized by Gandhi and has been referred to as ideological nonviolence (Martin and Varney 2003a: 214). In this way advocates select nonviolent action for principled causes, uphold the concord of means and ends, and view the antagonist as an associate in the struggle to suit the needs of the contending forces so that they might come to see nonviolence as a mode of life (Weber and Burrowes 1991). Weber says principled nonviolence focuses on rekindling communication, tries to persuade the challenger that their methods are wrong, and persuades rather than compel them to change their tack. It is not against persons but structures and organisations propagating subjugation and unfairness (A comparison of practical and principled nonviolent action theories 2013). The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006) affirm that ‘principled nonviolence is often rooted in traditional or religious beliefs and customs, or in moral principles alone. It is based on a moral stand, an ethical code which disallows the practice of violence, often throughout all actions of life.’ Principled nonviolence therefore presents an alternative for resolving conflicts and differences in a harmless manner.

Put differently, principled nonviolence is the approach that was used by Gandhi when he embraced individual nonviolence as a way of life and a productive occupation, when he propagated the use of nonviolence against unswerving and structural violence. His strategy for conflict resolution derived from a conviction that methods cannot be alienated from outcomes, a conviction in the harmony of every part of life, and a readiness to endure for one’s viewpoints (Martin and Varney 2003b: 80). According to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006) principled nonviolence does not aspire to eradicate or conquer someone. For a true nonviolent campaigner, there is no rival. It endeavours to stop unfairness by influencing the architect of injustice to employ reason and admit to the errors committed by him. This view is shared by Chabot and Sharifi who conclude that ‘... Gandhi’s approach is more promising for people struggling toward ways of life promoting dignity, self-rule and love of humanity, both in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.’ They are opposed to practical nonviolence which they contend only aims to conquer the antagonist whilst paying little or no attention to weak types of violence within these nonviolent social movements as well as indiscernible violence in

their past and present outcomes (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 205, 207). They argue that Sharp disregards the fact that the movements in South Africa, the Philippines, and Serbia not only damaged repressive leaders and governments, but also unlocked the door for universal neoliberal forces that have enhanced the position of the privileged rich at the cost of mounting dispossession and desperation amongst the underprivileged in these countries (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 221).

Actually, principled nonviolence encompasses different ideas such as pacifism, a commonly non-active method of struggle against violence; Tibetan Buddhist professionals who shun all types of brutality; and the dedication of the Quakers, a religious cluster, to employ their intensely held conviction in a nonviolent way of life to bring about change, not only within themselves as persons or in their direct area of control, but in the entire world (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 2006). Weber and Burrowes (1991) are of the view that a large number of the Western upholders of nonviolence belong to either associates of nonviolent Christian camps (persons who have come to the belief that nonviolence is the only technique that is in line with the teachings of The Bible) or individuals who have been converted to the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. In this regard, Schock (2013: 277) notes that the roots of nonviolent resistance can be traced to different traditions and religions which endorsed nonviolence like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Judaism and Christianity.

In essence the adherents of principled nonviolence emphasize empowerment of the person and internal peace as a precondition for nonviolent action which comes about as a result of taking part in nonviolent action (Martin and Varney 2003a: 221). A comparison of practical and principled nonviolent action theories reveal that unlike pragmatic nonviolence which is directed at the attainment of aims, principled nonviolence upholds the premise that the final goal of all societal change is to bring about compromise between opponents so as to encourage fairness. Conversion is the only acceptable instrument of change that adheres to the procedure of change which builds relationships with the opponent. Pragmatic nonviolence points out that the formulation of overall goals and the use of planned strategies and tactics are designed to benefit the movement whereas principled nonviolence's focus is on organizing actions that will make an impact and encourage both change and negotiations between the conflicting parties. On the contrary, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2006) argue that ethical

nonviolence professionals do not unavoidably use nonviolent strategies and actions, despite the fact that they at times have them.

In my study I will investigate the extent to which principled and pragmatic nonviolence were used in the Zimbabwean context given the similarities and differences between these two types.

## **2.6 Planning nonviolent campaigns**

Planning is critical for the success of any project or campaign, whether violent or nonviolent. To this end, an understanding of the issues involved in planning nonviolent campaigns guided the researcher in his objective *evaluate the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies and methods used by non-state actors in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013*.

The advantages of a nonviolent campaign become evident in creatively merging tactics, strategic thinking, and participants' devotion (War Resisters' International 2009: 34). A campaign has been defined as a related succession of activities and actions which are done over a period of time to attain explicit known aims so as to influence change on a specific issue. For Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006: 72), a campaign is 'a strategically planned and executed set of nonviolent actions aimed at a targeted group.' Sheehan (1999: 30) expands the idea of a nonviolent campaign to encompass a process during which a large number of people gather with a universal dream, designing agreed aims, employing innovative approaches and utilizing an assortment of tactics. She stresses that it is much more than simply a matter of identifying a problem and using a tactic to address it, and that it is also more than a group of projects strung together over a period of time.

Planning a nonviolent campaign is often difficult because there is need to unite slack unions whose potential is often overrated and whose prospects are varied (Helvey 2004: 67). Long term strategic planning is required to enable the nonviolent resistance group to find the most efficient methods for ending coercion, to evaluate when the political circumstances and popular disposition are ready for action, and to decide how to begin the nonviolent operation and how to widen it as it progresses, whilst challenging the opponents' suppression and new counter measures. Strategic planning also empowers the nonviolent struggle cluster to grow powerful because of its awareness of potential harms, opposition, and responses that the resisters will probably meet (Sharp 2005: 443). Generally, planning helps a campaign to stay organized and

therefore the 'how to' has to be brief and precise for every level of planning from strategic to tactical. Nonviolent movements have to structure them in a standardised format that ensures clarity as to the objectives, actions to be taken, and assigning different responsibilities (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 52).

Planning is indispensable in the early stages of a nonviolent struggle, firstly in performing a thorough appraisal of the abilities of both one's own movement and that of the adversary and then to design a strategy based on pragmatic factors (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 44). In Sharp's point of view strategic planning demands that the strategists be imbued with a deeper understanding of the whole conflict situation (Sharp 2005: 448).

At this juncture it is also important to introduce the meaning of a strategic estimate. A strategic estimate refers to the identification and analysis of the broad context of the conflict, including physical, geographical, climatic, historical, governmental, military, cultural, social, political, psychological, economic and international factors prior to developing the strategy itself. A strategic estimate is simply a calculation and comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the nonviolent struggle group and its opponents, as seen within the broad social, historical, political and economic context of the society in which the conflict occurs. At minimum, it should include attention to the general conflict situation, the issues at stake, the objectives of both parties to the conflict as well as third parties involved, and assessing dependency balances between the contending groups (Sharp 2005: 448-449). In the development of effective strategies one must identify the issues and challenges at stake, consider where they come from, generate a dream of what the group wants, articulate its main objectives, and devise a strategy to achieve these objectives (War Resisters' International 2009: 35). As highlighted earlier, it is worth reiterating that nonviolence can be used as a tool for both resistance and bringing about change, including regime change.

There is room to adapt plans from other fields and put them to a different purpose. For example, a military operation strategy layout can be used for nonviolent preparation at every stage by deploying information to effectively accomplish the purposes of those who will be accountable for its execution (Helvey 2004: 70). The format not only guides the development of an entire plan, but may also help to avoid overlooking significant information. Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006: 52) identify the most important questions that need to be asked to carry out such

an exercise:

- What is the current environment in which the planned actions will take place?
- What is to be done (planned activity/ activities)?
- How are they going to be achieved (concept of operation)?
- What tasks and assignment of responsibilities have to be identified?
- What information is essential regarding support and communication?
- What might your opponent do in order to try and stop you? (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 52).

The plan format should contain five sections and each section should be as brief and as clear as possible and these include: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics and coordination and communications. A brief summary of the plan format as given by Helvey (2004: 70-72) with some additions from Sharp (2010: 47-54) is given in table 2.2 on the next page.

In the view of Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006: 53) there are two main benefits in having a clear format for planning to instruct those who have to execute the tasks. Firstly, a clear plan will be understood after a first reading and secondly, with a compact Plan Format Document, a movement can increase the capability of every activist to spread the movement's ideas within their own local community. Furthermore, the plan can serve as a tool for internal control, revealing the present capacities of the organization and what needs to change within the organization in order to enhance these capacities.

**Table 2.2: An operations plan format**

<b>Plan Format Section</b>	<b>Content Description</b>

<b>Situation</b>	<p>Two sub-paragraphs namely: a. Friendly situation and b) Enemy situation provide a brief description of the operational environment of the target area. In sub-paragraph a) information on the activities of friendly elements in the vicinity of the target area is provided. The information is limited to that which should be considered when detailed plans are prepared for the designated tasks for assigned missions. Sub-paragraph b) provides a description of the activities that are currently underway by opponent forces in the vicinity of the target area (Helvey 2004: 70-71).</p> <p>Close attention to physical, historical, governmental, military, cultural, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors relating to the conflict are a prerequisite for all strategic planning. Essential questions strategists need to address include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the main obstacles to achieving freedom?</li> <li>• Which factors will facilitate achieving freedom?</li> <li>• What are the main strengths of the dictatorship?</li> <li>• What are the various weaknesses of the dictatorship?</li> <li>• To what degree are the sources of power for the dictatorship vulnerable?</li> <li>• What are the strengths of the democratic forces and the general population?</li> <li>• What are the weaknesses of the democratic forces and how can they be corrected?</li> <li>• What is the status of third parties, not immediately involved in the conflict, who already assist or might assist, either the dictatorship or the democratic movement, and if so in what ways? (Sharp 2010: 47-48). In essence, this would be the strategic estimate.</li> </ul>
<b>Mission</b>	<p>This is a statement that clearly identifies the Who, What, Where, When and Why of the operation. There should be no question about who will be responsible for carrying out the mission, the specific objective(s) to be achieved, when the operation is to commence, and why the mission is necessary (Helvey 2004: 71).</p>
<b>Execution</b>	<p>Two sub-paragraphs namely: a) Concept of operation, and b) Tasks, that give a brief description of how the execution of the plan unfolds. Sub-paragraph a) describes how the planner envisions the operation unfolding from start to finish. It may include ‘phasing’ which further clarifies expectations:</p> <p>Phase I: Preparation. This describes those actions that need to be taken to get the organization(s) that are assigned to the mission fully capable.</p> <p>Phase II: This describes what will happen from the time the action begins until the objective is achieved.</p> <p>Phase III: If appropriate, this sub-paragraph and others may be used to identify immediate actions to be taken to consolidate the objective or describe what follow-on missions may be assigned so that the organization can be thinking ahead about the next mission (Helvey 2004: 71).</p> <p>An assessment of the roles of internal resistance and external assistance or pressure to bring about the disintegration of the dictatorship is done as part of the preparation. Here the country itself must bear the brunt of the struggle, and external assistance must only come to assist the initiatives of the internal struggle (Sharp 2010: 50). The means of struggle employed in waging the coming conflict is considered by planners who are cognisant of the advantages and disadvantages of several other techniques of struggle such as conventional military warfare, guerrilla warfare and political defiance among others. Among the questions the strategists need to consider include: ‘Is the chosen type of struggle within the capacities of the democrats? Does the chosen technique utilize strengths of the dominated population? Does this technique target the weaknesses of the dictatorship, or does it strike at its strongest points? Do the means help the democrats to become more self-reliant, or do they require dependency on third parties or external suppliers? What is the record of the use of the chosen means in bringing down dictatorships? Do they increase or limit the casualties and destruction that may be incurred in the coming conflict? Assuming success in ending the dictatorship, what effect would the selected means have on the type of government that would arise from the struggle?’ All perceived counterproductive types of action need to be excluded from the fully developed grand strategy (Sharp (2010: 48-49).</p> <p>Sub-paragraph b) identifies the specific tasks assigned to participating organizations (Helvey 2004: 71). In devising a grand strategy for political defiance the following questions need to be borne in mind: ‘How might the long-term struggle best begin? How can the oppressed population muster sufficient self-confidence and strength to act to challenge the dictatorship, even initially in a limited way? How could the population’s capacity to apply noncooperation and defiance be increased with time and experience? What might be the objectives of a series of limited campaigns be to regain democratic control over the society and limit the dictatorship? Are there independent institutions that have survived the dictatorship which might be used in the struggle to establish freedom? What institutions of the society can be regained from the dictators’ control, or what institutions need to be newly created by the democrats to meet their needs and establish spheres of democracy even while the dictatorship continues? How can organizational strength in the resistance be developed? How can participants be trained? What resources (finances, equipment, etc.) will be required throughout the struggle? What types of symbolism can be most effective in mobilizing the population? By what kinds of action and in what stages could the sources of power of the dictators be incrementally weakened and disabled? How can the resisting population simultaneously persist in its defiance and also maintain the necessary nonviolent discipline? How can the society continue to meet its basic needs during the course of the struggle? How can social order be maintained in the midst of the conflict? As victory approaches, how can the democratic resistance continue to build the institutional base of the post-dictatorship society to make the transition as smooth as possible?’ (Sharp 2010: 51).</p>



Administration and logistics	This paragraph identifies the administrative and logistic coordination arrangements for obtaining the support available for the operation (Helvey 2004: 71).
Command and Signal	If there are special communications and reporting requirements for the operation, such information would appear in this paragraph. Otherwise, it would contain the brief 'per SOP' (standing operating procedures). For nonviolent operations, it can better be called 'Coordination and Communications' to reflect the need to recognize that there must be communication between those participating in the actions and those responsible for coordinating all the elements involved (Helvey 2004: 71-72). 'Communication of the resistance news to the general population, to the dictators' forces and the international press' should always be strictly factual as exaggerations and unfounded claims will undermine the credibility of the resistance (Sharp 2010: 54).

Helvey (2004: 71) notes that assumptions should not be included in the format because assumptions being made by the nonviolent planners would be a significant piece of intelligence for an opposing regime. Annexes will contain detailed information on the movement's capabilities and intentions that the opponent could use to pre-empt or neutralize events before the plan can even be implemented. By stating an assumption one will be revealing what is not known and fundamentally, what is considered to be important because assumptions reveal the quality of analysis available to the plan writer.

My study needs to establish what kind of plan formats, if any, were employed for the nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe and determine how it can be included as a vital component of the nonviolent training programme.

## **2.7 Four levels of planning and action.**

According to Sharp (2010: 43-45), there are four important facets of strategic planning. These can also be referred to as levels of planning and action and these are grand strategy, strategy, tactics, and method. Before turning to the definitions of these terms as given by Sharp it is important to point out that 'our understanding of strategy has changed over the years as the word has a military heritage, and classic theory considered it a purely wartime military activity - how generals employed their forces to win wars' (Boone Bartholomees n. d.: 13). However, strategy is at present employed in non-military sectors and together the meaning and general assumption must be compatible with such tradition. Sharp provides striking definitions. He affirms that grand strategy is the framework that serves to harmonize and direct the utilization of all suitable and obtainable resources (economic, human, moral, political, and organizational among others) of a cluster in quest of achieving its purposes in a conflict. It sets the fundamental structure for the selection of more focused strategies for combat in the struggle. It decides the allotment of common responsibilities and allocation of resources to particular groups for utilization in the

struggle.

Put differently, strategy is the notion of how to best accomplish certain objectives in a conflict that fall within the scope of the selected grand strategy. Strategy deals with whether, when, and how to fight, including how to realize maximum effectiveness in resisting to achieve particular objectives.

Tactics and methods of action are used to execute the strategy. Tactics refer to the competent use of one's forces to the best advantage in a conflict situation. A tactic is a restricted action, engaged to realize a limited objective. A tactic is therefore concerned with a restricted course of action that qualifies within the wide strategy, just as a strategy fits within the grand strategy. Tactics at all times deal with fighting while strategy embraces wider considerations.

Method refers to the explicit weapons or means of action. Within the technique of nonviolent struggle, these comprise the different types of action (which embodies several kinds of strikes, boycotts and political noncooperation among others).

The British military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart defined grand strategy, strategy and tactics with a military predisposition, noting that 'as tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of 'grand strategy'. While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should govern its objective, the term 'grand strategy' serves to bring out the sense of 'policy in execution'. The role of the higher grand strategy is to coordinate all the resources of a nation or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy' (Boone Bartholomees n. d.: 14). In fact, Sharp formulates his definitions with a profound understanding of how military strategists define the same and benefits from their conceptualisation in order to adapt them to suit nonviolent action, without ignoring their military connotations. Sharp (2010: 45) stresses that, 'the development of a responsible and effective strategic plan for a nonviolent struggle depends upon the careful formulation and selection of the grand strategy, strategies, tactics and methods.'

In my study I examine how these different levels of planning were used by the advocates of both violence and nonviolence during the Zimbabwean conflict of recent times.

## **2.8 Communication in nonviolent campaigns**

The assessment of the success and/or failure of the nonviolent campaigns which occurred in Zimbabwe further necessitates that one takes note of how the advocates of nonviolence communicated.

Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006: 60) maintain that communication is vital for a carefully planned campaign. Carefully targeted communication is used to mobilise the public against repression with the aim of changing public opinion about an issue as well as changing the habits and behaviour of the public in relation to that issue. There are four main target audiences. Firstly, membership and supporters these refer to persons who back your movement either energetically or inactively. Secondly, the wider audience (a wide range, starting from your antagonist and its followers, to student representative organisations and factions who may share your organisation's ideals). Thirdly, prospective allies (the entire opposition, as well as every single socially active faction that share the same principles and devotion to the nonviolent strategy, who have infrastructure available) as well as worldwide spectators (global NGOs encouraging human rights, overseas media, and other governments and business interests ) (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 61). The emphasis that a message that attracts each of the target audiences to your movement should relate to your mission statement and be crafted to simultaneously promote action and condition people to respond to a subsequent call for action. A message can be defined according to the US National Democratic Institute as a restricted body of honest information that is always communicated by an aspirant, party or nonviolent pressure group in order to present a persuasive reason for an audience to decide, and act on behalf of that choice (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic 2006: 62). Arsenijevic et al. (2011: 189) argue that in order to achieve mobilization of the public a movement has to contain all four essentials of target communication in its communiqué, which are recognition of target audience, meaning and importance of the message that is sent, the carrier of the message, and a mechanism for feedback collecting, as was the case with the national movement, Otpor in Serbia.

Communication plays a key role in any conflict. According to Martin and Varney (2003b: 6), communication is critical in both sustaining and damaging a repressive regime's legality, in organizing or disturbing opposition, and in communicating with adherents in other parts of the globe. However, communication not only involves words, since noncooperation also creates

meanings amongst observers and explanations which help to make clear the purposes of the actions. Arsenijevic et al. (2011: 193) referring to Serbia, assert that individual public actions that attracted the attention of media, certainly opened the space for spreading the message practically free of charge, which appeared to be a very effective way for a nonviolent movement to present its goals and messages.

In other words, 'the communicative dimensions of noncooperation and intervention are what anarchists call 'propaganda of the deed, in which the drama of action communicates without words' (Martin and Varney 2003a: 215). Communication is an important tool for rallying and harmonizing resistance, attracting antagonists and making people outside instantly aware of moving developments (Martin and Varney 2003b: 79). A communication strategy that provides world-wide publicity to the decadent and brutal behaviour of the nonviolent group's adversary is imperative since people cannot be expected to denounce issues with which they are not conversant (International Online Training program On Intractable Conflict, 1998). It is important to realize that access to information and conflicts over meaning are decisive in nonviolent campaigns because it is indispensable to assemble support (Martin and Varney 2003b: 101). More importantly, using the media in nonviolent campaigns '... is like picking up a double-edged sword: the media can both support and destroy good campaigns' (War Resisters' International 2009: 49). The media should be approached with caution and a good understanding of what activists expect to gain from that interface.

Communication systems are crucial since they are used by contending parties in their effort to win allegiance from the populace. It is important both in overcoming censorship and in countering elite perspectives especially when government can try to dismiss, shame and weaken activists by impounding records, suppressing information, pressurizing the media, disseminating gossip and fabricating stories (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin and Varney 2003a: 229). Activists should therefore treat communication issues as fundamental in every action and address conflicting views of the situation. Where the mass media is controlled under dictatorships and omit the perspective of the oppressed, the opposition must turn to other media including clandestine talks, leaflets, graffiti, concealed radio, even figurative communication at funerals, performances and other 'genuine' events to exchange experiences (Martin 1996). Conversely, there is a contradiction in so far as the mass media is selectively used by oppressors, against

instances where they have been helpful to nonviolent resisters in cases such as the Algerian generals' rebellion, the Czechoslovakian struggle against the Warsaw Pact offensive, and the fall of the East German communist establishment.

Mediums of communication vary from time to time. Stories by journalists, photos, video tapes, eye witness's reports, public lectures, and newsletters have all played a significant role in generating outrage against repression in various parts of the world. Digital photographs exposed the torture and abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Decentralised communication technologies in the form of networks that are ruled by the internet better serve movements that are pitted against repression (Hess and Martin 2006). Above all, alternative communication strategies have had to battle for attention against the dominance of newspapers, television and the radio (International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict 1998).

Kowalchuk (2005) argues that unarmed insurrections that have remained resilient against repression and have brought about political transformation are those that created methods of communication within the movement that circumvented the regime's control over the public media, thereby permitting the dissemination of activist agendas and the organization of mass action. Equally powerful are 'symbols, language, stated goals, modes of participation and other aspects of communication' which are critical because they preserve the harmony, morale, and determination of the resistance (Martin and Varney 2003b: 96).

In the present study I have to assess how communication has either helped or hindered the successful execution of nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe.

## **2.9 Methods of nonviolence**

It is further necessary to identify the types of nonviolent methods which were used in Zimbabwe.

Gene Sharp has made a major contribution to the field of nonviolent action by categorizing methods of nonviolent action and cataloguing hundreds of different techniques along with an array of historical examples. He also introduced the idea of consent premise of power which he used to explain how nonviolent action functions (Martin and Varney 2003b: 82). In his 1973 publication *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* Sharp outlined 198 different means of nonviolent action and has continued to add more to this already impressive list.

McCarthy and Sharp quoted in Bennett1997: 493) state that the methods of nonviolent action are simply the kinds of actions that people choose or find themselves doing when they participate in nonviolent conflict. Forms or types of nonviolent action are other terms that can be used, but the term methods conveys the idea that groups use these techniques in order to accomplish something. Gene Sharp documented 198 means of nonviolent exploit in his 1973 publication titled *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (War Resisters' International 2009: 46). This is not an exhaustive list of nonviolent methods because new ways are still being developed (King and Miller 2006: 73). There are certainly more than 198 methods because new circumstances and technologies create opportunities for people to design new methods and technology has also transformed the implementation of old methods (Bennett 1997: 493-494).

According to Sharp (2005: 19), there are three broad categories of nonviolent means namely nonviolent protest and persuasion, non cooperation, and nonviolent intervention that are synthesized into units (War Resisters' International 2009: 46). The multiplicities of forms of noncooperation have lead to a further subdivision of these methods into socio-economic, political and sometimes psychological types (Bennett 1997: 493). Sharp (1990: 2) simply talks of the “‘weapons’ of nonviolent action’

### **2.9.1 Methods of protest and persuasion**

Sharp asserts that ‘nonviolent protest and persuasion is a class of mainly symbolic actions of peaceful opposition or of attempted persuasion, extending beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of noncooperation or nonviolent intervention’ (Sharp 1990: 10). McCarthy and Sharp (Bennett1997: 494) explain that methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion area group or collective means of expression and symbolic display which are aimed at influencing the course and outcome of a conflict in ways that are not provided for in the usual procedures for settling disputes that a political system might have. Any action which voices peaceful opposition to a policy or law with the intention to persuade others to change their attitude toward that policy and to join the nonviolent struggle to overturn or correct the policy or law can be viewed as nonviolent protest and persuasion (International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict 1998). These methods include symbolic communication in the form of speeches or posters, music and song, theatre, or the images of art and visual expression or they may find expression in the mass participation of people in marches or parades, demonstrations,

processions, and protest funerals (Bennett 1997: 494). Action by these methods initiate the nonviolent struggle, which signals to the public that pro-democratic forces are objecting and challenging particular actions, policies and abuses perpetrated by the government (Helvey 2004: 35).

### **2.9.2 Methods of noncooperation**

Disobedience involves the purposeful breaking, withholding, or challenging of particular prevailing socio-economic and political relationships (Sharp 1990: 10). This may be spontaneous or planned, legal or illegal (Sharp 2005: 54, 400). Among the methods of nonviolent action, noncooperation is the broadest (Sharp 1990: 10). It includes radical actions which involve refusal to do things that are normally done to support a person, institution, or public authority with which one is in conflict (International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict 1998). It may be social, political or economic, depending on the institution is being challenged. Helvey (2004: 35) is of the view that ‘noncooperation is the most powerful category of nonviolent methods available to opposition movements’ because it can effectively undermine and remove the sources of power from the opponent. Sharp (2005: 54) argues that the impact of different types of rebellious behaviour depends greatly on the number of people involved and the extent to which the opponents rely on the persons and groups that are refusing to collaborate .

#### **Methods of Social Noncooperation**

Social noncooperation is the refusal to continue regular social relationships, either particular or general, with individuals or clusters considered as having committed some wrong or injustice, or to go along with certain behaviour patterns or practices (Sharp 2005: 55). Methods of social noncooperation are many but relatively few are discussed at length in any of the literature (McCarthy and Sharp quoted in Bennett 1997: 506). Noncooperation is reflected in withdrawal of individuals, non-participation in social events, customs and institutions, or pulling out of the social system as ways of showing opposition (Sharp 2005: 400). Sport boycotts, both against South Africa and at the Olympic Games, and the U.S. sanctuary movement of the 1980s are good examples (Bennett 1997: 506).

#### **Methods of Economic Noncooperation**

Economic noncooperation involves refusing to take action to provide some kind of economic

benefit or advantage to another and include economic boycotts which means refusal to buy from, sell to, or engage in specific economic arrangements with another party, like the withholding of rents, services, taxes, labour or any of a variety of economically significant contributions (Bennett 1997: 508). International sanctions and labour strikes also constitute economic noncooperation among other forms such as strikes, general strikes and slow-downs.

### **Methods of Political Noncooperation**

Methods of political noncooperation are also known as political boycotts (Sharp 1990: 10). According to McCarthy and Sharp, (Bennett 1997: 528), political noncooperation implies the withholding of collaboration or conformity with the accepted or required standards of behaviour in political office, or within the political system. Sharp notes that the goal of nonviolent action may be to attain a certain limited objective, or to transform the nature or composition of a government, or even to bring about its breakdown. In his view, political insubordination includes rejection of authority, citizen noncooperation with government, citizen alternatives to obedience, action by government personnel, domestic governmental action, and international governmental action (Sharp 2005: 60, 443).

### **2.9.3 Methods of Nonviolent Intervention**

Sharp (1990: 10), says that nonviolent intervention methods are actions basically designed to interrupt or disrupt a given activity or process of the opponent. McCarthy and Sharp (Bennett 1997: 541) amplify this, noting that methods of nonviolent intervention seek to interfere with or directly modify the workings of an institution, disrupt the status quo in some visible way, which may be through psychological, physical, socio-economic, or political means. The methods include ‘fasts, sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, the establishment of new social patterns, stay-in strikes, alternative economic institutions, the seeking of imprisonment, work-on without collaboration and parallel government’ (Sharp 1990: 10). Weber and Burrowes (1991) add that it involves setting up alternative political, socio-economic institutions including ‘non-hierarchical cooperatives, markets, ethical investment groups, alternative schools, energy exchange cooperatives as well as parallel media, communications and transport networks’. This final group of methods is what Gandhian literature refers to as the *constructive program*. Methods of nonviolent intervention can be negative or positive and may disrupt, even destroy, or could otherwise establish new behaviour patterns, policies, relationships or institutions. In contrast to



the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion and other forms of noncooperation, methods of nonviolent intervention are usually both harder for the resisters to sustain and harder for the opponents to withstand. They hence pose a more direct and immediate challenge to the opponents, and may therefore bring more rapid change, speedier and more severe repression, or possibly even rapid resolution (Sharp 2005: 62, 403-404; Helvey 2004: 39; Albert 1978: 3).

**Table 2.3 A Summary of the methods of nonviolent action**

Method category	Explanation and examples
Protest and persuasion	These are forms of activity in which opinions by the practitioners are expressed by symbolic actions either in show of support or disapproval of an action, a policy, a group, or a government. They include written declarations, petitions, leafleting, picketing, wearing of symbols, symbolic sounds, vigils, singing, marches, mock funerals, protest meetings, silence, turning one's back, haunting officials, taunting officials, fraternizing, parades, pilgrimages, walk outs, teach ins, demonstrative funerals, political mourning, delivering symbolic objects and display of portraits among others.
Noncooperation	This class of methods is extremely large and may take social, economic, and political forms in which people refuse to continue with their usual ways of cooperation or to initiate new ways of cooperation. Social noncooperation methods include social boycott, excommunication, student strikes, stay-at-home, collective disappearance, interdiction, withdrawal from social institutions, protest emigration, and flight of workers among others. Economic noncooperation can be further grouped into (1) economic boycotts and (2) labour strikes. The methods of economic boycott include: consumers' boycotts, rent withholding, refusal to let or sell property, lock outs, withdrawal of bank deposits, revenue refusals, and international trade embargoes among others. Labour strikes include: protest strikes, prisoners' strikes, slowdown strikes, general strikes, economic shutdowns, quickie walkout, professional strike, industry strike, peasant strike, sick-in, working-to-rule strike and strike by resignation among others. Political noncooperation includes withholding or withdrawal of allegiance, boycotts of elections, boycotts of government employment or positions, refusal to dissolve existing institutions, reluctant and slow compliance, disguised disobedience, civil disobedience, judicial noncooperation, deliberate inefficiency, and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents, noncooperation by constituent government units, and severance of diplomatic relations among others.
Nonviolent intervention	Nonviolent intervention methods actively disrupt the normal operation of policies or the system by deliberately interfering, either psychologically, physically, socially, economically, or politically. The methods in this class include but are not limited to: the fast, sit-ins, nonviolent raids, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent occupation, the overloading of facilities, alternative social institutions, alternative communication systems, reverse strikes, stay-in strikes, nonviolent land seizures, defiance of blockades, seizures of assets, selective patronage, alternative economic institutions, the overloading of administrative systems, the seeking of imprisonment, and dual sovereignty and parallel government.

This table was developed using information from Sharp (2005: 41-43, 52- 64)

## 2.10 Conclusion

In summary, nonviolence means active commitment to work for peace without the use of violence. Whether nonviolence is viewed in the pragmatic or principled sense, it is an efficient instrument and ethical means for dealing with conflict and political strife because it minimises damage and casualties. Given the ambiguity created by the term nonviolence, terms that relate to specific actions or movements are used, that is, nonviolent action, nonviolent resistance and nonviolent struggle. Nonviolent action as a technique includes specific methods that are presented in three broad classes, which are nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent struggle has been employed throughout history under

various conditions, with varying results and among other strengths, it possesses no demographic boundaries. Furthermore, nonviolence is more likely to produce constructive rather than destructive outcomes. Principled and pragmatic approaches to nonviolence differ mainly in the nature of commitment, the assumed relationship between means and ends, the approach to conflict in general, the attitude towards the opponent with the supposed way of how nonviolence works and the issue of nonviolence as a way of life. In practice, however, the two are intertwined. Various misconceptions about nonviolence exist and chief among them is the belief that it is powerless, i.e. that it is rooted in a denial of the nature of power in politics and the important role power plays in the operation of nonviolent struggle. Planning nonviolent campaigns is critical to the success of a nonviolent struggle. Communication plays a key role in nonviolent campaigns since it is important for mobilizing and coordinating resistance, winning over opponents, as well as alerting those beyond the immediate situation and undermining a repressive regime's legitimacy. Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr, the visionaries of nonviolence, and Gene Sharp and Richard B. Gregg, nonviolence theorists, are among the prominent contributors on the subject of nonviolence.

It is evident from the discussion that nonviolent action resolves conflict in ways more effective and peaceful than any other method of conflict resolution. Moreover, nonviolent action is applicable to all situations whether democratic or dictatorial, as opposed to the misconception that it needs a democratic or nonviolent opponent in order to be successful. Nonviolence creates durable and sustainable peace. Communication in nonviolent campaigns should be given greater attention because nonviolent action is above all a struggle for loyalties. Building support among those who are subject to oppression or repression and among third parties is another critical role played by communication in nonviolent conflict. Planning is important to a nonviolent movement because its major aim is to answer 'Who will do What, When, How, Where and Why?' questions. The weapons of nonviolent struggle are the methods used in nonviolent action which embodies nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention.

The next chapter examines the history of nonviolence using examples drawn from Asia, the Americas, Africa and Europe before, during and after the Second World War. This is vital because it serves as the basis of empowering Zimbabweans to realise that nonviolence approaches have worked wonders in various conflict ridden terrains of the globe and hence

Zimbabweans can engage them with success if they apply them with care. This is critical to all who live in conflict affected areas and do not believe in the power of nonviolence or acknowledge that violence is a choice that one makes, because nonviolence has been used in different parts of the globe with positive results.

## **Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW**

*‘Nonviolence is the greater force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man’-Mohandas Gandhi*

### **3.0 CHAPTER 3: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NONVIOLENCE**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, I address objective 1: *To explain the evolution and development of nonviolent campaigns in different parts of the world.* The key thrust is to examine the history of nonviolence using examples drawn only from Asia, the Americas, Africa and Europe before, during and after the Second World War and therefore does not attempt to provide a comprehensive global history of nonviolent actions. Reflection on examples of nonviolent actions is critical especially to those who live in conflict affected areas including Zimbabweans and who may not have faith in the power of nonviolence, or be cognisant of the fact that one can choose to engage in nonviolence in order to accomplish one’s objectives. Nonviolence is a strategy that has achieved prominence because of the impact it has made especially in bringing change by removing longstanding regimes. While conflict is an inevitable element of any society, nonviolence deals with the way conflict arises, how it finds expression in particular ways, and the manner in which problems are resolved (Burgess 2006: 8). Armed struggle is not an option for civic society, bearing in mind that the state has a monopoly over military and other instruments of political coercion (Helvey 2004: x). Accordingly, the mass annihilation that took place as a result of the two world wars compelled governments, conflict resolvers and peace builders to realise the importance of devising alternative means of constructively engaging in conflict (Sheehan 1999: 30). A vital trait of nonviolence is that ‘it is a process through which a great number of people come together with a common vision, setting common goals, creative strategies and employing a diversity of tactics’. It is not merely a matter of identifying a problem and using a tactic to address it — such

as ‘a leaflet campaign’ or a ‘campaign of civil disobedience’ (Sheehan 1999: 30). Nonviolent struggle is often employed by those who are also pursuing negotiation, mediation, and various types of conflict transformation (Miller and King 2006: 13).

Disputes about how to confront oppressive regimes and their policies are more than a century old and limited agreement about the issue exists today. Leninists achieved some success in China, Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria and its proponents therefore believed that armed struggle is the only way in which a revolution can be achieved. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) however assert that the nonviolence propounded by Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. offer an alternative way of removing repressive regimes leading to more durable peace with limited risk of a relapse into instability or civil war.

### **3.2 A case of nonviolence in the Middle East**

#### **3.2.1 Islam and nonviolence before the Second World War**

Socio-economic, psychological and political methods are used by the people and institutions waging conflict by nonviolent means and involve diverse tactics such as protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, and showing disaffection and people power by demonstrating (Sharp 2010: 30). Nevertheless, these methods should not be used through individual action or trivial events, but are effective only if they are applied as elements of a comprehensive strategy (Sharp and Jenkins 2003: 23).

Karen Abi-Ezzi (2003: 693), comments that the way in which Islam is portrayed in the Western world projects Islam as a very dangerous religion and counters it with the assertion that ‘Islam is a lived religion and tradition that promotes peacebuilding and the nonviolent settlement of conflict.’

After the death of Mohammed, *jihad* was divided into two categories, lesser and greater *jihad*. The advocates of *jihad* argue that the term actually refers to nonviolent activism. Greater *jihad* is the struggle to be a pure and good person, while lesser *jihad* indicates armed struggle (Kurlansky 2006: 36). The striving of the soul to gain the upper hand over the animal nature is seen as the greatest fight or *jihad* (Mohideen 2001: 141). The object of jihad is self-defence, which is also a natural law with all animals, not the propagation of the faith (Mohideen 2001: 138). In light of the perceived misconceptions about Islam, Satha-Anand (2001a: 1) asserts that, ‘Islam’ has

stopped to be a simple description but instead, it means a lot of ‘unpleasant’ things to some non-Muslims because it is normally perceived as heavily oriented towards violence. According to Ahmad (2001: 42), this is based on several misinterpretations of Islam as taken from the following verses of the Holy Qur‘an:

Fight in the cause of Allah  
Those who fight you,  
But do not transgress limits;  
For Allah loveth not transgressors (2:190).

And slay them  
Wherever ye catch them  
And turn them out  
From where they have  
Turned you out;  
For tumult and oppression  
Are worse than slaughter (2:191).

And fight them on  
Until there is no more  
Tumult or oppression,  
And there prevails  
Justice and faith in Allah;  
But if they cease,  
Let there be no hostility  
Except to those  
Who practice oppression (2:193).

The major question could be about what Islam calls ‘just cause’. The experiences of Islamic religion in conflict encouraged me to find out the extent to which religion contributed to either nonviolence or violence during the Zimbabwean conflict.

### **3.2.2 Islam and nonviolence after the Second World War**

Gene Sharp’s works helps one to comprehend how it is possible to ensure justice and resist humiliation, resolve conflict and bring about social change, without loss of life. Chabot and Sharifi (2013: 205) however, argue the nonviolence concept promotes the spread of neoliberal ideas of freedom and democracy, which rests on multiple forms of visible and invisible violence. There are nevertheless fine examples in history where courage, deep conviction and a just cause have prevailed, against armed might, without degenerating into violence (Gregg 1960: 10). Sayyid Qutb after being tortured in Egyptian cells called for violence against Arab regimes

which he felt had lost the characteristics of Islamic faith because they had unleashed violence against their own citizens (Rubin 1990: 49-50). Scholars hence put the blame on *lesser jihad* as the main culprit that has led to increased violence in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden also unleashed immense violence against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s largely due to the predominance of *lesser jihad*. According to Montville (2006: 464), the use of revolutionary violence lies at the core of Islamic movements such as al-Qaeda, al-Shabab and Boko Haram although he claims that these doctrines are not rooted in Islam. One of the major goals of Islam is to ensure justice, an important component of nonviolent pursuit in the resolution of conflict. In this way it seeks to achieve justice, mercy, compassion, wisdom, service, faith and love (Montville 2006: 465).

The years 1982 to 1984 were a period of turbulence in the Ta Chana district of southern Thailand as a result of sectarian violence. On January 7, 1985 which was a *Maulid* day (a day to celebrate Prophet Muhammad's birthday), all parties came together and decided to settle the bloody feud. Here Haji Fan, the father of the latest victim, stood up with the Holy Qur'an above his head and vowed to end the killings (Satha-Anand 2001b: 7). Quoting the Qur'an, Satha-Anand (2001b: 24) believes that Muslim actions are essential to world peace: Peace!—a Word (of salutation) from the Lord Most Merciful! (36:58). However, Islam does not rule out violence in certain situations when it is defensive in character. Otherwise Islam emphasises social justice, brotherhood, and the equality of humankind (Ahmad 2001: 50).

Another case of nonviolence in the Middle East was evident during the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza. There were obvious elements of civil resistance in the *intifadah*, which began on December 9, 1987 (Roberts 1991: 6). Of course, the *intifadah* received its portion of blame on the grounds that it was characterised by violent acts such as stone-throwing and the killing of those dubbed 'collaborators'. The *intifadah* helped to keep the occupation on the international agenda although it failed to end the occupation itself (Roberts 1991: 6-7).

Saudi Arabia is believed to be the country of origin of fifteen out of the nineteen terrorists who were involved in the attack of New York and the Pentagon on 9/11 September 2001, and are reported to have staunchly supported *Wahhabism* (an extreme interpretation of Islam). Despite this glaring evidence, a study done in 2008 by the Terror Free Tomorrow organisation

discovered that not more than 1 out of 10 Saudis viewed al-Qaeda in a friendly manner, and 9 out of 10 thought that the Saudi military and polices should pursue its fighters. There was only 13 percent who were in favour of the view that suicide bombing was sometimes or often justified (Etzioni 2011: 30). The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions are said to be empowering models for the Syrians (Kahf 2013: 1). The Arab Spring generally awakened people across the region and revealed to them the importance of voicing their grievances as they demanded accountability and transparency from government, and protection of human rights and civil liberties (Saban Center 2012: 4). The Syrian uprising began nonviolently and the vast majority of its populace maintained nonviolence as the path to pursue regime change and a democratic Syria, but it was overturned by an armed faction which emerged in August 2011, leading to nonviolent resistance in Syria being eclipsed (Kahf 2013: 1-2). The formation of the Free Syrian Army on July 29, 2011 was largely responsible for that. Nonviolence failed because a significant number of activists were imprisoned, killed, displaced or forced into hiding, and many avenues for nonviolent activism were closed by conflict conditions (Kahf 2013: 22). To worsen the situation, the USA and allies supported the Free Syrian Army which was composed of fighters drawn from different countries such as Libya, Afghanistan and Chechnya among others, thereby weakening nonviolent resistance. In fact, this reduced the fighting force to a US sponsored group trying to bring about regime change in Syria.

### **3.2.3 Impact**

From these experiences in the Middle East it is evident that nonviolence is a useful strategy. Since time immemorial nonviolence was employed as a tool to settle disputes. But the ‘greatest’ challenge is the misinterpretations of what *jihad* entails, considering that Western thought is awash with the belief that Islam is a violent religion. While this can be supported from the view that the Quran itself supports and contradicts violence, there is less emphasis on *greater jihad* which stresses self-purification rather than ‘fighting for the just cause’. Evidence from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt shows that although nonviolence strategies face challenges there is room for success if the strategies are well implemented. The role of nonviolence during the Arab Spring motivated me to find out more about the role of nonviolence during the recent years of conflict within Zimbabwe.

### **3.3 New Zealand and European cases of nonviolence**

#### **3.3.1 Nonviolence before the Second World War**

Nonviolence is a strategy that knows no boundaries in view of the fact that it has been used by many nations. An inspiring early case of nonviolence was witnessed in New Zealand by a group of people called the Maori 'Children of Heaven'. The Maori used military means to fight British soldiers in New Zealand from 1845 to 1872 in about 13 important wars (Ritchie 2001: 5). One of these happened at a place called Parihaka. A man called Te Whiti emerged to encourage co-existence between the Maori and the *pakeha* or whites. In the face of extreme brutality, Te Whiti encouraged his people not to revolt in spite of the tribulations that they faced. Tactics of nonviolence employed included sit-ins. Te Whiti and the inhabitants of Parihaka are hailed world-wide for halting a genocide that would have meant the extinction of the Maori people, especially considering that they then constituted about 40 000 of the total population (Kurlansky 2006: 70).

The mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century witnessed several acts of nonviolence in Europe. When the Austrian emperor Franz Josef tried to subordinate Hungary to Austria, there was a boycott of Austrian goods led by a Hungarian Catholic land owner called Ferenc Deak. Austrian tax collectors were not assaulted, but Hungarians simply responded by refusing to pay taxes. When the authorities reacted by imprisoning people, representatives from Hungary refused to sit in the Imperial Parliament, leading to the release of prisoners and the granting of partial self-government (Gregg 1960: 15-16).

The industrial revolution contributed to the catastrophe of the 1914 war, as nations fought against each other using state of the art war equipment. The horrors of the war were felt as the use of sophisticated weaponry advanced with the coming in of poison gas as an instrument of war in 1915 at Ypres demonstrated how lethal modern warfare had become. It was 'fashionable' to join the war as shown by German war veteran Erich Maria Remarque who revealed that parents did not hesitate to use the word coward to shame children who hated service (Kurlansky 2006: 126). After the war Europe was left devastated by what had happened and this led to the formation of the League of Nations in 1919 which handled thirty disputes between 1920 and 1940, amongst others playing a crucial role in averting wars between Sweden and Finland in 1920 and between Bulgaria and Greece in 1925 (Firmage 1971: 426-427).



At the beginning of the Second World War Germany overran the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway. When they were occupied by the Nazis there was no resistance as King Christian X ordered the people to behave like 'good Danes'. When the Danish population showed signs of discontent, Hitler sent his two closest aides, General Hermann von Hanneken and SS General Dr. Werner Best to clamp down on the Danes who were showing signs of discontentment against Nazi rule. As a protest against German presence in their country in 1943, people from all trades such as fisherman, police, fireman, office workers and civil servants came together in the city centre and in the process they ignored imposed curfews. At times, the protest turned violent as evidenced by the killing of a German soldier who had fired shots into the crowd wounding four people (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 218, 220). When Best hatched a plan to round up all Jews in Denmark, Georg Duckwitz, a German shipping attaché who had been involved with the Nazi Party opposed the idea because of its impact on German-Danish relations. In order to prevent the massacre of Jews, Duckwitz phoned a Danish politician and friend called Hans Hedtoft to avail him with Hitler's plan.

The Jewish community was made aware of the plan. One interesting incident was when a truck driver called Jorgen Knudsen searched through local phone books for the addresses of families with 'Jewish-sounding names'. He responded by driving his ambulance to these homes and taking those who had nowhere to hide to hospitals or doctors active in the resistance (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 223; Bloor 2008: 70- 83). When the Germans tightened up their search for Jews, a plan was hatched by a group called Holger Danske to transfer all the Jews to Sweden by the group's twelve fishing vessels. The initiative saved 7,742 Jewish families including non-Jewish spouses who successfully escaped to Sweden in October 1943 although 472 were captured and deported to Theresienstadt prison camp (Bak 2013: 36). It is crucial to take cognisance of the fact that it was the ultimate aim of the Nazis to eliminate the Jews from the rest of society (Stræde 2010: 3). The Danes devised several strategies to resist the Nazis. The universities of Copenhagen and Aarhus for example closed for a week in protest while the Ministry of Religion delivered a protest letter to Best and sent it for circulation to the clergymen for them to use it in their sermons (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 223; Bloor 2008: 78-79). Consequently, Jews were given a certain degree of latitude that was unheard of in any other German occupied country in Europe (Rittner n. d.: 1).

The Danish resistance finally got an upper hand after the underground Freedom Council won the heart of the Danish army to recognise the Council as the nation's de facto government on the condition of active opposition to German forces. A Command Committee was set up to coordinate resistance actions in all the districts. This compelled Best to withdraw the pro-Nazi Danish militia (called Schalburg Corps) from the city, ended the curfew, and ordered German troops not to fire on Danish citizens (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 228). From August, the Freedom Council replaced its previous tactics of sabotage and military measures with nonviolent action, notably general strikes. Strikes had a crippling effect because they halted the production of supplies for the Germany army whilst any strike by the railway workers was devastating for the reason that the Germans entirely depended on railroads to move troops to the front (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 229). The German soldiers reacted by arresting close to 10 000 policemen while the king's police at Alalienborg Castle was apprehended. A German officer instructed King Christian X to raise the swastika over the castle but the king out rightly refused so that the swastika never got an opportunity to fly over the castle.

The First World War ended with the defeat of Germany and the victorious allied powers including France took this as a pretext for revenge for the way she had been punished after being defeated by Prussia in 1871 by the Treaty of Frankfurt. As a result the Treaty of Versailles saddled Germany with the entire responsibility for the outbreak and damage caused by the war through Article 231 war guilt clause. Despite their territorial and military losses, the French still wanted the Germans to cede the state mines in the Ruhr which were rich in million tonnes of coal as a tactic to force Germany to pay reparations. The German president Friedrich Ebert resisted it, and the French and Belgian troops deployed in the Ruhr on 9 January 1923 made a show of force. Germany could not resist the invading forces, because her troops were not allowed to within 50 kilometres of the Rhine. In the meantime the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate transferred all their important files to Hamburg, 320 kilometres north of Essen while others were buried under floorboards of the building (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 180, 184).

The print media played a pivotal rule in championing the resistance against the invading French and Belgians. The American media, as expected sympathised with the Germans because they did not agree with many clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. An American opinion journal called *The Nation* wrote:

...no answer to the French invasion would be more effective than the practice of non-cooperation....If the miners and technical men of the Ruhr were brave and united enough simply to refuse to work for the French...they would give the immediate and effective reply to the French attempt to win by what is...economically impossible (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 185).

The Germans swiftly responded by halting coal deliveries to the French. This led to the arrest of Friedrich Thyssen who was the spokesman for the mine owners. On January 22 about 75 000 mill and mineworkers in the Ruhr responded by organising a strike. At Oberhausen, railway workers abandoned their posts and cut off electricity to all the signals. Besides, at Osterfeld miners refused to work unless French troops withdrew (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 186).

Germany further responded by pulling railway wagons out of the Ruhr region and whilst the French replaced some they lacked adequate capacity for their mission to be accomplished. In their reaction, the Germans deployed objects such as idle cars, rocks, wood and coal on the railroads to curtail the movement of French trains. This did not, however, alleviate a coal starved France which ended up importing a million tons of coal from England much to the agony of the public. When the French soldiers resorted to arresting mine directors for refusing to deliver coal, the workers would down their tools on two conditions, that is, the release of the officials or soldiers to leave the mines. The resistance could be attributed to the fact that ninety percent of the Danish population belonged to the Lutheran Church which between 1940 and 1943, also took decisive measures to combat anti-Semitism (Rittner n. d.: 4). Some miners sprayed the loaded coal with a mixture of water and sand so that by the time it reached France blast furnaces it would be useless. In some centres like Essen, Dortmund and Bochum which were the command centres for the Franco-Belgian mission, the Germans would cut telephone cables and power lines to the hotels where the foreigners were staying (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 189-191).

Finally in late 1923 the Americans through the Dawes plan drew up a five-year plan to assist the Germany economy recover because it was torn apart. The French finally went home without the coal they were looking for and had to rebuild the devastated Northern provinces using their own resources (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 206; Sharp in Jenkins 1992: 15). There are other instances of nonviolence that took place in Europe before the Second World War such as the strikes and political non-cooperation during the 1920 Kapp *Putsch* against the Weimar Republic, the German government-sponsored noncooperation in the Ruhr in 1923 to the French and

Belgian occupation and major and Dutch anti-Nazi resistance, to mention only two (Sharp 1980b: 7). However, Sharp argues that the methods used were unrefined as they lacked preparation, training and planning.

### **3.3.2 Nonviolence after the Second World War**

Poland provides a ‘perfect’ example of how nonviolence could be an instrument to achieve targeted objectives. Several decades of Soviet rule disallowed freer political systems throughout Eastern Europe as evidenced by the violent suppression of trade unions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Wielgohs and Pollack 2005: 25-28). Workers in Poland had pathetic working conditions and in response they engaged nonviolent methods to address issues such as pay increase and the removal of maternity leave (Bartkowski 2009). In 1956, the workers took to the streets of Poznan, Gdansk and Warsaw to protest against low wages. The regime responded by killing protesters, thereby raising the tension level (Ackerman and DuVall 2000:116; Bartkowski 2009). On 12 December 1970, the workers and the communist party (known by its Polish initials, PZPR) gathered at Lenin Shipyard and initiated a strike demanding the retraction of price hikes and resignation of those responsible, including Gomulka. The workers marched to the provincial party headquarters where they engaged in running battles with the internal security police (Ackerman and DuVall 2000:117). This gave the nonviolence advocates the upper hand and confirms Bartkowski’s assertion that, nonviolent insurrections are more likely to have lethal consequences for purposeful causes than violent resistance (Bartkowski 2013: 21).

Although the Communist government unleashed unrestrained violence against the dissenting voices the protests did not end. The creation of a dissident trade union movement called Solidarity in 1980 managed to create a unified movement of intellectuals and workers. The organisation had a strong belief in nonviolence as a result of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi (Kurlansky 2006: 169). The Soviet Union was successful in taking over Eastern Europe during the Cold War but all their gains were lost when the socialist societies resorted to nonviolence to rebuke Soviet domination (Randle 1991, quoted in Martin 2009: 42). Initially the movement was launched to push for greater economic and political freedom, but it was able to solidify the demands of trade unions toward the political goal of free elections and ending Soviet dominance (Miller and King 2006: 21). It is apparent that civil resistance influenced change and bringing an end to communism rather than nuclear weapons and military force (Roberts 1991: 1).

After years of resisting with limited effect, nonviolent protagonists in Serbia developed a comprehensive strategic plan, which combined their previous experience with a study of nonviolent strategies. Slobodan Milosevic who maintained his power by repression and control of the mass media was forced to resign as president in 2000. Strategic nonviolent struggle in Serbia encompassed dismantling the support structures of the Milosevic regime, bringing the democratic opposition parties together in cooperation, encouraging the general population to vote, holding the regime accountable for possibly falsified election results that finally led to the departure of Milosevic (Miller and King 2006: 21). In the former Soviet republic of Georgia in 2003, nonviolent action led to the resignation of long-time president Eduard Shevardnadze in what is now recalled as the Rose Revolution (Miller and King 2006: 21-22).

### **3.3.3 Impact**

It is evident that nonviolence can be a very effective strategy of showing rejection of something that advocates do not want to happen. Te Whiti encouraged co-existence between the Maori and New Zealand settlers despite the humiliation that he suffered at the hands of the latter. During the course of the Second World War, the Danes realised that they did not have a big enough arsenal to oppose the German war machine and Nazi occupation, but resisted its rule through noncooperation and general strikes. Noncooperation was in the end very effective in counteracting foreign domination. A high level of cooperation was exhibited through the strategies that were used to save the Jews who were on 'the verge of extinction'. What united the Danes was simply the hatred of Germans who wanted to impose their will and their King Christian X who was at the centre of resistance against the invaders. Also of importance was the resistance put up by the Germans in the coal region of the Ruhr against French demands to have the Germans supply coal to the French to compensate for the destruction caused during the First World War. The French finally withdrew after workers in the Ruhr resorted to noncooperation. The ouster of Serbian and Georgian leaders is attributable to nonviolent strategies that were employed.

## **3.4 The Americas**

### **3.4.1 Early development of nonviolence in North America**

The Americas have a rich history of the use of the nonviolence strategy. Before and during the American war of independence many nonviolent tactics were employed. Between 1765 and 1769

there were 150 riots and street actions in the thirteen colonies (Kurlansky 2006: 66). In response to the Stamp Act that was passed in 1765, the colonists staged a series of demonstrations throughout the colonies. In other states like South Carolina two thousand demonstrators protested by burning effigies and then staging a mock funeral for the death of 'American Liberty'. The end result was that the stamp officials were required to quit in every colony with the exception of Georgia (Zinn 2003: 53-57). Nonviolence was strengthened by a boycott of British goods and within a year the Stamp Act was repealed. The Townsend Act was introduced in 1766 in order to tax imports indirectly. Americans mainly resorted to nonviolence in the pre-independence war days when as a sign of protest women weaved cloth by hand rather than buy fabric from British mills. In order to challenge the British tea industry, on 16 December 1773, sixty revolutionaries dressed as Mohawk Indians boarded three ships in Boston Harbour and dumped 342 chests of tea valued at £10 000 into the sea (Kurlansky 2006: 77). The colonists thus resorted to nonviolent methods in an effort to register their displeasure against the manner in which they were treated by the colonisers.

One of the most influential figures behind the followers of nonviolence in the Americas was a Catholic priest of Spanish descent called Bartolome de las Casas. His goal was to encourage co-existence between the Indians and Spaniards but he received not an ounce of support to achieve this (Cantens n. d.: 27). Similarly, when the Europeans invaded North America, the Cherokees (American Indians) first adjusted their lifestyles to suit the invaders but everything changed when gold was discovered on their land, leading to the 1830 'Indian Removal Act'. The Cherokees responded by seeking court assistance and Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the act was illegal (Zinn 2003: 117-119). This was resounding victory for nonviolence and the rule of law despite the fact that a Cherokee faction of 500 sold out against the wishes of 17 000 other Indians, who were force marched to Oklahoma (Kurlansky 2006: 67). The journey resulted in the death of 4 000 Cherokees and the rest lost faith in nonviolence. They instead executed the leaders who had signed the removal treaty.

### **3.4.2 Nonviolence after 1945**

Mahatma Ghandi's nonviolent tactics worked well in the United States of America, especially at the 'peak' of racial segregation. Prominent American activists and pioneers of an organisation called the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) formed in 1942, Houser and Bayard Rustin in

1947recruited eight whites and eight blacks to sit in the ‘wrong’ section of segregated buses. During the Korean War, Rustin who was a black American, demonstrated and was attacked with a stick by a furious spectator. In order to convey his ‘gratitude’, Rustin handed the attacker a second stick and he dropped both (Kurlansky 2006: 154). In fact, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s championed by Rustin, A. J. Muste, and Martin Luther King Jr., internationally became one of the most effective nonviolent movements in history chiefly because of its emphasis on the power of nonviolence to achieve set objectives. The US black civil rights movement employed nonviolent civil disobedience as its major collective weapon (Beckwith 2002: 75). As a result of racial segregation, there were bus boycotts in Montgomery, Alabama, beginning in December 1955, when a black person Rosa Parks refused to surrender her seat to a white passenger. This ultimately led to an alternative transportation system and finally ended with the desegregation of the entire bus system (Albert 1978: 4). The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was formed in 1965 and its members endured a lot of beatings and imprisonments. This led to disillusionment and SNCC resorted to violence instead. The group opposed Martin Luther King Jr., but he insisted on his teaching of nonviolence (Kass and Kass 2013: 8-10). Meyers (2000: 8) however argues that the National Guard, an instrument of violence in the Vietnam War, was used to stop an ongoing tide of violence.

The 1950s witnessed a worldwide crusade against the production, stockpiling and spread of nuclear weapons. A small anti-nuclear group called SANE was founded in 1957. Starting 1 January 1948, A. J. Muste refused to pay his taxes in protest of the U.S nuclear programme which had obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Kurlansky 2006: 157; Danielson 2004:1, 9). Muste was brought for trial after three years but nothing was done since he did not have a bank account and property. Many Americans protested against America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, which the government described as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ (Mariani 2011: 12-13). The media joined the protest through making critical films and although it took long, the Americans eventually had to pull out of Vietnam.

Nonviolence was also effective in having authoritarian regimes in Mexico and Argentina overthrown. A group of fourteen women gathered in 1977 at Buenos Aires’s Plaza de Mayo in front of the government building, the Casa Rosada, to protest against the ruthless and brutal Argentina government (Guembe and Conte 2004). The women who called themselves Las

Madres Plaza de Mayo, did this through advertising in newspapers and circulating petitions. The more ruthless the government became the bigger the group and their allies became. While many factors contributed to the downfall of the Argentine regime in 1982, this group of women are credited for starting the process that lead to the demise of the dictatorship. (Kurlansky 2006: 174; Ackerman and Rodal2008: 113).

Another remarkable case of nonviolent action took place in the USA in 1989 when the United Mine Workers of America protested against Pittston Coal Group over health and disability rights which had been revoked (Nyden n. d.: 386-388). The strike also drew in non-miners and the use of nonviolent civil disobedience was widespread. In order to force the authorities to address their grievances, workers employed nonviolent tactics such as picketing, mass rallies and demonstrations, occupations of Pittston property, and mass sit-downs at mine entrances, coal-processing plants, and company headquarters (Beckwith 2002: 76).

### **3.4.3 Impact**

It is evident that nonviolence played an influential role in the Americas, just like any other continent. During the colonisation of America by the British the colonists responded by boycotting British goods and one cannot underestimate the economic consequences of these actions. Earlier in South America, the Catholic priest de las Casas believed that co-existence between Indians and the Spaniards was crucial. When the Europeans invaded North America the Indians responded by co-opting them into their structures. But what later on proved to be problematic were the insatiable ambitions of the Europeans who wanted to drive out the Indians after the discovery of gold in the area. The Indians responded peacefully by engaging the courts but they were sold out by a few Cherokees who had been bribed. This subsequently compelled the Indians to lose faith in the nonviolent strategy.

More recently, the formation of the Congress of Racial Equality by Houser and Bayard Rustin in 1942 was a milestone in addressing racial discrimination that was rampant in the United States of America. When Martin Luther King (Junior) joined the fray it meant the intensification of the fight against racial discrimination through tactics such as bus boycotts. Argentina and Mexico also witnessed remarkable results of nonviolence through the ‘peaceful’ removal of despotic regimes. The fall of the Argentine regime in 1982 was largely attributed to a women’s group called Las Madres Plaza de Mayo.



### **3.5 Asian experiences of nonviolence**

#### **3.5.1 Nonviolence up to the Second World War**

In many of the conflicts that have taken place in the history of mankind, the advocates of nonviolence have argued that violence was not only immoral, but a less effective means of achieving certain objectives (Martin 2008). The benefits of nonviolence is that like violence, it is very active in the sense that it is a means of persuasion to achieve certain objectives, especially in view of its tactics such as boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, street theatre and demonstrations to mention but just a few. However, one of the most important observations by Kurlansky (2006: 6, 8) and (Martin 2008) is that pacifism and nonviolence are not the same, because the latter encourages activism by other means. The two most prominent religious advocates for nonviolence in the Asian context have been Hinduism and Buddhism.

#### **3.5.2 Nonviolence in the post Second World War era**

Cataclysmic violence struck Japan on 6 and 9 August 1945 when atom bombs were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leaving about 120 000 people dead and six square miles of the built-up areas destroyed (Kurlansky 2006: 142). President Truman justified the attacks on the grounds that Japan had done the same at Pearl Harbour. However, this line of argument has serious flaws. Mohandas K. Gandhi, popularly known as ‘the great soul’ Mahatma, is credited for being the paramount example of the twentieth Century nonviolence preacher. Gandhi’s dream was to ensure equal treatment between the British and the Indians through the use of nonviolent tactics such as strikes, boycotts and protests (Gandhi’s politics: The experiment with nonviolence n. d.: 7-8). Gandhi’s experience in South Africa and later on in India provided a ray of hope for a better future among the down trodden, exploited, and oppressed, as well as those who wanted to transform society. The emancipation of India largely through nonviolent means, inspired many people as they looked forward to the emancipation of all humanity through similar means (Ahmad 2001: 28). Gandhi was also successful in forcing the South African government to end its discrimination against the Indians and black South Africans by rejecting its treatment of non-whites (Kurlansky 2006: 147). Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 for refusing the British terms of independence which divided the Muslims and Hindus into Pakistan and India.

Besides Gandhi, India had Abdul ‘Badshah’ Ghaffar Khan who is also credited for creating the world’s first nonviolent army, the Khudai Khidmatgars, or Servants of God (Kurtz 2009). When

there was a general strike the British sent in the army, but the demonstrators stood their ground despite being fired upon and killed. Gandhi's ideology of nonviolence was derived directly from his Jainist religious background. Suffering at the hands of violence was a means of self-purification and showing merit for a Jainist. Meyers, a critic of the nonviolence strategy, was critical of Gandhi after his proclamation during World War 2 when he said, 'We do not seek independence out of Britain's ruin'. This meant a great Saint was endorsing Indian soldiers to kill Japanese and German soldiers for a good cause (Meyers 2000: 5-6), but 'this hardly squares with the ideology of Nonviolence'. What Meyers said perfectly fits into what Roberts (1991: 5) revealed when he said, 'Leaders of nonviolent movements sometimes favour certain threats or uses of force, even while they insist on nonviolent discipline in a particular struggle'. In another scenario, the South African anti-apartheid movement brought electoral victory to Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), but has not reduced poverty or violence for millions of South Africans (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 207). The problem of such arguments is that they do not offer an alternative to violence. Moreover, they lack an in-depth analysis of the requirements for the success of the strategy of nonviolence. Nonviolent struggles are not always successful and cases in point are the movements in Burma in 1988 and China in 1989 which culminated into massive crackdowns and a continuation of political repression (Miller and King 2006: 22).

### **3.5.3 Impact**

The Asian experience is very useful for advancing our understanding of the idea of nonviolence. A study of Buddhism and Hinduism enhances our appreciation of the role these beliefs play in shaping the attitude of Asian societies to the challenges they face on a daily basis. The success stories in nonviolence in the Asian milieu can be harnessed for the benefit of nonviolence implementation in Zimbabwe.

## **3.6 Nonviolence in Africa**

### **3.6.1 Nonviolence before colonisation**

It is important to look at Africa's experiences of nonviolence because African history is rich in nonviolent struggles (George-Williams 2006: 18). The ideology of *Ubuntu/Hunhuism* helps to explain the move of African people towards the practice of nonviolence. Popularised by Samkange in his book ..... (1980), the concept provides the foundation for the basic values that

manifest themselves in ways in which African people think and behave towards each other and everyone else they encounter. (Mangaliso cited in Pillay, Subban and Govender, 2013: 107) defines *Ubuntu* as an African philosophy that embraces the essence of being human and a person finding personhood through other persons, as expressed in Nguni languages ‘*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*’ or ‘*munhu munhu pavanhu*’ literally meaning a person is a person through other persons (Mugumbate and Nyanguru 2013: 84). The Shona people in Zimbabwe generally believe that murder is a result of *mweya yetsvina* or *mamhepo* (evil spirits) which drive people to behave in that manner (Mangena 2012: 67). It means therefore, that a person possessing *hunhu/Ubuntu* is able to control himself, his passions and instincts. Failure to do so could only be due to *kushaya hunhu* (lack of integrity) (Mangena 2012: 68). The African philosophy of *Ubuntu* conveys the idea that ‘I am because we are; I can only be a person through others’ (Pillay, Subban and Govender 2013: 106). It is evident that the concept of *ubuntu* played a vital role in ensuring peace in different (traditional?) communities. This study will look at the role of *ubuntu* in nonviolence campaigns in the Zimbabwean context.

### **3.6.2 Nonviolence during colonisation**

During the colonial period, Africans were determined to fight for their dignity which the colonisers had deliberately sought to destroy. Former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is hailed as one of the disciples of nonviolence as a result of his profound belief in the need to employ nonviolence strategies to resolve disputes or force a particular course of action. Recalling the attacks that were executed by the Rhodesian Air Force during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation on Zambian soil, Kaunda said,

I have seen the bodies of innocent refugees in Zambia blown to bits by Rhodesian bombers and my soul has been so tormented by my raging mind and angry heart that had I not been able to forgive my enemies because Christ has forgiven me, I should have become deranged with fury (Kaunda 1982: 181-182).

In order to put across his strong commitment to nonviolence, Kaunda as one of the admirers of Mahatma Gandhi said, ‘It is by the power of forgiveness we are freed from the burden of past guilt so that we can act boldly in the present’ (Kaunda 1982: 182). The element of forgiveness forms the crux of Kaunda’s attitude towards violence. The belief that God showed love through sending his only son to die on behalf of the world (John 3:16) played a crucial part in shaping Kaunda’s position on the moral and spiritual justification for denouncing violence.

However, Kaunda tried to be very pragmatic in his assessment of nonviolence. He did not rule out the absence of violence in any revolution or struggle when he said, 'I must be honest-there are times when revolutions are a tragic necessity because the extension of human rights to large numbers of oppressed citizens can be achieved in no other way' (Kaunda 1982: 93). Yet, it can be argued that nonviolent methods such as those employed in Denmark during the Nazi occupation in the Second World War yielded very effective results without shedding a lot of blood.

Apartheid South Africa provides an appropriate example on how nonviolence strategies have been used on the African continent. The ANC initially resorted to legal battles in order to stop the racial discrimination that characterised the country. Its leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were jailed for defying segregation laws imposed by the regime. The apartheid regime yielded to strategies of nonviolence as both sides entered into a spirit of reconciliation. As a sign of rejecting the repressive pass laws, thousands of people responded by converging at police stations to be arrested. At Sharpeville, the police however responded by opening fire on defenceless civilians leading to the death of almost 70 people. The intensity of the violence that was being unleashed by the whites moved Nelson Mandela to dump nonviolence and to create the armed military wing, Umkhonto Wesizwe (the Spear of the Nation) of the ANC. Violence thus played a dominant role as the ANC increased its violent attacks, which rose from 13 in 1979 to 281 in 1989 (Kurlansky 2006: 176). However, Marks (2006: 54-56) argues that it was the strategy using nonviolent methods such as boycotts and talking to intermediaries that brought de Klerk and Mandela to the negotiating table when they realised that violence would not bring an end to the conflict.

Using the South African example, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 16) conclude that labelling one campaign as 'nonviolent' and another as 'violent' is difficult because often both nonviolent and violent campaigns existed side by side among the opposing parties. In colonial Namibia, a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as churches, trade unions, student movements, women's organisations and human rights organisations played a very active role in providing social protection and support while being highly critical of the colonial regime (Mwange 2009: 162). However, considering European colonialism world-wide, it appears that indigenous people made little use of nonviolent methods. Kurlansky (2006: 65) rather doubts

whether these methods would have been successful given the determination of colonial powers to conquer other races.

After the establishment of German South West Africa (now Namibia) migrant workers formed the first informal civil society organisations of blacks, in spite of the fact that they were not allowed to organise themselves. The workers staged the first strike in 1893 at the Gross Otavi Copper Mine against poor working conditions. It was in 1920 that the first African trade union was formed, but it was ruthlessly suppressed by the South African occupying regime. Namibian contract workers in South Africa formed the Owamboland People's Congress in 1957 led by Andimba H. Toivo ya Toivo. The aim was to fight against the hated migrant labour system (Mwange 2009: 162). This organisation was later converted into the Owambo People's Organisation (OPO), the forerunner of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). In the 1970s the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) was established in exile by SWAPO (Mwange 2009: 162). During the 1971–1972 labourers' strike, solidarity and unity in nonviolent resistance successfully led to consideration of the demands of exploited workers (George-Williams 2006: 18). The workers lived in pathetic conditions in the designated overcrowded townships and were separated from their families. This arrangement led to rampant prostitution and alcoholism (George-Williams 2006: 18-19). Students and teachers also actively participated in the struggle for the independence of Namibia. The formation of the Namibia National Student Union (NANSO) in 1984 increased the protests by mostly black people who called for equality in education. The teachers were represented by organisations such as the Namibia National Teachers Union (NANTU) and the Teachers Union of Namibia (TUN) which fought against inequalities in education and promoted social equality (Mwange 2009: 163).

After independence, the civil society organisations continued to play a significant role in influencing government decisions. This was evident at the National Land Conference, when the NUNW that represented the interest of Namibian workers presented its position paper on the land question, stating that it was 'basically opposed to any attempt that regarded the market as a mechanism for the redistribution of land from the privileged propertied minority to the landless majority' (Geingob 2006: 5 cited in Mwange 2009: 162). It is a fact that forced labour, land alienation, racial discrimination, and colonial taxation characterised the colonial period in Africa. In many instances, citizens responded to injustice with nonviolent resistance. Some Africans,

particularly those in French colonies, used mass emigration as a method of nonviolent resistance during the period of early contact with Europeans (George-Williams 2006: 26). Strike actions and boycotts were the most popular nonviolent strategies of economic sabotage used to demand redress of grievances.

Although the Algerians used armed resistance during the period of French colonisation, nonviolent means such as mass emigration, a proliferation of associations and newspapers demanding full citizenship rights, and the organization of alternative institutions ranging from schools to political parties represented an array of nonviolent methods used to challenge the French (Nonviolent Resistance in North Africa and the Middle East n.d.). These played a critical role in putting pressure on the French despite the fact that violence was still their primary tool.

### **3.6.3 Nonviolence after independence**

Islam is the dominant religion in North Africa. As a result minority religions such as Christianity may face a degree of persecution from Muslims, especially if one considers what has been happening in Northern Nigeria and the Central African Republic since 2011 and 2013 respectively. With respect to the situation in Egypt therefore, the Christian community in the USA under the banner of World Evangelical Fellowship champions the rights of Christians in Egypt. Warren Cofsky undertook a campaign to have friends and colleagues write letters to the US embassy in Egypt, the Egyptian ambassador in America, the State department, Congress and even the President so that Warren's three friends who had been imprisoned for converting to Christianity be released. After ten months the young Christians were released (Zoba1996). Fellow Christians encouraged each other to resort to prayers in recollection of what Paul the apostle reminded the Christian community to observe when he was in chains for preaching the death and resurrection of Christ.

In 2011 there was a 'surprising' wave of popular protest in the Arab world leading to the downfall of dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. The Arab Spring revolutions undoubtedly contributed to bloody conflicts in other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and fundamentally reshaped the nature of politics in the region (Aday *et al.* 2012: 3). Electronic media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube also contributed significantly to the escalation and spread of these conflicts as people used the social media to expose what was happening throughout the course of these revolutions. The revolutions which took place in

Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 help one to appreciate the strength of the strategy of nonviolence in transforming the status quo. This is true notwithstanding the fact that there were also incidents of violence during the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, but the conflicts never descended into sustained violent conflict (Aday et al. 2012: 19). Unlike in Libya where the conflict devolved into full-scale internal war between Muammar Gaddafi and the rebels, in Egypt the ouster of Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and his successor Morsi was done through massive nonviolent protests.

A vivid example of nonviolence practised in North Africa is described by Abu-Nimer, namely a special spiritual process for handling murder cases. He relates that, if the perpetrator confesses guilt, he lies beside a sheep. A family member of the victim then approaches the two with an option of killing either the man or the sheep. As expected, the sheep is always the choice (Montville 2006: 466). This act restores dignity, respect and honour to the victim's family because they will no longer be seen as weak or unable to take revenge, and therefore being socially marginalised (Abu-Nimer 2003 quoted in Montville 2006: 466).

Against the backdrop of a remarkable decrease in the outbreak of interstate conflicts in Africa since the end of the Cold war, Harris (2008: 77) calls for an urgent reconsideration of the nature and size of military forces. This call encourages the propagation of nonviolent methods in the resolution of socio-economic and political conflicts.

### **3.6.4 Impact**

The African philosophy of Ubuntu is important for our understanding of Africans' response to various challenges in society. The spirit of Ubuntuism regulated the behaviour of people in their surroundings. It means that for a person to be treated humanely s/he should do the same to others. In other words, that humane treatment is reciprocated between individuals and between groups of people. Therefore, violence was regarded as an anomaly and anyone behaving in such a manner would not get the blessing of the community until they had received the necessary reprimand. *Ubuntu* plays an influential role in determining people's attitude in different situations. It is expected that everyone has to naturally know what is wrong and right, considering the power of the socialisation process. During the colonial period Africans were quick to realise that colonisation had come to destroy their civilisation as much as slavery had done. In that regard, numerous strategies and tactics were put in place to evade the effects of the brutal colonial policies which were crafted to turn the African into a permanent labourer. Strikes,

boycotts, sabotage and feigning illness were some of the popular methods that were devised and it was not long before the whites realised that they were working with a disgruntled people. Even in post independence Africa in the face of despotic regimes the affected people rely on strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, and the like to express their discontent against the system. In addition, the modern generation benefits from modern technology to enhance nonviolence strategies in forcing a particular course of action. It was indeed the commitment to nonviolent campaigns which led to victory whereas in other instances it was a combination of violence and nonviolence which forced oppressive regimes to address the causes of conflict that divided the society.

### **3.7 Zimbabwean nonviolent campaigns, 1890 to 1998**

#### **3.7.1 Nonviolence and the pre-colonial state**

The early inhabitants of what is now Zimbabwe had several mechanisms to deal with disputes in pre-colonial days. Mudenge (1974: 375) revealed that the last dynasty to rule Zimbabwe called the Rozvi, realised the devastating effects of violence emanating from succession disputes and devised mechanisms to reduce conflicts generated by such incidences. This means that when a *mambo* (chief) died, the royal Rozvi clan with the dynastic name *Tumbare* took over as regent until a new mambo was elected (cited in Mutanda 2013b: 132). The pre-colonial society used an array of nonviolent methods to resolve conflicts and this was passed on from one generation to another:

The indigenous Shona people have their own ways of peacefully resolving conflicts. A close family friend (*sahwira*) handles disputes usually involving immediate family members whereas the Dare (panel of elders) chaired either by the kraal head (*sabhuku*), or headman/chief (*mambo*) deals with conflicts among the subject people (Mutanda 2013b: 132).

#### **3.7.2 Nonviolence and the colonial state**

Zimbabwe's colonial state provides good examples of what could be achieved by nonviolence means. The colonial state was exploitative to say the least and the local population came up with several strategies to evade the humiliating methods of labour recruitment and harsh working conditions. The fact that mining was initially the mainstay of the economy until agriculture surpassed it in the second decade of the twentieth Century meant that labour was desperately needed by the colonial regime (Chadya and Mayavo 2002: 12). During the colonial period the imperialists carved up the whole of southern Africa countryside into labour reserves (O'Laughlin



2002: 511). Because of possession of military force by the colonisers, the conquered were almost helpless. The only way for them was to find mechanisms that would 'ease' their situation.

There are clear reasons why indigenous people were not willing to join wage labour. This is attributed to the fact that peasant agriculture was at its peak whereas there were a lack of incentives in the mining and agricultural sectors (Chadya and Mayavo 2002: 13). Despite the success story of African agriculture, the Europeans generally believed that they had little to learn from the African peasant farmers because of the experiences drawn from their agricultural and industrial revolutions (Kramer 1998: 87). Initially, the settlers responded by importing labour from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique. As a matter of fact, the colonial system ensured that industry, mining and commercial farms attracted cheap labour (Ncube 2000: 162). The Africans employed a number of nonviolent means such as deserting the mines and farms which belonged to the whites. This hampered production on the white owned commercial farms.

### **3.7.3 Nonviolence and the post-colonial state up to 1998**

The post-colonial state announced a policy of reconciliation after a bitter civil war (Muchemwa, Ngwerume and Hove 2013) and accommodated all the contending parties in government. Reconciliation was negated by the fighting that broke out after 1980 in Matabeleland and continued up to the 1987 Unity Accord. In 1989 the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was established to contest ZANU PF in the elections, but it was met with violent reprisals by the state actor. ZUM arose after Tekere was expelled from ZANU (PF) in 1988 and stood against Mugabe in the 1990 presidential election as leader of the new opposition party (Tendi 2013: 840). In the 1990s students and the ZCTU's peaceful demonstrations received heavy handed responses from the state. However, the socio-economic situation in the country was bad, partly as a result of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), but also due to maladministration of the country's economy. This was apparent in the demand for land by ordinary people and war veterans. At the peak of economic troubles, the war veterans demanded gratuities and monthly payments in 1997. In 1998 there were massive demonstrations and strikes and nonviolent actions led by the ZCTU, then led by Morgan Tsvangirai. This culminated in food riots which were quelled by the military (Mamdani 2008).

### **3.7.4 Impact**

The fact that Zimbabwe had strategies to prevent coups during the pre-colonial period shows that violence was not conceived as the solution to the succession problems of the Rozwi rulers. The role of *Tumbare* was so important in making sure that bloodshed was reduced or avoided. These principles of nonviolence were carried into the colonial period as people faced the brutalities of the colonial regime. The fact that labour recruitment was forced shows that the Africans did not freely volunteer their labour to the white settlers. When the workers realised that they had no choice but to work for the whites, they responded by malingering and pretending to be ill. The end of colonial rule in 1980 brought a black led government to power. The Robert Mugabe regime has been accused of abusing human rights and this has inevitably led to the sprouting of many civil society organisations such as WOZA, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, NCA and. The key goal of these organisations was to try and compel the Mugabe regime to reform or be replaced through the use of nonviolent means.

### **3.8 Summary**

This chapter demonstrates that nonviolence as a strategy to resolve conflicts is not new. It has been used since time immemorial and was not confined to particular parts of the world. It was employed worldwide in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia and Europe at different times in human history. Even during the pre-colonial and colonial eras in Zimbabwe there is evidence of the use of nonviolence methods in a drive to resolve conflicts.

### **3.9 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that nonviolence has been used to resist and confront oppressive authority in conflict situations all over the world. Nonviolence, just like violence has been used since the beginning of human history and has registered both successes and failures. Major religions such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity teach nonviolent ways of resolving conflict, notwithstanding the extremist interpretations of these religions by those who want to justify violence. The ancient Middle East records many conflicts which were resolved through nonviolent rather than violent means. In Europe, nonviolence was employed successfully against the most ruthless dictators and systems like the Nazis, and during the Cold War period against Communist regimes, thereby challenging the notion that it can only work against weak opponents. The teachings and writings of Gandhi profoundly influenced the development of nonviolence in Asia, the Americas and Africa in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century although the

practice was used before. In Asia, Gandhi's prominent role in the struggle for India's independence is a good example of a success story of nonviolence as a strategy. Africa as a continent also has a rich history of nonviolence rooted in the concept of *Ubuntu* where Africans treated each other with respect and dignity. Given the widespread historical experiences of nonviolence throughout the world, I found it empowering and inspiring to study nonviolence experiences in Zimbabwe during recent times.

In the next chapter, I discuss the history of violence in Zimbabwe since the colonial period. I argue that post colonial violence was bred and cultured during the colonial period when war broke out between the state's RSF on the one side, and ZANLA and ZIPRA on the other.

## **Part II: LITERATURE REVIEW**

*'Violence begets violence' (or 'hate begets hate') - Martin Luther King, Jnr.*

*'The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world' - Hannah Arendt.*

### **4.0 CHAPTER 4: AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE SINCE 1890**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The history of violence in Zimbabwe takes us back to pre-colonial and colonial times. It is along period in which Zimbabweans have been socialised into violence. The land issue was, and still is at the heart of Zimbabwe's political, economic and social development. During colonisation it was the source of political violence and it is still is at the root of tension with Britain, the former colonial power. The arrival of European settlers in September 1890 was the beginning of the removal of blacks from their land. The 1893 conquest of the Ndebele kingdom led to the creation of the Gwaai, Nata and Shangani Reserves. The 1896-97 Shona and Ndebele first Chimurenga/Imfazwe (war of liberation) in which the Whites were victorious, the nationalist struggle (the second Chimurenga/Imfazwe) which led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the controversial Lancaster House constitutional negotiations and peace agreement in 1979, all hinged on the land question. Progressive dispossession was realised mainly through violence, war, and legislative ratifications by successive colonial Governments, culminating in the racially skewed land allocation and possession pattern that until recently was typical of Zimbabwe.

This chapter describes the history of violence in Zimbabwe from 1890 to 1998 (Objective 2). It highlights the main violent watersheds and critically discusses the use of violence as a political strategy with a view of demonstrating how violence was used by government and non-state actors for the furtherance of their objectives. This is significant because it helps to justify the extent to which the cultivation of the culture of nonviolence is important as a condition for moving towards sustainable peace and development in the country. I first give an outline of the general causes of violence, and given the fact that the liberation fighters were referred to as terrorists, I find it necessary to briefly discuss the causes of terrorism. To achieve this, I draw on only a few instances of violence to demonstrate how the scourge of violence needs to be halted through the cultivation of nonviolence practices for sustainable peace to prevail in the country.

In Zimbabwe, violence has normally been considered as just an incident by the conquerors rather than an abnormal process that was violently established leading to the subjugation of Black people by the White occupiers. When the local inhabitants sought redress through negotiations no sustainable democratic resolution was reached. This compelled the Black people to resort to the armed struggle and the Ian Smith regime referred to them as ‘terrorists’ in an effort to criminalise the exploited people and obtain allies against them. The sections that follow demonstrate that violence in Zimbabwe was not an incident but runs across a long period from the colonial to the post colonial period. In fact, the creation of Zimbabwe has been clouded with violence of a magnitude that leads Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 4) to conclude that violence has become part of the culture of Zimbabwean politics. Coltart echoes the same sentiments when he remarks:

Zimbabwe is afflicted with a disease akin to alcoholism, namely endemic violence. For over 150 years, leaders of this beautiful country, bounded by the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers, have used violence to achieve their political objectives. Violence was used by Lobengula to suppress the Shona. Violence was used to colonise, and the threat of violence was used to maintain white minority rule. Violence was used to overthrow the white minority. And since independence, violence has been used to crush legitimate political opposition. The use of violence has been compounded by another phenomenon – namely a culture of impunity. Those responsible for use of violence have never been brought to book. Not only is there a long history of violence used successfully to achieve political objectives but also those who have committed horrendous crimes have prospered through their actions. As a result, the use of violence is now deeply embedded in our national psyche. Political violence is accepted as the norm. [But] political violence is not the norm in democratic societies. It may be the norm in tyrannical states. It may have been used in the formative stages of democracies. But it is now anathema in democracies. There is also no doubt that the use of violence inhibits economic development and creates a whole barrage of social problems, including domestic violence. The sustained and long-term use of violence in Zimbabwe lies at the very core of many of the problems our nation faces today. We are indeed afflicted by a very serious disease and need help (Coltart 2007a: 48–54).

## **4.2 Terrorism**

Violence has different levels and magnitudes. It can be a limited war and war which is condemned as terrorism. Violence has been defined as the expression of physical or verbal attack against one or more persons, and as coercive activity against another's desire or fear of being harmed (Mangena and Hove 2013: 229). Political violence then is the expression of physical or verbal attack by one political party against another, or for that matter an attack by the state on individuals or groups considered to be a danger to the survival of the party or government that

initiates the violence. There are many examples where those in charge of the status quo have been compelled to relinquish power due to increase in, and difficulty to contain violence, such as the Cuban revolution of 1959 and Zimbabwe's liberation war 1964-80. However, Suttner warns against the use of violence in the name of liberation saying:

Violence is usually unjustified. It is a breach of peace, or potential peace in our case, which is a condition for society based on mutual respect. Violence tends to dehumanize the other, especially in political violence where the victim is defined as the enemy... It is now undesirable to emphasize heroic acts of war where these feed into heroic actions... (Suttner 2010).

Agreeing with Suttner, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) note that violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.

Others hold that the victims of colonial domination were compelled by day to day experiences of inequality to resort to violence in an effort to liberate themselves from unfair practices, as Frantz Fanon notes:

For the colonised people this violence...invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning... The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny and a collective history... (Fanon 1967: 73).

I In the case of Zimbabwe the Blacks resorted to violence to end colonial subjugation thereby forcing the White minority led government to accept discussing the conflict on the table at Lancaster House in 1979. In their quest to fight for independence the liberation fighters were dubbed terrorists by the colonial regime.

Terrorism is difficult to define. Some scholars have defined it negatively when they have argued that it is not a fair way of advancing grievances by the affected persons. During the Second Chimurenga in Zimbabwe it was used by the establishment of the day referring to the freedom fighters. It has been accepted in different 'fora as just a word, a subjective, and not an objective reality, that it is not an excuse to suspend the rules of International law' (Whitbeck 2001). Britain's inclusive terrorist legislation defines terrorism as 'the use or threat of action to influence a government or intimidate the public for a political, religious or ideological cause'

(International Council on Human Rights Policy 2008: 22). One can perhaps say that terrorism involves the unjustified use of force in the pursuance of personal or group interests.

In other circles it has been described as an 'illegal, organised, systematic way of adopting terror activities for the aim of changing the present system and in order to serve the terrorists own political objective', while the US State Department defines it as 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience' (Addo 2004: 13).

In a nutshell therefore, terrorism can be defined as the use of terror for the furtherance of political ends. The terrorist in the North American case refers to a radical or a fundamentalist Muslim, one who endangers the US interests and the lives of the American people or one who finances terrorist activities, or those who harbour them, as the then US president George W. Bush, put it.

During the colonial era Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) guerrilla fighters were called terrorists. When the Law and Order Maintenance Bill of 1972 was promulgated, it made death sentence the maximum punishment for harbouring, supporting, or failure to communicate the presence of guerrillas. The then Minister of Law and Order noted that 'Government is determined to make absolutely clear to anyone contemplating terrorist activities or assisting terrorists in any way, that he will do so at the risk of his own life' (Cole 1984: 89).

Following the Altena Farm attack by guerrillas in the North East of the country the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Smith said:

The terrorist incursion in the north east of our country has developed in a manner that we had not previously experienced and as a result we have to face up to a number of serious problems. In the first place, for some months now these terrorists have been operating in this area, quietly and methodically undermining the local population. These were used to good effect in misleading local tribesmen into accepting that the terrorists were worthy of their support. I am sure that I do not have to inform you how easy it is to mislead these simple, gullible people who still believe in witchcraft and the throwing of bones... Thereafter their task was made easy through the shelter, food and assistance they received from the locals (The Rhodesia Herald, 14 September 1973).

On the basis of the above citations, a terrorist can be defined as a nationalist who fights those who subjugate him and are in charge of the status quo. The Whites colonised Zimbabwe in the

1890s using any strategy at their disposal and began to oppress and segregate the Blacks thereby compelling them later to resort to the barrel of a gun in their search for freedom.

The guerrilla fighters and their leadership on the other hand, regarded themselves freedom fighters and influenced by the idea of a just war, they considered warfare as morally wrong but ethically permissible in some circumstances as the 'lesser evil'. At best, the just war theory may be seen as a repeated principled 'reflection on the morality of a war, and is not a set of boxes that a politician can tick to establish if a war is 'just'' (Megoran 2007: 133–135, 478). In the same way, in the eyes of the liberation fighters all forms of resistance against white domination were justified, including war because independence had been lost in 1890 and all attempts to regain it without war had been fruitless. In this light, the armed struggle was viewed as a morally upright mission of liberating the country from colonialism.

Acts of terrorism may therefore be perpetrated in reaction to perceived injustices prevalent in the international system, when violence is seen as the only option for compelling redress. In the Zimbabwean case Blacks resorted to violence in an effort to liberate themselves from colonialism.

A terrorist act may be described as a dangerous act committed by an individual, organization, group or states. The Organization of African Union/African Union Convention on the Prevention and elimination of Terrorism defines a terrorist act as:

- (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is intended to;
  - (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to act according to certain principles; or
  - (ii) Create general insurrection in a state;
- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) – (ii) (Addo 2004: 13).

The AU definition of a terrorist act gives the organization wide scope for combating terrorism, if efforts to implement it are given serious thought. What remains a problem for Africa is the



universal definition of terrorism the US has imposed on the continent. To be meaningful, I propose that Africa should use an African grown definition of terrorism and this will avert prejudicing individuals fighting for a worthwhile cause to be misconstrued as terrorists as was the case with Zimbabwe's freedom fighters between 1964 and 1979. The United Nations Organization (UNO) where African countries are affiliates has adopted an Anti-Terrorism Resolution 1373 on threats to International Peace and Security as a result of terrorist acts which direct all countries to unite in the fight against terrorism.

Given the challenge of terrorism and how it became popular after the 9/11 terror attack in 2001 in the US it is critical to discuss how acts of terrorism could be averted. The majority of experts have asserted that the solution lies in establishing and addressing the root causes of terrorism, whereas the US and its allies believe that terrorism can be controlled through coercion. It was however, evident from the past coercive efforts that the use of force results in the killing of the innocent people, uncalled for displacements, destruction of the infrastructure and economic retrogression, of which Afghanistan is a case in point. A more lasting approach is finding the root cause and to then focuses on how this can be addressed.

According to Coning, 'there is a growing body of literature that argues that the root causes of terrorism are poverty, chronic underdevelopment and a deep sense of marginalisation'. This school of thought holds the view that the poverty stricken may have lost hope of ever catching up with the rich who benefit immensely from globalization. Those opposed to this viewpoint argue that although 3 billion people out of six billion in the world are poor, only an insignificant number turn to terrorism, thus linking terrorism to poverty would be incorrect. In this regard, the then president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, during his address at the United Nations General Assembly in 2004, argued that while the rich held the notion that terrorism was the principal threat and challenge for humanity it was notably, 'poverty and underdevelopment' (Coning 2004: 20-21).

The president of the World Bank at the time, Wolfensohn also noted that 'poverty and the hopelessness it brings to so many in our world were the greatest potential source of instability on our planet today'. He stated that 80% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in the hands of one billion people, whilst five billion people share the remaining 20%. 100 million children never get the chance to attend school, one billion people have no access to clean water

and more than 40 million people in developing countries are HIV positive with slender chances of receiving treatment. As a result of this scenario, he concluded that 'too many will grow up in poverty and disillusionment with a world they will view as inequitable and unjust' (Wolfensohn 2004). Al Gore cited by Radu (2002) echoes the same sentiments when he asserts that the source 'of evil in the world is poverty and ignorance; disease and environmental disorder; corruption and political oppression'. From the aforementioned arguments, it is evident that poverty plays a pivotal role in the spread of terrorist activities in the world. In the Zimbabwean case, the majority of the oppressed people had to resort to the armed struggle because they had been alienated from their land and restricted by various pieces of repressive legislation.

According to Ramesh Thukar cited by Coning (2004: 21), the root cause of terrorism is not religion or poverty, but lack of liberty and freedom. Democracy creates a platform for the struggle for power and provides a chance for a group of people to vent their anger openly. It is the denial of such democratic chances which compel the concerned persons to resort to terrorist activities which are driven underground. To this end, fanatical anger is born out of deprivation and inequality. He goes on to argue that group grievances arise as a result of deeply felt injustice. He concludes that:

Terror is the weapon of choice by those who resent being historical victims, but are too weak to do anything about it through conventional means. The US becomes the focus of grievance if its aims are seen to be propping up brutal and occupying regimes (Coning 2004: 22).

Black people during the colonial period felt the injustices, notably the lack of representation, segregation, and being compelled to live in mosquito and tsetse infested, poorly watered, remote Reserves. From the foregoing contributions, one could conclude that poverty and factors such as lack of liberty and freedom cause terrorism.

Despite the large number of people who argue that poverty is the root cause of terrorism, it has proven difficult to establish the link between poverty and terrorism. Convincing evidence can be drawn from the suspected master mind of the 11 September 2001 bombings, Osama bin Laden who was a multi millionaire, and the fact that the hijackers themselves were privileged, hence what the link is between poverty and terrorism, is difficult to discern. It must be realised therefore that terrorists in the majority of the operations have been the middle and upper classes, the educated, very rarely the poor. To support this view, Radu (2002) refers to the South

American Tupamaros and Motoneros of the 1970s, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua and Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolutionaries. Radu's viewpoint however is not convincing since the privileged groups who use terror do so in most cases on behalf of the poor voiceless majority whom they choose to identify with on ethnic or religious grounds.

The only way to bring terrorism under control is to establish what causes it. A meeting was convened in Oslo-Norway in September 2003 under the auspices of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and it outlined many causes of terrorism listing the following:

Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law, failed or weak states; rapid modernization; extremist ideologies of a secular or a religious nature; historical antecedent of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupations; hegemony or inequality of power; illegitimate or corrupt governments; powerful external actors upholding illegitimate governments; repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers; the experiences of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin; failure or unwillingness by states to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes; the presence of charismatic ideological leaders and triggering events as outrageous acts committed by the enemy, lost wars, massacre, contested elections, police brutality or any other provocative acts that may call for revenge (Coning 2004: 24).

The above may convince readers that there are many causes of terrorism which may be grouped under political and socio-economic factors. Zimbabweans resorted to violence, or terrorism (in the words of their colonisers) to end the impoverishment which had been caused by loss of land and the repressive laws such as the maize control Act, cattle levy Act, the colour bar system, and pass laws among others. Above all, the Black people wanted a fair inclusion in the existing systems of the white dominated government, but when this was given a cold shoulder, war was chosen as the only means which could compel the whites to relinquish power to the majority. In this study, a violent act and a terrorist act are treated synonymously.

#### **4.3 Colonisation, 1872-1890**

The British South Africa Company colonised the areas inhabited by the Shona and the Ndebele in 1890 and 1893 respectively. A number of fraudulent treaties were entered into between 1887 and 1890. The main events between 1872 and 1890 include: the Moffat Treaty, the Rudd Concession, the Charter of the British South Africa Company (BSAC); the activities of the pioneer column and the occupation of Mashonaland (June- September, 1890); the occupation of Manicaland (1890); and the conquest of Matabeleland (1893). The events prior to the

colonisation of Zimbabwe must be explained within the wider perspective of the competition to control the whole of Central Africa by Britain, Germany, Portugal and the South African Republic (Transvaal) who were all involved in the scramble for Matabeleland following the discovery of gold deposits on its territory in 1886 (Zvobgo 2009: 11-12). When Germany declared a Protectorate over South West Africa, Rhodes was worried that German expansion and a westward expansion of the South African Republic were going to affect the British expansion northwards. Prior to the signing of the Grobler treaty between a representative of the South African Republic, Pieter Johannes Grobler and the Ndebele king, Lobengula on 30 July 1887, British officials feared that this treaty could lead to the occupation of Matabeleland by the South African Republic. Cecil John Rhodes wanted the whole continent from Cape Town to Cairo to be a British sphere of influence. The assumption that the area north of the Limpopo was richer in gold as compared to the Witwatersrand increased the rivalry amongst European powers. In response to the Boer initiative, Rhodes speeded his mission of the British expansion northwards. Consequently, this phase of Zimbabwean history was initiated violently. The consequence was that:

The advent of colonialism brought in a colonial state that was to enjoy 90 years of domination built on superior military might. The colonial state perpetrated violent disposessions of livestock and land, relocations of the dispossessed people to marginalised lands, brutal exploitation of African labour and institutionalised racial discrimination (Nyakudya n. d.: 28).

In its aftermath, the colonial administration created a state institutionalised system or racialised land allocation that led to the outbreak of violent conflicts affecting the country up to this day (Machakanja 2010: 1-2). Richardson (1959: 6) notes that once given the opportunity to settle in Africa, the Whites were bound to come into conflict with Africans and the only question was how much violence this required. Instead of bringing democratic standards and customs to the African people, the colonial system ingrained authoritarianism. The system just secured an embryonic inflexible mind in the autonomist leadership. Consequently, the repression of the colonial period replicated itself inside the nationalist political organisations, while the war of independence also strengthened the tradition of authoritarianism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 102). One may therefore argue that it was due to the advent of colonialism that violence was reinforced. According to Mazarire (2006: 9-10), for the inhabitants of Chivi, the defence of

Munaka and the advent of the Pioneer Column with mounted maxim guns constituted a violent occupation of their area.

#### **4.4 Anglo-Ndebele War, 1893-4**

Different scholars have portrayed Ndebele history as a terrain of violence. They divide Ndebele history into two phases, the first running from 1820-1840 characterised by the turbulent years of the 'mfecane' and wars during the years of migration northward. In the second phase between 1841-1893 the Ndebele transformed themselves into a fully-fledged settled heterogeneous nation on the Zimbabwean plateau (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008a: 71). This section does not cover these Ndebele phases but focuses on their relations with their colonizers.

The colonisation of Mashonaland by the BSAC transformed the balance of power on the Zimbabwean highveld, and the impact on Ndebele hegemony was substantial. After the occupation of Mashonaland, the BSAC started to stir up more violence between the Ndebele and the Shona, and through a strategy of confrontation justifying their attack and conquest of the Ndebele state. The encouragement of violence between the Ndebele and the Shona in the 'tributary zone' had a twofold objective. It was designed to validate the BSAC as a force that came to end violence and to set free the Shona from Ndebele despotism, and to stamp out Ndebele 'savagery and violence'. It was further intended to diminish Ndebele supremacy by creating a lot of enemies for them (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 212-213). They promised the Shona of the 'tributary zone' protection from Ndebele raids and encouraged them to discontinue paying tribute to the Ndebele. The whites further persuaded Lobengula to extend the reach of the Ndebele state and influence, so as to uphold the claims of the Rudd Concession against other contending whites, in particular the Portuguese. Lobengula was trapped into launching full-scale raids on the Shona and the last of these was used as an opportunity to obliterate the Ndebele state in 1893.

The early BSAC administration used vilification to justify their conquest of the Ndebele state. Reed (1967) says:

The white man was in Rhodesia but three wars had to be fought before he was secure. King Lobengula had agreed that he might mine for gold, but the Matabele warriors did not agree that they must cease from enslaving the Mashona, who in turn deduced that the white man was too weak to protect them and refused labour for his mines and farms. In 1893 Mashona were massacred near Fort Victoria and when the Matabele king refused to

give up his claim to the Mashona raiding grounds, war began. Lobengula burned his capital and fled. Major Allan Wilson with a small force tried to capture Lobengula in his kraal and failed: all were wiped out. Lobengula escaped and died, possibly by suicide, Matabele resistance collapsed, and in later time a great city, Bulawayo, rose on the site of Lobengula's kraal (Reed 1967).

It is apparent that the BSAC forced a conflict with the Ndebele through the various incidents which include the Victoria incident, the Jameson Raid, and the Bere incident as a strategy for conquering Matabeleland where they anticipated obtaining huge gold deposits that they had failed to get in Mashonaland (Mills n. d.a.: 11-12).

The Ndebele were victims of violence, dispossession and brutality at the hands of the BSAC. Indeed,

...the Ndebele state became a victim of imperial violence and destruction. The existence of an independent Ndebele state was interpreted by the advocates of Victorian aggrandizement, as a barrier to the advances of "Civilization and Christianity" in general and the imperial interests of Cecil John Rhodes and the British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C) in particular (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 210).

In fact, the whites used the Ndebele retaliatory attack on Bere, a Shona headman in the Victoria (now Masvingo) area as a pretext for their offensive. The conflict broke out after Bere's people in May 1893 took advantage of the presence of whites and raided cattle that belonged to Lobengula. In response, Lobengula sent a 3000 strong force under the dual command of Mgandani and Manyao to discipline Bere and regain the cattle but the whites responded by protecting Bere and his people (Needham, Mashingaidze and Bhebe 1984: 118). In order to avoid clashes with whites, Lobengula had sent Manyao and Mgandani with a letter explaining the necessity for the raid and assuring the whites that they were not going to be affected and molested. However, the letter reached Lendy on July 14, 1893 when the attack on Bere had already commenced leading Jameson to have a short-lived *indaba* (meeting) with Manyao and Mgandani who were demanding the handing over of the Shona for punishment after they had sought refuge in the town of Masvingo and others in the mountains. Jameson instead ordered Mgandani and Manyao to withdraw with force immediately, failing which they were going to be driven back by force. Mgandani admitted that the task of withdrawing was difficult as their large number were not going to be moved that easily and quickly. Consequently, Lendy was tasked to ensure that the Ndebele force withdrew from the area within two hours. Unfortunately, Lendy's patrol caught up with a section of Mgandani's retreating fighters leading to a skirmish, since he concluded that

Mgandani had defied Jameson's orders. The skirmish led to the death of Mgandani and 11 of his compatriots whilst the rest of his men fled (Needham, Mashingaidze and Bhebe 1984: 118-119).

The course of the war involved violence, death of people, pillaging, stealing of cattle and burning of Ndebele homes. The Ndebele force's attempts to curtail the whites advance at the Shangani River battle failed because the latter had superior fire-power. During the Shangani River battle the whites deployed five Maxim guns, three rapid-fire Gatling guns, two cannons and two-hundred rifles so the isigwagwagwa (Maxim gun) cut the Ndebele to pieces (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 221). The Ndebele monarchy had finally been shattered.

#### **4.5 First Chimurenga, 1896-7**

Africans north of the Limpopo River rose against white settlers to stop them from occupying their land. The word 'Chimurenga' has a number of meanings such as revolution, war, struggle or resistance (Pisani 1981: 20). The collapse of Jameson's raid into the Transvaal in 1895 ruined Rhodes' prestige. The defeat by the Boers motivated the Ndebele to take up arms against the whites in 1896. As a result, over 280 white men and their families were shot, stoned, bludgeoned or speared while the Ndebele also incurred heavy losses of men, women and children (Baxter 2011). The whites had responded with a force of 2,000 White and 600 Black troops to end the uprising. Unlike in the defensive battles of 1893, in 1896 the Ndebele attacked any white person and institution, looted stores and missions and set them on fire. The whites responded ferociously by shooting any Ndebele person they encountered, burnt their villages, and destroyed crops and hidden grain stores of the 1894 and 1895 harvest season. However, the blacks were defeated due to their inferior weapons and technology. (Mazingi and Kamidza n. d.: 322). The conquest of black people led to far-reaching land seizures, enormous dislocation of the indigenous people, confiscation of their cattle, and the exploitation of their labour (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 242).

After the Ndebele had surrendered the Shona rose against the whites in Mashonaland. The spread of the uprising to the Shona area can be attributed to the introduction of hut tax, outbreak of cattle disease in the form of rinderpest, the influence of religious leaders and spirit mediums, and the loss of cattle and land. There was no unified command when the Shona rose against the whites hence different Shona groups took up arms at different times in 1896. The whites responded by dynamiting the caves in which they were hiding, by using collaborators, and by destroying grain stores. Reinforcements were brought in from South Africa leading to the defeat

of the Shona who also had inferior weapons compared to the BSAC force (Beach 1979; 1986). It is evident that both sides resorted to violence for the furtherance of their objectives. During the First Chimurenga many fell victim to, and suffered the wrath of white imperialism in what was essentially a struggle for the recovery of lost land and dignity.

The whites' violent responses were evident when the leaders of the First Chimurenga in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland were summarily tried and hanged. Smith (1989) graphically relates their cruel fate:

What rebel spies were caught were summarily tried and hanged. There is a tree, known as the hanging tree, to the north of the town, which did service as gallows hither the doomed men were conveyed. On the ropes being fastened to their necks, they were made to climb along an overhanging branch, and thence were pushed or compelled to jump into space after "a last look at Bulawayo". Their bodies were left suspended for twenty-four hours (Smith 1989: 287-288).

He also records the trial and execution of spirit mediums Kaguvi and Nehanda in Mashonaland:

Nehanda was taken out on to the scaffold. Her cries and resistance when she was taken up the ladder, the screaming and yelling on the scaffold, disturbed my companion, Kakubi, very much, till the noisy opening of the trap-door on which she stood, followed by the heavy thud of her body as it fell, made an end to the interruption. Though very much frightened, Kakubi listened to me and repeated that he would no longer refuse baptism. After he had made the necessary acts of faith, repentance, etc., I baptized him, giving him the name of the good thief, Dismas, with whom he was to share the great blessing of forgiveness in the hour of death ....The hangman came and did his duty ... Kakubi did not give the least trouble nor did he make any lamentation. He died ...quiet, resigned and, as I hope, in good disposition (Smith 1989: 287-288).

#### **4.6 Settler Responsible Government, 1922-1952**

The settlers pressured colonial governments to accord them responsible government status with an electorate restricted entirely to the predominantly white minority. In Southern Rhodesia, responsible government status was granted and its 1922 constitution ensured that the white minority had overall control. A number of laws were borrowed from the Cape Colony and the franchise was based on property and income qualifications rather than a specifically defined racial qualification. A few Africans there by qualified to vote (Mills n. d.b.: 2). Added to this, repressive and exploitative legislation was subsequently enacted, such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951.



Failure to obtain the anticipated quantities of gold in Mashonaland and Matabeleland compelled the whites to divert their attention to commercial farming with the intention to grow export crops. To achieve the commercial farming objectives of the Whites, a cheap black labour force was needed. Tension between the settlers and Africans was inevitable as they were in competition with respect to crop production, land, and the supply of adequate labour. To disempower the Blacks, the Morris Carter Land Commission was set up, culminating in the notorious Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which forcibly divided the country into Black and White areas as shown in table **4.1** on the following page.

An influx of British settlers facing the post Second World War economic challenges in Europe, led to the rapid increase in white population from 80 500 in 1945 to 219 000 by 1960. A significant number of these Whites resorted to commercial farming and a limited number took up white-collar jobs in the cities. However, ex-service men were offered farms virtually for free as a reward for their contribution to the war effort. Consequently, the numbers of Whites running farms nearly increased twofold from 4 673 in 1945 to 8 632 in 1960 (Hanyama n. d.). To create farms for these whites, there were extensive evictions of the Black communities and as a result about 100 000 people were forcibly removed into Reserves which were situated in the tsetse or mosquito infested areas like Gokwe and Muzarabani between 1945 and 1955. Most of the Reserves were inhospitable with sandy soils or where soils were good the areas were poorly watered and not suitable for human settlements.

Table 1 <b>Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia in 1930</b>		
CATEGORY	ACRES	% OF COUNTRY
European	49,149,174	51.0
Native Reserves	21,127,040	22.0
Unassigned Area	17,793,300	18.5
Native Purchase Area	7,464,566	7.8
Forest Area	590,500	0.6
Undetermined Area	88,540	0.1
TOTAL	96,213,120	100
<b>Source:</b> <i>The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe</i> , <del>Moyana Henry Vuso</del> , Mambo Press 1984		

The policy of racial segregation had severe effects on Africans, including overcrowding and land degradation in the Reserves. This was confirmed in 1959 by the then Land Development Officer in the Native Agriculture Department, Ken Brown who said:

The majority of arable areas in reserves are already so eroded and so exhausted of fertility that nothing short of a 12 to 15 year rest to grass will restore them to a state of structure and fertility which would enable economic crop production to commence (Hanyama n.d.).

The state of the degradation in the so called Native Reserve was further confirmed when the then Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donald Lamont, asked in June 1959:

Can you in conscience blame the African, if eking out tenuous existence from the poor soil in an overcrowded Reserve, he is swayed by subversive propaganda, while close besides him here lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may not cultivate, not occupy, not grace, because although it lies unused and unattended, it belongs to some individuals or group of individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit from speculation (Hanyama n.d.).

By and large, the settlers blamed the congestion and wearing down of the land in the Reserves on supposed African malpractices. In response, the colonial Government enacted the Native Land

Husbandry Act in 1951. The act was designed to enforce de-stocking and conservation practices on the land held by the Blacks by force (Alexander 2006: 9).

During the same period violence was explained on the basis of an ethnic hatred thesis. It argued that urban violence broke out as a result of tribal clashes which date back to the period before the coming of the whites (Ranger 2006: 193–228; Msindo 2007: 267). In reality, the ethnic based violence was encouraged as a divide and rule strategy.

In this period, violence was driven by the government of the day through various successive pieces of legislation including the Land Apportionment Act, the Cattle Levy Act, The Maize Control Act, the Colourbar Act and the Native Land Husbandry Act.

#### **4.7 Federation, 1953-1963**

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of July 1953, the British Parliament established the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, whereby the colony of Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were merged together to form one unified state. It was formed to link the three territories of Central Africa politically and economically. After a rocky ten-year period, the Federation was dissolved on 17 December 1963. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland soon became the independent nations of Zambia and Malawi respectively. Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, faced a prolonged struggle until the attainment of Zimbabwean independence in 1980. There were several cases of violence by the state against non-state actors between 1954 and 1963, of which a few examples are outlined in this section.

In 1954 the Wankie (Hwange) miners demonstrated and they were tear-gassed as they demanded an improvement in their working conditions and in October 1960, seven black people were killed and 70 were injured in Salisbury (Harare) during a riot (Sachikonye 2011: 2).

In July 1959 the black nationalists responded to the discriminatory administration of the state. In Southern Rhodesia, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed, replacing the banned African National Congress. It launched its direct confrontation against White domination in January 1960, prearranging recurrent demonstrations against the Federation. In July, Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead reacted by ordering the arrest of three NDP leaders but Whitehead's repressive tactics ignited more problems than it resolved. The arrest of the leaders prompted

extensive violence in Southern Rhodesia as ‘party leaders ordered their members to mount resistance against provocative police operations’ (Bhebe 1989: 74).

In July 1960, about 7 000 Africans congregated in the township of Highfield and marched into Salisbury to confront Whitehead. In response, police were deployed to cordon off and disperse the marchers (Cary and Mitchell 1977). In Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia's second-largest city, demonstrations broke out in what came to be known as the ‘zhii’ riots which marked the beginning of the confrontational era between Africans and the colonial government leading to widespread violence (Sachikonye 2011: 2). It was this oppression used by the white government which compelled the Africans to take up arms against their oppressors.

#### **4.8 Second Chimurenga, 1964-1980**

This section focuses on some of the violent atrocities which were perpetrated by the contending parties during the Second Chimurenga. In an effort to end racial segregation and the skewed land allocation, the Blacks resorted to armed struggle after all efforts to negotiate had failed to reap any positive results. This period has been dubbed the Second Chimurenga, which was a prolonged conflict between the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) on the one hand, and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) on the other. In fact, ‘Colonial violence provoked African nationalist violence. Zimbabwe was therefore born out of a bloody clash of colonial and nationalist violence’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 28).

In 1964 violent operations were begun by both ZANU and ZAPU fighters. However, due to lack of mobilisation and politicisation seven ZANLA guerrillas were killed in the Chinhoyi battle of 1966 by the Rhodesian police force (McLaughlin 1996: 73). After that there was a temporary stoppage of the deployment of forces by ZANU in an effort to pave the way for the mobilisation of the civilian population to support the armed struggle. Thereafter, from December 1972 to April 1980 the violent conflict raged between the nationalist forces and the RSF and victory was finally won at the elections by ZANU PF. Many civilians in the process became victims of physical and psychological violence which was carried out by both parties during the decisive phase of the Second Chimurenga or war of resistance (Hove 2012b: 201-203). Earlier nationalist leaders had been incarcerated at Hwahwa, Sikombela and Gonakudzingwa. As a result of the war, there emerged many sites of war time destruction such as shattered dip tanks, schools, water

pumps, restriction centres (such as Gonakudzingwa) and homesteads (Hove 2012b: 197). Subsequently, many civilians and combatants were killed by the fighting parties. It is reported that from December 1972 to August 1976 the Second Chimurenga led to the death of 2,408 people who consisted of 1185 guerrillas, 149 RSF, 39 White civilians and 1035 Black civilians, and from the black civilian casualties, 432 were killed by the RSF whereas 603 by guerrillas (Sachikonye 2011: 7). The ZANLA guerrillas used violence against civilians who were accused of betraying the struggle (Dzimbahete 2014: 121). Added to this, the guerrillas killed 2,751 civilians and the RSF killed 3,360 between 1977 and 1980, excluding those who were killed in external raids by RSF (Caute 1983: 386). All told, more than 30 000 people were killed, almost 100 000 maimed, and more than 750 000 were displaced from their homes, confined protected villages, and an equivalent number became refugees in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique during the Second Chimurenga (Reeler 2009: 3).

As a counter-insurgency strategy, the Rhodesian government introduced a dawn to dusk curfew whereby those who violated the stipulated times were shot dead on sight, water sources were poisoned, and chemical and biological warfare was also engaged (Hove 2007: 59-65). In 1967 the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act provided mandatory death penalty for the possession of arms of war. In 1976 the Act added long prison sentences for harbouring, or failure to report guerrillas (Hove 2007: 66). In external operations, thousands of people were killed as the RSF bombarded the refugee or training centres such as Chimoio, Tembue, and Nyadzonia, in Mozambique and Mboroma and Mkushi in Zambia.

The liberation struggle instilled in many political leaders and their supporters a militaristic approach and perception of politics. Even up to this day, ‘... ZANU PF certainly prides itself in its violent past and its capacity to deploy this infrastructure of violent politics to those who dare challenge it’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 105- 6).

In the rural areas there was a lot of witch-hunting and threats which led to the death of suspects who were summarily tried and then killed by the guerillas. Linked to this, Marowa (2009: 125) reveals that there were three parties which operated in the Dandawa area in Hurungwe and these were the RSF, its local front Pfumo reVanhu (PRV) and ZIPRA. Actual battles took place between the PRV and the ZPRA forces, and it was between these two that a tug of war occurred.

People in Dandawa were harassed and executed after being accused of being sell-outs on account of their off-spring or relatives who were recruited into the PRV (Marowa 2009: 125).

Black nationalists in the 1960s also castigated those who opposed their views and actions as sell-outs. In this regard, Stanlake Samkange recalled that ‘Those who are not with us are sell-outs. Those who form a rival political party must be prevented at all costs. So houses and cars were stoned. Petrol bombs thrown into people’s bedrooms’ and even trade union leaders were branded as sell-outs, imperialist stooges and threatened with direct nationalist violence such as ‘Kill Jamela, Drive him away – sell-out’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 107 - 108).

Weapons of war were indispensable, but some of these arms were then used to get rid of political opponents, including within the nationalist movements. Civilians lived in fear and a siege mentality and dared not criticise nationalist leaders. The Chairman of the Bulawayo Youth League in 1961, Dumiso Dabengwa, said, ‘Any African who remains independent and does not take part in the common cause is as bad a sell-out as the so-called moderates. Those who are not with us are against us’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 107-8). More recently, Wereki Sandiani, a Second Chimurenga war veteran admitted that those accused of betraying the cause of the armed struggle were brutally killed. He explained how they killed those who were accused of rebelling in 1977 and concluded that ‘killing a sell-out was like killing a fly during the struggle’ (Huni 2013: 7).

There was much animosity, hatred and violence also amongst Blacks during the period of the armed struggle. Moore writes that:

If one goes back into the history of the liberation war, there is also little unity of a hegemonic sort. The list of tensions is a long one: the split eventuating in ZANU emerging out of ZAPU; the March 11 Movement ... the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi, or, as some of its detractors called it, the Front for the Liaison of Zezuru Intellectuals); the Nhari Rebellion – and centrally, the Chitepo Assassination ... the Zimbabwe People’s Army and Vashandi Movement (wiped out with particular Machiavellian cold-hearts and ideological hypocrisy by the man these young radicals helped into power); the Hamadziripi-Gumbo ‘coup’ in 1978; and the mysterious death of Josiah Tongogara the day after he advised Robert Mugabe to go into the 1980 elections together with ZAPU, with which ZANU was ostensibly allied in the Patriotic Front. The closer one looks at the history of Zimbabwe, the more one wonders how anyone could ‘imagine’ a ‘community’ based on the nationalism exemplified by its political brokers (Moore 2008: 32).

African politics was fraught with conflicts, also in the urban areas. For example, there was violence amongst blacks in Bulawayo, Masvingo and Harare (Tekere 2007: 54; Nkomo 2001: 101; Nyagumbo 1980: 179). The struggle for liberation was loaded with intricate uncertainties and inconsistencies to the extent that it was characterised with intense plotting, hostilities, factionalism, violent eliminations and murders. The nationalist leaders and their forces fought each other and Masipula Sithole (1999) dedicated a whole book: *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the struggle*, to these violent divisions experienced during the war of liberation. Moreover, there existed negative schools of tyranny, authoritarianism, brutality and the cult of personality (Bhebe and Ranger 2003: 2).

As a result of these experiences of violence in the pre-independence era, the ZANU PF government continued to be characterised by the culture of intolerance, intimidation and violence which was derived from the liberation struggle. It supports the argument that the legacy of violence socialised during the liberation struggle was and still is experienced in the post independence period. As a result Zimbabwe resembles a country whose course and practice of national reconstruction in the post-colonial era has been intricate and delicate because of the divisions along racial and ethnic contours inherited at independence in 1980.

#### **4.9 Lancaster House Conference, 1979**

The widespread fighting between the liberation movements and the RSF was stopped by the Lancaster House Agreement which led to a ceasefire agreement. The post-colonial government inherited the colonial pattern of unequal land ownership. The provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 set conditions for the post-independence government making it difficult to address speedily the socio-economic inequalities created during the period of white minority rule. Consequently, the Lancaster House Agreement was a dangerous seedbed for future violence mainly due to its one-sided willing-seller, willing buyer principle.

The various struggles which had been waged over land demonstrate the significance of land because of its political and economic value. Yet the skewed nature of the Lancaster House Agreement was evident where it emphasized the willing seller-willing buyer principle without defining a further approach to be pursued should the seller not be willing to sell. In fact, the agreement had effective protection of white owned commercial farmland and yet the Whites later

became unwilling to share the land with the land hungry Blacks (Muchemwa, Ngwerume and Hove 2011: 219-220).

Worse still, post-conflict restorative-transitional justice and practical reconciliation were evaded by the agreement. The perpetrators of human rights violations from the contending forces went unpunished. There was silence about the past in the belief that searching for the truth would open old wounds and damage the politics of verbal reconciliation which was in reality just a pronouncement. Therefore, the violence committed by the contending forces was not resolved as nationalist leaders chose this strategy because they thought it would bury their violent past against civilians in Rhodesia and against their opponents in the various training camps in Zambia and Mozambique (Huyse 2003: 36). Furthermore, the Lancaster House Agreement did not adequately facilitate disarmament, and retention of weapons by ex-combatants who awaited incorporation and disbandment proved to be catastrophic as ZANU—ZAPU ethnic-based conflict continued in the post-independence period. There was no national healing, reconciliation and integration hence distrust and tension between ZANU and ZAPU prevailed after independence.

Since Zimbabwe's constitutional-reform process had its basis in the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 which helped in the attainment of independence in 1980, it was extensively criticised as being predetermined by the British (Dzinesa 2006: 258-259). It is apparent that the Lancaster House Agreement failed to address some of the crucial challenges which endangered sustainable peace prospects and nonviolence opportunities. The agreement which ended the war set a foundation for future instability in Zimbabwe.

As a consequence of the Lancaster House Agreement, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) representing white farmers was opposed to meaningful land redistribution. Remarks by the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo to a gathering of the CFU are instructive:

I don't think we are being unreasonable if we say you commercial farmers, who own the best and the bulk of Zimbabwe's land because of history, should share part of it with the indigenous, displaced and landless blacks who are the majority (Maruta 2010: 10).

It appears then that the 1979 agreement was in reality a biased arrangement which exploded two decades later. It only secured the Whites interests and lessened the opportunities of socio-economic restitution for the benefit of the Black people. The Tangwena struggle for land started in



the early 1970s and were largely resolved by 1986. The signs of land hunger were evident during second decade after independence as the Svosve people in Mashonaland East and the Chiremwemwa people in Masvingo went on forcible land grab in 1997. These were evicted by the riot police. Indeed it was the rise of a vibrant opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which forced the ZANU PF led government to introduce the ad-hoc FTLRP in 2000 in an effort to regain its waning support.

#### **4.10 Gukurahundi in Matabeleland, 1982-87**

The liberation movements used violence against the RSF and those who supported them or were accused of doing so. Even before they resorted to the armed struggle the Blacks were cultured into structural, direct and physical forms of violence by the state security sector institutions established by the White led system. This was disastrous as violence bred violence:

At independence, our society did little to rehabilitate itself from the habits of violence prevalent during the liberation war. We have assumed that violence is a tool that we can take up, use and drop at any time. History has proved that this is not so... (Kaulem 2004: 81).

After the achievement of independence, Zimbabwe was hit by a violent domestic conflict, subsequently referred to as *Gukurahundi* (*rains that usual come in mid August washing off the chaff at the end of the winnowing season*) and in this civil war it refers to the removal of political opponents according to the Zimbabwean government. Mugabe formed the new government and invited Nkomo and two other ZAPU leaders who were appointed ministers. This was a good strategy towards black to black reconciliation, but it did not last long. Antagonism between ZANU and ZAPU in government reached its zenith in 1982 due to allegations that ZPRA harboured a plot to depose the ZANU PF government. In response, ZAPU leaders in the government of national unity were dismissed. Conflict and mutiny in the new army broke out when ex-ZIPRA commanders were arrested, some charged with treason and others detained without further trial. This lack of political sincerity by the liberation movements led to an undeclared civil war which broke out between 1983 and 1987 affecting the Matabeleland provinces and some parts of the Midlands province.

It turned out that Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands were exposed to violence in which an estimated over 20,000 civilians were massacred (Cover for Assembly Hansard 2008) and tens of thousands more were tortured by the Fifth Brigade which was answerable to President Robert

Mugabe (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 1999: 6). Hundreds vanished and thousands lost homes and livestock. The 1980s violence was without any doubt far in excess of anything that happened in affected regions during the 1970s war of liberation. While the ‘dissidents’ of Matabeleland can be blamed for some of the atrocities, all evidence points to government forces, in particular the Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) being responsible for over 90% of the violations against civilians (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 1999: 20).

Nkomo was accused of deploying a few military forces to the front during the struggle whilst reserving a huge number for use in carrying out a coup d’état if ZANU PF won elections. These accusations were based on allegations regarding buried arms caches which were found on ZAPU farms, although some of these arms caches were purportedly stashed on ZAPU properties by the CIO. Robert Mugabe in 1983 openly called for brutal action against Joshua Nkomo the ZAPU leader. Mugabe told his supporters, ‘ZAPU and its leader, Dr Joshua Nkomo, are like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head’ (Nkomo 1984: 2). This statement by Mugabe encouraged violence against PF ZAPU leadership and its supporters and violence began in 1983 and continued up to 1987.

Gukurahundi ended with the 1987 Unity Accord which was viewed as an agreement by which PF ZAPU was swallowed by ZANU PF. There was no national healing, reconciliation and integration of Zimbabweans after the Unity Accord leaving continued resentment, anger and pain (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 1999: 1-2). People in the affected areas still yearn for the day when they will be shown where their loved ones are buried, or to get a public apology from ZANU PF leadership beyond the remark that ‘it was a moment of madness’ (Cover for Assembly Hansard 2008). People remain divided and wounded up to this day and that is why leaders like Dumiso Dabengwa pulled out of the Unity Accord.

#### **4.11 RENAMO Incursions, 1981-1992**

Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana or Mozambique National Resistance Army (RENAMO) or Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) was connected to the Portuguese and was established with the help and sponsorship of the Rhodesian intelligence (Flower 1987: 60-62).

RENAMO was established in Rhodesia but it was transferred to the South African Defence Forces when Zimbabwe regained its independence in 1980. It was set up to fight Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) which succeeded the Portuguese in 1975. Its destabilisation operations began to affect Zimbabwe in 1981 with an attack on its trade routes into Mozambique, namely the Beira and Limpopo corridors. In 1982 Zimbabwe deployed troops to defend these vital routes to its economy and RENAMO formally declared war on Zimbabwe in October 1986 (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates 1989: 1979). In the process to prevent RENAMO incursion along the eastern borders, the ZDF violated the rights of both Zimbabweans and Mozambicans.

The South African-backed RENAMO bandits carried out brutal human rights abuses, particularly in Mount Darwin in the North east of Zimbabwe, Chipinge and Chiredzi in the south east from 1986 onwards. The RENAMO operations were extremely ruthless and insensitive. Many innocent people in the eastern border areas were killed, injured, or had to live with daily insecurity as a result of this conflict (CCJP 1997: 13).

In June 1987 RENAMO fighters raided a town in the North East stealing food, blankets and killing more than 10 inhabitants. The attacks were meant to divert government support away from South Africa's liberation movements and force it to withdraw its troops from Mozambique. From January 25 to July 24, 1989, there were about 80 murder and 78 abduction incidents among other cases, amounting to a total of 248 bandit related incidents (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates 1989: 473). Between June 1986 and April 1987, 335 Zimbabweans were killed inside Zimbabwe, 280 wounded, 667 abducted and coerced to transport stolen goods (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates 1989: 1980).

One can understand from the above that in the post independence era Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands provinces were not the only areas which suffered due to violent military operations. The inhabitants of Zimbabwe's eastern border areas also experienced violence and human rights violations as a result of RENAMO operations. After the Rome Accord in 1992, there was no transitional-restorative justice for the perpetrators of these gruesome operations. Worse still, there wasn't even compensation for either the victims of the RENAMO incursions into Zimbabwe or the operations of the ZDF. This shows that post independence Zimbabwe was also characterised by much violence.

#### **4.12 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, 1991-98**

Sachikonye (2002: 13) notes that when Zimbabwe attained its independence, there were high hopes for its political and economic future. However, the introduction in 1991 of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was a signal of economic challenges which could not be resolved without embracing huge external funding. ESAP was crafted by the Bretton Woods Institutions that is, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This programme initiated a return to privatisation and to liberalization of the economy, thus posing a threat to the gains which had accrued due to the basic needs strategies pursued since 1980.

Contrary to the expected positive outcomes, ESAP had disastrous consequences. There was little growth to talk about between 1991 and 1995, unemployment rose from 30 to 50 percent and it led to de-industrialization in the manufacturing sector. When the programme came to an end, the economy was weaker than it was before. Even the World Bank admitted in its audit that the programme had been flawed from its commencement and admitted that ESAP had contributed to the country's economic decline (Zimbabwe: Progress Report on the Implementation of the Platform for Action 1995-2003 n. d.: 5 - 6). Droughts, floods, growing external debt and interest on debt reimbursement, and failure to accomplish ESAP's objectives were some of the factors which led to the economic downturn of the 1990s. The welfare achievements of the 1980s collapsed as budgetary allocations to social sectors were down sized leading to increased poverty in the end (Mpofu 2012: 13–14). Commenting on the same period, Zhou and Zvoushe (2012: 416) argue that during the second decade after the attainment of independence policy making had to be analyzed within the broad policy framework of the ESAP because they were neo-liberal market-driven policy schemes which were implemented as dogmatic solutions to the economic crises of the 1980s. The budget discrepancy remained high. The failure of a World Bank-directed ESAP was exacerbated by three political decisions notably the cash payments of unbudgeted gratuities to veterans of Zimbabwe's civil (liberation) war in 1997 to dampen their public discontent, Zimbabwe's unbudgeted military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) civil war in 1998, and the ad-hoc introduction of the Fast Track Land Redistribution in 2000 (Hove and Gwiza 2012: 285-290). ESAP led to closure of industries and retrenchments, causing working and living conditions of workers to deteriorate. In response, demonstrations and strikes increased as workers called for improvements. In 1998 there were violent food riots which affected mainly Harare and Chitungwiza. The riots were violently

quelled by the army and the airforce and defending the response by the security sector Nathan Shamuyarira said, 'The area of violence is an area where ZANU PF has a very strong, long and successful history' (Onslow 2011: 8-9; Meridith 2007: 241).

The government did little to help improve the situation and this led to the rise of a vibrant opposition political party the MDC in September 1999 arising from the labour movement, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), to contest ZANU PF. This opened another phase in which violence increased in the country as ZANU PF tried to destroy the MDC. Moreover, the security sector was blamed for the running of a Government by Operations (GBOs) (Moyo 2006). For example, commencing in March stretching to July 2000, Operation Tsuru ('Rabbit') was initiated. This was comprised of roughly 1,500 war veterans, 1,000 soldiers of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 300 CIO operatives, approximately 200 members of the police, and 5-6,000 ZANU PF volunteers, including ZANU PF youth members (Chitiyo 2009: 4). Operation Tsuru was basically the use of military means for political goals, using both persuasion and coercion alternatively (Chitiyo and Rupiya n. d.: 359-360) by ZANU PF in its fight for survival. Such secret operations have continued up to the present so that the future of opposition political parties is still under threat given the lack of separation between ZANU PF and state security institutions (i.e. army, police and CIO).

When Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 there were attempts by ZANU PF to turn the country into a one party state but this never materialised. The demise of the PF-ZAPU party through the forging of the Unity Accord of 1987 meant that opposition were drastically weakened. As suggested by Sithole and Makumbe (1997: 122-123), it was only independent candidates who emerged to challenge the electoral hegemony of ZANU PF. In 1990, an opposition political party ZUM led by the late Edgar Tekere contested ZANU PF (Tendi 2013: 840). Most of its members were tortured, imprisoned, injured and killed such that by 1995 it had been weakened (Tekere 2007). The continued use of violence by the Zimbabwe government against its citizens escalated in 2000 after the formation of the MDC in 1999.

#### **4.13 Summary**

In light of the above, it is clear that Zimbabwe has been characterised by a long history of violence. Violence dates back to the colonial and the post colonial periods of which some of the watersheds have been highlighted. It is clear that Zimbabwe was from the beginning subject to

the turmoil and political instability of colonisation, the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893-4, the First Chimurenga, BSAC rule, Responsible Government status, the Federation interlude, and the Second Chimurenga of the 'seventies. Violence replicated itself in post-independent Zimbabwe during the *Gukurahundi*, the responses to RENAMO and the rise of opposition political parties. In the process, many people lost their lives as a result of politically motivated violence. Of course, it is imperative to realise that there were also periods of negative peace and these should not be misconstrued by disregarding the fact that Zimbabwe has been a victim of violence since 1890 up to today. Given this ongoing violence, I propose the cultivation of a culture of nonviolence as the only strategy can bring sustainable positive peace in Zimbabwe.

#### **4.14 Conclusion**

The culture of violence experienced in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the colonial period. Firstly, it can be explained by the legacy of the colonial white settler state. The ZANU PF government in 1980 inherited the political economy of this state, its domination through the use of force, and its security directed executive and legislative capacity, through the Central Intelligence Organisation, and the Special Branch/CID which was incorporated into the Zimbabwe Republic Police. In addition, there has been the legacy of using asymmetric and disproportionate force when responding to opposition and dissent. From 2000 onwards, further repressive legislation of colonial style was introduced, including POSA and AIPPA.

Secondly, violence is part of the political culture of ZANU PF, dating back to the liberation war era when those who did not share its doctrine or criticised it were branded as its enemies and sell-outs. By and large, the culture of violence nurtured during the colonial period through security sector institutions of violence, while the atrocities of the liberation armies all continue to sustain the culture of fear, conformity and unreserved support to those in power. There is therefore need for national healing, reconciliation and integration in Zimbabwe and peace education should be central in the achievement of this goal. There is need to review Zimbabwe's education system with a view of introducing peace studies from pre-school level to tertiary institutions in a drive to encourage Zimbabweans to engage nonviolent strategies. The next chapter presents the methodology which was used in the collection of data, its presentation and analysis.

### **PART III: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **5.0 CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS**

##### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter outlines the methodology which was used in this study with particular attention to the research design, population sampling, data collection and data analysis techniques. It further highlights the ethical concerns and procedures which were followed in an effort to ensure credibility of the research findings.

##### **5.2 Research phases**

The research road map used for this study has four stages. The first conceptual stage entails choosing a topic, and formulating the research questions, objectives, and defining the significance of the study. Related literature in the field of nonviolence was reviewed to help guide the study and to identify gaps.

The second stage encompasses the actual research design and planning of the study. The researcher opted for a non-probability sampling technique. Only respondents who consented, were 18 years and above older, and were living in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 were interviewed.

At the third stage, data collection was carried out using the methods outlined below. During the fourth stage the data collected was analysed and presented in four chapters followed by conclusions and recommendations. Polishing of the thesis was also done at this stage.

### **5.3 The Research Design**

Research design has been defined differently by different authors. Mouton (2012: 55) refers to a research design as ‘a plan or blue print of how you intend conducting the research’ to provide answers to the research questions in the best, i.e. most scientific way. In the same vein, it is described as ‘the plan or blue print according to which data are collected to investigate the research hypothesis or question in the most economical manner’ (Huysamen 1994: 10). Whilst Huysamen’s (1994: 10) definition has similarities with that of Mouton (2012: 56) its main focus is on data collection. It defines the constructs or variables in a way that demonstrates how they will be graduated or measured. In addition, a research design is the plan, recipe, or blueprint for investigation, and as such provides a guideline according to which a selection can be made of which data collection method(s) will be most appropriate to the researcher’s goal and to the selected design (Delpont 2002), whereas to others research design is made up of only the operations carried out to test the hypothesis (Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee 2006).

I used an exploratory, descriptive, contextual qualitative and evaluative research design in this historical research on nonviolent campaigns that were carried out in Zimbabwe. I used exploratory research to obtain information about the background history of the Zimbabwean conflict, understand the nonviolent strategies and methods used during the nonviolent campaigns, and assessing the responses of the opponent or the state actor. The Evaluation design was applied in assessing the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies and methods used by the non-state actors as well as the state. I also designed a training programme covering the whole process of planning and implementing effective nonviolent education campaigns after conducting some face to face interviews that revealed limited knowledge among participants about nonviolence. My study mainly involves conceptual analysis, theoretical exploration and literature review that do not require primary empirical collection (Mouton 2001: 57) except where training was involved. The purpose of the study is to investigate an interest, test ideas, and corroborate a compound theory (Babbie 2004: 107). In this study, the aim was to identify nonviolent campaigns that were carried out in Zimbabwe, assessing their effectiveness in light of the state actor’s responses at the time.

#### **5.3.1 The Type of study**

The present study is largely qualitative, and hence involves exploratory, descriptive and evaluative designs concerning nonviolent campaigns. My research road map was guided



by Mouton (2012). In the following sections the different designs which were used in the study are briefly discussed.

### **5.3.2 Descriptive**

*Descriptive research* refers to studies that have as their main goal an accurate portrayal of the uniqueness of persons, circumstances or clusters (Polit and Hungler 2004:716). The use of a descriptive approach in data collection in qualitative research gives one the ability to collect accurate data on and provide a clear picture of the phenomenon under study (Mouton and Marais 1996:43-44).

Streubert-Speziale and Capenter (2003:22) argue that a descriptive technique in data gathering is fundamental to open unstructured qualitative research interview analysis. In this study, the respondents were encouraged to describe the nonviolent campaigns they participated in, and the strategies and methods they used, including their outcomes. The respondents were purposively selected, that is to say only those participants who were involved in the Zimbabwean conflict were interviewed.

### **5.3.3 Exploratory or historical-descriptive**

The exploratory research is carried out in order to learn something or find out the truth concerning something (The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced Learners 2001:540). Burns and Grove (2003:313) note that *exploratory research* is research carried out to obtain new insights, realize new facts and/or augment knowledge of a phenomenon. Historical-descriptive design according to Mouton (2012: 170) is ‘a narrative analysis attempting to reconstruct the past as accurately as possible’. This design was used in an attempt to reconstruct the nonviolent campaigns that took place in Zimbabwe.

### **5.3.4 Action Research**

A nonviolent campaign training programme was designed and implemented based on insights that were obtained from the interviews and other data collection methods used in the study. The programme trained 40 volunteers to acquire knowledge about the concept of nonviolence and how nonviolent approaches can be used to persuade and at times compel the state actor to resolve the socio-economic and political challenges experienced in Zimbabwe. The participants completed a questionnaire prior to training and they were requested to rate their overall understanding of nonviolence on a scale of 0-10. After the training the participants were asked to

complete the same questionnaire that they used prior to the training and rate their understanding of nonviolence again on a scale of 0-10. The researcher evaluated both the pre-training and post-training findings and was able to comment on the short term impact of the training programme. The findings of the nonviolence training programme are presented in chapter 9.

**Population Sample:** The 40 participants for the nonviolence training programme were drawn from 1000 students at College X, a tertiary institution registered with the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education in Zimbabwe. The respondents voluntarily participated in the training programme. The researcher recruited four volunteers from each of the ten provinces in the country.

### **5.3.5 Evaluation**

Implementation evaluation research is designed to answer the questions of whether an intervention (programme, therapy, policy or strategy) has been appropriately implemented and whether the target group has been adequately covered and whether the programme brought about changes (Mouton 2012: 158-160). The impact of the nonviolent campaigns used by the non-state actors and the training programme on nonviolence were evaluated in an effort to assess its impact on the beneficiaries.

According to Mouton (2001: 51), the unit of analysis refers to the ‘what of the study’: what ‘object’, ‘phenomenon’, ‘entity’, ‘process’, or ‘event’ is being explored. The unit of analysis was largely qualitative. This study explores the nonviolent campaigns, strategies and methods used by non-state actors against the state actor.

### **5.4 Why use a questionnaire?**

A questionnaire was used because it reduces interviewer bias and influencing of respondents, because the respondents have to answer the questions on their own (Kothari 2004: 100). Questionnaires were distributed by the researcher to reduce costs and minimise the low rate of return that often results from mailed questionnaires. They were also used because the respondents were able to read and write English. In addition, interviewees had enough time to give adequate thought to their responses.

Questionnaires can only be used when interviewees are educated and cooperate. Control over mailed questionnaires may be lost once it is sent and there is also the possibility of vague or no replies to some questions (Kothari 2004: 101).

The participants were 40 selected volunteers that were balanced in terms of gender and were aged 18 and above years. The same questionnaire that was distributed during the pre-training was re-distributed to the participants a month after the training programme in order to measure the impact of the training programme.

The College X is a professional college whose students are adults and use English language as a medium of spoken and written communication. The director of studies at the College X, Mr. Y introduced the researcher to the students and allowed the researcher to carry out interviews and the nonviolence training programme with volunteer students. The aspect of voluntarism and the completion of the consent form were emphasized among students in my introductory remarks. Participants were given enough time to go through the purpose of my study, introduction letter and the consent form. The research participants were not linked to the researcher in any way and this research did not target any particular ethnic group but required any individual who met the inclusion criteria. Participants in the nonviolence training programme received the necessary food and transport money.

### **5.5 Research methodology**

Methodology refers to ways of obtaining, organising and analysing data (Polit and Hungler 2004:233). Put differently, methodology includes the design, planning, sample, methodological limitations, and the data collection and analysis techniques employed in a study (Burns and Grove 2003:488). In the words of Henning, van Rensburg and Smit (2004:36) methodology refers to a logical ‘group of methods that complement one another and that have the ability to fit to deliver data and findings that will reflect the research question and suit the research purpose.’ In addition, Holloway (2005:293) defines methodology as a ‘framework of theories and principles on which methods and procedures are based.’

In my study methodology denotes the ways in which the research was carried out in a coherent sequence. The major aims of this research were to explore, evaluate and document the nonviolent campaigns used by the non-state actors (but including the MDC-T party) and to assess their

effectiveness. The study used the qualitative methodology because my study was largely historical and thus depended on analysing primary and secondary data in its attempt to reconstruct the past.

### **5.5.1 Qualitative Research**

Qualitative methodology is dialectic and interpretive. During the interaction between the researcher and the research participants, the participants' world is discovered and interpreted by means of qualitative methods (De Vos 2002:360). *Qualitative research* also refers to inductive, total, holistic, and illustrative, and is implemented to comprehend, deduce, explain and widen a theory on a phenomenon. It is a logical technique used to illustrate life practices and furnish them with implications (Burns and Grove 2003:356). Qualitative research is generally linked with terminology, verbal communication and lived reality rather than measurements, figures and mathematical information.

Researchers who use qualitative research employ an individual-based and holistic perspective to comprehend the human experience, without paying attention to explicit theories. The unique milieu of the study is recognised, and a wealth of information and detail is collected to portray a dynamic picture of the subjects' truth and public environment. With regards to the accumulation of knowledge, qualitative research is viewed as progressive and active, and does not use official prearranged schemes. It entails the orderly compilation and scrutiny of descriptive data in a planned and perceptive manner to discover the uniqueness and importance of human experience (Holloway 2005: 4-6, 47-51).

In this study the researcher sought to investigate the thoughts and opinions of the participants. He examined the nonviolent campaigns used by the non-state actors from the participant's own viewpoint. This helped the researcher to gain an insight into the experiences of the Zimbabweans who took part in nonviolent campaigns, as well as those who reacted to these campaigns. Empathy assisted the researcher to construct vivid accounts from the data collected from respondents, to interpret their experiences and to engender empathetic and pragmatic understanding. This could only be achieved through a cordial researcher-respondent relationship based on interviewing and interpersonal proficiency.

### **5.5.2 Relevance to the study**

Qualitative research is an individual-based and holistic approach. It develops an understanding of people's opinions about their lives and the lives of others. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to create an understanding drawn from a vivid image of the research respondents' truth (Holloway 2005:5). In qualitative investigation, the researcher is obligated to be an excellent listener, pleasant, non-judgmental, truthful and flexible. In fact, qualitative research entails content examination encompassing a range of techniques which include collection of empirical evidence. When working with the respondents, the researcher did not pressurise them to describe their experiences during the Zimbabwean crisis, but allowed them enough time to respond freely. Qualitative data gathering methods are flexible and unstructured with room for collecting verbatim reports and observing details which usually are not quantifiable. Thus, videos, recordings, written account, and all sensory tools were used during data collection. In addition, qualitative research is preferred since it uses an inductive form of reasoning by developing concepts, insights and understanding from patterns in the data, draws meaning from the respondents' viewpoint, and tries to comprehend the sense that people append to everyday life. The contrary notion of reality is hence seen as being nothing more than pre-conceptions.

I The researcher finds meaning by being immersed in the data, develop concepts from themes, describes phenomena, articulates observations and data into words. Furthermore, the researcher uses quotes from documents and transcripts, examines data by digging out themes, focuses on the associations linking elements, and make use of words as the foundation for evaluating rather than arithmetic data (Brink and Wood 1998:246; Burns and Grove 2003:357).

Qualitative methodology is preferred because it can be used in the generation of new theories that emerge from information collected during the research process (Burns and Grove 2003:19). Qualitative research reveals the uniqueness and importance of human experiences as expressed by respondents and interpreted by the researcher through different levels of analysis.

Miles and Huberman (1994:4) argue that the key motives for carrying out qualitative research are interpretation and premise production. My study uses description where there is little knowledge about how the nonviolent campaigns, especially the methods and strategies that were put to use. The researcher was able to elicit human feelings such as denial, pain, caring, in capacity and resentment. To sum it up, qualitative research deals with understanding aspects being studied as

a whole, which helps me to piece together a conflict history of Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013.

## **5.6 Sampling**

A sample is part of a population under study (Chimedza 2003: 36). In considering the sample size, factors such as cost and data quality are taken into account (Mouton 2012: 186). The researcher engaged purposive and snowballing sampling techniques to gather data from respondents who were conversant with the nonviolent campaigns which took place in Zimbabwe.

### **5.6.1 The study population and its sampling frame**

The focus of this study was on nonviolent campaigns used in Zimbabwe, strategies, methods and effectiveness between 1999 and 2013. Therefore, the sample of the study was drawn from people who were in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 and experienced and/or were knowledgeable about the pertinent issues raised in the study. The respondents were able to speak and write English, were 18 or above years and were willing to take part in the study.

#### **5.6.1 Sampling method and size**

Population Sample: The twenty face to face interview participants were selected on the basis of participation or knowledge about nonviolent campaigns. Some of the interviewees participated in the nonviolent campaigns that took place in Zimbabwe and others were affected by the Zimbabwean crisis. These are also made up of victims of the government response to nonviolent campaigns and academics who were knowledgeable about the topic of my study. Some of the participants had more than one of the characteristics outlined above. The interviewees were selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques.

Purposive sampling was used in choosing twenty respondents from the institutions, politicians and individuals who were conversant with the nonviolent campaigns which happened during the time covered by this study. Snowballing was used to locate ten respondents with knowledge of these nonviolent campaigns. De Vos (2002: 207) present purposive sampling as a procedure in which the selection of sample elements ‘is based entirely on the judgement of the researcher, in that the sample is composed of elements that contain the most common characteristics, representative or typical attributes of the population’.

## **5.7 Data collection methods**

Data collection is the accurate, logical gathering of information pertinent to the research sub-problems through the use of methods which include interviews, focus group discussion, narratives and case histories (Burns and Grove 2003:373). Data gathering starts with the researcher making a decision as to where and from whom the data needed should be collected (Talbot 1995:472). During the data collection process the respondents were given the chance to vividly portray their experiences. In this study, data collection took place in four phases; the review of related literature, document analysis, structured and unstructured interviews. Discussed below are the methods and techniques that were used in the study.

The materials consulted during data collection were varied, including academic texts, political pamphlets, reports by national and international NGOs, official government and UN reports as well as journalistic reports, journals and newspapers. In the process a number of methods and techniques were used and these are discussed below.

### **Methods**

(i) Analysis of historical material

(ii) Analysis of documents

### **Techniques**

notes were recorded, content analysed, video (from YouTube) and films viewed and listened to as important information relevant to the study was written in notebooks and research records were examined.

Primary and secondary documentary sources were analysed.

#### **5.7.1 Interviews**

Interviewing deals with prepared (structured) or unstructured verbal communication between the researcher and respondents, when information is communicated to the researcher. In this study, data was gathered by interviewing respondents in a noise free environment without interference or barriers, and where they felt secure. Interviews were carried out in an area preferred by the respondents and the interview length was determined by the answers of the respondents.

In this study, twenty respondents were interviewed (between June 2014 and June 2015) and recorders were used after seeking informed consent and clarifying issues about confidentiality.

During the process closed and open ended questions were asked. The respondents were drawn from a population sample that had been involved in the recent Zimbabwean conflict, or had knowledge about the nonviolent campaigns witnessed during this period. These interviewees were made up of academics, heads of organisations, ordinary people, politicians, teachers, student leaders and students.

### **5.7.2 Open unstructured interviews**

An oral interview is conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee for the specific purpose of obtaining relevant information for the research (Cohen and Manion 1989 in Dirwai and Gwimbi 2003: 77). Interviews take a number of forms based upon how they are structured. Open unstructured interviewing is viewed as the main method of data gathering technique where the respondents' descriptions can be investigated, elucidated and tenderly explored (Kvale 1996:89). Normally, the open unstructured interviews are used to ensure in-depth data collection (Burns and Grove 2003:284). Related to this, De Vos (2002:302) notes that the goal of the unstructured interview is 'to actively enter the world of people and to render those worlds understandable from the standpoint of a theory that is grounded in behaviours, languages, definitions, attitudes and feelings of those studied'. No questions are precisely or rigidly worded. In fact, open unstructured interviews seek to reflect the openness and receptive approach of interviewing that seeks to obtain the real or true views and feelings of respondents.

### **5.7.3 Considerations for unstructured Interviews**

There are a number of considerations that were borne in mind during the interview process. In this study a significant number of practical steps were pursued. These include:

- Designing interview guide questions.
- Buying a recorder and spare batteries.
- Pre-testing the data collection equipment (recorder).
- Making appointments and agreements with all the respondents about a time which would fit them.
- Choosing a favourable place which ensured confidentiality and was free from interference.



- Finding chairs for the face to face interview process
- Carrying extra pen and paper for emergency purposes.
- Providing bottled water

In addition, prior to the commencement of each interview I introduced myself and the purpose of my visit to create a positive interview environment, reminded the respondents about the consent/agreement, asked for permission to tape and/or video record the interview (Talbot 1995:477), showed the equipment to the respondent and briefly explained how it works, explained that the interview was unstructured where probing questions would be asked, and the respondents were thanked for their time and accepting to be interviewed

#### **5.7.4 Advantages and disadvantages of Interviews**

In the qualitative technique, interviews are the most commonly used data collection means (Babbie and Mouton 2001:289). Interviews were used in this study because they bring to our mind an interviewee's thoughts, feelings and actions and this in turn provides us with their subjective reality (Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit 2004:52). It must be noted that, interviewees are usually more willing to talk to an interviewer rather than completing a questionnaire. Furthermore, interviewers go to the respondents' homes or workplaces and interview them there (Huysamen 2001:144-7). Interviews allow the researcher room to probe the respondents in order to get to the core of the issues in question. Probing motivates the respondents to give more information. However, probes must be neutral to avoid manipulating the participants' responses. Added to this, the researcher got an opportunity to ask open-ended questions which did not require a single-word response but provided interviewees with sufficient opportunity to express their feelings (De Vos 2002:293) and allow participants to respond in their own words (Polit and Hungler 2004:349). Moreover, the interviewer asked for clarification from the interviewees, for example, 'Can you please tell me more about why the nonviolent campaign you participated in failed'?

According to Kothari (2004: 97), the *unstructured interviews* are characterised by a flexibility of approach to questioning and do not follow a system of pre-determined questions and standardised procedures of recording information. He further notes that the interviewer has greater freedom to ask supplementary questions where there is need, omit certain questions if

they are not relevant, may change the sequence of questions, has freedom to include or exclude some aspects while recording the responses. Overall, it is the central method of gathering information in the case of exploratory research studies.

On the other hand, flexibility results in lack of comparability of one interview with another. They are much more difficult and time-consuming to analyse as compared to the structured responses attained through structured interviews. They require more knowledge and greater skill on the part of the interviewer and can be a very expensive method in large and widely spread geographical samples (Kothari 2004: 98).

#### **5.7.5 Inclusion criteria**

The research respondents recruited and interviewed are those knowledgeable about nonviolent campaigns and/or violent state actor responses which took place between 1999 and 2013. Furthermore, the respondents were 18 or above years old. Added to this, these volunteered to participate and did not expect remuneration after their participation. The volunteer respondents were in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 and were able to read and write in English.

#### **5.7.6 Exclusion criteria**

The researcher did not collect data from people who were unable to read and speak English because they were unable to comprehend on their own what my research was all about. Those expecting remuneration for their participation in the study were not engaged in an effort to ensure the precision of the findings. Those below the ages of 18 did not take part because they could not make informed decisions on their own. They needed their legal guardians to consent on their behalf.

#### **5.7.7 Recruitment process**

The respondents were recruited on the basis of their experiences about either the non-state actors or the state actor responses to the nonviolent campaigns that were used in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013. I targeted those who were in Zimbabwe during the entire period covered by the study, were able to read and write in English. The researcher had to visit the respondents who were knowledgeable about the topic, were 18 and above years old and were ready to take part. The researcher made appointments with the respondents who chose places where they were interviewed. Introductions were done and permission to record the interview was sought prior to

the day of the interview, Confidentiality was explained and respondents were asked whether they wanted their real or pseudonym to be used during data presentation process. Some of the respondents agreed to have their real names used during data presentation.

### **5.8 Delimitations**

The study deals with nonviolent campaigns involving non-state actors (MDC, NCA, ZCTU, ZINASU, and WOZA) and the state actor responses to them between 1999 and 2013. It had to abide by the objectives of this study given in chapter 1. Therefore, my study did not attempt to provide a comprehensive history of all organisations which used nonviolent campaigns to engage the state actor at the time.

### **5.9 Limitations**

The research was carried out in a turbulent environment where it was difficult to persuade and even approach some prospective respondents who are conversant with the Zimbabwean conflict and the nonviolent methods which were used to compel the government to bring about changes. This became even dangerous with the split that followed in ZANU PF which became divided between the so-called ‘gamatox group’ (the Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) party which was launched on 1 March 2016) and the weevils group (led by Emmerson Mnangagwa one of the two vice presidents who were appointed after Joice Mujuru was expelled). The researcher had to go through boundary partners and/or gate keepers and this process was time consuming. In some instances, I used YouTube to capture the views of persons such as Morgan Tsvangirai because it was dangerous to be seen visiting such people. I was also discouraged from approaching influential politicians when Dzamara Itai a journalist-cum-activist (who called for the occupy *Africa Unit Square* in Harare to compel President Mugabe and his government to resign in light of the socio-economic woes) was bashed by the police and left for dead (Mtimba 2015) and subsequently abducted and his whereabouts are yet to be known.

The sampling techniques are drawn from the non- probability sampling category which do not provide a clue of selecting members of the population. All members in the population do not stand an equal chance of being selected in convenient, purposive, snowball, quota sampling techniques. My study engaged purposive and snowball sampling techniques which affect the degree of the precision of this study. The high level of polarisation in the country led to the refusal by some prospective participants from taking part in the study because of fear that the

collected data could be used against them. Some respondents refused to have their voices captured and even where notes were written they emphasised that their real names should not be used in the presentation of data.

#### **5.10 Ethical considerations in data collection**

Ethical considerations are an important aspect in this study where data would be collected on an ongoing conflict where the state had and still has serious contestations with non-state actors. The researcher had an ethical responsibility to firmly take cognisance of the rights of respondents who are expected to provide this knowledge (Streubert Speziale and Carpenter 2003: 314). Initially, the researcher build trust between the respondents and himself including respecting them as independent people who should be allowed to make sound decisions (Burns and Grove 2003:65; Streubert Speziale and Carpenter 2003: 314).

The researcher observed ethical measures such as ethical conduct towards respondents' information, including reporting of the results, and using pseudonyms for those who indicated that their real names should not be used.

In short, I took cognisance of consent, confidentiality and anonymity, privacy, dissemination of results and the right of respondents to withdraw from the study. The researcher's introductory letter (from the Durban University of Technology's Faculty of Management Sciences- Department of Public Management and Economics) requesting support from prospective respondents to participate in the study was shown to all interviewees. Furthermore, written permission (informed consent) should be sought from contributors for the interviews (LoBiondo-Wood and Harber 2002: 273; Polit and Hungler 2004: 151). Confidentiality and anonymity was ensured. To this end, no information that the respondent discloses 'by means of cameras, tape recorders, and other data gathering devices, ... face to face interviews or in participant observation' was made public or accessible to others, and where potential threats existed, identities were not disclosed (Mouton 2012: 243-44). Even then the sources of information remained known to the researcher only (LoBiondo-Wood and Harber 2002: 273). In this study no names are revealed against the respondents' wishes, and codes and/or pseudonyms were used instead.

The rights to privacy were secured where respondents were free to choose the time, degree and universal state of affairs under which personal information can be disclosed to others or kept a secret from others (Burns and Grove 2003:171). Once again privacy was preserved by not revealing respondents' names against the information obtained.

The interviewees were informed of their rights to disengage from the study at any time whenever they chose to. Prior to the commencement of the interview, the respondents were informed of their rights (Holloway 2005:292). Furthermore, the research did not:

- Work with disadvantaged group(s) or special populations.
- Recruit minors as participants
- Allow participants to take part before they consented.
- Ignore clarifying areas of concern to the participants.
- Prevent any participant who decides to pull out of the process at any time.
- Provided food and transport to the volunteers who participated in the nonviolence training programme.
- Ignore the aspect of gender sensitivity thus recruited both female and male participants who were 18 or above years old.
- Deposited all information and materials collected for safe keeping with the DUT Department of Public Management and Economics.
- Recruit participants who have any relationship with the researcher as students or members of the family.
- Engaged in any activities which put their physical, emotional and spiritual well-being at risk or incurred financial cost to them.

### **5.11 Validity and Reliability of data collection methods**

The methods used in this study are valid because they were set out to collect data which assisted in the exploration and evaluation of the nonviolent campaigns which took place in Zimbabwe. To attain validity, the structured and unstructured interview questions solicited answers to the stated objectives given above. In this regard, the data collection methods gathered data which was used to measure the effectiveness of the nonviolent campaigns as well as methods used by non-state actors, in a drive to measure the extent to which the objectives of the different campaigns were accomplished, and to compile the history of violent state actor responses.

According to Trochim (2006), reliability is concerned with whether the same results would be arrived at if the research is repeated assuming that what is being assessed is not changing. To ensure validity and reliability, a number of signposts were observed during the interview process. To achieve this, I sought participants' consent and requested for their permission when recording the interview. Research questions were clarified where there was need and good rapport was created such that the participants felt comfortable to express their views. Furthermore, I maintained a non-judgmental attitude, respected participants, remained friendly throughout the process, had to pay attention to verbal and non verbal cues, probed participants for further information, closed the interview by reassuring participants of confidentiality of the information provided. Overall, reliability is about dependability and is associated with qualitative research.

### **5.12 The interview guide**

The interview guide was composed of both closed and open ended questions and had higher or lower order questions. The data collected through the interview guide helped the researcher to corroborate other sources of data used. It provided room for the interviewer to probe respondents and to rephrase questions where the respondents did not understand the asked question. The interview guide questions used are given in appendix A.

### **5.13 Methods of data presentation and analysis**

The empirical phase which involves the actual collection of data is followed by preparation for data analysis (Polit and Hungler 2004:51). In data presentation and analysis the researcher used qualitative analysis because historical studies thrive on descriptive analysis. The presentation of findings was guided by objectives as outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.4. The main themes of the study guided my presentation and as a result my Chapter 6 presents nonviolent strategies and methods used by the non-state actors, Chapter 7 provides the state actor responses, whereas Chapter 8 provides the effects of the Zimbabwean conflict which were both a result of the state and non-state actors activities, and Chapter 9 presents an assessment of the impact of the nonviolence training programme.

The analysis and elucidation of the data collected from interviewees was done through transcribing the interviews and analysing them in line with the themes which were dominant in my study. In addition, data obtained through interviews was contrasted with data collected from secondary and primary sources. I took care to reduce bias which might have emerged as a result

of my way of seeing, analysing and interpreting such that it did not determine the outcome of my research and how it was presented. I consciously kept an open mind as much as possible. On the one hand, I presented what I collected during the face to face oral interviews fusing with data obtained from other sources. In fact, I took cognisance of the warning by Portelli that:

Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility. The importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge. Therefore, there are no 'false' oral sources [...] 'wrong' statements are still psychologically 'true,' and [...] this truth may be equally as important as factually reliable accounts (Portelli 1991: 51).

Writing at a later stage, Fujii (2010) held the same view that,

[...] the value of oral testimonies researchers collect in places that have recently suffered violence does not lie solely in the truthfulness of their content. It also lies in the meta-data that accompany the testimonies. By meta-data, I mean the spoken and unspoken expressions about people's interior thoughts and feelings, which they do not always articulate in their stories or responses to interview questions. Meta-data can take both spoken and unspoken forms. They include rumours, silences, and invented stories. Meta-data are as valuable as the testimonies themselves because they indicate how the current social and political landscape is shaping what people might say to a researcher (Fujii 2010: 232).

The above views enriched my study by taking into consideration the unspoken expressions during the interview process.

#### **5.14 Summary**

Discussed above is the research design, data gathering methods, ethical considerations, validity and reliability of the research, the delimitation and the limitation of the study.

#### **5.15 Conclusion**

The research design used in this study embodies historical descriptive, evaluative and exploratory techniques. Snow-ball and purposive sampling techniques were used in this study. Data was collected through structured and unstructured interviews, analysis of documents which include newspapers, reports and videos obtained from YouTube. It asserts that ethical issues were respected and adhered to throughout the course of the study to ensure the validity and reliability of the research findings.

The next chapter examines the nonviolent campaign strategies and methods that were used in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 by non-state actors in a drive to compel the state actor to address the socio-economic and political challenges.



## **PART IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

*'To protest is to say that something is wrong; resistance means trying to stop it. To protest is to raise your voice; to resist is to stand up with your body'-Jim Wallis 1984.*

*'[Nonviolence] is directed against forces of evil rather than against persons who happen to be doing the evil. It is evil that the nonviolent resister seeks to defeat, not the persons victimized by evil' — Martin Luther King Jr.*

### **6.0 CHAPTER 6: NONVIOLENT METHODS USED IN ZIMBABWE 1999-2013**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe using nonviolent means was spearheaded by the civil society and the opposition political parties against ZANU PF rule. This chapter discusses the nonviolent methods that were used in Zimbabwe by the non-state actors in their drive to compel the state actor to handle the socio-economic and political challenges between 1999 and 2013. It examines the methods used by the NCA, ZCTU, WOZA, ZINASU and the MDC supporters against the state actor (ZANU PF) thereby addressing the first part of the third objective. The strategies engaged by the non-state actors are classified into Sharp's three broad categories namely: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 1990: 10). Each of these strategies is made up of various methods which were used in different parts of the world including Zimbabwe. In addition, regular institutionalised techniques of political action that were employed are also examined and these include litigation, elections, referendum, and the negotiation approach. Overall, the different campaigns were partly successful in the short term against the state actor because hotly contested elections were held in March 2008 as a result of which a GPA which outlined a number of reforms in September 2008 was signed by the contending parties and it became a precursor to the GNU in 2009. Nonviolent campaigns should be viewed as an integral part of conflict resolution providing various possible strategies towards achieving peace, justice and ultimately socio-economic and political development.

#### **6.2 Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion**

These are made up of symbolic gestures and actions projected to voice peaceful opposition to a policy or a law, or to convince others (amongst the adversary or the complaint group) to certain views or actions, for example marches, petitions, pamphlets, vigils, displays of flags and colours and public speeches.

### **6.2.1 Demonstrations**

Since the late 1990s civil society was on the forefront of exerting pressure on the Mugabe regime with the ZCTU still playing a significant role ,despite losing most of its membership to unemployment which was then estimated to be above 80 percent (Rotberg 2011: 6). Demonstrations were carried out by other active organisations including the NCA, the MDC, WOZA, and student organisations, particularly ZINASU. These non-state actors in most cases engaged nonviolent methods including demonstrations, against the state actor in the period under study.

One of the significant non-state actors which emerged to advance democratic constitutional principles was the NCA which was formed in 1997. It was made up of trade unions, student organisations, political parties, churches, women's organisations and other non-state actors (NCA n. d.). The February 2000 constitutional referendum success of the NCA in defeating the ZANU PF Constitutional Commission was not the end of the NCA's struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. Apart from its abortive struggle for a 'people-driven' constitution during the inclusive government, the NCA was also involved in street protests for political tolerance and some bread and butter issues such as commodity price hikes (Taundi 2010: 5). In 2003, the NCA was commended as one civic group apart from the ZCTU consistently partaking in public protests but was criticised for lack of strategy when its demand for a new constitution before any new election resulted in some friction with the MDC (United States Institute of Peace 2003: 10). The NCA led several peaceful marches and demonstrations and distributed fliers in the country's major cities and towns intended to put pressure on the government to agree to the demands for a democratic constitution between 2003 and 2007. At the same time, it provided civic education on the connection between a constitution, good governance and human rights (Lumina 2009: 29-40, 37). As observed by Davenport and Trivedi (2013), activism increases awareness of injustice and the problem at stake particularly among those that participate in it. As a consequence of NCA and other organisations' actions the important matter of constitutional reform remained on the national agenda culminating in international publicity which compelled SADC to take keen interest in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe following the events of March 11, 2007 (Lumina 2009: 46-47).

In September 2006 some of its members were arrested by the police after demonstrating in Mutare city centre and more than 500 of its members embarked on a peaceful demonstration calling for a new constitution and protested against the police assault of 15 leaders of the ZCTU in Harare (Human Rights Watch 2006). In fact, in an interview with the chairman of the NCA, Lovemore Madhuku emphasised that his organisation used nonviolent methods such as boycotts, peaceful protests and marches. He further noted that the participants lacked violent inclinations and did not engage in violence because they were fighting for democracy in a limited democratic environment. Madhuku noted that planning and communication were difficult through top down processes because at the beginning the nonviolent actors did not enjoy widespread presence in every locality and/or community. There were few people who were involved in planning, and communication was done through unofficial methods, which included keeping contact with members through oral communication and fliers, which were not widely disseminated and communicated since their operations were secretive (He made it clear that the nonviolent demonstrators were violently dealt with through killing, arrests, beating, while some people disappeared. He concluded that the NCA partly met its objective of providing a post-independence constitution although the constitution was not people-driven as the NCA had advocated, but felt that his organisation's work was historic because it set a foundation for other organisations to engage the state using nonviolent methods or using nonviolence activities in different ways (Interview, 2 June 2014).

The aims of the NCA were to: 'help bring about the initiation of an inclusive and broad-based constitution-making process in Zimbabwe; foster, protect and deepen a culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law in Zimbabwe and to implement, incorporate and protect human rights' (Ruzivo 2008: 7). However, Madhuku admitted that the NCA's objectives were not met as anticipated because of the interference of the state actor. Its objectives were to:

- Identify shortcomings of the current constitution and to organise debate on possible constitutional reforms.
- Organise constitutional debate in a way that allows broad based participation.
- Subject the constitution-making process in Zimbabwe to popular scrutiny in accordance with the principle that constitutions are made by and for the people (NCA 1997).

In this regard, the NCA carried out grassroots campaigns, empowering people about rights-linked issues which include the importance of an inclusive, extensive constitution; facilitated debates; organised meetings, seminars and debate workshops; issued public statements; monitored legal, political and social developments in Zimbabwe; published reports on human-rights related subjects including the plight of women in Zimbabwe and engaged in local and international networking. NCA also organised demonstrations and civic education. The campaigns and other actions of the NCA resulted in a more extensive awareness of the constitutional subject amongst Zimbabweans. However, during the recent constitution making process ZANU PF manipulated and threatened citizens and told them what to say about what it wanted to be contained in the constitution (Daily news Staff Writers 2011). This means that the end product was a ZANU PF dominated constitution, notwithstanding the fact that the other political parties also influenced the constitution-making process. The process was therefore elitist (neglected the voiceless majority) thereby watering down the aspect of being people driven (Manyeruke and Hamauswa, 2013). An interview revealed that the constitution-making process was marred by the fact that the people that were chosen to speak had been given political party positions, hence the process was stage managed (Interview with Muzenda a university graduate from Masvingo province, 15 June 2014). Muzenda further noted that the constitution is meant for the present and future generations, hence should be made in a free manner. What cannot be taken away from the NCA is the fact that it was instrumental in calling for the rejection of a draft constitutional proposal in a referendum held in 2000. Commenting about the 2013 constitution-making process which was initiated by the NCA, A resident of Zvimba in Mashonaland West province in an interview said:

Constitution-making is a big deal in terms of the life of the country. In our case the process was driven by individual and small group interests rather than national interests. It was critical to be honest and candid in order to come up with a document to govern everyone. It was interest driven not national and not people driven. Above all, I do not think the NCA had a mandate of the people hence the document could not be people driven. However, I am not a constitutionalist but the document is something that can be used as a starting point (Interview, 18 June 2014).

On the other hand, a renowned academic on human rights issues, Masunungure pointed out that the NCA was a success before it meddled a lot in politics because it had one objective. He also revealed that the NCA was effective in the late 1990s and early 2000s when it advocated for the

No vote which won. The moment it became entangled in politics it lost direction and this became evident when the NCA transformed into a political party (Interview, 22 June 2014).

Former president of ZINASU University of Zimbabwe branch, Maposa noted that ZINASU uses three Ds in its communication mode namely, debate, dialogue and demonstrations as a last resort after failure of dialogue. He added that the NCA failed in its aims because the constitution did not capture the views of students who are the future leaders and thus the constitution does not incorporate the needs of the generality of Zimbabweans (Interview, 14 June 2014).

The MDC was formed in 1999 and split into two factions in 2005. The MDC splinter groups became known as the MDC-M (it was led by Arthur Mutambara) and since 2011 known as MDC-N (because it is now led by Welshman Ncube) and the main faction known as MDC-T (led by Morgan Tsvangirai). Of these splinter groups, reference here is largely made to the MDC-T. The MDC since its appearance on the national political panorama led a number of demonstrations against ZANU PF's ill-treatment and perceived maladministration with some demonstrations being unsuccessful and others successful. During the tenure of the GNU in 2012 the MDC-T Youth Assembly conducted a peaceful march in the centre of the town of Masvingo demanding a number of issues, namely the release of their chairperson Paul Madzore together with seven other members of the party from prison on purportedly false charges of participating in the murder of a police officer (Interview with Petros Mutedza in Glenview, 2011). They demanded far reaching judiciary system changes as the courts were allegedly being used by politicians in ZANU PF to persecute instead of charging members of the MDC, independent media and civic society (MDC 2012: 2). During the 2003 World Cup Cricket played at Queens Sports Ground in Bulawayo, alleged MDC activists held peaceful protests expressing the feeling among many Zimbabweans that there must be 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' and displayed banners which in part read: 'Zimbabwe needs justice' and at the same time waved red cards which are a signal of the MDC conveying the message that Mugabe must go (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 11-14). It is necessary to note that the activists claimed to have some training in conducting peaceful protests and this was disclosed by the 'group leaders' arrested by the police and interviewed by Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark (PHR/DK) (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 11).

The ZCTU also held demonstrations which at times were blocked by the police despite court approval for them to express their basic freedoms including the right to assembly. In September 2006, the ZCTU together with other civic groups and opposition political parties led a peaceful protest in about 34 various locations where they called for an end to ‘economic decline, demanded living wages and greater access to antiretroviral drugs for Zimbabweans diagnosed with HIV/AIDS’ (Miriam and Hosinski 2013: 4). During these demonstrations it is alleged that some police personnel expressed their solidarity with those who confronted the government over the state of the economy. In addition, the police were even eager to join but fell short of courage to defy orders because they doubted the capacity of the protesters, taking into consideration their small number and organisational capacity (International Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 4). On 10 October 2009, the ZCTU conducted successful demonstrations as participants marked the Decent Work Day. However, the main demonstration in Harare was short-lived because it only lasted 48 minutes before police blocked it. The police also thwarted plans by the ZCTU to carry out a demonstration commemorating the ZCTU leadership’s 2007 detention and torture, and this was in contravention of the court approval which had allowed the demonstration (Action for Southern Africa 2009). In response to the harassment of organisations which wanted to be accredited as election observers by government for the March 16, 2013 referendum, the ZCTU jointly protested with nine other civic groups on 11 March 2013 and the protest forced ZEC to authorise the proceedings of the accreditation exercise which only left ZimRights unaccredited (Miriam and Hosinski 2013: 8).

A female dominated organisation called Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) was established in 2003 essentially to give voice to women from all walks of life who were not accorded a platform to air their grievances. WOZA heavily relies on the principles of strategic nonviolence to achieve their objectives. Demonstrations play a key part in the organisation’s strategic action. Besides, they distribute roses on 14 February every year (Valentine’s Day) as a sign of love (Women of Zimbabwe Arise 2007: 3). The gesture by WOZA is important because all the problems that the country faces are because of hatred, including hating freedom of assembly and expression and hating divergent political views and life.

WOZA (‘come forward’) is a *Ndebele* word being the acronym of Women of Zimbabwe Arise which was set up in 2003 as a women’s civic movement to:

- Provide women, from all walks of life, with a united voice to speak out on issues affecting their day-to-day lives.
- Empower female leadership that will lead community involvement in pressing for solutions to the current crisis.
- Encourage women to stand up for their rights and freedoms.
- Lobby and advocate on those issues affecting women and their families (WOZA n. d.).

By 2013 it had a nationwide membership of more than 75, 000 women and men. It was established ‘to be a litmus test’ of the principles of strategic nonviolence, to demonstrate that ‘the power of love can conquer the love of power’ (Anonymous 2008a: 7) fighting for improved governance, social justice and human rights ranging from rights to assembly, expression, health, education and better living standards (Mugo and Ali 2008: 146). In 2006, Men of Zimbabwe Arise (MOZA) was formed adding to the structure of WOZA (Anonymous 2008a: 7). Since its formation, WOZA was carrying out street demonstrations every month distributing flyers and newsletters which explained why the protest is taking place (Anonymous 2008b: 15). Since 2003 WOZA has carried out hundreds of protests and in the process over 3,000 women and men have been taken into police custody at times for two or more days. These victims were referred to as ‘frontline human rights defenders’ because they bore the brunt of police beatings and intolerable conditions in prison cells (WOZA n. d.).

WOZA successfully used tactics such as ‘handing out roses on Valentine’s Day’ to ‘spread the love,’ ‘asking for bread’ and picketing at schools in poor suburbs to register displeasure with continuous school fee increases’ (Taundi 2010: 5). On Valentine’s Day in 2004, WOZA members were prevented by the police from distributing roses under the banner ‘Cry Beloved Zimbabwe’ which emphasised that love should overcome hate and the message was heard by only a few (Ndlovu 2004: 219). In 2006 WOZA members were arrested and detained with their babies after demonstrating against school fees hikes (Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 4). By 2008 WOZA had led over 100 peaceful demonstrations registering their displeasure with the socio-political and economic state of affairs in the country (Anonymous 2008b: 14). Their protests were focused and although involving a variety of activities their demands are contextually specific. For example, they protested against the exclusion of ordinary citizens from the SADC mediation process which started in 2007, and against government-sponsored violence against opposition members and supporters during elections (Mugo and Ali 2008: 146). According to Dugger (2008: A.6) Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, Methodist and Apostolic churches

in Zimbabwe provided sanctuary for the nurturing of WOZA allowing it to grow into a formidable protest movement against the rule of Mugabe and by 2008 its membership had risen to over 60 000. At numerous times, WOZA members from diverse backgrounds ranging from maids, vegetable vendors and hairdressers went onto the streets together with their leaders like Jenni Williams in their struggle for democracy. They sang gospel songs, banging empty pots and carrying brooms showing the need to sweep the government clean. In May 2008, Jenni Williams and 13 other women were arrested in Harare for marching and distributing fliers in the capital's streets demanding the Mugabe regime to end its violence on the electorate before the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election.

WOZA also held a peaceful demonstration on 21 September 2013 marking the commemoration of the International Day of Peace. The demonstration was held right outside the parliament in Harare aimed at reminding the elected members of parliament to seriously work for the improvement of the country, adhering to both domestic and international law, and raising a banner with the message 'Peace Must Deliver Freedom and Development for All' (NGO Law Monitor 2013). Up until 2013, WOZA was still the most noticeable women's organisation that persisted to aggressively pursue its objectives.

University students in Zimbabwe countrywide have been involved in public demonstrations in opposition to unacceptable government actions and policies such as deteriorating standards in education, health and corruption. In this regard, student activism has been described as '...radical voices of reason waging a just and selfless struggle for the betterment of the lives of students and the nation at large' (Sithole 2013). Since its establishment in 1986, ZINASU led many of the student demonstrations. In 2006 a number of student activists were arrested after demonstrating against tuition fees hikes (Human rights Watch 2006).

After 1995 ZINASU took part in other urban protest actions in Zimbabwe. The students went beyond fighting on behalf of the voiceless civil society. They were directly concerned and participated in strikes, demonstrations and political debates. Put differently: 'This period, marking a new phase in student activism, saw the convergence of student activism with the wider movement for democratic and social change across Zimbabwe'. In 1997 ZINASU started to raise explicit political demands and made it apparent that, 'only by building a political movement would the government respect the right to free education' (Zeilig 2008: 222-224).



It is evident from this discussion that demonstrations by the NCA, ZCTU, ZINASU, WOZA and the MDC exposed the absence of accountability on the part of the Mugabe regime which flouted democratic principles and processes for the furtherance of its major aim of remaining in power perpetually. The demonstrations were a constant reminder to the state-actor that it was failing to provide for the socio-economic and political needs of its citizens. However, instead of taking steps to ameliorate the socio-economic and political situation the government chose repression as its major weapon to try and silence dissent.

### **6.2.2 Music and song**

The MDC since its formation has used music and songs to rally supporters and members of the public to its cause, articulating their grievances, keeping up morale, encouraging people to join and protest against malpractices of ZANU PF, and at the same time spreading the message about the party's (MDC) objectives, values, approaches and policies. Before 2005 the MDC relied on already existing protest songs to criticise state malpractices and then started producing its own songs to launch its first album in 2006. NCA, WOZA, ZCTU and ZINASU have all used protest music and song during demonstrations and protests.

The songs played at MDC rallies and functions included songs by Thomas Mapfumo, especially from his 1999 album *Chimurenga explosion* which contains tracks that share the same sentiments and rhetoric as the MDC, namely that it was ZANU PF that was responsible for the economic meltdown of the country. His 2002 album *Chimurenga rebel* with songs condemning the Fast Track Land Reform and destruction of the economy, and his 2004 album *Zvichapera (It will come to an end)* that contains songs such as 'Masoja nemapurisa' ('Soldiers and policemen') which condemns violence and repression by the police and the army, thereby supporting the agenda of the opposition (Musiyiwa 2013: 93-94).

The opposition also gave political meaning to songs that were not politically motivated. These include songs like *Bvuma Wasakara* of 2000 by Oliver Mtukudzi which was interpreted to be referring to President Mugabe, who was by then 76 years old and whose portrait was hanging above the stage, helping people to easily identify and even point to it when the song was played (Timberg 2009; Palmberg 2004: 18). Thorsen (2004: 10) also notes that Mtukudzi's track symbolises something that the opposition could not speak about openly, but was used as a political weapon symbolising '...President Mugabe's struggle against his old age in a political

system in crisis.’ Palmberg (2004: 19-20) citing Mtukudzi’s *Bvuma Wasakara* (2000) and *Bvunze Moto* (2003) albums, aptly observes that many songs escape recognition because they are subtle in their allusions to the leadership crisis that gripped the country, as compared to Mapfumo who uses direct language in his 1999 album *Chimurenga Explosion. Handiende* (‘I won’t leave’) by Steve Makoni was another song used to ridicule Mugabe’s reluctance to let go of power. Poet Cde Fatso’s (real name Samm Farai Monro) 2008 album *House of Hunger*, speaks boldly criticising the bad human rights record of the Mugabe regime as does Chirikure Chirikure. Songs by Raymond Majongwe attacking state violence, tyranny and partisan justice were also warmly welcomed by the opposition. *Musazvidzokorore futi* (*Don’t repeat it again*) with the song, *Dhiziri paChinhoyi* (‘Diesel at Chinhoyi’), *Ngozi* (*Avenging spirit*) and *Live in Joburg 2008* are his 2009 albums that bemoan the economic meltdown and deteriorating socio-political state of the country (Musiyiwa 2013: 94). Kuhlmann (2010: 16) notes that Viomak also adds to the list of protest musicians in the diaspora who have released a protest album on Mugabe’s birthday every year since 2006.

Realising the power and central role music play in campaigns and political contest, the MDC first composed its own songs during the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections (Sibanda 2005). *Tsunami* became the first album of the MDC produced in 2006, criticising Operation Murambatsvina that was condemned both locally and internationally as a gross human rights violation. This album marked the beginning of the proliferation of protest songs by the opposition sponsored activists like Paul Madzore, Francis Chikunguru, The Hot Wire Boys, Dread Reckless (real name is Happison Handson Mabika) and Sister Fearless (real name is Patience Takaona). Noteworthy is that most of the songs perceived as protesting Mugabe’s rule were recorded outside the country as local recording studios feared victimisation by the regime, and if they recorded here did so secretly (Nyamhangambiri 2008). Despite government censorship of perceived anti-government music, the use of social media technology, that is online websites, mobile phones, car radios and computers in people’s homes or offices have allowed people to circumvent censorship, resulting in the music being publicly heard nonetheless (Musiyiwa 2013: 95). The use of radio stations considered by the regime as pirate helped the opposition to put its songs on the air. SW Africa Radio which transmitted from London into Zimbabwe played a significant role (Sibanda 2005). Digital technology has allowed many people to have access to the music and has been aided by ‘...the introduction of DVD/CD players, home

theatres, computers, car Frequency Modulation (FM) transmitters, the Internet, blue tooth, cell phones and other metadata files have increased transfer of recorded music' (Blom, Van Niekerk and Muranda 2012: 52).

According to Musiyiwa (2013: 29), during the post-2000 era pro-opposition songs foretold ZANU PF's end politically, replaced by the MDC and the rupture songs include 'Disaster' by Thomas Mapfumo, *Vachamhanya* (They will be punished) by Paul Madzore and 'Zanu yaguma' ('Zanu has come to an end') and 'Reuben' by Francis Chikunguru. These songs have a psychological effect of warning people to change their malpractices or risk imminent sanctions of the disaster in their midst. A song by Francis Chikunguru 'Sungano' (Unity) sung at the third Congress of the MDC in 2011 was an encouragement song to the party's members and supporters to be united in order to defeat ZANU PF. To this end, Musiyiwa (2013) rightly observes that:

... pro-opposition or pro-change songs whose cluster of themes includes democracy; political change; respect for human rights; good governance; transparency and the rule of law. For instance, Chikunguru's songs "Kurukura" ("Discuss [i.e., change]") and "Zviri mberi" ("What lies ahead") express these MDC ideals. Like pro-ZANU PF songs their lyrics constitute a cluster of themes of negation which blame ZANU PF. Corruption; violence; state-sponsored repression; dictatorship and national economic and political meltdown, are all blamed on Mugabe and his party. In songs such as "Kure kure" ("We came a long way") and "Vekurohwa" ("Of violence") or "Egypt taramba" ("No more to oppression") by Madzore; "Ndiri musoja" ("I'm a soldier") and "Vana vanzwa" ("Children have suffered") by Dread Reckless and Sister Fearless; and Chikunguru's "Chirongwa" ("The programme"), the MDC is depicted as confronting ZANU PF in search of social justice (Musiyiwa 2013: 82).

Protest music in Zimbabwe is believed to be important and influential now as it was during the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence against the oppressive white minority rule when motivating and energising combatants (Carmichael 2007). Pro-MDC songs falling in the mobilisation category include:

... "Uyai tivake nyika" ["Come and let's build the nation"] and "Torikakata bhande" ["Pulling the belt"]; *mhanyai* ([please] run), encouraging people to keep advancing the cause of the movement (as in "Uyai tivake nyika" in which it is said, *mhanya nekoko* [run through that side]); *tiende or handei* (so that we can go or let us go)... (Musiyiwa 2013: 38).

Madzore's song 'Simudza ngere-ngere' ('Lift up the bell') is also a mobilisation song gathering together for action MDC party leadership and their supporters in the mentioned places in the song. The song 'Uyai tivake nyika' ('Come let us build the nation') by Hot Wire Boys is a mobilisation song rallying together the MDC leadership and their supporters to work hard to rebuild Zimbabwe destroyed by 'corruption, monopolism, murder and covetousness' at the hands of ZANUPF (Musiyiwa 2013: 39-40).

MDC songs are also persuasive, portraying the leaders '... as democratically-minded, anti-corruption, anti-dictatorship and champions of good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights' and promised 'change' which would be ushered in through the implementation of the aforementioned ideals such as the provision of jobs to the people after attracting direct foreign investment viewed as the panacea to socio-economic restoration which would reinstate Zimbabwe within the community of nations (Musiyiwa 2013: 42). According to Tonini (2005: 95), the MDC was actually formed on the basis of the need to confront the excesses of the ZANU PF led government and its corruption, promoting transparency and accountability, aimed at stopping the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. Musiyiwa (2013) aptly observes:

...while in pro-ZANU PF songs Mugabe is the subject of overt praise, Tsvangirai and the MDC are implicitly denounced. The same technique is also used in pro-MDC praise and other songs in which Tsvangirai and the MDC are showered with explicit positive epithets and in tandem Mugabe and ZANU PF satirized both overtly and covertly. For instance, Chikunguru's "Save Ibwe" ("Save is the rock") depicts Tsvangirai as a god and the MDC party as the only political party that gives Mugabe nightmares. Mugabe is also the subject of open demonization (Musiyiwa 2013: 45).

The NCA used music and song, launching an album and community theatre to generate publicity about the irregularities and controversy surrounding the 2005 parliamentary elections and Operation Murambatsvina respectively (Lumina 2009: 36). ZINASU sing and chant protest songs whenever they protest and demonstrate. For instance, on 22 April 2008 in Bindura, ZINASU sang protest songs against the continued clinging to power by Robert Mugabe despite having lost in the harmonised elections held in March of the same year. This was before the march was disrupted by armed soldiers (Clark 2008). Again in 2010, about 100 ZINASU activists were arrested when they were protesting, singing protest songs and waving placards which read: 'Restore Academic Freedoms' and 'We demand full implementation of the GPA' (Radio VOP 2010). The ZCTU in staging demonstrations against unsatisfactory working conditions also sing protest songs. Marching in the streets has been the hallmark of the ZCTU-

organised protests intended ‘to remind government and employers that workers are hungry, angry and tired’ (NewZimbabwe.com Staff Reporter 2009; Oread Daily 2005).

WOZA uses music and song whenever they stage demonstrations and protests. On 29 November 2012 during the commemoration of the 16 days of Activism against Gender Violence a group of about 300 WOZA activists staged five separate protests against police harassment marching to police officers in Southampton House to deliver a letter of complaint where their leaders, Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu, were arrested. The arrest attracted many of the activists, airing their sympathy and booing the police when they insulted the WOZA activists for speaking in Ndebele. Undeterred and in defiance of the police instructions not to speak in Ndebele, the WOZA activists went on to sing Ndebele songs only. Among the songs they sang was *Thina silwela amalungelo* (we are standing up for our rights) and *Lamulela Amapholisa bayasitshaya* (help us by intervening, the police are beating us) (Zamchiya 2012). In June 2012, 101 WOZA activists almost brought work in the police station to a standstill when they were arrested, as they fought for their rights to be observed, singing protest songs whenever the police details wanted to separate and interrogate them individually. The aim of the police was to release some of the activists to remain with a small number whom they could formally charge. The activists continued singing, demanding access for their lawyer Kossam Ncube after being denied three times by the police. The arrests followed a sit-in protest in Bulawayo pushing for the release of the draft constitution. They were singing a popular 1980s Ndebele song, ‘ilitshe likaNkomo limbomboziwe, liyovulwa ngubani, limbomboziwe? (Loosely translated it means Nkomo’s ‘stone’ denoting a plan, has been hidden or turned upside down, who is going to put it right?)’ (WOZA 2012). This song was meant to remind people that they should not repeat what Nkomo (popularly known as ‘Father Zimbabwe’) did when he fell victim to ZANU PF violence and urged people to decide their own destiny by refusing to be silenced by violence (WOZA 2012).

Music and song has been used effectively by the MDC and other groups to protest malpractice by the state under ZANU PF, and to propagate the opposition’s position on matters of governance. In this way it managed to deconstruct and wrestle away ZANU PF’s monopoly on telling people about the country’s history, economy, national identity, and sovereignty.

### **6.2.3 Protest theatre**

Protest theatre has also been used to put across grievances, articulating social and political issues affecting the public, encouraging members of the public to join in the fight against the wrongs perpetrated by the government. According to Chiyindiko (2011: 8-9), ‘protest theatre movement has been at the forefront of articulating the disillusionment, despair, hopelessness, apathy, hopes and aspirations of Zimbabweans at home and abroad’ and its development and expansion was caused by the socio-economic decline experienced then in the country. Protest theatre has strongly criticised the ZANUPF led government policies, with particular attention to land reform and redistribution, elections, political violence, HIV/AIDS and corruption. The plays include *Super patriots and Morons*, *Decades of Terror*, *Final Push* and *Overthrown*. These protest plays were banned because of their anti-government stance (Chiyindiko 2011: 30). Kuhlmann (2010: 16) mentions *Theatre Under Fire* is among protest theatre groups in the diaspora that criticise the situation in Zimbabwe, as well as the way asylum seekers are treated in the UK.

Daves Guzha of Rooftop Promotions is one among several protagonists of protest theatre that regularly produce protest plays at their venue ‘Theatre in the Park’ which is associated with freedom of speech in the country. Amongst the protest plays performed first at ‘Theatre in the Park’ are ‘*Heal the Wounds*’ in September 2009 which dealt with the then current and important issues in the country relating to national healing, reconciliation and integration, while ‘*Waiting for Constitution*’ in February 2010 focused on the constitution making process and was commended for being instrumental in sensitising people to participate in the project (Chiyindiko 2011: 4-5). It is evident that protest theatre has been used as a nonviolent way of protesting against unwarranted actions and policies by the government of the day. It further informed, educated and sensitised the public to socio-economic and political developments in the country.

### **6.2.4 MDC red card, slogan caricatures and symbols**

The red card was an MDC way of conveying the message that President Mugabe must go, and waving the red card demonstrates a peaceful act of expression. More importantly, red generally became a symbolic colour for the party especially during election time when anyone who wore red clothes was associated with the party and its message of eagerly working for change and the removal of the Mugabe regime. As a result, red was apparently banned by the ZANU PF led government during the run up to elections. The prohibition of red clothes, objects and fliers and cards thus posed a challenge to organisations that also used red to celebrate other events like

AIDS day. Radio and television presenters were also reported to have been cautioned for wearing red ribbons when presenting AIDS programmes (Zimbabwe denies banning red on TV, 2004). This suggests that red had become a symbolic colour associated with opposition politics.

The MDC used the analogy of football where use of the red card connotes that Mugabe must be sent off the political playing field, since he was shown a yellow card with the rejection of a new draft constitution during the 2000 referendum. Voting against ZANU PF and Mugabe symbolised the waving of a red card as referees do in football, and opposition supporters proudly waved them whenever they met or saw ZANU PF supporters. However, violence erupted for just possessing the card or a red whistle, especially in rural areas. It is noted:

[T]he regime is also having to cope with the rise of a less dramatic, but still highly effective, form of opposition, which has captured the imagination of Zimbabwe's football-mad, militant urban populace. It is red, costs almost nothing, fits in your shirt pocket and can be used to get rid of dictators responsible for foul deeds. At appropriate moments, such as the appearance of President Mugabe's 24-vehicle motorcade, you whip out the little plastic rectangle and brandish it as the armour-plated presidential Mercedes-Benz flashing past. It tells the 76-year-old autocrat that he has been red-carded, and it is time to get off the field he has dominated for the past 20 years (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002).

Red card waving by MDC supporters have been the hallmark of Tsvangirai's campaign rallies since 2000 and nearly delivered the long expected change in 2008 when the MDC was able to campaign in rural areas (Moyo 2013). Before the 2013 elections speculation was high '... that just like in 2000 the referendum on the Copac draft constitution would be 'a yellow card' and the general election would be 'a red card' signalling the ousting of ZANU PF and Mugabe' in a contest that was believed to be the final one (Moyo 2012; Gutu 2013). Contrary to the MDC-T's expectations, ZANU PF won the 2013 polls which were marred by several irregularities.

at its inception the MDC used the open hand palm as its party symbol which signifies openness and transparency together with their main slogan *Chinja maitiro, maitiro chinja– Guqula izenzo, izenzo guqula*, (Change your ways, your ways have to be changed) as a way of changing the way in which ZANU PF engaged in politics by shunning political violence (Mapara and Wasosa 2012: 290). In fact, the MDC party symbol is the opposite of ZANU PF's clenched fist and the former's slogan has been described as envisaging a possibility of change in Zimbabwean politics as it conveyed a notice to ZANU PF that it risked losing state power following electoral defeats

during the 2000, 2002 and 2008 elections, but in response the ruling party resorted to violence against its real and perceived political opponents (Mapara and Wasosa 2012: 290).

The MDC's red cards, *Chinja maitiro*-slogan and the open palm party symbol have been consistent with its founding principles of using nonviolent means to attain democratic change. It is beyond doubt that ZANU PF has been ill at ease because of MDC's effective nonviolent protest and persuasion methods that has challenged its entrenched hold on power.

### **6.3 Methods of noncooperation**

These methods aim to limit or withhold certain existing relationships, for example student or labour strikes, political and consumer boycotts, civil disobedience towards oppressive laws, or severing diplomatic relations. Noncooperation strategies encompass several methods that can be further divided into three sub-categories, namely social, economic and political noncooperation are used in this study.

#### **6.3.1 Social noncooperation: Student strikes and protests**

College and university students in Zimbabwe have been involved in student politics and activism protesting against deteriorating education standards and services that have gone beyond the reach of many students. Amid these difficult conditions and the economic meltdown that has gripped the country, students and their representative groups, particularly ZINASU boycotted classes in 2002 showing solidarity with ZCTU's call for a stay-away (Pearson 2003). In 2006, ZINASU led student strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, protests and class boycotts against tuition fee hikes at colleges and universities that took place at the Bulawayo Polytechnic, University of Zimbabwe, and Masvingo Teachers' College among others (Birthday presents to Mugabe from Zimbabwe's students: riots, demonstrations, protests and sit-ins, 2006).

ZINASU apart from championing the student cause is also credited with facilitating multiparty democracy together with other democratic forces, which resulted in the formation of the MDC in 1999. It has purposefully challenged human rights abuses, corruption and poor governance among other mismanagement actions that endanger democracy (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2013a).



Social noncooperation in the form of student strikes led by ZINASU has been a feature of the struggle for democracy since 1999. Although the impact of student actions is not clear, what is certain is that some knowledge of nonviolent methods existed within the student movement. The responsible authorities certainly got the message and this was apparent when demonstrations were outlawed and a police presence was established at the institutions of higher learning to monitor the situation.

### **6.3.2 Economic noncooperation:**

#### **Mass stay-aways**

Mass stay-aways were effectively used by the ZCTU during the late 1990s and periodically since 2002 together with the MDC, and the most threatening ones were carried out in 2003 and 2004. According to Laakso (2003), an attempt at a stay-away campaign by the ZCTU following the 2002 presidential election, protesting the way the elections were arranged, failed to ensure the participation of workers. A national stay-away by the ZCTU and the MDC in 2003 on 18 and 19 March was singled out as having been largely successful in major towns and cities like Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Kwekwe as less than 20 percent of workers went to work (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 24). The United States Institute of Peace (2003: 2) share the same sentiment when it points out that as opposed to mass actions in 2002, this work stay-away of March 2003 for two days had over 70% participation rate countrywide and was aimed at protesting against human rights abuses by the government and its inability to safeguard citizens' security.

In addition to the MDC's two-day work stay-away in March 2003, the ZCTU also called for labour action on April and June of the same year. The April labour action was a reaction to protest a 300 percent fuel price hike by the government and had widespread participation across the whole country. The June mass action which came to be popularly known as the 'final push' resulted in Harare and Bulawayo shutting down for a week, despite a severe clampdown by government security personnel (United States Institute of Peace 2003: 2). The crackdown was officially justified on the basis that the stay-away was in violation of POSA (United States Institute of Peace 2003: 5). The main objective of the stay away was to compel Mugabe to resign or negotiate with the opposition, but this was not accomplished due to severe government repression. It is critical to realise that, although the 'final push' failed it had serious effects which

forced the one time fierce critic and at some time staunch supporter of ZANU PF and President Mugabe, Jonathan Moyo (2009) to conclude:

Even though it failed in the end, the MDC's 2003 "Final Push" campaign sent shockwaves within Zanu PF by demonstrating the readiness and willingness of huge numbers of Zimbabweans to take to the streets or stay at home and bring public life to a crushing standstill to get Zanu PF out of power (Moyo 2009).

Ndlovu (2004: 220) and Kibble (2004: 230) observe that the year 2003 shows that staying away from work was the only way people were prepared to protest, as they appeared unwilling to face the riot police and army. This is convincing given the fact that there were numerous cases of both arrests and police brutality on members of WOZA, ZCTU and the NCA who had been brave enough to take to the streets in 2003. Such hostile responses forced people to shy away from demonstrations thereby reducing their intended forceful impact. It supports Sharp's observation that the impact of the various methods of noncooperation largely depends upon the numbers of people participating and the extent to which the opponent is dependent on the people or group of people refusing to cooperate (Sharp 2005: 54). In this regard, Davenport and Trivedi (2013) observe that nonviolent direct action exposes participants to severe repression and discrimination. Kibble (2004: 231) further points out that opposition force which include the MDC, ZCTU and the NCA, failed to unite and agree on tactics such as mass action, to try and overthrow Mugabe, or to force ZANU PF to the negotiating. This opinion is shared by Kagoro who asserts that following the 2002 presidential election the MDC was divided between resorting to mass uprisings or negotiation, and whether to seek international intervention. While the MDC was expected by the masses to lead the street mass uprisings protesting against the stolen election, its leadership also appeared to have expected the masses to initiate the move (Kagoro n. d.: 23-24). The NCA also participated and even spearheaded some stay-aways in the main urban centres pushing for a democratic constitution to be drafted in Zimbabwe, an objective they had maintained since 2000 (Lumina 2009: 29). Apparently, whilst the outcome of nonviolent uprisings against dictatorial regimes is heavily influenced by security force defections as was the case in Egypt. Zimbabwe also adds to the list of those countries like Bahrain and Syria during the Arab Spring where the military largely remained loyal to the regime thereby faltering the nonviolent uprisings and obstructing regime collapse (Nepstad 2013).

During the initial years of the MDC, ZANU PF was shaken by the urban dwellers who appeared to be largely behind the opposition. In this regard, one prominent activist, Munyaradzi Gwisai concluded that:

the urban masses have waged massive struggles that have shaken to the roots not only the post-colonial authoritarian state, but also the vicious neo-liberal paradigm imposed by our rulers ... The struggles have gone further than most in challenging one of the continent's most entrenched and violent ruling classes (Gwisai 2002: 50).

Several attempts by different groups to engage in a strike or protest were met with heavy-handedness by the police who, for example arrested and beat up ZCTU and WOZA leaders in late 2006 when they led a protest demanding economic rights and constitutional reform. Instead of condemning police brutality Mugabe justified the beatings and arrests. He even warned that the police would hit and detain those who dared to protest or strike and labelled the action by the ZCTU 'a revolt to the system'. It was followed by some junior doctors and teachers who went on strike in early 2007 being detained. In response to the call for another national stay-away in April 2007, the government banned political rallies and demonstrations (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 29).

For the Mugabe regime stay-aways appear to have been the most threatening method of nonviolent action judging from the harsh reaction in words and physical action which were meted out to activists. This is supported by the fact that if the massive stay-aways had succeeded in bringing the country's economy to a halt, certainly the Mugabe regime would have crumbled without a single shot being fired. Should it have happened, it would have affirmed the power of noncooperation as a method of nonviolent action against Zimbabwe's dictatorial regime.

### **Strikes and go-slows**

Teachers in Zimbabwe have resorted to strikes and at times go-slows in protest against bad working conditions and poor remuneration as the economic situation in the country worsened. These actions almost brought the public education sector in the country to a halt. Strikes and go-slows have been the hallmark of the education sector since 2000, but reached crisis proportions in 2008 due to the dreadful economic situation.

According to WOZA (2009: 3), normal lessons were effectively suspended towards the end of 2008, because teachers were on strike and the government had to postpone the opening of

schools for the first term of 2009 from 13 January to 27 January. This was so because the government had failed to reach an agreement with the teachers' unions. In 2012 there was again a call for strikes by some teachers' unions, including the Progressive Teachers' Union (PTUZ), designed to coerce the government into increasing teachers' salaries. No strike materialised due to divisions amongst the unions, when some of the unions warned their members not to participate, and this rendered the wage bargaining process ineffective (Gwanoya 2012). Some teachers in Harare however, participated in the strike and vowed not to teach until their hunger was addressed (Deutsche Presse-Agentur reporter 2012).

### **6.3.3 Political noncooperation Election boycotts**

Since its formation in 1999 the MDC has boycotted two elections. The first election boycott in 2005 led to divisions in the party. The disagreements were over whether or not to boycott the elections. The boycott by Tsvangirai of the 2005 senatorial elections after the March 2005 House of Assembly elections citing a skewed and flawed electoral framework which was biased in favour of ZANU PF led to the splinter of the MDC. Some of Tsvangirai's lieutenants (26 members) participated and they were expelled from the party. The rebel splinter pro-senate group was led by Professor Welshman Ncube which later elected Arthur Mutambara as their leader. This happened despite the fact that the MDC had taken a position in August 2004 not to participate in any future elections unless there were reforms which would guarantee a free and fair poll. It appears that they were hoodwinked by ZANU PF's cosmetic reforms to the electoral law in an attempt to align it with the SADC protocols. This split in the MDC weakened and hampered its efforts and ability to challenge ZANU PF (Ploch 2008a).

Tsvangirai also boycotted the June 27, 2008 presidential run-off in a drive to save lives of his supporters from the wrath of ZANU PF violence. Undeniably, extreme organised violence was unleashed by the government against the MDC top leadership, grassroots, and other supporters during this period, which compelled Tsvangirai to withdraw a week before the election from participating. Over 300 MDC supporters died during this period (Mutandiri 2009; Solidarity Peace Trust 2013: 29). It is clear from the above, that Tsvangirai stuck to the principles of nonviolent action when he withdrew, but Mugabe went into the election as the only candidate

won by 85 percent margin. However, unlike in previous elections, Mugabe lost credibility even among his African sympathisers and internationally (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 33).

From the two election boycotts by Tsvangirai discussed above, it can be learnt that whilst the last one managed to throw the Mugabe regime into a legitimacy crisis, the first one was ill-planned and did not have a great impact on Mugabe because the effort was divided. The earlier attempt to boycott the Senate poll failed for the reason that a fraction of the MDC members participated due to dissention in their ranks.

### **Civil disobedience**

In August 2006, the two MDC factions, churches, and civil society groups engaged in a strategic nonviolent action code named *Save Zimbabwe Campaign*, aimed at curtailing ZANU PF's plan to postpone presidential elections beyond 2008. This launched regular periodic protests which were carried out by key civic organisation groups that included the ZCTU, NCA, WOZA and ZINASU. The NCA began distributing flyers which read: 'we will vote in 2008 under a New Constitution' (Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 10). The government on 22 February 2007 announced a ban on all political rallies and public demonstrations for three months. It took this decision on the basis that the country was in a volatile situation, but this only prompted the opposition and civil society groups further into civil disobedience. Prior to the ban, opposition political rallies and activities, notably Tsvangirai's presidential campaign launch in Harare and Mutambara's rally in Bulawayo were dispersed by the police armed with baton sticks and water cannons despite the High Court ruling which had legalised such political activities (Ploch 2008a: 14; International Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 10).

The March 11, 2007 *Save Zimbabwe Campaign* prayer meeting where both MDC faction leaders and other civic society leaders attended, was in direct defiance of the government announcement. The campaign led to the arrest of both Mutambara and Tsvangirai, and many opposition and civic members. In response to the arrest of their leaders, opposition supporters protested the following day and were also arrested after sustaining several injuries, which caught the attention of the international media, together with world and regional leaders who criticised the abuses (Ploch 2008a: 14). If the truth is to be told, the existence of POSA meant that many of the campaigns that were conducted by opposition and civic groups after 2002, were acts of

disobedience that were followed by massive arrests. This is confirmed by the position of the NCA following the government announcement of the ban, noting that ‘The NCA will not recognise the authority of a partisan police force and we urge all citizens to ignore such dubious orders from misguided elements of the brutal police force’. The NCA had repeatedly ignored POSA provisions in the past that called for political parties and civil society groups to notify the police before conducting a protest and proceeded to stage street demonstrations demanding a new people-driven constitution in Zimbabwe (Own Correspondents 2007). The *Save Zimbabwe Campaign* certainly drew international and regional attention, forcing SADC to take the Zimbabwean crisis seriously; for fear that the effects of the crisis would spill over into the whole region.

It is apparent from the above that civil disobedience need not to be only planned, but can also be spontaneous, especially when leaders are detained. Given the existence legislation such as POSA, civil disobedience both planned and spontaneous was carried out by protesters and demonstrators against the excesses of the Mugabe regime.

#### **6.4 Methods of nonviolent intervention**

*Nonviolent intervention* embodies direct physical obstacles to transform a given situation, either negatively by disturbing normal or well-known social relations, or positively through imaginative actions building new independent social relations, and these include sit-ins, nonviolent invasion and occupation, hunger strikes, and setting up alternative social relations and institutions like secretive education structures, substitute markets or parallel establishments.

##### **6.4.1 Sit-ins and occupations**

WOZA is one formidable group that has stood the test of all the brutalities of the ZANU PF-led government and did what many of its counterparts failed to do. In 2008, Williams led a WOZA sit-in on the grounds of government offices demanding food for the hungry, and the formation of a power-sharing government with the opposition as a matter of urgency (Dugger 2008: A.6). In 2006, ZINASU also staged sit-ins at colleges like Hillside Teachers College which lasted more than two days, in protest against the tenfold tuition fee increase (Birthday presents to Mugabe from Zimbabwe’s students: riots, demonstrations, protests and sit-ins 2006).

Apart from sit-ins, WOZA attempted to overcrowd jails by having about 2 500 of its 60 000 members incarcerated during 2008 (Dugger 2008: It is evident that WOZA knows and

understands nonviolent methods of intervention which are capable of exerting greater pressure, but at the same time elicits severe repression from the challenged regime.

#### **6.4.2 Alternative communication systems and media**

Alternative means of communication were sought outside Zimbabwe, because of the legal restrictions limiting the freedom of independent news media within the country. The domestic radio stations and only television station were controlled by the government and served as a ZANU PF mouthpiece (Mutandiri 2009). Electronic and print media were forced to cover and air official news that the state considered to be of national significance (Musiyiwa 2013: 85). *Capital Radio*, *MABC TV*, *Radio Dialogue* and *Freedom Radio* were the private stations which sought to give Zimbabweans a plural and alternative voice and accommodate the opposition political parties' voices. As a result, they were closed down by the government in 2000 and in response to this forced closure, some of them had to broadcast from outside the country (Mazango 2005: 50). According to Manganga (2012: 108), the denial of space in the state controlled media by the government to the MDC compelled the latter to resort to '...independent (pro-MDC) newspapers, online publications, foreign radio stations and regional and Western media to articulate and disseminate political messages.'

The alternative sources of information used by the opposition include *Voice of the People* (VOP) which broadcasts locally produced programs from the Netherlands. Other independent radio stations include *Short-Wave Radio Africa* based in London, and *Voice of America* (VOA) funded by the USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) to broadcast Studio 7, 'a shortwave daily programme and AM radio described by the USAID as "the principal source of independent electronic media in the country"' (Ploch 2008a: 32). In an endeavour to interrupt these broadcasts the Mugabe government used Chinese manufactured equipment to regularly jam them (Kuhlmann 2010: 16) with little success. Besides *SW Radio Africa* which broadcasts both on short wave frequencies and online from, other radio stations based in the UK which broadcast through the internet to reduce expenses and avoid legal limitations include *Zonet*, *Zimnet*, and *Nehanda Radio* (Kuhlmann 2010: 15) and *Afro Sounds FM* and *Zimnet radio* (Manganga 2012: 111). The attempts to jam diaspora broadcasts by the government are an indication that these broadcasts are able to fulfil their objectives despite interference and restrictions. Manganga (2012: 113-114) rightly contends that quantifying the impact of cyber activism which is the

mainstay of the Zimbabwean Diaspora, is difficult but it is beyond doubt that it has made it possible to share ideas and establish linkages between political groups and individuals both abroad and at home. However, he also argues that overreliance of the Zimbabwean Diaspora on the internet for political activism has a weakness because cyber space only provides information to a few who had access to computers and the internet.

Some local independent print media include *The Independent*, *The Financial Gazette*, *Sunday Standard*, *Newsday*, *Daily News*, *The Zimbabwean* and *The Zimbabwean on Sunday*. Some of these have been issued from London and South Africa to circumvent draconian laws such as AIPPA which could stop them from being printed inside the country (Mbanga n. d.: 77). Some local dailies such as the *Daily News* and other private newspapers were closed down in 2003 using AIPPA (Zimbabwe Institute 2007: 20; Coltart 2008: 15-16) and they were only allowed to return on the streets in 2011 during the tenure of the GNU. Online-newspapers such as *ZimOnline* therefore became very useful alternative sources of information for both Zimbabweans in the diaspora and locally. In addition, Zimbabweans in the diaspora run more than 100 websites, many of them offering chat platforms where people discuss and comment on political issues and other news (Mbanga n. d.: 79). Apart from *Zimonline*, ‘cyberspace’ or ‘desktop’ activists contribute to the dissemination of information, and):

By operating through the internet, this group has built up transnational networks of political activism discussing the politics of the homeland and spanning Britain, South Africa, the US and Zimbabwe (e.g. representatives of online news agency and online broadcasting stations such as NewZimbabwe.com, ZimOnline.co.za, TheZimbabwean.co.uk, ChangeZimbabwe.com, ZimDaily.com, *SW Radio Africa* as well as exiled journalists from the Association of Zimbabwe Journalists (Kuhlmann 2010: 13).

Manganga (2012) argues that the increased use of cyberspace was due to the need to share and articulate political views without fear of reprisals from the state security agents. He remarks that, ‘...electronic mailing lists, peer-to-peer networks, wikis, Internet forums, blogs and emails [as] are increasingly becoming important sites for political intercourse and these are almost impossible for the Zimbabwe government to control’ (Manganga 2012: 111). Furthermore, electronic petitions condemning the government have been sent via the internet to the United Nations (UN), SADC and the African Union (AU) by the Zimbabwean Diaspora. Locally, the internet was used by some cyber activists. Good examples include the use of *kubatana.net* website by Bev Clark posting political messages, protesting and condemning human rights



abuses by various political players including the government, and informing viewers about coming political meetings of both politicians and civil society and even sending updates via emails to subscribers and various bloggers who were running their own websites like Samm Farai Monro's *www.comradefatso.com*, with the common intention to '...use the Internet to express paranoia, humour, rumour, frustration, stoicism, rage, anger and hope in view of the Zimbabwean crisis' (Manganga 2012: 113). It was through the use of the internet that many people circumvented the state's restrictive laws like AIPPA and POSA because it provided them with a platform for free expression of their political views.

The MDC had to resort to alternative means of communication outside the country in its quest to effectively communicate between its members and the public because the local media was muzzled. This was unavoidable given the fact that the national broadcaster which consists of four radio stations and one television station with only two channels was reduced to a ZANU PF propaganda mouthpiece. The GNU tried to ensure media freedom but only piecemeal reforms were carried out. Only two independent radio stations started broadcasting during the tenure of the GNU, but they were also believed to be linked to ZANU PF because the owners were allegedly aligned to the Mugabe regime. The GNU pushed for the availability of independent newspapers and consequently the *Daily News* and *Newsday* returned to the streets after they had been banned by ZANU PF.

#### **6.4.3 Alternative economic institutions**

The parallel economy grew in strength in the late 1990s, reaching a peak in 2007-8 due to failed government policies that plunged the country into economic crisis. The parallel economy was a nonviolent method used by those who wanted to avoid the regulation and control of the formal authorities. The economic crisis was brought on by:

...Zimbabwe's costly involvement in the conflict in the DR Congo; high pay-outs to veterans of the liberation war that had inflationary consequences; the often chaotic implementation of the country's land reform programme; the decline of export revenue from the agricultural sector; high budget deficits that were financed through money creation, and subsequently high inflation; economic distortions caused by price regulations and the misalignments of the foreign exchange rate; erosion of property rights and entrepreneurial freedom; international sanctions such as travel restrictions on the country's elite; declining FDI inflows and lack of access to credit and balance of payment support from agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank (Luebker 2008: 17).

It is evident that Zimbabwe's economic problems are rooted the economic mismanagement by the government which pursued policies that entrenched poverty and at the same time making it very costly to do business in the formal sector, thereby collapsing investor confidence, both domestic and foreign (Gilpin 2008). Attempts to rescue the situation saw the government enforcing price controls and other measures leading to the shortage of foreign currency and basic commodities such as food and fuel. Unproductive spending by the government through quasi-fiscal funding of the public and other favoured sectors and projects, through the central bank that directly financed subsidies, compensated 'exporters' for exchange rate losses, underwrote loss-making government-owned entities and serviced the relentless rising stock of domestic debt, thereby exacerbating the economic meltdown and resulting in widespread unemployment and poverty. Gilpin notes that 'quasi-fiscal spending accounted for most of the overall fiscal deficit by the mid-2000s, with interest payments on domestic debt accounting for 80 percent of GDP in 2006' (Gilpin 2008).

A parallel, also known as black market started with illicit trade in foreign currency, but then extended to trading in food, fuel, and other basic commodities (Magaisa 2009). According to Games (2002: 6), a parallel market in basic commodities like bread, sugar, cooking oil and mealie-meal emerged to counter the shortage of these goods in the shops created mainly by price-controls. It is important to note that the terms informal, parallel and black market, whilst used interchangeably in fact refer to a complex web of different methods and markets (Makochekanwa n. d.: 2; 2010: 6). A severe shortage of foreign currency arose as a result of the erosion of Zimbabwe's 'export competitiveness' and the unavailability of donor funds, thereby fuelling a parallel foreign exchange market which by 2002 saw more than Z\$350 buying one United States dollar (Web dev author 2009). According to Coltart (2007b), the demand for foreign exchange rose further in 2007 and saw one United States dollar being bought for Z\$35 000 in mid-May, Z\$50 000 by the end of May, Z\$120 000 in mid-June and Z\$200 000 by June 20, prompting business people to adjust prices so rapidly. Fuel prices necessarily quickly responded to skyrocketing inflation, which in turn affected the price of all goods, both locally produced and imported.

'Burning money' was also another parallel market related activity that was born as a result of the need to circumvent restricted withdrawal limits imposed by the central bank, limiting the

amount of money individuals could withdraw from their personal accounts. 'Burning money' allowed privileged individuals like government delegates travelling abroad to withdraw money far beyond the official limits from a bank making them able to amass considerable wealth by exploiting the huge difference that existed between black market and official exchange rates (Magaisa 2009). Commenting on the parallel market it was noted at the time:

...the continued expansionary monetary policy through low interest rates of around 30 percent against an environment of high inflation of more than 110 percent has caused an increase in the demand for assets other than money market ones like shares, foreign currency and property as inflation-hedge efforts by investors. Given that most of these transactions take place outside the banking sector, this has caused significant financial dis-intermediation, a development that negatively affects the potency of monetary policy (Web dev author 2009).

This scenario led Zimbabweans, both ordinary and business people to develop creative strategies in a drive to survive despite the worthless Zimbabwean dollar. The growth of the parallel economy in Zimbabwe can be explained as having been necessitated by the country's citizens' need to earn a living by avoiding or manipulating taxes and foreign exchange controls, in an environment of characterized by unemployment, poverty, hyperinflation, business regulatory environment restrictions and a high social security burden (Makochekanwa 2010: 7-9). At the peak of the crisis in 2007-2008 fuel coupons and groceries, especially non-perishable ones, replaced the worthless currency as medium of exchange among other innovative forms of barter exchange. Such measures were caused by the failure of financial institutions 'to attract deposits and offer loans, coupled with the huge costs and risks incurred by doing business through official channels. The formal economy was rendered largely irrelevant given the fact that the informal economy allowed people to deal in cash, particularly the US dollar and the South African rand (Gilpin 2008). According to Makochekanwa, the second economy, that is, the informal sector which includes the black and parallel market, constituted 70% of the economy in terms of GDP in 2008, only to decline to 52% by the end of 2009, compared to less than 10% in 1980 (Makochekanwa 2010: 56). To him, the second economy involves all unregistered economic activities which may be legal or illegal but contribute to the official Gross National Product (GNP).

From the above synopsis one can conclude that the parallel economy enabled people to make ends meet amid a dire economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The parallel economy became a substitute

for the formal economy and people resorted to it as a nonviolent method in their struggle for subverting the government, of course unwittingly. The parallel economy shook the government's economic pillars of support as its activities that involved avoiding taxes and 'burning money' undermining the government's revenue base and thus its financial capacity to roll out its various programmes.

#### **6.4.4 Disclosing identities of secret agents**

In March 2013, a Facebook page was established code named *Baba Jukwa*, "a concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking community with their leaders, Government, MPs and Ministers", revealing assassinations of several people at the hands of ZANU PF (Guma 2014). On the *Baba Jukwa* page it was revealed that the death of some prominent ZANU PF members such as the retired General Solomon Mujuru, Edward Chindori Chininga and some MDC activists was caused by ZANU PF's need to remain unchallenged in power. Mujuru was perceived to be highly vocal and opposed to ZANU PF and President Mugabe's way of ruling the country and even going as far as challenging the president to step down allowing a younger person to run the party and the country (Rotberg 2012). *Baba Jukwa* further disclosed the names of the secret operatives behind all the murders, assassinations and deaths of people who were opposed to Mugabe's administration. These revelations made by *Baba Jukwa* qualify in the category of nonviolent methods of intervention.

The real name of *Baba Jukwa*, loosely Father of Jukwa, is not known, but he is believed to be a disgruntled ZANU PF insider who leaks information about fraud and other sinister moves by his party and secret CIO agents and became synonymous with the voice of the voiceless online. Reagan-Sachs states:

With the disarming profile picture of a cartoon old man, *Baba Jukwa* traffics in political napalm, spilling damaging details of high-level party meetings, allegations of voter fraud, and embarrassing gossip – all replete with private phone numbers for citizens to harass the officials in question (Reagan-Sachs 2013).

It is of significance to note that *Baba Jukwa* provided citizens with wealth of knowledge about ZANU PF actions and beyond doubt sent shockwaves within the party (*Baba Jukwa* warnings come true 2013). He warned about ZANU PF political targets and most notably he foretold the death of Edward Chindori Chininga, a Member of Parliament who released a damning report on corruption in the diamond mines at Chiadzwa. Chininga died only nine days later in a suspicious

car accident. Following Chininga's death, *Baba Jukwa* went on to divulge details about how he died at the hands of secret agents, even disclosing their names. His aim was to expose ZANU PF and stop further killings of that nature which he viewed a threat to openness (Reagan-Sachs 2013). Through *Baba Jukwa*'s disclosures, it became known that a CIO member, Menard Muzariri was behind the assassination of retired General Mujuru in August 2011, acting on instructions of superiors from the highest office in the land. Muzariri engaged three South African based Lebanese assassins to eliminate Mujuru (*Baba Jukwa* tackles Mujuru Death 2013).

Apart from *Baba Jukwa*, one should note that the MDC-T also disclosed the CIO operatives who were responsible for the death of its own activists and other anti- ZANU PF figures. It became public that the late CIO Deputy Director and head of internal operations, Elias Kanengoni who was declared a national hero, shot the late Gweru mayor, Patrick Kombayi during elections in 1990 when he was just a CIO officer, and that he was responsible for orchestrating the death of several other MDC-T activists (Bell 2013;Mafa 2013).

The above validates the fact that disclosing the identities of secret agents was a nonviolent method of intervention employed in the struggle for justice in Zimbabwe.

## **6.5 Regular institutionalised techniques of political action**

These are made up respectively of referendums, elections, negotiation and litigation.

### **6.5.1 Referendums**

Two constitutional referendums have been conducted in post-independence Zimbabwe, the first one was in 2000 and the second in 2013. Besides the mass stay-away of the late 1990s, display of people power was once again demonstrated in the 2000 constitutional referendum where a 'No' vote campaign by the NCA with the assistance of the MDC and the ZCTU won against the 'Yes' vote campaign by the government Constitutional Commission (Ndulo n. d: 187). In this case, the people expressed their position through the referendum without directly confronting the Mugabe regime

In line with its founding aim to create a new people-driven constitution when it argued that the existing constitution was preventing political, social and economic development for the good of all Zimbabweans, the NCA in 1997 called for a new constitution which they viewed as a condition for 'good governance, justice and transparency'. A new people-driven constitution

would make clear and meaningful the important matters which include presidential terms, land reform and human rights, and envisioned the replacement of the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution which had been subject to numerous amendments benefitting ZANU PF (Makumbe 2011: 21-22).

The government hijacked the NCA plan, manipulating and exploiting it after realising its populist potentialities. To fulfil its aims, the government immediately formed a Constitutional Commission which massively publicised the significance of a new constitution with the assistance of the government controlled media (Ndulo n. d.: 185-187). A draft constitution document which did not capture much of the people's views was compiled during the outreach consultations. Among other negatives in the draft constitution produced by the Constitutional Commission, was its call for the expansion of Mugabe's executive powers and an endorsement of ZANU PF plans to seize commercial farms owned by whites without compensation for the actual land involved. Unsurprisingly, the NCA and the MDC turned down the draft constitution and immediately campaigned for a 'No' vote whilst the government-funded Constitutional Commission campaigned for a 'Yes' vote. In the referendum vote held in February 2000 the 'No' vote got 54.7 percent and the 'Yes' vote obtained 45.3 percent (Taundi 2010: 2). ZANU PF was defeated in a national referendum that was characterised by peace. The 2000 referendum was about constitutional matters only, but was viewed as voting for or against Mugabe's leadership (Matyszak 2010: xv-xvi). In effect, it was the first electoral defeat that ZANU PF and Mugabe had suffered in a national election (Bond and Saunders 2005).

The failure of the 2000 referendum to pass a new constitution into law meant that the need for a new constitution remained unresolved in Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) echoes the same sentiments that a new constitution was needed to replace the Lancaster House constitution which had been amended more than eighteen times in favour of ZANU PF, resulting in a constitution that plunged the country into a governance crisis, particularly since 2000. The NCA participated once more in the 2013 constitutional referendum, but this time its 'No' vote campaign did not succeed since the forces campaigning for a 'Yes' vote were many, including its former MDC allies and ZANU PF itself. The NCA argued that the inclusive government multiparty constitution parliamentary committee (COPAC) initiative to draw up a new constitution would produce a 'politician-driven' and not a 'people-driven' constitution in any sense of these words

(NCA 2010). The constitution was indeed approved through a referendum, but it was only a partially ‘people-driven’ document as people’s views were subjected to negotiation and compromise by the three political parties to the inclusive government (Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2013: 15). The 16 March 2013 referendum had the largest voter turnout since independence with about 3, 259, 454 total vote casts, the ‘Yes’ vote having a majority of 3, 079, 966 votes against a paltry 179, 489 ‘No’ vote (Solidarity Peace Trust 2013: 9). However, the constitution strictly speaking was not ‘people-driven’ and the NCA can be credited for its sustained campaign to have a new constitution, which immensely contributed to the political commitment of the GPA parties in 2008 to adopt a timetable for constitutional reform. This was clearly articulated in Article 6 of the GPA where acknowledgement of the need for a new people driven and democratic constitution was evident in language reminiscent of the NCA’s campaign message. Apart from the NCA, there were also other civil society organisations and political voices that publicised constitutional issues and kept them on the national agenda (Lumina 2009: 51-55).

### **6.5.2 Elections**

Since the formation of the MDC in September 1999 as an opposition political party, the election environment became much tenser for ZANU PF as the former proved to be a serious contender. This was confirmed by the outcome of parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005, presidential election in 2002, and the harmonised election in March 2008. It was only the July 31, 2013 election which was an exception and reversal to the pre-2000 era. At its inception the MDC was founded on socialist democratic principles and its members were drawn from varied backgrounds such as the: ZCTU, NCA, business, professionals, academics, students, whites and the unemployed youths (Taundi 2010: 3). Democratic principles and nonviolence aimed at ending Mugabe’s rule were the founding ideals of the MDC (Beeston and Raath 2006: 27).

During the parliamentary elections held in March 2000 just after the referendum, the then newly formed MDC secured 57 seats and ZANU PF defeated it with 62 seats out of the 120 contested seats (Makumbe 2009: 9; International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 32 2001: 3). What brought about such a result was the fact that the elections were held amid violence, harassment and intimidation of MDC candidates and their supporters by ZANU PF militias and security forces, including the use of food aid by government in some provinces as a political tool, the

skewed electoral laws, and stifling of independent voter education (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012: 8-10). The turnout of voters was huge in urban areas, especially in Harare and the Matabeleland provinces where the MDC got much of its vote, whilst ZANU PF enjoyed support from its strongholds in the provinces of Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo and Midlands (Matlosa 2002: 140).

When presidential elections were held in March 2002, Morgan Tsvangirai garnered about 42 percent whilst the incumbent President Mugabe got 56 percent, and the remaining percentage was shared among three other candidates (Matlosa 2002: 141; Taundi 2010: 4). The 2002 elections were characterised by unprecedented levels of violence perpetrated by ZANU PF loyalists and supporters made up of war veterans, security agents and militias who harassed opposition supporters. Allegations of vote rigging were very loud, and Tsvangirai claimed that the election was 'stolen' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012: 10). In short, Tsvangirai complained of vote rigging during all of the 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013 elections.

The African leaders did not heed Tsvangirai's protests and Mugabe was endorsed as the victor and confirmed president of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, Western countries, the Commonwealth and the United States of America refused to recognise Mugabe's victory and in response imposed targeted sanctions on the president and his officials accused of perpetrating anti-democratic activities (Matyszak 2010: xvi).

In 2004 the MDC announced that it would not participate in any future elections unless there were significant reforms. It however, failed to stick to this demand, since it took part in the March 2005 parliamentary elections when ZANU PF won with majority 78 seats and MDC got 41 seats (Bryan 2005: 4). The MDC lost because they were not prepared for the election due to their delayed decision to participate, causing them to have little time to campaign (Ploch 2008a: 6). However, the poor showing of the MDC was perhaps also due to the fact that the 2002 and 2005 elections were held after the government had enacted several successive pieces of draconian legislation, most notorious among them POSA and AIPPA, all with the intention of undermining civil liberties and outlawing effective public participation in democratic processes. In this regard, Soko and Balchin (2009: 37) believe that these laws largely account for the poor showing of the opposition and low voter turnout in the 2005 elections, as many people had lost faith in the democratic process. It appears what ensnared the MDC to participate were cosmetic



reforms to the electoral law made by ZANU PF which hoodwinked the international community and thus legitimised the election outcome (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012: 10). Noteworthy is the fact that unlike previous elections in 2000 and 2002, the 2005 elections were held in a relatively peaceful environment, but like them they were neither fair nor legitimate (Bracking 2005; Bryan 2005: 2-5). The MDC split in 2005 over disagreement about whether to participate or not in the September 2005 Senatorial elections. Subsequently, out of the 26 MDC members who took part only seven won leaving ZANU PF with the majority of the senatorial seats. Observers conclude that it was lack of unity in the MDC ranks that accounted for the low voter turnout during this election (Ploch 2008a: 12).

The 29 March 2008 harmonised elections marked a major turning point in the electoral history of Zimbabwe. These elections were observed as being closest to being free and fair since the beginning of the Zimbabwean crisis, but were far from being fair due to the manipulation of the voters' roll, direct control of the media, and using state resources, especially food handouts for political ends by ZANU PF (Matyszak 2010: 12; Masunungure 2009). For the first time ZANU PF was beaten in an election with the MDC-T winning with two more seats than ZANU PF, making it the most disputed of all the elections in the country. The presidential election outcome was withheld by the government-appointed electoral board, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which delayed the results for five weeks. When they were published Tsvangirai had 47.9 percent, Mugabe got 43.2 percent, Simba Makoni got 8.3 percent and Langton Towungana had 0.6 percent (Matyszak 2010: 13). The delay prompted many to believe that Mugabe had apparently lost the election and the MDC-T even claimed that Tsvangirai had won by 50.2 percent. However, given that the official results did not declare anyone the winner with 50 percent plus one vote, a run-off was required between the two leading candidates (Taundi 2010: 4). As indicated earlier Tsvangirai boycotted the election amid government sponsored violence.

The MDC also lost the March elections because the 'securocrats' 'increased their leverage over the various organs of the state, the economy and party [ZANU(PF)] structures, as well as in the legislature where they contested elections as retired members of the security service' (Raftopoulos 2013: 16). The increasing number of appointments of serving and retired military personnel to strategic state organizations was a signal of militarisation and demonstrates the extent of the Joint Operations Command (JOC)'s power (Rupiya n. d.). The degree of the JOC's

influence was apparent when it deterred Mugabe from accepting the 29 March 2008 presidential election results (Bratton and Masunungure 2008). Tsvangirai alleged that Mugabe's first reaction to his electoral victory in March 2008 was to commence dialogue between the MDC and ZANU PF about accepting defeat and the composition of a new government (Tsvangirai 2011). Tsvangirai however claims that Mugabe stopped negotiations as a result of the influence of the JOC which delayed the publication of the election results whilst poll results were being manipulated in a drive to justify a run-off election in June 2008 that would provide Mugabe an opportunity to retain the presidency (Tsvangirai 2011). To ensure a Mugabe victory, the JOC then devised a nationwide operation of violence and intimidation to secure victory for Mugabe in the June run-off (Human Rights Watch 2008a; Masunungure 2009). MDC's party structures were hit by arrests, torture, targeted assassinations and disappearances, and its electoral support base broken by all-night indoctrination vigils, intimidation, public beatings and displacement between March and June 2008 (Human Rights Watch 2008a).

The manipulation of the 29 March harmonised election results for five weeks exposed Tsvangirai and his MDC's lack of a contingency planning as to what step the opposition would take, when victory is denied. Nonviolent responses such as deploying people in the capital to pressurise Mugabe to concede defeat could have been used. The negotiations which Tsvangirai welcomed proved futile. Following the post-27 June election outcome, the GNU did not act, but instead invigorated ZANU PF by according it time to revive and regroup. According to Dumezweni and Shange (2013), Tsvangira's boycotting of the military junta's imposed run-off election was correct, but he failed to find an alternative such as mass protests to keep up the momentum and avoid the impasse the MDC factions had created. In reality, the MDC assumed responsibility with little power to influence events thereby helping to salvage ZANU PF's embarrassment, by sharing the blame of continuing anguish among the ordinary people concerning rampant corruption in government bound together with their former opponents. Indeed, the regrouping and consolidation of ZANU PF position for a better image both domestically and internationally was made possible by the GPA (Mhandara and Pooe 2013: 13).

It appears that the MDC subscribed to a culture of nonviolence. This was enunciated in article 4.3 of its constitution that the 'MDC is against all forms of violence and does not believe in the use of violence as a way or means of attaining any political, social, economic or religious

objective' (MDC 2000: 6). It is important to note that in practice the MDC failed to adhere to a culture of nonviolence. Party activists got entangled in violent reactions against the supporters of ZANU PF (Interview with Ruzivo, Secretary General of the University of Zimbabwe Teachers Association, 7 June 2014; Moyo, 9 June 2014) although such cases were limited. In addition, the MDC also experienced intra-party violence (Sachikonye 2012: 61) and this contributed to its split in 2005.

With possible victory in sight the leaders of the two MDC formations, Tsvangirai and Mutambara failed to agree on a single MDC candidate for the March 2008 presidential election. Tsvangirai contested for President and Mutambara supported the independent candidate Simba Makoni. The GNU did not reflect the parliamentary dominance of the two MDC factions. Instead ZANU PF which had lost in the March 2008 elections flexed its muscles because it controlled the powerful ministries of Defence, State Security and Justice. Mugabe reserved the Executive position as the president and Tsvangirai was appointed a non- Executive Prime Minister in style similar to the one that was used in Kenya (Muguti, Tavuyanago and Hlongwana 2012: 152).

The GPA aimed at enforcing civilian oversight over the security sector via the National Security Council (NSC) made up of the representatives of all the contending parties, but the power of the military and intelligence was not to be pushed aside (Mavhinga 2011: 8). In fact, ZANU PF continued to use the JOC behind the scenes to the detriment of the NSC and maintained its control over the public media, which continued attacking the opposition (Sachikonye 2012: 40). The MDC formations were given service and economic ministries with restricted functions and authority. There were no strategic transformations in the leadership of state institutions as President Mugabe reappointed the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Johannes Tomana the Attorney General without the approval of the MDC-T leadership, and even refused to swear in Roy Bennet as the Deputy Minister of Agriculture. This demonstrated the increased despotism of Mugabe and ZANU PF. One scholar concludes that, 'the GNU in Zimbabwe has been characterized by political bickering, fighting for political power, acrimony, threats and counter-threats' (Mapuva 2010: 260).

The MDC nearly won the parliamentary election in 2000, clinching 57 seats in spite of extensive violence by ZANU PF that led to the loss of 31 lives. The MDC almost deposed the Mugabe regime only 16 months after its formation and thus demonstrated the seriousness of the

opposition and the degree to which the electorate was losing hope in the revolutionary party. However, state orchestrated violence and internal problems led to a decline in the number of seats that were won by the MDC. In the partly rigged 2005 parliamentary elections the MDC lost 16 seats to ZANU PF which thereby obtained the required two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution unilaterally (Zeilig 2008: 216). Commenting on state repressive tactics, Kriger noted that prior to the period that ZANU PF triumphed in the elections: ‘The ruling party had already laid the groundwork to control the outcome and honed its skills in terrorizing voters in by-elections’ (Kriger 2005: 32).

When the MDC, a party that in great part rose as a result of the vigour of the student movement neglected its social base, ZANU PF changed its social direction. This tactical decision invigorated the ruling party more than it had been during the liberation struggle in 1964-1979. ZANU PF politicised the rural poor using the contentious Fast Track Land Reform, mobilizing the impoverished War Veterans and engaging the youth by means of the National Youth Service. The teaching of National Strategic Studies to students who enrolled for higher education also became compulsory (Pankhurst 2002:119–22). The MDC largely failed because:

The regime was given the space to pursue this strategy because of the failure of the opposition. On each of these issues the MDC managed, with extra ordinary consistency, to leave the party disarmed and unable to articulate the frustrations and passions that the ruling party sought to galvanize. This process was not inevitable. Some activists attempted to reverse the collapse of the opposition into a neo-liberal rut, to prevent the party from becoming what Sikhala describes as ‘almost a party of the rich...’ (Zeilig 2008: 232).

Furthermore, the MDC had weak organisational structures, had a poor strategy of how to deal with rural areas, and failed to handle the issue of ethnicity in structures and intra-party violence (Sachikonye 2012). Added to this, the MDC-T lost popular support due to corruption in MDC-T-administered urban councils, self enrichment by those in leadership positions, absence of clear party policies, failure to influence change in government during the GNU, and spending inadequate time on party issues (International Crisis Group 2013).

In summary, the MDC failed in its use of nonviolent strategies to accomplish its objectives, which were outlined as:

- To be an all inclusive, dynamic political party with a truly national base and which shall seek to win political power and form a government of the people through free, fair and direct elections.
- To seek the mandate of the people to govern the country and work for a dynamic economy built on principles of mixed economy with a strong social conscience.
- To build an open democracy in which national government is accountable to the people through the devolution of power and decision-making to the provinces, local institutions and structures.
- To seek equal representation of women as far as possible in public office and within the party.
- To pursue the principle of active civic participation in public affairs and in the pursuit of this principle working with unions, business and employers' organisations, human rights organisations and other civic groups in the formulation of national policies (MDC 1999).

The MDC was formed from a workers' organisation, the ZCTU but lost this constituency as most industries closed down, and when it got into the GNU it forgot its mandate and focused on wealth acquisition instead, thus for getting what it was fighting for (Interview, Maposa 14 June 2014). Echoing the same point of view, Zano comments:

Initially the MDC-T claimed to be a cluster of radical forces which included Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), and a broad-based coalition of churches, Women's groups like Women Of Zimbabwe Arise (Woza), Students' Union groups like Zinasu, and civil society organisations. Upon inception of the inclusive government which started on February 11 2009, when the MDC-T leader Tsvangirai was sworn-in as Prime Minister, the party lost touch with realities that kept them in tandem with labour concerns as its critical partners in the movement. Throughout the full life cycle of the MDC-T government officials failed to use their influence to ensure that labour demands were met. Civil servants did not get better salaries and they continued to languish in poverty with salaries that fell far below the poverty datum line. Their conditions of service remained pathetic as well. What made the situation fatal for the MDC-T is that they headed the Finance and Labour ministries. Another blow to MDC-T was the continued existence of the illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe that curtailed economic development. Tsvangirai's promise to turn around the economy in 90 days if he got into government did not come to pass (Zano 2014).

The MDC also failed because of a limited agreement on nonviolence, which was apparent when the MDC split in 2005 until there are now four MDC formations. A nonviolent approach demands a lot of planning, patience and discipline, which the MDC lacked because some of its members actually believed in the power of violence (Interview, Masunungure 22 June 2014). Furthermore, the MDC failed because it rushed to get into the GNU before its turn for being in

government was ripe. This was clear before the time of the GNU when ZANU PF was challenged by the socio-economic collapse of the country (Interview with Paradzai, teacher in Guruve District, 13 June 2014).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the MDC was unable to gain power through free and fair elections because of the tactics that were used by the state actor. Since the MDC was prevented from forming a government it was not able to accomplish its other democratic objectives. The MDC exerted pressure on the government until it joined the GNU. The GNU brought some semblance of socio-economic and political stability which however, is rapidly being diminished (Interview with Shadaya, labour officer in Harare, 13 June 2014). It should nonetheless be commended for its nonviolent contributions to the Zimbabwean conflict, despite the GPA which represents a missed opportunity for resolving the socio-economic and political challenges faced by Zimbabweans (Interview with Muzondo, a resident of Harare, 7 June 2014).

The forced July 31, 2013 harmonised elections which the MDC-T could have boycotted reversed the trend set by the previous elections since 2000. ZANU PF won a majority in parliament with 160 seats, the MDC-T got only 49 seats and MDC-N failed to get even a single seat. President Mugabe won by 61.09 percent defeating his Tsvangirai who had 33.94 percent, and Welshman Ncube got a paltry 2.68 percent of the vote (Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2013: 66-69). Although the elections were peaceful, they were also fraught with irregularities (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute 2013; Mhandara and Pooe 2013: 26-27). After the election, talk on the streets was to the effect that the election was 'stolen from the people,' not 'stolen from Tsvangirai' as in 2008, since grave flaws were apparent long before the election (Dumezweni and Shange 2013).

The irregularities were mainly due to a rushed election that was called by President Mugabe without the implementation of the GPA principles, especially those which had a bearing on elections which included security, electoral and media reforms (Mathye 2013: 3). Added to this, there were no major reforms in the electoral provisions, thus the Electoral Act was violated when a 30 day voter registration window was not provided, and ZEC failed to release the voters' roll in time, doing so only on the eve of the poll day. Consequently, on the polling day about a million dead voters were still on the roll and a million living voters had their names mysteriously removed and thus were turned away on the voting day (Zimbabwe Election Support Network

2013: 60-63; Dumezweni and Shange 2013). The MDC factions, especially MDC-T complained tabling a lot of evidence concerning numerous irregularities that had prevailed before and during the polls, declaring it a 'stolen' election and a 'monumental farce' (Smith 2013).

Magaisa (2009) commenting on the elections between 2000 and 2008 says:

...those elections have delivered absolutely nothing of substance, confirming the view that elections are not necessarily indicative of democracy. Instead, elections have been synonymous with allegations of rigging, unfairness, fear, extreme violence and everything that is negative about politics. Going by what transpired in the last decade, it will be difficult to convince those who do not believe that elections can be an agent of change for as long as one of the contestants also plays the role of referee and enforcer of the rules (Magaisa 2009).

Although the elections in 2013 were held under a new constitution, the dominance of ZANU PF over the ZEC had not been dismantled, leading again to contested election results. ZEC continued to discharge its duties in a partisan way and the opposition was as a result not granted access to the voters' roll. Election materials used before, during and after the polls as evidence to challenge the election results in courts of law, will be presented below.

### **6.5.3 Negotiation**

After the illegitimacy of President Mugabe's 'one man poll win' in 2008, there was widespread international isolation of his regime even by his African sympathisers, that went hand in hand with the economic meltdown associated with recorded inflation in July 2008 around 231 million percent per annum (Matyszak 2010: xvi). The biting effects of the 'targeted sanctions' forced Mugabe to negotiate a power sharing agreement with the MDC. A GNU (which became functional on February 11, 2009) was the product of the negotiations that were facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, then President of South Africa, under the auspices of SADC. Mbeki left the implementation of the GPA (that was signed on 15 September 2008 between ZANU PF and the two MDC formations) to his successor, President Jacob Zuma. Tsvangirai was sworn in as the prime minister while Mutambara was his deputy and Mugabe retained the presidency with full and direct control over all the state's security services during the GNU (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 32-34). The dominance of ZANU PF in the GNU was evident in that it had the majority of government ministers despite ministers being drawn from all the three political parties to the GPA (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 34).

Tsvangirai justified his decision to join the GNU despite vehement opposition from his former civic allies who doubted the efficacy of the GNU in being able to bring about real democratic change, by arguing that:

This is a strategic decision of positioning a party in order to unlock the tentacles that have spread around the whole country... To democratize, cut those roots and create (favourable) conditions for free and fair elections... Without the firing of a bullet, we did it. Without losing the lives of Zimbabweans deliberately, without violence, without other known African conflicts, but we did it (Maingire 2009).

It had however, come about because the possibility for the MDC-T to oust Mugabe through the electoral route was closed (Miti 2012: 36). The socio-economic and political situation was worsening and the ordinary people were suffering amid increasing uncertainty over the effectiveness of Western pressure on Mugabe and ZANU PF to give up power (Mhandara and Pooe 2013: 12). For Tsvangirai, working with Mugabe was the only choice, although the latter dominated from the beginning to the end of the GNU. According to Zeilig (2010), the GNU meant conceding defeat in the eyes of other social activists such as the NCA and ZINASU. Joining the GNU marked the MDC-T's estrangement from the NCA and partly the ZCTU. The GNU ended in 2013 with Mugabe winning the election amid a 'stolen' election cry by the MDC-T.

One can conclude that negotiation brought a truce to the Zimbabwean crisis giving the Mugabe regime breathing space. The GNU was the outcome of a negotiation and mediation process which positively assisted to bring about some normalisation of the socio-economic and political situation in the country. Moreover, physical violence was reduced and economic stability restored as a result of the introduction of a multi-currency system.

#### **6.5.4 Litigation**

The MDC challenged the 2000 parliamentary election results in 38 constituencies, alleging gross human rights violations among other irregularities. None of these cases saw finality before the 2005 parliamentary elections came about. The main reason for failure in having the cases finalised was the staffing of the judiciary with biased pro-ZANU PF judges. Those who executed their duties impartially were pressurised to leave, and this forced the chief justice to resign together with some other judges from both the High Court and Supreme Court benches so that they were replaced by partisan ones (Reeler 2009: 6).



The MDC also sought a solution through the courts after the 2002 presidential election that was also marred by violence and intimidation. The MDC 2002 election petition like the other parliamentary election petitions was also not heard and remained unresolved until the 2008 harmonised elections were held (Reeler 2009: 7).

The MDC challenged a further 16 parliamentary election results in 2005 claiming that the results had been rigged. The crux of the matter concerned results from rural districts where ZEC had reported total voter turn outs before the results were announced, and in each case ZANU PF candidates were pronounced winners and MDC losers. What raised suspicion was that the winning candidates could have been awarded pseudo votes to prevent MDC victory during the tabulation process (Ploch 2008a: 7). To avoid further problems, ZEC stopped announcing total voter turnout and went on to argue that the discrepancies in the identified results were due to communication problems from the rural areas. None of the results were overturned, but the opposition got further legal recourse in 2006 when the Supreme Court ruled:

‘Against the arguments of the chief justice, the attorney-general, and the justice minister, the court ruled that the judicial appointment of commissioners to the electoral court was unconstitutional and violated the principle of separation of powers’ (Ploch 2008a: 8).

The MDC also filed a court application in 2008 demanding that the ZEC release the election results after the latter violated procedures by refusing to publish results at polling station, ward, constituency and national level as soon as these reach the respective centres. The ZEC released House of Assembly results very slowly at a rate of about forty a day giving the excuse that the results were still trickling in from distant districts. Surprising enough was that rural constituencies were announced early before those in and around Harare. The delay was meant to avoid the early announcement of the presidential election results and in reaction to this the MDC filed an urgent court application demanding the results to be released, but it was not successful (Matyszak 2010: 22-23). The MDC factions did not throughout resort to any other nonviolent methods than these apparently futile court actions.

Following the 2013 harmonised elections, the MDC-T also contested the election results by again filing over 100 election petitions with the Electoral Court. Most of these were withdrawn due to failure by the candidates to raise the US\$10, 000 deposit required from each candidate. Morgan Tsvangirai, also had to withdraw his petition seeking to nullify the presidential results

due to inability to access the electoral material that was needed for substantiating his allegations (Zimbabwe Election Resource Network 2013: 73).

In summary, election petitions have since 2000 have merely managed to make the public aware of election irregularities, but not overturn the results. Solidarity Peace Trust citing Martin Luther King's statement that 'Peace is not the absence of violence, it is the presence of justice', concluded that:

...in every election since 2000, the MDCs have appealed aspects of the electoral outcome through the courts. However, these petitions and their appeals have been dragged out through the entire five-year term of parliament and have been left unresolved by the next election, or have been dismissed (Solidarity Peace Trust 2013: 29-30).

Litigation can only work if the judiciary maintains its independence. In this regard, it is apparent that whilst operating through conventional political channels costs less than using irregular political strategies including violence and nonviolence, the absence or blocking of institutional channels in some countries results in many groups concluding that they cannot achieve their objectives through conventional means (Cunningham 2013). They therefore turn to other uninstitutionalised means, whether violent or nonviolent. The judicial system in Zimbabwe failed to deliver on its constitutional mandate to handle cases in a non-partisan manner. The government interfered with the judiciary thereby blocking the opposition's only line of hope. The courts became incompetent in the execution of their responsibilities because all the judges were appointed by President Mugabe and by extension generally ruled in favour of his party, ZANU PF.

The limited achievements of the non-state actors were by and large caused by the violent tactics used by the state actor. Hence Raftopoulos concludes:

As the country slips deeper into economic crisis and international isolation, the opposition forces have to develop new non-violent ways to confront the regime. Thus far, ..., the civic and opposition forces have tried a range of strategies to oppose Zimbabwe's ruling party. These have included strikes, stay-aways, demonstrations, public meetings, regional and international lobbying, the use of both national and international legal instruments, censure from various international bodies, limited international sanctions, and pressure from the Zimbabwean Diaspora. These measures have, in different ways, caused problems for the regime, but neither singularly nor collectively have they been able to bring about political reform (Raftopoulos 2006: 3-4).

## **6.6 Summary**

This chapter discussed the nonviolent methods that the non-state actors used in their struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013. It focused on the methods used by the NCA, ZCTU, WOZA, ZINASU and the MDC by using three types of strategies namely nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

Demonstrations, protest music, songs and theatre, election boycotts, and strikes are among the nonviolent methods used by the ZCTU, WOZA, ZINASU, NCA and the MDC in their struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. In addition, institutionalised techniques of political action such as referendums, elections, negotiation and litigation were also employed. Although these methods all failed to end the ZANU PF regime's autocracy, most of them in one way or another have contributed to reducing the regime's excesses. Nonviolent methods had a considerable impact on the ZANU PF regime which was compelled by non-state actors to hold a more democratic election in March 2008, sign the GPA together with opposition political parties in September 2008 which became the foundation for the establishment of the GNU in February 2009. Although the main opposition MDC-T was prevented from getting into power by the ZANU PF regime, a culture of establishing opposition political parties was reactivated by the MDC after ZUM had been crushed. Nonviolent campaigns should therefore be viewed as an essential part of conflict resolution for achieving peace, justice and ultimately socio-economic and political growth. This despite the fact that the MDC was not able to form a democratic government, the NCA did not achieve a people driven constitution, and ZINASU was politicised and came to be viewed as an extension of the MDC.

The above discussion shows that the non-state actors failed to attract inspiring support from citizens that could assist to detach the regime from its central sources of power. This is because where the nonviolent campaigns have been put to serious use they have given birth to notable results in different contexts including Iran, the Palestinian Territories, the Philippines, and Burma. Factors that help nonviolent campaigns to succeed embody higher levels of participation which results in improved resilience, a better possibility of tactical innovation, augmented opportunity for civic interruption and change in allegiance among opponents' previous supporters plus members of the military organization. However, it is important to note that the success or failure of a campaign is determined by the methods used and that deciding whether a

campaign is successful is difficult because at times some of the objectives of the challenger are achieved or the objectives may change along the way. Nonviolent activists must take into consideration the main argument that movements can be viewed as nonviolent judged by the occurrence of nonviolent methods and the apparent participation by members of the movement in ways that are nonviolent in character (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; 2011).

## **PART IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

*'Dictators are not in the business of allowing elections that could remove them from their thrones' — Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy.*

### **7.0 CHAPTER 7: GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The Gandhian campaigns in South Africa and India inspired black American activists in the US civil rights movement and pro-democracy protests in Chile. The peaceful revolution in Serbia in 1999 influenced activists in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Lebanon a few years later leading to successful socio-political changes (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 291). Nonetheless, nonviolent campaigns are not at all times victorious because some of the organisations and individuals may be viciously crushed by the regime or occupiers and fail to bring about key socio-economic and political changes like what happened in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, the Tiananmen Square protests in China, and campaigns in Tibet and Burma. Other campaigns were only partly successful such as the Palestinian first intifada or the US civil rights movement which ended official segregation in the South, but failed to change the economic and social discrimination suffered by African Americans (Carter et al. 2006: 3). The campaigns carried out in Zimbabwe were only partly successful in the short term since the regime was not forced to stop its brutal tactics against the non-state actors.

This chapter discusses some of the violent strategies and tactics used by the state actor as it responded to the non-state actors' nonviolent campaigns between the year 2000 and 2013. This addresses issues outlined in the second part of the third objective. The chapter does not attempt to deal with all the brutal strategies and tactics employed by the state because space and time will not permit, but seeks to provide some insight into the nature and effects of the state's responses. The nonviolent strategies and tactics used by non-state actors produced commendable results, judging by the violent state responses in a drive to remain in charge of the status quo. In fact, the state used all the means at its disposal in an attempt to silence dissent. However, the violence that was employed by the government and its militias did very little to stop the people from criticising it for explicit incompetence in service delivery and the handling of political issues. In response the government simply resorted to either physical or psychological violence. Thus the Mugabe regime resorted to violent invasions of white owned commercial farms, the introduction

of restrictive legislation to stem the tide of opposition political parties, manipulated church and traditional leaders, militarised and politicised public institutions, abducted political opponents and charged opposition leaders with treason, engineered pre and post-election violence, rigged elections, gagged the media, used food as a political weapon, awarded key allies hefty packages, unleashed state security agents on dissenting voices, and killed opposition activists and supporters as the gap between the party and government narrowed. It was through these violent strategies and tactics that ZANU PF managed to remain with an iron grip in power. This was of course to the detriment of non-state actors' initiatives to try and bring to an end such brutality.

## **7.2 Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)**

Before 2000 efforts at redistributing land were carried out on a more limited scale. The ZANU PF government only turned to full-scale land redistribution, better known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 following its defeat in the February 2000 referendum fearing a more humiliating defeat in the June 2000 parliamentary and the March 2002 presidential elections respectively. As a result, the land issue was a crafty tactic meant to salvage popular support during the run up to the 2000 parliamentary elections (Makumbe 2011: 2-4).

Land redistribution became a handy strategy because there was a genuine need to correct the long standing issue of colonial land imbalances where minority whites had huge tracts of land at the expense of the black landless majority. Land also became a political tool given the fact that white farm owners had openly shown support and bankrolled the MDC, infuriating Mugabe in the process. President Mugabe and his ZANU PF party in turn mobilised war veterans, unemployed youths and rural people to orchestrate white-owned farm invasions across the country in order to prevent an imminent defeat in the 2000 parliamentary elections (Makumbe 2011: 7-8). In other words:

angered by the negative results of the referendum on a new constitution in that month, ZANU PF devised a malicious but brilliant strategy designed to recover domestic support, provide new sources of patronage, fulfil the promises of the liberation struggle and attract international support from traditional allies of the 1970s (Ndlovu 2004: 216).

Mugabe and ZANU PF invoked the memories of the war of liberation, dubbing the land invasions the Third *Chimurenga* (Third Revolution) which were meant to finally correct the colonial injustices and liberate Zimbabwe, continuing from where the first and second revolutions had left off (Makumbe 2011: 5). They therefore claimed that violence was justified

on the grounds of pursuing the unaccomplished mission of the war of liberation, but in reality it was directed against the non-state actors who wanted to establish a government that was meant to improve the socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe.

The FTLRP at face value seemed to have been aimed at correcting and redressing past colonial injustices and equitably redistribute land where among its objectives the government of Zimbabwe intended to:

- acquire not less than 8.3 million hectares from the large-scale commercial farming sector;
- reduce the population pressure in communal areas;
- reduce the extent and intensity of rural poverty among rural families and farm workers by providing them with adequate land for agricultural use;
- increase the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP and to export earnings;
- promote environmentally sustainable use of land through agriculture and eco-tourism;
- develop and integrate small-scale farmers into the mainstream of commercial agriculture;
- create conditions for sustainable economic, political and social stability (Makumbe 2011: 8-9).

The Zimbabwean government in fact failed to fulfil any of the above objectives except the first one. This is so because among other things the land was mostly allocated to people from urban areas thereby preventing the decongestion of the rural areas (Moyo 2013: 26; Bangwayo-Skeete, Bezabih, and Zikhali 2010; Matondi and Dekker 2011: 18) and rural poverty has also increased since the FTLRP (Kinsley 2010: 2). The agricultural sector contribution to GDP and foreign currency earnings fell dramatically after 2000 and the country started importing food in addition to receiving food aid from that time (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010a: 1). Consequently, some of the countries from whom Zimbabwe is now importing food welcomed the evicted white commercial farmers and allocated them huge tracts of land to set up commercial farms with government assistance. These include Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Nigeria (Moyo 2012). Although the government denies allocating land on partisan basis investigations show that most beneficiaries of the FTLRP were ZANU PF members. In addition, among the war veterans who got land few had a farming background (Scoones et al 2011: 3; Chisango and Obi 2010: 19-20). This inevitably resulted in the collapse of the agriculture sector leading to chronic food shortages thereafter.

Furthermore, disturbances to the commercial agriculture sector brought with it devastating consequences that worsened the already bad economic situation. Apart from the decline in

foreign currency earnings and food shortages, the government's efforts to arrest the situation it had created brought further chaos. It tried to manipulate interest rates, prices and foreign exchange rates which resulted in artificial shortages of goods whose prices were controlled, a thriving black market, illicit exporting of basic goods to countries in the region, while factories and other businesses that were closely linked with agricultural production closed shop (Ndlovu 2004: 216-217). The state actor evidently imposed price control and other tough measures without considering the costs involved. This clearly illustrates that the violent land invasions saved ZANU PF from political extinction, but on the other hand led to an economic meltdown of the country's agro-based economy.

### **7.3 Arrests and imprisonments**

One of the most formidable tactics that was used by the ZANU PF government to stop protests or unrest was the imprisonment of its perceived and real critics. The main objective of this tactic was to deter people from making harsh statements against a party which was responsible for the socio-economic down-turn and political violence that bedevilled the country since the year 2000. The arrests targeted people from all walks of life, ranging from civic organisation personnel, opposition activists and their sympathisers. After the Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances (*Gukurahundi*) that took place between 1982 and 1987, the violent responses against the leaders and supporters of ZUM, and the rise of the MDC party in 1999, ZANU PF resorted to arrests and imprisonment as one of its major survival tactics. ZANU PF instituted a regime of violence designed to crush anyone perceived to be against the ruling party. In response, former Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo,<sup>2</sup> accused ZANU PF of practising internal dictatorship, institutionalised patronage and refusal to reform (Moyo 2009). The strategy of imprisonment was implemented in a drive to destroy the MDC and restore ZANU PF's popularity.

Instead, Mugabe's support since 2000 gravely plummeted. In the National Assembly Elections ZANU PF's margin of victory steadily declined since 1980 up to 2000 (Matlosa 2002: 140). Mugabe first tasted defeat during the 2000 referendum, a critical constitutional test that would have seen Mugabe becoming President for life (Hot Topics 2004: 1). It was this defeat that forced the state to deploy brutality in order to suppress the opposition and silence all non

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<sup>2</sup> By the time Jonathan Moyo wrote this article he had been expelled in the party (ZANU PF) for convening a meeting at Dinyane High School in Tsholotsho allegedly aiming at appointing a new president and vice president for the party.



conforming voices. As a result, the 2000 Parliamentary, and 2002 and 2008 Presidential elections, were tainted with widespread allegations of electoral fraud and intimidation (Hot Topics 2004: 1; Johnson 2008.). In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the MDC had only five seats fewer than ZANU PF and this unsettled Mugabe who was preparing for presidential elections scheduled for 2002. An orgy of violence orchestrated by the state followed leading to loss of lives and widespread internal and external displacements.

WOZA embraced demonstrations as a method and also engaged into a lot of skirmishes with the riot squad of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) which was always the first to arrive in the vicinity (Women of Zimbabwe Arise 2007: 6). According to Nolwandle a member of WOZA, the organisation played a vital role by engaging in a protest walk meant to stop the passing of the NGO Bill crafted to halt the operations of all international human rights organisations in the country. During the march, police clad in full riot gear arrested all members and threw them in a single cell (Amnesty International UK 2013). The NGO Bill was never passed. Since then WOZA members were harassed, intimidated and beaten. In line with this, WOZA national coordinator and founder, Jenni Williams, said the police approached their activities with a political agenda and WOZA advocates were imprisoned for such activities as watching a video of events which took place in other parts of the world (Amnesty International Canada 2011).

As one of their principles, WOZA set down to avoid any form of violence. In this regard, the ZRP played a dominant role in perpetrating violence, an authentic paradox of custodians of the law being the violators of peace. The police arrested and imprisoned people including WOZA activists who suffered a lot of deprivation. This was deliberate since the aim was to punish the persons considered to be hostile to government. The state security agents tortured, assaulted and inflicted psychological harassment during the arrest and custody of civilians, while many of them incurred severe injuries (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2004: 6). Nonviolent social movements in countries with populations that have long suffered from oppressive domestic governments and destructive foreign interventions have generally gained sympathy on a larger scale (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 205). This was also the case with WOZA who were in the eyes of many stakeholders, innocent victims (Interview, Ruzivo 7 June 2014).

ZANU PF initiated the arrest of influential figures as a tactic of containing dissenting voices. The arrest of Beatrice Mtetwa, a human rights lawyer was one of the most publicised incidents of

government repression (Center for Global Development 2013: 1). Civic organisations were also constantly targeted. These included the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, Counselling Services Unit, The Zimbabwe Peace Project, Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights to mention but a few (Center for Global Development 2013: 1).

It is a fact that in countries like Burma, Iran and Zimbabwe, opposition movements are often treated with great brutality both in the street and in prisons. Such rulers commonly try to discredit civil resistance by asserting that it is part of a Western imperialist plot (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 120-121). According to Matikiti, ‘treason and espionage charges have too often in the past been used as political weapons – to exterminate, dismember, disadvantage and punish innocent people and perceived adversaries or competitors’. It can be argued that ZANU PF often relied on incarceration of opposition members in order to assert its authority and punish its opponents. Writing from a theological perspective, he further notes that ‘Christians were not spared from political violence’ in as much as all stakeholders of the opposition were affected (Matikiti 2012: 192).

In 2001, Madhuku was jailed without charge for leading a demonstration after soldiers throttled a student and threw him from a train in motion (Madhuku 2010: 2). He was also subject to a smear operation by state-owned media. His home was set on fire and his house in Harare damaged by attacks. In 2004, he was arrested, beaten and left for dead during a protest in Harare. When he recovered he said, ‘We will not be deterred by the beatings and the cruelty of this regime. They can only stop us by killing us’ (Nyarota 2009). In October 2004, the state tabled a bill in parliament seeking to outlaw NGOs, including the NCA. He was charged with organizing an illegal protest in 2006 but a magistrate dismissed the charges. He was assaulted by the police in 2007, when his arm was broken and was left with cuts on his head and body. He was summoned to court in 2011 for leading the 2004 protests, a move which drew international condemnation (Madhuku 2010: 2). He was re-appointed as the NCA's chair in 2006 under contentious circumstances because he amended its constitution to extend his leadership in office. Mugabe portrayed Madhuku's conduct as ‘opportunism’, saying:

There are some fraudulent human rights campaigners like Lovemore Madhuku and his NCA who, when broke, intentionally provoke the police in order to get arrested and raise money from the donors. As such, they easily attract the attention of international media

line CNN, BBC over nothing. That's the Madhuku survival strategy for you (Manyukwe 2013).

Despite the criticism by the head of state, Madhuku remained resilient and dedicated as a human rights campaigner saying, 'I will not give up my desire for Zimbabweans to have a new democratic constitution. I am prepared to die for it' (Masuku 2011).

Violence was unleashed after a partnership of organisations made up of churches, civil rights groups and labour organisations led by the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, arranged a prayer meeting under the theme *Save Zimbabwe Campaign* which was poised to take place in Highfield at Zimbabwe Grounds on 11 March 2007. These were viewed as hostile and crushed by the police. The prayer meeting was held, but the ZRP violently ended the gathering, killing Gift Tandare an NCA and MDC advocate in the process (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010b:10). Writing about the incident, Bratton and Masunungure (2011: 29) say the events of the abortive *Save Zimbabwe Campaign* led to the death of one person, 50 hospitalized, and the arrest of over 200 people. In the ensuing battle, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the smaller faction of the MDC, Arthur Mutambara and NCA leader, Lovemore Madhuku were arrested (Rukuni 2013). The event displayed unto the world that ZANU PF was a brutal party which needed such action for sanity to retain power. In addition, it revealed ZANU PF's disrespect of fundamental liberties and the rule of law. In reaction to the declining political situation in Zimbabwe, there was international protest which compelled the SADC to hold a special meeting in Tanzania at the end of March 2007. The meeting endorsed the South African mediation role in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe's government has on several occasions charged his political opponents with treason. Mugabe charged and tried Joshua Nkomo with treason on the basis that the PF ZAPU leader sought to assassinate him, thereby forcing Nkomo to flee wearing a dress as disguise (Whande 2013). Other PF ZAPU cadres who were charged with the same crime include Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, and the latter died in prison despite being acquitted by the High Court. In 2002, the MDC trio of Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube and Renson Gasela were accused of scheming to assassinate President Mugabe. However, Welshman Ncube and Renson Gasela were later discharged for lack of evidence against them (Thorncroft 2002).

Ari Ben-Menashe through his Dickens and Madson consultancy company was working for Mugabe. He passed on tapes of the ambiguous conversation which he claimed to have held with Tsvangirai to eliminate Mugabe. The Zimbabwean authorities charged Tsvangirai with treason which is punishable by death in the country. Tsvangirai was represented by Advocate George Bizos SC, one of the prominent lawyers who represented Nelson Mandela during his 1960's treason trial and two Zimbabwean advocates (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 2013b). He was tried for treason before the Harare High Court but was acquitted in October 2004 after the judge accepted he had not used the word 'eliminate' to mean that he wanted Mugabe to be assassinated. Judge Paddington Garwe described Ben-Menashe, who was the prosecution's star witness as 'rude, unreliable, and contemptuous' (Thornycroft and Blair 2004).

Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) Director, Jestina Mukoko, journalist Andreason Manyere and other pro-democracy activists were abducted in 2008 and charged with treason. Former Chimanimani Member of Parliament, Roy Bennett together with Giles Mutsekwa and other MDC officials were charged with treason in 2009 after weapons were allegedly found on the farm of Peter Hitschmann. At least seven serving and retired middle and lower ranking officers from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) were charged with treason in 2009. International Socialist Organisation coordinator and University of Zimbabwe lecturer, Munyaradzi Gwisai, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) employee, Hopewell Gumbo and 42 others were charged with treason for watching news coverage of the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings and discussing the Arab Spring in relation to Zimbabwe (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 2013b). If anyone among the accused was found guilty of treason s/he would have been sentenced to death. Although the accused were not found guilty this had a psychological effect which was meant to intimidate and deter people from joining or taking part in the MDC and other organisations' nonviolent activities.

#### **7.4 Internal displacement**

Internal displacement took place in Zimbabwe mainly as a result of violent land seizures, operation Murambatsvina, and pre and post election violence during and after the run up to the 2002 presidential election and the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election. In almost all of these cases, the supporters of the MDC were the targets. It was meant to destroy the party once and for all as the displacements occurred in areas believed to be MDC strongholds, or where it

had the potential of frustrating ZANU PF's hold on power either through the ballot or through other means like mass action.

ZANU PF thrived through the use of the strategy of *Gukurahundi* (literally violence but means the first rains which washes away the chaff) each time its hegemony was threatened (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 11). This was apparent through military style operations such as *Operation Murambatsvina* of 2005 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 11). *Operation Murambatsvina* (Restore Order or Operation Clear the Filth) had a catastrophic impact on the urban poor, which is why it was codenamed Tsunami because it destroyed people's sources of livelihoods through demolishing people's homes and shops. Analysts and commentators renamed the operation 'Operation Murambavanhu,' (Operation Anti-people) because of the gross human rights violations the operation brought on the people (Makumbe 2011: 34-35). Many analysts believe that it was politically motivated since it occurred shortly after the disputed 2005 parliamentary elections and was furthermore meant to avert mass protests against the deteriorating economic situation while at the same time punishing the MDC's reputed urban support base (Ploch 2009: 16-17; Chitiyo 2009: 5; Moss 2007: 142).

Murambatsvina left about 70% of people in some urban areas without shelter and 76% losing their sources of income (Ploch 2009: 16, 2010: 22). Some of its objectives were precisely outlined by Makumbe as:

- To diffuse a politically volatile situation that was developing and largely defiant to the state apparatus;
- To reclaim the political space that the opposition MDC had taken since its formation in 1999;
- An attempt at reversing the debilitating breakdown of law and order that the ruling ZANU PF had promoted and sponsored since 2000;
- To get rid of political, social and economic entities and structures that were operating independently of both the state and the ruling political party, ZANU PF;
- To create an environment conducive to foreign direct investment in a futile attempt to attract foreign currency back into the economy;
- A futile attempt at destroying the parallel market, hoping that the foreign exchange traded there would then be offered to the state through formal financial institutions;
- To inflict pain on urbanites that are generally viewed as supporters of opposition political parties;
- To drag a sizable number of people back to the rural areas where they are more vulnerable to ZANU PF political control;

- To reduce the visibility of growing urban poverty – a direct result of the political crisis and the failed land reform process;
- To divert public attention from some of the worst problems that the nation was facing, e.g. shortage of food, fuel, and the breakdown of social services such as health and education (Makumbe 2011: 27-28).

The operation forced the displaced people to move into transit camps outside the cities and towns before many of them were finally returned to their rural areas where they were believed to have come from as reflected on their national identity cards. However, some had no rural homes to return to (Ploch 2009: 16). This operation deepened poverty for many Zimbabweans because it affected about 700 000 people directly and more than 2.4 million were indirectly affected (Mazingi and Kamidza n. d.: 357).

For some, Operation Murambatsvina was not the first violent displacement since they had also been victims of the violent land seizures since 2000 and politically motivated violence before, during and after elections in 2002. It is documented that many victims of the land invasions fled to urban areas in search of employment following their loss of livelihoods and homes during the land reform which affected about 400 000 farm workers from commercial farms. Politically engineered violence in 2002 displaced more than 100 000 people from their homes. About 500 000 who had settled on the farms on the pretext of the 2000 land invasions were also evicted in 2004 in the wake of a new phase of land reform. Some of these displaced people were the ones who lived in the slums earning a living from participating in the parallel economy prior to Operation Murambatsvina, as the informal sector accounted for about 70% and the formal for only 16% (Ploch 2009: 16). Alexander and Tendi sum it up well when they note that:

On top of massive job losses, extreme economic hardship and targeted violent repression, hundreds of thousands of MDC supporters were displaced and at times disenfranchised as a result of the seizure, occupation and chaotic resettlement of the vast majority of Zimbabwe's white-owned large scale farms from 2000 and the urban 'clean up' operation of 2005, known as Operation Murambatsvina, under which unplanned and 'illegal' homes were destroyed on a massive scale (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 6).

During the politicised operation *Murambatsvina* the police and army units obliterated hundreds of shacks and houses in high-density urban areas nationwide. The government however asserted that the operation was necessary to reduce urban crime and improve service delivery in the cities. Opposition supporters maintained that the operation was state revenge against urban support for the MDC.

The political violence that preceded the presidential run-off election in 2008 also led to huge numbers of internally displaced persons, apart from those who died. Amnesty International (2013: 13) notes that about 12 000 people were tortured in bases established across the country leading to over 28 000 being internally displaced. It can therefore be argued that internal displacement in Zimbabwe since 2000 was politically and humanly induced as ZANU PF and its supporters believed that violence was the way to get rid of the opposition MDC's victory in the polls.

### **7.5 Introduction of repressive legislation**

The growth of political opposition and mounting wave of protest by civil society organisations compelled the government to respond with ruthless legislation which could 'silence' the fiercest government critics (Women of Zimbabwe Arise 2007: 2). Despite being a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, Zimbabwe's record on human rights was deplorable during the period covered by the study. Draconian pieces of legislation were introduced by Jonathan Moyo, the then Minister of Information in 2000. The electoral challenge that ZANU PF faced during the parliamentary elections of 2000 led to a number of measures being put in place as a means to extend control over the media, information access and the electoral process (MISA Zimbabwe and Article 19 2004: 1).

According to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2004: 1) to further state tyranny, the government was given excessive authority against its own people empowered by a brutal piece of legislation, that is, POSA. In a true reflection of the old adage which says 'History repeats itself', POSA was a reinvention of the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) which was introduced by the Ian Smith regime to thwart the activities of nationalist political parties during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. Upon assuming power in 1980, the Mugabe regime used the same legislation to harass Joshua Nkomo and his PF ZAPU supporters in an operation called *Gukurahundi*. LOMA was renamed POSA in 2002 and was used to clamp down all activities perceived to be anti-Mugabe. After the founding of the *Daily News* and the MDC, media reporting became more polarised and held entrenched positions on social, economic and political issues. The state-owned newspapers like *The Herald*, *The Chronicle*, *The Manica Post*, *The Sunday News*, *The Sunday Mail*, *Kwayedza* and *Umuthunywa* rallied behind the ZANU PF government while the *Daily News*

vigorously and unapologetically backed the MDC (Chari 2010: 133). University of Zimbabwe lecturers such as Claude Mararike, Vimbai Chivaura and Sheunesu Mpeperekwi became prominent features on the sole state-owned television station, ZTV which was renamed ZBC TV, as they churned out unconvincing propaganda on programmes like *Nhaka Yedu*, *Madzimbabwe* (Chitando and Togarasei 2010: 153), *Zvavanhu* and *African Pride* (Bulawayo 24 Staff Reporter 2014).

POSA was used by the ZANU PF dominated government to arrest perceived government enemies, such as MDC and civic society members. Between the period February 2003 to January 2004, around 1,200 arrests were made by the police empowered by POSA to do so (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2004: 5). A survey of all the elections that were held in Zimbabwe since 1980 shows that the 2000 Legislative election and the Presidential election of 2002 attracted the highest amount of international attention (Matlosa 2002: 139). There is much evidence that POSA was crafted to punish a particular group of people. The law was selectively implemented in a politically partisan way so as to totally prohibit the democratic rights of civil society or opposition political parties. At the same time, ZANU PF supporters had the liberty to undertake the same activities as those carried out by opposition groups, without interference (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2004: 5). POSA without doubt derailed nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe because non-state actors were expected to apply for them to assemble or demonstrate peacefully, and in most cases permission was denied, especially to opposition political parties and civic groups which held views contrary ZANU PF.

In an effort to control the outflow of information and ensure that the people are given one sided information generated by the Ministry of Information, the government promulgated a strict media law called Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2004: 9). AIPPA was approved by the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 31 January 2002 and signed into law by President Robert Mugabe on 15 March 2002 just after the Presidential elections in which he was declared winner. AIPPA obligated all journalists and newspapers to register with the government-controlled Media and Information Commission (MIC). This automatically means that there is no objectivity in the processes of sanctioning media companies. Moreover, the information minister holds sweeping powers to decide which publications can operate legally and who is able to work as a journalist (Kelly and Cook 2011: 377-385).



According to MISA Zimbabwe and Article 19 (2004: 1), AIPPA was created by Jonathan Moyo as a principal instrument of the government and the ruling ZANU PF party in order to choke independent media reporting in Zimbabwe. Laws such as POSA, AIPPA, Interceptions of Communications Act, Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act to mention the most important are viewed by critics as simply designed to make it difficult for the MDC to win elections (Chibwe 2013: 119).

The Daily News campaigned nonviolently for the respect of human rights and return to the rule of law. It exposed corruption and abuses of power by those in power. It provided an alternative source of information, but its equipment was seized by the ZRP on 16 September 2003. The daily newspaper was charged under AIPPA for operating without a licence (MISA Zimbabwe and Article 19 2004: 20). Research conducted by Zimbabwe Advertising Research Foundation (ZARF) showed that although *The Herald* commanded wide readership, *The Daily News* had also a huge readership thereby leading to its prosecution on two major occasions (Willems 2004: 1771). *The Daily News* offices were bombed in April 2000 while its printing press was also blown up in January 2001. On 19 September 2003, armed police officers declined to evacuate the paper's offices and barred staff from accessing its offices. Against court orders, the police declined to return *The Daily News'* computers and other equipment confiscated as evidence (MISA Zimbabwe and Article 19 2004: 20). The fact that armed police were instructed to occupy the premises was an indication that the process was politically motivated. It appears that AIPPA was targeting the *Daily News*, the only independent daily newspaper that was available in the country at that time. In light of biased news content from the broadcast media, some people especially in the rural areas relied on external stations such as *Studio 7* and *Shortwave Radio Africa*. The government responded by confiscating a lot of radios in many rural areas so that people would continue listening to traditional radio stations owned by the government (Mutasa 2013). The muffling of independent media was done on the premise that they provided citizens with the information necessary to make informed political and economic choices (Graves 2007: 4). Such measures were a threat to development considering that independent media play a critical role in building and sustaining democracies, societies, and economies around the world (Graves 2007: 4). Apparently, all freedoms which permitted advocates of nonviolence to engage the government in a nonviolent manner were muzzled through restrictive legislation.

Both AIPPA and POSA were passed just before the 2002 presidential election in an effort to ensure the incumbent president victory and preventing the opposition the same chance by starving the country of the freedom of assembly, expression and press (Jafari n. d.: 6). Makumbe (2011: 18) maintains that the technique of public control was used by the ZANU PF led government for a long time in order to make sure that opposition political parties had little or no political space to operate in whilst the government's monopoly on the media allowed it to largely control and determine what the citizens should hear, have and see regarding the country and the world at large.

Like LOMA its predecessor, POSA criminalises insulting the president in his official or personal capacity (Jafari n. d.: 7). Makumbe (2009: 10) agrees that Zimbabweans are fully aware that POSA is more repressive than LOMA was and that POSA together with AIPPA '... are clearly products of fear of the people's power'. In addition, the same section of POSA also criminalises print or broadcast information perceived to abuse, or is false with respect to the president. During the Rhodesian era some degree of freedom was exercised and the media was a public sphere provided it did not involve national security matters (Manganga 2012: 105). POSA prohibits 'false statements' that will have a negative impact on state security, economic interests, or undermine citizens' confidence in the law enforcement agencies. Consequently MDC members, journalists and human rights activists were harassed, arrested and detained as they exposed the government to public scrutiny (Jafari n. d.: 7). According to Melber (2004: 235) citing Hammer and Raftopoulos, these draconian laws were a desperate initiative from a political party with a waning popularity and its monopoly was meant 'to control or destroy the independent media and to silence all alternative versions of history and the present'.

POSA also prohibited peaceful protests, rallies and mass stay-aways through vague terms which it used to describe acts of subversion, thereby severely limiting freedom of assembly of individual, political parties and civil society. To make it worse, a jail term of up to 20 years is the punishment for attempting to coerce the government using all sorts of peaceful means or even the threat of violence. According to Jafari (n. d.: 7), in POSA 'Coercing' is defined as "constraining, compelling or restraining" through 'boycott, civil disobedience or resistance to any law, whether such resistance is active or passive . . . if accompanied by physical force or violence or threat of physical force or violence'. From this definition, it is apparent that even

nonviolent participants at a rally or mass stay-away can be subject to prosecution. As a result, many were harassed, arrested and detained for violating POSA. Amendments were also made to section 17 of POSA, stopping participation in strikes and mass stay-aways by incorporating the forcible disturbing of public peace, security and order (Jafari n. d.: 7). Moreover, according to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2003: 2), POSA was used by the police to unlawfully arrest and torture people mainly journalists, pastors, clergy, civilians and members of parliament, thus it effectively took away the freedom of assembly, expression and association from the people.

The ruling party was shocked by the civic unrest and street demonstrations the country witnessed from late 1997, prompting it to curtail political activity in many ways including banning street demonstrations (Makumbe 2011: 18). Many leaders of civil society and the opposition were arrested for mobilising people to participate in strikes and demonstrations using the POSA provisions designed to prevent any objection to state operations. POSA also gave the police powers to outlaw public gatherings and issue notices to determine the route, duration and location of the gathering. Failure to notify the police before participating in such a gathering could attract a 6 months sentence in jail or a fine, while organisers of the gathering were responsible for any damage caused or resulting from the gathering (Jafari n. d.: 7). Many MDC Members of Parliament were arrested for purportedly addressing unlawful gatherings. POSA in 2002 was used ahead of the presidential election to restrict the MDC presidential campaign and most of its rallies and meetings were either cancelled because the police were not willing to provide security, or did not approve the meetings which thus did not take place. As a result, the MDC only managed to address eight rallies and about 83 rallies were cancelled or disrupted by the police using POSA whilst ZANU PF held about 50 rallies without any hindrance. POSA was also used to disrupt meetings in private places like homes or hotels once they were categorised as political. This had a negative impact on the activities of non-state actors like the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) which provided voter education and advocated free and fair elections (Jafari n. d.: 8). In essence, POSA was designed to stifle public political debate and dialogue and more importantly engagement and the MDC could not meet its supporters in rural and urban areas (Manganga 2012: 108). Bratton and Masunugure (2011: 24) note that the two laws, POSA and AIPPA, put together ‘...amounted to the suspension of constitutional protections and the re-imposition of a state of emergency.’

POSA shut down MDC's political gatherings (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012: 10). AIPPA resulted in the creation of the MIC overseeing the press, imposing a strict registration policy on journalists and introducing severe penalties on alleged publishing of falsehoods (Jafari n. d.: 8). The legislation was used to bar many foreign journalists through denial of accreditation. The *Daily News*, the *Daily News on Sunday*, the *Tribune* and the *Weekly Times* were banned between 2003 and 2009 (Manganga 2012: 109). The provisions of AIPPA were used many times to arrest and detain journalists whose stories criticised the government. The Commission and information minister defined what falsehood meant and a severe penalty of up to two years in jail or a fine were meted out for violations. Sixteen journalists were arrested after the 2002 presidential elections, including Geoff Nyarota, the then editor-in-chief of *Daily News* (Jafari n. d.: 9). It is not surprising that among the ten monitored Southern African countries in 2003, Zimbabwe accounted for more than half of the 188 violations of media freedom and freedom of expression recorded by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) on World Press Freedom Day (Melber 2004: 235).

#### **7.6 State engineered violence against non-state actors**

Political violence was first witnessed during the FTLRP when in the process of violently evicting white land owners, no less than ten white commercial farmers and more than 200 black farm workers were killed and thousands displaced (Makumbe 2011: 8) and rendered jobless (Gavin 2007: 7). This led to a humanitarian crisis in which the human rights of farm workers were grossly violated, and opposition supporters were forced to flee their homes to escape death, harassment, and assault at the hands of marauding ZANU PF mobs who were backed by the police and the army.

Before the 2002 Presidential elections, Mugabe sanctioned the formation of militias countrywide who were denigrated as the 'Green Bombers'.<sup>3</sup> Border Gezi training camp in Mount Darwin was the first national youth service training camp set up in 2001. The government initiated a training programme where the youths were taught military drills and patriotic history in the name of a National Youth Training Service. It was created after the gains the MDC made in 2000, in

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<sup>3</sup> The expression 'Green Bombers', as they are colloquially known in Zimbabwe, is both an indication to the characteristic green uniforms that the youth militias wore and reportedly also a disparaging reference to the militia as a type of large fly – a bluebottle – that is regularly seen flying around bad odor.

particular its victory in the referendum and the winning of 57 parliamentary seats. The government condoned mayhem and violence, but most horribly they were culpable of planning, orchestrating and executing violence against their own people (Reeler 2003: 2). The apex of the recruitment of militias was between 2001 and 2004, when 18,000 youths were recruited under the dreaded Border Gezi national youth service programme where they underwent political indoctrination before being deployed to fight partisan political wars (Mutanda 2013b: 134). These militias orchestrated violence of the highest magnitude with alarming impunity.

The militia groups which varied in size between 20 and 30 were armed with bicycle chains, axes, iron bars, sjamboks, pangas, and electric wires. In some cases, they were also in possession of guns. Hit-squads were established for special missions and these were usually armed. Consequently, a number of key individuals, David Stevens, Martin Olds, and Tichaona Chiminya among others, were killed as a strategy to intimidate those who dared to continue opposing ZANU PF (Reeler 2003: 8). The groups set up operational bases, usually in rural district council offices, or in buildings owned by ZANU PF members at growth points and some urban districts, from which raiders were deployed into surrounding communities to hunt down opposition supporters, who were either taken back to be tortured, beaten, or detained, or were terrorised in their homes, together with their families.

The 2002 presidential election witnessed a breakdown in law and order that saw crimes such as murders, arson, kidnappings, rape and abductions increasing (Makumbe 2011: 28). During the election campaign and soon after the election not less than 100 MDC supporters were murdered on political grounds and others were severely tortured and beaten. These brutalities were repeated with greater severity in the run up to the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election where 'clearance' was supposed to be sought before entering or leaving a village even for medical attention. The parliamentary elections in 2005 however, witnessed less violence than the previous elections in 2000 and 2002 (Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2008:12, 53). Reports of intimidation, harassment, and arbitrary arrest of opposition members were nonetheless still rampant, and opposition assemblies and rallies were disturbed as well as restricted by ZANU PF militia and the police in Harare, Bulawayo, and more frequently in the ZANU PF strongholds of Mashonaland and Manicaland. Ploch (2008b: 3) reports that despite government assurance that there would be zero tolerance of violence, the run up to the

harmonised elections in 2008 witnessed several cases of politically motivated violence especially following the events of 11 March 2007. It led to 603 incidents of torture, 865 of assault, and 2766 arrests or detentions. Between November 2007 and March 2008, 1775 incidents of political violence were reported.

In fact, bases are a significant element of the Liberation War rhetoric and the guerillas launched operations against the Rhodesian forces and commercial farms from the bases. Training and mobilising took place and discipline was enforced against ‘sellouts’ at the bases. The guerrillas were given information about the movement of the RSF and supplies by the young men and women – ‘*mujibas*’ and ‘*chimbwidos*’ at the bases (Reeler 2003: 10). Strategically, the militias, CIO operatives, and soldiers intimidated the population to recall the brutalities of the guerrilla operation during the Second Chimurenga. The bases were thus a reminder about the possible return of war because opposition members were tortured at the bases. ZANU PF viewed the establishment of torture bases as a long term strategy critical for coercing people to support it. In the run up to the 2002 presidential elections and 2008 presidential run-off elections, bases mushroomed in several parts of the country.

The militia-led violence began both against the nonviolent demonstrators in Harare and in the invasions of the White owned commercial farms. Militia were deployed in the 2000 Parliamentary elections, the various by-elections in 2001 and the Presidential election in 2002. The war veterans used force and intimidated people in Murehwa to support ZANU PF, in Gweru there were street fights between supporters of the MDC who carried out demonstrations in sympathy with the ZCTU. ZANU PF supporters were transported from as far as Mberengwa (Interview with Muparuri, teacher from Mashonaland East province, 16 June 2014). The militia have continued to be a significant factor in the execution of violence to date. For example, militia imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on the residents of Kuwadzana suburb ahead of a constituency by-election. The curfew was imposed by militia that had no obligation to do so without an announcement of martial law, or emergency powers. The number of victims of torture by militia, police, and CIO was estimated at 200 000 in 2000 alone. The group leaders of the militia were largely war veterans who repeatedly threatened the use of violence to prevent the MDC from getting into power in Zimbabwe because they snubbed it as a front bent on protecting the interests of the white minority (Reeler 2001, 2003:2-3, 6).

In August 2001, Ashton's Landfall Farm in Mutorashanga was invaded by 150 settlers. On 14 January 2002, youth militia led by Mbamba, a ZANU PF councillor, invaded the farm, beat the occupants, and slaughtered some beasts. This was despite the fact that Patrick Ashton, just like many other white commercial farmers had bought his land from government after independence (Cross 2002). These militias perpetrated violence resulted in the death of more than 180 people during the land grab that was at its peak between February 2000 and March 2002 (MISA Zimbabwe and Article 19, 2004: 2).

From 2003, the government wanted to make it compulsory for all school leavers to undergo a youth training programme. The minimum age for such a programme was 16 years (Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: 1). As a matter of fact, ordinary level youth graduates gained automatic entry into nursing schools, agriculture training centres and teachers' colleges. Graduates also found attractive employment in the army, police and prisons. War veterans and army personnel trained youth in the camps. A number of them were deployed in their own districts to work as ZANU PF agents, and were among the 75 000 ghost workers who remained on the government payroll (Muleya 2011). It is therefore clear that violence in Zimbabwe that occurred before, during and after elections succeeded because ZANU PF retained full control of the security apparatus (International Crisis Group 2012: 1). Such a rigidly militarized environment meant that nonviolent campaigns would not easily succeed.

The youth militias in Zimbabwe were involved in murder, torture, rape and the destruction of property (Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: 1). Rape was used as an instrument of war in many conflicts. Vlachova and Biason (2005) quoted in Ward (2013: 192) argue that in the Rwandan genocide which took place in 1994, between 250,000 and 500,000 women and girls survived rape. It has also been confirmed that rape is under reported because many women fear they will be stigmatised and excluded by reporting the crime (Ward 2013: 192). It was very dangerous for the children who joined the militias to desert at a later stage. In a testimony, a girl called Rejoice (pseudonym) was forced to join the youth militia camp at the age of 16. She reported that inside the camps they were forced to cook and wash for the boys. The girl fled after three months and in response the militias burnt her mother to death and after a month her father was attacked by people connected to the militias (ZCSVF 2010). In addition, George (pseudonym) from Kadoma, Mashonaland West province was forcibly recruited into a ZANU PF camp called Sanyatonga. He

was compelled to beat his parents in public on account of supporting the MDC and as a consequent his mother died (ZCSVF 2010).

By 2011 bases were already well established in ZANU PF strongholds. In Mudzi North there was a ZANU PF base called Sherenje where captured opposition supporters were beaten and even killed. Given this scenario the villagers confessed that for the whole of 2011 there was no peace in the area. This was confirmed by one of the victims of violent displacements who said:

As for me, I will never return home. We are always on the run and as we speak our properties have been destroyed. It's better if they [MDC] find safe houses for us. In 2008, we were severely beaten and my back is still painful (SWRADIOAFRICA 2011).

In a similar incident, one man interviewed by *Short Wave Radio Africa* explained how he lost his seven cattle and twelve goats when he escaped from the brutality of the ZANU PF militia and their supporters. In a related incident, another victim fled for his life when ZANU PF militias wanted to kill him. He wondered whether or not he would recover his property (SWRADIOAFRICA2011). The year 2011 witnessed an increase in the cases of politically motivated violence as ZANU PF anticipated that the pending elections will be held (Gagare 2013).

Again, the manipulated unemployed youths burnt and looted property and lives were lost all in the name of 'protecting the gains of independence'. Added to this, political violence was encouraged by people who occupied leadership positions. An example is when Newton Kachepa, a ZANU PF Member of Parliament (MP) for Mudzi North drove a 15 member gang after 9 p.m. to persecute one of the victims of violence who was accused of supporting the MDC in his constituency. At one of the rallies carried out Kachepa, the MP confessed his responsibility for the death of MDC activists namely: Muronde, Tambo, Mweza's son and another victim from Ward Two to make them four. At the rally, the MP threatened the victim with death if he continued to support the MDC. Furthermore, at Dendera Business Centre in Mudzi North on 20 April 2012, Kachepa warned: 'Don't be taken away by things that are of sell-outs [MDC]. If you do sell-out things, I am telling you-you will cry...You say ZANU PF kills? It doesn't kill. If you provoke it, it destroys' (Think Africa Press 2012).

On 26 May 2012 when the MDC activists were holding a rally at Chimukoko Business Centre, violence broke out. ZANU PF youths marched towards the MDC rally venue. The two groups



clashed and the outnumbered MDC members fled leaving one of their colleagues, Cephas Magura dead. Other MDC activists were severely injured in clashes that involved approximately 300 ZANU PF youths who had been ferried there by Kachepea (Think Africa Press 2012).

ZANU PF backed militias were given alcohol and drugs and taught how to administer electric shocks in an effort to extract information from their victims (Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: 1). The youths had been clandestinely recruited to spearhead ZANU PF's terror campaign. Teachers were among the most targeted victims and many rural schools were terrorised through the setting up of militia bases at the schools, attacking teachers, and exposing pupils to violence (Pswarayi and Reeler 2012: 2 ). Many teachers were victims of various forms of direct violence perpetrated by their former students. The creation of militias violated the African Union's effort towards the establishment of a peaceful continent because it caused human suffering and was a setback to development opportunities in Africa (Govender and Ngandu 2009). In light of the deliberately created militias, the execution of transitional justice is important despite the challenges involved which include the government's unwillingness to pursue wide-ranging initiatives to stop violence (International Center for Transitional Justice 2009). Therefore, it is imperative to halt the creation and training of militia led by war veterans and ZANU PF supporters (Human Rights Watch 2002: 5). Moreover, it is criminal to intimidate those who are perceived to hold views contrary to government policies.

Zimbabwe's youths were indoctrinated at adolescent level. School children were forced to attend ZANU PF political gatherings and were socialised into how to perpetuate the unchallenged rule by ZANU PF. Even at national events such as Independence Day where everyone was supposed to voluntarily and happily attend, some people chose not to attend because of the way ZANU PF manipulates such gatherings to castigate its political opponents. At Independence Day celebrations held on 18 April 2012 in Mt. Darwin West, a war veteran called Sigauke thanked spirit mediums called Nehanda and Kaguvi for guiding the African fighters during the country's struggle for independence. He turned to spewing hate speech accusing some people of 'selling' out the liberated country. On the same day at Mutwa Primary School, pupils staged drama that encouraged violence as they sloganeered: 'Forward with ZANU PF! Down with Tsvangirai!' (SWRADIOAFRICA 2012b).

Zimbabwe's war veterans accompanied by party youths displaced around 150,000 permanent farm-workers during the land reform. A large number of temporary workers, many of them women were affected (Scoones *et al.* 2010: 5). In addition, war veterans and ZANU PF militia occupying commercial farms were implicated in the intimidation, assault and murder of white farm owners (Human Rights Watch 2002: 19). Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA) founding member, Andrew Ndlovua admitted that pro-ZANU PF war veterans received preferential treatment, a situation which created a lot of insecurity as they became a 'reserve military force' (Matenga 2013). Before the June 2008 presidential run-off, there was an orchestrated campaign of rape and torture perpetrated by ZANU PF youth militia, CIO operatives and people who identified themselves as veterans of the liberation war affiliated to ZANU PF. Victims of rape ranged from the age of five to the elderly grandmothers (AIDS-Free World 2009: 10, 12). It is therefore apparent that the conflict in Zimbabwe had major negative socio-economic and political effects. Indeed, in conflict governments divert expenditure towards the military, cut public investment and maintenance expenditures. High military spending becomes hard to reverse after the war thereby reducing the peace dividend (African Development Bank 2008: xvi). University of Zimbabwe Students were "beaten thoroughly by the police when they participated in the 'Final Push' in 2003" because they had violated POSA (Interview, Muzenda 15 June 2014).

To sum up, state security forces and militias have since 2000 committed acts of violence against thousands of civilians, targeting primarily political opponents and aid workers. The security sector violated human rights through imprisonment, enforced disappearance, murder, torture, and rape (Amnesty International 2003; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2002; Human Rights Watch 2007). On 30 April 2008 the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in its press statement revealed 'country-wide reports of systematic violence in the form of assaults, murders, abductions, intimidation and wanton destruction of property against innocent civilians whose alleged crime is to have voted 'wrongly'' (CCJP 2008). In addition, after losing the 29 March 2008 presidential election, President Mugabe carried out extensive state-sponsored violence and terror (Amnesty International 2008). In September 2008, Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara signed the GPA. In spite of the signing of the GPA, the Zimbabwean milieu remained turbulent as ZANU PF continued to wreak violence against MDC supporters and other political opponents (Human Rights Watch 2008b; Amnesty International 2011).

## **7.7 Rigging of elections, intimidation and political violence**

Mugabe has suffered electoral defeat ever since the formation of the MDC (Mike Campbell Foundation 2014: 12). Evidence on the ground suggests that ZANU PF has lost every elections held since 2000 including the disputed presidential poll that paved way for the GNU, and the elections that followed it in July 2013 (Moyo 2013). Ibbo Mandaza, head of a research think tank called Sapes Trust, argues that ZANU PF has survived through rigging. At a meeting convened by a civil society organisation called Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition in 2013, Mandaza revealed that President Mugabe lost the presidential election in 2002 but used rigging instruments such as state security organs (Chimoio 2013). It is believed that if Mugabe had not rigged the 2002 Presidential elections by incarcerating MDC activists, shutting down polling stations in MDC strongholds, and detaining international election observers, the opposition party would have triumphed (Kebonang 2012: 28). Elections have therefore not been free and fair for a long time, resulting in voters losing faith in the entire electoral process manifested in disillusionment, pessimism, and apathy (Zimbabwe Institute 2007).

On 29 March 2008, Zimbabweans voted in harmonised elections. It took more than five weeks before the results were announced for the presidential contest. It showed that Mugabe had been defeated by Morgan Tsvangirai, but the margin was not within the range stipulated by the SADC guidelines for the conduct of democratic elections to secure victory in the first round. On 30 March 2008, Mugabe held a meeting with his top security leadership to consider his election defeat. According to Timberg, he was ready to concede defeat but was directed by the ZDF commander Gen. Constantine Chiwenga to stay in the race, with the senior military officers ‘supervising a military-style campaign against the opposition’. The military plan was directed by Emmerson Mnangagwa, a former security chief of the earlier *Gukurahundi* conflict that was code-named ‘CIBD’, which stood for: ‘*Coercion. Intimidation. Beating. Displacement*’ (Timberg 2008). Timberg further asserts that the operation was designed to crush and coerce the opposition party MDC supporters to vote for ZANU PF. By 20 June 2008, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights had ‘recorded 85 deaths in political violence since the first round of voting’ (Parasram 2008). As a result, the 27 June 2008 polls were widely condemned because they were not free and fair, and therefore, not credible or legitimate.

Senior army officers coordinated ZANU PF militias to attack MDC supporters and civil society networks leaving a trail of bloodshed. In the wake of incessant violence, Morgan Tsvangirai sought refuge in a foreign embassy and was forced to withdraw from the race to spare his supporters further death and destruction (Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: 2). The government appointed ZEC did not address the inaccuracies in the voters' roll that were evident from previous elections. On the eve of the 2008 election the MDC pointed out that the government had printed nine million ballots, even though there were only 5.9 million registered voters (Ploch 2008b: 2). The 2008 election impasse compelled SADC at the recommendation of the African Union to step up its efforts to mediate between the conflicting parties. In spite of the challenges it faced, the AU has a formal mandate to engage in mediation as a form of peacemaking as this was legislated in the 2002 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Ndinga-Muvumba 2009: 11).

According to Sachikonye, the rigging of the 2008 presidential run-off elections occurred much earlier and not at the ballot box itself. The unleashing of state sponsored violence and terror created an uneven playing field because it was part of the vote rigging process. Many people were intimidated, tortured and even killed. This swayed more of the voters towards ZANU PF. In ZANU PF strongholds such as Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe, MDC agents and supporters had to flee in order to save their own lives. A lot of literate and known opposition supporters were instructed to declare illiteracy and ZANU PF agents accompanied them to the ballot box where they voted for ZANU PF under duress. Voters in rural areas were also forced to record the serial numbers of the ballot papers they used and hand them over to party's leadership after the poll. The strategy was crafted as a way of supervising and intimidating the electorate (Sachikonye 2011: 58-59).

Chitiyo (2009: 2) correctly observes that 'indeed, the security sector has been intimately linked to Zimbabwe's electoral history over the past decade – they have been the sponsors, managers and agents of political violence at election time.' According to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (2008: 53), the run up to the presidential run-off election left '...a trail of destruction – houses burnt down, many people displaced and homeless, orphaned and homeless children and communities torn asunder.' The political violence was state-sponsored as it involved members of the ZNA, ZRP, CIO and the Zimbabwe Prisons Services working closely with the ZANU PF

militia, and witnessed the death of not less than 200 MDC supporters. More than 50 000 rural people were displaced and many of their homes burnt (Makumbe 2011: 30-31). Widespread harassment, torture, beatings, and murders of supporters of opposition parties were witnessed. Following the first round of the 2008 elections violence intensified and continued even after the signing of the GPA. According to Rotberg (2011: 10), between March 2008 and May 2011 about 500 MDC supporters were killed, and the same period also witnessed more than 13 000 violent incidents that were backed with personal narratives, police reports and medical reports. The violence was perpetrated by ZANU PF hardliners made up of the military, party loyalists and party militias. Alexander and Tendi (2008: 6-7) argue that violence was necessary in order to maintain both ZANU PF party discipline and electoral success.

The presidential run-off election of 2008 represents the height of the JOC's (consists of the heads of army, police, air force, intelligence and prison service), bid to thwart the peaceful transfer of power to any person without liberation war credentials, which they had vowed not to accept as early as 2002, referring to Tsvangirai (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 10). JOC was fully responsible for the violence and mayhem which ensued in the run up to 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election all in the name of protecting the country's sovereignty, although practically speaking violence was carried out to protect the wealth and power they had amassed. As Nepstad (2013) argues, soldiers who receive benefits from a regime are susceptible to remain largely loyal to the government and the Zimbabwean experience also demonstrates this. The Zimbabwean security sector, especially the military is known for having a symbiotic relationship with ZANU PF, which led them to continuously view the MDC as a front of the West resulting in them refusing to implement government decisions during the GNU and even boycotting the newly established national security organ, that greatly undermined the transition process as the 'securocrats' were motivated by: 'fear of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the MDC...' (International Crisis Group 2010: 1). Key figures from the JOC, led the violence and established 'bases' at schools, clinics, once white-owned farms and other places where torture, beatings and intimidation was carried out by the youth militia who were the chief perpetrators of violence since April 2008 up to the polling day, 27 June the same year (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 11-13).

With the violence turning nasty, the same torture bases were even set up in MDC strongholds in town including the leafy suburbs of Harare (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 11-13). In high density suburbs, coercion and violence was worse due to human rights violations whereby residents were denied information through an operation codenamed *Burutsa Dish* (Operation Take down Your Satellite Dish). This operation forced residents to take down their satellite dishes with the aim of denying them ‘wrong’ news from outside the country (Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2008: 55). The satellite dishes were perceived by the government as spreading ‘anti-Zimbabwean’ Western propaganda (Chitiyo 2009: 6). As has always been the case in post-2000 violence, the opposition continued to be considered traitors working in cahoots with foreigners and therefore not to be protected under the law. MDC politicians, their families, activists and supporters were ruthlessly murdered, abducted, arrested and jailed without any conviction, or on spurious charges; were tortured, beaten and had their property attacked (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 12-13).

The necessity of holding elections was questioned, given the pronouncements after 2002 by some key figures from ZANU PF and the JOC that voting was not all that important as long it was not for ZANU PF. According to Masunungure, statements by members of the military and other security institutions before the 2008 harmonised elections were tellingly partisan and threatening. For instance, Brigadier General Sigauke was quoted six months before the elections as saying:

As soldiers, we have the privilege to defend this task (of guaranteeing Mugabe and ZANU(PF) rule) on two fronts: the first being through the ballot box, and second being the use of the barrel of the gun should the worse come to the worst. I may therefore urge you as citizens of Zimbabwe to exercise your electoral right wisely in the forthcoming election in 2008, remembering that ‘Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again’ (Masunungure 2009: 69-70).

General Constantine Chiwenga, the Commander of the ZDF was quoted three weeks into the elections saying:

Elections are coming and the army will not support or salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during, and after the presidential elections. We will not support anyone other than President Mugabe who has sacrificed a lot for this country (Masunungure 2009: 70).

Retired Major General Paradzai Zimhondi, Commissioner of Prisons was quoted just a month before the elections saying that he would not salute Tsvangirai or Simba Makoni if they happen to win in the presidential race. He noted:

If the opposition wins the election, I will be the first one to resign from my job and go back to defend my piece of land. I will not let it go.... I will only support the leadership of President Mugabe. I will not salute them [Makoni and Tsvangirai] (Masunungire 2009: 71).

In addition, during the run up to the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election other pronouncements include the statements by George Charamba, then Publicity Secretary of ZANU PF who during the run up to the run-off election was quoted saying:

a mere X on a piece of paper, all done in time shorter than life creating ecstasy, can steal a free people, steal a heritage, steal a freedom, steal a land, steal a future ...we will have to shoot – yes shoot – the ballot box for the preservation of our independence (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 12).

Furthermore, President Mugabe declared that: ‘the MDC will never be allowed to rule this country – never ever. Only God, who appointed me, will remove me – not the MDC, not the British’ (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 12; Jongwe 2008). He was also quoted just 10 days before the run-off election saying, ‘You can vote for Tsvangirai, but if he brings back the whites we will go to war’ (Chimunhu 2009).

From the above citations, one can easily glean the degree to which the Zimbabwean politics was polarised and that violence was sanctioned from the highest office in the land. In essence, it is clear that the security forces were hostile to an MDC election victory and was determined to subvert it at all cost. To this end, Ndlovu (2004: 217) correctly puts it noting that ‘a combination of severe repression, patronage through allocation of land and positions that give access to public resources, and ever more strident racial and xenophobic rhetoric have kept the forces of opposition off balance and out of step’. However, one wonders why elections could proceed before the institutions of violence had been reformed in the country. In light of these glaring undemocratic threats, it was important to address the issue of the security sector before elections could be conducted. Otherwise, the environment under which the elections were held signalled wastage of resources in a process that would return the same party to power, whether it wins or loses.

It was the magnitude of violence that led Tsvangirai to withdraw from participating in the run-off election and subsequently led to the non-recognition of Mugabe's one man poll win which attracted condemnation from all corners of the world, including even so called friendly African countries. The mounting pressure of illegitimacy on Mugabe forced him to enter into a GNU with the two MDC formations as highlighted in chapter 6. The key fact is that political violence was used by ZANU PF to remain in power.

Since the beginning of the 2013 election campaign Mugabe became serious about the legitimacy issue since he did not want a repeat of the Machiavellian type of politics he had depended on in the previous elections. There was breakdown of the rule of law as the security sector deteriorated further into an extremely politicised and partisan institution. In the harmonised elections that were held on 31 July 2013, there is a lot of evidence pointing to election rigging. The most notable were the discrepancies on the voters' roll such as the negligence to register more than 2 million voters under the age of 30 and the appearance of hundreds of thousands of dead people on the voters' roll (Global Witness 2013: 2). ZANU PF was accused of employing a technology company with Israeli links, *Nikuv* to tamper with the electoral roll (Global Witness 2013: 2). In this case, diamond money was allegedly used to fund the operations of *Nikuv* which was housed at King George VI barracks. According to a United Kingdom paper called the *Mail on Sunday*, *Nikuv* was paid \$13 million for its role. The Chinese and Israeli firm *Nikuv* were thus fingered in the electoral fraud that happened in 2013. It is further alleged that ZANU PF worked with the registrar-general, Tobaiwa Mudede, to falsify the voters roll (Moyo 2013). According to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2013: 23), ZANU PF's electoral strategy in 2013 evidently shifted away from its traditional dependence on violence, although selective coercion and intimidation persisted. Morgan Tsvangirai told Lance Guma of *Nehanda Radio* that the elections held on 31 July 2013 ran short of credibility because they were militarised (Guma 2013). At a press conference held on 3 August 2013, Tsvangirai further stated that the elections were a farce due to the violations which marred the electoral process, and the absence of pre-election reforms. The voters roll, voter registration, special vote, bussing of people, ballot printing, access to the media and the question of assisted voters were all major worries (Zimbabwe Guardian 2013). Tsvangirai reported that in Muzarabani, of the 17, 000 voters 10, 500 were assisted voters (Zimbabwe Guardian 2013). Tsvangirai lamented: 'Our conclusion is that this has been a huge farce. The credibility of this election has been marred by administrative and legal violations



which affect the legitimacy of its outcome' (NTDTV 2013). At the ZANU PF National Congress in 2014, President Mugabe shockingly revealed that the MDC had won 73% majority in the 29 March 2008 elections (Mbiba 2014; Mbiba 2015; Kwaramba 2015).

### **7.8 Militarisation and politicisation of state institutions**

Debate has been generated in Zimbabwe on the subject of security sector reform. The debate emanates from the fact that the formalisation of the alliance between ZANU PF and the security sector from 2000 was calculated to prevent the MDC's access to state house (Chitiyo 2009: 3). This was because the MDC had gained so much ground judging by the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008. In addition, from 2000 until the establishment of the GNU in 2009, the country's political landscape was dominated by military personnel (Nyakudya 2013: 87-90).

In this study, the term militarization embodies all the observations that are outlined by Alexander who notes that:

First, militarisation referred to the posting of liberation war veterans and others with strong links to ZANU (PF) from senior ranks in the military to senior positions in state institutions. Such postings were used to build and discipline a partisan state. Second, militarisation encompassed the decisive intervention of the military quasi military and as part of the state in electoral politics, most dramatically in the run-up to the June 2008 elections. Third, it referred to the entrance of military men (former and serving, in and outside the state and party) into lucrative networks of accumulation and patronage, ranging from the award of government contracts and tenders to businesses owned by military and party leaders to more direct control of production and trade. These practices have a long history rooted in the 1970s, but the 1997 military intervention in the DRC marked a new watershed, while the involvement of the security forces in Zimbabwe's massive diamond fields from 2006 'cemented' their 'role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe's business community'. ...Finally, militarisation constituted a style of governance, most clearly embodied in the operation (Alexander 2013:811-812).

Zimbabwe's military has a history of directly reinforcing ZANU PF. ZANU PF interests have become confused and inseparable with the national interest due to the absence of a distinction between party, state and government (Chitiyo 2009: 3). This ruined good governance and democracy since the police, army and intelligence safeguarded ZANU PF elite's interests and frustrated, obstructed and intimidated opposition political parties and other non-state actors. State institutions failed to protect individuals and organisations which engaged in nonviolent methods in order to take a position with regards to socio-economic mismanagement and political

violations in the country (Raftopoulos 2006). In reality, the institutions were unable to provide the vital checks and balances on the government so that the executive arm of the government continued to dominate every sphere in the country.

This dominance of the security sector is indeed connected to the one party state system prevalent in Africa. Zimbabwe undoubtedly is to all intents and purposes a one party state where ZANU PF philosophy is dominant in state institutions, where the heads are obligated to be part and parcel of the business of the party, and even becoming central committee party members (Makumbe 2011: 16). The partisan character of the Zimbabwean military dates back to the 1970s liberation war where the party (ZANU PF) mediated the symbiotic connection between the privileged military and political leaders. After independence in 1980 it was not easy for this bond to end as:

...the liberation war fighters became the new soldiers in a new state; their commanders became part of Zimbabwe's military elite. Those who were part of the political wing of the liberation struggle became the new political elite. What unified the political and the military elites is the ZANU (PF) party (Masunungure 2009: 69-70).

The politicisation within the Zimbabwean military and the whole security sector was developed by several experiences after independence. These embody the 1965-1979 liberation war, *Gukurahundi* 1981-1987, when the ZDF killed between 20 000 and 25 000 civilians, the campaign in Mozambique to help FRELIMO against RENAMO, and counter-subversion activities by the CIO and the ZRP against apartheid South African military operatives (Chitiyo 2009: 3). Chitiyo further notes that the climax of the politicisation of the security sector was in 1997 when ex-combatants of the liberation war were drawn into an alliance with ZANU PF to prevent the MDC from getting into state power. Linked to this, Masunungure further argues that Mugabe, the 'liberation wartime commander-in-chief is still the commander-in-chief in post-independence Zimbabwe' making it difficult to exclude the military from aiding the party when it is in jeopardy. As a result of these developments, 'it has been difficult, if not impossible, for the military to insulate itself from ZANU (PF)'s partisan politics' (Masunungure 2009: 70). However, partisanship of the state institutions, especially the army, has no space in constitutional democracies because:

One of the defining features of constitutional democracies, and a hallmark of democratic politics, is the non-partisanship of the military and security organs of the state. This does

not necessarily mean soldiers and those who command them are political eunuchs; it does mean that soldiers are not partisan political animals. They serve the state, and not political actors, whether these are individuals or parties (Masunungure 2009: 69).

In an effort to buy the loyalty of security personnel, the Mugabe regime gave land and houses to the top security personnel, and appointing a significant number of serving and retired army officers in who are now leading institutions which were formerly led by civilians (Moss 2007: 140). I It is apparent that:

current or former military officers currently control the Ministries of Energy and Industry, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (in charge of tax collection), the electoral commission, the state railway, the Grain Marketing Board, and the parks authority, and several are serving in the Senate and ambassadorial posts abroad (Ploch 2009: 27).

To weaken civil resistance, several top government positions were occupied by former and serving members of the CIO and the military. Undeniably:

Since 2000, Zimbabwe's state has been described as increasingly 'militarised', with military men being appointed in key positions throughout the state, and an expanding range of decisions and actions being taken by the military, from political strategy to the formulation and implementation of agrarian and economic policy (Alexander and Tendi 2008: 10).

Practically, key institutions in the country were and continue to be 'policed' by the military most of whom have retired or are legally expected to have retired (Chitiyo 2009: 9-10. Under normal circumstances civilianisation of the ZNA High Command is supposed to be carried (Chitiyo and Rupiya n. d.: 360). However, the top officers as opposed to retiring from active service have been horizontally transferred to directorships of civilian institutions in a drive to ensure the 'political reliability' or 'correctness' of the public institutions. A case in point is that of George Chiweshe who was a former judge advocate for military tribunals in the ZNA and was in 2001 appointed to the High Court. He was then moved in 2004 to be the head of the Delimitation Commission responsible for demarcating constituencies before the 2005 parliamentary elections and was accused of gerrymandering constituencies for the benefit of ZANU PF. He was also the inaugural chair of ZEC when it was established in 2005 (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 25).

Moreover, the military has frequently threatened free and fair elections in instances where the MDC-T was poised for victory. The electoral system was steadily militarised and politicized. From 2000 to 2008, the military monitored the bodies responsible for the conduct of elections.

Former or serving personnel from the military were recruited to lead the ZEC and the Delimitation Commission which are accountable for elections (Pswarayi and Reeler 2012). Major-General Douglas Nyikayaramba once headed the body when it was still called the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) (Moyo 2014). More-over, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, a retired officer in the ZNA was head of the Electoral Supervisory Commission tasked with the administration of the 2002 presidential election (Rupiya n. d.).

(.). Consequently, ZEC was dominated by well known ZANU PF sympathisers who were either serving or retired officers from the military, intelligence and police. In this light, ZEC's secretariat was 'problematic, partisan and militarised' (Kwaramba 2012; Zhangazha 2013; Chivara 2013).

It was difficult to conduct elections as stipulated by statutory instruments which direct the conduct of elections due to a number of issues. The Delimitation Commission was commonly known for gerrymandering constituencies and determining the sizes of each constituency suiting or disadvantaging the non-state actors. ZEC was also known for not considering seriously election irregularities and was unwilling to investigate electoral fraud, did not have authority to subject election offenders to punishment, could not highlight legal faults with an effect on the electoral process, issued unclear reports without quantitative details of polling, and had few members of staff to effectively supervise elections. Moreover, the Election Directorate which was wholly composed of government workers who supported the incumbent ZANU PF party, handled elections secretly violating some laid down ground rules of conducting democratic elections. The Registrar-General of Elections' Office was known for being unable to register voters properly and its head, Tobaiwa Mudede was a known partisan official who is a Provincial Committee member of ZANU PF. The Registrar's office was largely defensive when responding to media, opposition and independent candidates' queries (Matyszak 2014).

The judiciary was also not exempted from partisan decisions and actions although it initially retained some degree of autonomy. In this regard, Chitiyo (2009: 17) observes that 'although the judiciary has not been padded with military personnel, many of the judges and magistrates were political appointees who fulfilled a party agenda'. It can be gleaned from this statement that partisanship perverted the judiciary, just like other institution in the country. Between 2000 and 2003 11 of the most experienced Supreme Court judges left the bench following the 2000 land

invasion and threats by war veterans. Between 2000 and 2005, long-serving Chief Justices, Gubbay and Dumbusthena were also purged. Earlier in 1998, a member of the Chiweshe-led Delimitation Commission, Job Wabira, an ex- permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence, was castigated for giving a cold shoulder to a High Court ruling to set free the *Standard Newspaper* journalists who had been arrested and tortured by the military for publishing a story concerning an alleged coup endeavour (Guma 2012b). The judiciary was partisan and it was unable to avert the introduction of a draconian piece of legislation, particularly during the time that Jonathan Moyo was information minister. The High Court at times made politically motivated judgments. The effectiveness of the judiciary support nonviolent methods was weakened by the fact that Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, a former Attorney General, his successor Johannes Tomana, and the minister of justice were all ZANU PF sympathisers (Chitiyo 2009: 17). In addition, Godfrey Chidyausiku, a former minister, attorney general, and a known supporter of ZANU PF became the new Supreme Court head (Addison and Laakso 2003: 465), and more recently chief justice (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 25).

The ZANU PF government also politicised previously independent institutions like the University of Zimbabwe, the ZRP and even town councils, by appointing its party sympathizers in key management and command positions. Civil society was no exception as parallel organizations were established to rival independent church bodies, labour, student and residents' associations (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 26). An example is ZINASU, which was countered by the pro-ZANU PF group, the Zimbabwe Congress of Students' Union (ZICOSU) (Kachiko 2015). Similarly, the Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) was formed to counter the pro-ZANU PF government Zimbabwe Teachers' Association (ZITA) as the latter neglected their members by meddling in party politics instead of the teachers' welfare (Newsday Own Correspondent 2014). The ZCTU was similarly countered by the government-backed Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) (Tarugarira 2011).

The ZRP officiated at ZANU PF primary elections, restricting and controlling street demonstrations by non-state actors and ignored violence by ZANU PF leaders and supporters. ZNA top leaders are known members of ZANU PF who penalised their junior officers for supporting the opposition parties, CIO monitored non-state actors, alerted ZANU PF of opposition strategies, harassed and intimidated opposition parties, and threatened civic and

opposition leaders (Makumbe 2011: 19). The Public Service Commission (now the Civil Service Commission (CSC)) allocated senior positions to members of ZANU PF and the then Ministry of National Affairs gave administrative support to ZANU PF and implemented the party's decisions, trained the youths of the party at vocational training centres, and operated from the ZANU PF headquarters (Makumbe 2011: 19).

The ZRP has on several occasions either prevented people who wanted to demonstrate from marching in the streets, or dispersed them by using tear-gas and police dogs (Makumbe 2011: 19). Memorable examples include the earlier referred to 11 March 2007 incident when the *Save Zimbabwe Campaign* 'prayer meeting' which had put together civil society, churches and political parties including the two MDC formations, was disrupted by riot police. The non-state actors staged a peaceful demonstration against being forbidden to hold a prayer meeting. Some of the peaceful demonstrators were bashed, arrested and detained.

More recently, at Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Information minister Jonathan Moyo dismissed board members, retired Brigadier Elliot Kasu and retired Brigadier-General Benjamin Mabenge for supporting the rot in which the ZBC CEO Happison Muchechetere pocketed over US\$40 000 per month while ordinary workers went unpaid for more than seven months (Moyo 2014). The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings responsible for regulating the national broadcaster was staffed by several former army officers. These comprised three retired brigadier generals Felix Muchemwa, Gilbert Mashingaidze and Benjamin Mabenge. The Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) responsible for allocating licences to would-be broadcasters has among its board members former army officers, retired brigadier general Elasto Madzingira and retired colonel Reuben Mqwayi (Zhangazha 2013). These prevented any efforts towards the establishment of independent media.

Public-private business partnerships operating in the diamond mining industry were militarised probably to gain protection from the security sector as they enriched themselves and entrenched the existing political elite's power. This was apparent in Mbada Diamonds and Ainjin Investments which were firmly controlled by former military officers, and were accused of non-payment of tax (Zhangazha 2013).

Following Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, the construction and allocation of houses meant for civilian victims was led by army officers. A significant number of the intended beneficiaries did not get the houses which were allocated to the police and army personnel instead in a process that was riddled by bribes and political status (Freedom House 2007; Ploch 2010: 25). As a result, operation *Garikai* became a national scandal because it had many discrepancies, and the military and relatives of the politically privileged occupied many of the houses (Chitiyo 2009: 6). Military involvement in agriculture was done under Operation *Taguta (Maguta)* ('Eat Well') beginning in late 2005 which was an acknowledgement of failure of the government's land reform to meet the demand of grain in the country (Solidarity Peace Trust 2006). Initially, the military was incorporated in food distribution under the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) but *Maguta* extended the military involvement in food production under a command agriculture system. It was a programme designed to deploy military personnel across the country to control the population (Ploch 2009: 20-21; Pswarayi and Reeler 2012: 13-14). In April 2006, soldiers compelled farmers to sell their grain to the GMB (Ploch 2009: 21). It is evident from the above that for one to benefit from most militarised government institutions one had to be either passive or support ZANU PF. In this way the militarisation of institutions constrained the effectiveness of nonviolent organisations and individuals who were ready to confront the state via protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention methods.

Apart from the soldiers involvement in food production, the GMB has since 2000 been managed by security personnel, from Samuel Muvuti, a retired army colonel, to the current Albert Mandizha, a past senior assistant police commissioner who took over from the former in 2007 (Zhangazha 2013). Retired major general Mike Nyambuya, Energy minister in the early 2000s, was appointed as chairperson of National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board in 2012. Other militarised state entities include Zimpapers, Kingstons and New Ziana among others (Zhangazha 2013).

Former minister of State enterprises, Gorden Moyo, revealed the extent of militarisation of state enterprises at a public forum in Bulawayo in February 2014 when he said:

When I was the state enterprises minister, I called all parastatal board members to my office. I was surprised most introduced themselves as retired brigadiers, retired colonels, retired generals and retired commanders. So why is this a problem? It is a problem because the current government has been propped up by the military (Moyo 2014).

It is therefore apparent that ZANU PF reacted to the popularity of the MDC and the outcry by other non-state actors by staffing state run institutions with both erstwhile and serving military personnel. The members of the security sector were therefore a disservice to democratic processes, apart from outlawing peaceful demonstrations.

From the above, one can gather that ZANU PF politicised and militarised almost every state institution for the sole purpose of self-preservation. It is beyond doubt that this blocked any efforts by non-state actors to influence their government to bring about socio-economic and political changes in the country.

### **7.9 Use of food as a political weapon**

The government of Zimbabwe persecuted perceived political opponents by denying them access to food programmes (Human Rights Watch 2003b). According to Sachikonye (2012: 58), food was used as a political weapon in both rural and urban areas. ZANU PF in particular was able to manipulate the processes for registering beneficiaries and in the process it prohibited non-ZANU PF supporters from receiving food aid (Human Rights Watch 2003b: 3). Government food handouts were also used as a political tool in elections when it gave those who supported and promised to vote for ZANU PF, but denied it to MDC supporters (Freedom House 2007; Ploch 2009: 21; Masunungure 2009: 68)

One can draw comparisons with the experiences of the liberation struggle. The Rhodesian Security Forces, especially the Selous Scouts used chemical and biological weapons to kill ‘terrorists’. But the civilians were also affected as their animal herds died in large numbers. Cholera and anthrax became more widespread after the government realised that the guerrillas were infiltrating in large numbers (Hove 2012b: 198-199). The tactics used included poisoning wells, spreading cholera, infecting clothes were clandestinely distributed to guerrillas, and using anthrax to kill cattle and thus deny food supplies to the guerrillas (Hove 2012b: 198-199). It is therefore apparent that every regime has its own strategies and tactics to survive.

Food was used as a political weapon against vulnerable rural people who had to bow down to ZANU PF leaders in order to get food. Villagers who were supposed to be free from danger or threat (Bastick and Whitman 2013: 4) were at risk, especially those who did not support ZANU PF. In rural areas, maize was distributed by ZANU PF councillors and chiefs who employed



party politics to discriminate against perceived and known MDC members (Mutanda 2013a: 43). Headmen, working in liaison with officials from the ZNA and senior ZANU PF officials, were in control of Operation Maguta/Inala (Saxon 2013). Zimbabwe has experienced critical shortages of food ever since 2000,

The year 2008 was very bad for Zimbabweans in many respects. Famine was widespread and the supermarkets were virtually empty. Inflation levels were very high and a small tin of scarce shoe polish could cost \$21 billion (NewsRevue 2008). In a YouTube video posted by CNN, rural dwellers could be seen scavenging for food, specifically wild fruits (*hacha/chakata*) and literally competed with animals. People survived on *hacha* for a whole week. The villagers openly confirmed the shortage of food due to the economic collapse. They complained: 'It is the only food we have got and sometimes it is making us sick. Look at my mother here'. Due to the dire food shortage, Morgan Tsvangirai said Zimbabwe's situation in 2008 resembled a country emerging from war because it had many signs of a failed state (NewsRevue 2008). In fact, there was nothing to eat during breakfast, lunch and supper except *hacha* (Al Jazeera English 2008). People had to rely on food aid mainly from the World Food Programme via its implementing partners like World Vision, Mercy Corps, Concern, Goal and Oxfam. The government distributed grain was obtained on the basis of political affiliation.

Even essential agricultural input distribution was politicised. This was apparent during the administration of the mechanisation programme and Operation *Maguta/Inala*. According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which financed both programmes, the aim was to enhance national food security through increased agricultural production in an effort to increase the overall export potential of Zimbabwe's farming community, in a drive towards self-reliance (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2008: 17). Operation *Maguta/Inala* was set up in 2005 under the administration of the army and as a government strategy for mobilising and distributing inputs such as seed, fuel and fertiliser to *A1* and communal farmers countrywide in an effort to fill the silos of the Grain Marketing Board (Zvauya 2014). The ZNA was deployed to perennially dry areas such as Mudzi, Nkayi, Zaka, Gokwe and Gwanda (Nematiyere 2011). Instead of deploying Agricultural Extension Services teams in all parts of the country, the government used soldiers clad in military regalia especially during election period as an intimidation and vote buying technique by ZANU PF in a scheme which benefited its supporters only.

The agricultural input distribution scheme was chaotic in Mhondoro in Mashonaland West province, and this prompted villagers on 12 January 2012 to demonstrate against the councillor after failing to receive seeds and fertiliser, saying ‘Une vanhu vako’ (you have your own people) . In a related incident in Mataga, Mberengwa in the Midlands province, on 16 January 2012 a Grain Marketing Board official told people that they were to get inputs after break time provided they had cars. Beneficiaries protested against the corrupt decision (SWRADIOAFRICA 2012a/b). In practice, ZANU PF leaders invited and/or coerced people to attend its meetings and rallies, but excluded supporters of other political parties where material benefits lay (SWRADIOAFRICA 2011).

Even the food handouts to the Tokwe-Mukosi (Chivi) flood victims were politicised when government reneged from its obligations of giving four hectares of land and US\$4000 to each of the affected families. Over 18 000 were crowded in Chingwizi Transit Camp in Mwenezi where some victims lived in tents while others slept in the open. One hundred victims were treated for diarrhoea at Chingwizi each day because water was difficult to get and women waited long hours to get the precious commodity (Marwizi 2014). Despite the suffering experienced by the flood victims, the former Prime Minister in the GNU, Tsvangirai was barred from assessing the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis and interacting with the victims. The MDC reported that its members were prevented from getting into the camp because ZANU PF is so used to partisan distribution of food that they may want to misrepresent all assistance to the unfortunate victims as coming from ZANU PF’ (Tamborinyoka 2014). The allegations were confirmed by Alfios Chekai who said that some government officials in the province set up tuck shops, flea markets and restaurants at Neshuro Business Centre a few kilometres from the camp to cash in on the donations (Antonio 2014). The victims revealed that the then Provincial Affairs minister for Masvingo, Kudakwashe Bhasikiti and other top government officials gave credit to ZANU PF for the assistance, yet it came from well-wishers (Antonio 2014).

### **7.10 Manipulating church leaders**

The church’s participation in post-colonial democratic politics has been both intricate and unclear. At intervals, some quarters of the church became opposed to government activities while others acknowledged the state’s authority in the face of despotism. It is vital to realise that church leaders were divided over violence. The church institution was expected to protect people

and encourage nonviolence. However, due to politicisation and manipulation this institution was divided into pro-peace (non-state actors) and pro-violence (ZANU PF) camps.

In the pro-violence category was the Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) led by Johannes Ndanga, which was considered to be the voice of the church by ZANU PF. ZANU PF took advantage of its large membership and the ‘passive’ loyalty of its supporting apostolic sects in order to fulfil its political ends. The president and his senior lieutenants liked to frequent the gatherings of apostolic churches, especially during the run up to elections. The ACCZ stance of Mugabe and his party was in sharp contrast with the disposition of Western oriented main line churches which were actively critical of Mugabe’s rule. The ACCZ was actually formed in 2010 during the tenure of the GNU and was officially launched by the then Vice President Joice Mujuru (Mugabe 2012). Her involvement compels one to be sceptical about the motives for the formation of the ACCZ. Ndanga explicitly stated that ZANU PF, the Apostolic and Zion churches shared certain values in common, in an effort to counter the suspicion that ACCZ was a ZANU PF project.

*Johane Masowe YeChishanu* church was attacked by the government because it refused to be a puppet of ZANU PF, yet it was considered a revolutionary organisation during the Second Chimurenga when it criticised the late Ian Smith’s regime. Fearing the influence it could rally against ZANU PF:

The party mobilised all dark forces at its disposal, the Police force, Zanu PF militia, ZBC, The Herald, The Sunday Mail, the impartial courts, bogus church associations as well as dubious human rights groups to wage a physical as well as philosophical war against a relatively inconspicuous and unassuming group of Jesus Christ followers (Chimbalu 2014).

In its multi-pronged attack, ZANU PF was fronted by Johannes Ndanga the leader of a counterfeit organisation the ACCZ. Webster Shamu bore the brunt of showdown from *Johane Masowe YeChishanu* church in 2011 when he attempted to address its members at their annual general meeting (*musangano wegore*) in spite of blessings obtained from the so called *vapositori* leaders. He was booed and deserted by the church (Chimbalu 2014). It must, however, be emphasised that leaders from different church organisations do not support ZANU PF by force, but it is principally a matter of safeguarding personal interests.

As observed by Chitando (2013: vii), religion and politics are ‘systems of survival’. Muchechetere quoted in Chimuka (2013: 27) argue that the political role of the churches intensified after the 1990s as a result of the unfolding political and economic crisis. Groupings such as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) and the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference became vocal in criticising state repression and the government ultimately responded by forming the ACCZ.

A number of church leaders aligned to ZANU PF castigated popular Nigerian prophet Temitope Balogun Joshua (TB Joshua), alleging that he was not welcome in Zimbabwe and noted that his teachings were ‘judgmental, partisan and unorthodox’. This was brought up when Tsvangirai invited TB Joshua to be the guest speaker at the National Day of Prayer pencilled in for 25 May, Africa Day, 2012. Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe president and spokesperson, Goodwill Shana said: ‘People have a right to believe what they want, but it is difficult to believe a Word of God that comes on a partisan basis. We don’t want judgmental teachings, that is why we don’t subscribe to his teachings’ (Guma 2012a). Pentecostal Assemblies of Zimbabwe leader and ZANU PF supporter, Bishop Trevor Manhanga noted that TB Joshua had no power to transform the political landscape in Zimbabwe. He urged the prophet to first pray for “burning” Nigeria before talking of visiting Zimbabwe’.

The church was not impartial in its involvement in politics. The church institution is expected to operate as an instrument for checks and balances on the behaviour of the state, but this was not the case in Zimbabwe and the Anglican saga was a case in point (Interview with Mangena, resident of Harare, 3 June 2014). However, ZANU PF and its partisan church leaders embraced ex-communicated Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga who declared Tsvangirai a ‘sell out’ who should not be voted into power. He preached about the holiness of Mugabe and the satanic behaviour of Tsvangirai. Moreover, he attacked Bishops such as Julius Makoni, Chad Gandiya, and any MDC-T sympathisers, as agents who furthered western interests. He concluded that elections were to grant Zimbabweans a chance to choose between good, Mugabe, and death, Tsvangirai (Guma 2012a).

According to the bible, church leaders are supposed to speak on behalf of the voiceless oppressed majority, to limit the powers of leaders, to appoint and denounce leaders in light of the gross

violations of the guidelines given by God. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century leaders are guided by the constitutions designed in their countries and should be criticised if they fail to uphold them. It was the case with those who criticised President Mugabe and his ZANU PF party because they had violated human rights, perpetrated political violence, introduced oppressive legislation and conducted elections without transparency and accountability. In such circumstances, there was no space to effectively use nonviolent campaigns to compel the government to change its strategy of governing the country, without serious consequences from the Mugabe regime.

Manipulation was widely used during the run up to the 2013 elections by ZANU PF and doses of violence applied to ensure victory, whilst the MDC lacked patience and did too little for nonviolence to succeed. If the MDC-T was to call for a stay-away very few people will take part because of the need to concentrate on what brings food on the table, thus there is little collective action (Interview, Masunungure 22 June 2014).

### **7.11 Suppression of NGOs and teachers' organisations**

The United Nations (UN) openly acknowledges the role and positive contribution of civil society in all facets of development. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are active in areas of UN peacekeeping where they deliver development assistance and humanitarian aid (Stahn 2001: 379-380). The government of Zimbabwe has been launching an onslaught on NGOs ever since 2000. In 2010, the government banned NGOs from donating anything to the poor accusing them of being a front of the opposition party, the MDC (Mutanda 2013a: 43).

In March 2002, President Mugabe was declared the winner after garnering 54 percent of the vote in elections that were marred by overt irregularities and violence. Subsequently, the country was suspended from the Commonwealth and several countries imposed sanctions targeted at President Mugabe and his close supporters. In the aftermath of the 2002 elections, Mugabe sought to tighten his grip on power by crafting new legislation which was used by the government to prohibit or disrupt public meetings and demonstrations, threats and verbal attacks being published in the press (Davidson and Purohit 2004: 113). Many groups and persons were subject to harsh treatment, not only opposition leaders and supporters but also independent journalists, trade unionists, NGOs, civil society activists, teachers, judges and lawyers.

Zimbabwean NGOs argue that Mugabe and his colleagues benefited from organisations such as International Red Cross Society which funded the education of nationalist leaders and guerrilla supporters who languished in Smith's prisons. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and a number of Northern NGOs called for a boycott against the Rhodesian government which was notorious for violating human rights (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 2012: 1). Towards the run-up to the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off elections, President Mugabe instructed aid organisations to stop emergency distribution of food and medicines such as HIV anti-retrovirals (Thornycroft 2008). ZANU PF took advantage of the erratic food situation in the country. It was even worse in the urban areas where there was no maize meal in supermarkets. Aid agencies such as Care and Oxfam were among those affected by the government clampdown (Thornycroft 2008).

### **7.12 Awarding 'key' allies hefty salaries/packages**

When Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans realised that the demobilisation allowances were not enough to cater for their needs, they resorted to peaceful but forceful demonstrations at national events such as Heroes' Day in 1997. At last the government succumbed to the war veterans' demands and offered them huge unbudgeted gratuities. This was at the time of involvement in the war in DRC and further worsened the economic situation (Willems 2004: 1770). The government swiftly responded by disbursing a lump sum of Z\$50, 000 to each veteran (Hove and Mutanda 2014: 121). One school of thought argues that this was a way of buying their loyalty and political support in the upcoming elections (Besada and Moyo 2008: 2). The Z\$50 000 was a lot of money at the time but very few managed to use it productively and therefore sunk into poverty again within a few years.

The ZANU PF government followed this up by tasking the former war heroes to lead the violent land invasions as a way to silence them. In May 2007, war veterans were rewarded with Z\$9 billion from a paltry Z\$1.6 billion whereas 'enemies' of the state, teachers, were given Z\$6 billion from Z\$3 billion national budget (Hove and Mutanda 2014: 123). It became the strategy of the government to award key allies a range of benefits for political survival in light of the pressure that was exerted by the opposition MDC.

### **7.13-Violence against dissenting voices and fanning divisions**

The Robert Mugabe regime resorted to the use of state security organs against dissenting voices as a strategy to maintain Mugabe's grip on power. Key perpetrators of violence were war

veterans, the army, police, senior civil servants, ZANU PF militia, traditional leaders and common criminals (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010b: 11). This reveals that the traditional leaders failed to act as neutral custodians of communities they lead by getting involved in politics (Interview, Mangena 3 June 2014). In fact, Zimbabwe represents a classic case of an authoritarian regime hanging on to power by using whatever methods it considers necessary to ensure its continued existence (Davidson and Purohit 2004: 109). ZANU PF's dominance in electoral politics since 1980 has been explained differently by various authorities. This includes ZANU PF's attitude and behaviour towards opposition parties since independence, and the use of state institutions such as the CIO, police, army, and the media (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 132). However, among these one thing is ignored, that is, up to mid-1992 the ruling party was financed from public funds through the now defunct Ministry of Political Affairs to which no other party had access to. Although the Ministry was later on abolished, the financing of the ruling party continued under the Political Parties (Finance) Act of 1994 under which a party that had at least 15 seats in Parliament was entitled to public funds.

In 2007, the student union leaders at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Bulawayo were terrorised by the CIO (Moore 2007: 5). Their crime was that they had sent a petition to President Mugabe informing him that he was going to cap half-baked graduands at the 13<sup>th</sup> Graduation Ceremony on 12 October 2007 because they had attended lectures for less than 30 percent of their stipulated learning time, because of the government's failure to address the multi-faceted socio-economic and political crisis bedevilling the country (Moore 2007: 5). According to Zeilig, at the University of Zimbabwe:

Student leaders in ZINASU were frequently being picked up and tortured, often from their campus rooms in the night. The Information and Publicity Secretary, Phillip Pasirayi, temporarily 'disappeared' after being arrested in the middle of the night from the UZ, only to appear days later in Avondale Police Station (Zeilig 2008: 234).

Raymond Majongwe, Secretary General of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) surrendered himself to the police who were looking for him. He was beaten and injured by the police but not charged under the controversial POSA. He and other union leaders were accused of going into schools and intimidating teachers into adhering to their strike call. In response, the MDC condemned 'the politicised and militarised Zimbabwe Republic Police for the assault on the Secretary-General of the Progressive Teachers' Union', and noted that this was

in contravention of ‘the constitution of Zimbabwe, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several protocols to which Zimbabwe is a signatory, which clearly prohibit torture and other degrading treatment’ (News Monitor 2002).

Besides targeting opposition members and sympathisers, ZANU PF is also known for intimidating or eliminating party moderates. Towards the run up to the 2013 harmonised elections, Edward Chindori-Chininga died in a suspicious car crash (Moyo 2013). At the time of his death Chindori-Chininga was ZANU PF MP for Guruve South. The widely agreed reason for his death was his stance regarding Zimbabwe’s diamond industry. As a result of a sizeable number of Zimbabwean politicians who have died in mysterious car crashes, there was much speculation that Chindori-Chininga died at the hands of individuals in the state security apparatus who are loyal to ZANU PF. This can be compared with the deaths of prominent politicians through accidents such as Josiah Tongogara, Moven Mahachi, Border Gezi and Elliot Manyika. In a similar manner, the death of former army general Solomon Mujuru who died in a mysterious fire at his farm, was linked to diamonds (Gonda 2013) and/or leadership succession challenge in ZANU PF. According to the faceless *Facebook* character called *Baba Jukwa*, the long list includes Lookout Masuku who died in suspicious circumstances a few weeks after his release from prison and Susan Tsvangirai, wife of Morgan Tsvangirai who died in a car accident in 2009 (Baba Jukwa 2013).

In June 2005, Operation Murambatsvina was launched and this was followed up by attacks on ‘*Save Zimbabwe Campaign*’ marchers on March 11, 2007. This led to the death of youth organiser, Gift Tandare whereas MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai suffered deep cuts on his head. Other MDC activists like Sekai Holland and Grace Kwinjeh among many others were beaten up (Moore 2007: 9-10). During Operation Murambatsvina the government destroyed the sources of livelihood and homes of more than 700, 000 people for voting for the MDC. After receiving international criticism, especially after a report produced by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues, Anna Tibaijuka the government launched Operation Garikai to provide housing to the internally displaced, although as we have seen, many of the built houses were given to ZANU PF supporters and government associates (Besada and Moyo 2008: 18). This inevitably reflected the increase of repression in Zimbabwe.



Some people suffered permanent ailments such as lung damage after being repeatedly drowned and resuscitated during interrogation by the CIO (Hill 2005: 129). It cannot, however, be denied that the MDC were not always mere bystanders, but would sometimes retaliate, although this was after fellow members had been persecuted. Their revenge only gave ZANU PF the excuse to retaliate more which they did with the support of state security organs. In Zimbabwe, violence has been institutionalised to build an authoritarian state (Sachikonye 2011: xviii). When President Mugabe lost the presidential elections to Tsvangirai in 2008 security forces intervened by unleashing terror and violence in order to ensure that President Mugabe won the run-off presidential elections (Kebonang 2012: 29). On 16 April 2008, the state sent soldiers to beat and terrorise the people in Chitungwiza for voting for the MDC in the harmonised elections that had been held in March of the same year. The strategy was to stop them from voting for the MDC in the run-off that was supposed to take place in June 2008. In the town of Chitungwiza, the Chairperson of Chitungwiza Residents Association and chief election agent for the MDC-M was heavily assaulted by the soldiers who were on a three day assignment to 'bring hell' to the people of Chitungwiza (Sachikonye 2011: 54). Many people in Chitungwiza were brutally assaulted and this madness went on without any restraint from the state.

The prevalence of violence in other towns was also perpetrated by state security organs who acted with the full blessings of the state. The presence of a strong and united MDC has always been a threat to President Mugabe. Besides introducing rigid legislation to stem the operations of the MDC, ZANU PF also fomented divisions within the opposition. It is alleged that the MDC split into two that is the MDC-T and MDC-M, because it was infiltrated by the CIO operatives. Further divisions followed after the 2013 harmonised elections which resulted in the heaviest defeat of the MDC amid poll rigging. On April 10, 2014 the MDC national council expelled deputy treasurer-general Elton Mangoma, national executive member Last Maengahama, former director in the then Prime Minister's Office Jacob Mafume, and youth secretary-general Promise Mkwananzi (Tafirenyika 2014: 1). After their departure Mugabe was quoted as: '*Kana muchisiyana, vanobuda vobuda parunyararo kana vachida kuita party yavo, voita parunyararo*

(If there is a break-up, it must be in peace and if they want to have their own party, let them do it peacefully)'.<sup>4</sup> Morgan Tsvangirai accused Mugabe of fuelling the tensions when he said:

I heard my colleague (President Mugabe) saying rebels in the MDC should be left to express their opinion. "*Wazobuda pachenaka kuti ndiwe waivatuma. Mwoyochena wei mombe kuyamwisa mhuru isiri yayo?* (Now you have come out clear that you sent them (rebels) to cause disunity). How does a cow feed another's calf?) (Tafirenyika 2014: 1).

The police, army, militia and CIO systematically coordinated to block and crush the 'Final Push' campaign in 2003 (Sachikonye 2012: 58). The campaign was undertaken by students, NCA and WOZA and was designed to compel the Mugabe regime to resign.

Morgan Tsvangirai revealed that Mugabe had threatened to pull out of SADC if they were not going to go along with him. SADC's resolution in Maputo had agreed to have reforms before the July 2013 elections but in the end they had to protect his position (Guma 2013). SADC as guarantors were supposed to ensure that the conditions were ripe for an election.

The state in Zimbabwe employed its instruments of violence against non-state actors. According to Gene Sharp, the pillars that sustain violence are, 'The institutions and sections of the society that supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity'. Examples of the pillars of support include: 'police, prisons and military forces supplying sanctions, moral and religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy), labour groups and business and investment groups supplying economic resources, and similarly with the other identified sources of political power' (Sharp 2003:36; Helvey 2004: 91-18). From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that as long as the pillars of violence remained behind the Mugabe regime, he had an upper hand against nonviolent advocates.

In fact, the Zimbabwean case where the military was not separated from the regime, dovetails into what Zoltan Barany noted in his article about the role of the military during 2011 Arab Spring Movement that, 'no revolution within a state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces' (Barany 2012: 24). This observation that revolutions need the armed forces to back them or at least stay impartial has also been universalised by many prominent scholars and is applicable to popular uprisings beyond the scope of Barany's point of

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<sup>4</sup> This was said during Independence Day celebrations held on 18 April 2014 at the National Sports stadium the usual venue of the main national celebration.

attention (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 46; Nepstad 2011: 128). Therefore, as presently shown by the situation in Egypt it should be clear to the nonviolence advocates that as long as the majority of the security sector personnel remain loyal to the regime and other outside factors exert minimal pressure, the conflict can become drawn out leading to severe loss of life and no serious change to the regime status or any interior reform. However, the challengers of a repressive regime have the strength in that, 'Even if a government has monopoly of military force and the support of the world's one remaining superpower, it is still ultimately powerless if the people refuse to recognize its authority' (Zunes 2011).

#### **7.14 Summary**

To silence the non-state actors who used nonviolent strategies and tactics to influence the state to handle the socio-economic and political challenges they faced, the state employed various strategies and tactics. Indeed, rigid legislation was introduced and militia, police, CIO, war veterans and military violence was unleashed on the non-state actors who used nonviolent ways to call for improvement in different sectors of the Zimbabwean community. NGOs were outlawed, food was used for vote buying, hefty packages were paid to manipulate the traditional and church leaders, including war veterans and private media critical of the state was banned.

### **7.15 Conclusion**

The non-state actors were weakened through the state driven multi-faceted strategies. It was viewed to be the road to democracy via elections, that are not a nonviolent method because they are institutionalised, which painted a wrong picture about the effectiveness of nonviolence. The state actor was able to use all the state machinery such as the judiciary, military, traditional leaders, police and CIO to coerce the population into voting for it and to rig the elections. In this regard, the non-state actors had no strategy put in place to deal with flouted electoral processes, rigged elections and refusal to publish election results in respect of the constitutional directives. It was largely the politicisation and militarisation of state systems which dealt a death blow to nonviolent means of resolving conflicts notwithstanding the multiple scores registered by actors such as WOZA. The Zimbabwean case is a good example where nonviolence briefly succeeded and failed in the long term in light of non-legislated tactics and violence used by ZANU PF. The next chapter presents the direct and indirect effects of the state actor responses to the nonviolent campaigns used in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013.

## **PART IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

*'Our lives begin to end the day we choose to be silent about things that matter'- Martin Luther King, Jnr.*

### **8.0 CHAPTER 8: EFFECTS OF THE STATE ACTOR AND NON-STATE ACTORS' CONFLICT**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses some of the effects of the Zimbabwean conflict which took place between the state actor and non-state actors between 1999 and 2013 thus accomplishing the last part of the third objective. It does not provide a comprehensive history of the effects of the Zimbabwean conflict but provides a few examples that were caused by the contestations between the state actor and non-state actors. Practically, the conflict culminated in the introduction of targeted international sanctions, economic meltdown and the subsequent collapse of service delivery, increased corruption, emigration of Zimbabweans and the entrenchment of violence. Up to 2013 there were no signs of sustainable solution to the Zimbabwean conflict or the socio-economic and political challenges facing the country. In fact, it grew worse after the collapse of the GNU (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014) following ZANU PF's 31 July 2013 contested election victory.

#### **8.2 Economic meltdown and the shortage of basic commodities**

Zimbabwe has experienced an economic meltdown since 1998 which grew worse during the first decade of the new millennium. Zimbabwe's economic performance during this period was the worst in Southern Africa. According to the World Bank the country's per capita income at independence was around \$1 300, but declined to about \$950 in ..... (Makumbe 2011: 21). This was caused mainly by bad government policies, disregard of the rule of law, and private property rights. The non-state actors exposed the failures of government and exposed the corrupt practices which were given a cold shoulder by the ZANU PF-led government. Hyper-inflation led to an 80% decline in standard of living which by December 2008 resulted in the replacement of the Zimbabwean dollar by multi-currencies, mainly the US dollar, South African rand and Botswana pula. The banking sector also collapsed as people preferred assets other than the money market ones which were easily eroded by hyper-inflation (Web dev author 2009). The multi-currency regime came after ten years of neglect by the government on pointed criticisms in its policies. The country also witnessed an unemployment rate of 94% and a 90% poverty rate (Makumbe

2011: 21). This was a result of populist policies and refusal to scale down on government expenditure on parliamentarians, the cabinet and the security sector.

Zimbabwe's economy was weakened by the country's shift from food self-sufficiency to massive food imports where the government spent millions importing over 50% of the maize and wheat requirements. Against this negative development, the government refused to carry out a farm ownership audit and to enact policies to compel those who own land to effectively utilise it, and the net consequence was food insecurity. In addition, almost all goods the country used to manufacture like cooking oil, textiles and furniture were imported (Makumbe 2011: 21). This was caused by populist price controls which neglected the expenditures incurred by producers and inevitably led to the shortage of almost everything. A good example is 'Operation Reduce Prices' which was launched in June 2007 forcing retailers to reduce their prices by 50% in an effort to address the declining purchasing power of the Zimbabwean dollar. Unsurprisingly, this led to disappearance of stocks of basic commodities from shop shelves as it was not viable for producers to supply goods at prices below production cost. Commodities such as maize-meal, cooking oil and sugar became scarce in shops, but available at parallel markets where they were sold at exorbitant prices and often for foreign currency (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 27). Furthermore, industries and firms reduced production, reduced quality, or diverted production to other goods not susceptible to price controls creating more shortages (Makocheanwa 2007: 8). Living from hand to mouth was the order of the day for banks, and liquidity challenges emerged. Long term loans for farmers and businesses were non-existent as a result of hyper-inflation (Rotberg 2011: 6).

Runaway inflation and increasing cash shortages were recorded in Zimbabwe after 2000. Those dependent on fixed incomes and pensioners were the most affected as the government could not ensure that goods were available on the shelves, but totally failed to control inflation which by the end of 2003 had reached 600 percent (Ndlovu 2004: 217). The economic crisis at its peak in 2008 was characterised by a 165,000 percent hyper-inflation rate, a decline in the value of the Zimbabwean currency recording 99.9 percent against the US dollar, and an over 90 percent unemployment rate. Between 1997 and 2007 living standards dropped by 38 percent. All this left the government unable to fund public education and health among other sectors. As one of the effects of the economic decline, by 2006 AIDS was killing about 2 500 people weekly, and by

2007 about 1 320 739 children and adults were living with the disease (Mlambo 2013: 367). Food relief was supporting almost half the population as there was shortage of almost everything for consumers (Bratton and Masunugure 2011: 28). By 2007 Zimbabwe's economy was suffering from shortages of all kinds and continued on its downward spiral (Moss 2007: 135).

### **8.3 Collapse of service delivery**

In the period after 2000 the country's schools, clinics and hospitals were badly in disrepair, with a huge shortage of drugs and personnel with the required qualifications to work in the provision of these essential services. The collapse of service delivery was due to the crippling economic quagmire caused by mismanagement. Demonstrations, stay-aways, sit-ins and music were some of the reactions (discussed in chapter 6) echoing the need for engagement by the opposition political parties but were ignored by the government. Mass exodus of qualified personnel and professionals from the education and health sectors among others, in search of greener pastures outside the country contributed immensely to the collapse of service delivery in the country.

The mass exodus of teaching professionals negatively affected the public education sector by compromising the quality of education delivered. Professionals were replaced by untrained Ordinary and Advanced level school leavers (Mawere 2012: 112). According to Ndlovu (2004: 218), infrastructure at schools was in poor condition, from broken desks and toilets, walls with peeling paint, to laboratories with no equipment and books. In both rural and urban areas school fees were not affordable for many, forcing pupils to withdraw. Mission schools which were known for good education and training of professionals were also not spared as they were not able to maintain quality. Staff and student strikes at the state's major universities were witnessed year in year out crippling tertiary education. School enrolment in 2003 had declined to 65 percent (Kibble 2004: 228).

The period between 2000 and 2008 has been dubbed the destabilisation period/phase as it witnessed a decline in the quality of education, destruction of educational infrastructure, and internal instability was worsened by socio-economic and political deterioration, resulting in the movement and relocation of professionals in education. The effects of the neo-liberal structural adjustment policies, aggravated by economic mismanagement and corruption, accelerated the mass exodus of professionals from the country from the mid 1990s, through to the late 1990s (Mawere 2012: 113).

The economic meltdown coupled with political violence led to the shutdown of rural schools for a large part of 2008 as morale among the teachers who remained in the country was very low, and most of them were inexperienced or untrained, resulting in school attendance dropping drastically from about 85 percent in late 2007 to a mere 20 percent by the end of 2008. The education system by 2009 had declined to the extent where it was viewed as a ‘national disaster’ (Mlambo 2013: 357, 372-374; Interview, Muzenda 15 June 2014), given the fact that at the height of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008 the education sector was operating at minimum capacity. Informal schools mushroomed and there was no one to monitor the provision of education (Interview with Nyachega, teacher in Manicaland, 18 June 2014) and ‘by 2013 most of the private schools had just become a money spinning game’ (Interview, Paradzai 13 June 2014).

Higher and tertiary education was also affected by the economic and political crisis as lecturers left for other countries (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014). The lack of important basic services like water and sanitation compelled universities and other tertiary institutions to continuously postpone opening dates and even closing indefinitely because they could not operate under such unfavourable conditions (Association for the Development of Africa (ADEA) 2013: 40). Students faced serious challenges and many could not afford accommodation and transport costs that were spiralling due to the ever rising inflation. This forced a significant number of female students into prostitution (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014). In addition, fulfilment of experiential learning requirements of programmes that demand work-related learning and internships was increasingly difficult, if not impossible to implement as many companies underwent liquidation or shut down (Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA) 2009: 5-6).

The government withdrew grants which were paid to students at the University of Zimbabwe and students had to depend on bread as their main dish while others had to cook *sadza* (thick porridge) in their study bedrooms (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014). When interviewed on 9 June 2014, Moyo (a University of Zimbabwe graduate from Plumtree in Matabeleland South province) revealed that the education system was seriously affected and some students who were enrolled at universities could not construct a decent sentence in English. Commenting about the impact of the Zimbabwean crisis on education, UNICEF noted that:



Now on the brink of collapse, Zimbabwe's education system was once the best in Africa ....Past successes have been reversed by a raft of problems hinging on the lack of financing, which led to a marked decline in the pay envelope of teachers and school improvements grants (UNICEF 2009: 1).

The strategy of violence used by the state actor led to the displacement of teachers in the rural areas. Consequently, 'in 2008, 94% of the rural schools were closed' (Sachikonye 2009: 156) because of politically motivated violence.

Hospitals and clinics were left without equipment and medicines as well as qualified personnel. According to Mawere citing Chikanda, a 2002 survey showed that about 71% of nurses in Zimbabwe were contemplating leaving the country for various reasons:

...better earnings abroad, the need to save quickly for later use at home, pessimism about Zimbabwe's future, fear of crime and violence, the impossibility of making ends meet on public sector salaries, the need to ensure children's future, the demanding nature of their work, lack of opportunities for professional advancement, and fear of contracting Aids at work due to the absence of basic equipment such as gloves (Mawere 2012: 114).

All this impacted negatively on health care service delivery in Zimbabwe. Ndlovu (2004: 218) notes that both goods and services in Zimbabwe were either unaffordable or not available, and social welfare services meant for the poor had collapsed due to lack of funding by the government. For instance, the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) created by the government in 2001 to improve access to quality education by orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) covering their school and examination fees up to Advanced level virtually dried up in 2007 (ADEA 2013: 43).

However, it is critical to note that high fee-paying private schools managed to maintain fair standards for some time, but this was not the same with private doctors. Only the elite managed to afford the fees of the doctors, hospitals and medicines and some facilities were no longer available. For instance, patients on medical aid were forced to pay cash and claim later from service providers. Particularly doctors quarrelled over rates and payment procedures, making the employees on medical aid not different from those without cover. The situation was worsened by the government's response to the failures of service providers when it punished those headmasters who kept their schools running by adjusting school fees in line with inflation levels, and criminalising doctors for charging cash.

Zimbabwe experienced a severe cholera outbreak between August 2008 and June 2009 mainly due to the health care, water and sanitation systems of the country that had virtually collapsed, in particular when the Harare City Council lost the mandate to provide water to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) (Hove and Tirimboi 2011: 66). Among other basic social services, water treatment had declined over the years and so was refuse collection, leading to the outbreak of a severe cholera epidemic (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014). In addition to the shortage of staff, public health care providers often lacked basic medications, but their equipment was also malfunctioning. This situation led to about 4 300 deaths because of cholera from 98 500 suspected cases reported and in 2010 some cases were still being reported (Ploch 2010: 29). Uncollected refuse in high density suburbs in Harare led to an estimated 1900 illegal dumping sites in 2008. The spread of the disease was necessitated by the fact that people had no choice but to drink and use contaminated water and this was worsened when water supplies to the city of Harare were disconnected in December 2008 because the authorities could no longer afford to buy chemicals to treat water. Due to the ever moving population within and across borders the disease spread to neighbouring border towns of other countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique (Teaching with news. The United Nations: crisis in Zimbabwe 2009: 10). The water situation for Harare was dire because some suburbs like Mabvuku, Tafara and Borrowdale went for more than six years without tap water and other suburbs had only intermittent supplies for periods ranging from weeks to months without water (Mlilo 2012).

In addition, electricity blackouts were a severe problem (Bratton and Masunungure 2011: 28). Mlilo (2012) notes that the urban dwellers were turned into rural villagers when they experienced serious power shortages of between 9 to 15 hours a day. Apart from the ever increasing prices of basic goods, consumers experienced fuel and transport challenges, while attempts to control prices resulted in immediate shortages (Moss 2007: 135). Local authorities across the country struggled to maintain roads, to provide potable water, and collect garbage mainly because of the hyper-inflationary environment that prevailed during the crisis decade (Makumbe 2012). Most of these challenges engulfed Zimbabwe because the government ignored advice and constructive criticism from non-state actors.

## **8.4 Corruption**

Corruption in Zimbabwe has been a common feature since independence in almost all sectors of the economy. High levels of corruption took place within government circles which curtailed equal access to opportunities. According to Sachikonye, corruption ‘was accompanied by a dangerous sense of entitlement by politicians, war veterans, party officials and militias who believed they could seize people’s property without paying for it’ (Sachikonye 2012: 38).

Most notable scandals include the Willowvale, the VIP housing scheme, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), and the War Victims Compensation Fund among others. Investigations were made on some of these scandals but efforts to investigate other scandals were resisted by every means by the Mugabe regime (Makumbe 2011: 18). Corruption led to landlessness and housing shortages for most of the country’s citizens except for the beneficiaries of the corrupt activities. In addition, the lack of investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators did not help, but rather aggravated the scourge of corruption (Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (ACT-Southern Africa) 2013). In this section, I focus on some corruption cases which took place between 1999 and 2013. Corruption cases include the following scandals: Chiadzwa diamond fields, abuse of Constituency Development Fund (CDF), wealth accumulation, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), a land-grab that involved Kondozi Estate looting, the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), fertilizer shortage, the Harare Airport extension and interference with the functions of the judiciary (ACT-Southern Africa 2013). Zinyama (2014: 100) discusses some of the sleaze activities involving the Harare City Council, Temba Mliswa’s US\$165 million, and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA)’s US\$183 million scandals. Dishonesty intensified as the economic situation of the country worsened. Shana (2006: 1-2) notes that from 1987 corruption cases rose from two in seven years to an average of three to four cases per year up to 2002 when it became rampant and went beyond all political and chaotic bounds turning systemic or managed corruption that engulfed even the private sector .

Corruption seriously affected state-owned enterprises (Makumbe 2011: 25). Almost all the parastatals in Zimbabwe experienced some kind of corruption, especially activities to do with the appointment of board members and awarding of government tenders and contracts which were done in questionable circumstances. The Minister of Transport and Energy resigned in 2000 for

purportedly failing to procure enough fuel for the nation, but analysts argue that he only failed to admit that widespread corruption had hit the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) to the extent that the company had inadequate money to buy fuel for the country. The shortage of fuel exacerbated the closure of companies leading to increased unemployment.

Another ministry hit hard by corruption was the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture where the minister was accused of corrupt practices involving huge amounts of money that was apparent in the Grain Marketing Board (GMB)'s inability to buy maize from farmers. Despite calls on the government by non-state actors to stop corruption, no serious steps were taken to end the scourge of corruption. Instead of reprimanding the accused, the politics of patronage reigned supreme because few of those charged with corruption were prosecuted in the courts. Sadly more than 20 candidates, who had not been cleared of corruption charges, were fielded to represent the party in the 2000 parliamentary elections (Makumbe 2011: 26). Eleven of them won, three were appointed by President Mugabe as non-constituency members of parliament, and one was appointed into the cabinet. Sithole (2008) concludes that Mugabe appears to be content not only to live with corruption but also to allow it to thrive unchecked among his cronies. This followed after the realisation that in most of the cases individuals named and implicated were pardoned by the president rendering futile all efforts to fight the scourge.

In most of the cases nothing was done to deal with the cases of corruption and no investigations were carried out by those in high offices.

Even where investigations are initiated and produce results, as happened in several of the land audits after the violent land invasions that established that many of the occupants acquired more than one farm despite the 'one-man one-farm' policy, nothing was done to bring the culprits to book. Most of the persons that were implicated are Mugabe's cronies who included ministers and senior security sector officials who proceeded to parcel out some of the properties to their relatives and friends. Lack of political will to fight corruption was identified as the major cause of the perpetuation of the problem, because corruption is high within the law enforcement agencies and the politicisation of the police corrodes the whole policing effort that further complicates the problem (Sithole 2008). Shana (2006: 3) argues that corruption in Zimbabwe is fuelled by the politicisation of the nation with a disastrous impact on the country's level of transparency, accountability, integrity and ultimately the economy.

Related to this, Munakiri (2009) notes that corruption is the chief cause of the country's dire economic situation because it is taking place at all levels and in all facets of the Zimbabwean society. He argues that the level of corruption in the country was largely aggravated by the economic challenges characterised by scarcity of almost everything from basic commodities to luxuries and the temporary suspension of the rule of law at the height of the land invasions. Some punishable offences were also no longer punishable as corruption became endemic, such that one could get away with anything as long as one is connected to somebody in a high office and is prepared to pay a bribe for the crime. This is supported by Zimcop (2008) who confirms that corruption in Zimbabwe has become a deep rooted epidemic affecting every facet of society, and that the police act or do not act depending upon how much money and contacts one has thus act totally against their law enforcement duty. Corrupt activities involving the police appear to be so common to the extent where the society is aware that if one does not pay a bribe one will not get what s/he wants. This has encouraged many citizens to be involved in corrupt activities with the administration in an effort to get what they want. Such practices are prevalent in the issuance of passports, driver's licences, birth certificates, police clearance certificates and in obtaining foreign currency. In 2013, Zimbabwe was rated the most corrupt country in the SADC region and one of the most corrupt in the world as it was ranked 157 out of a total of 177 countries assessed by Transparency International (TI) (Zimbabwe: corruption endemic in Zimbabwe 2013). Recently, the country was stunned by the hefty salaries some managers of parastatals and state enterprises were giving themselves, bleeding the economy whilst their low level employees were in deep poverty as they went for months without getting their salaries (Mlilo 2014).

Corruption in the country is rampant across almost all the sectors, but particularly so in education, health, mining, sports, judiciary and agriculture. The poor have suffered the most as a result of corruption as they cannot afford to pay the huge sums of money that are demanded to facilitate the provision of services they might be seeking. Good examples include the demand of bribes by hospital officials to facilitate the provision of medication and service provision to patients leading to the death of many. In some cases demanding sexual favours by those in authority was singled out as a prevalent practice in rural areas. Headmen and village heads ask for bribes ranging from sexual favours, cash, and beasts to execute their responsibilities which they are expected to carry out without being paid by individuals (Corruption feeds on Zimbabwe's poor 2013).

ZANU PF members are not the only ones involved in corruption. An MDC-T audit carried out in August 2012 revealed ‘how councillors corruptly acquired vast tracts of land, a fleet of luxury vehicles and built mansions’ and noted the ‘shocking change of lifestyle of some councillors’ (McGregor 2013: 784), and this level of corruption has contributed to the declining support of the MDC-T in urban areas. In fact, the situation deteriorated in the urban centres to the extent that:

Privatisation created opportunities for accumulation on the part of state officials and party/military businesses, and contributed to the surge in corruption. By the height of the crisis in 2008, urban services collapsed, sewage flowed through Harare streets and cholera was rampant in the city’s high-density suburbs (McGregor 2013: 783).

Consequently, local authorities that were in the past viewed as capable professionals of repute in the SADC region were singled out as politicised, dangerously corrupt, and flawed by partisanship (Chatiza 2010).

Making a similar observation, the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal published its 2015 *Index of Economic Freedom* (IEF) and positioned Zimbabwe last among 46 African nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The report concludes:

Zimbabwe remains one of the world’s least free economies. President Robert Mugabe’s government is corrupt and inefficient. The labour market is one of the most restricted in the world, and business licensing forces most workers to seek employment in the informal sector. The violent seizure of land has underscored poor government land reform policies and upset investor confidence in a once-vibrant agricultural sector (Lukhele 2015).

Businesses depend on courts to put into effect agreements, resolve agreements, and permit commerce to operate. The IEF report further notes that ‘Pressure from the executive branch has substantially eroded judicial independence’ (Lukhele 2015). This signals the deepening of corruption in Zimbabwe.

From the above, we learn that corruption worsened as a result of the economic meltdown. Added to this, corruption caused capital flight and discouraged investors as a result of uncertainty caused by abrupt or unplanned policy shifts and state sponsored violence.

## 8.5 Displacement and emigration

The treatment by the state of non-state actors has affected thousands of Zimbabweans directly as a result of politically motivated violence. This has been evident during FTLRP, Operation *Murambatsvina*, as well as pre-election and post election violence. People in response took refuge either internally or externally.

The violence that was triggered by the FTLRP led to the displacement of over 220, 000 permanent and 40, 000-50, 000 casual and part-time farm workers, while Operation *Murambatsvina* affected 700, 000 people directly, and 2.5 million indirectly (Sachikonye 2012: 123, 159). After 2000 when Zimbabwe started to experience severe economic problems many people, both skilled and unskilled opted to leave the country for greener pastures. Out migration was also heightened by the high incidence of violence that dogged the country during this period. According to Makumbe (2011: 18), an estimated 60% of medical doctors trained in the country since 1980 left the country seeking better opportunities elsewhere. Mawere (2012: 111-112) notes that professionals leaving the country in search of employment before the late 1990s were mainly those from Matabeleland, due to their profound sense of state exclusion. However, in the late 1990s the whole of Zimbabwe experienced mass exodus of professionals and qualified personnel particularly from the education and health sectors who left in search of employment opportunities elsewhere. As highlighted above, 71% of the nurses who were in Zimbabwe in 2002 were contemplating going out to look for better working conditions.

The nonviolent activists and supporters of the opposition political parties were also displaced internally. A large number of people were displaced during and after the run up to the June 2008 election. According to the MDC-T, 86 of its supporters were killed after the general elections on 29 March 2008, and the party spokesman at the time, Nelson Chemise told IRIN that 'state sponsored violence' had displaced 'over 200,000 people, with over 20,000 homes destroyed and more than 10,000 people injured' (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008:42). Those whose homes were destroyed in the rural areas either took refuge in the urban centres, or fled the country after being warned that their lives were in danger. As a result:

The Zimbabwean migrant population in South Africa is estimated to be 2.12 million at the end of 2009....In the UK, the Zimbabwean population has been estimated at between 300,000 and 500,000, while in Botswana it is in the range of 200,000 to 300,000. Globally, we estimate the number of Zimbabweans living outside the country to be

between 3-4 million, about a quarter of the country's population (Makin and Kanyenze 2010: 9).

This influx of Zimbabweans and other migrants created grave problems of human trafficking and other abuses for these countries. The huge number of Zimbabweans in Botswana and South Africa sparked severe xenophobic reactions when foreigners were attacked in 2008 and 2015 respectively. According to Ndlovu (2004: 218-219), about 3.4 million Zimbabweans were estimated to have left the country.

Those who left include people from all walks of life. Professionals left together with their families in search of employment in places with greater security and better living standards. The young fled joblessness, and/or in quest for tertiary education where they could be enrolled without the trouble of first completing a 'national service' where indoctrination was the order of the day. Mothers left to fend for their children so that they could remit forex for school fees, clothing and food, and pensioners also left because of the need to supplement their meagre earnings wiped out by the ever growing inflation. Mass emigration beyond doubt resulted in collapse of families and moral decadence caused by both the economic woes and state engineered violence characterising the period. Violence targeted political activists and those who resented the absence of the rule of law and violation of human rights. Zimbabwe became a violent terrain given the violence experienced before, during and after elections, violent land seizures where rape and immorality was rampant, and as a result of other government operations (Moyo 2006). Makumbe (2009: 6) noted that over five million people were believed to be living outside the country after the 2008 collapse. Many of the Zimbabweans who went into diaspora experienced de-skilling because they had to work in positions below their level of training and experience (Makina 2010: 236). Those who worked in the UK care industry were stressed and frustrated because of de-skilling which led to loss of status as some felt ashamed as a result of the nature of their work (McGregor 2010: 180).

More than 70 000 trained teachers were reported to have left the country since 2000, going mainly to South Africa (Pswarayi and Reeler 2012: 6) and in 2007 it was estimated that about 25 000 teachers had emigrated to South Africa, Namibia and Botswana where many of them were reportedly working in unskilled occupations (Mlambo 2013: 372-373). Alexander and Tendi (2008: 6) also note that the need for jobs and safety caused many MDC supporters to leave the



country. Teachers left the country because of the economic situation and political intolerance that was targeting them for allegedly supporting the MDC (Nyazema 2010: 255). To make matters worse, this also affected tertiary education institutions where senior and experienced academics left for greener pastures for the following reasons: low salaries, increasing political intolerance, interference in university matters by government, and the curtailment of academic freedom, reducing to a sorry state the formerly vibrant higher education system (Mlambo 2013: 370). Academics were paid low salaries that were quickly eroded by runaway inflation, had poor and deteriorating conditions, and also faced transport and accommodation challenges (SARUA 2009: 5).

### **8.6 Sanctions**

Despite sanctions involving a mixture of embargoes and boycotts to inflict costs on a targeted adversary they share the common goal of attempting or threatening to withdraw economic benefits to pressure the targeted state to change its hostile policies (McCarthy and Sharp with the assistance of Bennett 1997: 511). Economic restrictions preferably termed ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘illegal sanctions’ depending on who is saying it, were imposed on the Mugabe regime by the European Union in 2002 led by the United Kingdom and the United States in 2003, following the Zimbabwean government’s abuse of human rights, especially during the land reform and elections (Hove 2012a: 72). The economic problems were worsened by mismanagement resulting in the government’s failure to repay its debt to the Bretton Woods Institutions from 1999, thereby forcing the institutions to withhold the balance of payment support to the country (Tungwarara n. d.: 112). Western countries and the United States of America took heed of Tsvangirai’s protests that the 2002 elections were ‘stolen’ and imposed ‘targeted sanctions’ on Mugabe and his officials perceived as hampering democracy in Zimbabwe, freezing their assets and imposing travel and trade bans (Matyszak 2010: xvi).

The Commonwealth took the first stance by suspending Zimbabwe for one year, compelling Mugabe to respond by withdrawing the country from the organisation for fear of an indefinite suspension in 2003. The EU and the US there after upgraded and increased their sanctions on ZANU PF officials and companies to try and make Zimbabwe return to democracy and the rule of law (Ploch 2009: 29). The sanctions on Zimbabwe encompass the US Congress’s enactment of ZIDERA (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act) of 2001, European Union’s

(EU) suspension of budgetary support it previously provided, asset freezes and visa bans on ZANU PF influential individuals and those in government by the EU, USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia and the prohibition of military and technical assistance to weaken the government's repressive capacity. According to Tungwarara, ZIDERA gave veto power to the US forbidding '...Zimbabwe's applications to multilateral lending agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the African Development Bank (ADB), for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling and international debt cancellation'. It also allows the imposition of travel bans and asset freezes on individuals perceived as undermining the rule of law and carrying human rights abuses. The EU started removing about thirty-five people in February 2011 from its list of about 200 ZANU PF individuals that include senior political, military and business people and six journalists, but extended the sanctions on others for the next year (Tungwarara n. d.: 110) whereafter the number of those removed each year continued to dwindle. In February 2014, the EU removed most of the remaining Zimbabwean companies and officials only to retain Mugabe and his wife Grace on its sanctions list (News Day Staff reporter 2014). However, the US remains fully committed to maintain the sanctions because of the contested 2013 elections (Solidarity Peace Trust 2013: 26).

A critical observation is that using sanctions as a tool to make the rule breaker reform did not yield results as sanctions have actually strengthened ZANU PF instead of weakening it. One can conclude that those who impose sanctions 'should be encouraged to acknowledge the fundamental reality that the sanctions scheme though a nonviolent strategy in most cases turns violent as it jeopardizes the welfare of the people it seeks to protect and ameliorate' (Hove and Chingono 2013: 15). In Zimbabwe, ordinary people have suffered instead of the ZANU PF elite due to the collapse of service delivery because government revenue and foreign investment in the country plummeted, as illustrated by the mass exodus of both skilled and unskilled labour estimated at about 3 million out of the 13 million Zimbabweans (Mutiga 2013). Manpower fled to different parts of the world in search of employment, especially into neighbouring South Africa and Botswana and overseas, including the UK and the US. The United States Institute of Peace (2003: 11) noted earlier that the sanctions limited aid to the provision of humanitarian relief and HIV/AIDS programmes only, leaving the government severely weakened in the delivery of social services. However, Tungwarara (n. d.: 113) is of the view that the sanctions, although not comprehensive have managed to send a message that repression would not be

tolerated, and have also helped the opposition's struggle against the ZANU PF dictatorship that resulted in the 2008 MDC-T election victory and the creation of the GNU. However, what Tungwarara sees as achievements have long been eroded by the 2013 ZANU PF hurried elections which ended the GNU, and Tsvangirai's failure to exploit his party's victory by allowing a 37 days delay in the announcement of presidential election results.

It can be seen from the above discussion that sanctions imposed on the Mugabe regime have had adverse effects on the poor citizens of the country whilst hurting the targeted ZANU PF elite least (Hove 2012a: 77) thereby weakening the intended goal of returning the country to democracy and the rule of law. Legislation that aided repression has not been removed and pre-election and post-election violence has not ended. Violence has instead even been used against expelled ZANU PF members in the post-2013 elections. Despite the use of violence and corruption to obtain control over resources, sanctions have nevertheless sent a message that aiding repression cannot be condoned, and have in a way melted the hearts of some ZANU PF hardliners.

### **8.7 Entrenchment of Violence**

Violence became entrenched in Zimbabwe as ministries, parastatals and the entire country became militarised. The security forces violated the constitution, opposition supporters were either tortured or displaced, ZEC was militarised and service chiefs openly declared that they would not allow a democratically elected presidential aspirant devoid of liberation war credentials, to ascend to power. All this was done in the name of preventing the gains of the liberation struggle. However, this prompted the advocates of democracy to call for security sector reform in a drive to demilitarise the entire country.

The national youth service training programme was purported to be a youth training initiative that disseminated valuable skills and patriotic ideals yet in reality it was a paramilitary training programme for Zimbabwe's youth with an apparent strategy of instilling 'antidemocratic, racist and xenophobic attitudes' (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 5). The youth militias so formed were used as apparatus of the ruling party to maintain its grip on power through 'torture, rape, murder and arson' (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 5). The youths were comprehensively brainwashed and thus deployed to execute any directives from their political commissars under the guise that they were to go unpunished for their deeds. Overall, the rise of the MDC saw: 'a

new national youth service training programme moving rapidly from a supposedly voluntary, small scale training that allegedly aimed at skills enhancement, patriotism and moral education, to what is now intended to be a compulsory, large scale, paramilitary training' (The Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 10).

Security sector personnel control different ministries which under normal circumstances should be led by civilians (Ploch 2009) and this affected their smooth functioning. For example, the "militarisation catastrophically undermined the prison services' capacity to carry out its most basic functions and divided its staff between 'professionals' and 'soldiers'" (Alexander 2013:807). Other military personnel are heads of parastatals (Moyo 2014). Added to this, top government positions were occupied by former or serving CIO and the military personnel (Chitiyo 2009). In fact, military men were appointed to key positions across the state and take important decisions and actions (Alexander and Tendi 2008). A vital institution, ZEC responsible for conducting elections, is militarised and this compromises the execution of its mandate in a free and fair manner (Hove and Harris 2015). Again, militarisation was evident during the GNU when: 'Inconvenient councillors were disciplined by threats and enticements from the feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and were also vulnerable to suspension, while ZANU (PF) militia made political loyalty a condition of access to market stalls, land and housing cooperatives' (McGregor 2013: 783). The militarisation aspect was successful because the JOC is completely partisan to the President and ZDF Commander-in-Chief, Robert Mugabe and committed to ZANU PF rule since 2002.

ZANU PF methodically and forcefully created fear by deploying youths to terrify civilians. Hateful statements that stained MDC politicians and endangered the security of many Zimbabweans were manifest. For example, President Mugabe said that,

The war veterans came to me and said, 'President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an 'X' made by a ballpoint pen'. Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana neAK? Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Lilekele ukupikisana lombhobho". Do not argue with a gun. (The Herald 20 June 2008).

The above pronouncements by leaders in power revealed a country where human security and democracy were threatened. In fact, this was a painful scenario for those who supported the liberation struggle because ZANU PF leaders were violating the same democratic rights they had

fought to ensure. The people of Zimbabwe were directly coerced to vote for President Mugabe despite the failure by his government to manage the economy.

Human security was further threatened by statements made by the members from the security sector (ZHR NGO Forum 2007; Sachikonye 2011: 47). Legitimate democracy can only succeed and prosper in the presence of a depoliticised security sector. The participation of soldiers in politics threaten civilian freedom of choice and hence democracy. During the run up to the 2002 presidential elections the service chiefs from almost all key sections of the security sector warned that ‘the highest office of the land is a straight jacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle’ (ZHR NGO Forum 2007; Ndlovu 2008). Also, just before the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election General Engelbert Rugeje warned:

This country came through the bullet, not the pencil. Therefore, it will not go by your X (voting mark) of the pencil. We cannot let the efforts of such people as the late Chimombe to liberate this country just go to waste. Today I came here by helicopter with the late Chimombe’s body. The next time I will come next week to Jerera, the helicopter will be full of bullets. You know what you did (Financial Gazette 19 June 2008).

In response to the partisan behaviour of the security sector, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of December 2005 Tsvangirai communicated in writing to President Robert Mugabe, the African Union (AU) Chairman, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Chairman, conveying his disappointment regarding the way in which Robert Mugabe had politicised and affiliated the ZDF and the ZRP to ZANU PF, saying:

As the Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), you are no doubt acutely aware of the Constitutional provisions and the relevant Acts of Parliament governing the conduct and operations of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). There are neither constitutional nor legal provisions in either the Constitution or the Defence Act and the Police Act which empower you to transform these national institutions into combative political units of your political party ZANU PF. Instead, in the Constitution and relevant Acts of Parliament, an impregnable line is clearly drawn between the areas of military operations and competence and those that are within the province of competence of political and civic authorities. You are constitutionally bound to maintain and uphold the line. Where the line is drawn is not a matter of interpretation, argument or haggling. The line is cast in stone. To equivocate on this fundamental principle is to overthrow a critical provision of the constitution and subvert the relevant Acts of Parliament. The ZDF and the ZRP are specifically and explicitly barred from participating in politics and political process of the country as organized units with distinctive preferences operationalised in the context of military and police formations aligned to a particular political party. They can participate in politics as

individual private citizens entitled to cast their votes in secrecy of the ballot box. This line between military and political/civil matters is designed to ensure the perpetuation of representative civilian government as opposed to the imposition of an unrepresentative military junta. For the record, I have stated that under an MDC government, the professional standing, hierarchy and integrity of the Army and the Police will be jealously guarded. The Army and the Police will be insulated from the negative effects of competitive politics on their esprit de corps (Tsvangirai 2005).

In this letter, Tsvangirai was trying to protect the constitution of Zimbabwe from violation. It also shows how vital it is to prevent security personnel from getting entangled in civilian matters. The letter makes it explicit that democracy is jeopardised by vesting the wrong responsibilities in the security sector.

It must be admitted that there is a strong umbilical cord between the former liberation movements' political parties and their political leaders in Southern Africa. In the Zimbabwean case, ZANU PF and President Mugabe have an indissoluble connection with the service chiefs which dates back to the Second Chimurenga. However, this unbreakable cord is being used selfishly, forgetting that the liberation war was a multi-stakeholder campaign which was meant to promote the welfare of all, not a few. Cognisant of the vital role the civilians played during the war of liberation, members of the security sector should be schooled to urgently stop incarcerating, politicizing, displacing, torturing, injuring, killing and creating dehumanizing conditions for their erstwhile allies.

To cultivate the culture of resolving conflicts and differences, it is crucial to address the socio-economic, security and political challenges that confront Zimbabweans instead of strengthening the arms of violence. After all, the military equipment sold to developing countries is often antiquated or obsolete. Autocracy or rule by force does not achieve sustainable peace. That is why Harris, a renowned proponent of nonviolence noted that 'The potential outcomes of demilitarisation, then, are positive and such a policy makes sense for the small countries of Southern Africa. These are, in any case, generally incapable of defending themselves militarily against a determined invader' (Harris 2008: 83).

Jonathan Moyo, former Member of Parliament for Tsholotsho, emotively deplored the insecurity which dogged Zimbabwe for over 33 years and saddled the entire blame on the country's security sector and President Mugabe (Moyo 2006). Furthermore, in response to the increasingly endangered human security caused by members of the military, Ndlovu-Gatsheni said that

Zimbabweans were held prisoners by a limited number of injudicious military generals who irrationally believe ‘they are king or queen makers’ who ‘can subvert and defeat the people in their chosen historical path’, and ‘will not salute any one with no war credentials’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008b: 4). Violence continued in different parts of the country even during the government of national unity (Sachikonye 2011) because violence had become entrenched. The FTLRP led to insecurity because it was violent, racist, partisan, violated the rule of law, and led to displacements, loss of employment and of life (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 207).

The security sector is accused of violating the statutory instruments which direct its functioning. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces instrument of 1988 firmly prohibits partisan conduct or participation in party politics (Matinenga 2013). Equally, for the ZRP article 48 of the schedule to the Police Act provides that:

a Regular Force member shall be deemed to be actively participating in politics if he— (a) joins or associates himself with an organization or movement of a political character; or (b) canvasses any person in support of, or otherwise actively assists, an organization or movement of a political character; or (c) displays or wears rosettes, favors, clothing, symbols, posters, placards or like articles having a political significance; or (d) attends a political meeting or assembly when wearing the uniform of the Police Force or any part of such uniform likely to identify him as a Regular Force member (Schedule to the Police Act, Chapter 11:10 Act 22 of 2001, art. 48).

Those in favour of security sector reform drew attention to the fact that military involvement in the running of elections was clear and acute between April and the 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election, when the security forces took a central role in ferociously campaigning for the ZANU PF candidate, President Mugabe. After the GNU:

The role of the security sector in the violence that characterized the period preceding the signing of the Global Political Agreement and the current political happenings in the country, reveal the profound role being played by the security sector in Zimbabwe’s transitional period (Malungisa 2011).

Members from the military were positioned in all the ten provinces and tasked to ensure victory for ZANU PF by whatever strategies and at all costs. The major problem with the militarisation of public institutions is that very few soldiers forget to retreat back to their military authority when they are confronted with challenges in public institutions. When the people call for reforms

it means that civilians desire a security sector that will protect, and not intimidate or restrict their freedom.

On 15 September 2008, at the height of the conflict between ZANU PF and the MDC formations, the two parties signed the Global Political Agreement that became the brain-child of the Inclusive Government which was set up in 2009. Realising the need to reform the security sector *Article 13.2* of the GPA proposed the inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system and that they observe the principles of the rule of law and remain non-partisan and impartial (Global Political Agreement 2008 art. 13). Moreover, the new constitution which was signed into law on 22 May 2013 forbids members of the security services to act in a partisan manner or further the interests of any political party or cause (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act. 2013 section 208). This is the reason that a violation of the instruments which were designed to ensure sustainable peace, democracy and development, attracted criticism from many sections of the Zimbabwean community.

In response to threats by members of the security sector, Roy Bennett a member of the MDC-T, noted that the security sector violated their oaths to uphold the constitution and recommended that they be charged with treason because of their failure to remain a-political as ‘professional Zimbabwean soldiers and servants of the people.’ He concluded that he was ‘putting together a ‘Rat List’ of those in the security services who have become political animals and who will be unfit to remain in their jobs in a new Zimbabwe’ (Bennett 2012).

After the introduction of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) in February 2002, the police used it as an instrument of criminalising freedom of association, assembly, and expression, and subsequently the banning of MDC meetings and gatherings. The pro-security sector reform camp therefore called for stopping the security forces from being involved in the electoral process. Investors are after all keen to invest in a secure environment where the security sector respects the rule of law as directed by the constitution of their country. Those who called for security sector reform further charged that the war veterans and the youth militia served the objectives of ZANU PF when MDC activists and civil society advocates were harassed and arrested on flimsy or fabricated grounds.



Magwegwe MP, Felix Magalela Sibanda further urged the service chiefs to recant and restate their loyalty to Zimbabwe through Parliament, concluding that, 'they should be sent for re-training at the military academy and those not amenable to training must be cashiered, which means dismissed forthwith or resign gracefully' (Nyikayaramba an 'idiot'- MP 2011). A constitutional democracy needs non-partisanship on the part of the military and security organs of the state. Linked to this, speaking at a meeting for political parties planned by *Voice of the Church* in Hwange, the MDC's Director of Policy Research, Qhubani Moyo said it was imperative to reform partisan military, police and CIOs from serving individual and partisan interests, to serving the national interest instead (Moyo 2013). However, to the state actor and those opposed to security sector reform, ZANU PF can only be removed from power through the barrel of the gun, not a ballot, and by God, as Mugabe told a group of Bulawayo Business people on 21 June 2008, 'Only God can oust me....not MDC, not the British' (Jongwe 2008). This is in explicit contempt of the democratic and electoral process outlined in the constitution of Zimbabwe which defends the people's will. Direct threats like these were designed to coerce and intimidate the electorate to vote for ZANU PF only.

The regimentation of the Zimbabwean community before and after elections was exposed in 2006 by Tsvangirai when he said:

The people are very clear as to what needs to be done to secure a free and fair election. They say they are working flat out on a multiple counter-strategy to rid their areas of violence, violent campaigns, intimidation and threats (King and Miller 2006: 131).

This shows that ZANU PF thrives on violence in order to remain in power. Therefore, the militarisation of the state is a major setback for the establishment of sustainable peace in Zimbabwe. However, nonviolent participants and their leaders must take into consideration that violence is not advisable, even when mixing violence and nonviolent methods. Wide cross-section participation is vital since it attracts large numbers of people.

## **8.8 Summary**

The Zimbabwean conflict is between the state actor and the non-state actors. The ZANU PF dominated state actor used violent and unconstitutional means to respond to the demands of the non-state actors, with terrible consequences for the socio-economic and political environment.

Service delivery collapsed, the economy declined, corruption and emigration increased, violence was entrenched in society, the entire state was militarised and sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe.

## **8.9 Conclusion**

The above discussion shows that the contending parties were determined to attain their objectives at the cost of undermining the whole socio-economic and political environment. Socio-economic and political mismanagement continued unchecked after 2013. Zimbabwe still needs nonviolent approaches in order to attain sustainable peace and security, and ultimately also socio-economic and political change. The unresolved conflict continues, which means that SADC, the AU, the UN and other stakeholders should not turn their backs on Zimbabwean. In the next chapter I present the findings of the nonviolence training programme.

## **PART IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

*‘People and groups must be taught nonviolent struggle as it is not intuitive or instinctive’-Mary King.*

### **9.0 CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS OF THE NONVIOLENCE TRAINING PROGRAMME**

#### **9.1 Introduction**

This chapter reports a limited piece of action research that was carried out to fulfil the fifth objective. It presents the findings drawn from the data collected through the use of a questionnaire that was distributed to 40 volunteers with the aim of finding out their level of understanding of the concept of nonviolence before and after training. The pre-training questionnaire distribution and data gathered from face to face interviews exposed limited understanding of the concept of nonviolence among the volunteer participants and respondents as compared to their knowledge of violence. Such a result motivated me to design a training programme, train the participants, and to measure the impact of the training programme on the beneficiaries. The completion of the questionnaire by trained participants led to the inference that nonviolence can be effectively understood and even used if its components are disseminated among Zimbabweans via different mediums and institutions of education by means of diligent planning and the active involvement of the participants. This does not necessarily mean that understanding the concept of nonviolence directly translates to practising it but it is a step in the right direction.

#### **9.2 Importance of the training programme and composition of participants**

Training in nonviolence is important because it builds trust and solidarity among participants, if it works and is embraced by the centres of power in Zimbabwe. It creates room for creativity as participants are encouraged to deal with the challenges they face. It encourages avoiding violence against an opponent because violence can backfire. Furthermore, it undermines the very pillars of violence. Added to this, it changes the quality of communication with bystanders and even with outsiders who are not yet concerned about the issue (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008: 11). The training assists the participants to acknowledge the value of each person in society and above all encourages peaceful resolution of socio-economic and political challenges.

The participants were volunteers who had a keen interest in learning about nonviolence. The forty participant volunteers were composed of 20 males and 20 females who have been in Zimbabwe since 1999, and were 18 years old and above.

I went into classes and introduced my research topic, read the consent form and indicated the gendered number of participants needed. The 40 volunteers were drawn from institution X (registered with the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology, to offer professional and academic courses) with a student population of 1000 students cutting across year 1 up to year 3. Strictly 40 students were recruited and they represented the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe, were supposed to have been in Zimbabwe between 199 and 2013 and be 18 years and above in terms of age. These were recruited on a first come first served basis, otherwise had there been no limit the response was overwhelming because 90 participants indicated their interest. The researcher's introductory letter (from the Durban University of Technology's Faculty of Management Sciences-Department of Public Management and Economics) requesting support from prospective respondents to participate in the study was availed to all interviewees. The responses of these participants were confidential that is why there are no names used for these participants.

### **9.3 Pre-training programme implementation evaluation**

To gain an understanding of the concepts of violence and nonviolence the participants' knowledge of these, the researcher circulated the questionnaire before participants volunteered. This was done as a basis of selecting those who had an interest in learning more about nonviolence as a strategy that can be used for resolving conflicts. In this way I was able to recruit 40 volunteers who were accorded the opportunity to consent and complete questionnaires. The answers and scores that were calculated out of ten, from the questionnaire given in 9.4 below helped to establish the gaps that existed in the knowledge of nonviolence amongst these volunteers. It was on the basis of the identified gaps from the face to face interviews and the completed questionnaires that a nonviolence training programme was designed, which is outlined in section 9.6. After the training on how to resolve conflicts using nonviolence skills and approaches the participants rated their own understanding by a score out of ten.

I chose to use scoring ranging from 0-10 to allow participants to rate their understanding of nonviolence and violence in numerical form after completing the questionnaire. In this regard 0

represents the least understanding of a continuum such as violence or nonviolence. This implies that a score of 10 represents a detailed or 'excellent' understanding of the chosen concept. For self-evaluation participants were asked to assign a numerical score reflecting their understanding of nonviolence and violence. Bearing in mind the challenge of self-evaluation, I encouraged the participants to be honest. A higher score naturally implies a better understanding of the concept.

The pre-training scores revealed a limited understanding of nonviolence, indicating that training was necessary. Training was done and a month later the same questionnaire was distributed for completion to the participants. After completion of the post-training questionnaire the participants were again requested to rate their understanding of nonviolence using the same scoring technique as before. The combined scores were then tabulated.

#### **9.4 The Questionnaire**

I used a structured questionnaire interview to establish the respondents' understanding of the concepts of nonviolence and violence in Zimbabwe (see appendix B). A questionnaire was used to ensure that: each respondent receives the same stimuli, interviewers handle questions consistently and can answer respondents' requests for clarification if they occur and prescribed response format, to enable rapid completion of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was also meant to meet the research objectives, obtain accurate information and to make it easy for respondents to give the necessary information. The first part of the questionnaire solicited personal information, such as age and gender. This assisted the researcher to maintain equitable distribution of respondents in terms of gender. Age helped me to keep only those respondents who were 18 and above years who did not require someone to consent on their behalf. The second part requested the respondents' educational levels which assisted me to plan the content and language of instruction for the nonviolence training programme. The last part the body has questions on violence and nonviolence. The questions were asked from what Perceived to be simple up to complex ones. These questions were meant to establish the knowledge of understanding by the participants on the two concepts violence and nonviolence. Above all, it was used to ensure rapid collection of data on interviewees who may have needed a much longer period to engage.

#### **9.5 Pre-training questionnaire findings**

After obtaining 40 volunteers, I requested the participants' consent and furnished them with the introductory letter. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 below summarise the respondents' pre-training level of

understanding of nonviolence and violence respectively. The data collected from the completed questionnaires prior to the training revealed a number of pertinent issues about nonviolence. The participants were between 19 and 55 years old and were living in Zimbabwe during the period covered by this study.

All participants had five O' Level passes, including English language, hence there was no need for translating the questionnaire into the local language. Twenty-five participants had not heard about the term nonviolence but were knowledgeable about non-violence. Seven respondents said nonviolence is effective in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges. Twenty-five participants noted that violence is effective in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges in the short term but that it sows the seeds of future conflicts. Three respondents noted that both violence and nonviolence can be used to handle socio-economic and political challenges, but that violence creates hostilities.

Five respondents were not sure about the effectiveness of both violence and nonviolence in dealing with socio-economic challenges but noted that their experiences in Zimbabwe taught them that violence creates disharmony, mistrust, displacement and destruction. The forty participants had knowledge about violence and had witnessed or experienced it before, during and after elections especially where opposition political parties were involved. The entire group of participants agreed that the dominant concept used by the government for dealing with challenges was violence, which they believed led to socio-economic problems. All respondents said peaceful ways can be used to resolve Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political challenges. Every respondent defined nonviolence as the absence of violence that is non-violence, not nonviolence. The scores out of 10 ranged from 0 to 4 regarding the level of understanding of nonviolence aspects, but from the definitions it was evident that the respondents mistook nonviolence for non-violence.

**Table 9.1: Pre-training scores of the forty respondents' level of understanding nonviolence (source: compiled by the researcher)**

<b>0-1 Scores</b>	<b>2-3 Scores</b>	<b>4-5 Scores</b>	<b>6-10 Scores</b>
25	13	2	0

On the other hand, there was evidence of clear understanding of violence among the participants. It emerged that Violence led to emotional distress, disunity, injuries, deaths and displacement of people, destruction of property, collapse of socio-economic systems, widespread unemployment as well as attracting actions. Violence was prevalent before, during and after elections, during operation Murambatsvina (Operation restore order), land invasions, during the removal of illegal diamond miners at Chiadzwa, and during the 6<sup>th</sup> ZANU PF Congress in December 2014 which led to the violent expulsion of former Vice-President Joice Mujuru. It was used by ZANU PF after 2000 and was politically motivated.

**Table 9.2: Scores showing the levels of understanding of violence by the forty respondents (source: designed by the researcher).**

<b>0-1 Scores</b>	<b>2-3 Scores</b>	<b>4-5 Scores</b>	<b>6-10 Scores</b>
0	0	3	37

## **9.6 The training process**

The training lasted for five days and each day was seven hours long excluding one hour lunch and 30 minutes tea break. It started on Monday 5 January 2015 and ended on 9 January 2015. These dates were chosen because the students were still on vacation. It took place at 'Z' sports ground inside a hired tent with forty five chairs. Each day started at 0800 and ended at 1630. The details of the topics covered during the training are given in appendix E.

### **Day 1**

We began the training by allowing the participants to establish training rules, outline what they expected to gain and share with others during the training. Meanings of critical terms which include nonviolence, non-violence, violence, movement and campaign among others were explained. I then conducted a lecture on: the *History of violence in Zimbabwe 1890 to the present*. This was covered in an hour because I used slides. Before the lecture students were allowed to explain what they knew about violence that took place in Zimbabwe between 1890 and 2013. In five groups made up of eight participants, I instructed them to identify tactics used by the perpetrators of violence and the responses that emerged from the affected people during the major violence watersheds. The feedback was given in form of outlines on manila sheets of paper.

In the afternoon session students were given brief handouts on the contributors of known violence and directed to identify the major characteristics of *principled* and *pragmatic* nonviolence citing examples where these were used. After feedback the participants were given homework i.e. to find out the nonviolence methods which they could have used in any violent epoch that was experienced in Zimbabwe.

## **Day 2**

The participants began with the session: what I recall from the previous day is..... This was followed by feedback on the possible responses the participants could have used to deal with violence during any given episode. Participants had a 30 minutes lecture on the *realities and myths of nonviolence, principles and guidelines of nonviolent action*. During the afternoon session participants were issued with handouts in order to find out about: *planning nonviolent action, components of a campaign, what nonviolence can and cannot do*. The report back was done and participants were given a task of identifying at least one case study where nonviolence was a success story and prepare to briefly explain how it happened and why it was a success.

## **Day 3**

The third day began with participants explaining the case studies where nonviolence was a success. It emerged that participants had studied Yugoslavia, South Africa, Georgia, Ukraine and Zimbabwe with particular reference to the NCA and other non-state actors' successful campaign for a 'No vote' during the 2000 'Zimbabwean Constitution' referendum. The morning session



focused on: ***Nonviolent campaign strategies and methods***: In groups participants identified the main nonviolent strategies (categories) i.e. *Protest and persuasion*, *non-cooperation* and *Intervention* and listed methods under these broad categories. In the afternoon participants shared knowledge on how some of the nonviolence methods of their choice can be used against an opponent.

#### **Day 4**

I began the fourth day by asking questions on what the participants had covered the previous day. In the process it was evident that some participants doubted the effectiveness of these methods. However, they later gained confidence about the effectiveness of the methods when I referred to *music and song*, *sit-ins* and *stay-away* which were used in Zimbabwe with a reasonable degree of success. There after the participants covered: ***Theory and realities of nonviolent campaigns***. Furthermore, participants were tasked to read about the case studies where nonviolence was a success and failure recording major aspects. Audio visuals were also used. The findings were presented on the fifth day.

#### **Day 5**

The fifth and final day focused on: ***Application of nonviolent campaigns: case studies of successes and failures of nonviolence, challenges and continuities***. After this participants were given a date exactly a month after the training to meet for the way forward. It was on that day that the participants completed the post training questionnaire.

### **9.7 Methods and Participants' activities**

Participants were served tea with biscuits, lunch with soft drinks each day and were also given transport money for each day. Details on the training budget are given in appendix A.

The researcher used: Group research and presentations, focus group discussions, group discussions, creative problem solving, lecture method, and a question and answer approach. Students were also listened to audio- visuals on nonviolence.

The participants were given questions to research and present in groups. They identified case studies of nonviolent campaigns which they summarised and presented. Added to this, participants wrote letters to people who wronged them in the past and then expressed their

emotions at the end. At this stage, some participants went to the extent of crying as they recalled the experiences with those who wronged them. Furthermore, the groups dramatized the resolution of differences in a nonviolent manner as opposed to violence. More so, they engaged in participatory problem-solving of any conflict of their choice, whether at family, community, national or global levels.

### **9.8 Post-training programme evaluation**

The same questionnaire that was used before training was distributed to the participants a month later on 9 February after the training programme in an effort to measure the impact of the training programme. The findings showed that:

- Participants had a strong appreciation of nonviolence.
- Participants were able to share some real life examples where nonviolence has been used with success.
- Nonviolence was used in Zimbabwe before 1999, and participants were able to identify some campaigns that took place between 1999 and 2013.
- Nonviolent methods used in Zimbabwe during this period include sit-ins, go-slows, peaceful demonstrations, and music and song.
- Nonviolent campaigns were met with violent state actor responses.

The scores of the post training ratings by participants were much higher compared to the pre-training ratings. These are given in table 9.3 below. The information given in table 9.3 shows that two participants registered a 3-4 score, thirty participants had 5-7, and eight 8-10, scores representing their level of understanding of the concept of nonviolence after the training programme.

**Table 9.3: showing the post nonviolence training scores of forty participants (source: compiled by the researcher).**

<b>0-2 Scores</b>	<b>3-4 Scores</b>	<b>5-7 Scores</b>	<b>8-10 Scores</b>
0	2	30	8

The difference in pre-training and post training knowledge of nonviolence shows that the concept of nonviolence is understood and used by very few people in Zimbabwe but can be easily imparted and appreciated. However, having knowledge about nonviolence does not necessarily mean people can practise it, but it is a step in the right direction.

#### **9.10 Prospects for nonviolence in Zimbabwe**

The face to face interviews were conducted with Zimbabweans who claimed knowledge of nonviolence. The interviewees consented to have their real names used and to have the interviews recorded and even be used for other academic researches. These respondents were composed of former students from local universities, lecturers and activists who were in Zimbabwe during the period covered by this study. Their educational qualifications ranged from honours to a PhD. Most of the participants were directly affected by the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political crisis. The interviews carried out with these respondents were tape recorded.

Zimbabweans have mixed feelings regarding what can be done to build a culture of nonviolence and sustainable peace in the country. Mabry (Interview, 18 June 2014) notes that violence is always negative, gruesome, and destructive and therefore unwelcome because it goes against what is natural and desirable. He further asserts that Zimbabweans must learn from their past by identifying things that should never be repeated such as violence. As opposed to violence, he calls for the cultivation of love, solidarity and a sense of belonging as Zimbabweans. He concludes that institutions of higher learning are places where people of different ethnic groups converge, hence they 'are places of unity in diversity' that bring together people from all parts of the country, whether students or lecturers. Above all, he calls for the need to get rid of 'uncertainty and suspicion, as well as being genuine as we look forward'. Some former students of the University of Zimbabwe asserted that nonviolent methods have failed to bring about change in the country, and that Zimbabweans must therefore embark on more forceful means in order for the socio-economic and political challenges to be realistically addressed (Interview, Hazvineyi; Mawoneke 19 June 2014). What is more apparent is that, it is very difficult to talk about national healing, reconciliation and integration in the present system where the perpetrators of violence are in charge of the status quo, unless they take the initiative (Interview, Moyo 9 June 2014). This is worsened by the fact that everything was politicised, to the extent that one fails to understand where the drive towards the creation of a culture of nonviolence can begin (Interview, Mudzimu, resident of Gokwe South in Midlands province, 23 June 2014).

Schools, the media and traditional leaders are crucial if violence is to end, but we should begin by changing the mindset of politicians in order to cascade the knowledge about nonviolent methods that can be used in resolving socio-economic and political challenges.

All the socio-economic woes can be halted by cultivating the culture of nonviolence through educational institutions, avoiding retributive solutions such as imprisonment of the perpetrators of violence and creating a favourable investment environment for both the East and West (Interview, Shadaya 13 June 2014); Maposa (Interview, 14 June 2014) argued that in order to rectify the socio-economic challenges, it is important to remove repressive legislation, which is still in force, despite the adoption of the new constitution which was designed to create a favourable investment climate, resolve the political problems, and curtail human rights violations including those directed at students. It is imperative to use agents of socialisation to transform the mindset of the children while they are still young; thus nonviolent methods should be taught from kindergartens up to universities (Interview, Masunungure 22 June 2014). The culture of nonviolence must be cultivated through ‘socialisation by the home, the school, church, media, the political parties and traditional leaders all need to take an active part to promote a nonviolent culture because they need to reinforce each other’ (Interview, Masunungure 22 June 2014).

According to Madhuku, nonviolence can be embraced in Zimbabwe through continued engagement with the state actor, civic education, dissemination of research on nonviolence, promoting the shunning of violence, and publicising the achievements of nonviolence (Interview, 2 June 2014). He concluded that the state actor should be encouraged by non-state actors to stop to reward violence where people are beaten and forced to vote for a given party.

In an interview with Nyachega (Interview, 14 June 2014), he emphasized that violence must be stopped, manipulation of churches to support some political parties against others must be shunned, repression against civilians by the security sector must be condemned and use of dialogue should be seen as the way forward, in a manner similar to the GNU which was guided by the GPA. Muzenda pointed out that if the education system is to disseminate knowledge about peace and nonviolence, teachers and pupils must not be coerced to take part in politics, and the curriculum should also address the disadvantages of violence (Interview, 15 June 2014). The starting point is to encourage people to remove the disease of jealousy which causes violence, and then to allow experts in peacebuilding to interact with people from one community to the

other (Interview, Mubvumba, a civil servant and A1 farmer in Mashonaland Central province, 16 June 2014). To establish durable peace in Zimbabwe, civil society must play an active role, since the state actor was the perpetrator of violence and thus cannot initiate peaceful processes (Interview, Mutanda, a university graduate from Bulawayo Metropolitan province, 24 June 2015). He added that the civil society must work with traditional leaders and other popular community opinion leaders in a drive to end the scourge of violence that is more pronounced during the run up to elections.

Ruguwa (Interview, teacher from Manicaland province, 17 June 2014) believes that the starting point must be to establish democracy through the ballot box, supported by respect of the constitution, and that this will pave the way for the cultivation of a culture of nonviolence. It is critical to positively harness the values of the past among Zimbabweans through the philosophy of Ubuntu which binds people together as one community. Universities should also cultivate love, tolerance, unity and oneness through the philosophy of Ubuntu (Interview, Mangena 3 June 2014). The education, judiciary, political and religious systems should be encouraged to come together to further the traits of Ubuntu which were demonstrated by the 1987 Unity Accord between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF, and the GNU that was established between the MDC formations and ZANU PF in 2009 (Interview, Mangena 3 June 2014). The culture of resolving the socio-economic and political challenges can only be a success story if the teachings on nonviolence are embraced by various institutions such as the family, school and the church (Interview, Ndawana, university graduate from Matabeleland South province, 23 June 2014). To this end it is clear that a culture of nonviolence and nonviolent struggle are essential in establishing more long-lasting and internally peaceful democracies that will not regress into civil war (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

### **9.11 Summary and Conclusion**

Prior to the designing of a training programme, a questionnaire was completed by all of the forty volunteer participants in a drive to find out whether they understood nonviolence as a concept that can be used by the non-state actors to compel the state actor to address the socio-economic and political challenges. A lack of understanding of the concept was revealed and a training programme was designed to help empower the participants gain more knowledge and skills about the concept of nonviolence. The training programme was implemented through the use of

participatory approaches. Findings were presented by comparing the data collected by the pre-training and post-training questionnaires. After the training the participants appreciated the strength of nonviolence in campaigns that are carefully planned and executed.

The pre-training findings show that violence is the dominant strategy used by the state actor against the non-state actors before, during and after elections and other government driven operations. They also reveal that there was lack of understanding of nonviolence on the part of participants and that it was misconstrued to mean the absence of violence. The training on nonviolence however indicates that people can be taught to resort to nonviolent campaigns as opposed to the use of violence to address the socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe. The last chapter provides conclusions and recommendations arrived at on the basis of this study.

## PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 10.0 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 10.1 Introduction

The purpose of the study was to: a) *document nonviolent campaigns used by the non-state actors such as the MDC from 1999 to 2013 and assess their effectiveness* (see chapter 6) and b) *Design, implement and evaluate the effectiveness of imparting knowledge on nonviolence through a training programme* ( chapter 9). The first objective was met by the researcher demonstrating that nonviolence has been used in different parts of the world with varying degrees of success and failure. The second objective is addressed in chapter 4 reviewing literature which shows that Zimbabwe's history tends to publicise violent watersheds at the expense of nonviolent campaign experiences. The third objective of *examining the nonviolent strategies and methods used by non-state actors to deal with the socio-economic and political challenges and state actor's responses and impact of the nonviolent campaigns used between 1999 and 2013* is addressed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 identifies the three strategies that the non-state actors used, namely protests and persuasion, non-cooperation, and intervention, and several methods in the continuum of nonviolence with limited degrees of success because the regime remained in charge of the status quo. The second part of the third objective is dealt with in chapter 7 which asserts that the state actor responded to the demands and activities of the non-state actors by resorting to the strategy of violence such as extra-legal tactics to curtail the achievement of the objectives of the non-state actors. Chapter 8 which follows presents the main outcomes of the Zimbabwean conflict, such as the imposition of sanctions, increased corruption, collapse of health, education and water service delivery systems and rapid economic decline. The fourth objective of *evaluating the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies and methods used by non-state actors between 1999 and 2013* is dealt with in chapters 6, 7 and 8. It is apparent in these chapters that the regime did not give in to nonviolent state actors, because the pillars of state violence were not won over to nonviolence in addressing socio-economic and political challenges. The fifth objective of *drawing on insights from the exploratory research, to design and implement a training programme of imparting knowledge about nonviolence and how this can be used to resolve conflicts* (see chapter 9 ) was addressed by actively involving participants in a nonviolence training programme. However, the question whether participants will use

nonviolence in resolving socio-economic and political challenges in future was not put to test. The following section provides the main findings of each of the chapters.

## **10.2 Main Findings**

Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework which guided this study. It revealed that there are two types of nonviolence, namely pragmatic and principled nonviolence, as propounded by Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Gene Sharp. It is apparent that nonviolence as a strategy involves a lot of issues which should be considered in order for the strategy to succeed, such as discipline never to engage violence, planning how the campaign will unfold, and how the participants will act and communicate the strategies and methods that are to be used in the nonviolent campaign. The fundamental principles of nonviolent campaigns include an abstention from resorting to physical force to accomplish an aim, but also a determination to reject repression, domination, and any form of prejudice. It must therefore reject *direct* physical and *structural* violence. Nonviolent methods tend to increase in effectiveness as conflicts develop.

The concept of nonviolence is a strategy which has been used in all continents including in Africa. The concept is also known among Muslims who are considered to be violent by those who misconstrue their genuine grievances that compel them to resort to terror. Chapter 3 is critical for this study because it provides a global picture of the use of nonviolence as a strategy against those who are in charge of the status quo, to initiate socio-economic and political change. In most of the cases where nonviolence was successfully used, it was after diligent planning supported by vibrant communication against the despotic regimes which were then compelled to capitulate. Such success stories were registered in Georgia, Serbia, and South Africa where apartheid relinquished political power, but remained in control of socio-economic systems. Where on the other hand, concerted efforts of planning and communication were lacking, or where nonviolence was viewed as a single day battle, the autocratic regimes prevailed despite the biting socio-economic and political woes that were being experienced by the affected people. There is in fact, still need to disseminate and rekindle the message of nonviolence, especially in countries where violence has continued to smother the former.

It is evident in chapter 4 that Zimbabwe had dark epochs of violence from colonisation up to 1998. Even now the scourge of violence has not yet been curbed, with disastrous socio-economic and political consequences. Violence reigned in the Anglo-Ndebele war, First Chimurenga,



Second Chimurenga, RENAMO incursions, and the Gukurahundi. The conflict between ZAPU and ZANU in the early 1960s contributed to the building of a culture of violence which has been haunting the post-colonial state. History has rooted a culture of violence among Zimbabweans which must be halted if sustainable peace and ultimately socio-economic and political development is to be realised.

The fifth chapter provides the road map that was followed in this study. The research followed mainly a qualitative design. Mouton's definition of research design was adopted for this study. Ethical issues were observed selecting interviewees who were above 18 years old, conversant in the English language, and lived in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013. Some of these informants revealed limited knowledge of nonviolence as opposed to non-violence. The impact of training on those who lacked knowledge about nonviolence was therefore investigated.

The sixth chapter reviews how non-state actors such as the MDC, MDC-T, ZINASU, NCA and WOZA used nonviolent strategies against the state actor with limited success, since they failed to compel the opponent to abdicate, or to concede to their demands. It is evident that most participants just took part without adequate knowledge of nonviolence, because the strategy was introduced through a top-down model of communication. There were three broad strategies used, namely nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention in different forms as set out by Gene Sharp. Non-state actor activities and campaigns were however inexorably derailed by the violent responses of the state actor. Despite the violent state actor responses, non-state actors, especially the MDC, registered some gains which later failed due to limited experience and poor planning. The MDC, for example, did not know how to respond when election results were withheld for 37 days, which was way beyond the five days maximum constitutional limit. In Yugoslavia where diligent planning and lobbying was pursued, Slobodan Milosevic's attempt to manipulate election results failed when thousands of people poured into the capital city to demand the immediate release of the election results. When ZANU PF unleashed state machinery against the electorate during the run up to the presidential elections that were set for 27 June 2008, the leadership of the MDC-T decided that their supporters' lives were in jeopardy and pulled out of the race. This left Mugabe running a one horse election which he inevitably won, but at the price of international condemnation. ZINASU, MDC, NCA, WOZA and ZIMTA campaigns had an impact on the state actor only in the short term. In the end,

ZIMTA was infiltrated and began to back ZANU PF. In response, PTUZ was formed to counter ZIMTA which lived to the directives and wishes of the state actor. WOZA however was able to meet some of its objectives and continues to fight for the rights of access to services. The NCA insisted that the post-independence constitution was not people-driven and claims for itself a historic achievement because the final product ended up being more democratic in spirit. It is however worrying that the NCA turned into a political party leaving the constitution open to manipulation and abuse. It would have been tactical to have remained operational so that the violations of the constitution would be decried. Nonetheless, the state actor persisted in responding with violence in a drive to silence the non-state actors, leading to Zimbabwe's expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations. In summary, the non-state actors failed to compel the regime to surrender power, because the pillars of regime support, particularly the security sector remained intact, increasing its grip on the country.

In chapter seven, state actor responses are discussed. The culture of violence that black people experienced under the colonial state was continued in the post-colonial state as manifested in the violence used against PF ZAPU and ZUM after independence. The post-colonial state actor continued to use brutal tactics against the non-state actors in a drive to retain its iron grip on power. Violent land occupation, abductions, imprisonment before trial, and abuse of the media were used by the Mugabe regime in an attempt to silence the non-state actors. ZANU PF and President Robert Mugabe continue to use violence as their main strategy to influence elections and retain political power. Violence has been the main instrument of militia groups, war veterans, CIO, police and the military for the furtherance of ZANU PF objectives in the recent past. Non-state actors, in particular MDC supporters were the main target of brutal force. Vote buying, rigging of elections, and manipulation of the judiciary and traditional leaders were other unconstitutional methods that were used to ensure that non-state actors would be prevented from gaining access to power. The state introduced repressive legislation like POSA, and mobilised militia, police, army, and war veterans against ZINASU, MDC, PTUZ, WOZA and NCA to arrest, beat, injure, kill, abduct, displace, imprison and destroy their livelihoods. To curb the non-state actors from attaining their objectives by means of elections, the state resorted to violence before, during and after the polls against opposition political parties and their sympathisers. When the non-state actor almost attained victory, rigging of the electoral process and manipulation of results after the election was the order of the day.

Chapter 8 presents some of the direct and indirect effects of the conflict between the state and non-state actors who engaged in nonviolent campaigns between 1999 and 2013. It describes the hyper inflation which threatened sustenance, survival and the stability of the country's socio-economic systems. The unplanned land seizures led to an increase in unemployment, corruption and emigration of manpower in search of greener pastures. Service delivery in the health, education and water delivery sectors collapsed. The rigging of elections, violence, and violation of human rights attracted international sanctions as Zimbabwe became militarised. Now with the disputed 2013 election outcome and growing factionalism within ZANU PF there are higher chances of a further worsening of socio-economic and political conditions.

From the findings of the training programme outlined in chapter nine, it is apparent that using nonviolence against the state is a feasible strategy which is not well known in Zimbabwe, and that the non-state actors who used it did not accord it serious attention in terms of planning, communication, and implementation. This still is the case because violence was for a very long period used as a strategy by both the colonial and the post-colonial state. Due to the state's repressive tactics, the use of nonviolence was not a success story in the longer term because of limited dissemination of information about how it works as a strategy. The state's violent tactics simply coerced innocent civilians to comply with its wishes and demands. Consequently, a significant number of Zimbabweans still harbour the belief that violence is superior to nonviolence. This mentality can only be removed if state institutions take the initiative to cultivate a culture of using nonviolence to address socio-economic and political challenges that affect Zimbabweans. Cultivating a culture of nonviolence is an achievable reality if all stakeholders take an active part. The next section provides recommendations.

### **10.3: Recommendations**

In light of the negative socio-economic and political effects experienced during the nonviolent campaigns used it is crucial to provide some practical and policy recommendations to different stakeholders in the Zimbabwean conflict. The recommendations focus on organisations and institutions which include the police, military, political leaders, civic groups, educational institutions, SADC, AU and the UN. The main thrust of the recommendations is to encourage stakeholders to resort to peaceful ways including nonviolence in order to resolve socio-economic and political challenges and help the country free itself from a culture of violence. It is hoped

that the contending parties will reflect on the recommendations so that a sustainable solution to the Zimbabwean conflict can be found to the benefit of all.

### **To the Military and its Commander in chief**

Abide by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Act and stop taking part in politics, and remain cognisant of where your responsibilities for national defence start and end. Stakeholders who call for professionalism in the ZDF should firmly be against any violations, but avoid targeting individuals. Parties to the conflict must agree not to harm or endanger members of the ZDF who have been implicated in violence in the past, in order to prevent a relapse into violence or refusal to hand over power by military personnel. In this regard, the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) should be rekindled to play an effective part in uniting Zimbabweans who have been divided by their violent past. Civilian institutions like the ZEC need to be demilitarised.

### **To the Zimbabwe Republic Police**

Stick to your mandate of maintaining law and order irrespective of political party affiliations, and stop interfering in politics. Be mindful of the fact that the ZRP Act forbids active participation of its members in politics. All Zimbabweans will benefit if the police force abide by the ZRP Act in its day to day execution of its responsibilities, and bring to book all citizens who take the law into their own hands.

### **To Politicians**

Represent all people in your constituencies irrespective of political party alignment and when relief services are being provided, stick to your constitutional duties. Also help the security sector to ensure a semblance of stability in the country by exercising parliamentary oversight.

### **To Educational institutions**

Institutionalise the philosophy and practice of nonviolence in a drive to establish a culture of resolving socio-economic and political challenges through the use of nonviolent strategies, methods and tactics. Educational institutions from kindergarten to tertiary institutions in Zimbabwe should be encouraged to offer courses on nonviolence so that violence can be replaced by peaceful means of resolving conflict.

### **To Civic Groups and other non-state actors**

BE Mindful of the significance of adhering to the statutory instruments which guide your code of conduct during the course of executing your duties so that you reduce, and eventually bring to an end conflict with the state. Desist from taking part in politics. Avoid discriminating your beneficiaries during your activities on the basis of political party affiliations. Remind public authorities to protect you, and respect the guidelines which direct your operations.

### **To the Southern Africa Development Community**

Re-engage the parties to the Zimbabwean conflict, including the splinter ZANU PF and MDC groups, given the high incidence of inter-party and intra-party violence. This is imperative in the light of failure by the contending parties to honour the 24 key issues outlined in the GPA. Further help to improve oversight in the run-up to elections, in particular with regard to adherence to the SADC guidelines towards democratic elections. More so, devise mechanisms to reduce and prevent violations of these guidelines. Where possible deploy the election observer mission that takes part in the whole electoral process rather than only being present during polling.

### **To the African Union**

Mediate to reduce the spill over effects of the Zimbabwean crisis that are being felt in other countries such as Botswana and South Africa, which are overwhelmed by the influx of Zimbabweans. This can be done by encouraging the use of nonviolent strategies and methods by stakeholders to the Zimbabwean conflict, to address the socio-economic and political challenges, given the rapidly declining socio-economic and political situation following the contested 2013 election and the recent split in ZANU PF. Bring pressure to bear on the government to halt violence so that an enabling environment is created for engagement between the contending parties and other stakeholders.

### **To the United Nations**

Engage with troubled nations like Zimbabwe and establish means of intervening to protect innocent people including activists, especially when violence prevents regime change, leading to a failed state.

### **Policy recommendations to the State**

See to it that the security sector, the ZDF, militia groups, CIO and ZRP, comply with the regulations that govern their operations, especially with respect to being a-political. Note that the violent measures you take while in power may be used against you once you are out of office, hence it is imperative to cultivate a culture of nonviolence to avert retribution in future. Furthermore, be mindful of the importance of peace and empower the security sector to end violence. End animosity between and among Zimbabweans by cultivating a culture of nonviolence through the media and educational institutions. Nonviolence is part of the broader peace building approach, hence can be introduced into the country's education system at all levels from kindergarten up to tertiary institutions. Initiate activities which ensure that the education, judiciary, political and religious institutions take an active role in reducing the culture of violence. For this to succeed, the executive must act first, beyond paying lip service to national healing, reconciliation and integration so that other stakeholders will commit their time and resources towards peace building. In return, this will help build the culture of resolving socio-economic and political challenges through the use of nonviolent strategies and methods. Abide by the national, regional and international laws and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a signatory, defend the rights of Zimbabweans and other nationalities, and be mindful of your obligation to protect all citizens irrespective of political allegiance. Create a favourable environment for investors in a drive to resolve socio-economic challenges. Furthermore, uphold the country's constitution, as well as regional and international conventions designed to safeguard the rights of the weak. Heal, reconcile and integrate Zimbabweans beyond the barriers of race, creed or colour, accord your citizens access to resources, and respect all basic freedoms.

### **Policy recommendations to the Civil Society organisations**

Use nonviolence to engage the state actor in a united way and always stick to nonviolent alternatives. Promote national unity as you discharge your responsibilities. Condemn all human rights violations including politically engineered amendments of the constitution of Zimbabwe. Harness the positive values of Ubuntu philosophy which unites people, and cultivate the spirit of love, tolerance, and oneness.

## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix A: Interview guide Questions: used for respondents who claimed understanding of the concept of nonviolence.**

1. Explain the meaning of violence and its development in Zimbabwe at national level since 1890 to 2013.
2. What do you understand by the term nonviolence?
3. What were the socio-economic and political challenges you experienced in this country as a result of the policies of the state actor between 1999 and 2013?
4. Identify the nonviolent campaigns which took place in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2013 to compel the state actor to address the socio-economic and political challenges you have identified.
5. How was the campaign(s) you have identified above, planned and communicated?
6. With reference to the campaign(s) identified, describe the nonviolent strategies and methods which were used in an attempt to resolve socio-economic and political challenges caused by the state actor in Zimbabwe since 1999 up to 2013.
7. Did the methods that were used during the campaign help in the attainment of set objectives? Give reasons for your answer.
8. Using one nonviolent campaign implemented by one organisation, do you think nonviolent campaigns are effective in handling the socio-economic and political challenges?
9. How did the state actor respond to the nonviolent campaigns which were carried out to compel the state actor to address the socio-economic and political challenges you faced since 1999 up to 2013?
10. From your experiences, what comments do you want to make about the planning, implementation and outcomes of nonviolent campaigns in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges caused by the policies of the state actor?
11. What methods do you think can be used by Zimbabweans to compel the state actor to resolve the socio-economic and political challenges?
12. What in your view is effective in dealing with socio-economic and political challenges between violent and nonviolent campaigns?

13. What were the direct and indirect effects of both the nonviolent campaigns and the state actor's responses between 1999 and 2013?



## Appendix B: budget for the training programme

Item Description	Quantity	Unit Price	Totals
Tent hire for five days	1	US\$140	140
Plastic chair hire for five days	45	US\$1.34	60
Transport for 40 participants	40	US\$5	200
Rice and one piece chicken	42	US\$5	210
Soft drinks	200	US\$0.50	100
Grand Total			670


## Appendix C: The Questionnaire

**Aim:** To establish understanding of the concepts of Nonviolence and violence in Zimbabwe.

1. Sex                      Male ☐                      Female ☐
2. Age                      18 years ☐                      20-30 years ☐  
                                 31-45 ☐                      46-60 years ☐  
                                 60 years + ☐
3. Marital Status:  
                                 Married ☐                      Divorced ☐  
                                 Single ☐                      Widowed ☐  
                                 Others (please specify).....
4. Highest Educational qualifications  
                                 Grade 7 ☐                      ZJC ☐  
                                 'O' Level ☐                      'A' Level ☐  
                                 Tertiary (specify).....
5. For how long have you been living in Zimbabwe?  
0-5 years ☐

- 6-10 years ☐
- 11-15 years ☐
- 15 years+ ☐
6. Have you heard about the term nonviolence?  
Yes ☐ No ☐
7. If the answer to 6 above is yes. Give the meaning of nonviolence.  
.....
8. Have you heard about the term violence?  
Yes ☐ No ☐
9. If the answer to 8 above is yes. Give the meaning of violence.
10. Can you think of an example where nonviolent efforts were made to bring about change in Zimbabwe?  
.....
- a) How effective do you think they were?  
.....
- b) Do you think a more violent approach would have been more effective? Explain your answer?  
.....
- c) Do you think nonviolent efforts have brought about any positive changes in Zimbabwe? Please explain your answer.  
.....
- d) Do you think violent efforts would have been more effective? Please explain your answer.  
.....
- e) What were the effects of nonviolence on the intended target?  
.....
- f) How did violence affect the intended target?  
.....
- g) What suggestions would you make to ensure that nonviolence is successful in capturing its objectives?  
...
- h) What do you think can be the most useful concept (violence or nonviolence) in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict?  
.....
11. In your opinion, what do you think can be done to enhance the use of nonviolence in resolving socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe?  
.....

## Appendix D: Durban University of Technology Researcher's Letter of Introduction




20 May 2015

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I write as the PhD supervisor of Medial Have, whose thesis title is *Nonviolent campaigns in Zimbabwe, 1999-2013: strategies, methods and effectiveness*.

I would be very grateful for any assistance you can provide him.

By all means get back to me with any questions [geoffreyh@dut.ac.za](mailto:geoffreyh@dut.ac.za)

  
Geoff Harris

Professor & Head

Peacebuilding Programme

**PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME**  
DURBAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

## Appendix E: Topics covered during the five day nonviolence training

- **History of violence in Zimbabwe 1890 to the present**
- **Introduction to nonviolence:** definitions, how nonviolence works, types of nonviolence i.e. principled and pragmatic
- **Nonviolence theorists:** Historical development, leadership and roles of Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Gene Sharp.
- **Nonviolent campaigns and myths:** principles and guidelines of nonviolent action, planning nonviolent action, components of a campaign, what nonviolence can and cannot do i.e. case studies of successes and failures of nonviolence.
- **Nonviolent campaign strategies and methods:** *Strategies*; 1. protest and persuasion, 2. non-cooperation and 3. Intervention, nonviolence methods under the three broad categories.
- **Theory and realities of nonviolent campaigns**
- **Application of nonviolent campaigns:** challenges and continuities

## **Appendix F: Consent Form**

### **Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:**

I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, \_\_\_\_\_ (name of researcher), about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: \_\_\_\_\_,

I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.

I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.

In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.

I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.

I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.

I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Full Name of Participant**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Signature**

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (name of researcher) herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Full Name of Researcher**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Signature**

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